negotiating - mit

More than ever, effective problem-solving de-mands that we know when and how to create valuable agreements with other parties. But negotiating isn’t always best. Here’s how to “get to yes” when it’s appro-priate—and even crucial.

STRATEGY TOOL #5 We Are All Negotiators Now: An Introduction to Negotiation in Community Problem-Solving by Xavier de Souza Briggs The Art and Science of Community Problem-Solving Project at Harvard University July 2003

Sections to guide you: • Ideas in brief • Ideas at work • Taking stock: applying

the ideas in your community

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We are all negotiators now, because a growing number of public and private issues are jointly de‐cided. As more and more stakeholders ask to par‐ticipate in decisions that affect them, and as the work of public problem‐solving is shared across the government, business, and non‐governmental (nonprofit) sectors, the demand for negotiation grows dramatically. No one can afford to ignore this core civic skill—being able to creatively ad‐vance shared interests and resolve differences too.

Yet to many civic‐minded people, negotiation con‐jures up negative images of “horse trading”—hard‐ball, self‐interested transacting in which power games, threats, and deception dominate. Plus, it

isn’t always clear when negotiation is most appro‐priate in a larger effort to tackle social problems—or, for example, how negotiation relates to other civic practices, such as stakeholder organizing, participa‐tory planning, or building partnerships. Finally, community problem‐solving often involves special challenges associated with informal bargaining, powerful subtexts grounded in a community’s his‐tory, ambiguous rules about who should be “at the table” and who can represent whom.

This tool provides an overview of negotiation funda‐mentals, a discussion of the special issues outlined above, handy worksheets for preparing your own negotiations, and a set of pitfalls to avoid.

Ideas in Brief Strategy tool #5

Ideas at Work

KEY ISSUE OPPORTUNITIES CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS

Negotiation (or conflict management) is one tool, not always the right tool, for problem-solving with others. It’s important to know the potential and limits of negotiation—and to recognize that sometimes we have no choice: we find ourselves negotiating where we need the cooperation of others.

Strategies and tactics for coming to agreement are obviously important for progress on social problems. Without them, joint problem‐solving can lead to process paraly‐sis (talk that thwarts rather than supports action), impasse, or old‐style imposed decisions that lack constituencies.

If one or more parties are not com‐mitted to it, negotiation can be a device for distraction or manipula‐tion, particularly if some parties do not have the influence needed to protect and advance their interests. Also, poorly handled negotiation can deepen conflict and mistrust.

Classic advice to “negotiate interests, not positions” becomes challenging to practice in the context of problems with many dimen-sions, ideological divides, and complex stake-holder interests. Subtexts, such as a tension between the civic old guard and the new, can undermine pro‐gress. Still, recognizing that ele‐ments of competition can co‐exist with cooperation can shift mindsets from stand‐off and finger‐pointing to problem‐solving.

To go from bargaining—in the nar‐row sense of negotiating fixed in‐terests and options—to problem‐solving together, groups must be conscious about framing problems well up front, working hard at gen‐erating options, and then moving the ideas toward negotiated agree‐ment. Divergent thinking can sharpen the stakes and be a source of breakthrough innovation.

Joint problem‐solving takes will, time and other resources, and prac‐tice, practice, practice. Facilitators and access to diverse expertise can help, but much hinges on the abil‐ity of the parties to question as‐sumptions without resentment, apply flexible thinking, and crea‐tively exploit their differences. Much joint gain is built on trades between parties that want different things.

A large part of community problem-solving is getting effective agents (representatives) to negotiate on behalf of coalitions of stake-holders. Sometimes, coming to agree‐ment on our side and directing our agent effectively are at least as tricky as negotiating with the other side(s).

Agents often play a crucial role in brokering agreements across multi‐ple levels of conflict, where each side has several subgroups. Com‐ing to agreement means learning how to navigate the rules of a game with several levels.

Agents can abuse their roles to stall agreement and advance personal agendas. Plus, the conventional wisdom that we should come to firm internal consensus (“circle the wagons”) on our side and then negotiate with “them” can backfire badly, leading to positional bar‐gaining and failure.

Copyright © 2003 Xavier de Souza Briggs, The Community Problem-Solving Project @ MIT. No permission or fee is required for any and all educational use, pro-vided that this material is provided free or at cost of reproduction.

works to reconcile donors’ expectations about accountability with the flexibility required by fledgling grassroots or‐ganizations and experienced commu‐nity‐based service agencies.

• A community development organiza‐tion forges a deal in which a for‐profit corporation agrees to employ neighbor‐hood residents and procure goods and services from small businesses in ex‐change for community‐based support for the corporation’s presence in the area.

• A neighborhood planning effort in‐volves shared decision‐making about

many things—the scope of planning, the roles of key players—residents, merchants, funders, facilitators, and others—in the process, and substantive priorities once the plan is ready for implementation.

• A collaborative of funders looks for ways to pool investments in a target issue (or place), advancing shared ob‐jectives while pursuing the funders’ specialized missions and program goals as well.

As Roger Fisher and William Ury put it in Getting to Yes, the negotiation best‐seller:

More and more occasions require negotiation; conflict is a growth industry. Everyone wants to par‐ticipate in decisions that affect them; fewer and fewer people will accept decisions dictated by some‐

Negotiation happens in communities all the time, since joint action and joint decision‐making are crucial to making a difference in the world. Rarely is the for‐mal authority of any one decision‐maker or stakeholder enough to accomplish important ends, and all too often, im‐posed decisions are mandates without constituencies to act on them.

As for the specifics, negotiation hap‐pens in many contexts, engages a huge variety of stakeholder groups and per‐sonal styles, and takes many forms. For example: • A group of public, private, and non‐profit community leaders gathers infor‐mally to outline a local campaign to strengthen families and promote child well‐being. The group must accommo‐date the varied interests around the table and choose communication strate‐gies that, likewise, will mobilize a broad base in the community.

• Residents in a rural village meet to de‐velop a budget for allocating social investment funds to a variety of com‐munity infrastructure, income genera‐tion, and other needs. Participants must not only choose options but decide on criteria to apply to the options and

even “decide how to decide”: through majority vote, consensus process, some other approach?

• A company works out new guide‐lines on mitigating pollution, dealing with local and state government and a coalition of environmental advo‐cacy groups to balance economic and social objectives.

• A nonprofit service provider negoti‐ates a performance‐based contract with a government funder. The two parties look for ways to ensure re‐sults while protecting the nonprofit’s autonomy to develop its operational capacity and manage services in cul‐turally appropriate ways that serve the community.

• In developing a new community ini‐tiative, a local “civic intermediary”

We Are All Negotiators Now: An Introduction to Negotiating in Community Problem-Solving by Xavier de Souza Briggs

Xavier de Souza Briggs is Associate Profes‐sor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Part of The Art and Science of Com‐munity Problem‐Solving Project, this tool was prepared to illustrate strategic challenges and choices facing people and institutions around the globe rather than to highlight effective or ineffective handling of particular situations. This project is made possible by generous support from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, Harvard’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Negotiation is back‐and‐forth communication de‐signed to reach agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.—Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes

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governmental or‐ganizations, grant agreements be‐tween philanthro‐pies and nonprofit service providers and advocates, and more. And interna‐tional negotiations a r e impo r t a n t mechanisms for resolving differ‐ences within and across nations. And negotiation may include complex power games and, sometimes, decep‐tion. More gener‐ally, negotiating

parties often use information strategi‐cally, to advance their interests. Parties emphasize certain ideas and not others, and they may omit information without actually lying to other parties.

But the popular images of where ne‐gotiation happens and how it gets done blind us to a great deal of value that ne‐gotiation adds to community problem‐solving and to the many settings in which it takes place in our civic lives—very of‐ten more informally than in those stock images of diplomats and businesspeople cutting deals, very often by building rela‐tionships (not souring them) and creating new learning so that better ideas are pos‐sible, not just convenient “deals.”

The popular images also distort what it means to be an effective negotiator. If hard‐ball and power games were the rule, one would expect cunning, assertiveness, impatience with those who do not con‐cede, emotional toughness and a lack of empathy, and similar traits to define an effective negotiator’s style. Master nego‐tiators would be those who have mas‐

one else. People differ, and they use negotiation to handle their differ‐ences … Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back‐and‐forth communication designed to reach agreement when you and the other side have some interests that are shared and others that are opposed.

A few big claims are embedded in that simple definition, The first is that negotiation is a means toward varied ends, not an end or a “good thing” in and of itself. Negotiation can even be the wrong means toward certain ends, as we will see in a moment. More specifically, the aim of negotiation is to make agree‐ment possible (an interim goal, not an end goal). The results of that agreement may or may not turn out as the parties expect. Negotiation does not provide a crystal ball.

The second implication is that nego‐tiation is primarily a process of communi‐cation, meaning that it’s subject to many of the breakdowns and breakthroughs that affect human communication gener‐ally. Wires get crossed, signals sent are not necessarily those received. Clever persuasion can over‐simplify important facts and mobilize people for all the

wrong reasons. People can use very dif‐ferent words—and body language, too—to convey their expectations. And the needed information may not be available or not to everyone at the right times.

Third and finally, negotiation is de‐fined by interests held by parties (or “stakeholders”). Negotiation is clearly not the only element in joint problem‐solving. It’s the one focused on coming to decision by (a) discovering commonalities or common ground in what two or more

parties want, along with (b) ways to resolve their differences.

By definition, then, negotiation makes sense where and when parties, issues, and interests are already (more or less) defined and when the parties believe they can do better at the negotiat‐ing table than away from it. Negotiation involves seeking agree‐ment at key decision points, but a great deal of civic process—in de‐mocratic societies, both young and old—involves defining the parties, issues, and interests, and setting up a decision process.

Negotiation is therefore part of a larger process of joint problem‐solving. It’s not a set of facilitation tricks for use at the table that make up for bad civics away from the table.

Myths and Realities In spite of the fact that negotiation

is useful and increasingly common, to many civic‐minded people, negotiation has a bad name. It conjures up negative images of “horse trading”—hard‐ball, self‐interested transacting in which power games, threats, and deception dominate. Bargaining instead of build‐

ing consensus. Dealmaking instead of building relationships and creating new possibilities for civic action.

Negotiation includes all of those things, of course. It is important for completing many economic transac‐tions—not just wage agreements but business deals of many kinds, contracts between government and non‐

Introduction to Negotiation

Negotiation is therefore part of a larger process of joint problem-solving. It’s not a set of facilitation tricks for use at the table that make up for bad civics away from the table.

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To many civic-minded people, negotiation has a bad name. It conjures up images of “horse trading” and hard-ball, power games and deception dominate. Bargaining instead of building consensus. Dealmak-ing instead of build-ing relationships.


tered psychological tricks for throwing the other side off balance.

Not so. In decades of advanced train‐ing in negotiation and conflict resolu‐tion—at Harvard and many other univer‐sities—we’ve learned that some of the least effective negotiators are defined by those traits. Negotiation does involve persuasion and can require tremendous assertiveness and toughness, but very often, it also requires active listening skill, substantive creativity to invent options for mutual gain, and the ability to win the trust of others—even where that means overcoming a painful past or building a relationship from scratch.

What’s more, when we ask veteran negotiators from the military or business world to negotiate with each other in simulations or role‐plays, these “pros” often do much worse than beginners with a little bit of training and strategy under their belts. Not only are the tangible out‐comes worse, but the veteran negotiators leave the negotiations less emotionally satisfied and with fewer useful relation‐ships with their counterparts across the table. The reason is that the veterans of‐ten have to unlearn bad habits. Because of the norms in their own workplaces and perhaps some factors of personality and upbringing as well, the veterans also tend to view all negotiations as essentially competitive games—contests wherein one party has to do badly for the other party(ies) to do well.

Of course, this does not mean that effective negotiation is purely a matter of cooperation. Often, we cannot assume that others will be cooperative. Indeed, they may be all too eager to exploit our good‐will and cooperativeness. They may hoard information while we share it.

They may seek to improve their own alternatives to negotiation and worsen ours—back us into a corner, so to speak, where we have little room to maneuver and (seemingly) little lever‐age over the outcomes that matter to us. Finding ways to create valuable coop‐eration while guarding against these risks is what negotiation skill is all about.

Potential and Limits: Negotiation Fundamentals

How then should we define the fundamentals of negotiation in ways that make us more effective? And how should we understand the limits of ne‐gotiation, too? The Taking Stock box (next page) offers an outline. It ad‐dresses the wide range of negotiation situations in which problem‐solvers in the public, private, and non‐governmental sectors may find them‐selves.

The past few decades have seen dramatic growth and progress in the

fields of negotiation, mediation, alterna‐tive dispute resolution, and consensus building. The development of theory and practice in these areas is tremen‐dously positive, given the observation that shared decision‐making is increas‐ingly the “rule of the day” in democ‐ratic societies. But enthusiasm for the techniques can blind us to a simple fact: The best tools are no good—and may even be bad (harmful)—when applied to the wrong task.

When bringing people together to effect change, the first question is not how to go about negotiating decisions effectively but rather : Is negotiation appropriate in this situation at all? Should we negotiate with “them”? Why now? What are the alternatives to nego‐tiation? And is a negotiation in fact pos‐sible—will they agree to negotiate?

From the standpoint of a third‐party wishing to help parties in conflict come to agreement, similar questions are: Are the parties that could craft a valuable agreement ready to negotiate? Will they recognize the value of negotiation and truly commit to the process? What will it take to support that process and see it through?

Sometimes, we have no choice but to negotiate. We depend on others to help us accomplish things and influ‐ence decisions. We find that we have interests that are shared with other stakeholders, as Fisher and Ury de‐scribe it, but others that are opposed. Without formally announcing it or set‐ting an official “table” at which to hold talks, we are negotiating. We are en‐gaged in give‐and‐take to advance our interests.

But sometimes we do have a choice, and negotiation may not be appropri‐ate—or not yet. For example: • When the nature of a problem and the best solution are clear and widely

Negotiation does involve persuasion and can require tremendous assertiveness and toughness, but very of‐ten, it also requires active listening skills, substantive creativity to invent options for mutual gain, and the ability to win the trust of others—even where that means overcoming a painful past .

When bringing people together to effect change, the first question is not how to go about negotiating deci-sions effectively but rather: Is negotiation appropriate in this situation at all?

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understood, negotiation may be redun‐dant, distracting, and even counter‐productive. Negotiation and conflict resolution have sometimes been criti‐cized as “poor people’s justice” in that they compensate for what the law will not enforce. More generally, negotia‐tion can lead to distraction and ma‐nipulation. In some instances, law and community norms point to a clear set of actions—e.g., compliance by a key, powerful party. Negotiation can be an awkward way to make key parties “do the right thing.”

• When it is not clearly in the interests of all parties to negotiate—or key parties otherwise lack commitment to the process. The threshold test here is this: Do the parties to a negotiation recog‐nize, at minimum, the potential to do better at the negotiating table than away from it? This is key to the com‐mitment that negotiation requires. But key parties may prefer lawsuit, inde‐pendent action (going it alone), or some other alternative to negotiation. Dia‐logue and key events—a change of status or perceived interests—may lead key parties to re‐assess the attractive‐ness of their alternatives (see below).

• When parties need assistance but don’t yet have it. Sometimes, gaps in data and information, the technical com‐plexity of the issues, different world‐views, a history of strained relation‐ships, or other barriers make it impossi‐ble for parties to come to agreement on their own. In these instances, mediators or other third party facilitators may be helpful to support the process or sim‐ply to help parties explore the possibil‐ity of negotiating with each other (see below).

As the tools in this series explore in detail, community problem‐solving is defined by collective effort to identify and frame problems for public discus‐sion, to build movement and create con‐stituencies for change, to set meaningful directions—chart a course or “plan”—


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TAKING STOCK (Part One): Negotiation Fundamentals

1. Should we negotiate? Negotiation is not always best. Sometimes, parties are not committed to it, negotiation may be a device for distraction or manipulation (where little of value will actually be decided), or one or more parties may not have the influence and autonomy needed to protect and advance its interests at the table. But sometimes, we have no choice: where there is interdependence and people have different views of a problem or somewhat different interests, we find ourselves, in effect, negotiating a way forward.

2. What value does negotiation add? Negotiation is a part of problem-solving to-gether. Negotiations are defined by parties, issues, interests, alternatives (choices of terms that together would make up an agreement), and the size of the bar-gaining range (in which agreement is actually possible). But specific negotia-tions—crucial episodes in time when agreement may be forged, given parties, issues, interests, and alternatives—are often embedded in larger processes of organizing stakeholders and issues for attention, planning that is substantively smart as well as participatory, and building partnerships to implement jointly created plans. Moreover, community problem-solving frequently involves a host of negotiations, and varied sets of parties, over time—not one big “deal” in which all things are decided once and for all.

