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PREVENTING THE MISUSE OF CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS IN IEDs

Meeting of Experts on CCW Amended Protocol II

8-9 April 2013

Steve BROWNSenior Technical Officer, NSPA General Services Programme

steve.brown

Presentation SummaryPresentation Summary

Introduction to NSPA

What is an IED?

Global IED Incidents 2013

NATO Strategy

Mitigating the risk

NSPA and the NATO Trust Fund

Conclusion

NSPA Points of Contact

2Steve BROWN NSPA General Services Programme8-9 April 2013

NSPA at a glance


NSPA Business

8-9 April 2013 Steve BROWN NSPA General Services Programme 44

CAN

USA

BE L

NLD DEU LVA (HQ) Capellen, LUX (NAMP) Pápa, HUN

Kosovo

TUR

AFG

(SOC) Taranto, ITA

(CEPS) Versailles, FRA

1.200 staff – 14 Permanent Locations

22 Support Partnerships

Support Conferences, Sales Agreements and Partnership Agreements, Common funded programmes

10,000 firms registered throughout NATO and Partners

2011 contractual instruments: 24,000

2011 contracted value: M€ 2,080.5

NATO Member States (individually or collectively)

Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transformation (and subordinate commands)

Partner nations

NATO Agencies

International entities (EU and UN)

Components of an IED


Containers

Explosive Charge

Power Source

Timer/Switch

Initiator

Delivery System

The many faces of the IEDThe many faces of the IED


IED Incidents – Jan & Feb 2013IED Incidents – Jan & Feb 2013


India25 Incidents – 31 x IED

Afghanistan24 Incidents – 33 x IED

Pakistan37 Incidents – 42 x IED

Iraq16 Incidents – 23 x IED

Syria10 Incidents –15 x IED

Colombia3 Incidents – 3 x IED

EIRE / N.I.3 Incidents – 3 x IED

Yemen2 Incidents – 2 x IED

Greece5 Incidents – 5 x IED

Bosnia1 Incident – 1 x IED

Nigeria3 Incidents – 5 x IED &140 x IED (recovered)

Libya2 Incidents – 2 x IED

Egypt1 Incident – 1 x IED

Somalia4 Incident – 4 x IED

Source: CimicWeb

Mali6 Incidents – 11 x IED Thailand

5 Incidents – 7 x IED

Indonesia1 Incident – 1 x IED

Kenya1 Incident – 1 x IED

Lebanon1 Incident – 2 x IED

NATO Strategy (1/2)

8-9 April 2013 88Steve BROWN NSPA General Services Programme

NATO Strategy (2/2)

PrepareThe

Force

AttackThe

Networks

DefeatThe

Device

C-IED(to Defeat the System)

Understanding and Intelligence

8-9 April 2013 99Steve BROWN NSPA General Services Programme

The Terrorist Network and the IEDThe Terrorist Network and the IED


International

Financial

Material

Foreign Support

Regional

Financial

IEDSupplier

Regional Support

BombMaker

External Influenceand Support

Cell Leader

IntelligenceLeader

OperationsOfficer

Finance Logistics

IEDOperator Recruiter

Security IEDTrainer

Surveillance Operator

Local IED Cell

Training Camp

Trainees

Local SupportReligiousInstitution

Financial

LocalHospital

Village

Cell Members

Surveillance

Secondary AttackOn First Response

Attack Video

Information &PropagandaOperations

Post-Blast

IED Detonation

Mitigating the risk of diversionMitigating the risk of diversion


Denyingthe Supply

Non-stockpiled ammunition Stockpiled ammunition

UXO / AXO Clearance

Improvements toPhysical Security

Improvements toStock Management &

Accountability

Destruction of Surplus:•Industrial•OBODCCW Protocol V Partly CCM

No global UN Convention

Stockpile destruction priorities – Countering IED/Terrorism

Ammunition Type IED/Terrorist Threat

Remarks

MANPADS Risk to civil / military aviationDetonators

Risk of use in IEDsBulk ExplosivesAnti-Tank Mines

HE-containing munitionsAnti-tank grenades and missiles Vehicle / helicopter ambush

