nrc: home page - mr. harold r. denton, director · 2012. 11. 30. · tennessee valley authorit1y...

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORIT1Y

KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE 37902

400 West Summit Hill Drive, E3A8

December 5, 1985

Mr. Harold R. Denton, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555

Dear Hr. Denton:

Your letter to W. F. Willis dated September 26, 1985, requested copies ofinvestigation reports and related documents dealing with potentiallysafety-related employee concerns on TVA's nuclear plants. Copies of therequested information as outlined in TVA's October 7, 1985, letter areenclosed and cover the period of November 29, 1985 through December 5, 1985.TVA has previously submitted copies of the requested information throughNovember 28, 1985. We are also enclosing computer summaries of theinformation which we have transmitted to date.

If you have questions concerning the material transmitted, please contactM. S. Kidd or B. F. Siefken at FTS No. 856-2289 or 856-6230, respectively.

Sincerely,

KC. W. WhittDirector, Nuclear Safety

Review Staff

Enclosurescc (Enclosures):

Hr. James H. Taylor, DirectorOffice of Inspection and EnforcementU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555

Dr. J. Nelson GraceRegional AdministratorU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II101 Harietta Street, Suite 3100Atlanta, Georgia 30323

B512090274 851205PDR ADOCK 05000390A. PDR 4

Page No.

12/05/85

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITYWATTS BAR EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAMNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WEEKLY K-FORM LISTING

QTCNUMBER SUBJECT

KEYWORD

KEY

WORD

EX-85-037-001EX-85-121-002EX-85-121-004EX-85-148-00EX-85-151-001EX-85-151-002EX-85-154-001EX-85-157-002EX-85-157-003EX-85-162-001IN-85-317-001IN-85-317-002IN-85-317-004IN-85-347-003IN-85-349-001IN-85-349-002IN-85-349-003IN-85-469-X04

IN-85-469-X05IN-85-469-X06IN-85-627-003IN-85-978-001IN-85-978-002IN-85-978-003

IN-85-978-004IN-85-978-007IN-86-184-002

IN-86-184-003IN-86-184-004IN-86-229-003IN-86-254-001IN-86-254-002IN-86-254-004IN-86-254-005IN-86-254-006IN-86-254-009IN-86-315-006PH-85-040-001PH-85-040-003PH-85-054-001PH-85-054-002PH-85-056-001WI-85-089-001WI-85-096-001XX-85-060-001XX-85-102-001XX-85-102-003XX-85-102-004

PIPE SHIP RESTRAINTI DOCUMENTATIONDOCUMENTATION

L TERMINATION OF CABLSCABLE TRAY OVERFLOWHVAC PIPECABLE TRAYS,CABLE BENDSFAN MOTORS TERMINATEPOOR DESIGN/CONDT LNWELD RODSWELD MACH CALIBWELD CERT PROGQA/TVA TR 75.1HANGER INSTALLATINADEQ WELD INSPECTDOCUMENTATIONHVAC DUCTWORKHAVC DUCTWORKHVAC DUCTWORKUNCONCERN MGTELE CABLE PULLINGBACKFILL LIFT LIMITSBACKFILL MATERIALCONCRETE POURSMATERIAL HANDLING STCLASSIFICATION PIPIN

SUPPORT X-RAYSPIPE SIZESDOCUMENTATIONCABLE PULLINGELE CABLE PULLINGQ/NON-Q CABLESELE CABLES/VAMASCOCABLE PULLING INSPECCONDUIT OVERFILLINSPECTIONWELD INSPECTPROTECT UNDERCOATINGCONFUSIONQUALIF OF QC INSPECAUDIT BRANCHQT PROCEDURESPIPE DEFORMITYBLN/EQUIP RUSTBFN/SIZE HANGERBFN/STEAM LINEBFN/NOTICE INDICATIO

HANGERSCONSTRUCTQACONSTRUCTELECTRICALHANGERSELECTRICALELECTRICALQAELECTRICALWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGQAWELDINGWELDINGCONSTRUCTCONSTRUCT

DOCUMENT

DOCUMENTQAELECTRICAL

CIVILCIVILCIVIL

MATERIALMATERIAL

WELDINGWELDINGDOCUMENTELECTRICALELECTRICALELECTRICALELECTRICALELECTRICALELECTRICALOPERATIONSWELDINGCONSTRUCTHANGERSINSPECTIONQAMATERIALMECHANICALCIVILOPERATIONSDESIGNOPERATIONS

INSTALLCONTROLEFFECTPERSONNELCABLESHVACTRAYSCABLESEFFECTCONDUITRODEQUIPMENTWORKMANSHIEFFECTADEQUCAYINSPECTIONCONTROLCONTROLCONTROL

