COMMONWEALTH STATUS AND/OR THEBILATERAL COMPACT OF ASSOCIATION:THE SOLUTION TO A MUTUAL PROBLEM '

Luis Vega RamosUniversity of Puerto RicoLaw School

INTRODUCTION

On the day of Puerto Rico's quincentenial, Washington,D.C. woke up to a

message that demanded the clarification and the approval of the bilateral compact of

the sovereign Free Associated State of Puerto Rico as a response to the results of

the November 14th status plebiscite! The petition's purpose was to put an end to an

almost century-long dilemma for Puerto Rico and the United States.

Throughout its history, Puerto Rico has been pulled by two opposing forces:

cultural self-affirmation and the preservation of political and economic ties to a

stronger power. For the United States, the dilemma has centered on whether it is best

to maintain Puerto Rico as a perpetual dependency in order to secure its interests in

the island or if the costs of this outweigh its benefits.

The commonwealth arrangement of 1952 has outlived its usefulness and no

longer functions as a solution to the dilemma. The proposed commonwealth definition,

that won the plebiscite, called for a "bilateral compact which can only be amended by

mutual consent." 3 We must devise a definitive solution that takes into account the

historical problems of the relationship and offers solutions to them, and that responds

' Dedicated to Marco A. Rigau and 2,059 other Puerto Ricans who simply had the courage to stand bythe principle and be counted.Special thanks to Rail S. Mariani Franco for his invaluable help in preparingthis paper. Presented at the Caribbean Studies Association .19th Annual Conference in Yucatan, Mexico,and the Second Annual National Conference on Relations Between the U.S., American Samoa, Guam,Micronesia, Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico and the U.S.V.I., Washington, D.C., May 1994.

2 Tne Washington Post, November 19, 1993, page A54.'For a translation of the status definitions for the plebiscite see 'Hemisphere", Vol. 5, No. 3,

Summer/Fall 1993, page 39.

to the aspirations expressed by the Puerto Rican people in the status plebiscite of

1993.

I. The Commonwealth of 1952: compact or "monumental hoax"?

On December 10, 1898, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the United States

acquired Puerto Rico as a Spanish-American War booty. Said treaty granted Congress

full power to determine the "civil rights and political status" of the island and its

inhabitants. 5 Thus, Puerto Rico became a possession of the United States, subject to

the sovereign will of Congress

In acqbiring Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam, the United States had

formally become an imperial power. The awkwardness of this situation prompted an

intense debate as to the applicability of the Federal Constitution to these new

possessions, the limits of congressional power to legislate over them and their ultimate

political destiny.

For Puerto Rico, it took 24 years, two organic acts (the Foraker and the Jones

Acts) 6 , and a series of Supreme Court decisions, known as the Insular Cases' , to

solve this debate, but in an inconclusive manner!' The solution was concretely stated

in Balzac v. Porto Rico 9 , where it was concluded that Puerto Rico belonged to, but

was not part of, the United States. Judge Taft stated that while U.S. citizenship was

collectively granted in 1917, the island was still an "unincorporated territory" of the

United States, in which only the most fundamental guarantees of the Federal

4 Phrase used by Circuit Judge Magruder in Figueroa v. The People of Puerto Rico , 232 F.2d. 615 (1st Circ., 1956).

Article IX, Treaty of Pans of 1898; 30 Stat. 1754, 1759.6 31 Stat. 77 (1900) and 39 Stat. 951 (1917) respectively.7 De Lima v. Bidwell 182 US 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 US 244 (1901); Dooley v.

United States, 183 US 151 (1901); Pepke v. United States 183 US 176 (1901); Hawaii v.Mankichi, 190 US 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States 195 US 138 (1904); Rassmussen v. US,197 US 516 (1905).

8 See Judge Black's negative critique of the Insular Cases in Reid v. Covert , 354 US 1 (1957) at14.

9 258 US 298 (1922).

Constitution applied. The Supreme Court deemed the right to a trial by jury not to be a

fundamental right and, thus, inapplicable to Puerto Rico.

The territorial status of Puerto Rico remained unaltered during the next three

decades. It was clear that Congress exercised plenary powers over the island in virtue

of the Territorial Clause of the Constitution.'°

In 1950, after passage of an amendment to the Jones Act that permitted the

popular election of the insular governor" , Congress started a process, with the

approval of Public Law 600'2 . This process culminated in 1952 with the establishment

of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico,which is the current arrangement between the

island and the federal government.

Public Law 600 stated that it was adopted by Congress "in the nature of a

compact, so that the people of Puerto Rico can organize a government pursuant to a

constitution of their own adoption." The law went on to describe the process by which

the Puerto Rican people would adopt their constitution, which had to be ratified

ultimately by the President and the Congress. Finally, the law stated that a series of

provisions of the Jones Act would still remain applicable to Puerto Rico, under the

name of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act of 1950. 14

There are at least two of those provisions that seem to seriously weaken

the theory of the existence of a compact binding Congress. Section 1 of the Act

reads:

That the provisions of this Act shall apply to the Island of Puerto Rico andto the adjacent islands belonging to the United States. 15

This section seems to mean that, notwithstanding the so-called compact,

1 ° Article IV, Section 3, US Constitution."Elective Governor Act of 1947; 48 U.S.C.A. 737 et seq.12 64 Stat. 319; 48 U.S.C.A. 731(b) et seq.13 Id.' 4 48 U.S.C.A. 745 et seq./5 48 U.S.C.A. 731.

3

Puerto Rico still remained a possession of the United States. Furthermore, regarding

the limits of congressional power over Puerto Rico, Section 9 stated:

That the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicableexcept as hereinbef ore or hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have thesame force and effect as in the United States, except the internalrevenue laws... 18

To fully understand the implications of P.L. 600 and its effect on the

constitutional status of Puerto Rico, one must go to its legislative record. It is there that

the congressional intent and understanding of the proper meaning of the phrase "in

the nature of a compact" can be found."

During public hearings held by the House Committee on Public Lands' the

Governor and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, the Department of the

Interior and the Department of State of the United States all agreed that passage of

this legislation was "a development into self-government on the part of a non-

incorporated area of the United States, without virtually changing its position relative to

the United States."

The Senate's committee report summed up this reasoning by stating that:

The measure under consideration would not change Puerto Rico'sfundamental political, social and economic relation to the UnitedStates."'

