The Influence Of Modernization & Globalization On Quebec Nationalism

By

Todd Julie

For

Professor Sanjay Jeram

POL438

June 23, 2012

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Q: How have the successive developments, modernization and globalization, informed Francophone nationalism in the post-WWII period?

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I argue that modernization and later globalization built up and broke down successive

institutions that encouraged the transformation of elite Francophone classes, who then

proceeded to further shape and be shaped by those same institutions. More specifically, I

will argue that modernization and globalization paradigms: 1) shaped the elite

Francophone class, who moved, generally speaking, from religion to politics to business

as they moved from one paradigm to the next. 2) Shaped the societal institutions (both

Québécois and Canadian) that shaped this elite. The leapfrog dynamic between

institutional and political forces best allows us to understand the larger transformation of

Quebec nationalism. In historical view: Modernization first creates an educated elite,

within existing Catholic educational institutions, then prompts them to craft new secular

institutions (the welfare state), partner with others (labour unions) and create a modern

Québécois identity in order to fight against traditional barriers to their advancement.

These “Quiet Revolution” political institutions create new elites who, encountering the

limitations of modernization, craft new economic institutions in step with globalization,

breaking their bonds even further.

In order to speak about modernization, globalization or elites, we must first define our

terms. For our purposes we understand Modernization as a state-centric mode and theory

of development that harnesses social, political and economic forces to this singular foci.

In the post-WWII period this has meant the development by each state of its own

industrial base, Keynesian economics and the welfare state. Unlike modernization,

globalization is an internationally focused mode and theory of development that tends to

place limitations on state governments to ensure common and open terms of trade

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between countries. This has generally entailed the de-industrialization of rich countries

and the curtailment of the previous welfare state. In practice, both processes have been at

work throughout the post-war period. They have been separated here for the sake of

clarity. A case can be made for doing so because while they overlap in practice, they

have been somewhat more separate as successively dominant theoretical paradigms for

elite action. Our definition of elites is kept necessarily broad, in order to draw out larger,

generalized transformations of Quebec nationalism. By elites, we mean only those in the

educated classes prominent enough to influence the direction of Quebec nationalism.

Modernization created both a new middle class of industrial workers and a new

professional class in Quebec1. McRoberts explains, "the conversion of Quebec

nationalism to the goals of modernity was due to a multitude of changes in French

Quebec society . . . Urbanization, industrialization, the emergence of mass media, and in

particular, the rise of new social classes"2. Industrialization took place early in the

twentieth century in Quebec and the eventual institutional modernization of the Quiet

Revolution owes itself to this material change in the forces of production. While these

new classes had been raised and educated within the old traditional structures of the

church, the church alone could not provide modern employment opportunities for such

vast numbers of educated professionals. It also lost control of the labour movement as

the unions grew and moved their discourse to the secularized left3. Both these modern

classes, workers and elites, could see a common enemy in the Anglophone business

1 Erk, J., “Is Nationalism Left Or Right: Critical Junctures In Quebec Nationalism” in Nations And Nationalism, 16 (3), 2010: 4322 McRoberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997) 323 Erk, Is Nationalism Left or Right, 432

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community. The province’s wealthy Anglophone minority exclusively occupied the top

positions in Quebec’s big businesses.

Elite political influence and events played a crucial a role in the timing of the transition

from traditionalist to modern Quebec nationalism. French-Canadian nationalism has its

roots in traditional, ethno-cultural institutions. From the Quebec Act of 1775 (and

before) up until the Quiet Revolution, the pillars of Francophone identity were the Roman

Catholic Church, the Civil Code, the Seigniorial system of land holding and the French

language. However, all that time a more modern liberal conception of the nation existed

and tried repeatedly to take power. The Constitution Act of 1791 gave representative

assemblies to both Upper and Lower Canada and led to struggles for control of the house

between Anglo leaders and an emerging Francophone Petit Bourgeoisie in league with

the majority agrarian population of Lower Canada4. McRoberts describes how these

struggles eventually led to a nationalist movement and in 1837, armed insurrection. The

defeat of this rebellion led to the merging of the Canadas and a surprising cooperation

between French and English Canadians5. Throughout confederation Quebec struggled

with the rest of Canada over the meaning of Canadian federalism. In the twentieth

century the long hold on power of Premiere Maurice Duplessis's conservative Union

Nationale (1936-1959, with a brief liberal interval during WWII) with its base in

traditionalist rural Quebec, meant that the Quiet Revolution took place later than it

otherwise might have. Duplessis rode to power on a platform of "faith, language, race"6 -

a perfect example of pre-modern nationalism. However, new forces were emerging in

4 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 55 Ibid., 6-96 Erk, Is Nationalism Left or Right, 432

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Quebec. The political alliance between the Francophone elite and the growing labour

movement finally secured a new conception of nationalism, based on modernization in

Quebec7.