CONTROL

EFFECT

CABLES'-BACKFILLBACKFILLCONCRETE

CONTROLCONTROL

WORKMANSHIWORKMANSHICONTROLCABLESCABLESSEPERATIONCABLESCABLESCABLECONTROLINSPECTIONCONTROL050 NOTESINSPECTORSEFFECTCONTROLINSTALLINSTALLCONTROLADEQUACYCONTROL

MAY 16

LETTER

Page No.12/05/85

TENNESSEE VALEY AUTHORITYWATTS BAR EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWEEKLY K-FORM LISTING

QTCNUMBER SUBJECT

KEYWORD

KEYWORD

XX-85-102-008 BFN/MANAGEMENTXX-85-118-001 NPS/AUDIT FUNCT MANUXX-85-119-001 NPS/AUDIT PROGRAM*** Total ***

DOCUMENTQAQA

CONTROL

EFFECT

EFFECT

- - 1- - 1- -

I.

MAY 16LETTER

EMPLOYEE CONCERN ASSIGNMENT REQUEST

TO: Director - NSRS TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T50209

ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and hasassigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority:

Category:

Concern # EX-85-037-001 - I]C-o n- d t ai- .Y.EN (H_

Confidentiality: -YES -NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: --YES

Concern:RESTRAINTDRAWINGSPROBLEMS.

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

PROTECTIVE DEVICES (P.D.O'S) ALSO KNOWN AS PIPE WHIPSTRUCTURES IN REACTOR BUILDING UNIT 1 HAVE PROBLEMS. THE48W1700 SERIES CAN BE REFERRED TO FOR IDENTIFICATION OF THECI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

o6hlp p e•JfkFIfl ~:

. /NOV 219 1985e. Z._ - .- ---- •--- -- -- -

MANAGER, ERT DATE

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concernto:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

~O~NSRS DT

U




Priority:

Category:

Concern # EX-85-121-002ond - F!5t q 4_E _N &)-


Supervisor Notified: _XYES NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: DRAWINGS ARE NOT WALKED DOWN BEFORE WORK PACKAGES ARE PUTTOGETHER BY ENGINEERS, ON SITE. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NOADDITIONAL INFORMATION. -GENERIC CONCERN-

L~Q u ffk

n 10-"- " ~ ...+ O) 18

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS ~1

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # EX-85-121-004

Confidentiality:T I-YES -NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: _XYES ___NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: SEVERAL ENGINEERS (DISCIPINE KNOWN) TELL CRAFT TO "FIX IT" ASI WANT IT, THEN I'LL COME BACK AND DO THE PAPER WORK LATER.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO NAMES OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.-GENERIC CONCERN-

?Zib~~~ 1\Ac~9~A

MANAGER. ERT DATE

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation oi the above concernto:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS 6T




Priority:

Category:

Concern # EX-85-148-001



Concern: SUB-JOURNEYMEN ARE TERMINATING GA AND NON-CA CABLES INJUNCTIONS BOXES PER DIRECTION OF FOREMAN (NAME KNOWN). DETAILS KNOWNTO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

/ / NOV .198MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT /

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS ATE

1•&~~~~~~' S l;/ 4[y r 4•


TO: Director - NSRS TRANSMITTAL NUMBER T5020O


Priority: 1 Concern # EX-85-15-O01

Category: 52 Confidentiality: -YES _NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: __YES-_X_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: UNIT 2 ANNULUS ELEV. 737' PENETRATION -#11 (?) CABLEOVERFLOWING CABLE TRAY IS IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH PENETRATION. COULDCAUSE DAMAGE TO CABLE JACKET. CI STATED THAT TO GET TO THIS LOCATION,ENTER ANNULUS AT 737', TURN LEFT AND PROCEED ABOUT 25-30' ALONG LEDGE.CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

MANAGER, ERT DATENSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concernto:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)_

NSRS •DATE

".p . L 7 -• <; -••; .,, .. : : , ,.i :•• .•;S . .:.. . . . .. 7




Priority: 1

Category: 12

Concern # EX-85-15i-002


Supervisor Notified: _,YES _XNO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: UNIT 2, AUXILIARY BUILDING, ELEV. 737' AT LRB &-All, 12" HVACSCH 40 PIPE. CI STATED THERE WAS (IS) A HORIZONTAL TO VERTICAL TOHORIZONTAL RUN THAT HAD 3 HANGERS DELETED (APPROX 4 MOS AGO) THAT LEFTMORE THAN 20' BETWEEN HANGERS. THE ONLY HANGER LEFT (CEILING) HAD ITS"KICKERS" REMOVED. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTIONDEPT. CONCERN.

L) 0.

MANAGER, ERFT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS )

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DTAfJP




Priority: 1

Category: 52

Concern # EX-85-154-001


Supervisor Notified: _X_YES ,__NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: MANY CABLE TRAYS HAVE LOCATION BRACKETS THAT ARE NOT WELDEDTO THE CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS. CI ESTIMATED 20-25% OF THE BRACKETS IN THEANNULUS OF UNIT 2 HAVE NOT BEER WELDED - MANY HAVE BEEN PAINTED EVENTHOUGH THEY WEREN'T WELDED. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTIONDEPT. CONCERN.

