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“PERSONALITY FACTOR IS HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE IN

UNDERSTANDING A NATION STATE FOREIGN POLICY”.

EXAMINE THIS STATEMENT IN LINE WITH YOUR

UNDERSTANDNG OF NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY UNDER

UMARU YAR’ADUA

ABSTRACT

This study aims to understand the role personality plays in

understanding a Nation-State foreign policy; it analyzes the

role the personality of Nigeria’s immediate past president

played in determining his foreign policy objectives. There have

been discordant tunes about the ability of President Umaru

Yar’Adua with respect to his personality and how he carried

out his foreign policy objectives. People referred to the

president as slow and incapable of carrying out his functions,

this would also be analyzed in this study. There is no gain

saying the fact that the personality of a leader in authority

plays an important role in his decision making capability. The

Nigerian President was seen as passive, in the sense that he

did not take active part in the running of the country’s foreign

affairs and this had a negative effect in international comity of

Nations with regards to Nigeria.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

COVER

PAGE……………………………………………………………………………

…….1

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………

………………..2

TABLE OF

CONTENT……………………………………………………………………..

.3

CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION...

………………………………………………...5

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE

STUDY………………………………………………….5

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE

PROBLEM.................................................…...6

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE

STUDY…………………………………………………….6

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

STUDY…………………………………………………6

1.5 RESEARCH

PROPOSITIONS……………………………………………………...7

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1.6 RESEARCH

METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………….7

1.7 SCOPE AND

LIMITATION……………………………………………………….…7

1.8 DEFINITION OF

TERMS……………………………………………………….…..8

CHAPTER TWO- LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETHICAL

FRAMEWORK

2.1 NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY: AN

OVERVIEW……………………..…….10

2.2 NIGERIA IN MAY

2007…………………………………………………………….11

2.3

PRESIDENCY…………………………………………………………………

………..13

2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK-PSYCHOLOGY

APPROACH……….13

CHAPTER THREE

3.1 YAR’ADUA, PERSONALITY AND FOREIGN

POLICY………………....18

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3.2 YAR’ADUA AND NIGERIA’S FOREIGN

POLICY……………………..….19

CHAPTER FOUR- SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND

CONCLUSION

4.1

SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………

………….27

4.2

RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………………

……….28

4.3

CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………

……..….28

REFERENCES………………………………………………………………

……………….30

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Personality of an individual plays an important role in

determining a Nation-State Foreign Policy. There is no gain

saying the fact if the personality of a Decision-maker is not

studied it would be difficult to understand the rationale behind

some rules and decisions. Scholars of old and even present

scholars have studied the personality of powerful leaders of

old in order to understand the reason why some policy were

carried out while others were not, leaders of old like Adolf

Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse Tung, Kim Il Sung and a host of

others were analysed in order to understand the rationale

behind some decisions. Some people fail to realise that laws

are not made by the state itself but by certain individuals in

positions of authority, for a law or decision that is attributed to

a state to be really understood, the people behind such laws

should be analysed. The successes or failures of a particular

regime in authority are attributed to the type of person in

position of authority.

For Nigeria’s foreign policy under the leadership of Umaru

Yar’adua to be analysed, the personality of the president would

be analysed; the president was referred as a too slow to act

and incapable of performing the complex function of running

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the Nigerian state. Nigeria’s foreign policy statement under

the immediate past president of Nigeria would be analysed in

order to understand the role the personality of its past

president in performing his functions.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The personality of Nigeria’s immediate past president in the

person of Umaru Yar’adua played an important role in his

foreign policy statement and this had a negative impact in

promoting the interest of the Nigerian state in the

International scheme of things. Nigeria was referred as a

“toothless bulldog” due to the inability of the Nigerian

president in carrying out his functions when it came to foreign

relations.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study seeks to analyse the relationship between the

personality of President Umaru Yar’Adua and his foreign policy

statements. It aims to understand if the personality of

Nigeria’s Yar’adua had a role to play in his policy statements

and objectives.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The level of Nigeria’s prominence in International Affairs

especially in the African continent has dwindled, and this

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happened during the emergence of Umaru Yar’adua as

Nigeria’s president.