Modernization recommended a particular kind of nationalism and elites would seek to

mold their movement in this image. The earlier Duplessis government, while nationalist

in a certain sense, was not ideologically animated by modernization theory and so, while

it guarded its own political rights, it did not seek to intervene in the social or economic

life of the province8. In 1960, with the election of the Quebec liberal party of Jean

Lesage, the new Francophone elite were in and they quickly began taking control of the

social, economic an political life of the province9. Lesage articulated this new conception

of the role of government perfectly. French Canadians, he said, "feel that in Quebec

there is a government that is able to play an irreplaceable role in the development of their

collective identity, their way of living, their civilization, their values"10. Francophone

nationalism now gave way to Québécois nationalism, a territorially-based concept that

reflected the transfer of the reigns of the nationalist movement from a porous culturally-

based movement that might exist beyond Quebec in other French speaking parts of

Canada, to a political one bound by Quebec provincial jurisdiction. Industrial

modernization, both in fact and as a commitment of the new elites, also required the

continued influx of new immigrants to work in factories. Therefore Quebec nationalism

could no longer be based on ethnicity and became based primarily on language, which

7 Ibid., 4328 Ibid., 4329 Beland, D. & Lecours, A., “The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism And Social Policy Reform In Canada, The United Kingdom and Belgium” in Comparative Political Studies, Vol.38 No.6, 2005: 68510 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 34

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any new immigrant could learn. This meant the province would place extreme

importance on control of language laws. New immigrants had to be compelled to learn

French or the nationalist project would be undermined. As Kenneth McRoberts says,

"The central place of the Quebec government in the project of a modern francophone

society gave a greatly expanded meaning to the claim that Quebec was not 'a province

like the others"11. Lesage began calling the province L'Etat du Quebec12 and elite

nationalists would soon begin to push for some sort of constitutional protection of their

political gains13.

The nationalist government began to intervene in the Quebec economy, gearing it

towards the nationalist project. Hydro-Quebec was created in 1962 by nationalizing a

number of private electricity companies14. The government began to funnel public funds

into institutions like the “Caisse de Depot et de placement”, which invested money from

“Quebec pension funds, retirement insurance plans and various other public agencies”15

and “la societe generale de financement” to invest heavily in Francophone businesses16.

More than this, these agencies were tasked with modernizing Quebec’s industrial

structures17. Pierre Arbour describes how state intervention accelerated during the first

11 Ibid., 3412 Ibid,, 3413 Ibid., 34-3514 Arbour, P., Quebec Inc. And The Temptation Of State Capitalism (Montreal: Robert Davies Publishing, 1993) 2115 Ibid., 2016 Drover, G. & Leung, K.K., “Nationalism And Trade Liberalization In Quebec & Taiwan” in Pacific Affairs (Vol.74 No.2, 2001: 21517 Arbour, Quebec Inc., 21

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term in office of the Parti Québécois 18. The imbalance in pay that had existed between

Anglophones and Francophones within the province was overcome19

Modernization ensured the social democratic character of Québécois nationalism. In

taking over the political, social, economic life in Quebec from more traditional

conservative elements the modernizing liberal elite also tied its new brand of Quebec

nationalism to socially progressive policies20. Denis & Denis have found the rise of

nationalism and labour unions in Quebec to be intimately intertwined21 and the labour

union was itself an institutional product of modernization. Their power is based on mass

production, mass consumption, collective bargaining, Keynesian demand management

and the welfare state22. Cooperation was crucial for Quebec politicians in making their

initial claim to represent the interests of the entire Québécois nation. In 1964 the Quebec

government’s new Labour Code was the envy of workers throughout the rest of Canada23.