3. Isn’t it about competitive tricks and clever maneuvering? Negotiation often involves some element of competition, as when we each party wants part of a limited resource, but can also involve important and creative cooperation, as when parties invent new options to create more value for all sides. Sometimes, parties value different things, not the same thing, and this provides a way to make valu-able “win-win” trades. Negotiation is not synonymous with either competition or cooperation alone.

4. OK, but in the end, is it only dealmaking? Negotiations can be focused on crafting a deal (to seize an opportunity) or resolving a dispute (to overcome a costly stand-off or conflict) or both. The same fundamentals are useful either way, but deals and disputes may be quite different in tone, tempo, and specifics.

5. Don’t some negotiations end in impasse anyway? Many impasses and ineffi-cient agreements result when parties refuse to negotiate their interests and in-stead focus on particular positions. Negotiation becomes a contest defined by demands, a test of who will “give in” first.

6. Is negotiation always about formal agreements and marathon sessions “at the table”? No, negotiation can be quite formal, as when a process of seeking agreement is announced and agreements made are recorded and given legal status, perhaps in a contract or pact. But negotiation can also be quite informal--part of the give-and-take of everyday civic life, in which participation is needed to make progress possible, in which constituencies for change, and not just techni-cally promising ideas, are required.

7. Who should participate? This depends on the issues and stakes. Negotiation can take place between just two parties or among multiple parties. In the latter case, agreement may require the assent of all parties (unanimity) or some critical num-ber of the parties—say 5 out of 6 or 7 out of 10—acting in a coalition. Plus, agents (representatives) must often negotiate on behalf of stakeholder groups.

8. Aren’t mediators or facilitators important? Negotiation may be assisted by third parties, whether neutral or “interested” facilitators. The most well-known type of third-party facilitator is the neutral mediator, whose job it is to help parties come to useful, sustainable agreements. Neutrals have no substantive interest in the outcome, only an interest in improving the process. But problem-solving over time may call for intervention by “mediators with clout” who press stubborn parties into giving negotiation a chance. Indeed, intermediaries or go-betweens play a variety of challenging but important roles in community problem-solving. (See the linked tool in this series, “Working the Middle: Roles and Challenges of Intermedi-aries.”)

decisions. Everyone agrees that de‐mocracy demands dialogue and de‐liberation to allow a careful treatment of issues. But sustaining democracy also requires concrete action on prob‐lems in the world, and action requires making choices, setting priorities, agreeing on roles, agreeing to dis‐agree on some issues but move ahead on others. Talk alone won’t do the trick, even if that talk is inspired and

inclusive. Engage, define, deliberate, decide, act, and then engage again. Any way you define the civic action loop, decision and action are critical, and shared decision often requires the give‐and‐take of negotiation, whether it’s formal or informal.

• When there is a willingness to decide but basic communication break‐downs or other “process barriers” get in the way. Much of negotiation is about thinking and communicating

more effectively to seize the potential agreements that seem to lie just outside our grasp.

• When a unilateral decision could get the job done but a joint decision would be more legitimate and supportable in the community.

The second major lesson in the Taking Stock box is that promoting the public interest through joint action—community problem‐solving, broadly defined—may involve a range of negotiations over time, not one big, formal negotiating table where all things get decided, where one grand “deal” is struck. So we want to think of the work of tackling a public problem(s) or seizing a major opportu‐nity to promote the common good as demanding a host of negotiation skills and settings, depending on what is most appropriate when and whose interests are at stake.

Furthermore, as I noted above, nego‐tiation is a means of delivering the goods, but negotiation does not enable itself. Negotiation matters most to a commu‐nity’s civic life where it builds on a proc‐ess of organizing issues and stakeholders, carrying out substantively smart as well as participatory planning, and building

partnerships to implement jointly‐created plans. Some define negotiation so broadly that it encompasses all of these—the agreement‐seeking process itself and eve‐rything around it. But I find it more use‐ful to define and explore those other practices and processes as challenging, important in their own right, and worthy of careful strategies and tactics (see the tools in this series on those topics).

Third, many efforts to make decisions together include, unavoidably, elements of competition as well as cooperation. So


based on stakeholder values as well as the substantive challenges posed by the problems people care about, and other processes.

The work is both art and science in that some patterns are regular and reli‐able but improvisation and good judg‐ment, as well as risk‐taking and acts of intuition, are usually required too.

The opportunities to apply negotia‐tion skills within these processes, often quite informally, are many. But not eve‐

ryone wants to or can participate effec‐tively in negotiation. (See the case exam‐ples on organizing and negotiation in the linked tool in this series, “Organizing Stakeholders, Building Movement, Set‐ting the Agenda.)

Before we move on, let’s be clear on the kinds of situations in which negotia‐tion may not only be appropriate but actually essential: • When parties share an interest in an outcome but have not come to needed

See linked tool in this series, “Organizing Stakeholders, Building Movement, Setting the Agenda”

Beyond being appropriate, negotiation may actually be essential where: parties share an interest in an outcome but have not come to needed decisions, there is a willingness to decide but communication breakdowns and other barriers get in the way, or a unilateral decision could perhaps get the job done—but a joint one would be much more legitimate and supportable in the community.

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we want to get better at identifying and work‐ing through both as effectively as possible.

As we will see be‐low, this is more than an abstract principle of recognition. Cooperat‐ing and competing at the same time is chal‐lenging for most of us, because we are not ro‐bots. Efforts to get more of what we want—“claim value,” as negotiation ex‐perts James Sebenius and David Lax put it—may crowd out efforts to create value for all of the parties involved. This is es‐pecially true where emotions are running high, the issues are complex, the options seem limited, and time and other re‐sources are in short supply.

Point four in the text box reminds us that negotiations can be mainly about creating an opportunity that hinges on shared decision‐making—a deal to create a new policy or program, pool funds, exchange resources, etc.—or mainly about settling a dispute that is costly and unacceptable to the parties involved. Or both. Not only are dealmaking and dis‐pute resolution somewhat different in tempo and tone, but the consequences of not reaching agreement can be quite dif‐ferent as well. “No agreement” in the context of a deal generally means that the parties find alternative ways to pursue the opportunities they value.

But a failure to resolve a dispute be‐tween two or more parties can impose huge costs on other parties or the com‐munity at large, sour relationships among the disputants (making it harder to prob‐lem‐solve together later on), and even generate new, wider conflicts—the down‐ward spiral where conflict escalates.

Fifth, as we will see in a moment,

many people instinctively negotiate over positions—specific terms they pre‐fer—rather than explore multiple op‐tions for advancing their interests (the underlying, valued things that posi‐tions reflect).

For example, in negotiations with a company and local government over an economic development project, a com‐munity‐based nonprofit group insists on a specific number of new jobs for neighborhood residents instead of ex‐ploring multiple ways of satisfying the group’s underlying interests, which are to (a) enhance economic security in the neighborhood, in part by (b) maximiz‐ing the positive spillovers of the project. Finding these terms unacceptable, the company backs off, governments gets impatient with both parties, finger‐pointing begins, and the result is costly impasse.

By engaging the parties in learning and a process of considering different ways to satisfy the underlying interests, “interested‐based bargaining” enhances the likelihood of a valuable agree‐ment—as well as a relationship to draw on another day.

We will explore the final points in the text box in the sections to come—looking at two‐party versus multi‐party negotiations, for example, and the role of mediators and other third‐party fa‐cilitators. Mediation is quite important

in community problem‐solving, even where it is unofficial and informal. And we’ll use some case examples to explore what it means to prepare effectively for negotiation and actually work things out at the table, through back‐and‐forth com‐munication. (For more illustrations, see the reading and resource list at the end of

this tool.)

Principled Negotiation: An Overview For now, lets assume that negotiation actually is appropriate—and perhaps even essential—in some context that matters to you. There are defined par‐ties, key issues, interests that are at least somewhat clear to shape and motivate the negotiation. Here are Fisher and Ury’s basic rules for princi‐

pled negotiation, which stand up again and again in practice—in an incredibly wide variety of specific situations around the world: • (People) Separate the People from the Prob‐lem. Fisher and Ury advise negotiators not to make big assumptions about the other side’s intentions and not to entan‐gle the relationships in the substance of the problem. Instead, they urge us to discussion perceptions, let each side blow off steam, and listen actively to what is being said.

• (Interests) Focus on interests, not posi‐tions. Acknowledge their interests as part of problem‐solving. Explore your multiple interests: ask “why” ques‐tions, get at basic concerns behind the stated preferences.

• (Options) Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do. Invent op‐tions—avoid the instinct to narrow immediately to specific terms or posi‐tions—by making time to brainstorm without judging. Use facilitators to support the process of inventing before deciding.

• (Criteria) Insist that the result be based on some objective standard, such as market value, precedents or moral standards, best‐available scientific judgments, professional standards, the principle of


Failure to resolve a dispute between two or more par‐ties can impose huge costs on other parties or the community at large, sour relationships among the disputants, and even generate new, wider conflicts.

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reciprocity or equity, measurable costs and benefits, etc.

The distinction between positions and interests is extremely important and, we have found, much easier said than prac‐ticed. Negotiation educators often tell the story of two chil‐dren fighting over an orange. A parent in‐tervenes and, perhaps not surprisingly, gets the children to agree to split the orange in half. Fair and equita‐ble, it might seem. But it turns out that one child wanted to eat the orange (the fruit), while the other wanted only the orange rind to use in a baking recipe. Each child could have ne‐gotiated a much better deal—all of the fruit to one and all of the rind to the other. But by responding to positions rather than interests, the parent has un‐wittingly created a very inefficient deal. In the shorthand of negotiation, consider‐able value has been “left on the table.”

As Fisher and Ury have long stressed, these and other principles are driven by practical, not moral considerations. This is not to say that felt obligations to others, or even allegiance to higher creeds and notions of justice, have no place in nego‐tiation. Rather, the principled negotiation

approach seeks to enable negotiators who may have quite different moral commitments and even limited trust in each other to problem‐solve together. The approach is designed to help two

or more parties do better through ne‐gotiation than they could otherwise, period. It does not rely on higher moral

principles about what we owe to others.

That said, it certainly helps when negotiators come to the table with some commitment to fair play and a genuine interest in fair outcomes for all sides. Such commitment and interest may well be rooted in moral, religious, or cultural traditions about which the par‐ties feel very strongly.

Let’s put these ideas to work in the first case example, in which we will also use the first worksheet in this strategy tool.

Case #1: Negotiating a Public/Nonprofit Contract for Services

Imagine a meeting—it could be in almost any community in any corner of the world—in which a government agency and a nonprofit, non‐governmental organization are scheduled to develop a contract for services. The nonprofit organization will be the service provider, government the funder and

regulator that invests public resources and monitors per‐formance to ensure compliance with applicable laws as well as results. Let’s say that the ser‐vice is screening and vaccinat‐ing children to prevent the spread of a crippling disease. (The service could just as easily be job training or environ‐mental clean‐up or develop‐ment of affordable housing.) Let’s keep it simple to start and

imagine that the only issue up for discus‐sion is price—the fee that government will pay the nonprofit for a specific quantity and quality of service. There are, there‐fore, just two parties and one negotiable issue.

The worksheet on the next page (Getting Ready to Negotiate: Prep Tool #1) allows us to define the situation, better understand our alternatives, and prepare an approach. Both parties—the govern‐ment and nonprofit representatives—could benefit from this preparation. To keep this discussion clearer, though, let’s suppose that I represent the nonprofit.

We know there are two issues, and assume for now that there is history be‐tween me and the other party. It would help me to know more about the person negotiating across the table from me, so I decide to do some homework on their work style and reputation (if any) in the community as a negotiator. Also, where “influentials” are concerned, assume that there are no other key parties except for those in government to whom my nego‐tiation counterpart reports. Presumably, their interests will be directly represented by my counterpart. (Note that it would help if I knew something about the per‐


The principled negotia-tion approach seeks to enable negotiators who may have quite different moral commitments and even limited trust in each other to problem-solve together.

9

TAKING STOCK (Part Two) PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION

In Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher and William Ury provide four (4) core principles: 1. (People) Separate the people from the problem. Many impasses and poor agree-

ments result from confounding the substance of the issues with the relationship or personal issues between the negotiators.

2. (Interests) Focus on interests, not positions. Interests—the underlying things of value that negotiators really want—can often be advanced in many ways (see next point). So specific terms (positions) should not crowd out the effort to under-stand and address interests.

3. (Options) Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do. As Fisher and Ury add, “Invent before deciding.” Often, it’s psychological, not substan-tive barriers, that prevent parties from creating better options and more value for all sides.

4. (Criteria) Insist that the result be based on some objective standard, such as mar-ket value, community precedents or shared moral standards, best-available scien-tific judgments, professional standards, the principle of reciprocity or equity, meas-urable costs and benefits, etc.

(Continued on page 11)

Getting Ready to Deal: Negotiator’s Prep Tool #1 Use this form to make notes. Use a separate sheet to develop full-length answers and best guesses.

Alternatives What is my best alternative to (this) ne-gotiated agreement (BATNA)? (What alternatives would I rely on to advance the same interests on these issues?) What is their best alternative(s)? How certain am I about this? Based on what I know, should I make the first offer or try to them to do so?

Arguments What “principled” arguments (rationales) can I use at the table to support what I want? What are their counter-arguments likely to be? How can I respond to those?

More Homework How can I find out more about their inter-ests, alternatives, likely arguments, and style? Who can help me learn more?


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THE BARGAINING RANGE

If possible, sketch the potential range for coming to agreement, based on the parties best alternatives:

Issues Number and Types. What are the main issues to be negotiated? Which are tangible (e.g., price) and which intangible (e.g., autonomy, recognition, etc.)? Side Issues. Is there room to introduce additional issues? Will they be valued? (Think about possible sources of trades.)

Interests Mine. What are my tangible interests in the issues up for negotiation? What am I looking to protect or advance? What about my key intangible inter-ests? Theirs. What interests do they—or might they—have at stake, tangible or intangible? (Tip: Don’t confuse this with the interests you wish they had.)

Parties Number. How many are there (including yourself)? _____ Direct/Agents. Are the negotiators rep-resenting their own interests or those of an organization, group, or other constitu-ents? History. What relationship or other his-tory do I have with the other party(ies)? (Think about the person(s) but also their constituents, if appropriate.) Style. What do I know about their negoti-ating or working style? How do they deal with others in the context of handling conflict or coming to decision? How can I find out more about those with whom I have no history or about whom I have no knowledge? Influentials. What key parties who are not in this negotiation might nevertheless exert an influence? (Think of parties that may try to shape the process or out-comes, as well as those to whom the other party might defer or feel obliged.)

son’s boss—i.e., about who this person will report to on the outcome of our ne‐gotiation. If that person’s perceptions are important to my counterpart, then they become, by extension, important to me, too.)

Next, let’s try to understand the num‐ber and nature of the issues being negoti‐ated and what the bargaining range on those issues may look like. The one tangi‐ble issue here is price. We can expect that the nonprofit will favor a higher fee for its services, while government will seek to minimize the fee. The price issue is therefore inherently competitive; the two parties’ interests—on this narrow is‐sue—are at odds, and the negotiation looks much like a private, negotiated transaction, in which you or I might buy a home or used car or ornament in a ba‐zaar.

Before we make this situation more complex—and also more realistic—by bringing other issues into view, consider how much room the two parties have, even on the narrow issue of price, to craft a mutually beneficial agreement and leave the table satisfied.

First, the bargaining range, sometimes called the “zone of possible agreement,” is defined by the limits of what the two parties will accept. Rationally, if govern‐ment can purchase the same service from another vendor for, say, $12 per unit of service (per client served), why should it pay this nonprofit vendor any more? Twelve dollars per unit of service, what’s known as the Best Alternative to Negoti‐ated Agreement or “BATNA” in the shorthand, becomes the rational reserva‐tion price (reservation value) of the gov‐ernment party.

To keep the case simple for now, we are going to assume that government does have a range of service providers to choose from (though this may not be the case) and that it can compare providers

and choose on the basis of price alone (though realistically, a host of other factors might also be weighed).

The nonprofit’s alternatives and reservation price may be more complex, however. Government may be the only funder “in the market” for vaccination services. The nonprofit may be low on funds and eager to get the vaccination service funded. Its only alternative to government funding may be to provide a different service, generate some reve‐nues that way and self‐fund (on a more limited basis) the vaccination service. Realistically, this nonprofit—our non‐

profit’s—financial options seem lim‐ited. A key conclusion of this preliminary analysis, then, turns out to be a big les‐son about bargain‐ing power: Some‐times, the best way to gain leverage at the table is to improve

your options away from the table—i.e., your alternatives to negotiated agree‐ment.

But sticking to the simple version of events, we, the nonprofit directors, have decided that we will accept as

little as $6 per unit of service, which is just a little more than our costs ($5) for providing the service. In principle, then, the bargaining range runs from the mini‐mum $5 per unit that we will accept to the maximum $12 that government will pay ($5‐12).