<6j~NOV ~O2 510083MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority: 1 Concern # EX-85-157-002

Category: 52 Confidentiality: -YES -NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: XYES NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: LL AND LR CONDUILETTE FITTINGS CAUSE TOO GREAT,-OF A BEND ATTHE FITTINGS FOR THE CABLES. THEY ARE USED SITE WIDE. CONSTRUCTIONDEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. -GENERIC CONCERN-

NOV21 W85MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS ' DATE

0

..- . .- . - c--p.




Priority:

Category:

Concern # EX-85-157-003


Supervisor Notified: _XYES NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: UNIT 2, REACTOR BUILDING, MOTOR LEADS FOR 6 OR 7 FAN MOTORSWERE LUGGED BUT NOT TERMINATED AS INDICATED ON THE TERMINATION SLIPS.THE LEADS WERE FRAYED AND DAMAGED. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HASNO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. (DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TOCONFIDENTIALITY).

MANAGER, ER? DATE

1085


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # EX-85-162-001Cor -nFidetialiy: E _NO (I&-HConfidentiality: -YES -NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: --YES _X_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: CONDUIT LINES ARE POORLY DESIGNED AND ENGINEERED. MANY ARETOO CLUTTERED AND BEND RADIUS IS TOO TIGHT ON MANY. CONSTRUCTION DEPT.CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. -GENERIC CONCERN-

.A No' 2 5 19385MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS __.__

OTHERS (SP CIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority: -1 Concern # IN-85-317-001


Supervisor Notified: _X_YES NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: WELD RODS ARE OVER-BAKED. THIS MAKES THE FLUX FALL OFF.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

-° / a• ta

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS 6 t

OTHERS (SPECIFY) _

S-------------------------------------




Priority:

Category:

1 Concern # IN-85-317-002

Confidentiality: YES NO (I&H)


Concern: WELD MACHINES NEED TO BE CALIBRATED SO THAT' THE AMPERAGESETTINGS MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE ACTUAL OUTPUT. BLOWHOLES ANDINCOMPLETE FUSION AT THE WELD MAY OCCUR. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.UNIT 2. CI COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY)OTHERS (SPECIFY)----------------------------------------------------

CU NSRSDATE



ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and hasassigned the indicated category and Priorlty:

Priority: 1

Category: 33

Concern # IN-85-317-004

Confidentiality: YES -NO (I&H)


Concern: LACK OF CLEAR GUIDELINES ON PIPE WELD THICKNESS LIMITATIONSFOR WELDERS CERTIFIED TO WELD THIN WALL PIPE (UP TO L.75"). WELDERCERTIFICATION PROGRAM DID NOT CLEARLY ESTABLISH LIMITATIONS ONWELDERS. LACK, OF CLARITY ONLY APPLIED PRIOR TO RESTRUCTURING OFWELDING PROGRAM. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. UNIT 2. CI COULD NOTPROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS e, /OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NS•RS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-347-003


Supervisor Notified: _X_YES ___NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: QA DISAGREES WITH TVA TR 75.1. IT DOES NOT REFLECTPROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A GOOD QA PROGRAM IS DIFFICULT.NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT.UNIT 1 & 2.

A GOOD QACI COULDCONCERN.

0. I]- - (, -i P 7 1

NSRS has assigned responsibility forto:

MANAGER, ERT DATE

investigation of the above concern

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS _

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE

a..

i ýi




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-349-001


Supervisor Notified: __YES _X_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: RB #2, EL 720, HANGER # 2-62A-259 IS WELDED ON TWO (2) SIDES.CONCERNED INDIVIDUAL DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE DRAWING CALLED FOR BUT DIDNOT THINK HANGER WAS INSTALLED PROPERLY. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.UNIT 2. CI COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

ý4Lý,CR Z,).74LLA1T

NOV 129 1035MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS I

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

9JJ~Z9~'2

NSRS /DATE

- - - "-IN




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-349-002

6 Confidentiality: -YES -NO (I&H)


Concern: INSPECTORS (SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS UNKNOWN) WILL OFTENWELD FOR BEING UNDERSIZED OR OVERSIZED WITHOUT PERFORMINGINSPECTIONS. THEY (INSP) JUST "EYEBALL" THE WELD AND"JUDGEMENT" CALL. UNIT 2. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CIPROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

UL,()

L)

REJECT AADEQUATEMAKE ACOULD NOT

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS---- ,ý(-

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-349-003



Concern: WHEN INFORMED THAT A HANGER CANNOT BE INST-ALLED AS PERDRAWING, ENGINEERING (SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL UNKNOWN) WILL TELL CRAFTS(KNOWN) TO INSTALL HANGER AS BEST THEY CAN AND THAT ENGINEERING WILL"AS-BUILD" LATER. UNIT 1 & 2. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI COULDNOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