Anti-Personnel Mines Ottawa Convention, possible use in IEDsSmall Arms Ammunition UN PoA, Criminal and terrorist use

System-based munitions (ATM, SAM) “Improvised” launchersCluster Munitions Oslo Convention

Smoke and Pyrotechnics

Steve BROWN NSPA General Services Programme 12128-9 April 2013

NSPA and the NATO Trust Fund Policy Development

September 2000

Established to assist Partner Nations meet Ottawa Convention obligations

NSPA (NAMSA) selected as primary Executing Agent

June 2001

Small Arms and Light Weapons

All conventional munitions (incl MANPADS and Cluster Munitions)

November 2002

Management of the consequences of defence reform

September 2004

Inclusion of Partner Nations as potential Lead Nations

Inclusion of Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative nations

June 2009

Policy revised to allow Contact Nations (e.g. AUS, JPN) to act as Lead Nation

Current

Policy being revised to extend the range of projects available to Partner Nations


NSPA and the NATO Trust Fund International Treaties

Anti-personnel Mine (Ottawa Convention Mar 99)

Albania, Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia & Montenegro, Tajikistan


SALW (UN Programme of Action)

Ukraine, Serbia & Montenegro, Albania, Mauritania

Ammunition Stockpile Management (UN RES 61/72)

Albania, Afghanistan, Georgia, Jordan, Mauritania, Ukraine, Tajikistan

ERW (Protocol V CCW)

Azerbaijan, Georgia, Jordan

Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention Aug 10)

Ukraine

Project Preparation Legal Agreements Project Execution

Lead Nation Agreed

Financial Management Agreement

Host Nation & NSPA MOU

Project Proposal

Implementing AgreementPMSC Informed

ContractsFeasibility Study

Verification

Reporting

Financial Management

Informal DiscussionNSPA / NATO IS / Delegations

Technical Management

Executing Agent Agreement

Sufficient Contributing

Pledges

NSPO ASB Approval

Letter of Intent

NSPA and the NATO Trust Fund The Process


NSPA and the NATO Trust Fund Achievements


Physical Security & Accountability Improvements Physical Security & Accountability Improvements


Afghanistan – New Storage Facility and Stockpile Management Training

NSPA – UXO clearanceNSPA – UXO clearance

Afghanistan

Mine and UXO clearance in support of ISAF

Albania

UXO clearance at 17 ammunition depots

Azerbaijan

UXO clearance Saloglu depot

Mine and UXO clearance Jeyranchel range

Georgia

Demining training and equipment

Mine and UXO clearance Skra depotKosovoMine and UXO clearance in support of KFOR

Turkey

UXO clearance of military ranges at Kavkaya and Sunay


APL stockpile destruction

Albania

Belarus

Moldova

Serbia

Tajikistan

Turkey

Ukraine

Cluster munition destruction

Denmark

France

Greece

Netherlands

United Kingdom

Ukraine

USA

NSPA Support toOttawa and Oslo ConventionsNSPA Support toOttawa and Oslo Conventions


Conclusion

Preventing the use of conventional ammunition in IEDs by;

Building on and supporting the NATO Strategy and Trust Fund Policy

Maximizing international technical and financial assistance to nations in the framework of international legally binding treaties

Absence of international legally binding treaty for the destruction of stockpiled ammunition – inhibits greater achievement

NATO Trust Fund


NSPA Points of ContactNSPA Points of Contact


Frederic PeugeotTrust Fund Project [email protected]

General Services ProgrammeNSPARue de la GareCapellen L-8302G.D Luxembourg

Bülent TüdesProgramme [email protected]

Scott WillasonChief Ammunition Support [email protected]

Steve BrownMine Clearance Project [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]





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