There is no better time for this research work to be written

than this point in time in which the fortunes of the Nigerian

state when it comes to International relations is in shambles.

This research work is being written in a crucial period of this

democratic dispensation, the timing is apt as the present

government is determined to tackle the deep rooted problems.

1.5 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

For the purpose of this research work, relevant research

propositions have been outlined to serve as a directional guide

and articulation of the research findings or work.

However, these propositions focus more on the major

problems to be investigated and could possibly lead to other

minor research questions in subsequent research works. The

following are relevant and essential instructive to this research

work:-

i. Personality factor is not highly instructive in understanding a

Nation-State’s foreign policy.

ii. Personality factor is highly instructive in understanding a

Nation-State’s foreign policy.

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1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research work would make use of secondary method of

data collection. Content analysis would be made use of,

especially the Internet.

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION

This research work would cover areas in which the personality

of Nigeria’s immediate past president has affected the foreign

relations capability of the Nigerian state.

This research work s subject to some limitations and the major

one is being that of time, the time frame of the research work

is short; and also the non-availability of materials is also a

limiting factor in writing this research work.

1.8 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

THE STATE

States is defined as political units that exercise ultimate

internal authority and that recognize no legitimate external

authority over them (Anifowoshe, 1999). States are the most

recognized and revered of our political organizations. States

are also the most powerful of all political actors, whether large

or small, rich or poor, populous or scanty, states share all or

most characteristics sovereignty, territory, population,

international organization and domestic support.

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FOREIGN POLICY

This is a course of action or a set of principles adopted by a

nation’s government to define it relations with other countries

or groups of countries (Saleh, 2003). A country’s foreign policy

also set forth its positions on a wide range of international

issues. Little wonder why Reynolds defines foreign policy as a

range of actions taken with reference to external situation and

domestic factors.

POLICY

Fredrick (1963) defined policy as a proposed course of action

of persons, a group, or government within a given environment

proving obstacles and opportunities which the policy was

proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or

realize an objective or a purpose. The two essential features of

this definition are course of action and goal or objectives.

These are essential elements of every policy.

DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy had been defined as the management of

international relations by negotiations the method by which

these relations are adjusted or managed by ambassadors and

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envoys, the business or act of the diplomat. Implicit in this

definition is the fact that the international system is far from

being. Perfect and this arises out of the competing demands

which nation states make on it.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK

2.1 NIGERIA FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW

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May 29, 1999 heralded a new era in Nigeria, ending an

unbroken stretch of 15 years of authoritarian Military rule.

The return to democracy had long been anticipated by both

Nigeria and wider International communities for many

reasons. Nigeria’s status in the International world had been

darkened with its expulsion from the Commonwealth for years

earlier in 1995. The dramatic turn of events was in sharp

contrast to the golden era of the Nigeria’s foreign policies

when the country was the toast of Africa and when it also

championed the cause of African Liberation. As the continents

foremost freedom fighter, she was christened a frontline state,

an honor otherwise reserved for southern African countries.

During this period if Nigeria had estranged relations, with any

country it was the as a result of its pursuit of a worthy cause,

the fight against apartheid and external domination of African

territories by the Europeans.

This had also taken place under Military rule. The difference in

the 1990s was the growing record of the human rights abuses,

corruption and a chain of broken promises manifested in the

rendering useless of one transition programme after the other.

The General Sani Abacha model was even more worrisome as

he planned to perpetuate his stay in office by moving from the

military to an elected Civilian head of state. The expulsion of

Nigeria from the commonwealth dealt a big blow to her ego as

it was, Nigeria whose view on any issue was respected from

being the toast of the continent and from serving as chair of

the United Nations (UN0 special Committee against apartheid

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for well over two decades, to become a byword, an object of

scorn in the global scene. One point this era underscores is the

impact of domestic conditions on foreign relations. The

domestic conditions inhibited Nigeria’s relations and

leadership role to the extent that she sought friends, among

the other untouchables of the international community like

North Korea. Abacha’s demise in office in June 1998 paved

way for yet another junta, which nevertheless moved to restore

Nigeria’s thoroughly battered image and international

relations generally. This they achieved by announcing and

executing a transition programme that culminated in the

swearing in of an elected government a little over a year later.

