natural p the olitics disasters...politics of natural disasters 3 • some communities have...

Politics of

The

NATURAL DISASTERS

William L. Waugh Georgia State University

Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company Boston New York

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

Cen

gage

Lear

ning

Not for

Rep

rint

CONTENTS Introduction.................................................................................................... 3 Natural Hazards in the United States ............................................................. 5

Earthquakes ........................................................................................... 7

Tsunamis ................................................................................................ 9

Hurricanes ............................................................................................. 10

Tornadoes .............................................................................................. 12

Wildfire .................................................................................................. 13

Other Hazards ....................................................................................... 14 Natural Disaster Policy .................................................................................. 15 The Evolution of Emergency Management .................................................. 18 The Future of Emergency Management and Disaster Policy ........................ 22 Discussion Questions ..................................................................................... 24

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

Cen

gage

Lear

ning

Not for

Rep

rint

Politics of Natural Disasters

OVERVIEW

1. What determines the hazards that officials focus on most?

• Recent catastrophic disasters, from the 2004 “Christmas” tsunami in the Indian Ocean to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, are encouraging a focus on natural disasters in the United States.

• Federal officials have focused primarily on terrorism since the 9/11 attacks and have been inattentive to the threats of natural disasters.

• Federal resources, including funding, have primarily been directed to programs dealing with the threat of terrorism.

• Local officials tend to focus on the hazards that pose the greatest risk to their communities, but they also focus on the policies and programs that the federal government funds.

2. What hazards pose significant risk to American lives and property?

• There is a wide range of natural hazards in the United States, including earthquakes, volcanoes, wildfire, hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, floods, droughts, heat waves, landslides, snow and ice storms, and sinkholes.

• States with significant seismic hazards have strengthened building codes and land-use regulations to reduce vulnerabilities to earthquakes.

• States with significant tsunami hazards are developing warning systems and evacuation plans to reduce the risks to life and are considering restrictions on development in areas that might be flooded by tsunamis.

• The United States has had a few major tsunamis, including the 1946 Hilo and 1964 Alaskan tsunamis, but there is evidence that much larger tsunamis have struck the West Coast in the past.

• The hurricane risk along the United States coastline is increasing as more people move to the coast and the strength of storms increases.

• Hurricane losses can be reduced by moving development out of areas subject to storm surge and other flooding and by elevating structures so that flood waters can pass below them.

• It is difficult to evacuate coastal areas when hurricanes threaten, because it is not easy to predict where the storms will come ashore, and evacuees may be caught on highways or in low-lying areas if not evacuated early enough.

• Regulating land-use is extremely difficult, often politically unpopular, and frequently challenged successfully in court, unless regulations are adopted well before disaster strikes.

1

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

2 Politics of Natural Disasters

• Though the science of tornado prediction is improving, it still provides little warningof the storms.

• The public needs to understand the meanings of tornado warnings and watches.

• Community preparedness for storms can reduce the vulnerability of residents.

• The risk of wildfire is increasing as development intrudes on the Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI).

3. How has disaster policy developed in the United States?

• Seldom a concern beforehand, natural disasters become a political issue after a major disaster occurs.

• National and international disasters can draw public attention to the threat from natural hazards.

• There is a brief window of opportunity to address natural hazards after a major disaster.

• Disaster policy is problematic for the following reasons:

• There are so many hazards.

• Few are concerned about the hazards until a disaster occurs.

• There is little support for regulation.

• There is little support for planning efforts.

• The political constituency for strong policies has little influence.

• The administrative constituency for strong policies also has little influence.

• It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of policies and programs (except after a disaster).

• The American political system is fragmented vertically and horizontally.

• State and local capacities are very uneven.

• The emphasis after Hurricane Katrina is on self-reliance and a reduced federal role in disaster responses.

• Emergency management evolved from the volunteer fire brigades of colonial America and still relies heavily on volunteers.

• The first national hazard programs were for floods and civil defense.

• In the 1970s, following major natural disasters, the National Governors’ Association asked President Carter to consolidate federal disaster programs. In 1979, the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created.

• FEMA became a “dumping ground for political cronies” in the 1980s, and Congress considered dismantling the agency in 1992 after poor responses to Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki.

• FEMA was reinvented in 1993, when President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as director of the agency.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

Politics of Natural Disasters 3

• Some communities have state-of-the-art, professional emergency management programs, and some still rely on part-time volunteers without staff or budget.

• The 9/11 attacks changed emergency management by focusing on terrorism and moving resources and personnel away from natural hazards programs.

• FEMA director Michael Brown resigned after the poor federal response to Hurricane Katrina.

4. What is the future of emergency management and natural disaster policy?

• The United States still needs to address serious natural hazards.

• The poor response to Katrina pointed out serious flaws in the national emergency management system.

• Congress is debating whether FEMA should remain within the Department of Homeland Security or be removed and restored as an independent agency reporting to the President.

• The politics of natural disasters are much like the politics of other policy areas.

• Disaster policy reveals a lot about community values, particularly in how the needs of those least able to help themselves, such as the elderly and disabled, are addressed.

Key terms: disaster policy, emergency management, Hurricane Katrina, earthquakes, volcanoes, floods, land-use regulation, building codes, disaster insurance

Introduction Recent catastrophic natural disasters across the world have drawn attention to the need for nationsand communities to prepare for known hazards, and to be adaptable when new hazards become known. Real life disasters have also encouraged examination of the potential for mega-disasters, ranging from giant tsunamis to asteroid strikes to solar storms. At the same time, scientists areurging action in anticipation of the disastrous effects of global warming. In short, natural and unnatural disasters are getting much more attention than they have in decades. National policymakers, however, are focused on the threats of pandemic influenza, terrorism, and, after Katrina, hurricanes. These are the threats judged most in need of government action. At the state and local levels, emergency managers tend to focus on the threats that pose the greatest risk to their communities, but they are forced to pay attention to the threats that public officials and their constituents consider most serious. The funding of disaster programs is more often based upon perceived threats than assessed risk. For example, federal funds are still targeted largely at the risk of terrorism, but state and local officials have been arguing that they should spend more on the kinds of disasters that they are more likely to face. For officials in California, it is more certain that there will be major earthquakes in the near future than a major terrorist attack. Too, for officials in Florida and along the Gulf Coast, powerful hurricanes are more an immediate concern than terrorism. That does not mean that terrorism is not a serious threat; rather, it means that terrorism is less probable and its effects likely less catastrophic than the natural disasters that have caused devastation in the past. It is said that all disasters are local. The impact is local, and the response, at least initially, is local. The first responders, such as firefighters, police officers, or emergency services