Analyzing the Case: Persuasion, First Offers, and Walk-Aways

What’s striking, in the role plays we have run in the classroom with hundreds of negotiators of all ages and back‐grounds, is how varied the outcomes are across pairs of negotiators given the same instructions and same basic structure (two parties, one issue, fixed reservation values). While quite a few negotiators end up with agreements clustered in the middle of the bargaining range, more than a few are at the extremes, and some do not reach agreement at all, even where there seems to be much so room to agree!

How is this possible? First, the two parties involved rarely know exactly how much the other party will be willing to accept. The frequently heard question,

“What’s your bottom line?” aims to se‐cure this precious information.

So one reason that our hundreds of pairs of negotiators end up in different places is that people make different as‐sumptions about the other side’s reserva‐tion value and how much or how little will satisfy them. In many instances, ne‐gotiators under‐estimate the full bargain‐ing range: their own view of the issues blinds them to the other side’s perspec‐tive and, in this case, financial room to maneuver. Sometimes, though, each ne‐gotiator over‐estimates how much the other party can concede, and stubborn, positional bargaining ensues, leading to impasse or bruising, dissatisfying agree‐ments.

Note, before we move on, note that the Worksheet is a device for recording everything that you already know and for


11

(Continued from page 9)

Sometimes, the best way to gain leverage at the table is to improve your options away from the table—i.e., your alternatives to negotiated agreement.

identifying some gaps in your knowledge that careful background work (“homework”) might fill in. Typically, you won’t know the bargaining range as specifically as I gave it to you above ($5 to $12), but the more you can find out in advance, the better. The more you can learn at the table to add to your home‐work, the better as well.

A second reason that negotiation out‐comes differ so dramatically from pair to pair is that negotiation is a back‐and‐forth persuasive process, and some peo‐ple are more persuasive—or conversely more easily persuaded—than others. More generally, negotiators’ strengths, weaknesses, and styles vary widely (see “Skills and Style” on this page).

In multiple examples of the simple “price negotiation” outlined here, we have heard every conceivable argument and request—at the table, during the ne‐gotiation—by every imaginable personal‐ity!

Some in the seller role (the party that seeks a higher price) will empha‐size how hard it is to make ends meet, portraying itself as the resource‐poor party, the disadvantaged in the situa‐tion. Setting the price is framed as fun‐damentally a fairness issue. Others will make the most dramatic claims about the service they are selling, comparing their services (unaided by anything the faculty have suggested) to “the best in the world” and “state of the art.” Other negotiators will emphasize the impor‐tance of a “future working relation‐ship,” even where the instructions indi‐cate that no such future is likely, that this is to be a one‐off deal.

The key is that human beings often respond at least as much to the “why” (rationales) we offer as the “what.” Mountains of psychological research confirm this. We are much more likely to respond to people and ideas that strike us as reasonable and

even important. One reason I ask my students to think

about their specific arguments, and not just their interests, in advance—and to outline their arguments on the Work‐sheet—is that a little attention to these principles of persuasion can go a long way (and see Principles of Persuasion on the next page).

Persuading, of course, is about influ‐encing how your audience thinks and acts. So “know your audience” is rule one—and another reason to do your homework.

More Lessons: The Psychology of Negotiation

A third reason that outcomes range widely is anchoring, a well‐documented psychological phenomenon in which our minds get stuck or “anchored” by assign‐ing weight to a piece of information that is irrelevant or, at best, modestly impor‐tant. As Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale show in Negotiating Rationally, many negotiators use first offers or other early, stage‐setting remarks to anchor their counterparts in a favorable part of the bargaining range.

How does this work? The govern‐ment negotiator might begin our contract meeting with a statement that passes for small talk, “You know, we’ve been buried in these contract talks lately. The other day, I spent four hours with a nonprofit group even though I was willing to come up to $7 per unit!”

The government’s contract negotiator is hoping I will do several things with this “casual” remark. First, she hopes I will view my negotiation with her in the


Negotiation is a back‐and‐forth persuasive process, and some people are more persuasive—or conversely, more easily persuaded—than others.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Three) NEGOTIATION SKILLS & STYLE

Roger Fisher and Wayne Davis find that six interpersonal skills are consistently impor-tant for effective negotiation. They help define a negotiator’s personal repertoire: 1. Being able to express strong feelings appropriately. 2. Remaining rational in the face of strong feelings. 3. Being assertive within a negotiation without damaging the relationship. 4. Improving a relationship without damage to a particular negotiation. 5. Speaking clearly in ways that promote listening. 6. Inquiring and listening effectively (active listening).

Keith Allred, inventor of the Personal Conflict Profile™, an assessment tool, recom-mends developing and, over time, measuring your success as a negotiator in multi-ple dimensions. You and those with whom you negotiate should rate you a success in … 1. Being persuasive. 2. Maintaining strong relations with the other party. 3. Making your reasoning clear for the positions you advocate. 4. Understanding the other party’s interests and communicating that you appreciate

their perspective. 5. Recognizing the relative importance of various issues to the other party, as well as

which interests you share with them and which conflict. 6. Generating options that effectively address the party’s interests. 7. Apologizing for problems or harms for which you are responsible and avoiding

inappropriate blaming of the other party for problems which arise.

context of comparable negotiations held recently and perhaps accept a compara‐ble outcome as fair. But unless there are mandated fee schedules and other guide‐lines for these contracts, my contract should presumably be decided on its own merits and according to the willingness of the two parties at the table to craft the most valuable agreement they can. Who cares about that other negotiation?

Second, my negotiation counterpart is hoping I will remem‐ber the words “even though I was willing to come up to $7”—a sign that she is a coop‐erative bargainer (“willing”) and that she really conceded something to come, in effect, “all the way” up to $7.

Without using overt hard‐bargainer tactics, my counterpart is seeking to an‐chor me at the low end of the bargaining range so that I will think any outcome greater than $7 incredibly generous (on her part) but perhaps even unattainable.

Another, more direct approach to anchoring one’s counterpart is to make the first offer, and this can be done infor‐mally. My counterpart might say, “How much do you really need to provide this service? About $5.50 per unit?” Again, the $5.50 figure is meant to get me think‐ing on the low end of the bargaining range, and while it is not an official offer, the implication is that my counterpart mentions it because she would certainly be willing to agree on a price that meets my “needs.”

As Fisher and Ury remind us in Get‐ting to Yes, if negotiation is about advanc‐ing interests, we can “disarm the hard bargainer” without appearing unreason‐able. “I don’t think it’s strictly a question of need,” I say, “So why don’t we talk about a fair price for delivering a valuable service to the community?”

The most important defense against anchoring is recognizing it and practicing

a little mindfulness at the table, lest our own minds play tricks on us.

But the second defense hinges on a more basic question: When should I make the first offer? The rule of thumb is that if you have done your homework and are fairly confident you know your counter‐part’s reservation value, then make the first offer and work to anchor them in a portion of the bargaining range favorable to you. If you are unsure about their reserva‐


Disarming the hard bargainer: “I don’t think it’s strictly a question of need,” I say, “So why don’t we talk about a fair price for delivering a valuable service to the community?”

“Framing” is important to persuasion because people perceive their interests differently depending on how choices are posed.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Four) PRINCIPLES OF PERSUASION

As Michael Watkins notes, “framing” is important to persuasion because people per-ceive their interests differently depending on how choices are posed. Taken too far, this is a recipe for manipulation, of course, but used appropriately, framing principles can give our good ideas a needed boost. Here are some tried-and-true approaches to framing and otherwise conveying our ideas more persuasively: 1. Invoke the common good. Many persuasive arguments emphasize collective bene-

fits and downplay individual costs. 2. Make connections to core values. Draw on the genius of marketing, which links

things for sale (cars, clothes, etc.) to cherished values, such as independence, re-spect, and innovation.

3. Heighten concerns about loss or risk. Emphasize what makes desired courses of action less risky than alternative courses of action.

4. Leverage the power of contrasts to make requests seem more reasonable. Prac-titioners often manage expectations by living the adage, “Under-promise, over-deliver.” Likewise, negotiators may ask for a great deal initially and then retreat to a more reasonable request. Advocates compare what they want to what others have asked for, showing how their requests aren’t so big “in the scheme of things” (i.e., in comparison).

5. Strategically narrow or broaden the focus. “A choice that could be construed as setting an undesirable precedent might best be framed as a highly circumscribed, isolated situation independent of other decisions,” says Watkins.

6. Neutralize toxic issues. Table them or make up-front commitments that allow you to move on to other issues where you can generate momentum.

7. Refute counter-arguments in advance. This rule goes back at least as far as the ancient Greeks, notes Watkins. Anticipate their major reservations and address them preventively.

8. Give your counterpart(s) a script for persuading others. Give those with whom you’re negotiating some arguments that address the concerns of key others—e.g., their bosses, peers, allies, etc. Equip those you are persuading to persuade others.

Source: Michael Watkins, “The Power to Persuade” (Harvard Business School Publishing, 2000). See also Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (1984) and Zimbardo and Leippe, The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence (1991).

tion value, either let them make the first offer (and work hard to avoid being an‐chored by it) or make a flexible first offer that probes for information: “What would do it for you here, say about $11?” (Note that this wording is less ag‐gressive than “What’s your bottom line?”)

There are other, more subtle, reasons that pairs of negotiators, given the same “basic” exercise with the same instruc‐tions, generate such a wide range of out‐comes. One reason is differences in per‐ceptions of the situation. Some negotia‐tors instinctively see the process of seek‐ing agreement as a primarily competitive process. They have a will to win and use the phrase “winning” to describe their outcomes. In this simple price case, com‐

petitive as it is, both parties can do better than their reservation values—which is a form of winning open to both parties—yet some negotiators cannot help but see themselves in a race with the other party.

Another psychological distinction we often find is this: Some negotiators are much more willing than others to risk no agreement for the sake of winning con‐

cessions from the other party (i.e., claiming value for themselves). In plainer terms, some parties are much more willing than others to walk away from the table. And the credible indica‐tion that they will walk away—it may or may not be seen as a “threat” per se—can be a powerful source of influ‐ence over the outcome (specific terms of

the agreement). Not surprisingly, a favorite tactic in price negotiations, or other competitive one‐issue negotia‐tions, is making the other party believe that you are indifferent to the agree‐ment, could “take it or leave it.”

Taking the Case Further: Reputa-tions, Linked Bargains, and Joint Gain

As a practical matter, most negotia‐tions important in community problem‐solving are not so limited or so purely competitive. Let’s add a few features to this public/nonprofit contract example. That is, let’s change the game in ways that reflect more real‐world features and possibilities.

Imagine, first of all, that the encoun‐ter between a government agency and a key nonprofit service provider is any‐thing but a one‐time or “one‐off” agree‐ment, that some future is likely in that

the parties will be dealing with each other again—and perhaps in a variety of settings. Immediately, we should recog‐nize a few things about how dramatically this may shift our preparation for the negotiation and our behavior at the table: • Reputation matters. The stakes are no longer limited to the tangible issues formally up for negotiation (such as price for services) but now include our reputations in the community. We care not only about the near‐term outcome but about perceptions of the outcome and effects of those perceptions on sub‐sequent encounters—probably with a range of parties, not just our counter‐parts across the table now.

• Bargains can be linked. The terms of this agreement may be linked to other ne‐gotiations in which the same two par‐ties expect to engage. That is, this bar‐gain may be linked to another one that includes the two parties, so we will probably think about the gains and concessions we make with a series of negotiations in mind, not just the one encounter. We may even explicitly link today’s agreement to another one: Do this for me now, and I will compensate you later.

• The quality and usefulness of the relation‐ship is at stake. For all of the just‐mentioned reasons, strengthening or weakening the relationship between the parties is always a possibility, even if the parties do not discuss their


Some negotiators are much more willing than others to risk no agreement—walk away from the table—for the sake of winning concessions from the other party

The stakes are no longer limited to the tangible issues formally up for negotiation but now include our reputations in the community.

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(intangible) interest in improving the relationship explicitly (or pursue it with equal gusto and effectiveness).

These considerations are incredibly common in joint problem‐solving and not only at the local or “community” level. Many of our most valuable agreements are forged with people with whom we will deal again and again. Networks op‐erate to communicate our reputations—for fair or unfair play, for certain types of demands and concessions, for employing a particular style of negotiation. Parties confronted with imposing limitations in the near term find ways to use the future to promise compensation—“what goes around comes around,” we say, and “win some, lose some,” meaning that what matters is doing as well as you can over the long haul, not just “winning” today.

Let’s change the price game in an‐other important way now, expanding the number and types of issues. (Note that one key question on the Worksheet is, “What are the issues?” and another is, “Is there room to introduce additional is‐sues?”)

Even where a negotiation is mainly a transaction between two parties, in public problem‐solving, transactions are rarely about one issue alone. Along with tangible interests in price (financial resources), time, and substantive role in whatever follows the agreement, parties often care about a host of intangibles, such as image, higher principles—having a say, for example, or setting an important precedent or respecting com‐munity traditions and the values be‐hind them.

There are two ways to look at the effects of adding issues, which often change the game. One way is to con‐clude that the new game is more com‐plex, harder to resolve because they are now more concerns and more to figure out and work out. And adding issues may sometimes just make things harder, it’s true. But another, more crea‐tive way to look at this is to see that

when there’s more to negotiate, there’s often more room to negotiate too. As Se‐benius and Lax note in The Manager as Negotiator, where parties value different things (or the same things differently), they can make valuable, win‐win trades.

Let’s return to the case of our two party contract negotiation, this time with a few more issues and a future—the pros‐pect of a relationship and additional en‐counters—in the mix.

Imagine that the government agency values three things but not all three to the same degree. The public budget is tighter this year than last, and all managers are under pressure to show cost savings wherever possible. So price (for services) is very important, and ultimately the gov‐ernment cares most about total price, not the unit price, because it’s the total cost that will be most visible to the public and to elected officials. Second, the Mayor is eager to show progress on campaign commitments to improve community health, most of all children’s health and safety. So timing—how soon the services can begin and get to communitywide scale—is also very important to the gov‐ernment. A third issue, program design (the specifics of how the vaccination pro‐gram will function) is only somewhat important, as long as the service provider guarantees quality outcomes, and gov‐


Where there’s more to negotiate, there’s often more room to negotiate too.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Five) EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS

Effective relationships that allow people to work together over time share certain traits. In general, such relationships tend to be … 1. Forward-looking. Change is expected, even anticipated. The parties involved

make room for their relationship to grow. They look ahead to anticipate shocks and opportunities in the environment that might affect the outcomes they care about—and thus the relationship.

2. Committed and resilient. They withstand pressure, in part through willingness and capacity to “see things through” before resorting to “hardball.” The parties avoid making major assumptions about each others’ intentions. Effective communication is key, and this means more than sending signals clearly. It also includes active listen-ing—listening to understand, summarizing what they say and checking with them to be sure you have understood.

3. Fair—i.e., perceived as fair by both sides. The relationship reflects a balanced allocation of benefits and rewards, meets the parties’ criteria—whatever defines value—over time, even if short-term costs and benefits are uneven here and there.

4. Trust-based and forgiving—but provocable. Charles Sabel and other students of cooperation recommend “studied trust” in which the parties make it easy for each other to monitor compliance with commitments made. Beyond having a practical value, supporting such mechanisms signals a willingness to do what you say. And Robert Axelrod says parties can apply a tit-for-tat rule to infractions, being “provocable but forgiving.” Abuses will not be tolerated, but parties will extend each other the benefit of the doubt and will be willing to forgive, at least within certain limits.

5. Realistic. Agreed-upon expectations are reasonable and, where possible, adjust-able. In a rush to agree, parties will not insist on or agree to things that cannot be delivered, based on best-available information and standards.

ernment has some preferences about staffing and materials to be used.

The nonprofit sees things a bit differ‐ently. It needs to obtain a fee per unit of service that will cover its costs, but the organization would be willing to forego a larger contract for the sake of flexibility to experiment with the program design. One reason is that the organization wants to establish itself as an innovator, and so the specifics of program delivery are quite important. A second reason is that the nonprofit wants to retain the auton‐omy to develop its own capacity in ap‐propriate ways—not get stuck with staff‐ing dictated by government, for example, only to see funding evaporate and priori‐ties change. As for timing, the nonprofit would like to get up and running soon,

but it does not want to rush into the field (and make costly errors) simply for the sake of visibility.

Figure 1 outlines these distinct prefer‐ences. In the shorthand of negotiation, the interests indicate what parties would pre‐fer vis‐à‐vis specific issues, and weights indicate how important (overall) a given issue is relative to the other issues.