In the middle 70's, Quebec unions helped to create the Parti Québécois 24. Denis & Denis

explain, "government initially sought formulas that would enlist the aid of the labour

movement in their national economic efforts, offering in exchange to maintain the goal of

full employment"25. During the Quiet Revolution Francophone elite power was based on

democratically elected governments with the support of labour. However, they were not

18 Ibid,, 2719 Hamilton, P., “Converging Nationalisms” in nationalism In Ethnic Politics, 10 (2004): 66820 Beland & Lecours, The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity, 68521 Denis, S. & Denis, R., “Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec” in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995: 22222 Ibid., 21923 Ibid., 22024 Ibid., 21825 Ibid., 221

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yet firmly entrenched in business. Had they secured top positions in business before

government, one wonders whether the result would still have been a social democratic

nationalist movement.

Modernization also created a much stronger conflict between French and English Canada

in two important ways. Firstly, as McRoberts explains, "the older French-Canadian

nationalism had been largely focused on private, church-based institutions. Thus the

nation could be advanced in ways that did not impinge at all on the Canadian political

order"26. The commitment of both groups of elites to modernization theories of

development, meant that both pursued modern state building projects along the same

political, social and economic lines simultaneously27. Of course, each had in mind a

different state that reflected their own power base. Secondly, each side thought of the

issue in a slightly different context. The Canadian state defined itself in opposition to

increasing post-war American encroachment28. Since Quebec and Canada both defined

themselves in opposition to possible assimilation into a larger whole, both felt unity was

required at lower levels in the face of the larger threat. As a result, Quebec and the

federal government did not negotiate the question of Quebec nationalism with exclusive

reference to one another but also in reference to their own specific concerns.

Politicians at both the nationalist and federal level also brought their own specific

understandings of modernization and nationalism to the table. The Pearson government

had flirted with a more asymmetrical, dualist approach to Quebec's demands. It enacted a

26 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 3827 Ibid., 3828 Ibid., 37

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"contracting out formula" that allowed the Quebec government to take control of a series

of social program policies that were the preserve of the federal government elsewhere in

the country29. Intellectuals in Quebec and English Canada pushed the idea of an English-

Canadian nationalism that would have then allowed for cooperation with French-

Canadian nationalism in a dualistic state30. However, these pleas were rejected with the

election of Pierre Trudeau. Prime Minister Trudeau continuously equated Quebec

nationalism with its traditional, ethnicity-based roots and would not credit any notion of

modern, liberally based nationalism. For him modernization was based on individualism

and was explicitly non-national31. Trudeau sought to re-orient Francophone loyalties

toward the Canadian state and away from the province of Quebec. His language

legislation, establishing bilingualism within the federal government and across the

country was emblematic of this32. Trudeau’s limited conception of the role he would

allow the Quebec government would lead to nationalist elite conversion to the goal of

secession33.

Not only did Modernization encourage different reference points for each party, it also

framed the competition in a particular way. As long as the competition was political, the

existing Canadian state possessed the obvious advantage of being an actual state. Within

the Modernization framework, there was no greater authority. Quebec politicians could

make league with the labour movement and ordinary French Canadians but there was no

29 Ibid., 4230 Ibid., 5431 Ibid., 5932 Ibid., 65, 7933 McRoberts, K., “Internal Colonialism: The Case Of Quebec” in Ethnic And Racial Studies, Vol.2, No.3, 1979: 313

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higher institution above the state they could appeal to. The federal government thus

controlled the game. During the 1980 referendum the feds threatened hard financial

bargaining and potential financial ruin in the case of Quebec secession34. They could also

reach down to disrupt Quebec unity. Trudeau's multiculturalism policy was certainly

viewed in this light. Granting minority group rights threatened to turn Quebec

nationalism into just one of many minority group concerns in Canada35. This problem

would plague Quebec nationalists who wanted secession from Canada. After defeat in

the 1995 secessionist referendum, Jacques Parizeau stated the referendum had failed due

to “money and the ethnic vote”36. Despite the offensive way Parizeau framed his

statement it was largely true. The vote had been extremely close and the immigrant vote

had decided the issue37. The Prime Minister could also play provinces against one

another. During the 1982 constitutional debate, Trudeau was able to detach the Quebec

premiere Rene Levesque from a provincial premier’s coalition and get an agreement

signed without Quebec’s ratification38. With this act, Trudeau locked in his specific

understanding of modernization with the protection of individual rights over group rights.

