National SeriesLecture 3

The Web of Prevention

Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK

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Outline

1. The new reality: What should be done?2. Exercise 13. The Web of Prevention4. Exercise 25. References

• ‘No single focal point’ of threats– Many potential actors, materials and information can be related to

dual-use issues, existing at international, regional, national, local and individual levels

Unpredictable future of the life sciences

Reviewing the threats (Lecture 2)

Manmade threats: warfare, crime and terrorism

Safety/accidental risks at laboratories

Natural outbreaks of infectious disease

What should be done?

The aim of bisecurity measures• To “persuade those contemplating the misuse of modern biology for

hostile purposes that the effort and costs are just not worth it … at many different levels.”

(Dando 2006)

The new reality = action is required at ALL levels• “Individual, sub-national, national, regional, like minded, and

international, public, private, government and intergovernmental levels”.(Littlewood 2005)

The Web of Prevention (WoP)

• A multifaceted construct of national and international efforts to mitigate and respond to the potential for the destructive use of the life sciences, accidental risks and natural threats of disease, has been broadly conceptualised as a Web of Prevention (WoP).

(Pearson 1993, International Committee of the Red Cross 2003; British Medical Association 1999, 2004; Feaks et al. 2007)

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Exercise 1

The WoP: what should be done?

• Discuss what kind of international and national measures should/could be developed as part of the WoP (10 min)

• Specify security measures to mitigate risks from public health and terrorist threats, and from the unpredictable future of the life sciences.

• Report to the class.

To address risks of natural outbreaks of infectious disease:• Public health preparedness and response planning

To address safety/accidental risks:• Laboratory regulations to safely manage dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an

accidental release into the environment and unauthorized access; also to consider preventing the release of methodological information and outcomes to unauthorised people

To address manmade threats:• Strong international arms control agreements with effective national implementation • Internationally coordinated export controls• Intelligence• Biodefence

To address the unpredictable future of the life sciences:• Oversight: Review of security-sensitive science and technology developments• Promotion of the responsible conduct of research through education

Possible components of a WoP

Web of prevention

Public health measures

Laboratory measures

International prohibition

regime

Export control

Intelligence

Biodefence

Oversight and review of Sci-Tech

Responsible conductNatural

threats

Safety risks

Governance of science

Manmade threats

Disease Detection & Prevention

Need for global capacity building in: • Diagnostic capacity for relevant diseases

• Tools for sampling, epidemiological intelligence and investigation

• Diagnostic and detection techniques, tools and equipment

• Adequate technical expertise

• International, regional and national laboratory networks

• Relevant standards, standard operating procedures and best practices

• Cooperation on the research and development of vaccines and diagnostic reagents, and between international reference laboratories and research institutions.

(United Nations 2010)

International policy• International Health Regulations (WHO 2005)

• Public health response and preparedness for natural outbreaks share characteristics with biodefence against terrorism, while the latter also requires specific measures to counter attacks with weapons (see Franz 2011)

• “Being better prepared to deal with terrorism can mean better public health systems overall.” (Remarks by Kofi Annan 2006)

Public health/biodefence nexus

Biodefence Public healthTerrorism, Crime & warfare

Natural outbreaks

Health security

World Health

Organization

(Humans)

World Organization

for Animal Health

(Animals)

Food and Agriculture

Organization(Plants)

Arms control

BTWC

Australia Group

UN Security Council

Resolution 1540

Public health/arms control nexus

“Since there is no single technology or process that could be applied to prevent or deter [biological weapons] … international instruments for nonproliferation … and public health are critical factors in achieving global health security.”

(Bakanidze, Imnadze and Perkins 2010)

Laboratory measures

WHO Biosafety Guidelines (2004)

• Laboratory biosafety “is the term used to describe the containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release”.

• Laboratory biosecurity “refers to institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogens and toxins”.

“Effective biosafety practices are the very foundation of laboratory biosecurity activities.”

Laboratory measures

No “one size fits all”• The Guidelines state that biosafety levels, practices and equipment

“relate[s] but do[es] not ‘equate’ risk groups* to the biosafety level of laboratories designed to work with organisms in each risk group

(*For “risk groups”, see the note section of this slide)

• “National standards should be developed to recognize and address the ongoing responsibility of countries and institutions to protect specimens, pathogens and toxins from misuse”

Laboratory measures

• WHO Biosafety Guidelines but no international standards– Difficult to develop a national standard or guidelines– Is physical protection enough to ensure safety? (are there other social elements

relevant to the issue?)

Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard (CWA-15793:2008)

– “The CWA 15793:2008 is the first internationally recognised management standard to specifically address hazards associated with microbiological laboratories at all containment levels.”

– “The standard “also provides a structured approach to managing risk associated with people, facilities and working procedures in laboratory environments.”

(Huntly 2011)

International prohibition regimes

• Geneva Protocol of 1925 – Bans the use of bacteriological weapons

• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972/1975– Adds further bans e.g. on development of BW of all kinds

• The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1995– Also covers toxins

• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004– Requires all UN member states to ban nuclear, chemical and

biological weapons by non-state actors

International prohibition regimes

• Article I of the BTWC

– “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain:

• 1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;”

Export Controls

• Aim: ensuring that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons

• Targets: agents, equipment and expertise– (e.g. control lists)

• Challenges: controlling the intangibles – (e.g. scientific findings, DNA sequences for certain

pathogens, methods of weaponization)

Export Controls

Security and development dilemmas

• Article III of the BTWC: prohibits the transfer of any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of this Convention.