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


personnel, are almost always local. Local first responders may have to deal with the disaster for days before help arrives from state or federal agencies. That is a major dilemma in disaster policymaking and emergency management. The government with the most resources is usually far from the disaster. The federal government cannot be a first responder, because it may take days or even weeks to mobilize personnel and transport supplies to the disaster area. By the same token, although local emergency response organizations are experienced in dealing with fire, flood, and other natural disasters, their capabilities may be overwhelmed by a major disaster. As a result, policymakers have focused on how to bring national resources to bear in major disasters and how to build local capacities to deal with disasters until help can arrive. While national policy seems to be changing since the poor response to Hurricane Katrina, the foundation of the national emergency management system rests on local capabilities to deal with disaster. While there are communities that do not have emergency management offices or agencies, or have only part-time, unpaid volunteer emergency coordinators, the trend is toward more professional emergency managers and more funding of essential disaster planning and preparation. The increasing professionalization of the field is due to several factors. First, local officials may be held legally liable for failure to prepare reasonably. Second, they may be held politically liable for failing to protect people and property effectively. Third, their communities may suffer economically when there are large losses. Fourth and last, local officials also have an ethical obligation to protect residents and their homes and businesses, as well as the environment. Governments were originally organized to help communities deal with common threats. How well they deal with disaster is the measure of their effectiveness. The assumption in emergency management is that state officials provide assistance when local resources are overwhelmed and local officials are struggling to deal with a disaster. In turn, federal officials provide assistance when state and local resources are overwhelmed. In reality, however, agencies from all levels of government and a multitude of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may be involved in disaster response and recovery operations. Historically, Americans have relied heavily upon volunteers during emergencies of all kinds. For example, volunteer fire brigades were organized in colonial communities, and most fire departments in the United States are still volunteer, although the number of mixed (volunteer and paid firefighters) and paid fire departments is increasing. Communities also rely heavily on organizations like the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army to provide assistance to the victims of fire, flood, and other disasters. Networks of governmental and nongovernmental organizations may also be involved in efforts to prevent disasters or reduce their effects and to prepare for the disasters that do occur. The National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), for example, is a coordinating body for national volunteer activities. Its members are voluntary organizations (see Table 1). Emergency or disaster management has become all the more important because of the increasing vulnerability of communities. There can be serious political repercussions when disasters are not handled reasonably well. Effective emergency management has become a major issue in the last two decades because of the increasing vulnerability of people and property and the heightened severity of catastrophic disasters. Increasing numbers of Americans have moved to coastal communities vulnerable to hurricanes, to California and the Pacific Northwest, which are vulnerable to earthquakes, and to homes in or near woodlands prone to wildfire. Society itself has become increasingly vulnerable because of its dependency on fragile technologies, from transit systems and cruise ships to computer systems and power grids. Technological failures caused by mechanical malfunctions or human error can have devastating effects in terms of human casualties and property losses. There is also a growing social vulnerability due to the aging population, increasing poverty, and increases in chronic diseases and conditions (e.g., diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart disease). All three of these social conditions contributed to the problems evacuating and sheltering victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


Table 1

National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)

Agency Agency Adventist Community Services Lutheran Disaster Response America’s Second Harvest Mennonite Disaster Service American Baptist Men Mercy Medical/Angel Flight America American Radio Relay League National Emergency Response Teams (NERT) American Red Cross National Organization for Victim Assistance AMURT (Ananda Marga University Relief

Team) Nazarene Disaster Response

Catholic Charities USA Northwest Medical Teams International Center for International Disaster Information The Points of Light Foundation Christian Disaster Response International Presbyterian Church (USA) Christian Reformed World Relief Committee REACT International, Inc. Church of the Brethren—Emergency

Response/Service Ministries The Salvation Army

Church World Service Society of St. Vincent de Paul Convoy of Hope Southern Baptist Convention—North American

Mission Board Disaster Psychiatry Outreach United Jewish Communities Episcopal Relief and Development United Church of Christ—Wider Church

Ministries Friends Disaster Service, Inc. United Methodist Committee on Relief The Humane Society of the United States United Way of America International Aid Volunteers of America International Critical Incident Stress Foundation World Vision International Relief Friendship Foundation

Source: NVOAD web site: http://www.nvoad.org.

Natural Hazards in the United States When Hurricane Katrina devastated Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama coastal communities in 2005, it was judged the worst natural disaster in American history. However, the nation has experienced catastrophic disasters that rival the losses of life and property caused by Hurricane Katrina. Large areas of New York City burned in 1835, and much of Chicago burned in 1871; Galveston (Texas) was leveled by a hurricane in 1900, with 6,000 to 8,000 people losing their lives; San Francisco was largely destroyed by earthquake and fire in 1906; and the Mississippi River flooded in 1927, damaging communities from Illinois to Louisiana and killing 246 people. That flood destroyed 41,487 buildings and covered an area of over 26,000 square miles in seven states. It caused an estimated $100 million in damage (approximately $1.12 billion in 2005 dollars).1 Lesser catastrophes have also cost hundreds of lives and billions of dollars in damage.2

1 Kevin R. Kosar, “Disaster Response and Appointment of a Recovery Czar: The Executive Branch’s Response to the Flood of 1927,” CRS Report to Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 25, 2005, p. 3. 2 See the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s listing of “Billion Dollar U.S. Weather Disasters” at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

http://www.nvoad.org/

http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html


Hurricane Katrina making landfall on August 29, 2005.

Source: NOAA.

Hurricane Hugo cut a swath through South and North Carolina in 1989, Hurricane Andrew flattened communities in south Florida in 1992 before making landfall a second time in Mississippi, four hurricanes in quick succession devastated the state of Florida in 2004, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast in 2005. Nonetheless, Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,300 people and has caused an estimated $25 billion in damage (the economic costs of the disaster may not be known for years). By way of comparison, the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, resulted in almost 3,000 deaths in the aircrafts and in and around the World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Natural hazards in the United States include earthquakes, floods, heat waves, droughts, hurricanes, landslides, thunderstorms, tornadoes, tsunamis, volcanoes, wildfires, and winter storms. One might also add public health emergencies, such as epidemics, that result from natural (non-man-made) causes. Current concerns over the potential that avian influenza might be passed from human to human and cause an international pandemic have certainly focused attention on public health preparedness efforts. The natural hazard list might also be expanded to include solar storms, asteroid strikes, and other extraterrestrial phenomena. The foci of disaster policy and emergency management professionals have generally been on those hazards that pose the greatest risk, i.e., those that occur frequently and cause significant

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


damage. For most communities, the greatest risks are from structural fires and floods. For communities along the East and Gulf Coasts, the greatest major hazards are generally hurricanes. In California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska, the greatest risk comes from earthquakes, although hazards such as wildfires, volcanoes, and tsunamis are certainly significant threats to lifeand property. Clearly, some communities face more hazards than others. The degree of risk varies. The long history of earthquakes in California, including the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 and Northridge earthquake in 1994, has focused the attention of state officials on that hazard. Additionally, the levee breaches that caused the flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina have encouraged a serious assessment of the levees on the American and Sacramento Riversaround the California state capital, Sacramento. Given that risk is often measured in terms of threats to people and property, the more populated states are often judged to be at the greatest risk. In terms of disasters that result in Presidential disaster declarations and the deployment of federal, as well as state and local, emergency response agencies, California, Florida, and Texas are at the top of the list. Americans have been lucky for the most part. While there are natural hazards on the North American continent and around the world that pose dangers, the nation has experienced remarkably few catastrophic disasters. The risk, however, may be greater than generally assumed. Native American communities were decimated by earthquakes, tsunamis, and other natural disasters in the centuries prior to the arrival of Europeans. Legend and myth provide evidence of the impacts of natural disasters on communities. The continent was only sparsely populated then, and it is far more densely populated now. Fortunately, the United States has not suffered a disaster like the “Christmas” tsunami of 2004 that killed over a quarter of a million people in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Somalia, and other nations surrounding the Indian Ocean. It has not suffered a major earthquake like the one that killed over 80,000 Pakistanis in 2005 and left millions more to spend the winter months in make-shift homes in the Himalayan Mountains. However, catastrophic disaster is certainly possible in the United States. Seismic faults underlie the city of Los Angeles and have been found in other large metropolitan areas. A new cycle of powerful hurricanes has been predicted. The vulnerability of cities like New York City, Miami, Galveston, Houston, Wilmington (North Carolina), Tampa-St. Petersburg, and New Orleans is well documented. The hazards are being identified and analyzed, the risks are being assessed, and the design and implementation policies and programs to mitigate the hazards are being put into motion.