During the congressional debates, it was clear that with varying degrees of

authoritarism, the attitude of congresspersons ranged from blatant imperialism to

benevolent paternalism. Only Rep. Marcantonio (D-NY) lifted his voice in protest,

16 Id."7 Helfeld, David M. "Congressional Intent and Attitude Towards Public Law 600 and the Constitution

of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico", 21 Rev. Jur. UPR 255 (1952).16 Hearings Before the Committee on Public Lands on H.R. 7674, March 14 and 17, 1950.19 Statement given by the Governor of Puerto Rico, Luis Munoz Marin, regarding H.R. 7674, March

14, 1950.20 Report No. 1779, Senate, 81st Congress, 2nd Session.

Li

calling the measure a "fraud" to the Puerto Rican people. 2' As could be expected, his

accusation went unheard by the rest of Congress.

With the legislative interpretation properly in place, Congress approved and the

President signed P. L.600 into law. For them it seemed clear that the compact entered

into did not alter Puerto Rico's status as a territory.

The people of Puerto Rico accepted, in a special referendum, the terms offered by

Congress and elected a constitutional convention to elaborate the organic document.

Besides adopting it, the convention also adopted a series of resolutions. One of them

stated that Puerto Rico had attained "the goal of complete self-government", within "the

terms of the compact entered into by mutual consent..." 22 Furthermore, this resolution

went on to say that "the people of Puerto Rico reserve the right to propose or accept

modifications in terms of its relation with the United States..." 23

These statements of the constitutional convention seem to contradict, if understood

in their broadest meaning, both Congress' and President Truman's interpretation of

P.L.600. While Congress had stated that these actions had not altered the fundamental

status of the island, the elected representatives of the people of Puerto Rico claimed

that "the last vestiges of colonialism" had "disappeared in the principle of the

Compact." Something or someone had to give, as the constitutional convention soon

found out.

After being popularly ratified by a 4 to 1 margin, Resident Commissioner Ferncis

introduced H.R. Conc. Res. 430 by which Congress would ratify the Puerto Rican

constitution. In finally approving the constitution, Congress ordered Puerto Rico to

21 To see a summary of Rep. Marcantonio's remarks consult FernOs Isem, El Estado LibreAsociado de Puerto Rico, Antecedentes, Creaci6n y Desarrollo Haste la EpocaActual 2nda ediciOn, Editiorial de la U.P.R.,1988, pages 111-112.

22 Resolution 23 of the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico, 1 L.P.R.A. pages149-150.23 Id.

5

accept two amendments in order for the document to take effect.' President Truman

signed the resolution with amendments into P.L.447 25 and the constitutional

convention "accepted" the amendments . 23 The commonwealth of Puerto Rico was

officially proclaimed on July 25, 1952, coinciding to the day with the 54th anniversary

of the U.S. invasion of the island?

The following year, the U.N. General Assembly, having received assurances given

by the President of the United States committing the U.S to accept any request made

by the Puerto Rican legislature in favor of a greater degree of, or even total

independence28 , approved Resolution 748(VIII), which gave international recognition

to the "new constitutional status" of the island'

With this resolution the process of creation and legitimization of the commonwealth

status was completed. This gave way to an era that started with overcelebrated

industrialization and the presentation of Puerto Rico as the model for U.S. relations

with underdeveloped countries in the thick of the Cold War, to a period where juridical

ambiguity, political powerlessness, economic dependance and "unwise practices" 3' of

"hanky panky' 31 have prompted a crisis that demands the urgent revision of the U.S.-

Puerto Rico relationship.

2° Congressional amendments to the Puerto Rican Constitution were the elimination of Section 20 ofthe Bill of Rights (Article II) which was modeled after thehuman rights embodied in the U.N. Charter andcontained , for example, the right to work, and an addition to Section 3, Article VII, ordering all futureamendments to the constitution to be compatible with the Federal Constitution and the Federal RelationsAct of 1950.

25 66 Stat. 327; 48 U.S.C.A. 731(d).28 Resolution No. 34 of the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico; 1 L.P.R.A. pages153-155.22 Proclamation on the Foundation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 1 L.P.R.A. pages 155-156.28 See Arguelles and Gautier Mayoral, Puerto Rico y la O.N.U., Editorial Edil, 1971, pages 125-

126.29 Id. at page 112.30 Quote from President George Bush's State of the Union Address, February 7, 1989.31 See Ferndndez, Ronald. The Disenchanted Island, Praeger, 1992, page x..

II. The Problems of Puerto Rico

For Puerto Ricans, the problems related with political status seemed to

complicate, not to end, with the creation of the commonwealth: Although no one can

deny that commonwealth status permitted Puerto Rico to enjoy the benefits of an

accelerated economic growth, unrestricted access to the U.S. market and to the

mainland, and a certain degree of political stability , it must also be aknowledged

that Puerto Ricans have also suffered heavily from its side effects. These have become

more evident in recent years, giving some validity to the argument that the price Puerto

Rico has paid for commonwealth has been too high.

Today, Puerto Rico is a society plagued with a high (and drug related) crime rate,

unbridled consumerism, extreme dependance on welfare programs and federal tax

breaks, and a constant struggle between its national identity and and the possibility of

total assimilation to the United States. It would be unjust to totally lay all the blame for

these evils on commonwealth status or even on the United States; we (Puerto Ricans)

also share a measure of responsibility for tolerating the deterioration of our society. But

we do not need to lay blame. What we need to do is understand the problems of

modern day Puerto Rico, so that we can fashion a political and economic relationship

that foments solutions to those problems and forecloses the possibility of new ones.

The problems of Puerto Rico can be divided into four categories: juridical

ambiguity, the issue of national identity, economic dependance and political

powerlessness. Although they are extremely interrelated, we will discuss each of them

separately .

32 This should not be understood as to mean that there have not been instances of political turmoilduring the past forty years, as the attempts to force the Navy and the Marines from Vieques and Culebra,the Cerro Maravilla killings of two independence advocates at the hands of the police in 1978 and theattacks on U.S. military facilities and personnel located in the island in the early eighties, just to name a few,demonstrate.

33 This list does not attempt to include all the problems of the island, only the ones that are directlyrelated with the status question.

A) JURIDICAL AMBIGUITY

Before the establishment of the commonwealth there was no doubt that Puerto Rico

was a territory of the United States. The President, the Congress, the courts and the

Puerto Rican people all agreed this was the correct interpretation. After 1952,

however, things have not been so clear.