Whereas before we had a bargaining range in one dimension (price), now there

are many possibilities for one party to trade (concede) something less impor‐tant to it in exchange for something it values more. For example, in one possi‐ble outcome: • Government grants significant flexi‐bility on pro‐gram design in exchange for a commitment by the nonprofit for early delivery, beginning in three weeks. But the nonprofit convinces gov‐ernment that rapid start‐up

should be limited to a pilot phase that generates some lessons useful for a scaled‐up version of the program to start 3‐4 months from now. The pilot will show visible follow‐up by the Mayor but limit costly mistakes.

• The nonprofit accepts a smaller total contract (addressing government’s need to limit total costs) but secures a fairly high unit price that will help

the organization build up a skilled staff and the equipment needed to deliver quality community health programs. Pointing to evidence that cheap pro‐grams yield correspondingly limited

results, the service provider argues successfully for qual‐ity and impact rather than “mile‐wide, inch‐deep” cov‐erage of the total population.

• Each party is able to claim victory on key intangible in‐terests—the nonprofit has protected its autonomy to design and deliver an inno‐vative community health program, the government has ensured responsiveness on an urgent public problem,

as well as the appearance that it is man‐aging resources carefully in a tight‐budget year.

This agreement reflects what is known in negotiation as a package or “bundle.” It addresses specific options on several issues at once.

Why is this “bundling” so important? Go back to each issue named above, and you will notice that the government agency and nonprofit service provider seem to have conflicting interests. On time, for example, government favors “start immediately” and the nonprofit wants time to do things right. On pro‐gram design, government has some pref‐erences, but the nonprofit would like total flexibility to do things as it sees fit. And finally, one party continues to want a higher, and the other a lower, price.


Whereas before we had a bargaining range in one di-mension (price), now there are many possibilities for one party to trade (concede) something less impor-tant to it in exchange for something it values more.

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PARTIES KEY INTERESTS (By Issue)

Government Agency • Shave costs in a tight-budget year.

• Show response on Mayor’s campaign promises (secure rapid implementation schedule)

• Ensure quality

Nonprofit Service Provider • Cover costs, ensure quality, develop capacity.

• Ensure quality, learn through pilot phase

• Protect autonomy, develop reputation for inno-vation

ISSUES (Relative Importance)

• Price (very important) - focus is total price

• Time (very important) - i.e., schedule for imple-menting the service

• Program design (somewhat important)

• Price (very important) - focus is unit price

• Time (somewhat important)

• Program design (very important)

Figure 1. Expanded Public/Nonprofit Negotiation over a Service Contract

Each individual issue in this negotia‐tion, then, is purely competitive (or “zero‐sum”). More for one party means less for the other. Try to negotiate the issues one by one, and we face a series of competitive, win‐lose exchanges. No win‐win (joint gain) will be possible.

How can the parties do better than this? The key is that the two parties do not have identical interests or weight each issue the same way, as we outlined above. Trades are possible where the parties can exploit these differences in what they want—not the most intuitive idea, since negotiation is sometimes described as an effort to find common ground. Yes, agreement will come only where the two parties jointly agree on some package, but building a valuable package, among a host of alternative proposals, will clearly demand that the parties understand and explore their differences.

As George Wu of the Harvard Busi‐ness School notes in “Sources of Joint Gains in Negotiations,” most joint gains are about leveraging differences, in which each party receives something valuable to it in exchange for giving something cheap (or cheaper) to it. There are multiple di‐mensions along which differences can lead to valuable win‐win trades: • Differences in interests, as we saw in this simple case example, often in the form of placing different weights on specific interests. Swaps create value by trading

what each party values less for what each values more;

• Differences in belief about the future. Parties that expect different things can, in effect, place different bets about the future. This is what makes stock markets run. In the example above, government and the nonprofit might have very different beliefs about the potential of an untried pro‐gram. The party confident of a high payoff with the program might be willing to back it for little up front

compensation, contingent on a big re‐ward if the program indeed pays off. Trades create value by responding to each party’s (different) prediction about the future, usually via a contin‐gent agreement or “bet.”

• Differences in aversion to risk. Some peo‐ple are, as economists say, risk‐seeking while others are risk‐averse. Risk seek‐ers are willing to run bigger risks in exchange for bigger rewards, while others prefer to play it (comparatively) safe. Trades offer a guarantee to the

more risk averse party while shifting bigger rewards, in the case of success, to the risk‐seeking party. So a risk‐averse community development or‐ganization may be happy to accept a limited number of guaranteed job slots for neighborhood residents from a su‐permarket moving into the neighbor‐hood. What matters most is getting some jobs for sure. The more risk‐seeking party (the supermarket) trades that guarantee for flexibility to hire anyone it likes should the market be‐come very successful (even if the pro‐portion of the market’s employees who are neighborhood residents goes down). A more conventional approach would simply settle on a number of job slots, regardless of these different appe‐tites for risk. And

• Differences in time preference. As we saw above, making sure that something happens right away may be much more important to one party than to others. The party agreeing to speed things up can be compensated via issues that it cares about more than timing.

Wu suggests that negotiators not just identify interests they share with the other side(s) but also construct an inven‐tory of differences. This can begin in ad‐


Wu suggests that negotiators not just identify interests they share with the other side but also construct an “inventory of differences” that can be a guide to possible trades.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Six) BARRIERS TO JOINT GAIN

Win-win—or “creating value” for all sides—is often possible in negotiation. Yet many factors can make it hard to find or deliver, for example: 1. Assuming a “fixed pie” (that parties’ interests are directly opposed on all issues,

with no room for trades). 2. Assuming a conflict (parties actually want the same thing, but “baggage,” bias,

and the escalation of conflict obscure it). 3. Thinking narrowly about differences (the parties consider differences in interest

only, ignoring time, risk aversion, and other preference differences). 4. Taking up zero-sum (competitive) issues one by one. Trades depend on working

across issues to create value for both parties. Without “bundling,” the parties can only carry out a series of competitive, win-lose negotiations that are less efficient and, typically, much less emotionally satisfying.

5. Devaluing the other side’s offers (proposals by the other side tend to be deval-ued—“why aren’t they giving in more?!?”).

6. Exaggerating claims and posturing. 7. Being overconfident (each side believes the other will be willing to concede more).

vance of the negotiation and continue at the table, as the parties learn more about each other.

So far, we’ve added issues to a very basic one‐issue (price) negotiation. Below, we’ll see how adding more parties like‐wise expands the possibilities for valu‐able trades—and introduces the need for more tools to manage the process through which parties interact. Before reading on, take a moment to review the core concepts we have covered so far (next page).

If you remember nothing else from this first case and discussion, remember this: Do your homework. Prepare, pre‐pare, prepare. Most inexperienced nego‐tiators, and many experienced ones too, under‐prepare significantly. In effect, they foolishly rely on assertiveness, clev‐erness, or charm at the table (or all of the above) to compensate for huge gaps in the information they have—gaps that might have been remedied with a little investment of time and energy up front.

Beyond the Basics: More Parties, More Issues, More Creative Solu-tions

We’ve seen so far that effective nego‐tiation hinges on choosing situations that are appropriate—insofar as one can choose—adopting some basic principles to enable joint problem‐solving (rather than stand‐off or avoidance), preparing away from the table for what happens at the table, managing our own perceptions and those of others, and looking for op‐

portunities to create joint gain (sometimes in counter‐intuitive ways). These factors, which apply even in the case of two parties working out agree‐ment, become all the more important when the number of parties increases and the negotiation process becomes more

complex. First, let’s look at the general fea‐

tures that make multi‐party negotia‐tions special and apply these ideas to a new case example, in which parties come together in a community to define and implement solutions to a critical social problem. Many of the ideas that

apply to negotiations across organizations or groups, such as in the case example below, also apply when multiple parties within an organization are negotiating a major decision.

Following the example, we’ll consider more advanced issues related to media‐tors and other types of third‐party facili‐


Most inexperienced negotiators, and many experienced ones too, under-prepare significantly. In effect, they foolishly rely on assertiveness, cleverness, or charm at the table (or all of those) to compensate for huge gaps in the information they have.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Seven) REVIEWING KEY CONCEPTS

1. Know your alternatives—and improve them. Be clear on the value of your alter-natives to negotiated agreement, learn as much as you can about their (your coun-terpart’s) alternatives, and improve yours if you can. Alternatives to negotiated agreement define the bargaining range, and the quality of these alternatives helps determine the leverage that parties have. Sometimes, the most important thing you can do to gain leverage at the table is to improve your alternatives away from the table—or worsen the other side’s perception of its alternatives. Options are a source of power.

2. Shape their perceptions through principled arguments. Since information about the other party(ies) is often incomplete, much of the persuasion in negotiation cen-ters on shaping the other side’s perceptions about the bargaining range and desir-ability of particular outcomes within it. This is different from convincing them simply to share your interests or give in for the sake of fairness. So know your audience, and prepare your arguments and counter-arguments carefully.

3. Make the first offer if your information is good. First offer can help “anchor” the other party(ies) in a portion of the bargaining range favorable to you, but make the first offer if your information on their reservation value is good, or make an open-ended, probing offer to improve your information.

4. Be mindful of your own perceptions. What makes negotiation a human process, and not a robotic exercise in information exchange, is the power of our perceptions and biases—as well as, more positively, our capacity to self-correct and “rescue” ourselves. Be careful about attributing (rather than confirming) the other party’s intentions, listen well and communicate as clearly as possible (and confirm that they understand), re-negotiate the process if their conduct does not seem respectful or constructive.

5. Change the game to create a more valuable agreement. Even negotiations that seem narrow and limited to competition can often be expanded to consider future relationship, intangible interests, and linked issues (such as quality linked to price).

6. Look for valuable trades. In multi-issue negotiations, win-win trades are possible, but it’s usually differences in what parties want that makes trades possible. Some key types of trade-able differences relate to interests, beliefs about the future, aversion to risk, and time preferences.

7. Do your homework—on the issues; options; other party’s interests, alternatives, and negotiating style, and more. Once you’ve identified the stakeholders, learn all that you can about them, what they value, and how they view the world. Most inexperienced negotiators, and many experienced ones too, under-prepare signifi-cantly. Use your personal networks, public information sources, industry databases, key informants or knowledgeable observers (including well-informed journalists), and other sources. Don’t rush to the table ill-prepared.

tators, the challenges of negotiating on behalf of constituents (being an “agent”)—a very common pattern in community problem‐solving—and more.

Negotiations that include three or more parties present dynamics that are quite different from the two‐party case we worked on above. First, unless full consensus (unanimous support) is re‐quired, agreement generally depends on getting a coalition of parties to support a package or proposal. That is, when the number of parties goes from two to three, something new can happen: two parties can ally to oppose the third. The specific number of parties that must support a proposal may depend on law or prece‐dent, or it may be up to the discretion of civic leaders who simply want to ensure a broad base of support for a given policy, program, or initiative.

As Howard Raiffa shows in The Art and Science of Negotiation, this makes for a more complex process of engagement among the parties but also a richer set of possibilities—for trades, for example—than one‐on‐one negotiation offers. For instance: • The process can be complex. Many important negotiations can happen among subgroups of the parties, in “side meetings.” So there may, for ex‐ample, be two‐party and three‐party negotiations embedded in a larger six‐party negotiation process. When key parties or public observers dislike such meetings, they complain about “backroom deals.” But many informal, small‐group consultations can, with proper safeguards, be invaluable as mechanisms for exploring options, clarifying statements made in public (e.g., in the media), sharing controver‐sial concerns, and removing obstacles to agreement. Parties often open up in smaller, informal settings in ways that larger gatherings, particularly if open to the public, do not encourage.

• Coalitions can be built in a wide variety

ways, for example by leveraging shared interests (tangible or intangi‐ble), shared positions on a particular proposal (e.g., a shared preference for “no deal” or even “no negotiation”), shared history (common experiences, an important relationship, shared traditions), shared vulnerability (e.g., to being excluded from a valuable agreement ) , valuable t rades (“carrots”) or penalties (“sticks”) that influence support, and common allies or enemies.

• Recruiting allies is often hard—and so is keeping them. Michael Watkins and Susan Rosegrant, in “Sources of Power in Coalition Building,” notes that framing and other effective per‐suasion techniques are crucial for delivering on all of these. Recogniz‐ing a potential coalition “on paper” is one thing. Building a real, committed

coalition by recruiting and retaining allies is another.

• Building a strong coalition sometimes depends on when we approach particu‐lar parties, not just who we approach. Rather than approach potential allies in just any order, coalition builders look to create “bandwagon effects” (wherein one party’s decision to offer support is influenced by the appearance of a group already in favor) and exploit patterns of deference to particular in‐fluential or respected parties (“Since party X supports you, I should too”).

• Coalitions that are built can also be broken using a variety of those strate‐gies. Those who oppose a given pro‐posal may look for “weak links” in a coalition in hopes of dissolving or un‐dermining it. Parties that can be re‐cruited easily may also be recruited away easily—to an “adverse” or block‐ing coalition. (Note that one party’s favorable coalition is typically an op‐posing party’s adverse one.)

Beyond these key features, many multi‐party negotiations in community problem‐solving present with certain common contextual features. These in‐clude some of the issues we considered above in the “enriched” version of the two‐party negotiation.

For example, the parties around the table can bring varied resources—from money and facilities to reputation and political legitimacy—to bear on commu‐nity problems and opportunities. So problem‐solving together includes an important element of identifying, under‐standing, and bundling those resources in creative ways. The key questions are not just “what do you want?” (interests) but


The key questions in multi‐party problem‐solving are not just “what do you want?” (interests) but “what can you do?” (capacity and resources).

Recognizing a potential coalition “on paper” is one thing. Building a real, committed coalition by recruit-ing and retaining allies is another.

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“what can you do?” (capacity and re‐sources).

Next, the players generally expect to be dealing with each other again, so rela‐tionships and reputations are typically quite important. Relationships not only offer aid and impose obligations on parties. Networks of relationships also transmit information around the community in ways that can affect public support for (or opposition to) the negotiation process,

particular negotiators, and the specific deci‐sions that negotiation may produce.

Furthermore, be‐cause each negotiation builds on a history and anticipates a shared future, the parties con‐nect their perceptions and commitments across negotiation en‐counters. They use civic process to work out

larger issues about the overall direction of community life and the rightful roles and status of various parties in that life. This working out does include very self‐interested “jockeying” for position and control, but more generously, it is about using encounters with other par‐ties to find your place on the commu‐nity stage and, over time, to make a meaningful contribution.

Finally, the parties can rightly view

negotiation as a process that happens at key points when shared decisions are re‐quired, not as the framework or set of techniques that defines civic life from start to finish. Again, there is much more to community problem‐solving than com‐ing to decision by crafting deals or resolv‐ing disputes, but conversely, it would be hard to imagine progress in a community without such decision‐making.

These realities create important op‐portunities, constraints, and subtexts that enrich and complicate the negotiation process. Failing to recognize and address the subtexts can lead to disaster. On the other hand, pandering to all of them can lead to process paralysis—the fruitless

quest to make everyone perfectly happy with everything that hap‐pens. Let’s put these ideas to work in the second case example, using a new worksheet to analyze a complex situation.

Case Example #2: Responding to Homelessness in Ourtown Our second case example is adapted from an exercise based on real events. The Consensus Building Institute of Cambridge, Massachu‐setts developed the exercise for the

Council on Foundations, a philanthropy trade group in the U.S. (Edward Scher wrote the exercise under the supervision of Lawrence Susskind of MIT.) Setting and situation. Ourtown has

long had a fairly small and stable popula‐tion of homeless people. But recently, changes in the area economy—a rapid jump in rents and other costs of living—seems to have increased the number of individuals and families living on the streets and heading to the city’s only homeless shelter.

Tension has mounted as the homeless have become more visible in public parks and around businesses. Though many civic leaders have prided themselves on the city’s commitment to providing shel‐ter and supportive services in the past, demand has outstripped supply in recent months. What’s more, the greater visibil‐ity of homeless people has some activ‐ists—both downtown and in the city’s


TAKING STOCK (Part Eight) BASICS OF MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATION

Identify and build favorable coalitions, using …

• Shared interests

• Shared positions (e.g., no deal)

• Valuable trades

• Common history, shared traditions or experiences

• Common allies or enemies

• Shared vulnerability (protect each other, strength in numbers)

Identify and deal with adverse coalitions …

• Anticipate them—do your homework. Think about the “natural allies” who might line up against your interests or agenda.

• Break them (divide and conquer). Pre-empt when you can (get out early to under-stand parties and recruit), look for holes in the adverse coalition, woo parties into your coalition (or a neutral stance) after the fact if necessary.

• If appropriate, discourage separate meetings that might produce them.

• Move the conversation beyond narrow competition and immediate interests. Ap-peal to higher principles, shared goals, notions of fairness (where appropriate), the “norm of unanimous action,” which is strong in many cultures and settings.