NSRS has assigned responsibility forto:

NOV2 9 1983MANAGER, ERT DATE

investigation of the above concern

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS )

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NR DATE




Priority: 1 Concern # IN-85-469-X04


Supervisor Notified: __YES __.NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: FABRICATION/INSTALLATION OF HVAC DUCTWORK SUPPORT IS NOT INACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN DRAWINGS. THE GENERAL CONFIGURATION ISNONCONFORMING, AND IMPROPER AND UNAUTHORIZED/UNDOCUMENTED SUBSTITUTESOF MATERIAL AND SUPPORT TYPE HAVE BEEN MADE. CI STATED AS EXAMPLES:(1) SUPPORT 2030-DW920-IOH-1085 IS INSTALLED AS PER DETAIL 47A055-94;IT SHOULD BE INSTALLED AS DETAIL -97 (2) SUPPORT 2030-DW920-lOH-1087IS INSTALLED AS DETAIL -189; IT SHOULD BE DETAIL -17. SYSTEM 31,AUXILIARY BUILDING. UNITS 1 & 2. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HASNO FURTHER INFORMATION.

. .... uV 2 1 1085MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

-- -------------------------------------------




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-469-X05

Confidentiality: _YES -NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: --YES -__NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: INSPECTIONS HVAC DUCTWORK SUPPORTS WERE CONDUCTED PRIOR TOISSUANCE OF THE DESIGN DRAWINGS TO SPECIFY THE REQUIRED DETAILS ANDLOCATION, FOR EACH SUPPORT. LOCATION AND 47A055 DETAIL DRAWINGS WERENOT ISSUED UNTIL 1983, YET MOST SUPPORT INSPECTIONS WERE PERFORMEDPRIOR TO 1980. THE DRAWING ISSUED IN 1983 SHOWS DETAILS THAT AREDIFFERENT THAN THE INSTALLED AND PREVIOUSLY INSPECTED CONDITIONS.EXAMPLE: DRAWING 47W920-iOH AND 2030-DW920-1OH-1085 AND -1087. SYSTEM31, AUXILIARY BUILDING, UNITS 1 & 2. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CIHAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

1 4 -/7, " / .' 0

------------------------------MANAGER, ERT DATENSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concernto:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)_.

NSRS DATE

~1' ~




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-469-X06


Supervisor Notified: __YES ___NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: QA RECORDS FOR HVAC DUCTWORK SUPPORTS DO NOT CORRECTLYIDENTIFY THE "AS BUILT" CONDITION. RECORDS OF INSPECTION HAVE BEENCHANGED TO FALSELY SHOW CONFORMANCE TO DESIGN DRAWINGS, WHICH WERE NOTISSUED AT THE TIME OF THE INSPECTIONS. AND ALSO SHOW ACCEPTANCE OFNONCONFORMING CONDITIONS. EXAMPLE: QA RECORDS FOR SUPPORTS2030-DW920-1OH-1085 AND -1087, SYSTEM 31, AUXILIARY BUILDING, UNITS 1 &2. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

/ /

-. NOV 2 1935----------- ------------ ---------------MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-627-003

Confidentiality: -YES _NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: __YES _XNO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: MANAGEMENT DOES NOT RESPOND TO OR ACT UPON CONCERNS BROUGHTTO THEIR ATTENTION BY EMPLOYEES. (NAMES/DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASEARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY).CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NDAtE

1, - ()




Priority: 1 Concern # IN-85-978-001

J7 P -Y§4ýr-,6J6 17Category: 52 Confidentiality: _YES -NO (I&H)

Supervisor Notified: _XYES ...NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: SUPERVISOR (KNOWN) DIRECTED THAT ELECTRICAL CABLE BE PULLEDWITH CHERRY PICKERS, MACK TRUCKS, AND TRUCK MOUNTED WINCHES. PROBLEMWAS WIDESPREAD. EXAMPLES INCLUDE (A)MUCH OF THE LARGE CABLE IN BURIEDCONDUIT IN THE 500 KV SWITCHYARD, AND (B)500 MCM CABLE THAT IS NOWINSIDE THE TURBINE BUILDING #1, BUT WHICH WAS PULLED BY A MACK TRUCKUSING A STEEL CABLE. CONDUIT ENDS WERE IN LINE WITH THE DOOR IN THETURBINE BLDG. THAT OPENS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE 500 KV SWITCHYARD.THE MACK TRUCK WAS STATIONED IN THE THEN INCOMPLETE SWITCHYARD. 1976.CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