Using the faculties recognized by Section 9 of the Federal Relations Act, Congress

has exercised consistently its power to legislate over Puerto Rico. Aside from the

inapplicability of the internal revenue laws, Congress has legislated over the island in

two ways:

1. Treating Puerto Rico in the same manner it would treat the fifty

states; or

2. Explicitly treating Puerto Rico in a different manner than the fifty

states. This has permitted both deferential and detrimental

treatment of the commonwealth in various legislations.

The Executive Branch also has mixed feelings on how to treat Puerto Rico and its

commonwealth status. The Kennedy Administration in 1961 issued the first

Presidential memorandum on Puerto Rico. 34 It recognized the "unique position of the

Commonwealth" and that its "structure, and its relationship to the United States which

is in the nature of a compact, provides for self-government in respect to internal affairs

and administration , subject only to the applicable provisions of the Federal

Constitution, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and the acts of Congress

authorizing and approving the constitution." 35

Thirty-one years later, the Bush Administration emitted a new memorandum on

34 Memorandum of July 25th, 1961; 26 Fed. Reg. 6695.35 1d.

Puerto Rico./' Its tone is strikingly different. It starts by announcing that Puerto Rico is "a

self-governing territory of the United States." Consequently, the island is subject to

federal authority under the Territorial Clause. This memorandum, which specifically

revokes the Kennedy memorandum, is still in force today, but under evaluation by the

White House of President William Jefferson Clinton. 3'

The issue of the juridical ambiguity of the commonwealth has recently reached

critical proportions in the federal courts. For decades the First Circuit of Appeals has

maintained that the commonwealth status so altered the nature of the U.S.-Puerto Rico

relationship, that the latter ceased being a territory of the United States in 1952.

The Supreme Court has not been clear in its position, thus contributing to the

ambiguity. While in Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 3', it stated that

the commonwealth's legislation was to be treated by federal courts as any other state

legislation, in Harris v. Rosario° it concluded that congressional source of power

over Puerto Rico flowed from the Territorial Clause and thus, Congress could

discriminate against Puerto Rico so long as there is a rational basis for the

discrimination. Then, in 1982, the Court seemed to contradict itself again in

Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party 4', when it stated that "Puerto

Rico...like a state, is an autonomous political entity, 'sovereign over matters not ruled

by the Constitution'." 42 These contradictions have been explained by the existence of a

double standard regarding the treatment of the commonwealth by the federal

36 Memorandum for the Heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies, November 30, 1992; 57Fed. Reg. 57093.

" Task Force, The White House, Washington, D.C. Letter to The Hon. Ron de Lugo, Chairman,Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives from Marcia Hale, Assistant to thePresident, and Director Intergovermental Affairs, March 9, 1994, 2 pages.

36 See More v. Mellas, 206 F.2d. 377 (1st Circ., 1953); Figueroa v. The People of PuertoRico, 232 F.2d. 615 (1st Circ.,1956); US v. Lopez Andino , 831 F.2d.1164 (1st Circ., 1987).

39 416 US 663 (1974).4°446 US 651 (1980).41 457 US 1 (1982).42 457 US at 8.

c\

goverment:13

Based on the Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party dicta the First Circuit

explicitly concluded in U.S. v. Quinones" that:

Thus, in 1952, Puerto Rico ceased being a territory of the United Statessubject to the plenary powers of Congress as provided by the FederalConstitution. The authority exercised by the federal governmentemanated thereafter from the compact itself. Under the compact betweenthe people of Puerto Rico and the United States, Congress cannotamend the Puerto Rican Constitution unilaterally, and the government ofPuerto Rico is no longer a federal government agency exercisingdelegated power. (cites omittedr

Just recently, the Eleventh Circuit in U.S. v. Sanchez' gave an opinion that

openly contradicts the position of the First Circuit with regards to the constitutional

status of the commonwealth. Quoting directly from Judge Torruella's concurrence in

Lopez Andine, the decision stated that:

With each new organic act, first the Foraker Act in 1900, then the JonesAct in 1917, and then the Federal Relations Act in 1950 and latteramendments, Congress has simply delegated more authority to PuertoRico over local matters. But this has not changed in any way PuertoRico's constitutional status as a territory, or the source of power overPuerto Rico. Congress continues to be the ultimate source of powerpursuant to the Territory Clause of the Constitution.°

It goes on to say that:

Congress may unilaterally repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution or theFederal Relations Act and replace them with any rules or regulation of itschoice. Despite passage of the Federal Relations Act and the PuertoRican Constitution, Puerto Rican courts continue to derive their authorityto punish from the United States Congress and prosecutions in PuertoRican courts do not fall within the dual sovereignty exception to theDouble Jeopardy Clause.°

43 Helfeld, David M. "How much of the Constitution and Statutes are applicable to the Commonwealthof Puerto Rico", 110 F.R.D. 452 (1974).

"758 F.2d. 40 (1st Circ., 1985).45 758 F.2d. at 42.4 992 F.2d. 1143 (11th Circ.,1993).47 831 F.2d. at 1172." 992 F.2d. at 1152.49 992 F.2d. at 1152-1553.

The Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari to the defendants, once

again demostrating its reluctance to face the issue with total clarity. Sooner or later it

will have to solve the conflicts between circuits and decide once and for all the

constitutional status of the commonwealth. Until then, the juridical ambiguity of the

status quo affords the people of Puerto Rico a constant uncertainty as to what they are

entitled to and as to the limits of congressional power over us.

B) THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Juridical ambiguity brings about one important side effect: the issue of

collective identity5) As a result of our "unique" position with regards to the United

States, islanders have had -throughout this century- a hard time figuring out what it

means to be Puerto Rican in the eyes of the metropolitan power.

Events that have produced this crisis have been taking place since the moment the

U.S. troops entered the island in 1898. The failure of the U.S. to recognize -for the

better part of this century- that in dealing with Puerto Rico, it has been dealing with a

distinct and unique nationality has been the driving force in this folly.

Let's sum up events. Early in our territorial subordination, the Supreme Court stated

that Puerto Rico belonged to, but was not part of, the United States. 51 Congress

understood Puerto Rico to be "foreign" to the United States and even created, in 1900,

a Puerto Rican citizenship, which had no juridical significance.'2 Then, in 1917 we

were "welcomed" into the American family with the congressional grant of U.S.

citizenship. s3 But that citizenship did not make us 100% Americans: only the most

5° It is important to stress that the issue of national identity will not be totally solved by a juridicalscheme; this would only be the begining of a process that cannot limit itself to the legal aspects of therelationship.