With the return of Democracy after 15 years of military rule,

the country’s image had been severely battered abroad, and its

economy in bad shapes. Thus it had become palpable that a

new approach was necessary to address the place in the

community of nations. Since the experience of a country at a

certain point in time determines its attitude towards the

outside World, Nigeria’s foreign policies over a long period

had lost its focus and became entangled in internal problems.

Its primary goal however, was to attract a deluge of foreign

investors to take advantage of the country’s abundant human

and material endowments. This is the background against

which the President Olusegun Obasanjo led administration

underpinned its new foreign policy thrust which revolves

around economic diplomacy.

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2.2 NIGERIA IN MAY 2007

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is the most populous nation in

Africa with an estimated 146 million inhabitants living within

an area slightly more than twice the land area of California.

With a GDP of over $296 billion and huge reserves of crude oil,

Nigeria is the second largest economy in the Continent, the

leading oil exporter and 37th largest economy in the World.

Nigeria is located in the Gulf of Guinea in the Western part of

Africa. Nigeria was created by the amalgamation of what were

known as the Protectorates of Northern Nigeria, Southern

Nigeria and the Colony of Lagos into one nation in 1914. The

nation was granted independence in 1960 in what was

considered by Time magazine as a model of negotiated self-

rule.

Nigeria in May 2007 was in high spirits – we were about to

successfully transfer power democratically from one elected

government to another, handing over a sound economy that is

almost debt-free with healthy reserves of over $45 billion. For

the first time since Nigeria’s first republic was terminated,

there was a window of opportunity to break from the past. The

world was watching with interest, with good reason. According

to Rotberg in a report prepared for the Council on Foreign

Relations:

For policy makers everywhere, Nigeria should be the central

African question. No country’s fate is so decisive for the

continent. No other country across a range of issues has the

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power so thoroughly to shape outcomes elsewhere in sub-

Saharan Africa. If Nigeria works well, so might Africa.

For some people in President Obasanjo’s government, the

elections were disappointing but the best candidate won.

Nigerians elected a University graduate as President for the

first time, a person Nigerians were convinced was a decent

man, and raised the possibility that Nigeria will break the

vicious cycle of bad leadership that has defined our nation. We

were optimistic about the future.

2.3 PRESIDENCY

In the presidential election, held on 21 April 2007, Yar'Adua

won with 70% of the vote (24.6 million votes) according to

official results released on 23 April. The election was highly

controversial. Strongly criticized by observers, as well as the

two primary opposition candidates, Muhammadu Buhari of the

All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) and Atiku Abubakar of the

Action Congress (AC), its results were largely rejected as

having been rigged in Yar'Adua's favour.

After the election, Yar'Adua proposed a government of national

unity. In late June 2007, two opposition parties, the ANPP and

the Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), agreed to join

Yar'Adua's government. On 28 June 2007, Yar'Adua publicly

revealed his declaration of assets from May (becoming the first

Nigerian Leader to do so), according to which he had

₦856,452,892 (US$5.8 million) in assets, ₦19 million ($0.1

million) of which belonged to his wife. He also had

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₦88,793,269.77 ($0.5 million) in liabilities. This disclosure,

which fulfilled a pre-election promise he made, was intended

to set an example for other Nigerian politicians and discourage

corruption.

2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK- PSYCHOLOGICAL

APPROACH

The psychological method of political inquiry would be made

use of as the theoretical framework in this paper in order to

the able to understand the role the personality of Nigeria’s

immediate past president in the person of Umaru Yar’adua

played in his foreign policy statements. Foreign policy is the

product of human agency, that is to say, individuals in a

leadership position identifying foreign policy issues, making

judgments about them and then acting upon that information.

It is this fundamental insight – the product of the critique of

rationality in decision making – that initiated a concentrated

study of the impact of individual psychology on foreign policy.

Underlying this approach was the recognition that individual

leaders of states exercised a seminal influence over the foreign

policy process by dint of their experience, outlook and

limitations, and were therefore worthy of special attention.