NOV 2!9 1985MANAGER. ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DA




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-978-002


Supervisor Notified: _X_YES 1-_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: EARTHWORK BACKFILL LIFT LIMITS WERE OFTEN EXCEEDED BETWEENCOMPACTION OPERATIONS. INSTEAD OF AVERAGING ABOUT 1' OF DEPTH, LIFTSOF TWO OR THREE FEET WERE PLACED BEFORE COMPACTING. EXAMPLE: SEISMICBARRIER TRENCHES ADJACENT TO INTAKE STRUCTURE. UNITS 1 & 2, 1974-1977.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

/ 3/./• . t!NOV 29 1985

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concern

to:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS _

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

SRSI DATE




Priority: 1

Category: 53

Concern # IN-85-978-003



Concern: TVA USED IMPROPER, UNCERTIFIED BACKFILL MATERiAL WIDELY -THROUGHOUT THE WBNP SITE. THIS MATERIAL DID NOT PACK WELL, ANDCOMPACTION LEVELS WERE BELOW WHAT WAS NEEDED TO ENSURE STABLE FILLS.EXAMPLES INCLUDE SEISMIC TRENCHES A & b AT THE INTAKE PUMPING STATIONAND BENEATH THE NORTH VALVE ROOMS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. 1974-1977.

'9.

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS J

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-978-004

Confidentiality: _YES -NO (I&H)


Concern: TVA MADE A PRACTICE OF WORKING CONCRETE POURS ONTO IMPROPERLYPREPARED SURFACES. (UNCLEAN SAWDUST, CONSTRUCTION TRASH, WIRE. NOTSCORIFIED. NOT GREEN CUT OR WASHED DOWN TO FREE SURFACE OF LOOSEPOWDER). EXAMPLE: FLOORS, WALLS, AND FOUNDATIONS, INCLUDING UNIT 1TURBINE FOUNDATION. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT.CONCERN.

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS ATE



ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, andassigned the indicated category and priority:

Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-85-978-007



Concern: TVA ROUTINELY VIOLATED MATERIAL HANDLING, AND STORAGEPROCEDURES, BUT NOONE EVER TOOK CORRECTIVE ACTION. CRAFTS (KNOWN)EXPEDITERS WOULD DUMP MATERIALS (EG., IRONWORKER STEEL) OFF OF TRUCKSAND DAMAGE THEM, WOULD LEAVE MATERIALS (EG., INSULATION) EXPOSED TORAIN DAMAGE, AND DID NOT TAPE OR COVER PIPE OR CONDUIT OPEN ENDS. OCWAS ONLY CONCERNED WITH INSPECTING WAREHOUSE STORAGE CONDITIONS:MATERIALS WERE NEGLECTED BETWEEN THE WAREHOUSE AND THE PLANT. CI HASNO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

7 / ! 19MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

has

-------------------------------

----------------. 6

NSRS DATE



ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, and hamassigned the indicated category and priority:

Concern # IN-86-184-002


Supervisor Notified: _XYES _..NO

Concern: CLASSIFICATION OF ST-CONCERN. DIFFERENT GRADES AND DIETHE SAME PIPING SYSTEM. CONSADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

AINLESS STEEL PIPING 'SHOULD BE OFFFERENT CLASS OF PIPE ARE ASSEMBLED INTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

.NSRS DATE

Priority:

Category:

*1

/




Priority: i

Category: 33

Concern # IN-86-184-003


Supervisor Notified: _XYES -__NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: P.D.O. (PROTECTION DEVICES) STEAM GENERATOR SUPPORTS SHOULDBE X-RAYED. THERE IS A PROBABILITY OF TRAPPED SLAG. CONSTRUCTIONDEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

,~V /O212 1 S9)MANAGER,'Ri DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS D' DA T

2-. *...




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-86-184-004-Con-i935 4 -_E _O I&



Concern: THERE ARE DIFFERENT SIZE (GAUGE) PIPE WELDED TOGETHER. THISOCCURRED IN REACTOR #1 AND THE FEED WATER HEATER STORAGE TANK.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

I L - NSRS DATE



ERT has received the Employee concern identified below, andassigned the indicated category and priority: -

Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-86-229-003



Concern: SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN CHANGED FROM ORIGINALDRAWINGS BUT NEVER DOCUMENTED.- DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, BUT WITHHELD DUETO CONFIDENTIALITY. UNIT 1. NUCLEAR POWER DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NOFURTHER INFORMATION.