" The Insular Cases, note 7, supra.52 This was part of the Foraker Act of 1900, note 6, supra.53 This was part of the Jones Act of 1917, note 6, supra.

fundamental guarantees of the Federal Constitution applied to Puerto Ricans. 5'

Contemporaneously, there was a policy of the United States Government to

assimilate Puerto Ricans to the American Way of Life. This policy, which lasted for

three decades, forced English and the pledge of allegiance to the U.S. flag, while

authorities declared the use of the Puerto Rican flag an unlawful action. 5s This policy

turned out to be a total failure, but it has left grave scars on the Puerto Rican collective

psyche. We had not become more American; we had only become more afraid of

being Puerto Rican.

Commonwealth status has not solved the dilemma in a definitive way. Although

in the past forty-two years there have been various official affirmations of our distinct

national identity --like the establishment of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in 1956

and the 1991 law (now repealed) that declared Spanish as the only official language

of the island-- and numerous popular ones ,the fundamental question remains

unanswered: what does it truly mean to be Puerto Rican?

This has been complicated in the last decades by the continuous migration of

Puerto Ricans to the U.S. mainland and by the return wave that continues to grow

every year. Puerto Ricans in the U.S. are rejected as not being American and when

they return to the island they are met by with lack of understanding by islanders. It is

fundamental that in developing a definitive solution to the mutual problem of the U.S.-

Puerto Rico relations, they be taken into account. They too need a "patria".

In terms of the situation of our youth, two scholars have stated:

For today's Puerto Rican youth it is particularly difficult to develop astrong and congruent sense of identity. Our society has suffered greatand fast economic and social transformations without the opportunityto decide what should be accepted or rejected (e)verything was

54 Baizac, note 9, supra In discussing the citizenship question, it should be taken into account thatthe concepts of citizenship and nationality are not synonyms; while the first one is a juridical concept, thesecond one is a sociological one, which denotes a stable human community, with its own history,language, culture and territory. This is clearly the case with Puerto Rico.

55 For a complete chronicle of the Americanization period see NegrOn de Montilla, Americanizationin Puerto Rico and the Public School System, 1900-1930, Editorial Edil, 1970.

accepted without measuring its consequences. 93

But despite these difficulties, Puerto Rican youth still strives for the preservation

of our identity, as its strong adherence to our language, our music and our cultural

and sport ambassadors suggest.

Since it is clear that there is both a resistance of the American society to

assimilate or incorporate the Puerto Rican nationality and a resistance of Puerto

Ricans to dissolve themselves in the "American Melting Pot" 93, we must fashion a

political solution that rests on the affirmation of the Puerto Rican nationality as its

foundation.

C) ECONOMIC DEPENDANCE

Luis Nieves FaIcOn, a leading Puerto Rican scholar, has referred to our society

as one afflicted with "a pathology of dependance" on federal funds. 59 We have to

agree. Once again, we will let the facts speak for themselves.

A 1990 General Accounting Office briefing described the situation as follows:

Total federal spending, at $6.2 billion in 1988, comprises about 34percent of Puerto Rico's $18 billion gross product. In the 50 states, theaverage is about 18 percent. About 38 percent of the federal spending -about $2.4 billions- was in grants to the commonwealth or its localgovernments. This includes welfare assistance, education, highway aid,and customs duties shared with the island. Another 47 percent was fordirect payments to individuals, including those for retirement, disability,and veteran's benefits. Most of the remaining 15 percent was for thewages of federal employees on the island, such as postal workers, and

5° See Quiles and Saltalamacchia, "Informe de Puerto Rico", SituaciOn de la Juventud enAmerica Central, Wilco, Cuba y Puerto Rico, CEDAUCLACSO, 1990, page 229.

" See Moynihan, Daniel P., Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, OxfordUniversity Press, 1993, pages 73-77, 150. For a general discussion of the issue of nationalities and theUnited States, see Schlesinger,Jr., The Disuniting of America, Norton, 1992.

"See Flores, Divided Borders: Essays on the Puerto Rican Identity, Arte POblico Press,University of Houston, Texas, 1993.

" Nieves FalcOn in Puerto Rico: The Search For A National Policy (Richard J. Bloomfield,editor), Westview Press, 1985, pages 47-58.

6° United States General Accounting Office, Puerto Rico: Information for StatusDeliberations, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, March 1990.

for procurement, such as military purchases.Additionally, the federal government provided $703 million to Puerto Ricoin direct loans, loan guarantees, and insurance in fiscal year 1988. Forexample, the federal government guaranteed $50 million in studentloans, $454 million in mortgage insurance, and $9 million in theDepartment of Veterans Affairs home loans.'

Compounding the issue, a 1991 CRS document& stated that while in the fifty

states and the District of Columbia the percentage of persons under the poverty line is

12.4%, in Puerto Rico the number is 64.4%. That means that almost two-thirds of our

population is under the U.S. poverty line and, thus, eligible for federal assistance.

According to a professor of Political Science at the University of Puerto Rico:

The transfer of federal funds to Puerto Rico is another example of thesometimes ad hoc character and lack of clear goals by U.S. policy-makers towards Puerto Rico. No one in Washington foresaw, forexample, that the food stamp program in Puerto Rico would sooncomprise one-fifth of the federal program, or that, when Congress latercut the program drastically, it would have dire economic consequenceson the island. The rising numbers of economically marginal and poorindividuals created by Puerto Rico's economic crisis during the last twodecades have come to depend on federal programs for the economicsurvival. The Puerto Rican poor support statehood, not because of anideological or cultural bond to the United States, but because statehoodwill guarantee their economic security 83

Beside its effect on enlarging the support for statehood in the island, others

argue that "federal funds, especially food stamps, have contributed to create a form of

'family ideology of waiting', in which the tendency to wait for someone else to do things

for us is unavoidable; thus thwarting any effort that implies the attainment of the

desired goals."'