Globalization gave a wholly different cast to the nationalist struggle of elites by offering

the appeal to the higher institutions that had been lacking under the modernization

paradigm. While the Quiet revolution had been conceived of along modernization theory

lines, it had been frustrated in its more state-centric, constitutional aims. The FTA,

34 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 15735 Kymlicka, W., “Citizenship, Communities And Identity In Canada” in Bickerton, J. & Gagnon, A.G. (ed.) Canadian Politics, Toronto: University Of Toronto Press Inc., 2009: 2636 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 23237 Ibid., 23038 Ibid., 165

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NAFTA and the WTO seemed to limit the federal government’s powers of intervention

and offer financial security to Quebec in the case of a successful sovereignty referendum.

The Belanger-Campeau report (a 1991 report by the Quebec National Assembly on the

politics and constitutional future of Quebec39) even thought the FTA might increase the

chances for sovereignty40. Further, provincial subsidies used to create "Quebec Inc.",

were not immediately challenged by the FTA. Drover and Leung relate how “regulations

on tariffs, subsidies and countervail applied initially only to the federal government”41.

However elites understood that eventually the Quebec government would be restrained to

some extent, along with the federal government. It began to “give greater weight to

private companies” and “placed increasing reliance on cooperative funds rather than

direct state support”42. Another transfer of power now occurred, from the Quiet

revolution era political elite, to the new business elite of Quebec Inc.

Globalization offered a new way towards sovereignty that harmonized with the

ascendancy of newly emergent Francophone business leaders in Quebec. During the first

years of the Quiet revolution most elites took jobs within the provincial state and public

sector43. In the late 1960's, government jobs had begun to dry up, leading to calls to make

French the language of business in Quebec44. In the late 1970's the Francophone business

class, created by the 1974 Bill 22 language legislation, came to maturity. Though both

groups, political and business, continued to mutually support one another, the new

39 LaForest, G., Trudeau And The End Of The Canadian Dream (Trans., Browne, P.L. & Weinroth, M.) (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995) 15140 Drover & Leung, Taiwan & Quebec, 21441 Ibid., 21642 Ibid., 21643 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 9944 Ibid., 99-100

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business branch of the elite began to outgrow their provincial boundaries and look for a

way to expand into foreign markets. Writing in 1995, Andre Turcotte asserted "the

support of a large portion of Quebec's political and business classes for continental

integration is a reflection of their views on the new maturity of the Francophone

segments within those classes and the need for structural changes that would allow those

groups to reach their objectives"45.

Calls for privatization of state (Quebec)-owned businesses began to be heard, as earlier

American perceptions of public subsidization of Quebec companies became a barrier to

further export growth. Globalization produced in elites a re-focusing away from the

welfare state, towards an almost exclusive focus on economics. A year after the FTA was

signed, a business roundtable chaired by Thomas Courchene provided a perfect

understanding of the difference between the economic model pursued under

Globalization and its essential difference in regards to the earlier modernization program.

"Most economics-based competition models”, it was said, are “not trying to artificially

define markets, they're looking at natural markets and making decisions on that basis"46.

“Artificially” defining national markets had been the aim of government under

modernization. Under globalization, the state-centric focus of Quebec and federal elites

would weaken significantly. This would urge a break with the elite’s former coalition

partners, the labour unions.

45 Turcotte, A., “Uneasy Allies: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans and NAFTA” in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995: 24246 Courchene, T.(Ed.), Quebec Inc.: Foreign takeovers, Competition/Merger Policy & Universal Banking, Kingston: Queens University Press, 1989: 35

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Whereas state-centric Modernization theory had encouraged a broad based nationalist

movement, with strong cooperation between elites and the labour unions, globalization

would largely remove elite interest in union support. The Close identification of the

nationalist Quebec government with globalization, represented by the Free Trade

Agreements, would now lead it to abandon the labour unions, who had been important

partners during the Quiet Revolution47. The Parti Québécois who had been created with

the support of the unions now turned their back on their socially progressive policies to

focus more exclusively on the economy. This re-orientation led not only to the

temporary loss of union support but also to a series of resignations within the party

itself48. Interestingly labour would return to “critical support”49 of the PQ, only insofar as

they returned to an officially sovereigntist position50. Increasingly the unions, who had

been so instrumental in the Quiet Revolution would find neither elite party, the PQ or

