Normal human communication via oral language

A speaker has an idea he wishes to communicate.

speaker

Articulator movements

signal

In order to do so, he moves the parts of his articulatory system, producing an acoustic signal.

Communication via oral language

The signal reaches the ears of a hearer.

speaker

Articulator movements

signal

The hearer perceives and interprets the signal.

Reception of the signal by the audio-perceptive system

This stimulates in his mind the idea that the speaker intended.

hearer

This is how humans normally communicate

speaker

Articulatory movements

signal

Audio-perceptive routines

hearer

Terminology

The idea the speaker wants to communicate is the meaning (signifié).

The meaning which the speaker intends is often a bit different from what the hearer comes up with. Thus we can distinguish the meanings from the meaningh.

Terminology

The phonological structure which the speaker activates is often a bit different from what the hearer gets. Thus we can distinguish the phonological structures from the phonological structureh.

The cognitive routines of production, perception and interpretation of the signal symbolize the meaning. They constitute the phonological structure (signifiant).

Terminology

The mental (cognitive) association between a phonological structure and a meaning is a symbolic link.

The structure formed by the association of a meaning and a phonological structure is a symbol.

Applying the terminology to the model of communication:

speaker

signal

hearer

meaninghmeanings

phonological structures

symbolic link

phonological structureh

symbol

A specific example(from Mixe)

speaker

signal

hearersymbolic

link

symbol

t hkv t hkvaudio-perceptive routines

neuro-muscular routines

audio-perceptive

routines

Important points

They include a productive (neuromuscular) aspect, and a receptive (audio-perceptive) aspect.

Phonological structures are cognitive structures (=routines).

The signal does not “have” or “carry” meaning. The meaning is in the minds of the speaker and hearer.

Important points

In normal conversation the speaker and hearer constantly switch roles.

They do not have two separate sets of symbols in their minds, one for speaking with and the other for hearing.

The symbols in the minds of the speaker and hearer must be quite similar.

Otherwise comunication will be very difficult.

Important points

For those two reasons,The similarities between symbols in the minds of different people, andThe unity of the symbols in each person’s mind,

We often get away with speaking of meanings and phonological structures without distinguishing between the production and the perception of a symbol,though sometimes we do well to distinguish.

Terminology

The study of meanings is Semantics. The meaning is the semantic pole of a symbol.

The study of phonological structures is (of course) Phonology.

We also speak of the phonological pole of a symbol.

Terminology

Symbols are bipolar

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

symbolic link

symbol

Other types of signals

There are other types of signalsGestures and bodily movements (sign languages)Writing (of many types)Morse code, Braille, etc.

Anything that a communicator controls, and a “communicatee” perceives, can function as a signal.

Spoken language is prototypical

Much of what is said of the speaker and hearer is true, mutatis mutandis, in the case of communication via other kinds of signals.

In many contexts, as a result,

Speaker = communicator

Hearer = communicatee

Phonological structure = signifiant of whatever kind

The symbolic link

The symbolic link is at the heart of language.

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

symbolic link

symbol

The symbolic link

What is its basic character?It is a mental association

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

mental association

The symbolic link

What is its basic character?It is a mental association

that works in both directions

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

mental association

The symbolic link

It works in both directions

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

the link facilitates the activation of the phonological pole

If you activate the semantic pole,

mental association

The symbolic link

It works in both directions

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

the link facilitates the activation of the semantic pole

On the other hand, if you first activate the phonological pole,

mental association

The arbitrariness of the symbolic link

The great Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure said that the symbolic link is “arbitrary”.

Many understand him to have meant that there is no reason for associating any particular semantic pole with its particular phonological pole.

semantic pole

phonolo-gical pole

unmotivated mental

association

This is not always or necessarily true, however.

Types of symbolic links

Symbolic linka conventional mental (cognitive) association between a meaning

(signifié) and a signifiant.

Iconic symbolic linka conventional mental (cognitive)

association between a meaning and a signifiant which is parallel to it in

some way. The parallelism motivates the association.

Arbitrary Symbolic Linka conventional mental (cognitive)

association between a meaning and a signifiant, with no reason for the association other than convention

Phonological and semantic “spaces”

Symbolic links cross the boundary between the semantic and phonological “spaces”.

symbolic links

semantic structure

phonological structure

semantic space

phonological space

ɻústdɔŋki

Semantic and phonological spaces

Phonological space is also part of semantic space

symbolic links

semantic space

phonological spaceha sʷ

kàkədùdldú

hghghg

Structuring of symbols by integration and composition

The rooster and its crow are components of a more inclusive structure that includes both of them.a. and b. are equivalent: a. is “compacted” and b. is “exploded”

b.

ɻúst

semantic space

phonological space

ɻúst

a.

kàkədù dú kàkədù dú

From morpheme to discourse: the cline of complexity

simplecomplex

at a high level of complexity

units more likely to be highly specific (lexical)

units more likely to be highly abstract patterns

little flexibility: either it is correct, or it’s incorrect

lots of flexibility

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

Unipolar vs. bipolar complexityPopocatépetl is complex phonologically and semantically, but (in English or Spanish) simple in bipolar terms.

popokatépetɬ

Unipolar vs. bipolar complexity

Tumbaburros is simpler in its phonology, but much more complex in bipolar terms.

atumb sobur

Relative predominance of lexical vs. “grammatical” structures

Lexical structures predominate at the morpheme and word levels, and practically disappear at the discourse level.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

Relative predominance of lexical vs. “grammatical” structures

How should we classify or categorize these kinds of structures.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

Relative predominance of lexical vs. “grammatical” structures

Traditionally they are separated into different “modules”, run according to different rules, by different mechanisms.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

Relative predominance of lexical vs. “grammatical” structures

CG takes this to be wrong-headed.