Economic dependance on federal funds is the gravest social ailment of the

Puerto Rican people. It makes us give away our sense of belief in our collective

6 ' Id. at page 28.62 Merck, Carolyn J. Welfare and Taxes under Alternative Status Options for Puerto

Rico, Congressional Research Service, Jan 15, 1991.83 Melendez, Edgardo. "Colonialism, Citizenship and Contemporary Statehood", Colonial

Dilemma: Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Puerto Rico, South End, 1993, page 44.64 Quiles and Saltalamacchia, supra, note 56, page 214.

ty

capabilities. If we add those who are directly dependent on federal funds, and those

who are dependent on congressional will to keep Section 936 alive in order to

preserve their jobs, we will find that almost the totality of our people is economically

dependent, one way or the other, on the United States. Not only is this politically

unwise; it is also morally reprehensible. We must move soon to end this dependancy

or the consequences will be disastrous both to Puerto Rico and the U.S. 65

D) POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS

The powerlessness of the commonwealth derives from the aforementioned

Section 9 of the Federal Relations Act of 1950. 6' This section gives Congress the

power to legislate over Puerto Rico in all matters not locally inapplicable, a

determination ultimately made by Congress. In exercise of that power, the Supreme

Court has said that Congress may discriminate against Puerto Rico in the application

of federal legislation, so long as there is a rational basis for such discrimination' The

Court has also recognized that Congress' power to discriminate over Puerto Rico

derives from the Territorial Clause of the Federal Constitution!'

What this means is that Puerto Rico is at the mercy of legislation enacted by a

Congress in which it has no voting representation, signed by a President for whom

nobody in Puerto Rico votes, and judicially reviewed by a system of courts in which

Puerto Rico possesses no formal power in appointing. In spite of that, some have

dared argue that the Federal Relations Act, of which Section 9 is part, is the compact

65 1n analyzing Puerto Rico's economy, one should not equate dependancy with lack of productivity,since our labor force is considered one of the most productive in the world.The problem, according to ascholar, is that Puerto Rico has had economic growth without economic development; see Dietz, JamesL. Economic History of Puerto Rico: Institutional Change and Capitalist Development,Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1986.

"Supra, note 16.6? See Harris v. Rosario supra , note 40.66 1d. at 651-652.

between Puerto Rico and the United States. But how can you argue that a law that

enables Congress to unilaterally legislate over the island and its people constitutes a

solemn compact between two parties?

In recent years there have been two actions taken by Congress that have

debilitated both the compact theory and the economic panorama of the island, which

are good examples of what has been explained above. First, the "Economic Act of

1984") amended Section 7652 of the Internal Revenue Code to fix limits to the

quantity of money to be returned to the government of Puerto Rico (and the U.S.V.I.)

resulting from the excise tax imposed on distilled spirits. The report referred to both as

being "possessions" of the United States.'° Although this provision had been

construed by many as a fundamental part of the compact, to this day no Puerto Rican

government has challenged the validity of this act in the federal courts.

Secondly, just last year, Congress amended Section 936 of the Internal

Revenue Code!' This section guaranteed federal tax exemption to U.S. companies

established on U.S. territories or possessions. This section, along with its earlier

incarnations, had been the backbone of the Puerto Rican economy, allegedly bringing

to the island many companies and creating thousands of jobs. Now the hour-glass has

begun to run out on the Puerto Rican economy and we are almost totally helpless to

do anything about it.

This reality only becomes worse by the fact that Puerto Rico lacks not only the

political power to preserve its actual economic model, but it also lacks the power to

create a new one. In this new world order of economic interdependence, exemplified

by the European Community and NAFTA, Puerto Rico lacks the political power to enter

into international agreements that can help reconstitute the Puerto Rican economy. If

Puerto Rico is to enter the twenty-first century with a self-sufficient economy and not

69 P.L. 87-189; 28 U.S.C.A. 7652.7°H. Conf. Rep. No. 432, 98th Congress, 2nd Sess., pages 133 et seq." P.L. 103-66.

with a dependent one, we need the international personality that comes with political

power. It is in our mutual interest that Puerto Rico becomes a player in the international

economic game, instead of continuing as a U.S. appendix.

These are the problems of Puerto Rico that.directly result from the status

dilemma. As an indispensable stepping stone in solving them, Puerto Rico needs the

"power to make all the needful rules and regulations" that will determine our future.

With power comes responsibility. Once the United States recognizes Puerto Rico that

power, we will assume the responsibility for our own future, and devise ways to make it

the best possible one for ourselves and for future generations.

III. The Problems of the United States

We have just analyzed the fundamental problems Puerto Rico faces as a result

of its status impasse. But the United States has also paid a price for this situation, and,

if something is not done soon, the price will continue to rise.

The problems of the United States regarding Puerto Rico's political status can

be put into three categories: international pressure, economic costs of the status quo

for the federal goverment and the possibility of a petition for statehood in the not so

distant future.

A) INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

Ever since the establishment of the commonwealth, the United States has had

to defend itself against international charges of colonialism. With the decolonization

revolution of the 1960's, U.S. diplomats have had to deal more and more with these

accusations. These led, in the 1970's, to a reopening of the debate on Puerto Rico's

status by the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations.

With the end of the Cold War in the late eighties, self-determination of peoples

and the eradication of all colonial regimes have resurfaced in the international agenda

with great strength. The affirmation of long suppressed nationalities is the driving force

behind that movement. The United States must take the lead in striking a relationship

with Puerto Rico that does away with all colonial vestiges, elicits international approval

and complies with the contemporary demands of international law for self-

determination and political association.

B) ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE STATUS QUO

We have already stated the extent of Puerto Rico's economic dependance on

the United States. This not only brings dreadful consequences for the island, but puts

the federal goverment in the position of having to pay the bill. A vicious cycle of

increasing dependance has been established: the more the federal government gives,

the more Puerto Rico thinks it needs.

The question is: how long is the U.S. willing to throw money into the black hole

of Puerto Rican dependance? One thing is sure, under the status quo there is no end

in sight. If the United States starts to limit its federal funding of the island without truly

empowering it to become a self-sufficient society, Puerto Rico will undoubtedly go

down the road of social and economic chaos. Is the federal government willing to

condemn 3.5 million U.S. citizens to that fate?

On the other hand, to commit the federal government to a perpetual

maintenance of Puerto Rico is not a realistic alternative. 73 It goes against everything

the federal government is trying to do. How can you justify a welfare state in Puerto

Rico, while all efforts in the United States are directed to cut spending and limit the

deficit? Is Congress and the Administration willing to sell a deal to the American

72 See the upcoming article by Ortiz Guzman, Angel, "La Cuarta Altemativa: AsociaciOn y DerechoInternacional en el Futuro Politico de Puerto Rico", to be published in 28 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R.; for anoverview of the general issues regarding this process see"Rethinkimg Nationalism and Sovereignty",Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2, Winter 1992.