,. / ._Nov21 1935MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SýECIFY)

•NSRS DATE

-7,,_<




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-86-254-001



Concern: ELECTRICAL CABLES WERE OFTEN PULLED BY TRUCK OR OTHER MEANSNOT ALLOWED BY PROCEDURE. EXAMPLE CITED OCCURRED IN 1978-1979, CABLEPULLS TO THE INTAKE PUMPING STATION FROM THE TURBINE AND AUXILIARYBLDG. "FUSE LINKS" WERE BY PASSED BY USING STEEL CABLE CHOKERS.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

/ NOV 29 1985MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS I

OTHERS (SP CIFY) -----------------------------------------------------'NSRS DATE

~- I'/ ~'(:




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-86-254-002



Concern: ELECTRICAL CABLES WERE PULLED FROM MANHOLES 1 -AND 2 TO AUXBUILDING ELEVATION 737. A STEEL CABLE WAS HOOKED BEFORE AND AFTER THEFUSE LINK TO ENABLE THE CABLE TO BE PULLED SHOULD THE FUSE LINK BREAK.THE CABLE WAS PULLED DURING 1ST SHIFT IN 1978-79. (CREWS KNOWN) THECABLE BEING PULLED WAS LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH VOLTAGE. THE CABLE WASFOR UNITS I & II. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT.CONCERN.

------------------------------------------------MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS PECIFY)

'NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # IN-86-254-004-7- - q/7 A- 6T -


Supervisor Notified: _YES _X.NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: CI BELIEVES PROCEDURES ARE BEING VIOLATED (IN GENERAL) WHEN aAND NON-Q ELECTRICAL CABLE ARE NOT BEING SEPARATED IN CABLE TRAYS.THIS INCLUDES LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE. BY NOT SEPARATINGTHE CABLE, THE TRAYS ARE BEING OVERLOADED. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

Z. NOV Z 1985MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS-

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE







Concern: ELECTRICAL CABLES ARE BUNCHED TOGETHER AND THEN COVERED WITHVAMASCO. THE THICK COATING OF VAMASCO POTENTIALLY CAUSES HEAT BUILD UPWHICH MAY CAUSE FAILURE. THIS IS A GENERIC CONDITION THROUGHOUT UNITSI AND II. IT EFFECTS LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE. SPECIFICAREAS IDENTIFIED ARE THE AUX. BUILDING, ELEVATIONS 757, AND 772. CIHAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

NOV 2 9 1985

MANAGER, ERT DATE

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concertito:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS ./

OTHERS (SPEC1 FY)

'NSRS DATE

"'II. k )




Priority: 1

Category: 7

Concern # IN-86-254-006


Supervisor Notified: --YES _X_NONUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: CONSTRUCTION CABLE PULLING INSPECTIONS PRIOR T01978-79, THATWERE PERFORMED BY ENGINEERING WERE NOT THOROUGH. IN MANY CASESENGINEERS WERE NEVER REQUESTED TO PERFORM INSPECTIONS. CI IS NOT SURETHAT THESE INSPECTIONS WERE EVER DOCUMENTED. QC INSPECTIONS ARE STILLINADEQUATE AS NOT ENOUGH INSPECTORS ARE UTILIZED DURING A LONG PULL.INSPECTORS ARE NOT STATIONED AT CRITICAL LOCATIONS DURING THE PULL.(EXAMPLE: IN AND OUT OF MANHOLES AND JB BOXES). CONSEQUENTLY,NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS MAY EXIST IN THE FIELD. (UNITS I AND II) CIHAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

1085------------- - ---------- ---MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS U

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

N SRS DAT

has

17

-.-. • ff,.l





9-Y-53 -z)&LCategory: 52 Confidentiality: -YES -NO (i&H)


Concern: CONDUIT RUNNING FROM MANHOLES I & 2 TO THE AUX. BLDG. AREOVERFILLED WITH CABLES. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION.

~ -- 'NOV 2,9 19,85MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS OATE

I # , ( )




Concern # IN-86-315-006

Confidentiality: -YES -NO (I&H)Category: 53

Supervisor Notified: _XYES ---NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: IF CERTAIN INSPECTORS FIND A DISCREPANCY --OR DEFECTIVEMATERIAL AND WRITE NOI, THEY CAN BE OVERRULED BY THE ENGINEER OR ANYLEVEL III NDE'S. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION.

-" -Nv ." O 2 9 1985MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

C1SR1 DATE

Priority:




Priority: 1 Concern # PH-85-040-001

Category: 33 Confidentiality: _YES _NO (I&H)


Concern: QA HANGERS WERE FREQUENTLY PAINTED BEFORE THE WELDS WEREINSPECTED. AUX. BUILDING, REACTOR BUILDING #1, ELEV. 742'-0", &745'-0". 1983. CONSTRUCTION -DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHERDETAILS.

L~4~ ~

NOV 21 1'3MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT s.-~'~}~

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # PH-85-040-003


Supervisor Notified: _X.YES ---NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: WATTS BAR STOPPED USING PROTECTIVE UNDER COATING #295 IN 1983AND APPLIED ONLY THE TOP OR FINAL COATING #305 PAINT IN CONTAINMENT,REACTOR BUILDING 1. CI STATED- THAT THE COATING #295 WAS TO SEAL THEITEM FROM RADIATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION.