Among the diversity of psychological factors said to play a role

in shaping foreign policy are the influence of individual

perceptions, human cognition, a leader’s personality and the

dynamics of group decision making.

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For proponents of the psychological approach, foreign policy

decision makers operate in a highly complex world and their

decisions carry with them significant risks. These include

linguistic–cultural barriers, stereotypes and high volume of,

yet incomplete, information. Hence through processes of

perception and cognition, decision makers develop images,

subjective assessments of the larger operational context, that

when taken together constitute the ‘definition of the situation’.

These definitions are always a distortion of reality, as the

purpose of perception is to simplify and order the external

environment. Policy makers can therefore never be completely

rational in applying the maximisation of utility approach to

decisions.

The role of perception

In dividing the setting of foreign policy decision making

between the ‘operational’ and ‘psychological’ environments,

Harold and Margaret Sprout, among the first scholars to

address FPA concerns, opened up the possibility of FPA

scholars investigating the interior life of the mind of individual

foreign policy makers. Robert Jervis produced one of the most

Influential studies in this area on the role of ‘misperception’ on

foreign policy decisions, which he says stems from the fact

that leaders make foreign policy based upon their perceptions

rather than the actual ‘operational environment’. For Kenneth

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Boulding, this suggests that foreign policy decisions are

largely the product of ‘images’ which individual leaders have

of other countries or leaders and, therefore, are based upon

stereotypes, biases and other subjective sources that interfere

with their ability to conduct rational foreign policy. Both

scholars see leadership as bringing its particular experience

and outlook, perhaps shaped by individual and societal

prejudices or media imagery, to the foreign policy process and

thus introducing distortions to ‘definitions of the situation’.

The role of cognition

Another dimension of the psychological approach that affects

foreign policy is cognition. Cognition, the process by which

humans select and process information from the world around

them, introduces important problems to the decision-making

process. Indeed, the limits that cognition – when coupled with

the role of perception – introduces to a rational account of

foreign policy are such that it is difficult to describe these

decisions as anything but the product of an incomplete (and

therefore unsatisfactory) process.

According to Alexander George, an eminent diplomatic

historian, the international environment is filtered by decision

makers through their own ‘operational code’, that is, a set of

rules and perceptions that have previously been established

within their minds and which are used to assess new situations

and develop policy responses to them. Robert Axelrod, an

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international relations scholar, suggests that this process leads

to the development of a ‘cognitive map’ that combines

perception, prejudice and an understanding of ‘historical

lessons’, and applies these to the task of decision making.

Moreover, his research findings suggest that foreign policy

makers tend towards those policy choices that involve the

fewest trade-offs, not necessarily the ‘best’ or ‘optimal’ policies

that rational choice theorists would have us believe, but the

ones that involve taking the path of least resistance. Indeed,

some have characterised this sub-optimal decision making as

‘satisfying’, that is the decision maker’s impulse to choose a

policy option that addresses the immediate pressures and

concerns rather than weighing the merits of a given policy.

Building upon these insights, other behaviourist scholars in

FPA have highlighted the distortions on rational foreign policy

imposed by the search for cognitive consistency by individual

leaders. The academician, Leon Festinger’s concept of

‘cognitive dissonance’, that is, the effort by which a decision

maker deliberately excludes new or contradictory information,

in order to maintain his existing image or cognitive map, is one

example of this. Jervis’ investigation into ‘cognitive

consistency’ points out that foreign policy makers habitually

screen out disruptive effects by finding a logical way of

incorporating it into the rationale behind a given foreign policy

choice.

The role of personality

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In addition to perception and cognition, FPA scholars have

sought to assess the impact of a leader’s personality on foreign

policy. They note that different leaders bring their own biases

to office and – this is most evident in the removal of one leader

and the installation of another – can exercise dramatically

different influences over their country’s foreign policy. For

example, Anthony Eden’s harkening back to Britain’s

imperialist past was a major factor in his ill-advised

intervention into Suez in 1956, while John Kennedy’s

inexperience and youth caused him to respond aggressively to

the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, also

Yar’adua’s personality also played a determining factor in his

foreign policy from the year 2007-20o9. Psychological profiling

of leaders, analysing the origins of their patterns of behaviour

as a clue to their possible actions, became a priority activity.