• Article X of the BTWC: allows the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes….

Strengthening non-proliferation regimes while not hampering economic and technological development is a critical agenda for both dual-use technology and for security

Effective Intelligence

• Effective intelligence: – essential for founding good policy and ensuring the effective

understanding of emerging challenges

• Failures in intelligence: – “Intelligence failures are nothing new and will certainly occur

again in the future” (Dando 2006)(e.g. Allied overestimation of German biological weapons capabilities in the World War period; recent Iraq “WMD”; and former Soviet BW programmes in reaction to the US biodefence programme) (Bansak 2011)

Accurate information analysis is not straightforward, but is essential for good policy decisions

Biodefence

Snapshot of biodefence: broader than medical counter measures

Biodefence Activities Equipment and Facilities Detection and surveillance Sample collection of biological

agents Information gathering and

analysis Decontamination Determination of the medical

treatment priority of infected victims and their transportation

Counter BW programmes

Portable sample collection devices

Infectious disease designated medical facilities

Micro-organism identification facility

Advanced outdoor testing facility

Reconnaissance vehicle Biological agent warning

equipment

Biodefence

Closely intertwined offensive and defensive capabilities

• “A defensive programme not supported by an offensive programme can be worthless. You cannot know how to defend against something unless you can visualise various methods which can be used against you.”

(General Creasy, 1958)

• The order [in the US] tended to be, first, weapon development, then development of safety measures for troops using the weapons, and, last, development of protective countermeasures against enemy biological weapons.

(SIPRI Vol.2)

• Transparency is a key against arms race/proliferation

(Wright and Ketcham 1990)

Oversight of Research

• Oversight of dual use research (i.e. research which serves, or could serve, both a benign and a malign purpose)

• Crucial in minimising the possibility of the assimilation of biological and toxin weapons into states’ military arsenals

• Often difficult to tell where to draw the line between prohibited and permitted research

• Crucial in avoiding the possibility of unnecessary restrictions to scientific freedom

(Miller and Selgelid 2007, Smith et. al 2010)

Dual-use dilemma

Oversight of Research

Statement on the consideration of biodefence and biosecurity (2003)Signed by editors of various prestigious scientific journals, including Nature, Science and some 30 other journals.

“We recognize that on occasions an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits.”

.....the paper should be modified, or not be published.

However, “Journals and scientific societies can play an important role in encouraging investigators to communicate results of research in ways that maximize public benefits and minimize risks of misuse.”

.....seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc.

Exercise 2

Role of scientists in the WoP?

• Discuss the role of scientists in the effort to enhance the elements of the WoP (10 min). Who should be responsible for identifying and monitoring possible “research areas of concern”(scientists, institutions, professional bodies, or government) ?

• How should the balance between security and the freedom of science be struck?

• Report to the class.

Reviews of Science and Technology

Reviewing of Science and Technology (S&T) is key to security

• “The formulation of national security policy is partly informed by states in regional and international security arrangements.

• S&T developments in the life sciences will continue to be considered in the chemical and biological weapon (CBW) arms control framework.”

(Hart and Trapp 2011)

S&T Development

National Security Arms Control

BTWC Article XII – “...a conference of States Parties…shall be held at Geneva,

Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention…

– “…Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.”

Reviews of Science and Technology

(McLeish and Revill 2011)

“There is overwhelming acceptance that advances in S&T have implications for a number of articles of the B[T]WC.”

A pre-requisite for life scientists as they engage with the WoP

• Needed to effectively review S&T under the BTWC and to strengthen biosecurity measures requires the engagement of practicing scientists

• Needed to prevent unnecessary restrictions to scientific freedom,

• Education of, and capacity building among, scientists on biosecurity issues is necessary for successful security

• Uninformed scientists = no effective science policy inputs to the WoP

Engagement of informed life scientists about biosecurity issues is key to successful security

Education

Accumulation of international calls for education

• Inter-Academy Panel Statement on Biosecurity 2005

• WHO Working Group Reports 2005, 2007

• OECD Best Practice Guidelines 2007

• US National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats 2009

• BTWC Final Report of MSP 2005, 2008, 2011

Education

Education

2011 BTWC Final Document of the 7th Review Conference – Education will be featured in future: • As an annual discussion point under the Standing Agenda Item on review of science and technological development (the governance of science and technology under the BTWC)

• As a capacity building method for strengthening the implementation of the prohibition aspect of the BTWC (security purposes)

• As a capacity building method for developing international cooperation in science and technology (development purposes) Education = A prerequisite for security, education and governance under the BTWC

Lack of biosecurity education programmes at the level of higher education= an urgent need for international efforts

Region/Country

Year Sampled Courses Principal Results

Europe 2008

142 courses in 29 countries

Only 3 out of the universities surveyed in Europe offered some form of specific biosecurity module

Japan 2009

197 courses in 62 universities

Implementation of ethics education for scientists rarely included dual-use issues

Israel 2009

35 courses in 7 universities

A biosecurity act exists; along with a report on bioterrorism by its national academy and security council; but no education courses

Asia-Pacific

2010

197 courses in 58 universities

Few biosecurity education courses, but nascent and growing interest in regional cooperation to promote education

Education

Nationalizing the WoP?

• How can the WoP be implemented nationally?

• Different countries have different socio-economic

contexts, therefore, no “one size fits all”

approach will work

List of References

• The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.