Quebec liberals had any interest in negotiating for their support51. Along with labour

unions, a significant portion of the Quebec electorate did not support the FTA and an

even larger share of the electorate didn't support NAFTA52. Hamilton asserts the Quebec

“public” is generally supportive of free trade53. But his statistics, while showing a higher

level of support than in the rest of Canada, indicate an evenly divided public at best54 and

he admits in his footnotes that removing elite opinion from this statistical free trade

47 Denis & Denis, Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec, 21848 Ibid., 21849 Denis & Denis, Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec, 21850 Ibid., 21851 Ibid., 235 The authors write that neither the PQ of the Parti liberale now “agrees to bargain for the unions support in return for signifigant concessions”52 Turcotte, Uneasy Allies, 25153 Hamilton, Converging Nationalisms, 66654 Ibid., 667

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support leaves one with opposition levels similar to those in the rest of the country55.

This difference of opinion represents a fracturing of the social contract within Quebec.

nationalism.

At this point it is necessary to offer one important aside to our general line of argument.

While globalization has created tension between the Québécois elite and the public on

whom they initially based their authority, the earlier, strong identification of Quebec

nationalism with social democracy and the welfare state, has made these institutions

harder to dislodge. An example of this is Laczko’s finding that social democratic

institutions are more popular in Quebec than elsewhere in North America. Even as the

PQ government cut healthcare services in the 1990’s they attempted to portray these cuts

as “more gentle and caring than those carried out in neighboring Ontario or Alberta”56.

Popular support for programs associated with the Quiet revolution may put them in a

slightly more defendable position. Nonetheless, the downward trend in labour’s position

is unmistakable.

Quebec Politicians had begun re-structuring nationalism around the new Globalization

paradigm even before the signing of the FTA. The election of the Parti Québécois led to

a mass exodus of Anglo-businesses from Quebec and this had an arguably positive effect

for elite Quebec nationalism. It concentrated Quebec politicians on reinforcing

Francophone ownership of Quebec businesses. To this end, Quebec became a leader in

55 Ibid., 683 “20. It is among the nationalist elite that one finds greatest support for continentalism. One study indicates that mass level data show similar levels of public opposition to free trade in Quebec as found in the rest of Canada”56 Laczko, L., “Nationalism And Welfare State Attitudes” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies, 18. 2, 2005

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financial de-regulation in order to create huge concentrations of financial capital that

could then invest heavily in Francophone businesses. Many important Quebec

companies became essentially "take over proof"57 because they were largely owned by

these mammoth-sized Francophone financial interests. The financial elite took over from

government the task of meeting regularly to decide industrial policy for the province58.

Interestingly enough, after the unsuccessful 1995 referendum (and a year after the signing

of the North American Free Trade Agreement), Lucien Bouchard proclaimed that

Quebecers were tired of referendums and wanted the province to focus on getting its

finances in order59. This sentiment was not shared by the unions (mentioned earlier) who

maintained support for the Parti Québécois only to the extent that they officially

continued to support sovereignty for Quebec, as well as “citizens groups and other social

forces . . . The PQ’s referendum success had been partly based on strong appeals to this

clientele”60. But for the nationalist elite, Globalization, initially justified in aid of

sovereignty, had made sovereignty less important.

In fact, interest in sovereignty had declined on both sides of the Anglo-French divide

among the business classes. In his article Semantics and Sovereignty, Michael Keating

documents the shifting loyalties of elites across this divide:

The issues of free trade and market integration are also tied up with class and sectoral issues and do not just hinge on the nationalist question. . . . There is no one position shared by political leaders and public opinion, but there does appear to be an electoral market for the new, emerging post-sovereigntist

57 Courchene, Quebec Inc., 1158 Ibid., 4559 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 232-23360 Ibid., 232

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discourse, which has the potential to bridge the gap between nationalist and non-nationalist forces in both cases61