All of these individualistic and deeply personal elements are

said to affect leadership and ultimately foreign policy

outcomes. In their study of personality, Irving Janis and Leon

Mann introduced a ‘motivational’ model of foreign policy

decision making that emphasised the fact that leaders are

emotional beings seeking to resolve internal decisional

conflict. The role of emotions is most pronounced in a crisis

and at this point stress intervenes, causing a lack of ability to

abstract and tolerate ambiguity, as well as an increased

tendency towards aggressive behaviour. ‘Tunnel vision’, a

fixation on single solutions to the exclusion of all others, may

also ensue.

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CHAPTER THREE

3.1 YAR’ ADUA, PERSONALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Umaru Yar’adua was a passive leader and he was very slow in

making decisions, people were of the opinion that his being

slow in making decisions was such that he would be able to

tackle problems as they come and not in a rushed manner, but

after two years and no impact when it comes to foreign policy,

President Yar’adua could be referred to as a man who was not

actively involved in taking part in Nigeria’s foreign policy. As

for Yar'Adua's personal style, there has been some iota of

evasiveness in some decisions taken so far.

Further, Yar'Adua appeared inscrutable to Nigerians and this

quality caused uncertainty in some quarters regarding his

readiness for the presidency.

An Inclusive Leader? Yar’Adua’s limited knowledge of Nigeria

and the world (for instance - he had never visited more than a

handful states in Nigeria before joining the presidential race,

and never been to the USA until he came to visit President

Bush in December 2007) and his introverted nature made him

easy to capture by a small clique (K-4) now called “the Katsina

Mafia”. Since he came into office, he appointed a

disproportionate number of Northerners to virtually all the

important ministries, departments and agencies. This drew the

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ire of other parts of the country, particularly the South-West

and the Niger Delta. Yar’Adua therefore failed to show he can

be a universalist and came across as sectional, or even worse,

clannish.

Nonetheless, finding the much needed but elusive answers to

Nigeria’s foreign policy weaknesses must begin with President

Yar’Adua himself.  If on the other hand, he had no desire to

engage personally in active foreign policy making and forays

as former President Olusegun Obasanjo did, then, he made it

worse by appointing a man that was incapable of handling the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the person of Ojo Maduekwe.

It can never be overemphasized, that effective foreign policy is

about personality, visibility and packaging, as it is about

substance. The world is awash with various demanding issues,

and most pertain to Africa. The attention these matters

deserve warrant seriousness and not levity; and Nigeria is well

suited for that leadership role. Perhaps, it was this realization

of the need for a hands-on approach in grappling with ever-

shifting foreign policy priorities that led Cyrus Vance to

declare that giving primacy to entrenched policy goals is

“baloney.”  Surely, his was an authoritative voice and one that

spoke from the wisdom of lessons learned.

3.2 YAR’ADUA AND NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

From the very outset of her independence from Britain,

Nigeria made Africa the centerpiece of her foreign policy.  In

that regard, there has been a semblance of continuity in her

foreign policy focus.  Inherent in that doctrine has been the

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supposition that Nigeria would always have a leadership role

to play in Africa and that whatever was in Africa’s interest was

invariably in Nigeria’s interest. Under various Nigerian

administrations -- military and civilian—efforts were made to

toe such guidelines and policy constructs, sometimes more

faithfully, at other times not.  Even the internationally

embattled Abacha regime found a worthy external role for

itself in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

In the area of foreign relations, Yar’Adua’s administration was

virtually off the African radar. He visited the USA early in his

tenure – in December 2007 where he expressed the desire to

partner with the US on Africom. Upon return to Nigeria, he

denied making such a commitment. He showed a preference

for economic relations with Russians (Gazprom), Iranians

(Nuclear Energy Power MoU) and Germans (Energy

Partnership for non-prosecution of Siemens bribes) than most

other advanced nations of the world. He addressed the South

African Parliament in June, 2008 and avoided most

international forums since then. There are unconfirmed

speculations that the state of his health did not allow for long

trans-continental flights, but the health of our President was

the nation’s most closely guarded secret.