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The parties use civic process to work out larger issues about the overall direction of community life and the rightful roles and status of various parties in that life.

residential neighborhoods—complaining that adding more services will simply attract more homeless people to Our‐town. Finally, there are competing pro‐posals for how to respond to the home‐less. Recent newspaper articles feature a debate between those who want to add shelter beds and those who claim that investing in self‐sufficiency will enable the homeless to become permanently housed, eliminating the need for more shelter capacity. A civic response emerges. An informal

conversation between the Mayor and a board member of the local community philanthropy leads to an idea: if the Our‐town Foundation will provide some flexi‐ble funding to address homelessness, the Mayor will create a Community Task Force made up of key organizations and chaired by the Foundation. Members of the Task Force will bring forward their own project proposals and be encouraged to collaborate if possible.

The Foundation’s board and senior staff enthusiastically agree to make $500,000 available if an effective col‐laboration or other project can indeed be developed.

Toward that end, a meeting of the Task Force has been called. In addition to a Foundation representative, this kick‐off meeting will include represen‐tatives of the five other organizations that make up the Task Force: • The Shelter, a professional run and generally well‐regarded nonprofit organization, the homeless shelter is represented by a trained social worker who believes that the shelter is the only institution that can meet the needs of Ourtown’s homeless. The Shelter, now in its 30th year in operation, proposes to expand the number of beds it offers, renovate its building and commit more funding to annual upkeep, and create a new

food service training program (to both meet the food needs of the homeless and train them for jobs in the commu‐nity).

• The Mayor’s Office. The city govern‐ment already provides some of the shelter’s funding and has some funding for special projects of its own. The Mayor’s representative has designed training programs in the past and be‐lieves that new projects should empha‐size job training and self‐sufficiency, not emergency services.

• The Homeless Union, an advocacy group that includes homeless people, some formerly homeless, and other advocates for the rights and needs of the homeless. With food donated from area restaurants and a pool of volun‐teers (including homeless and formerly homeless people), the Union has run a hot meal program in a park downtown for 8 years. The Union, represented by a formerly homeless war veteran, wants $500,000 in start‐up money to create a new shelter run by the home‐less themselves and strictly emphasiz‐ing a self‐help philosophy and sub‐stance abuse program.

• The Ourtown Homeowners Associa‐tion wants to protect the area economy, as well as the property investments of its homeowner members. It would like any new steps to address the needs of the homeless to safeguard these inter‐ests. The Association is represented by a former mayor of Ourtown who be‐lieves strongly in job training and self‐sufficiency approaches—and who wants homeless services to stay down‐town, away from residential neighbor‐hoods.

• The Ourtown Social Enterprise, a five


There are competing proposals for how to respond to the homeless. Recent news‐paper articles feature a debate between those who want to add shelter beds and those who claim that investing in self‐sufficiency will enable the homeless to be‐come permanently housed—eliminating the need for more shelter capacity.

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year‐old nonprofit community organi‐zation made up of professionals, stu‐dents, and retirees, has cleaned up parks and completed bigger and bigger community improvement projects each year. With funding from the Ourtown Foundation, the Enterprise now runs a child care center in a former school building. The organization wants to convert the building to a homeless shel‐ter and launch innovative, revenue‐generating programs with and for the homeless. The Enterprise needs about $300,000 to convert the building and $200,000 in operating costs each year. The new shelter would be run by paid staff as well as volunteers. The Enter‐prise already has a network ready to donate food and clothing. The group is represented by a politically active re‐tired doctor who believes that the long‐term solution to homelessness hinges on creating the right environment for building self‐esteem.

Because the Mayor and the Founda‐tion’s Board of Trustees want to see broad‐based support for new efforts to address homelessness in Ourtown, the Foundation and the Mayor’s Office have agreed that at least three of the four other members must be party to any agree‐ment. That is, beyond approval from the Mayor’s representative and the Founda‐tion representative, at least three other parties must agree with a proposal.

This is the information available to the parties involved. That is, this is a summary of what all of the parties know about each other, in advance of the up‐coming meeting. (In the full role‐play, far more information is given to each party on its own interests, and so discovering these is part of the challenge in the exer‐cise.) Using Worksheet #2, we will do

what we can to prepare for the upcom‐ing meeting, at which the stakeholders will explore their respective proposals and begin to work toward some agree‐ment.

But before we jump into analyzing the situation that presents here, let’s review a few core concepts by posing this question: What makes this a nego‐tiation? The quick answer to this is that

the upcoming meeting(s) of the Task Force offers an opportunity to advance the interests of two or more parties through jointly decided action. But the fuller response to the question defines this situation in the broader history and civic life of this community.

Note that there is already a recog‐nized problem area—homelessness—and fairly defined set of stakeholders. The Task Force may want to consider multi‐ple ways to frame and address the spe‐cific problems under the heading of homelessness. Likewise, the membership of the Task Force might expand or con‐tract over time. But for now, there are players, issues, interests, and an opportu‐nity to decide the specifics of something in ways that enable action—not merely hold a dialogue or organize attention to an overlooked social condition.

The upcoming meeting will surely not decide everything—e.g., all of the opera‐tional specifics needed to implementing decisions well. There may be a series of negotiations, some quite informal, to

come, as well as new civic organizing and planning efforts. Deliberating and acting on homelessness may lead to new atten‐tion for, and action on, related issues—the local economy, for example.

For now, though, we face one key de‐cision opportunity that comes, of course, with a set of challenges in tow. The Mayor and Foundation are bringing the parties together in hopes of constructing a valuable agreement among the parties in spite of their differences. It is not a given that there will be agreement or that it will be valuable enough to make a posi‐tive difference in the community. That is, not every agreement yields the hoped‐for results. As we will see, this is one power‐ful reason why problem‐solving with others hinges on a process for generating


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What makes this a negotiation? There are players, issues, interests, and an opportunity to decide the specifics of something in ways that enable action—not merely hold a dialogue or organize attention to an overlooked social con-dition.

(Continued on page 24)


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Getting Ready to Deal: Negotiator’s Prep Tool #2 Use this form to make notes. Use a separate sheet to develop full-length answers and best guesses.

Alternatives What is my best alternative to (this) ne-gotiated agreement (BATNA)? (What alternatives would I rely on to advance the same interests on these issues?) What is their best alternative(s)? How certain am I about this? Based on what I know, should I make the first offer or try to them to do so?

Coalitions and Group Process Who are my likely allies? Who are my likely enemies? In what sequence should I approach key parties? How should we handle process? What should the facilitator’s role be?

Arguments What “principled” arguments (rationales) can I use at the table to support what I want? What are their counter-arguments likely to be? How can I respond to those?

More Homework How can I find out more? Who can help me learn?


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PROMISING PACKAGES Sketch out some possible packages (terms on multiple issues) that might be in the zone of agree-ment:

Issues Number and Types. What are the main issues to be negotiated? (Tangible and intangible) Priorities. What are they for each party? Trades. What differences can we ex-ploit to create join gain?

Interests Mine. What am I looking to protect or advance? (Tangibles and intangibles) Theirs. What interests do they—or might they—have at stake, tangible or intangible? (By party) Interested Facilitator. What are their substantive interests (beyond the inter-est in good group process)?

Parties Number. How many are there (including yourself)? _____ Direct/Agents. Are the negotiators rep-resenting their own interests or those of an organization, group, or other constitu-ents? Facilitator. If there is on, will they be neutral or “interested”? History. What relationship or other his-tory do I have with the other party(ies)? (Think about the person(s) but also their constituents, if appropriate.) Style. What do I know about their negoti-ating or working style? How do they deal with others in the context of handling conflict or coming to decision? How can I find out more about those with whom I have no history or about whom I have no knowledge? Influentials. What key parties who are not in this negotiation might nevertheless exert an influence? (Think of parties that may try to shape the process or out-comes, as well as those to whom the other party might defer or feel obliged.)

strong substantive ideas based on good analysis, not just we‐feeling or strong relationships.

Analyzing the Negotiation Given that we can structure this as a

negotiation analysis, let’s start by consid‐ering the parties: who are they, who must be in the agreement (and who can be left out), and are any of the parties in the role of facilitator? Next, what do the parties want? That is, what are their interests and how are they likely to view the purpose and potential of the upcoming kick‐off meeting? Finally, what resources do they bring to the table.

Some of these questions we can answer quite confidently already, and others we may be able to address with some back‐ground work before the meet‐ing—by consulting with others informally.

First, the Task Force has six members, but their roles and status are hardly identical. Both the Foundation and Mayor’s Office must agree to any deal, so each of those parties has a “veto” power. Any one of the other parties can be excluded (making each somewhat vulnerable) but

given the three‐out‐of‐four standard out‐lined above, any two of those vulnerable parties can form a blocking coalition to kill any deal. So vulnerable is not the same as weak.

On the other hand, the Mayor’s Office and Foundation, as funders of any pro‐posals, also control one critical resource in the picture—money. What may be less obvious is that neither party provides direct services to address this problem.

Both of the “powerful” funder parties is quite dependent on the other players to make a difference on the issue of home‐lessness.

In addition, the Mayor has asked the Foundation to chair the Task Force, so the Foundation’s representative will likely be in a facilitator’s role, helping to manage the group’s process. But look closer. We know relatively little about the Foundation’s substantive interests or about its representative’s view of the issues or the process. We can surmise that the Foundation is not a true neutral

in this situation. It has a reputation and substantive investments in the commu‐nity that it wants to enhance and build on. The Foundation’s representative—the individual, not the organizational interests that individual represents as an agent—may also have personal com‐mitments and concerns that affect her actions during the negotiation.

The Foundation is, in this case, what we call an “interested facilitator,” not a neutral mediator but not (just) an inter‐

ested party either. The Foundation, like many important go‐betweens in commu‐nity problem‐solving around the world wants to both improve the problem‐solving process—in this case toward an agreement by the parties—and to further substantive interests of its own.

We will need to understand the Foun‐dation’s interests (and those of its agent) as well as we understand those of the other parties around the table. We also want to understand, and possibly shape, the Foundation’s role as a facilitator. In The Skilled Facilitator: Practical Wisdom for Developing Effective Groups, Roger Schwarz notes:

The facilitator’s main task is to help the group increase its effectiveness by improving its process. Process refers to how a group works to‐gether. Process includes how mem‐bers talk to each other, how they identify and solve problems, how they make decisions, and how they handle conflict … Underlying the facilitator’s main task is the funda‐mental assumption that ineffective group process reduces a group’s ability to solve problems and make decisions.

A growing number of guides and training opportunities helps facilitators

and those with whom they work to an‐swer key process questions, such as these in our case: What ground rules for the process should the Foundation, as facili‐tator, propose to the group? How asser‐tive should they be with the other par‐ties? What might threaten the facilitator’s authority to manage the process or its legitimacy as a go‐between? How will the process, and in particular the flow of in‐formation and contact, be managed? For example, should the facilitator keep eve‐


Both the Foundation and Mayor’s Office must agree to any deal, so each of those parties has a “veto” power. Any one of the other parties can be excluded—making each somewhat vulnerable—but since three of the four are needed for any agreement, any two of those vulnerable parties can form a blocking coalition to kill any deal. So “vulnerable” is not the same as weak.

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(Continued from page 22)

ryone at the table throughout or encour‐age side meetings to help work out dis‐agreements between particular parties?

Now let’s pay more attention to the issues at stake. The tangible ones are most obvious: the what, who, how, where, and how much of services (what to provide to the homeless, who should provide, how, where—in what location or other facili‐ties—and how much in terms of scale and funding). We are well beyond our one‐issue price negotiation now!

But the outline of the situation and parties suggests that even more is at stake in this particu‐lar episode of prob‐lem‐solving in the community of Our‐town. Intangible is‐sues, such as what values should define our approach to homelessness, are important here. For example, should the emphasis be on em‐powering the homeless to help them‐selves or emphasizing the most account‐able, high‐impact service delivery in the short run, which might tip the balance away from self‐help?

The issues of rights and obligations in community are also at stake. Are the homeless in fact a part of the community? What does being a member of the com‐munity entail in terms of rights and obli‐gations—what the community owes its vulnerable members and what they owe it? Finally, the “who” of services is much more than a technical question of who will deliver; it is about who will be asked to take the lead on an important commu‐nity problem. Some stakeholders may gain status and capacity and others lose it through this negotiation.

Let’s not forget: a thorough explora‐tion of the issues at stake is not about

creating a check‐list to work through mechani‐cally at the table. It is, rather, about unde r s t a nd i ng where the bargain‐ing range may be and what trades may be possible to

create value for a wide array of parties. Earlier, I noted that the effective

bargaining range is defined by the value of parties’ alternatives to the par‐ticular negotiation at hand. The best alternatives in this case are not so clear. The Mayor and Foundation do not seem to need all of the players at the table to become directly involved in service delivery, for example, but both are unwilling to simply pick a favorite among the parties present or hand out dollars to every group that asks—almost enough funding for each to really accomplish something. Spreading a given resource across many inde‐pendently operating parties often cre‐ates less value than more focused in‐vestments at the appropriate scale, par‐ticularly if the parties bring comple‐mentary capabilities and are willing to work together.

As for the other parties, we do not

know enough to determine best alterna‐tives very precisely. But assume for the sake of analysis that alternative funding for homeless activities is limited. It is in the service providers’ interests to work toward an agreement here. And it may be worth it for each party to settle for less than each would like, and to find a way to work together, rather than be excluded from the agreement entirely. The Home‐owners Association is rather unique among the parties. It is not a service pro‐vider and does not have a specific pro‐posal for service delivery by others, merely a set of advocacy interests. Like many public interest groups around the world, the Association wants primarily to help shape a civic outcome, not become some other party’s operational partner. Can the Association provide resources to support a new initiative, though? We do not know.

Creating Better Outcomes: Problem-Solving Together

Working out every possible negotia‐tion strategy and outcome for this nego‐tiation is much more than we need to do here. The point of our discussion so far is that organized effectively, even the most limited information can yield important clues to help negotiators and facilitators prepare and problem‐solve better.

But three important tasks remain for us. The first, which I will cover briefly, is to apply the basic coalition concepts (see Worksheet, “Prep Tool #2”). You can tell, from the party‐by‐party descriptions above, that some coalitions of parties are quite natural while others may require more work, based on interests, resources, history, or other factors. While we may get all six parties on board, it may well take a strong coalition (subgroup) to build momentum toward that. Whose support should we try to win early on in order to make the support of others more


A thorough exploration of the issues at stake is not about creating a checklist to work through mechani-cally at the table.

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Intangible issues, such as what values should define our approach to homeless-ness, are important here. Should the emphasis be on empowering the homeless to help themselves or emphasizing the most accountable, high-impact service delivery in the short run, which might tip the balance away from self-help?

likely? Whose support can we get at least cost? Going in, we would want to think hard about whom to approach, how, and when. Key coalitions might form before the meeting of the full Task Force, as is often the case in committees, task forces, and other group decision‐making struc‐tures. So getting out early and assessing where other parties stand may be crucial, especially for the parties we labeled “vulnerable” (in that they can be ex‐cluded from an agreement).

Our second task before leaving Our‐town is to illustrate how one can define problems and resources creatively in these kinds of cases, which recur often around the globe. Some of the most inno‐vative and promising options for action here are not immediately apparent, i.e., not in the individual parties’ initial pro‐posals.

The quest for the best‐possible solu‐tions is the heart and soul of effective problem‐solving, which includes three (3) broad steps: 1. Framing problems in ways that make them more solvable and lead to better ideas. “Better” has two meanings here: more technically promising (than alternative ideas or the status quo) and more le‐gitimate and politically supportable. The first rule of problem‐solving, then, is to set up your problem in ways that make it more solvable, but a great many real‐world efforts skip or rush this step, which is sometimes referred to as problem‐setting.

2. Exploring as many ideas as possible about how to respond to the problems. Contrary to popular belief, as Jim Adams ex‐plains in Conceptual Blockbusting, crea‐tivity can be learned and developed. The process of having more and better ideas may include breaking out of

familiar thinking habits, consciously avoiding incrementalism—the ten‐dency to modify existing responses to the problem in fairly trivial ways—and breaking a complex problem up into parts and having varied ideas about each part. The second rule of problem‐solving, in my view, is that the most common way to miss out on a great idea is never to have it in the first place. Having more ideas (overall) means that more ideas than can be thrown out, which bodes well for the quality of what’s left (the “keeper” ideas). This is the value of brainstorming and other idea‐generating tech‐niques (see links on our website). Faced with a complex, high‐stakes problem and with high costs of fail‐

ure, wouldn’t most of us be more con‐fident about the one idea chosen among fifteen considered than the one chosen among two?