<eZ~&.0 I / OV2 19.,85MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE

r "




Priority:

Category:

Concern # PH-85-054-002


Supervisor Notified: __YES _XNO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: CI QUESTIONS THE QUALIFICATIONS OF Q.C. INSPECTORUNIT KNOWN) WHO PERFORMED INSPECTIONS (KNOWN) AT WATTS BAR,CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI-HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

(NAME ANDUNIT 1.

oF qe 7*SPL:C1

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT _/

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)- -,,-- - -.- -_-- -)-- -- --.-- - --,- -.-- -. ,- -

NSRS DATE

a.




Priority: 1

Category: 5

Supervisor Notified: _XYES

Concern # PH-85-056-001

Confidentiality: 5YES -NO (I&H)

_ NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: THE DECISION TO DECENTRALIZE THE QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDITBRANCH IS THE RESULT OF RETALIATION FROM THOSE WITHIN TVA MANAGEMENTWHO DO NOT WISH TO HEAR ABOUT SfTE/SYSTEM DISCREPANCIES. THIS DECISIONVIOLATES THE TVA COMMITMENT TO THE NRC FOR STRONGER CORPORATEMANAGEMENT. THE CI REQUESTS QTC INVESTIGATE THIS CONCERN. NUCLEARPOWER DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

NOV 25 109S- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------- - -- - - - - ----MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS I

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS ' • .. . . B TE

V




Priority: 1

Category: 31

Concern # WI-85-089-001

Confidentiality: -YES NO (1&H)


Concern: QA MATERIAL IS BEING SENT TO SHACKS #565 AND #a19 AND IS NOTBEING RECEIVED NOR STORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH QA PROCEDURES.CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI -HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

MANAGER, _ DA7E

NSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation of the above concert!to:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)----------------------------------------------

6tJ3 SRS DATE

- ,. .. ,.w~t......




Priority: 1

Category: 52

Concern # WI-85-096-001


Supervisor Notified: _YES X_NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: IN UNIT #1 RAD. LAB. A LARGE DIAMETER PIPE MAY BE DEFORMED.THE DEFORMITY MAY BE COVERED WITH INSULATION. CI HAS NO ADDITIONALINFORMATION. ANONYMOUS CONCERN.-

-- ,,,~A ..Q 2 19 185MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -

OTHERS (SPECIFY) ---------------------------------------------- D

NSRSDDDAT




Priority:

Category:

Concern # XX-85-060-001



Concern: BELLE FONTE: CI IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EQUIPMENT COMPONENTSTHAT ARE INSTALLED IN UNDERGROUND WATER SOURCE. THEY GET RUSTED. ANYFURTHER INFORMATION WOULD CO4PROMISE CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTIONDEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

,. ,. / NOV 9 1085MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS _

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

as .DATE

. . ý'- d61- ---- - - . - , -




Priority: 1

Category: 25

Concern # XX-85-102-001

Confidentiality: -YES -NO (I&H)Supervisor Notified: _X_YES ...NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BROWNS FERRY: A CERTAIN SIZE HANGER WAS TAKEN OUT OF ASPECIFIC ROOM AND NOT REPLACED. THE DRAWING SHOWS IT IN PLACE. APARTICULAR WORK GROUP WAS SUPPOSED TO PUT IT BACK IN 1984. NUCLEARPOWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC,WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY.

1985MANAGER, ERT DATE

NSRS has assigned responsibility forto: investigation of the above concern

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS -,-

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE

has

0J

.. ...............




Priority:

Category:

Concern # XX-85-102-003

Confidentiality: _YES _NO (I&H)


Concern: BROWNS FERRY: IN 83 OR 84, THE LOW PRESSURE M'AIN STEAM LINEIN THE VALVE ROOM ON TURBINE BUILDING, UNIT 2, HAS MOVED SO FAR BECAUSEOF VIBRATION THAT SEVERAL BOLTS AND NUTS HAVE BEEN BEATEN FLAT ANDCONCRETE CHIPPED OFF BY EQUIPMENT VALVE HANDLES HAMMERING AGAINST IT.SPECIFIC ITEMS OF THE EQUIPMENT WERE OBSERVED TO BE DEFECTIVE AND ABOUT4 HANGERS WERE MESSED UP. MANAGEMENT WAS NOTIFIED VERBALLY. NOMAINTENANCE REQUESTS WERE WRITTEN. CI HAS NO IDEA IF THE DEFECTS AREPROPERLY REPAIRED. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION.


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS DATE

1-)\-




Priority:

Category:

Concern # XX-85-102-004T5-; -S1/



Concern: BROWNS FERRY: WHEN INSPECTION FINDS A NUMBER OF DEFECTS ANDDEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT AND ISSUES NOTICE OF INDICATIONS (NOI'S), THEY ARENOT PROPERLY FIXED. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TOCONFIDENTIALITY. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHERINFORMATION.