Earthquakes The largest earthquakes in U.S. history are listed in Table 2. The worst earthquakes, however, have not necessarily been the strongest. In terms of loss of life and property, the worst were the Prince William Sound “Great Alaska Earthquake” of 1964 and the “Great San Francisco Earthquake” of 1906. The Alaskan quake severely damaged Anchorage and Seward, caused a devastating tsunami that inundated coastal communities, and caused fires, landslides, and other secondary disasters. The San Francisco earthquake of 1906 and the fire that followed devastated the city. The water system failed, and the fire department was helpless in the face of a growing firestorm. Estimates of the number of deaths in the San Francisco earthquake range from the 664 counted by the U.S. Army in its relief operations to 3,000 documented by later researchers.3

3 Jeanne B. Perkins, Arrietta Chakos, Robert A. Olson, L. Thomas Tobin, and Fred Turner, “The 1906 Earthquake and Public Policy,” Natural Hazards Observer.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


Table 2 Largest Earthquakes in the United States

Rank, Location, and Date Magnitude 1. Prince William Sound, Alaska, March 28, 1964 9.2 2. Cascadia Subduction Zone, January 26, 1700 ~9 3. Rat Islands, Alaska, February 4, 1965 8.7 4. Andreanof Islands, Alaska, March 9, 1957 8.6 5. East of Shumagin Islands, Alaska, November 10, 1938 8.2 6. Unimak Islands, Alaska, April 1, 1946 8.1 7. New Madrid, Missouri, December 16, 1811 8.1 8. Yakutat Bay, Alaska, September 10, 1899 8.0 9. New Madrid, Missouri, February 7, 1812 ~8 10. Denali Fault, Alaska, November 3, 2002 7.9 11. Gulf of Alaska, Alaska, November 30, 1987 7.9 12. Andreanof Islands, Alaska, May 7, 1986 7.9 13. Near Cape Yakataga, Alaska, September 4, 1899 7.9 14. Ka’u District, Island of Hawaii, April 3, 1868 7.9 15. Fort Tejon, California, January 9, 1857 7.9 16. Rat Islands, Alaska, November 17, 2003 7.8 17. Andreanof Islands, Alaska, June 10, 1996 7.8 18. San Francisco, California, April 18, 1906 7.8 19. Imperial Valley, California, February 24, 1892 7.8 20. New Madrid, Missouri, January 23, 1812 7.8

Source: U.S. Geological Survey.

Those earthquakes were the worst because they struck more populated areas. The Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake in 1700 certainly devastated Native American communities along the coast, but there are few records to document the destruction. The New Madrid earthquakes in 1811 and 1812 similarly destroyed small communities in Missouri and surrounding states, but documentation is limited. Nonetheless, the risk of earthquakes and tsunamis posed by the Cascadia Subduction Zone4 has been determined to be higher than assumed in the past, as evidence of past earthquakes and tsunamis is being uncovered along the coastline. Similarly, the risk of another major earthquake in the central United States is considered very serious because of the devastation it poses to the cities of Memphis and St. Louis, as well as the hundreds of smaller communities in the region.

The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) agencies are the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the United States Geological Survey (USGS). NIST is the lead agency. The goals of the program are to:

• Develop effective practices and policies for earthquake loss reduction and accelerate their implementation.

• Improve techniques to reduce seismic vulnerability of facilities and systems.

4 The Cascadia subduction zone is where the Juan de Fuca plate slides under the North American plate off the coast of Oregon and Washington. Slippage along the plates can cause earthquakes and tsunamis. See the U.S. Geological Survey web page on the Cascadia Subduction Zone http://www.pnsn.org/HAZARDS/CASCADIA/cascadia_zone.html.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

http://www.pnsn.org/HAZARDS/CASCADIA/cascadia_zone.html


• Improve seismic hazards identification and risk-assessment methods and their use.

• Improve the understanding of earthquakes and their effects.

The program is expected to educate the public and public officials about the hazard, to advise on how to reduce the risk of losses of life and property, and to encourage communities to adopt effective loss reduction practices and policies. Selling risk reduction measures, such as stronger building codes and better land-use regulation, is difficult in a region that has not experienced a catastrophic earthquake in almost two hundred years. Despite the increased risk of a major earthquake in the region, public officials are skeptical, and many are unwilling to strengthen building codes to mitigate the risk of earthquake damage. Californians, on the other hand, have had major earthquakes in recent memory and are frequently reminded of the risk by smaller quakes. However, while lessons have been learned from recent quakes and building codes have been strengthened, older structures are still vulnerable, and the cost of retrofitting them is often too high for property owners.

Tsunamis Tsunamis may result from undersea earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, asteroid strikes, and other upheavals. Major tsunamis are infrequent occurrences in the United States, although frequent occurrences like earthquakes may cause them. In the 1990s, floods associated with the El Niño phenomenon uncovered evidence of very large tsunamis along the Pacific coastline near the Cascadia subduction zone. The evidence, along with legends and myths among the Native American groups in the region, has increased scientific and public interest and concern about the potential for damaging tsunamis. The region is now heavily populated, and millions of residents are at risk. Portland, Oregon; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia; and smaller communities from California to Alaska are at risk. Table 3 lists the historical tsunamis that have occurred along the U.S. Pacific Coast from 1788 through 2006.

Table 3 Historical Tsunamis along the U.S. Pacific Coast (1788–2006)

Location Nondamaging/Damaging Tsunamis (Years) Southern California 6 / 4 (1806, 1812, 1927, 1930) Northern California 9 / 0 Oregon 1 / 0 Washington 1 / 1 (1949) British Columbia, Canada 3 / 1 (1946) Southeastern Alaska 5 / 5 (1854, 1905, 1936, 1958, 1994) South Central Alaska 5 / 4 (1899, 1899, 1925, 1964) Kodiak Island and Alaskan Peninsula 3 / 3 (1788, 1788, 1883) Eastern Aleutians 7 / 2 (1946, 1957) Western Aleutians 2 / 1 (1965)

Source: National Geophysical Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