In this statement and in other places throughout Keating’s article, we see that Free Trade

did not have the support of the working class section of the Parti Québécois any more

than the agreement had the support of unions in English Canada62. Here Quebec elites

were in agreement with business elites in English Canada (and America), over and above

the wishes of their lower income nationalist supporters. The switch in the federal

government, from Liberals to Conservatives, re-oriented government policy towards

Quebec63. With the election of business candidate Brian Mulroney, the federal will

towards building a unitary state in Canada had evaporated. Participating in a Canadian

government-business roundtable, Torrance J. Wylie commented in 1989, "The 'spirit' of

Meech Lake . . . Changes the political environment in Canada and puts the provinces in a

very important position vis-a-vis constitutional development, and social and economic

policy"64. The Meech Lake accords had been seen by Quebec elites as a way to lock in

the successful de-regulatory reforms mentioned above. When that failed, free trade

became another way of doing so65. The neutral Netherlands’ Journal Of Business Ethics

amusingly characterized support for the later NAFTA agreement in Quebec as “a case of

a joint government-business coalition against popular desires”66.

61 Keating, M., “Semantics And Sovereignty or, Is There A Coherent post-Sovereignty Stance? Evidence From Quebec And Scotland” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies, 18. 2, 2005: 26662 Ibid., 264-26563 Courchene, Quebec Under Free Trade, 2764 Ibid., 2765 Hamilton, Converging Nationalisms, 667-66866 Pasquero, J., “Business Ethics In National Identity In Quebec: Distinctiveness & Directions” in Journal Of Business Ethics, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, No.16, 1997: 631

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As we have seen Modernization and Globalization favoured very different institutions.

Elite Quebec nationalism used these institutions for its own ends. Paradoxically

however, its ends and its identity were altered in turn by these different paradigms.

Modernization, entailing the coordination of social, political and economic policy pushed

elites towards the goal of an independent Quebec nation-state. In pursuing this end they

would partner themselves with ordinary Québécois in the labour movement and build a

large welfare state. Having achieved so much and yet failed in their quest for

sovereignty, they would try a different tact in turning to Globalization. This new

paradigm would alter the basis of their power and lead them to forsake their old

institutional partnership with the unions for free trade agreements that promised to limit

federal government intervention and increase their new business power. This cynical

reading of elite Quebec nationalism is perhaps balanced somewhat by the fact that labour

and the welfare states identification, in the early modernization period, has at least made

these institutions stronger in Quebec than in Anglophone North America, though their

relative decline under globalization is the same in Quebec as elsewhere. In examining

the interrelation between these phenomenon; elitism, nationalism, modernization and

Globalization, we gain a deeper understanding of the true nature of each. For that reason,

exploration of this topic should be of interest to Anglophones, Francophones and anyone

else interested in real progressive reforms.

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Bibliography:

Arbour, P., Quebec Inc. And The Temptation Of State Capitalism, Montreal: Robert Davies Publishing, 1993

Beland,D. & Lecours, A., The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism & Social Policy Reform In Canada, The United Kingdom & Belgium in Comparative Plitical Studies Vol. 38 No.6

Courchene, T.(Ed.), Quebec Inc.: Foreign takeovers, Competition/Merger Policy & Universal Banking, Kingston: Queens University Press, 1989

Denis, S. & Denis, R., “Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec” in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995

Drover, G. & Leung, K.K., “Nationalism And Trade Liberalization In Quebec & Taiwan” in Pacific Affairs (Vol.74 No.2, 2001

Erk, J., “Is Nationalism Left Or Right: Critical Junctures In Quebec Nationalism” in Nations And Nationalism, 16 (3), 2010

Keating,M., “Semantics And Sovereignty or, Is There A Coherent post-Sovereignty Stance? Evidence From Quebec And Scotland” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies

LaForest, G., Trudeau And The End Of The Canadian Dream (Trans., Browne, P.L. & Weinroth, M.), Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995

McRoberts, K., “Internal Colonialism: The Case Of Quebec” in Ethnic And Racial Studies, Vol.2, No.3, 1979

McRoberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle For National Unity, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997

Pasquero, J., “Business Ethics In National Identity In Quebec: Distinctiveness & Directions” in Journal Of Business Ethics, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, No.16, 1997

Turcotte, A., “Uneasy Allies: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans and NAFTA” in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995

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