"See Jasinowski, Jery J. (ed.), Economic Study of Puerto Rico: Report to the President Preparedby the Interagency Task Force Coordinated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. GovermentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, 2 vol.

people in which everybody but Puerto Rico has to contribute to reduce the deficit? I

think not.

The status quo is not an alternative for the United States. It condemns them to

artificially sustaining the Puerto Rican society, while they try to reverse that trend on

the mainland. Aspirations of parity to states in federal funding are pie in the sky. The

only way out of the black hole is to empower Puerto Rico with the political, economic

and social tools it needs to build a self-sustaining and prosperous future.

C) THE POSSIBILITY OF A PETITION FOR STATEHOOD

What should be the logical conclusion of a century-long process of juridical

ambiguity, crisis of national identity, economic dependance, and political

powerlessness?74 The answer should be obvious. If nothing is done to reverse the

current trend, the United States will face a statehood petition from the majority of the

Puerto Rican people sometime in the very near future, maybe as soon as 1996.

During the years of Americanization, support for statehood was not widespread.

But with the coming of federal funding and juridical ambiguity, the statehood tide has

been rising steadily since 1956. One scholar concludes: "The Puerto Rican poor

support statehood not because of an ideological or cultural bond to the United States,

but because they believe statehood will guarantee their economic security:us

What will be the problems facing the U.S. when it gets that statehood petition?

Besides the same perpetual dependance that comes with the status quo, the U.S. will

have to decide if it is willing to absorb a distinct nationality as a state of the Union. In

other words, is the U.S. ready to incorporate its own Quebec, Basque Country,

Catalonia or Northern Ireland into the Federal Union? There is nothing to gain from

"The effect of decades of instilling fear of independence and even of a greater degree of self-goverment on the collective psyche of the Puerto Rican people should not be underestimated as animportant factor in this process.

7 Melendez, supra, note 63.

that but perpetual dependance and political turmoil.There is not a single reason to

believe Congress would want that.

These are the problems facing the United States as they evaluate the results of

the 1993 plebiscite. Neither statehood nor status quo present themselves as

solutions. 76 As stated in the begining of this paper, the people of Puerto Rico have

taken the lead in, for the time being, rejecting statehood and favoring the empowering

of the current relationship through a bilateral compact.

Since time is of the essence, the United States must quickly respond to the

expression of the Puerto Rican people and resolve our mutual dilemma.

IV. The Bilateral Compact of the Free Associated State of Puerto Rico:

the Solution to a Mutual Dilemma

The commonwealth of Puerto Rico has been an ambiguous denomination for

an even more ambiguous relationship. Throughout its existence it has been afforded

various treatments by the federal government, ranging from "unique"n , to a condition

"like a state"?' , to being, once again, "an unincorporated territory"' . This, as we have

discussed, has permitted many problems for Puerto Rico and the United States. It time

to take the bull by the horns. Ambiguity must give way to certainty so that a mutually

beneficial relationship may develop. Now is the time to act.

What follows is a proposal of what that relationship should be.

76 Refer to the articles regarding Puerto Rico's political status published in Hemisphere, Vol. 5, No.3,Summer/Fall 1993; Current History, Vol.93, No. 581, March 1994; The Annals of the American Academy,May 1994.

"The Kennedy Memorandum of 1961, supra, note 34.'Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, supra, note 41.79 The Bush Memorandum of 1992, supra, note 36.

A) THE PEOPLE'S MANDATE FOR A BILATERAL COMPACT

On November 14th, 1993, Puerto Ricans, in exercise of their constitutional right

to petition the government for the redress of grievances° , and of their right to self-

determination, voted on the future status of the island. These were the results:

Commonwealth 823, 258 48.4%

Statehood 785, 859 46.2%

Independence 75, 253 4.4% 81

The triumphant commonwealth definition stated that the relationship between

Puerto Rico and the United States was to be developed within a "bilateral compact

which can only be altered by mutual consent."2 Now, in order to implement that

mandate, we must ascertain the proper meaning of this phrase.

The main question this concept came to answer was the issue of the

applicability of the Territorial Clause to the commonwealth. During the failed process of

negotiations for a congressionally sponsored plebiscite (between 1989 and 1991), the

Popular Democratic Party faced the issue with a resolution that stated that all status

options (including commonwealth) had to be understood as being outside the

Territorial Clause powers .° This resolution, which has not been repealed to this day,

was one of the bases of the plebiscite definition of commonwealth.e4

A bilateral compact is a contract between parties with equal juridical capacity to

enter into it. According to international law, this means that the parties have to be

sovereign political entities; according to U.S. Constitutional Law, it means that neither

8° Amendment I, US Constitution.8 ' Garcia Passalacqua, "The 1993 Plebiscite in Puerto Rico", Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, 1993,

page 13.82 Commonwealth definition, supra, note 3.83 Popular Democratic Party, Resolution of the General Council, November 17, 1990.84 Medina, Jorge L. "PPD drafts new definition of commonwealth for the ballot", The San Juan Star,

Tuesday, July 6, 1993; Martinez, Andrea," 'Sencilla y ganadora' la definiciOn del ELA", El Nuevo Dia,Tuesday, March 6, 1993, page 20.

of the parties can be a territory, not under a trusteeship agreement or under the

Territorial Clause. A political entity subordinated to the plenary powers of Congress

cannot enter into a bilateral compact with its superior. The only way to enter into a

compact with the federal government is to be sovereign and outside the Territorial

Clause.°

B) THE COMPACT OF ASOCIATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE

MARSHALL ISLANDS AND THE FREE ASSOCIATED STATE OF MICRONESIA

It has been argued that under the U.S. Constitutional system, it is impossible to

enter into bilateral compacts.° Yet as of this day, there are two examples that

contradict this argument. Let us take a brief look at them.

In 1986, Congress, through P.L. 99-239 w , entered into a "Compact of Free

Association" with the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia. This

compact was the result of a process of mutual determination, in which the people

voted to end their condition as trust territories and . "to enter into relationships of free

association which provide a full measure of self-government for the peoples of the

Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia."'

The compact is a comprehensive document that regulates all areas of the

relations of the federal goverment and the associated states. Contrary to the

commonwealth arrangement, it operates by specific delegations of concrete powers to

the U.S. It clearly recognizes the sovereignty of the associated states over all matters

85 In Matter of Bowoon Sangsa Co.,LTD 720 F.2d. 595 (1983), the 9th Circuit recognized theapplicability of United Nations' Resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV) to the associated states, forcing theUnited States to comply with these resolutions.