3. Refine and move the ideas toward agree‐ment. Some groups that offer options may not have to decide among them, but many groups, like the Ourtown Task Force we are considering here, must not only have ideas but, at some point, make choices among them. Brainstorming or other idea‐generating sessions in which judgment is sus‐pended give way to group evaluation of options by various criteria and, eventually, to decision itself.

These stages place different kinds of

demands on groups and facilitators. But the payoffs of investing in all three stages are well‐documented in studies of busi‐ness, nonprofit, and government prob‐lem‐solving groups—and of alliances across the sectors as well. Conversely, hundreds of my students, practitioners of all ages from every corner of the globe, have found that limited beginnings—starting the problem‐solving process with strict and limited perspectives on prob‐lems—beget limited options and, eventu‐ally, limited decisions.

This is particularly true in the Our‐town exercise, where breakthrough prob‐lem‐solving almost never emerges incre‐mentally—i.e., working outward from the detailed initial proposals of the parties.

Remember those proposals? Give us money to build and run a new shelter.


The first rule of problem-solving, then, is to set up your problem in ways that make it more solvable. But a great many real-world efforts skip or rush this step.

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See linked tool in this series, “Planning Together: How (and How Not) to Engage Stakeholders in Charting a Course”

Give us the money to renovate our shel‐ter and start a new job training program. Give us the money to help ourselves, don’t let the professional service provid‐ers drive the program. And so on.

There is nothing inherently wrong with any of these proposals. Indeed, each offers a compelling and unique selling point or two, and we can assume that all of the proposals are made in good faith, though they may not be equally promis‐ing in terms of the likely social impact.

For our purposes, though, the larger issue is that each proposal responds to a somewhat different framing of the prob‐lem to be solved in Ourtown. It is not self‐evident which frame, if any, is best. More to the point, it is not clear, before the first Task Force meet‐ing, that any of the par‐ties have considered alter‐native frames.

For example, the Shelter seems to have framed the problem as one of expanding the number of beds to meet short‐term shel‐ter needs, with some attention—though much less funding—to longer‐run self‐sufficiency needs.

The Union, for its part, does not ad‐dress the question of how it will, as a group with no experience running a shel‐ter or substance abuse program, gain the capacity needed to provide quality ser‐vices in those areas.

The Homeowner Association seems driven by what it opposes—by a defen‐sive posture—as much as any proactive framing of the problems facing the home‐less or the larger community.

A brief newspaper quote from the Mayor’s Office indicates an interest in discussing self‐sufficiency rather than more beds, but it is not clear how strict or narrow that focus is (recall that local gov‐

ernment already funds the Shelter). Finally, we have no idea, in advance

of the meeting, how the Ourtown Foun‐dation prefers to approach the prob‐lems.

There is often no one best way to frame a problem—not “best” in some absolute sense—but some frames are more helpful than others (“best‐possible”). Helpful frames lead to a greater range of initial ideas, draw on the varied expertise, and respond to the varied interests, around the table, and—ultimately, if not immediately—address the technical dimensions of problems as well as the politics or “public face” of the problems.

Jim Adams concludes, based on experience with hundreds of problem‐solving groups over the years, that re‐

framing, sometimes by “going up a level of abstraction,” is often helpful for gener‐ating more and better ideas. And Fisher and Ury suggest “shuttling between the specific and the general,” as well as look‐ing at problems through the lenses of different disciplines or professions.

Back to frames, we don’t want a frame that’s too abstract, of course, but the more common error is choosing overly specific frames. They impose limits that are particularly costly at the early stages of group work.

Let’s step back from the Ourtown case for a moment to see how powerful re‐framing can be as a tool for problem‐solving, first with a straightforward ex‐

ample of improving a technical product, then a community problem‐solving ex‐ample.

Re-Framing at Work For years, product designers strug‐

gled to help grocery store owners solve a costly problem: how to get goods from colder to warmer parts of the store safely and without wasting enormous amounts of energy? Refrigeration equipment keeps food fresh (at various temperatures) and accessible to customers as they shop. But when items must be re‐stocked, goods are transported between areas of the store that are very cold, such as deep‐freeze meat storage areas where only employees are allowed, and areas that must be warm enough to keep customers comfortable. Without managing the flow of air, gro‐


Helpful frames lead to a greater range of initial ideas, draw on the varied expertise, and respond to the varied interests, around the ta-ble, and—ultimately, if not immediately—address the technical dimensions of problems as well as the politics or “public face” of the problems.

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The larger issue is that each proposal responds to a somewhat different framing of the problem to be solved in Ourtown. It is not self‐evident which frame, if any, is best. More to the point, it is not clear, before the first Task Force meeting, that any of the parties have considered alternative frames.

cery stores would freeze their customers, over‐burden refrigeration equipment, and waste power.

For years, product supply companies addressed this need by offering stores a variety of swinging doors, which kept colder air on one side and warmer air on the other but allowed re‐stockers to pass through. Unfortu‐nately, none of these doors worked very well. Employees carrying large, awkward loads of cold food had trouble seeing co‐workers com‐ing in the opposite di‐rection. Door hinges did not wear well un‐der the constant traffic, and in order to keep the cold and warm air apart, the doors them‐selves offered more resistance than employ‐ees could easily handle when trying to get through—to be more specific, when trying to get through with‐out knocking someone else down.

Like many technical problems, this one was really several problems in one: (a) keeping air apart at very different temperatures; and (b) allowing grocery store workers carrying food loads to get from colder to warmer areas of the store (and back again) safely and reliably. The latter requires both high visibility in two directions and limited physical resistance.

Framed more abstractly, the problem offered the paradoxical challenge of pre‐venting movement (of air) on one hand and facilitating it (by people carrying food) on the other.

A breakthrough solution came when product designers and engineers recog‐nized that the problem they had actually

been solving was framed much more narrowly than that: “What kind of door should we create? How can we improve the doors we supply to meet grocers’ needs?”

It was natural that the problem should be framed this way, but it was very limit‐ing as well—a recipe for supplying incre‐mental ly bet ter doors, at best, from year to year (moving the hinges around, trying out different door ma‐terials, and so on). What the grocery s t o r e s r e a l l y needed was a boundary easily permeable to peo‐ple carrying food but impermeable (or mostly so) to air. To be more precise, a bound‐ary that allows

some things to pass through but not others is a membrane. Note that doors are just one form of boundary—and not often the most useful membranes.

By using “membrane” rather than “door” as the frame, the product teams had many more ideas—and much more varied ideas—about how to solve their two design problems. Eventually the designers supplied a new state‐of‐the‐art solution: in place of doors that had to swing open, thick vertical strips of see‐through plastic that parted as em‐ployees passed through. The strips of‐fered much less resistance to workers in motion than doors had, as well as great visibility in both directions, but still kept apart cold and warm air in differ‐ent areas of the store. In other words,

the strips created a brand new and quite effective membrane.

Sometimes we can find new leverage on hard problems by re‐framing the prob‐lem—by asking, “What problem are we really trying to solve?”—and having dif‐ferent ideas. In this case, re‐framing meant defining the problem a bit more broadly and abstractly.

Let’s consider one more brief exam‐ple. In 1993‐94, as part of the Comprehen‐sive Community Revitalization Program, a group of us worked to create neighbor‐hood plans for several low‐income neighborhoods in the South Bronx in New York City. All of the neighborhoods were home to a large and growing num‐ber of young people, but most were hugely under‐served by safe, accessible recreation opportunities.

By “safe,” I mean as free from crime and physical accidents as possible. By “accessible,” I mean near at hand—kids are much more likely to use recreation opportunities they can walk to—and open, at low or no cost, as many hours as possible. These definitions are important, because they helped shape the way we ultimately framed the problem(s) to be solved.

But I am getting ahead of my story. The scarcity of safe, accessible play op‐portunities was especially serious in a neighborhood called West Farms, located near the famous Bronx Zoo. When our planning work with a community devel‐opment organization and residents in the area began, the neighborhood had one‐tenth the citywide standard of public recreation space (based on its youth population size).

But how should we think about this problem in order to make it more solv‐able? That is the question that leads to framing. One option we had was this: Where can we create more parks, ball‐courts, and other play facilities in this neighborhood?


It was natural that the problem should be framed this way, but it was very limiting as well—a recipe for supplying incrementally better doors, at best, from year to year.

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Like many technical problems, this one was really several problems in one.

This frame has the advantage of being specific, concrete, and immediately un‐derstandable, not only to professional planners and facilitators but the general public, including the young people and their parents who lived in the neighbor‐hood. This is no small advantage in an era that demands we find more and more effective ways of engaging stakeholders in the planning and decision‐making that affects their lives.

But that initial frame offers some big downsides as well. It assumes, for in‐stance, that “opportunities” for recreation (or play) is synonymous with “facilities.” Facilities are typically built to serve spe‐cific uses. Facilities can be expensive and slow to open, and because they are usu‐ally restricted to certain uses, creating a facility often means choosing not to use

space for some other use which may be important. This trade‐off—or opportunity cost, as economists call it—was a major issue in West Farms, because the area was densely built‐up already and had many needs other than safe play, includ‐ing child care, business development,

family health care, and more. Some spaces, such as school cafeterias, were multi‐use (cafeteria by day, perform‐ance hall by night, etc.). But there were few opportunities to apply this “flex‐space” or multi‐use approach.

For the most part, we would need vacant land to develop new facilities. Yet there were very few vacant parcels of land left, the land scheduled for demolition would mostly go to help meet the other needs outline above, and most land in the neighborhood, whether vacant or not, came in small parcels ill‐suited to most types of rec‐reation facility. The one large vacant parcel left in West Farms was already scheduled to become a new, city‐run ballfield—a good thing, to be sure, though it might not open for another

two years or more. Beyond focusing us too narrowly on

facilities, our working problem frame has other limitations as well. The word “create” suggests that the central prob‐lem is adding new things to the com‐munity. A quick scan of the neighbor‐

hood revealed several under‐utilized play spaces that might be cleaned up, re‐paired, and monitored better to enhance safety (plus some that should be shut down because they were out‐of‐sight and had become havens for crime). We were still a long way from meeting the neighborhood’s play needs, but enhanc‐ing what you’ve got, rather than fixating entirely on new additions, is obviously a way to close a big gap between limited supply and much greater demand. It makes sense to avoid framing problems in ways that tend to overlook unused or under‐used resources already at hand.

To sum up, creating new ballcourts, parks, and other play facilities was cer‐tainly appealing—and neighborhood residents, as you might imagine, loved the idea—but the constraints suggested

that no single idea or type of idea would provide the magical solution.

To get a big pool of varied ideas, we would need a different, and specifically a broader, way to look at our design prob‐lem. John Shapiro, who headed our spa‐tial planning work, proposed that we frame the problem with a new sequence of questions: What are all of the spaces in a built‐up urban neighborhood that might be developed and used for play? And how can we keep them safe and accessible?

Compared to the previous frame, this one offers a much richer lens for generat‐ing varied ideas, because (a) it specifically invites a look at “all of the spaces” in the neighborhood (whether dedicated to play or not), (b) it indicates that spaces might be “developed and used” (whether they are in use now or need some work), and (c) the second part of the problem frame reminds us, in a neighborhood with high rates of crime and limited family re‐sources, that the end game is to expand


To get a big pool of varied ideas, we would need a different way to look at our design problem: What are all of the spaces in a built-up urban neighborhood that might be developed and used for play? And how can we keep them safe and accessible?

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the opportunities for play that will actually be used by members of the community. Safe and accessible were musts, and so we could not afford to let the community down by being imaginative at the start and fanciful at the finish—i.e., failing to deal with the realities of urban life.

Fair enough, but where are the spaces that kids play, or could play, in in a built‐up urban environment? Well, where is most of the space in any built‐up city? It’s in the streets, and we noticed that young people were indeed playing in the streets but only in ad hoc ways.

Now, traffic poses the obvious safety hazard to street play, and traffic flow should not be so compromised that the streets become unusable by vehicles. For‐tunately, the City’s police department had developed a program temporarily closing off small side streets for play use during summer days and evenings (when school is out). The program included some police monitoring of the streets, both the traffic and the play. What’s more, we noticed that the neighborhood’s young people were concentrated in par‐ticular apartment buildings on particular side streets and that many of these build‐ings had active tenants associations run by the parents.

These facts together sug‐gested a new strategy for ex‐panding play opportunities without costly new land‐consuming facilities: for the first time ever, designate as official play streets the small side streets that would least compromise

vehicular traffic flow but offer safe and accessible space to the greatest number of kids living nearby, all under the watchful eye of the tenant associations organized along those streets. Beyond providing “eyes on the street” by coor‐dinating volunteer members at all hours, the tenant groups could help manage play supplies and provide use‐ful adult contact with the police.

Looking closely at the streets in this neighborhood led to much bolder ideas, however, and these included new dedi‐cated facilities. The neighborhood was bounded on the west by a six‐lane boulevard for which no traffic study has been done in fifty years. Massive social and economic changes in the Bronx, including depopulation and income decline over the years plus some new highway construction, had significantly reduced traffic on the boulevard. A new analysis suggested that at least two lanes of the boulevard could easily be closed off to become a linear park.

Linear parks offer several advan‐tages in urban environments, such as the high visibility that tends to reduce crime—clear “sight lines” mean that there’s nowhere to hide illicit activity—and the elongated space needed to pro‐gram subareas for multiple age groups, from tot lots for very young children to ballcourts for older kids and benches in between. This particular facility would make unique use of the long, narrow strip of land that currently “served” as excess road capacity.

Finally, going back to our re‐framed design question, kids in built‐up urban

areas can also play on rooftops—and do, in many cities around the world. After careful consideration, though, we deter‐mined that the rooftops, beyond offering risks of serious falls, were too hard for people to monitor. It’s much harder to keep eyes on rooftops than eyes on the streets, and crime and other factors made this too serious a drawback in the Bronx. (Some schools were already making use of their rooftops but only because high perimeter fences prevented falls and be‐cause teachers monitored the kids at des‐ignated recesses and other play times.)

Here’s the main point: how we look at problems matters enormously for how we go about solving them. Frames mat‐ter. Few of the new ideas that were viable in West Farms or the grocery store exam‐ple would ever have been generated had the planners stuck to the narrower—and more obvious—problem frames.

Applying a New Frame in Ourtown

Recall that so far, some of the parties in Ourtown have framed “the homeless‐ness problem” in fairly strong but im‐plicit ways, while others have not articu‐lated any particular frame or view of the problem. So on one hand, we face possi‐ble tensions among competing frames, and on the other, there is no single, domi‐nant frame to encourage tunnel vision.

We need a frame that helps us have more and better ideas and that acknowl‐edges, first and foremost, that there is no single homelessness problem. Rather, Our‐town, like most communities, faces a host of interrelated causes, effects, conditions, and potential opportunities for interven‐tion—responses or “solutions”—in an area of concern that bears the label “homelessness.” Let’s say we begin, then, with a broad framing of the problem this group is to solve, expressed as this ques‐tion: How can we create significant capacity and results that respond to the prob‐


We could not afford to let the community down by being imaginative at the start and fanciful at the finish—that is, failing to deal with the realities of urban life.

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Few of the new ideas would ever have been generated had the planners stuck to the nar-rower—and more obvious—problem frames.

lems associated with homelessness in our community?

Not knowing how the group (Task Force) process will unfold, this frame nevertheless has several appealing fea‐tures: 1. By acknowledging that the outcomes

of the process should include “capacity and results,” we shift the discussion from a narrow debate over expanding or modifying current ser‐vices by current providers to a broader, more flexible consideration of who should act on problems in our com‐munity and how. New groups, includ‐ing self‐help groups organized by the homeless themselves, have potential to create results (change social condi‐tions) if those groups can develop the needed capacity. Resourcing current providers will almost always be the quickest way to get measurable results on very defined targets, such as “reducing the number of homeless

people without access to a shelter bed on any given night of the year.” But why convene a broad group to solve such a narrow problem? At very least, there is no reason to begin so narrowly.

2. By identifying “the problems associ‐ated with homelessness” as the targets for group attention, we give the group room to discuss the narrow status that defines homelessness (a lack of perma‐

nent or temporary housing at any given moment) but also related is‐sues of economic self‐sufficiency, rent inflation and the scarcity of af‐fordable housing in our community, people’s behavior on the streets, and other issues that stakeholders may see as related to homelessness.

3. Nowhere in our problem‐framing question do we specify (or limit) how the resources and capacity of the various parties may be combined to create solutions. The frame does not immediately direct attention to a specific partnership among the par‐ties, for example, or favorite pro‐gram idea. To the contrary, the frame gives us room to bundle and

unbundle the capacity and re‐sources around the table—money, facilities, service deliv‐ery experience, political legiti‐macy and connections to the target group (the homeless), and more—in myriad ways as we generate and test ideas.