The lesson of the Christmas tsunami in Indonesia, which struck coastal communities like Banda Aceh within minutes of the earthquake, has encouraged the development of tsunami warning and evacuation programs along the west coast of North America. Scientists are identifying hazard zones, determining inundation zones that are likely to be flooded by tsunamis, and helping policymakers develop warning systems that can effectively alert residents and tourists to the danger and evacuation plans to guide those at risk to high ground. Communities that adopt the recommended procedures can apply to be recognized as “TsunamiReady” communities.5 The 1964 tsunami that struck south central Alaska was caused by the Prince William Sound earthquake that devastated Anchorage, Seward, and other communities. The most remembered tsunami in the United States is the one that hit Hilo, Hawaii, on April 1, 1946. The tsunami seriously damaged communities in Hawaii and Alaska’s Aleutian Islands and killed 165 people. The Pacific Tsunami Warning System was established as a result of the tragedy, and warnings are now issued for all 7.5 or greater earthquakes in the Aleutian Islands.6 The West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center was created in 1965, right after the 1964 Alaskan earthquake and tsunami. The International Tsunami Information Centre had 28 member nations in 2005.7 The Sunda Trench earthquake was picked up by scientists at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, but there was no procedure for contacting officials in the Indian Ocean region and no system in place to communicate warnings to coastal communities. As a result, a new warning system is being implemented in the region with American help. The United States is also implementing a warning system in the Atlantic Ocean because surveys have identified undersea features that might cause landslides, which, in turn, can cause tsunamis. While communities at risk largely recognize the threat of tsunamis and the need to reduce the vulnerability of their residents, developing and maintaining effective alert and warning systems require an investment of public funds they often do not have. Ensuring that visitors are aware of the hazard and understand warnings does raise concerns that the information may frighten them and, thereby, reduce tax revenues. Much of the tax revenue of coastal communities comes from vacationers. Whether the risk is great enough to warrant limitations on coastal development or retrofitting buildings, bridges, and other infrastructure to withstand large waves is another concern. At what point should communities restrict development on the beaches that residents and visitors alike find so desirable?

Hurricanes Many of the same issues arise with the hurricane hazard. Should development be limited on beaches and in other low-lying areas that might be subject to storm surge and other flooding?Who should pay for sea walls to protect beach homes and coastal towns? Who should repair roads and bridges damaged by storms? Who should pay for beach replenishment when storms cause beach erosion? A great deal is known about hurricane impacts and the nature of the hazard.It is still difficult to pinpoint landfall early enough to ensure evacuation in the paths of the storms.But the science is getting much better both in predicting the number and size of the storms thatcan be expected and, via satellite imaging, in following their development. Table 4 lists the topten most expensive hurricanes in the 20th century.

5 The TsunamiReady Program is operated by the National Weather Service. See the National Weather Service web page: http://www.tsunamiready.noaa.gov/. 6 See William L. Waugh, Jr., Living with Hazards, Dealing with Disasters (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 2000), pp. 67–68. 7 See the International Tsunami Information Centre web page: http://www.tsunamiwave.info/

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

http://www.tsunamiready.noaa.gov/

http://www.tsunamiwave.info/


Table 4 Top Ten Most Expensive Hurricanes in the 20th Century

Year — Hurricane — Area Most Affected Cost 1992 — Hurricane Andrew — South Florida $26.5 billion 1989 — Hurricane Hugo — Charleston, South Carolina $7.0 billion 1999 — Hurricane Floyd — Mid-Atlantic states and Northeast $4.5 billion 1996 — Hurricane Fran — North Carolina $3.2 billion 1995 — Hurricane Opal — Pensacola, Florida $3.0 billion 1998 — Hurricane Georges — Florida Keys, Mississippi, and

Alabama $2.31 billion

1979 — Hurricane Frederic — Mississippi, Alabama $2.3 billion 1972 — Hurricane Agnes — Florida, Eastern Seaboard $2.1 billion 1983 — Hurricane Alicia — Texas $2.0 billion 1991 — Hurricane Bob — Northeast $1.5 billion

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

The biggest issues in hurricane hazard mitigation are moving development out of areas

that may be subject to storm surge, adopting and enforcing building codes to reduce wind and water damage, providing warnings early enough so that people can evacuate, and developing alternative evacuation plans to accommodate those who cannot evacuate in time. In many coastal communities, for example, it may be easier to evacuate residents to well-built, multi-story hotels and office buildings within the community than to transport them far enough inland to get away from the storm surge. Using local facilities, too, reduces the likelihood that evacuees will be trapped on highways during the storm. “Vertical evacuation” is particularly appealing to those who want to stay close to their homes. Regulating land-use along the coast is another strategy, but the courts have become less receptive to the idea of regulation when it reduces the value of property. Restricting beach access, for example, can have a tremendous impact on the value of beachfront property. As many communities along the Mississippi and Louisiana coastlines are finding after the Hurricane Katrina disaster, low-lying areas are vulnerable to storm surge and redevelopment may require relocating whole communities or elevating structures to permit storm surge to pass underneath them. Recent challenges to community efforts to restrict development have been successful. The “takings” issue is a problem for local governments trying to restrain beachfront development. The easiest course would be for local governments to purchase property in hazardous areas and use it for purposes that do not encourage the building of homes or businesses. This is commonly done in flood-prone areas and has been the practice during the most recent major floods. Whole communities were relocated out of the floodplain following the 1993 Mississippi floods. Recent court cases, however, have required authorities to compensate property owners for the reduced value of their property. When local officials adopt the regulations well before disaster strikes and before property owners begin developing close to the water, the courts are more sympathetic. If, however, the regulations follow the disaster, as they frequently do, property owners can more easily make the case that they have lost value and that they are due compensation.8 Even though the property owner may assume the risk to his or her own property, development in flood-prone areas can often increase the risk to neighboring property owners and cause environmental damage.

8 Waugh, 2000, p. 175.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


Hurricane Katrina Damage in Pass Christian, Mississippi. Source: FEMA.

Tornadoes “Tornado Alley” extends from Texas to the Dakotas or, depending on the map, to the upperMidwest. There are “mini-tornado alleys” elsewhere in the nation, including areas of easternMississippi, northwest Alabama, Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. These area prone to tornadoes tend to be where warm air collides with cold, where weather is more turbulent. SeeTable 5 for where major tornado outbreaks have occurred. The Super Outbreak of 1974 saw 148 tornadoes touch down over a 16-hour period. An estimated 118 of the tornadoes cut paths of one mile or more, with the total length of the paths of destruction being over 2,500 miles. The storms killed 330 people and injured 5,484 more. Tornadoes were tracked in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Six of the tornadoes were F5, the highest category on the Fujita scale. Large hail and straight-line winds contributed to the damage. The outbreak gave impetus to efforts to predict tornadic activity and to develop effective warning systems. Modern meteorology has increased the average lead time to 11 minutes,9 which is sufficient time for most to take shelter, but warning systems are still a problem. Sirens, for example, may not be heard in areas that are heavily wooded or have tall buildings that block the sound. Many residents may not understand the warnings even if they hear the sirens.