Yet despite Nigeria’s nascent democracy, the nation stands at

a discordant inflection point in its foreign policy.  Rarely has

Nigeria’s international voice and foreign policy lost so much

lustre as it has under President Umaru Yar’Adua and Foreign

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Minister Ojo Maduekwe.   As foreign minister, Maduekwe’s

tenure has so far proven distinctively unremarkable and his so-

called “Citizen diplomacy” vacuous.  At a time, when Nigeria is

touting its re-branding ethos, her foreign policy is in its most

lethargic state. Yet the challenges confronting the nation at

home and abroad were ever more self-evident. Painfully, there

seems to be no recognition of the worrying situation; or indeed

how to remedy it.

 President Yar’adua had no grand vision of foreign policy

because opportunistically extrapolated to the apex political

position through a most discredited electoral process; he had

been largely dogged and concerned with legitimacy. To

complete his embattlement, he was thoroughly vitiated by

political creditors, who invented him from relative obscurity to

prominence.

The grand rhetoric of the foreign minister, Mr. Ojo Maduekwe

about a nebulous concept of citizen diplomacy lacks any

theoretical coherence and even practical use. A weak and frail

tautology Mr. Maduekwe defines his citizen diplomacy as one

concerned with Nigerians anywhere in the world. This is

neither foreign policy nor diplomacy.

Foreign policy essentially consists in set priorities and other

critical agenda: identified as the core component of a nation,”

external interests, whose impact must reinforce the nation’s

strategic internal aggregates, and needs. Effective diplomacy

is largely derived from articulate and coherent foreign policy

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and this itself rest on national power.

The strength and stability of national institutions, capability,

predictability and transparency of domestic political process,

responsive, inclusive and participative structure all in various

degrees and measures constitute the critical benchmark of

national power.

Nigeria foreign policy in the past two years remained in the

shadows of the stalemated internal political process. Mr. Ojo

Maduekwe, Nigeria’s foreign minister brought more

grandstanding to the conduct of foreign policy, than any

meaningful substance.

In Prosecuting his largely amorphous citizen diplomacy, his

most outstanding achievement have been to summon

diplomatic representatives to his office and lecture them on

how to treat Nigerians in their home countries. Last January,

he took his political swagger to Washington, where he clashed

with an equally uncouth Nigerian ambassador to America.

Their mutual spat resulted in the recalling of the ambassador.

At the peak of former U.S President Bush project of Africa

Command Mr. Maduekwe and his boss spoke at cross

purposes. However, since the inauguration of President

Obama, the Africa command has gone into cold.

A calmer and level headed foreign minister would have

anticipated that most of the militarist policy of the widely

loathed former President Bush would have taken a back stage

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as any of his prospective successors would have shelved it. But

our impulsive foreign minister would grab anything for Nigeria

even if it were a bag of thorns.

After the coup in Guinea, following the death of that country’s

long reigning ruler, the federal government appointed envoy,

former military President, General Babangida and Mr.

Maduekwe spoke at cross purpose. While Babangida said that

the junta that easily ebbed away the weak institutions left by

the late ruler, were patriots, who deserved to be heard, Mr.

Ojo Maduekwe, a “civil rule puritan,” who made his name and

fortune in the service of Nigeria’s worst military kleptocrat,

late Gen. Abacha said that Guinean junta or any of their ilks

are not desirable in any part of the continent.

Besides rhetoric and grandstanding, Nigeria foreign policy did

not fare any better since the past two years. Foreign policy

results are measurable and could be well assessed. In how

many international foray is Nigeria’s voice clearly heard and

discernable? In how much global institutional architecture is

Nigeria’s mark clearly discernable? At the meeting of Group

20 and other countries that met in Washington to discuss the

global economic meltdown, Nigeria was conspicuous by its

absence. President Yar’adua later bemoaned Nigeria’s fate,

which himself and his ilk was largely responsible. Since the

past two years, Nigeria’s foreign policy, relations and

diplomacy has been characterized by topsy-turvy and has

absolutely nothing to show for it.