Now that we have a promising frame, we need to inventory the resources and capacity available. Traditionally, nego‐tiation focuses on identifying

and addressing interests, and we don’t want to ignore interests in Ourtown by any means. But unlike the price nego‐tiation we looked at earlier, it is not yet clear what these parties have to negoti‐ate with—i.e., what they bring to the table that may be valuable and deploy‐able.

Assets and skills inventories have caught on quickly in recent years, thanks in large part to John Kretzmann

and John McKnight of the Asset‐Based Community Development Institute. In the Ourtown case, when I say “resources and capacities,” I mean to include, as resources, money, space, political and in‐stitutional capital, and other resources, and, as capacities, experience and skill in organizing stakeholders for dialogue, mobilizing and volunteers, analyzing problems, designing and providing for‐mal services, and other capacities pos‐sessed by the Task Force members.

Though there isn’t always a bright, clear divide between them, resources and capacity should not be treated as the same thing. You may have access to a car in perfect running condition but no fuel to actually run it. Likewise, the skill to do something is different from the supplies

that something requires. Finally, a key skill in any field is using supplies (resources) cleverly and carefully, which we typically call “resourcefulness.”

Every party in the Ourtown example has either resources or capacity or both, and together, the parties may become quite resourceful. For example: • The Mayor’s Office can provide money—but as parties typically learn at the table, only for annual operating costs, not capital costs for renovating or constructing facilities.

• The Ourtown Foundation can provide even more money—but in the form of a one‐time grant, with no special restric‐tions.

• The Homeowners Association can pro‐vide money as well—but only for the specific purpose of renovating the ex‐isting shelter, which it considers an


Though there isn’t always a bright, clear divide be-tween them, resources and capacity should not be treated as the same thing.

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Resourcing current providers will almost always be the quickest way to get measurable results on very defined targets. But why convene a broad group to solve such a narrow problem?

eyesore.

• The Homeless Union has money from its revenue‐generating ac‐tivities—but only to cover the operating costs of services.

Those are the key funding re‐sources that may be available to the group—much more varied, let’s note, than the Foundation funding that supposedly motivated the Mayor initially.

One resource management principle should already be clear: the group should figure out how to use the most flexible money (the Foundation’s) last, after spe‐cial needs have been met by more the restricted or “earmarked” money (operating costs only, renovation only, etc.). As for other key resources: • The Shelter has an important facility (the shelter itself), with both beds and some room for service delivery.

• Ourtown Social Enterprise has a facility and a large pool of volunteers.

• The Homeless Union has an organized base of the client stakeholders (the homeless themselves), who want to be co‐producers of change—in plainer

English, agents of their own well‐being and advancement.

And all of these groups have capac‐ity, from skill and experience managing programs and facilities (Shelter, Social Enterprise) to mobilizing volunteers and advocates (Union, Social Enter‐prise) to helping other groups design and launch programs (Mayor’s Office, Foundation).

Figure 2 maps this inventory of key resources and capacities against some possible responses to the “problems related to homelessness.” Bundling and unbundling works like this: figure out what everyone can do and provide, figure out everything that might be useful and desirable in response to the

problem (regardless of who would do it or how), and then generate a variety of options for connecting the two. As a gen‐eral principle of negotiation, Fisher and Ury define the philosophy of this as “separate inventing from deciding,” i.e. separate the process of generating more ideas from that of judging (evaluating) and coming to decision.

Practitioners who try the Ourtown role‐play exercise typically do not arrive at anything quite as complete as Figure 2, and many people think in numbers and words, not pictures. So some groups gen‐erate most of this information but do not choose to organize it as I have here. They may simply outline “sources and uses” charts, accounting‐like, to match varied resources and varied needs.

But regardless of the group process or approach to the information, just like our two‐party, one‐issue (price) negotiation, Ourtown generates incredibly varied outcomes, despite the fact that everyone is given the same sheet of general instruc‐


See linked tool in this series, Perfect Fit or Shotgun Marriage?: The Power and Pitfalls in Partnerships

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Figure 2. Matching Capacity, Resources, and Action Options: Ourtown Revisited

ACTION OPTIONS FUNDING RESOURCES LABOR CAPACITY & SPACE

MAYOR’S OFFICE (Annual dollars for operating costs, services only)

THE SHELTER (Shelter facility, service delivery experience)

Food service

Job training

Shelter renovation

Shelter expansion

HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION (One-time grant, for shelter reno-vation only)

OURTOWN FOUNDATION (One-time grant for “something”)

OURTOWN SOCIAL ENTERPRISE (Service experience, school facil-ity, volunteer professionals)

HOMELESS UNION (Some service experience, credi-bility with homeless, self-help)

???

tions and each party—Mayor’s represen‐tative, Shelter operator, etc.—a standard‐ized sheet of confidential instructions for its own use.

In the most imaginative outcomes, every resource is somehow put to use, and more specifically, key parties—such as the Homeless Union and Social Enter‐prise—secure important new roles with‐out completely displacing the more estab‐lished service provider (The Shelter). Of‐ten, these arrangements take the form, “Party A will run program X using Party

B’s facility, Party C’s volunteers, and Party D’s funding.”

For example, in some outcomes, the Shelter agrees to let the Union run a food service and job training program at the Shelter (with operating funds from the Mayor’s Office), while the Homeowners Association provides money for Shelter renovation and the Foundation funds some additional beds at the Shelter plus the creation of a new facility and services by Social Enterprise (converting its school building). In addition, the Union pro‐vides volunteer coordinators for the job training program, while the Enterprise

(whose volunteer pool has much more job experience and formal education) provides volunteer mentors for the job training program.

From a substantive standpoint, Our‐town illustrates the potential of com‐mitted problem‐solving groups to dis‐cover, over time, significant options for joint action that were not visible, in some cases not even imaginable, at the start. Far from being a mere give‐and‐take transaction of the kind we often associate with the word “bargaining,”

this negotiation includes important ele‐ments of identifying resources, re‐framing tasks, and inventing more effec‐tive and satisfying solutions.

But our enthusiasm for such potential should not blind us to the fact that some of these stakeholders’ interests are in con‐flict—or the sad reality that many real‐world groups, when faced with similar challenges, do not succeed. A lack of trust or time stymies information sharing, and stubborn thinking habits and pride act as powerful barriers to better ideas. The

political window of opportunity may not yet exist to try the boldest, most promis‐ing ideas.

Having tools for analyzing and con‐ducting multi‐stakeholder or multi‐party problem‐solving helps one recognize and go after the potential, which is still, very often, hard work—emotionally and intel‐lectually demanding, posing risks. Prob‐lem‐solving with others is a human enter‐prise with few guarantees.

Our final task in this case analysis is to briefly review the key subtexts at work in Ourtown and similar negotiations, for they are incredibly common and power‐ful subtexts in many community prob‐lem‐solving efforts. Then we’ll explore one last set of ideas—about representing stakeholders as an “agent”—for this is a very common feature of community problem‐solving as well.

Classic Subtexts Ourtown illustrates four classic sub‐

texts in local civic efforts: • “Community”—who’s in and who’s out? What do we mean by “the community” for purposes of allocating costs and benefits, risks and rewards, rights and obligations? Ourtown’s civic efforts on homelessness can take many forms and head in many directions depending on


Far from being a mere give-and-take transaction of the kind we often associate with the word “bargaining,” this negotiation includes important elements of iden-tifying resources, re-framing tasks, and inventing more effective and satisfying so-lutions.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Nine) KEYS TO PROBLEM-SOLVING

1. Frame problems in ways that make them more solvable. Try frames that lead to more ideas, tap a wider range of capacity and resources around the table, and mobilize public support and legitimacy too.

2. Figure our what everyone can do and provide—not just what everyone wants or prefers. Many resources and many types of capacity can be useful for taking action in the world, and many problems required resources and capacity that are dispersed about the community. Resources include money, space, equipment (tools), access, and more. Capacity includes skill and expertise to put the resources to work. Map both kinds of assets—resources and skilled capacity—widely.

3. Generate many ideas about how to respond to the problem framed. Try unpack-ing a problem into parts and having ideas about action options for each part. Be sure to combine the parts and check for new problems! Solving one dilemma over there can lead to new ones over here, and so on.

4. Match #2 and #3—try bundling and unbundling in various ways. Play with phrases that suggest novel combinations: “Party A will use Resource X from Party B to do Activity Z in Party C’s space.” Look for ways to develop new capacity.

how this question gets answered.

• Symptoms versus root causes. Many so‐cial problems confront communities with difficult trade‐offs between short‐term relief and long‐run resolutions. Think of this as the short‐term response (“Band‐Aids”) versus long‐term (“structural”) solutions tension. In the case we have considered here, the pro‐posals for more beds vs. self‐sufficiency services reflect this tension.

• Respect, turf and voice. Who gets to de‐fine the problem and “lead the charge” to solve it? Who’s gaining or losing standing in our community in terms of leadership on a given problem? In this case, the Shel‐ter and Ourtown Social Enterprise embody the “old guard versus van‐guard” divide. The former is the estab‐lished provider, the latter the up‐and‐comer. The Homeless Union and Shelter em‐body the self‐help (by the homeless) versus profes‐sional service de‐livery (to the homeless) divide. Parties often have intangible interests in status, respect, and autonomy, and these inter‐ests may clash in a community crowded with institutions whose pur‐poses overlap.

• Services versus empowerment. This is a deeper philosophical tension, which correlates with the symptoms/roots and turf tensions above. Do we simply pro‐vide excellent services, or do we work

to build the political power and dig‐nity of a marginalized, stigmatized group? The former leads to a far more technical discussion, while the latter discussion, important as it is, should not blind the parties to the aspects of the problem that are techni‐cal (e.g., what capacity and resources are needed, how should success be measured, etc.).

I find that people think about their communities the way they think about their families—namely that no one else’s could possibly be as dysfunc‐tional. But working out these and other

subtexts is part of any community’s civic life. These are some of the hidden

negotiations be‐hind the visible

ones, and thinking people can—and should—disagree about some of the deeper questions outlined above. Con‐flict can be a source of learning and creativity.

Like other types of conflict, those outlined above are not always handled well via lengthy discussions, especially if they become mere gripe‐and‐grievance sessions or lead to finger‐pointing and withdrawal. But avoid being blind‐sided: identify and under‐stand the subtexts at play. See which

reflect intangible interests that can be addressed through negotiation. Consider, for example, whether they can be ad‐dressed through symbolic gestures (acknowledgment, apology, declaration) as well as tangible decisions (about fund‐ing, timing, significant partnerships, key role assignments).

If appropriate, consult with others. Hold dialogues in which the ground rules and setting encourage deeper learning and sharing across some of these divides rather than coming to decision.

In the very worst cases, identify those who may be prepared to undermine a collective problem‐solving effort, and determine whether there is a solid basis for their ongoing participation.

Negotiating on Behalf of Others Many problem ‐solving efforts in‐volve negotiating on behalf others, i.e., being their represen‐tative or “agent,” and recruiting others to negotiate on behalf of one’s group, organi‐zation, or coalition, i.e., finding an agent and holding him/her

accountable to a group of constituents (or “principals”).

A grassroots advocate negotiates with city government on behalf of her con‐stituent base. A manager negotiates on behalf of her department. A company’s CEO negotiates on behalf of a develop‐ment group carrying out a joint venture project with public and nonprofit part‐ners. A policy staffer negotiates on behalf of the Mayor’s Office—with representa‐tives of a wide variety of local organiza‐tions—as in the Ourtown example above.

Since representation and constituency building are core issues in the practice of


Parties often have intan-gible interests in status, respect, and autonomy, and these clash in a com-munity crowded with in-stitutions whose pur-poses overlap.

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People tend to think about their communities the way they think about their fami‐lies—no one else’s could possibly be as dysfunctional. But working out the subtexts is part of any community’s civic life.

democracy, it should come as no surprise that negotiation offers its share of dilem‐mas for those who must trust others to advance their interests at the negotiating table, as well as for the agents working to do that. This is all the more true where key negotiation representatives have not been elected, as is often the case in infor‐mal civic efforts, or where the interests being represented are those of an organi‐zation, not a political community of citi‐zens.

Negotiation expert Roger Fisher has

coined the phrase “negotiating in‐side out” to de‐scribe what often become compli‐cated and chal‐lenging negotia‐tions on two lev‐els: (a) within our “side” or party; and (b) between us and the other parties. Many veteran negotiators and researchers have shown that negotiating agreement on our side can be every bit as demanding as working across the table with “them.”

An in‐depth look at this topic could fill a volume, and not surprisingly, it has. In Negotiating on Behalf of Others (1999), edited by Robert Mnookin, Lawrence Susskind, and Pacey Foster, a variety of experts look at the strategies that agents use in business, politics, the law, and other fields. Here are some key concepts that every negotiator should know and put to work: • The myth of internal consensus. Conven‐tional wisdom typically holds that we should come to a firm internal position on our side before negotiating with other parties (at the “external” table). But appealing as this may be for rea‐sons of showing strength and solidar‐

ity—what we often refer to in Amer‐ica as “circling the wagons”—it can be a recipe for disaster. Recall that positional bargaining can be a source of inefficient agreements, non‐agreement (impasse), and soured relationships with the other parties—leaving us with little or nothing to draw on next time. Agents need to be able to negotiate interests and create joint gains at the table just like parties negotiating on their own behalf.

• The myth of no disclosure. Con‐versely, it may be appealing to send an agent to the table with instructions to “sound out” the other side and make no indication of what our side wants. “Tell them nothing!” we say, “Just ask questions.” But taken too far, this is a recipe for signaling such flexibility and lack of direction that we will seem rudderless and unpre‐pared. The other party(ies) may walk away if we don’t seem prepared to bargain in good faith and articulate some priorities—e.g., among our in‐terests or among the options on the table.

• Binding oneself and running risks. As Lax and Sebenius note in The Manager as Negotiators, “An agent may pretend to have more limited authority than in fact is the case.” In effect, the agent binds herself by limiting her own authority. There are many ways to

use the fact that the ultimate decision‐makers (the constituents) are not in the room, for example to get more informa‐tion from the other party, to hedge on responding to an offer, and to slow down the pace of a negotiation. Some effective, determined agents are more willing to run risks of no‐agreement than their constituents are. The agent may hold back, even where she knows her constituents would agree to an of‐fer, because she thinks they can get an even better deal.

• Ratification. Representing the interests of others implies approving agree‐ments that one’s constituents would approve or have approved. But not all agents are given clear direction on which kinds of decisions they can make at the table and which demand ratifica‐

tion. Is it OK to agree to joint fact‐finding or a new series of meet‐ings? Must every working document be approved word‐for‐

word by constituents? When groups are large and informal, it can be par‐ticularly challenging to act as an agent, for example if constituents are inter‐nally divided over how an agent should behave (process rules) or what, substantively, she should ask for at the table, or both. Time pressure, too—the need to develop, approve, or reject an offer or meeting quickly—can make ratification difficult and stressful for agents and those they represent.

• Trust‐building and trust‐breaking. Being an agent amplifies the broader chal‐lenge in negotiation of securing and keeping the trust of others. Trusting an agent means running risks—of the agent’s incompetence, deception, and more—in exchange for the rewards that a good agent can bring. Agents who represent diverse or fluid constituen‐cies—or groups in which authority issues are still being worked out—must work particularly hard to represent the


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Circling the wagons can be a recipe for disaster, since positional bargaining can lead to inefficient agree-ments, ruined chances for agreement (impasse), and soured relationships and lost credibility with the other parties.

range of their constituents effectively and fairly.

• Persuading in two directions and “selling out.” Officially, agents represent their constituents, but in practice, they act as go‐betweens who represent their con‐stituents and the other parties to each other. Agents can become “shuttle dip‐lomats.” Let’s say that I head to the negotiating table on your be‐half. You and I both expect that I will return to represent to you what the other side wants. But this may include persuading you to accept a deal that seems much more attractive to me, the agent, than to you, because we don’t think the same way and may not have the same information or assumptions. In com‐munity problem‐solving efforts, espe‐cially when conflicts are deep and emo‐tions run high, heading back to your constituents can be the hardest part. This is especially true if the agent must persuade those he represents about unpleasant realities or must propose a deal that seems far less valuable than

what they hoped for. Agents often gain information at the table—about the bargaining range, the other side’s interests, the nature of the issues, etc.—that constituents do not have but should have to make better deci‐sions. Unfortunately, if constituents lose trust in their agent or are simply

in denial about the hard truths he needs to convey, they may “fire the messenger” or label him a “sell‐out” who has switched sides.

• Co‐optation and conflicts of interest. Having noted the two‐way persua‐sion dilemma, we should also note that agents can be bought off by the other side. Short of that, agents may find themselves acting, instinctively, to advance their own interests—personal recognition, career advance‐ment, control over a project, etc.—in ways that conflict with the interests of their constituents. Checking the agent’s incentives and monitoring the agent can be very important—and so can recognizing an unavoidable con‐flict of interest in time to say “no” to representing someone.