9 See “The Worst in U.S. History: 1974 Tornado Outbreak,” http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/storms/, accessed on May 12, 2006.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/storms/


Table 5 Selected Major Tornado Outbreaks

Location and Date Fatalities Tri-State Outbreak in Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana, March 18, 1925

746 Natchez, Mississippi, May 6, 1840 317 St. Louis, Missouri, May 27, 1896 255 Tupelo, Mississippi, April 5, 1936 216 Gainesville, Florida, April 6, 1936 203 Super Outbreak, 13 states, including Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio,

April 3-4, 1974

330 Palm Sunday Outbreak, Upper Midwest, including Indiana, Ohio, and

Michigan, April 11, 1965

256

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Community preparedness includes development of an effective warning system so that residents hear, understand, believe, internalize (i.e., believe that they are at risk), and react appropriately to the warning. The National Weather Service issues “tornado watches” when the conditions are right for the development of tornadoes and “tornado warnings” when a tornado has been spotted or identified on radar. Communities often deploy trained “storm watchers” to look for wall clouds and other signs of tornadic activity and to initiate warnings. Preparedness also includes providing information to the public on the nature of the hazard and appropriate protective actions. A strong effort is being made by the National Weather Service, for example, to dissuade individuals from seeking safety under highway overpasses because they do not afford enough protection. Videos of individuals hiding under overpasses during a Kansas tornado have misled people into thinking that it is a good idea. FEMA is encouraging property owners who do not have basements or cellars in which to take cover to build “safe rooms” that can withstand tornado winds. At present, no structures, except for “safe rooms,” are considered safe during tornadoes. Communities that adopt the recommended mitigation measures can apply for recognition as “StormReady” communities.

Wildfire Just as coastal communities vulnerable to hurricanes are growing, development is increasing in the Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI). In the western United States, 38 percent of new homes are being built next to or within the WUI.10 The development is putting more and more property, as well as property owners, at risk of wildfire. Many scientists and fire officials believe that wildland fires are essential to remove dead trees, undergrowth, and other material that might fuel large fires. Fire officials are also concerned because dealing with wildfire is very different from dealing with structural fires. The equipment and training are different. Not all urban fire departments are trained to deal with wildfire. However, property owners want fires suppressed to avoid damage to their property. Building in the WUI also increases the potential for accidental fires. In 1991, fire broke out in the East Bay Hills in Oakland, California. Local fire departments were unable to contain the fire as it jumped large freeways. When the fire was finally 10 “Fires in the Wildland/Urban Interface,” Topical Fire Research Service, U.S. Fire Administration, Vol. 2, Issue 16 (March 2002), pp. 1–3.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


stopped, 25 people were dead and over 3,000 structures had been destroyed. The lesson was that heavily wooded residential areas are vulnerable to wildfire. Such fires had been known in urban America before, but expanded development in the WUI has greatly increased the risk to many communities. At a minimum, it has been suggested that property owners use fire-resistant building materials, build homes where they are more easily protected from fire spread, keep flammable vegetation away from structures, install smoke alarms, and have and practice evacuation plans. An alternative is to restrict development in the WUI and/or to require that property owners who choose to locate in the WUI pay a special fee for fire protection. Table 6 mentions some historically significant wildland fires that have occurred since the late 1800s.

Table 6 Selected Historically Significant Wildland Fires

Date, Name, Location Damage/Significance October 1871, Peshtigo, Wisconsin/Michigan 3,780,000 acres burned/1,500 fatalities in

Wisconsin September 1894, Hinckley, Minnesota Undetermined acreage burned/418 fatalities September 1894, Wisconsin, Wisconsin Several million acres burned/some fatalities August 1910, Great Idaho, Idaho/Montana 3 million acres burned/85 fatalities 1949, Mann Gulch, Montana 4,339 acres burned/13 smokejumpers killed September 1970, Laguna, California 175,425 acres burned/383 structures destroyed 1987, Siege of ’87, California 640,000 acres burned/timber lost in Klamath

and Stanislaus National Forests 1988, Yellowstone, Montana/Idaho 1,585,000 acres burned/damage to Yellowstone

National Park October 1991, Oakland Hills, California 1,500 acres burned/25 fatalities and 2,900

structures destroyed July 1994, South Canyon, Colorado 1,856 acres burned/24 firefighters killed 1998, Volusia Complex, Florida 111,130 acres burned/thousands evacuated 1998, Flagler/St. John, Florida 94,656 acres burned/thousands evacuated May 2000, Cerro Grande, New Mexico 47,650 acres burned/originally a prescribed fire;

235 structures destroyed; damaged Los Alamos National Laboratory

Source: National Interagency Fire Center.

Other Hazards Certainly, there are other kinds of natural disasters that affect communities in the United States. Flooding is the second most common disaster after fires. Regulating land use on floodplains is a politically charged task. The National Flood Insurance Program offers discounts on flood insurance to communities that implement mitigation measures to reduce the risk of flood damage and preparedness measures to warn the community about the hazard. Points are given for each measure adopted, and those points translate into discounts. Tulsa, Oklahoma, has been the most proactive community in the nation in addressing the risk of flooding. Thousands of communities, however, do only the minimum to qualify residents for flood insurance. Flood insurance is underwritten by the federal government because the scale of floods is often so great that private

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


insurance companies could not afford to issue policies because too many claims might be made from one flood. Communities distribute fans and/or provide air-conditioned shelters to the elderly during heat waves, distribute warm clothing and blankets during cold spells, provide warm shelters during winter storms, and provide other assistance when lives and property are at risk from other hazards. Snowstorms can paralyze cities. Ice storms can bring down power lines and cause outages for days and even weeks. “All-hazards” emergency management programs are designed to be flexible so that officials can adapt plans to unanticipated circumstances. Adaptation, innovation, and improvisation are necessary capacities to ensure that agencies can respond to threats to life and property.

Natural Disaster Policy Disasters have not always been a major political issue in the United States. Flooding was the first major hazard to be addressed, and systems of dams and levees were created to reduce the hazard to residents. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built levees and dams along many of the rivers that historically flooded. The extensive levee system built along the Sacramento and American Rivers in central California is similar to the system on the lower Mississippi River. Consequently, there are concerns that massive flooding could occur in and around Sacramento just as it did in New Orleans. Disaster policy tends to become an issue only after a major disaster and tends to focus on that particular disaster rather than the next one. Policies and programs to reduce earthquake risk were implemented after the Northridge earthquake in 1994, for example. International disasters also can have significant effects. The disasters are focusing events, as Thomas Birkland has called them.11 They focus attention on the hazard and the potential for more disasters. The 2004 Sunda Trench or “Christmas” earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Sumatra in the Indian Ocean, for example, drew attention to the risk of tsunamis along North American coastlines and encouraged more investment in tsunami warning systems in Hawaii, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California. It also called attention to the risk along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. It spurred on the development of a warning system in the Indian Ocean so that there will be more warning than there was in December 2004. Similarly, earthquake programs were expanded after the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes in California. Lessons are learned with each major disaster, and building codes and land-use regulations are adjusted accordingly to reduce the risk to people and property. Since the Northridge earthquake, for example, property owners are encouraged to strap water heaters, refrigerators, and other large appliances to walls so that they will not fall on residents during earthquakes. Big-screen televisions, bookcases, and lights can topple and seriously injure children and adults. Designing effective policies and programs is not an easy task. There are major obstacles to overcome.12 These are discussed in the following sections. The diversity of hazards makes it difficult for officials to focus their efforts. While the adoption of the “all-hazards” model means that officials develop more general plans and programs that can be adapted to circumstances when needed, known hazards should be identified and assessed.