88 See "Inventive Statemanship vs. The Territorial Clause: The Constitutionality of AgreementsLimiting Territorial Powers", 60 Virginia Law Rev 1041, at 1041: "The absolute terms of the territorial clauseseem to imply that Congress is restricted in its choice of relations with such areas to the frequentlyunsatisfactory extremes of annexation or complete independence. Thus, the clause appears to be themajor legal obstacle to some form of 'free association' as an in-between alternative."

8 ' 99 Stat. 1771.88 Id. at 1801.

.4- AL

not specifically delegated, and limits the sphere of action of the federal goverment to

those included in the document.

The compact is divided into four titles: Governmental Relations, Economic

Relations, Security and Defense Relations, and General Provisions. They deal with

everything from foreign affairs, environmental protection and grant assistance, to the

mantainance of Section 936 benefits and defense and security provisions. A special

mechanism of conference and dispute resolution is also included, consisting of an

arbitration board composed by representatives of both parties. Finally, Section 441

states that this compact may be terminated as to any of its parts by "mutual agreement"

and subject to the formalities contemplated in the corn pact. 89

The federal courts have made two important clarifications concerning the nature

of the compact. First, it has established that the options of free association and

commonwealth are different and distinguishable. Under the first, the associate state is

self-governing, the sovereignty of the U.S. does not apply and federal laws can only

apply by mutual consent. Commonwealth, on the other hand, is defined as a status

similar to Guam's (which is an unincorporated territory of the United States). 9'

Secondly, the compact specifically removed the associated states from the

jurisdiction of the United States. Accordingly, to try to challenge federal elements that

have been expressly taken out of the compact would raise a non judicially reviewable

political question. 9'

One final note, the Compact of Free Association has been given international

recognition by the United Nations, which has accepted both associated states (with

the strong sponsorship of the United States) as members of this organization.g2

66 1d. at 1829."Matter of Bowoon Sangsa Co. LTD , 720 F.2d. 595 (9th Circ., 1983); US v. Covington ,

783 F. 2d. 1052 (9th Circ., 1985).61 Antolok v. US 13 CI.Ct. 667 (1987).92 S/ Res/ 704 (1991); Security Council Resolution No. 704, August 9, 1991.

23

C) A BILATERAL COMPACT FOR PUERTO RICO

Having examined the problems of the present relationship between Puerto Rico

and the United States, the expressed aspiration of the Puerto Rican people for a

bilateral compact that can only be amended by mutual consent and the general

structure of the Compact of Free Association in force today, we suggest the adoption of

a similar compact between Puerto Rico and the United States as the juridical means to

bring about the solution to our mutual dilemma. 93

This BILATERAL COMPACT OF ASSOCIATION would tackle and solve all

the aforementioned problems facing both countries. For Puerto Rico, it will solve the

problem of juridical ambiguity by clearly stating the non-territorial nature of the

relationship. As it enters into the compact, the Congress would simultaneously dispose

of its plenary power over Puerto Rico under the Territorial Clause. The political

powerlessness problem will also be solved by this act, in the sense that, once Puerto

Rico is outside the Territorial Clause, it will have all the powers and attributes of a

sovereign entity, only delegating those contained in the compact. This recognition of

self-goverment should not limit itself to internal affairs, rather it must include the power

to conduct foreign affairs. That way, Puerto Rico will enter the twenty-first century as a

player in the international game and not as an appendix of the United States.

Recognizing Puerto Rico the authority to have foreign relations in its own name,

will make possible numerous economic opportunities for the island. This, plus the

guarantee in the compact of the present level of federal funding for a reasonable

amount of years will promote, if utilized correctly, the Puerto Rican economy. The

compact should include a provision in the sense that the funds not part of any

entitlement programs shall be given to the Government of Puerto Rico in a block grant,

with the assurance of the insular goverment that it will be used to develop

93 As an example, see Senator Marco A. Rigau's proposal to the Interagency Task Force, enclosed ina lettter of March 17, 1994 to Task Force heads,Jeffrey Farrow and Marcia Hale. El Nuevo Dia, 19 de marzode 1994, pagel6.

infrastructure. If this is done consistently for some years, there will come a day (in the

not so distant future) where Puerto Rico will not depend on federal funds to have a

viable economy.

The establishment of a bilateral compact will also create the structural

conditions that will help solve the issue of Puerto Rico's identity. Knowing that instead

of a possession with an ambiguous title, Puerto Rico is a partner on equal footing with

the United States will reinforce Puerto Rico's identity as a proud, "distinct" people, as

recognized by President Clinton in a letter of December 30, 1992. 9' Also the

international recognition that will come with this compact will help us develop a strong

sense of who we are and where we are headed as a society.

For the United States, the bilateral compact will solve its three main problems.

Once Puerto Rico is sovereign and its relationship with the United States complies

with the international criteria for political association, the international pressure will

cease. Charges of colonialism will be dropped in acknowledgment of the

empowerment of Puerto Rico.

The economic provisions of the compact will, over time, have the effect of

reducing the economic costs of the relationship. As Puerto Rico becomes a self-

sustaining economy, the federal goverment will be liberated from providing for our

sustenance.

Finally, once the compact is in place, Puerto Rico will not need statehood to

have the political and economic tools to fashion its future. Since Puerto Rican

attachment to statehood is mostly for practical reasons, and not for ideological ones,

the moment the U.S. concedes political powers to Puerto Rico support for statehood

will start to diminish. Congress, by rapidly adopting the bilateral compact, will avert a

petition for statehood from a 500 year old Spanish-speaking Caribbean nation. Thus,

94 Letter from President-Elect Clinton to Pedro RossellO on the latter's lnnaguration as Governor of theCommonwealth of Puerto Rico, December 30, 1992.

.25

the U.S. will avoid its Quebec.

The desirability of this type of relationship has been discussed through the

years. Scholars and political analysts have written about it.° The international

community has recognized it as a legitimate option. ° Actors in the Puerto Rican

political arena have actively spoken for this type of relationship in the island media, in

the halls of Congress, and in the United Nations.° Other members of the Puerto Rican

political spectrum have expressed their willingness to accept it.° Political realities and

the unsustainability of the status quo demand action. The time has come for the United

States to evaluate this alternative for Puerto Rico and take a position.

In considering the results of the 1993 plebiscite, the United States should take

note of the proposal developed by Senator Marco Rigau (PPD, at large), entitled,

fittingly enough, "Bilateral Compact".° We strongly endorse this proposal and

recommend it be used as a working document for both the Executive Branch and

Congress.