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The bribery scandal involving high state officials and some

multinational firms has largely been swept under the carpet,

even when these companies have been punished in their home

countries. At the break-up of the corruption scandal involving

the German Siemens, the government took an initial

commendable measure by blacklisting the German company

from further participating in contract tender in Nigeria until

such a time when all issues relating to the bribery is resolved.

Less than a year after that, the government reversed itself and

President Yar’adua claimed recently, that the government

change of mind was as a result of a meeting he had with the

German Chancellor, Mrs Angela Merkel at the sideline of

European Union/Africa Union meeting in Lisbon Portugal.

According to him, the German leader begged him to restore

the company in Nigerian good books and he did so, after a

guarantee that the company would behave properly. This

incredibly is before the Nigerian cohorts in Siemens scandal

are made to answer.

Infact, the alleged culprits are lumbering in visible limelight.

Also the related bribery scandal involving Halliburton and

some former high state officials was equally bottled in a cooler

inspite of a panel constituted to ostensibly bury it than to

throw any light in it.

And in all these, the message to the world is clear. A weak

institutional framework coupled with shoddy process, all

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demonstratable of a failing state, than any one capable of

taking any serious international responsibility.

When a state lacks capability and capacity to enforce its laws

and is visibly unable to rein in the excesses of vested interest

whether within the state apparatus or outside, then such state

cannot claim any effectiveness. Recently, the state traffic

police in Paraguay arrested an offending vehicle whose

occupant is the president of the country, Mr. Fernando Lugo

and slapped a fine, which the president promptly paid.

Nothing could demonstrate the rule of law when high state

officials are themselves subjected to the rigours of the law.

The international community and especially the business

community would not need elaborate lecture to realize that

Paraguay, once an elaborate court yard of junta dictatorship is

renewed. Within Africa, Nigeria stands far more diminished

after the neighbouring Ghana and South Africa conducted a

universally acclaimed fair and free elections.

With the announcement that the U.S President, Mr. Obama

was going to Ghana, Nigeria’s ruling party, the honey pot of

the ‘big men’ turned paranoid. They accused the U.S embassy

in cohort of opposition parties and civil society groups of

plotting to destabilize Nigeria.

Foreign policy and diplomacy deals with both perceptions and

realities. The world perception of Nigeria is a country brutally

misgoverned by its elites and worst, whose national wealth is

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routinely pilfered by its governors. Mr. Ribadu, former EFCC

chairman graphically illustrated the point, when he recently

told the Washington Post that, the man he prosecuted for theft

and looting of about 700 million U.S dollars is influential inside

operator within the Yar’adua administration and asked the

world to discountenance the pretence of anti-corruption which

the regime has repeatedly said.

The true situation of Nigeria foreign policy in the past two

years is that it has become a hostage of regime stalemate and

crises of legitimacy. The world that is still engaged to Nigeria,

does so in the hope of a new Nigeria beyond the former regime

clay foot, dogged in incompetence and corruption. It was

widely believed that when the chained giant held down by her

rapacious elites awakes, the world would be moved.

There are clear indicators that Nigeria’s status as a regional

hegemony and bellwether for Africa may have gone burst. 

Nigeria’s non-invitation to the last G-20 Summit capped the

diminution of her erstwhile status and foreign policy panache.

Also, observers continue to ponder Nigeria’s evident non-

engagement in Somalia; its loud silence on the crisis in Darfur

and Zimbabwe – facts that bespeak her fading influence.

Furthermore, her huge human, financial and political

investments in West Africa, especially in Sierra Leone and

Liberia, are rarely acknowledged these days, when others

scramble to take credit for rescuing both countries. This

pattern, however, is not new, as similar events transpired in

Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia, where Nigeria

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played key roles in their respective independence struggle, a

fact forgotten once the nations respectively achieved

independence. 

 

Nigeria faced a stiff opposition from Sierra Leone and Togo,

for the non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council for the

2010-2011 terms.  The two smaller and less influential

countries were unyielding.  However, it was the policy inertia

in Abuja and the failure to engage the two countries

assertively that most observers found confounding.  This fact,

speaks also to the overall foreign policy inertia and

dissonance. Evidently, there is stark policymaking and policy

implementation disconnect, a fact further compounded by

domestic politics and policy dissemblance.  However, Nigeria’s

problem seems to stem more from Yar’Adua administration’s

preoccupation with the management of its domestic political,

economic and financial situation. Understandably, the

prevailing global economic downturn has also not been

Nigeria-friendly.