11 Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997). 12 William L. Waugh, Jr., “Emergency Management and State and Local Capacity,” in Cities and Disaster: North American Studies in Emergency Management, eds. Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr., (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publishers), pp. 221–237.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


Disaster policy generally has low issue salience for officials and the public. Unless there has been a disaster recently, officials have little inclination to invest in programs to address hazards, and the public has little inclination to pay for such programs. There is a relatively brief window of opportunity in which officials and the public are concerned enough to act. In many respects, it is helpful when a disaster with minimal damage and minimal injury occurs, so that scientists and emergency managers can get officials to do something about the risk. The focus on bioterrorism caused by the anthrax attacks in 2001 and 2002 created an opportunity for public health officials to draw attention to the risk of pandemic influenza, which they consider more dangerous than potential terrorists’ use of biological agents. A critical element in hazard mitigation is regulation of building codes, land use, and behaviors that put people and property at risk. The easiest way to reduce the likelihood of death, injury, or property loss is to make people move away from hazards. Lives and property may be saved by preventing development on floodplains, along coastlines where storm surge may pose a threat, in woodlands prone to wildfire, near seismic fault lines, in landslide areas, in mountain valleys prone to flash flooding, and in other hazardous areas. However, people want to live near rivers, on beaches, in the woods, on hillsides, in the mountains, and near other hazards, and developers want to build where people want to buy homes. Finding a balance between reasonable development and preventing catastrophic losses is not easy for public officials. Developers often win the political battle. Similarly, strong building codes to make structures less vulnerable to earthquakes, wildfires, floods, and other hazards raise the cost of building, and there is strong political pressure to avoid regulations that increase costs. In California, for instance, there was tremendous opposition to the development of stronger building codes after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake because it might adversely affect land values and building costs and even scare potential buyers.

Some Americans oppose virtually any regulation of the use of private property, and state legislatures, county commissions, and city councils are reluctant to support regulations even if they might save lives and property. The courts have increasingly sided with property owners against regulations that might reduce the value of their property even when the development increases the risk of fire or flood or some other calamity to the community. The development of strong policies and programs has been limited by the lack of a strong political constituency. Public attention focuses on disasters for a few months or a few years, depending upon the size of the disaster, but that attention wanes rather quickly. There are political interest groups, such as environmental groups, that lobby state legislatures to reduce specific risks, but they are generally less influential than those that oppose regulatory actions, such as the building industry and developers. Moreover, people do want to buy homes on the beach, in the mountains, along river banks, and in other hazardous areas and are not supportive of policies that restrict those kinds of development. They support the principles behind hazard reduction but often do not support the policies necessary to advance those principles. Disaster policies and programs do have administrative constituencies, but they tend not to be politically influential. Scientists from the U.S. Geological Survey and universities monitor earthquake hazards and make recommendations concerning action to reduce the vulnerability of communities to disaster, for example, but they have relatively little influence in the policymaking process. Indeed, in recent years, some congressional leaders and Administration officials have tried to prevent scientists from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and universities from providing evidence of global warming and its likely effects.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


Measuring the effectiveness of disaster policies and programs has been difficult. It is possible to measure the cost effectiveness of policies and programs, but it is more difficult to measure their effectiveness in the long term. How much preparation is enough? Should taxpayers be asked to support more effort than is warranted by the level of risk, even though the community will be better prepared for catastrophic events? It is easier to determine how satisfied victims are with the assistance they receive or how fast a community recovers from disaster. The guiding principle in the 1990s, the “golden age” of FEMA, was that investments in mitigation paid off in reduced recovery costs. Efforts to determine the cost effectiveness of mitigation programs produced some evidence that every dollar spent to prevent or reduce the impact of disaster saved as much as four dollars in recovery. In recent years, FEMA and its parent organization, the Department ofHomeland Security, have reduced investments in mitigation, even eliminating some mitigationprograms, in favor of prevention alone. Grants are awarded competitively, which gives advantageto larger jurisdictions or those with more professional staff support, rather than awarded basedupon risk. Federal officials encourage communities to invest in their own mitigation programswith minimal to no federal support. The vertical fragmentation of the American political system greatly complicates emergency management and disaster policymaking. During the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005, federal, state, and local officials were unsure of their responsibilities. In some cases, federal officials assumed that they had more authority than they legally had. The new National Response Plan is based on assumptions about federal authority that would be accurate in a terrorist event but not in a natural disaster in which state and local authorities are the lead and federal authorities have to be invited to participate. The horizontal fragmentation of the American political system greatly complicates emergency management and disaster policymaking. At the local level, communities have their own fire and police departments and are legally responsible for responding to disasters of all sorts. Mutual assistance agreements and memoranda of understanding can facilitate interaction. Officials can agree on responsibilities and borrow resources, including personnel, from other jurisdictions. But, those agreements have to be in place prior to the disaster in order for them to work effectively. Similarly, states can development cooperative relationships. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact is an agreement that states can borrow personnel and resources, including National Guard troops, from one another.13

State and local capacities are very uneven. Some state emergency management agencies have sufficient funding to support a professional staff and to assist local governments in developing and maintaining effective policies and programs. Some state emergency management agencies are focused on the threat of terrorism and pay little attention to the threats from natural and technological hazards. Because federal funding has been funneled to Homeland Security programs, it is understandable that state and local officials might be focused on the threat of terrorism. Similarly, some communities have very professional staffs with trained emergency planners and trainers, and many have little or no staff. Some smaller communities are without a trained emergency manager and rely instead on volunteers or part-time coordinators drawn from other agencies. Often the emergency management coordinator is a fire official who has other responsibilities and little or no training in emergency management. Some small communities may employ itinerate emergency managers who move from one community to another assisting officials with their emergency plans, training, and disaster responses.

13 See the Emergency Management Assistance Compact web page: http://www.emacweb.org/.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

http://www.emacweb.org/


The Evolution of Emergency Management The emergency management function in the United States evolved out of community volunteer efforts. Fire brigades were organized, neighbors helped neighbors respond to threats ranging from flood to wild animals, and communities supported those who lost their homes and farms todisaster. Most fire departments in the United States are still volunteer organizations.14

Communities still rely primarily upon the local chapter of the American Red Cross and a varietyof nongovernmental organizations, including the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, IslamicRelief USA, United Way, Lutheran Disaster Response, Mennonite Disaster Response, SouthernBaptist Convention, United Jewish Communities, United Methodist Communities on Relief, andother faith-based and secular organizations. Community groups ranging from Veterans of ForeignWar chapters to university fraternities and sororities respond to disasters. The nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, range from professional organizations that provide administrative services to small groups who distribute water and make sandwiches. Private firms from Home Depot toWalMart also provide essential services as well as bring in essential supplies for recovery. Whilestate and local emergency management and Homeland Security agencies may have more capacitythan most of the NGOs, the NGOs and private firms do contribute critical resources and supportthe government effort. The national system is built upon volunteers, and those volunteers needto be utilized. Using NGO and community resources increases their capacity to deal with futuredisasters. They also provide assistance to the victims who do not qualify for government assistance, i.e., those who fall through the proverbial cracks. The first federal emergency management programs in the United States dealt with floods and civil defense. The focus was broadened with the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which authorized the president to issue disaster declarations and to mobilize federal agencies to help. The nation’s capacity to deal with major disasters was very limited during the 1950s and 1960s. It was only after a series of major natural disasters in the late 1960s and 1970s that the National Governors’ Association encouraged President Jimmy Carter to consolidate federal disaster resources into a single agency. In 1979, President Carter brought together programs from the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Housing and Urban Development and from the General Services Administration and the Executive Office of the President to form the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA struggled during the 1980s. Its early directors had little or no emergency management experience, and civil defense programs tended to dominate in the agency’s internal politics. In the mid-1980s, scandal rocked the agency, and the director and several of his subordinates were forced to resign. The agency became known as a “dumping ground for political cronies” who had worked on presidential campaigns. FEMA’s reputation was extremely poor; fortunately, it had few major disasters to handle. Part of the internal turmoil was the result of how the agency had been formed. FEMA was the product of the consolidation of disparate programs, not unlike the consolidation that created the Department of Homeland Security. The agency had many subcultures with different orientations toward the public, different technical languages, and different political constituencies. There was little commonality among the Civil Defense planners, insurance and flood mitigation personnel from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), fire services people from the National Fire Administration, course developers and trainers from the Emergency Management Institute, and the growing number of contractors.