95 FernOs LOpez-Cepero, Puerto Rico Soberano y Asociado, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1990;Garcia Passalacqua and Rigau (editors), Repsibika Asociada y Libre AsociaciOn:DocumentaciOn de un Debate Editorial Atlantic°, 1987; Aponte Perez, "La DescolonizaciOn viaLibre AsociaciOn", Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Vol. 40, No.3, August 1979, pages449-473; Fernandez, Juan. "EvoluciOn del Concepto de Libre AsociaciOn en las Naciones Unidas",Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, Vol. 43, No. 2, May 1982, pages 173-203.

96 Resolution of the Special Committee on Decolonization, September 12, 1978, A/33/23/Rev. 1.9 ' Rigau, Statement given to the Subcommittee on Insular Affaairs, Committee on Interior and

International Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 28, 1990;, Statement given to the Special Committee on Decolonization, August 13, 1991; , Statement given to the Special Joint Commission on the Status Plebiscite of the Puerto

Rican Legislature, July 16, 1993:Ortiz Guzman, Statement of the Juventud Autonomista Puertorriquena to the Special Joint

Commission on the Status Plebiscite of the Puerto Rican Legislature, July 16, 1993Vega Ramos, Statement given by the Juventud Universitaria Autonomista to the Subcommittee on

Insular Affairs, Committee on Interior and International Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9,1990;

, Statement given by the Juventud Autonomista de Puerto Rico to the SpecialCommittee on Decolonization, August 13, 1991. "Status Digno y Permanente", El Diario, October 14, 1993, pagel4.Vizcarrondo, "La Enmienda Vizcarrondo", El Nuevo Dia, December 4, 1990, page 49." See Carrasco, Olga. "Vientos favorables para el PIP", El Nuevo Dia,Saturday, April 28, 1992, page

4; "Macheteros urge review of U.S.-P.R. relations", The San Juan Star, Tuesday, April 12, 1994, page 7."Supra, note 93.

The bilateral compact that establishes the Free Associated State of Puerto Rico

(in Spanish it would continue to be called "Estado Libre Asociado") must clarify the

political dignity of the island, empower it to face the twenty-first century and guarantee

the four pillars of the current relationship: common citizenship, common market,

common currency and mutual defense. In the case of citizenship --as has been noted

by federal and local legal scholars-- there is no reason why Puerto Ricans cannot

have two citizenships (the U.S. and the Puerto Rican) if they so choose in an individual

fashion.lc° For the United States, the compact must preserve and protect its legitimate

interests in Puerto Rico.The determination of what those "legitimate interests" are must

be the result of negotiation and mutual agreements, which cannot place onerous

burdens on the Puerto Rican sovereignty. If there is enough vision, wisdom and

political will, on both sides, there should not be any difficulty in adopting this definitive

solution to the mutual dilemma of the U.S. and Puerto Rico.

CONCLUSION

The political destinies of Puerto Rico and the United States have been

intertwined since the turn of the century. A product of military occupation, they have

been characterized by neglect, shortsightedness, indifference, sometimes benign

paternalism, others outright imperiallsm. 1°1 These in turn, have bred confusion,

dependancy and uncertainty.

It may seem as if we have all been painted into a corner.

But there are always alternatives. Now that we near the new century, the time

100 See Statement of Hon. Fred M. Zeder 11 and James D. Borg, and Howard Hills, Hearings,Subcommittee on Pacific Lands and National Parks, Committee on the Interior and International Affairs,House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Sess., June 12, 1984, pages 98, 126-127; See alsoAlvarez, Jose J. "The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status ofPuerto Ricans", Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol.27, No. 2,.Summer 1990.

'See "Limiting Territorial Powers...", note 86, supra at 1068: "The reality, if not the definition, ofPuerto Rico's status has been something between a colony and independence, similar to statehood, butnot the same. Ultimately, any resolution of significant issues concerning Puerto Rico's status is more likelyto take place by means of the political system than through the courts."

2'1

has come for a major overhaul of the current relationship. Last November, the people

of Puerto Rico voted in favor of a genuine bilateral compact. On May 17, 1994 (one

day after President Clinton met with Governor RossellO" ), Congressman Don Young

(D-Alaska) amended his bill that proposed incorporation for the U.S. Insular Areas to

include other options of self-goverment and decolonization." These other options

have been defined, in the memorandum that accompanied the ammendment, as

independence and free association." The amended bill would initiate the

development of "articles of self-goverment" between the President of the United States

and Puerto Rico, so that legislation can be submitted to Congress before the

conclusion of the Decade of Decolonization as proclaimed by the U.N."

The U.N. recognizes as forms of decolonization only integration, independence

and free association. Accordingly, these are the three optons contemplated in the

amended bill." It would be wise, however, to expressly include the options of

independence and free association in the bill.

This bill provides a "clear process approved by Congress and the President" for

a future agreement between Puerto Rico and the United States.'w We support the

Young Bill, as amended, and strongly urge Congress to adopt it. In the case of Puerto

Rico, the offer of of free association contained in the proposed legislation should be

viewed as the U.S. response to the people's mandate of the plebiscite. This way we

can act with the speed that the times require and in accordance to the democratic

expression of Puerto Rico.

th2 Mulero, Leonor. "Defiende la utilidad de la isla", El Nuevo Dia, Martesl7 de mayo de 1994, page10. After the meeting, Governor RossellO stated that, at this time, the opportunity should be given to thesupporters of the commonwealth to try to achieve the enhancements proposed in the definition andapproved by the people.

1 °3 Mulero, Leonor. "Young amplia vias de status —, El Nuevo Dia, Miercoles 18 de mayo de 1994,page23.

W4 Id.105 Id'°6 Id.1071d.

As the contemporary global agenda unfolds, confusion, dependance, and

uncertainty must give way to political dignity, self-sufficiency and stability. The

procedural aspects of the Young Bill, along with its proposal of free association will

give Puerto Rico what it needs and the United States will have developed a functional

alternative to its territorial system. 1c6 For the immediate future, a BILATERAL

COMPACT OF ASSOCIATION is the best, perhaps the only alternative.

108Puerto Rico aside, Guam, the U.S.V.I., American Samoa , and the Northern Marianas have territorialstatus. For a detailed analysis of these cases and their future prospects, see Leibowitz, DefiningStatus: A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S. Territorial Relations, Martnus Nijhoff, 1989.