 

By any measure, Nigeria has played numerous critical Africa-

centered foreign policy roles over the years. These have not

been without material, financial and political costs. However,

as leader, she is clearly slacking off.  As a country, it seems

that her leadership gravitas suddenly deserted her.  The

evidence lies in the fact that many African nations no longer

consult Nigeria, as they once did, talk less of following her

lead in continental matters.  Hence, when recently President

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Yar’Adua posed the question: “Is it lack of will?” vis-à-vis

Nigeria’s exclusion from the G-20, many took that to be an

eminently rhetorical question. 

CHAPTER FOURSUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

4.1 SUMMARY

With the above analysis it is pertinent to note that the

administration of Umaru/Goodluck failed in carrying out the

foreign policy objectives of the Nigerian state and this can be

traced to the personality of the administration. Nigeria was not

acknowledged as the giant of Africa in terms of political and

economic power, rather she was referred to as the most

populous country in Africa. This can be seen due to the fact

that the President of the United States of America- which

Nigeria supported-visited other countries in Africa but did not

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visit Nigeria, instead, he sent his Secretary of state to the

country.

Nigeria’s past president was not actively involved with the

country’s foreign policy, maybe it was due to his illness, we

cannot tell, since he is no more, but it is pertinent to note that

Nigeria under President Umaru Yar’Adua had the worse

showing when it came to foreign relation, Nigeria was not

represented in various international meet in the world.

It is really unfortunate that President Umaru Yar’Adua did not

round up his tenure, even if he had finished it, Nigeria would

still be seen as a crippled giant, although Goodluck Jonathan

was part of the Yar’Adua administration, he is already making

waves in the International scene, this can be seen with his

recent visit to the United States of America and his interview

with C.N.N.

For the past 2 years, Nigeria has lost her place in the

International arena; Nigeria is now seen as the sleeping giant

of Africa.

Nigeria now has a new president, although the present

president was part of the last administration, it is hoped that

he performs well in terms of his foreign policy, Nigeria has

come of age, and it is time for her to take her rightful position

when it comes to the issue of foreign policy.

4.2 RECOMMENDATION

Nigeria should ensure that there is a policy framework that

would guide the affairs of Nigerian foreign policy. The

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framework should not be for a tenure only, but it should be

such that subsequent government in place would be able to

carry out.

A technocrat should be appointed as the Minister of Foreign

Affairs, whither the time when politicians that don’t know any

thing about diplomacy would be appointed as the Minister of

Foreign Affairs.

There should be a re-evaluation of Nigeria’s foreign policy, it

has come to fore that Nigeria is not held in high esteem in

Africa, even countries that Nigeria helped in fighting for their

independence are fighting for supremacy over Nigeria.

4.3 CONCLUSION

 Ironically, it is today difficult to forecast how Nigeria will act

on any global issue. It is also not farfetched to believe that

Nigeria’s foreign policy plodding along is a welcome salve in

some quarters. That, however, is not in Nigeria or Africa’s best

interest.  Nigeria is too big, too vital and definitely, too

important as a global and regional player to be ignored. Her

potentialities remain vastly undiminished, even though she

seems reluctant to self-actualize as a reliable leader and ally.

In addition, it is far too dangerous to allow Nigeria to slip into

the mode of irrelevancy.  Regrettably, no one can assist an

unwilling or incapable Nigeria to play its desirable and optimal

foreign policy role.

 If ongoing global trends and realignments are anything to go

by, the year ahead will be potentially and diplomatically

definitive for Nigeria. There is a vast leadership role and

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vacuum that needs to be filled.  Nigeria, must however, find

her lost foreign policy niche and bearing or risk further

marginalization in global affairs, as well as in Africa.  As things

stand, her present foreign policy lethargy is defeatist, and

someone should have told President Yar’Adua so. Perhaps, if

the president became aware of this reality, something

worthwhile might have emerged out of the “crookedness” of

Nigeria’s present indolent foreign policy disposition

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