14 A listing of fire departments by category is available at the following web site: http://fe.pennnet.com/about/links.cfm.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

http://fe.pennnet.com/about/links.cfm


American Red Cross Disaster Relief vehicle in Biloxi, Mississippi, after Hurricane Katrina.

Source: FEMA. At the state and local levels, emergency management capabilities were and still are uneven. Some states and communities have state-of-the-art programs with professional staff and strong relationships with the other public, private, and not-for-profit organizations responsible for dealing with natural and man-made hazards and disasters. Others do not. Some communities have no emergency managers, relying instead upon officials with other responsibilities. Some communities have part-time emergency managers. Some have unpaid volunteers with small or no budgets and no staff support. The consequence is that some communities have little capacity to deal with hazards or disasters, while others have tremendous capacity. For state officials, that means that some communities will need a lot of help during disasters and some will need very little. In fact, local programs may well be better staffed and trained than state programs. Political leaders may or may not have the resources to spend on programs that may not be needed, and they choose to gamble on strong emergency management capabilities not being needed. It is a political choice. It may also be a legal gamble, because local officials may be held legally liable for failing to exercise their discretion reasonably. Federal and state officials are protected by sovereign immunity as agents of federal or state law. Local officials are protected when they are exercising authority given by the state and enforcing state laws, but they may be held personally liable if they do not act reasonably to prepare their community for disaster or mitigate a known hazard.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


Emergency Operations Center in Biloxi, Mississippi, during Hurricane Katrina disaster.

Source: FEMA.

FEMA failed to respond effectively to Hurricane Hugo in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1989. The agency waited for the governor to request aid instead of proactively working with the South Carolina governor’s office to estimate damage and request essential aid. FEMA equipment and supplies were not moved close to the disaster area to facilitate the response, and the response was slow. FEMA officials again failed to respond as quickly as they might have to the Hurricane Andrew disaster in south Florida in 1992. The FEMA director was removed as head of the federal response effort by President H. W. Bush and replaced by the secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card. A slow response followed in Hawaii when Hurricane Iniki made landfall later in the year. Because of the poor performance of FEMA during these and other disasters, Congress considered dismantling the agency when it came up for reauthorization. The National Academy of Public Administration and the U.S. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office) studied FEMA’s organization and performance and issued reports outlining the major problems. However, when President Clinton took office in 1993, he appointed James Lee Witt as director of FEMA. Witt, unlike his predecessors, had emergency management experience and began reorganizing the agency to overcome internal conflicts. The agency structure was realigned from a program focus to a functional focus. The central functions were mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The focus of the agency was on mitigation, i.e., preventing or reducing the effects of disaster. Project Impact was created to encourage the development of “disaster-resistant” communities. FEMA worked with citizen groups, NGOs, state and local agencies, and other federal agencies to encourage hazard reduction. The programs were not without political, administrative, and/or technical problems. Local elected officials were sometimes unhappy about FEMA working through citizens’ groups rather than city or county offices, but there were advantages in engaging the public in community

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


programs. Project Impact, in fact, enjoyed some success in reducing hazards, and as a result, Seattle and surrounding communities suffered remarkably little damage during the Nisqually earthquake in February 2001. The national emergency management system includes public agencies ranging from FEMA to state and local emergency management agencies and from the U.S. Geological Survey to the National Weather Service. The National Response Plan (NRP) provides a structure to coordinate federal disaster efforts. NRP outlines Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that identify lead federal agencies for specific functions (see Table 7). The plan identifies the coordinating or lead agency, primary agencies, and supporting agencies. The American Red Cross is a federally chartered organization and has a special role in national disaster operations.

Table 7

Emergency Support Functions in the National Response Plan

ESF ESF Coordinator/Primary Agencies Transportation U.S. Department of Transportation Communications U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Public Works and Engineering U.S. Department of Defense Firefighting U.S. Department of Agriculture/Forest Service Emergency Management U.S. Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Mass Care, Housing and Human Services U.S. Department of Homeland

Security/FEMA/American Red Cross Resource Support U.S. General Services Administration Public Health and Medical Services U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services Urban Search and Rescue U.S. Department of Homeland Security/

Emergency Preparedness and Response/FEMA

Oil and Hazardous Materials Response U.S. Environmental Protection Agency/ Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Coast Guard

Agriculture and Natural Resources U.S. Department of Agriculture/Department of the Interior

Energy U.S. Department of Energy Public Safety and Security U.S. Department of Homeland Security/

Emergency Preparedness and Response/ FEMA/U.S. Department of Justice

Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation

U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Emergency Preparedness and Response/ FEMA/U.S. Department of the Treasury/Small Business Administration

External Affairs U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Emergency Preparedness and Response/FEMA

Source: National Response Plan.

The events of September 11, 2001, radically changed emergency management and how the nation viewed disasters. The focus of federal programs changed to the threat of terrorism, federal funding was redirected to anti- and counter-terrorism programs, and “weapons of mass destruction” became the watchword. What this meant for natural disasters was a lack of public attention, cuts in funding, cuts in personnel, and a change in culture from the open culture of emergency management to the closed culture of Homeland Security. When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003, FEMA became a very small part of that organization. What happened to FEMA has been described in the after-action reports and

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


investigations done after the poor response to the Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita disasters.15 There were problems with the responses to the four hurricanes (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) that struck Florida in late summer and early fall of 2004, and recovery efforts were still underway in Florida when Hurricane Wilma struck the state in September 2005. Roofs covered with blue tarps and lots covered with FEMA trailers became all too familiar sights. FEMA became the symbol of failure in disaster response even though other federal, state, and local agencies also failed to respond effectively. Michael Brown, FEMA director, resigned and criticized his superiors for failing to heed warnings about the levees in New Orleans and the limited capacity of FEMA to respond. The scale of the disaster certainly made it difficult for FEMA and other agencies to get access to the disaster area. Federal, state, and local officials often did not understand their roles in the disaster response. Analyses of the response have generally concluded that FEMA capabilities to deal with natural disasters declined when it was transferred to DHS, the agency lacked essential technical capabilities (such as information and communications technologies), communication systems failed and coordination of emergency response efforts was extremely poor, and it lacked the manpower to deal with a major disaster. There is less consensus on how to correct the problems. Currently, the debate within Congress is over whether FEMA should remain in DHS as an essential element if there is a catastrophic terrorist attack or should be removed and returned to its independent status reporting directly to the president. Some assets of the agency have already been lost. Many long-time FEMA employees have retired, transferred to other agencies, or chosen to work for consulting firms that value their hazard expertise. This is not a new problem for federal agencies, or for state and local agencies for that matter, but it is a problem that is causing a lot of concern. The “brain drain” means that much of the institutional memory and expertise has been lost.16 One indication of the challenge that fixing FEMA (or a new agency with emergency management responsibilities) entails is that President Bush offered the FEMA directorship to seven or eight people, all nationally prominent emergency management professionals, before nominating the acting director to the position.