• Inside game/outside game: the power of cross‐cutting coalitions. Faced with a party that is really several parties—or factions—in one, I may determine that the very best way to gain lever‐age across the table is by influencing the other side’s internal negotiation. At first blush, this rings of unethical

manipulation and sabotage from be‐low—undermining the other party’s position by sowing conflict from within. Knowing that our governments play this two‐level game regularly in their foreign policies may be no conso‐lation! But there are two sides to this coin. I may know that the agent across

the table is not fairly representing the range of opinion within the organiza‐tion or group she represents. I may simply wish to support the risk‐takers and innovators on the inside (their side) who are working for constructive change on a key public issue. Change agents frequently find that they have to play this inside game/outside game, for example using support for change out‐side an organization to change thinking and behavior within. Likewise, sub‐groups or factions on one side may find that their strongest allies are on—i.e.,


Faced with a party that is really several parties—or fac-tions—in one, I may determine that the very best way to gain leverage across the table is by influencing the other side’s internal negotiation.

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Heading back to your constituents can be the hardest part, especially if the agent must persuade those he represents about unpleasant realities—or must propose a deal that seems far less valuable than what they hoped for.

within—the other side.

Think about the Ourtown example we analyzed above, and one can quickly see how important these concepts might be‐come in any community facing a complex issue that taps a range of interests and values—and works across multiple levels of inside and outside negotiations.

Note, first of all, that each person at the table on the homelessness issue is a slightly different kind of agent. The Mayor’s representative represents some‐one (the Mayor) who in turn represents the wider community that elected her. But the near‐term interests of the Mayor’s Office will rarely encompass every single political interest in the wider community. It could not, so elected representatives (and their representatives in specific ne‐

gotiations) must choose among interests and make trade‐offs.

Next, the Homeless Un‐ion and Social Enterprise agents represent member‐ship organizations, but they may or may not be elected to their roles by the mem‐bers.

The Ourtown Founda‐tion and Shelter representa‐tives hold appointed (staff) positions in an organizational hierar‐chy, and their own interests as indi‐viduals within those organizations may be quite complex. In some organiza‐tions, board members are quite in‐volved and assertive, and so staff mem‐

bers represent their interests strongly. In other organizations, a strong and charis‐matic executive director may be the real constituent—the “principal principal”—for any agent. Or a staff member acting as an agent may feel compelled to represent the organization’s clients even against the better advice of his bosses. No simple life, that of an agent.

The larger point is less about the na‐ture of the Ourtown players roles as agents than the kinds of persuading, trust building, and competing and cooperating the agents must do. A six‐party negotia‐tion turns out to run in many more direc‐tions than six, as agents work to track the interests of the other parties at the table, their own constituents, and even key par‐ties that are not at the table but wish to exert influence—a prominent newspaper publisher, say, or the chairman of a local civic group. Also, some of the agents on the Ourtown Task Force may be empow‐ered by their organizations to approve a wide variety of decisions at the table while other agents are given much less latitude by those they represent.

All of this adds up to a multi‐level, multi‐party, multi‐issue game with sig‐nificant room for civic entrepreneurs or savvy and committed problem‐solvers to create valuable agreements—and, unfor‐tunately, for manipulators to stall the process, sow seeds of distrust, or promote


This adds up to a game with significant room for civic entrepreneurs to create valuable agreements—and, unfortunately, for manipulators to stall the process, sow seeds of distrust, or promote agreements that do not serve the range of inter‐ests at the table.

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TAKING STOCK (Part Ten) NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS

1. Don’t focus on getting the constituents you represent to come to a firm internal consensus before letting you approach the other parties. “Circling the wagons” first is appealing for reasons of showing solidarity and gaining influence. But it can backfire. You need room to learn and invent at the table, i.e. with the other side.

2. Do get some sense of priority issues and interests. Get factions, or subgroups, within your constituency, to come to some agreement about what is most important to them and what is less so.

3. Clarify the ground rules about ratification. What decisions are you authorized to make at the negotiating table, for example about the process and substance? What must be ratified by those you represent, and how will it happen? Is there a contingency plan if things start to move fast at the negotiating table?

4. Be prepared to be a go-between as much as a representative. Negotiating on behalf of others involves persuading and building trust in several directions, which often turns into “shuttle diplomacy.” You must persuade the other parties to make concessions valuable to your constituents. But you will probably have to persuade them to make concessions as well, and you may be delivering hard news about the real size of the bargaining range, what outcomes can be expected, etc. Agents and constituents find themselves working with different information, as the agent learns at the table. Agents run the risk of being considered sell-outs—or simply being dismissed if they do not seem to be demanding enough of the other side.

5. Clear up any conflicts of interest. Even the most trustworthy agent can find her/himself pursuing a personal agenda at odds with the interests of constituents.

6. Understand the inside game/outside game aspect of many negotiations. Since many important decisions involve conflicts among sides and within them as well, many negotiations present opportunities to create cross-cutting coalitions that join subgroups on one side with a like-minded subgroup on the other.

agreements that do not serve the range of interests at the table.

Final Thoughts: You as the Negotiator

Working out differences and coming to joint decisions are essential skills in any democracy. Big changes in the world make it important that we all work to understand negotiation more thoroughly and become the very best negotiators we

can. While familiarity with key concepts

can help, there is obviously no substitute for experience. Most valuable of all, we find, is practicing these ideas with access to constructive but critical feedback—people with whom to debrief your ex‐periences, people who will comment on what was or was not effective about your approach, people who will acknowledge your strengths while being candid about things you can work on.

In this introduction, we have worked on types of negotiation, situations in which negotiating may or may not be appropriate, ways to think about issues and process, and special dilemmas associ‐ated with negotiating on behalf of others (or having others negotiate on your be‐half). But there are many other important topics worth learning about, such as: • Diversity: How do culture, gender, and other identity‐group differences influ‐ence negotiation? Significant work is being done on this question, drawing on negotiation and conflict resolution experiences around the world, though much more reflection and discussion

are needed. Diversity can be mostly a boon or mostly a burden (if mishan‐dled), but most agree it should be recognized, respected, and managed. See below, together with links on our website, for some starting points.

• Ethics: Beyond the ground rules agreed upon by parties in negotia‐tion, are there certain do’s and don’ts that every negotiator should observe?

Experience suggests that many do’s and don’ts really do depend on the particulars of each situation—or so‐called situational ethics—but commu‐nity norms, broad ethical standards, professional standards for mediators, and a host of critical reflections (see below and the website) are available as guides. Ethical reflection and stan‐dards are particularly important for dealing with misrepresentation, bluff‐ing, falsification, deception, and ex‐tremes of “selective disclosure” (purposely omitting key information although you have not provided false information).

• Facilitators: our discussion of third‐party facilitators barely scratched the surface of this important and rapidly evolving area, which includes media‐tion, arbitration, and other roles and skill sets. See below and the website, plus the linked tool in this series, “Working the Middle: Roles and Chal‐lenges of Intermediaries,” which dis‐cusses a variety of go‐between func‐tions beyond process facilitation, as well as special challenges that go‐betweens face in community problem‐solving.□

Readings and Resources The literature on negotiation, dispute

resolution, mediation, consensus build‐ing, persuasion, and related topics is huge and expanding by the minute. Be‐low I have listed only those items that I know to be rich, candid, helpful, and ac‐cessible. Most of these I have used for years in my own courses and training sessions, and more than a few were writ‐ten by colleagues whose work I know in detail.

Where appropriate, I have indicated a few resources that are more advanced or research‐oriented, but most of these be‐low offer practical advice and discussion. In addition to the books, articles, and guides listed, more and more resources for learning are available free, in whole or in excerpt, on‐line. See our website for the most up‐to‐date listing of key resources, clearinghouses, on‐line peer learning exchanges, journals, and more.

1. Negotiation: Overviews The classic and still, to my mind, the

most accessible introduction to principled negotiation is Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin Books, 1981, 2nd edition 1991). A more in‐depth overview, which covers a variety of practice ideas but also research find‐ings, is Roy Lewicki, David Saunders, and John Minton, Essentials of Negotiation (Chicago: Irwin, 1994). And see varied


Most valuable of all, we find, is practicing these ideas with access to constructive but critical feedback—people with whom to debrief your experiences.

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How do culture, gender, and other identity-group differences influence negotiation? Diversity can be mostly a boon or mostly a burden (if mishandled), but most observers agree it should be recognized, respected, and managed.

subtopics in Negotiation Theory and Prac‐tice, edited by J. William Breslin and Jef‐frey Z. Rubin (Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiat ion Books, Harvard Law School, 1991), plus the Negotiation Jour‐nal published by the Program on Nego‐tiation at Harvard Law School.

The psychology of negotiation, in‐cluding cognitive and emotional dy‐namics that become crucial in the process of negotiating, are discussed very helpfully in Max Bazer‐man and Margaret Neale, Negotiating Rationally (New York: Free Press, 1993). Also see: Roy J. Lewicki and Carolyn Wiethoff, “Trust, Trust Development, and Trust Repair,” in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, M. Deutsch and P. Coleman, editors (San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1996); and Keith G. Allred, “Anger and Retaliation in Conflict” in the same volume.

For an excellent discussion of deci‐sion analysis, ethics, and other issues in negotiation, see Howard Raiffa, The Art

and Science of Negotia‐tion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

2. Conflict Resolution On theory and prac‐tice of conflict resolu‐tion specifically, see: Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, edi‐tors, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (San

Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 2000); and Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: Random House, 1986).

3. Public Dispute Resolution and Consensus Building

Much negotiation theory and prac‐tice was developed in the context of business transactions, alternatives to litigation, or highly formal diplomatic settings. For discussions of agreement‐

seeking in the context of domestic politics and public decision‐making, see: Law‐rence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Ap‐proaches to Resolving Public Disputes (New York: Basic Books, 1987); The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement, edited by Law‐rence Susskind, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas‐Larmer of the Consen‐sus Building Institute (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999); and various publications of the Harvard/MIT Public Disputes Pro‐gram.

For an insightful discussion of “modified consensus” and informal dy‐namics in community politics, see: How‐ell Baum, “Consensus Decision Making” in his The Organization of Hope: Communi‐ties Planning Themselves (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997); and Richard S. Bolan, “Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of Planning,” Journal of the Ameri‐can Institute of Planners, 1969, vol. 35(5), pp. 301‐310.

4. Negotiation in Organizations Negotiating within and across hierar‐

chies, along with other dimensions of organizational bargaining, presents spe‐cial opportunities and challenges. See David Lax and James Sebenius, The Man‐ager as Negotiator (New York: Basic Books, 1986). The book also offers an excellent discussion of coalitional dynamics and multi‐level negotiations.

5. Negotiating on Behalf of Others On being an agent (or being repre‐

sented by one), see: Roger Fisher, “Negotiating Inside Out,” Negotiation Journal, January, 1989, pp. 33‐41; and Ne‐gotiating on Behalf of Others: Advice to Law‐yers, Business Executives, Sports Agents, and Everybody Else, edited by Robert Mnookin, Lawrence Susskind, and Pacey Foster (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999).

6. Managing Process: Mediators and Other Facilitators

An excellent overview of mediation is Christopher Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, 2nd edition (San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1996). For more of a handbook of tactical advice, see Jennifer Beer and Eileen Stief,


LEARNING MORE To learn about other topics that relate to negotiation, check out these strategy tools in our series, available at www.community-problem-solving.net: Planning Together: How (and How Not) to Engage Stakeholders in Charting a Course. Many negotiations in community problem-solving emerge from, or quickly require, efforts to more carefully analyze problems and generate options for action—”plan”—while expanding stakeholder participation. This is true for practical reasons of wanting more and better ideas and for legitimacy reasons as well—wanting a meaningful community mandate. Learn more about the often unspoken expectations and competing objectives that drive participatory planning and decision-making and sometimes undermine it. Learn more about the strategies and tactics needed to “participate” stakeholders more effectively. Organizing Stakeholders, Building Movement, Setting the Agenda. Civic organiz-ing—the process of bringing people and institutions together to effect change—is one of the most fundamental elements of problem-solving in a democratic society. It’s also one of the most misunderstood. Because change doesn’t define or sell itself, organizing is crucial for motivating, building capacity for, and, perhaps most importantly, creating a constituency for change. Perfect Fit or Shotgun Marriage: The Power and Pitfalls in Partnerships. The concept of “partnership” as a mechanism for pooling resources to get things done is almost as old as recorded history—and so is the need to negotiate in order to make partner-ships successful. Useful partners may bring money, materials, expertise, reputation, relationships, and more to help us achieve things that matter to us—and, ideally, to them as well. Unfortunately, much available guidance on partnering either celebrates more than it clarifies or focuses on just a small part of the landscape. Learn more about the strategies and tactics needed to determine whether partnering is an appro-priate strategy and, if so, how to build partnerships that work.

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The Mediator’s Handbook, 3rd edition (British Columbia, Canada: New Society, 1997). On community mediation specifi‐cally, see history at links at the National Center for Community Mediation’s web‐site.

On facilitating group process, see: Sam Kaner et al., Facilitator’s Guide to Par‐ticipatory Decision‐making (British Colum‐bia, Canada: New Society, 1996); Roger Schwarz, The Skilled Facilitator: Practical Wisdom for Developing Effective Groups (San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1994); and a useful discussion of conveners and proc‐ess stages in Barbara Gray, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multi‐Party Problems (San Francisco: Jossey‐Bass, 1989).

7. Creativity in Groups See James L. Adams, “Groups and

Organizations,” In Conceptual Blockbust‐ing: A Guide to Better Ideas (Reading, Mas‐sachusetts: Addison‐Wesley, 1986).

8. Persuasion, Power and Style See principles and practices in Mi‐

chael Watkins, “The Power to Per‐suade” (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2000); Robert Cialdini, Influ‐ence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: Quill, 1984); and James Price Dil‐lard and Michael Pfau, editors, The Per‐suasion Handbook (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002). A variety of other books are available on persuasion theory and re‐search, including the conveniently titled Persuasion: Theory and Research, by Daniel O’Keefe (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002).

On group dynamics that affect influ‐ence in negotiation, see Deborah Tannen, “The Power of Talk: Who Gets Heard and Why,” in Negotiation, Roy Lewicki, David Saunders, and John Minton, editors (Boston: Irwin/McGraw‐Hill, 1999).

A variety of strategic and tactical top‐ics are discussed in detail in negotiation practice notes, such as: George Wu, “Anchoring and First Offers in Negotia‐tion” (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1995); Michael Watkins and Susan Rosegrant, “Sources of Power in Coalition Building,” Negotiation Journal, January 1996, pp. 47‐68; and James K.

Sebenius, “Sequencing to Build Coali‐tions: With Whom Should I Talk First?” Wise Choices: Decisions, Games, and Nego‐tiations, Richard Zeckhauser, et al, edi‐tors (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

9. Gender See Deborah Kolb and Judith Wil‐

liams, The Shadow Negotiation: How Women Can Master the Hidden Agendas that Determine Bargaining Success (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

10. Culture and Ethnic Diversity An excellent critical discussion of

this topic, including historical refer‐ences and a research review, is in Robert J. Janosik, “Rethinking the Cul‐ture‐Negotiation Link,” pp.235‐245 in Negotiation Theory and Practice, J. Wil‐liam Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotia‐tion Books, Harvard Law School, 1991). Also see Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1998). There is also a chapter on “culture and conflict” in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution.

On communication styles and power in cross‐cultural civic process, see: Xavier de Souza Briggs, “Doing Democracy Up Close: Culture, Power and Communica‐tion in Community Building,” Journal of Planning Education and Research, 1998, vol. 18, pp.1‐13; and Caroline S. Tauxe, “Marginalizing Public Participation in Local Planning: An Ethnographic Ac‐count,” Journal of the American Planning Association, 1995, vol.61(4), pp. 471‐481.


40

Got ideas? Send us your feedback on the content of this tool—or any and all ideas you would like to share on taking action to make a difference in communities: [email protected]

Thank you’s. Generous colleagues and friends of the Project pro‐

vided helpful feedback on these ideas in various stages of develop‐

ment, including Brian Mandell and Larry Susskind, or served as

my teachers and guides over the years, including Howard Raiffa,

Jim Sebenius, and Michael Watkins. In addition, I want to thank

the students who took my “Negotiation and Community Build‐

ing” graduate courses over the past few years, as well as practi‐

tioners from around the world who came in for training sessions

(professional education) at Harvard, for inspiring many of these

ideas and helping me to sharpen them. All errors are mine alone.

www.community‐problem‐solving.net Strategy for a changing world.

Xavier de Souza Briggs Associate Professor of Sociology + Urban Planning and Director The Community Problem‐Solving Project @ MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Urban Studies and Planning 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9‐521 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 U.S.A.

feedback@community‐problem‐solving.net

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