norton media library games of strategy third edition by avinash dixit susan skeath david reiley
TRANSCRIPT
Norton Media Library
Games of StrategyTHIRD EDITION
byAvinash DixitSusan SkeathDavid Reiley
Norton Media Library
Chapter 5Simultaneous-Move Games
with Pure Strategies II: Continuous Strategies and
III: Discussion and Evidence
Avinash DixitSusan SkeathDavid Reiley
FIGURE 5.1 Best-Response Curves and Equilibrium in the Restaurant Pricing Game Games of Strategy, Third Edition
Copyright © 2009 W. W. Norton & Company
FIGURE 5.2 Best Responses and Nash Equilibrium in the Campaign Advertising Game Games of Strategy, Third Edition
Copyright © 2009 W. W. Norton & Company
FIGURE 5.3 A Game with a Questionable Nash EquilibriumGames of Strategy, Third Edition
Copyright © 2009 W. W. Norton & Company
FIGURE 5.4 Disastrous Nash Equilibrium?Games of Strategy, Third Edition
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FIGURE 5.5 Justifying Choices by Chains of Beliefs and ResponsesGames of Strategy, Third Edition
Copyright © 2009 W. W. Norton & Company
FIGURE 5.6 Rationalizable StrategiesGames of Strategy, Third Edition
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FIGURE 5.7 Nash Equilibrium Through RationalizabilityGames of Strategy, Third Edition
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FIGURE 5A.1 Derivative of a Function IllustratedGames of Strategy, Third Edition
Copyright © 2009 W. W. Norton & Company
FIGURE 5A.2 Optimum of a FunctionGames of Strategy, Third Edition
Copyright © 2009 W. W. Norton & Company
Norton Media LibraryIndependent and Employee-Owned
Games of StrategyTHIRD EDITION
byAvinash DixitSusan SkeathDavid Reiley
This concludes the Norton Media Library Slide Set for Chapter 5