The Future of Emergency Management and Disaster Policy The United States has to address serious hazards, from the Yellowstone super-volcano to pandemic influenza, and indications are that responsibility will increasingly reside with state and local officials and with individuals and families. All-hazards emergency management and comprehensive emergency management are still the foci of state and local emergency management agencies, even though DHS has deemphasized mitigation and added awareness and prevention to the list. Federal programs are still overwhelmingly focused on the threat of terrorism, rather than natural disasters. More and more state and local officials are finding their own priorities based upon the hazards in their own communities. State policies regarding hazards may well conflict with federal policies. State and local officials, for example, are looking at the effects of global warming, including drought, flood, sea level rise, and more severe weather, on their constituents. State and local officials are also continuing to emphasize “dual use” when they invest in equipment, training, and other capabilities. “Dual use” means that equipment, personnel, etc., can be used in more common disaster responses as well as in response to terrorist attacks. For example, decontamination equipment can be used in hazardous materials responses, such as

15 See William L. Waugh, Jr. “The Political Costs of Failure in the Katrina and Rita Disasters,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 604, Special Issue on “Sheltering from the Storm: Repairing the National Emergency Management System after Katrina, ed. W. L. Waugh, Jr., March 2006. 16 Ibid.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


chemical spills, as well as incidences involving WMD.17 Officials are trying to find a middle ground between federal pressure to prepare for terrorist attacks and their communities’ needs to prepare for the natural disasters that are certain to happen. State and local officials are also finding some guidance in the development of programs in National Fire Protection Association Standard 1600 (NFPA 1600) and EMAP (the EmergencyManagement Accreditation Program). NFPA 1600 and EMAP have been recognized by Congressas the standards by which emergency management programs should be designed. The standardscover the components of comprehensive programs from the types of emergency plans to theadministration and financing of the programs. They provide benchmarks for officials to assessthe quality of their programs and ensure that the essential elements are present, documented,and functional. EMAP conducts assessments and accredits state and local programs that meetits standards. Katrina pointed out some serious shortcomings in the national system for dealing with hazards and disasters. Corrections are being made in how equipment and supplies are deployed to disaster areas, how personnel are recruited for disaster operations, how evacuation plans address the needs of special populations like the elderly and disabled, how communities designate sites for temporary housing, how national medical resources are deployed and what kinds of resources are deployed, how warnings are issued to residents, how care facilities (e.g., nursing homes and hospitals) determine when and how to evacuate, and so on. The lessons learned from Katrina and Rita are forcing a reevaluation of the national emergency management system. Since Katrina, federal officials have urged communities and individuals to prepare for the next disaster and not to expect federal support to arrive immediately. Greater self-reliance, including greater reliance upon individual and family preparedness and private insurance, is the focus. The likely reasoning behind the change in policy is that reducing expectations concerning federal responsibilities might increase state and local preparedness efforts and encourage individuals, families, and communities to create their own “72-hour kits”18 so that they can survive on their own until help arrives. It is uncertain, however, whether Americans watching events unfold on television will understand or agree with the policy if the victims of the next large disaster are seen struggling to survive and the “cavalry,” federal assistance, is not on the way to help. The poor may not have the resources to store sufficient food and water to survive on their own. Many of those trapped in the flood waters in New Orleans lacked the resources to evacuate and the resources to survive in their homes for more than a short period of time. In most respects, the politics of disaster are much like politics in other policy areas. Issues do not get on the public agenda unless there is a catastrophic disaster, and media coverage greatly influences how the disaster is perceived. The public attention span is relatively short. There are differing views of the hazards, different views of risk, and a multitude of other motives that influence political positions and policy choices. Many support the notion of self-reliance, encouraging residents to take care of themselves and their families, and many support the notion that the government is the “cavalry,” the responder responsible for ensuring public health and safety. There are political costs for failing to prepare adequately and/or to respond effectively, but blame is difficult to assign. The system is complex, and many people and many organizations have responsibility for ensuring success. Disaster victims and communities are very resilient. Disaster policy reveals a lot about community values, particularly in how policy addresses the needs of those who cannot take care of themselves.

17 CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive material) or B-NICE (biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, and explosive) are the new terms for WMD. 18 There is a debate within the emergency management community concerning the adequacy of three days’ supply of food, water, and other essentials. Some argue that everyone should have supplies for two weeks, and largely because of the avian influenza threat, supplies to last one to several months may be in order.

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint


DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Should state and local officials focus their efforts on the hazards that pose the most risk to their communities, or should they follow the federal lead and focus on the threat of terrorism?

2. How can officials convince the public and public officials to invest in policies and programs to reduce the risks from natural hazards when there are other policy problems to address?

3. Should communities be permitted to prevent development in hazardous areas if the only risk is to the property owner who wishes to develop the area?

4. Is it a problem that the national emergency management system is so reliant upon volunteers and volunteer organizations?

5. What should be the federal role in natural disasters when legal responsibility and authority rests with state and local officials?

6. When should the federal government not provide assistance to communities in disasters?

7. FEMA’s recent problems with the Hurricane Katrina response were at least partly due to the fact that its leaders were political appointees with little or no emergency management experience. Should presidents be required to appoint qualified administrators, and what qualifications should they have?

8. The tsunami hazard on the East Coast of the United States is less certain than the hazard on the West Coast. How might restrictions on development along the coastlines differ because of the differences in risk?

9. Should local officials be held legally liable when they do not prepare their communities reasonably for disasters?

10. Should communities have a special tax for property owners who build in the Wildland/Urban Interface (WUI) and require more fire protection than others in the community?

11. Should communities charge hikers, skiers, snowboarders, snow mobilers, and others for rescue operations when they have disregarded hazards like severe weather?

12. Should communities choose not to mount rescue operations when to do so would put rescuers at risk?

13. Should disaster assistance agencies refuse to aid victims when they put themselves at risk by choosing not to evacuate or to live in a hazardous area?

14. Should FEMA be an independent agency reporting directly to the president, or should it remain part of the Department of Homeland Security?

15. How can federal, state, and local officials encourage self-reliance, including individual and family preparedness, so that people will be able to survive on their own in a major disaster like Katrina?

16. Do you have a disaster plan and a “72-hour kit,” so that you and your family can survive for at least three days without outside help?

Cenga

ge Le

arnin

g

Not for

Rep

rint

natural p the olitics disasters...politics of natural disasters 3 • some communities have...

Documents