(Empirically it is problematical.)

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

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sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

Imposing categories on a cline

—

childhood youth maturity

minor adult

minimum chrono-logical age

maximum age

highly dependent independent dependent

weak strong less strong

ignorant wise

baby

little

chi

ld

old personch

ildad

oles

cent

youn

g ad

ult

mat

ure

adul

t

mid

dle-

aged

adu

ltol

der a

dult

— — — — — — — —

embr

yo?

—

dece

ased

?

senile?

Think of other kinds of gradual or scalar phenomena that we categorize: e.g. age.

Moral:

Binary divisions on such a cline oversimplify the reality.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

—

childhood youth maturity

minor adult

minimum chrono-logical age

maximum age

highly dependent independent dependent

weak strong less strong

ignorant wise

baby

little

chi

ld

old personch

ildad

oles

cent

youn

g ad

ult

mat

ure

adul

t

mid

dle-

aged

adu

ltol

der a

dult

— — — — — — — —

embr

yo?

—

dece

ased

?

senile?

Moral:

Describing it with fixed boundaries between categories, different rules for categories, and no differences within categories, inevitably distorts it.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

LE

XIC

ON

Mo

rph

olo

gy

SY

NT

AX

DIS

CO

UR

SE

Moral:

This does not mean that CG cannot distinguish between lexicon, morphology, syntax, etc.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

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wor

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phra

se

clau

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com

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nten

cepa

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— — — — — — — —

LE

XIC

ON

Mo

rph

olo

gy

SY

NT

AX

DIS

CO

UR

SE

Moral:

It does mean (a) that there will not be fixed boundaries between them.

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

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phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

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sect

ion

— — — — — — — —

LE

XIC

ON

Mo

rph

olo

gy

SY

NT

AX

DIS

CO

UR

SE

Moral:

detailed

highly schematic pattern

morpheme

com

plex

st

em discourse

wor

d

phra

se

clau

se

com

plex

se

nten

cepa

ragr

aph

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ion

— — — — — — — —

LE

XIC

ON

Mo

rph

olo

gy

SY

NT

AX

DIS

CO

UR

SE

It will also mean (b) that they will be governed by similar rules and mechanisms, so that they can grade easily into each other.

Association

Perhaps the most basic kind of relationship between structures is association.

Association reduces ultimately to some kind of co-occurrence in the mind.

“Neurons that fire together wire together”

Association is pretty much the same mechanism at a higher level: concepts that occur together get associated.

Association

Often two concepts occur together because they are parts of a third, more inclusive concept.

E.g. TREE and /tɹi/ are associated because they occur together as parts of the word tree.

E.g. chalk and blackboards are associated because they occur together in a classroom scenario.

Other relationships can be thought of as adding something to an association.

Association

Thus the brute association of chalk and blackboard also involves physical touching, the piece of chalk leaving part of itself behind on the board as a mark, that mark being the result intended by the teacher wielding the chalk, etc.

Association

You cannot relate two structures in your mind without their coocurring there. As such coocurrence is entrenched (becomes a unit) an association is established

Association

Bottom line: all cognitive relationships are associations, whatever else they may be besides. This includes identifications (correspondences) and schematicity relations (see ahead)We generally talk about associations only when other aspects of the relationships are less prominent / less germane to our purposes

CorrespondenceTwo conceived entities correspond when they are

taken as identical.

This is expressed in diagrams by a dashed line of correspondence. A and B, in the diagram, are understood to be the same thing.

A B

Correspondence

Correspondence is a bit of a tricky notion, however, in a couple of ways.

In the first place, it is inherently paradoxical.

Although two concepts are understood to be one, they nevertheless are two concepts.

A B

Correspondence

(That’s not as weird as it sounds, actually. We do it all the time. The changing visual impressions of somebody’s face are understood to be views of the same person, for instance.)

A B

Correspondence

What is recognized is that all aspects of A are present in B as well, and vice versa.

We thus see A and B simultaneously as two concepts, and yet as the same one.

The two concepts may actually differ very significantly in their emphases or in which facets of the understood unity are most in view.

This is related to the second kind of oddness.

Correspondence

Lines of correspondence are often (almost inevitably, it seems) used in practice in a less strict sense to mean (strict) correspondence of one aspect (an “Active Zone”) of one concept with some aspect of another.

Sloppy use of correspondence lines

The sound and the rooster’s mouth are not the same thing.

Rather the place the sound comes from is the one defined by the rooster’s mouth.

kàkədù dú

Strictly speaking, correspondence is identity

But when correspondences are used strictly the connected entities are being represented as being identical.

ɻúst

kàkədù dú

Correspondence

The experience of recognition or identification is very important to us.

Especially this is true of the identification of part of one entity with part of another.

This is absolutely central to our ability to link concepts together to form more complex concepts.

Correspondence

Correspondence lines are like the lines on a mechanics’ or a carpenter’s drawings.They can be seen as the record of distortion caused by pulling a unified structure apart.

Correspondence

Alternatively they are the instructions telling you how to join the pieces up when putting a complex concept together.

Correspondence

Our ability to recognize and establish correspondences is also basic to our (extremely basic ) ability to compare concepts.