/0

MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS Y/

OTHERS (SPECIFY) -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

NSRS y-D ATE




Priority:

Category:

Concern # XX-85-102-008


Supervisor Notified: _X_YES -_-NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: BROWNS FERRY, NOTICE OF INSPECTIONS AND MAINTENANCE REQUESTSWERE WRITTEN FOR DISCREPANCIES BY AN INSPECTION DEPT. AND ANOTHER DEPT.BOUGHT OFF THESE MR'S CLOSED AND PLACED THEM IN THE PLANT ARCHIVES.THE DEPT. WHICH WROTE MR'S & NOI'S WOULD BE STILL WAITING FORDISPOSITION. THEY DON'T HAVE PROPER TRACKING SYSTEM. NUCLEAR POWERCONCERN. CI HAS NO FUTHER INFORMATION.

4:,7"

;,• ,,,.•._•__.,,•i,..NOV Z9S 1985MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

'NSRS DATE

a.




Concern # XX-85-i1s-O01

Confidentiality: YES -NO (I&H)


Concern: CI STATED THAT THE GIVING OF THE NUCLEAR QUALITYMANUAL AUDIT FUNCTION TO THE INDIVIDUAL PLANT SITES AND SITEWILL REDUCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM, WILLINDEPENDENCE, AND WILL SUBJECT AUDITORS (QA SPECIALISTS)HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HASINFORMATION.

ASSURANCEDIRECTORSELIMINATE

TO SEVERENO FURTHER

v\ iý

/ / /NOV 21985

MANAGER. ERA DATENSRS has assigned responsibility for investigation ozf the above concernto:

ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS /

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSIR S D'A7E

Priority:

Category:




Priority: 1

Category: 5

Concern # XX-85-119-001


Supervisor Notified: _X_YES ...NO NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED YES

Concern: THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE AUDIT PROGRAM WILL CAUSE THEINDIVIDUAL PLANT SITES TO EFFECTIVELY DIMINISH IN THE AUTHORITY ANDORGANIZATIONAL FREEDOM TO IDENTIFY AND REPORT QUALITY PROBLEMS.NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN, CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

r_ / ý•.N WA -21 1%85MANAGER, ERT DATE


ERT

NSRS/ERT

NSRS _

OTHERS (SPECIFY)

NSRS D'ATE

Page No.12/05/85

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITYWATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANTEMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LISTING

QTC NUMBER SUBJECT INVEST DATE SORG REPORT U

DATE ARESPONSE C

C

** MILESTONE:IN-85-160-001 UNREPORTED FIREWI-85-084-001 WELDER CERTIFICATION** Subtotal **

NSRSERT

11/07/85 .F.11/12/85 ,T.

I-// /

11/12/85 CONSTRUCTI11/12/85 WELDING

** MILESTONE:

EX-85-003-003EX-85-049-001IN-85-001-003IN-85-010-002IN-85-012-X02IN-85-018-004IN-85-021-X05IN-85-024-001IN-85-031-001IN-85-037-001IN-85-038-001-85-039-001

*-85-039-002N-85-052-001IN-85-088-001IN-85-091-X02IN-85-130-002IN-85-134-001IN-85-169-001IN-85-202-001IN-85-207-002IN-85-251-002IN-85-260-003IN-85-311-008IN-85-325-006IN-85-393-003IN-85-406-001IN-85-413-001IN-85-424-011IN-85-424-X13IN-85-439-003IN-85-445-008IN-85-445-010IN-85-445-013IN-85-457-001IN-85-465-002

~-85-472-002- 85-527-001

ION-85-534-005

1 FUEL LOADUNAUTH CHNG TO WDRECNO SECURITY BARRIERWELDS UNDER WATERVIOLATION OF 050 NTSTENSILE STRNG OF FITSUPV NOT FOLLOW PROCWELDER CERTIF FALSIFDRWNS & 050 NOTESENBD PLTS NOT CORRECCONCRETE ANCHORSANALYS OF LARGE PIPETHML STRS ON PIPINGSTRES&SUPPRT LD PROBDRWNGS & 050 NOTESVACUM TEST ON DOORSNO NCR FOR LOST DOCUFIRE SEALS BREACHEDCRIT NOT MET/IDSS WLSYS 62 VALVE CLASSCRACK IN WELDUSE OF FISH TAPEMAINT WITHOUT NCRWELD DOCUMNTATIONCR ENTRANCE FIREDOORVALV CONT/OPER TRANFSAR REQ FOR SUPERVUNAUTH CHNG TO WDREC'050'NOTESINADEQ UPDT WELD CERFALSIF WELDER CERTIFINADEQ CRAFT SUPVPROC DIFFICULT TO KNEYE TEST INADEQUATE47-050 HARD TO USEINADQ REVIEW BY PORCLOOSE CONDUITNO NCRS ON ERCW LINSCABLE PULL W/O FUSEFIRE PROTEC HYDRO TE

ERTNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSERT/OGCNSRSERTERTERTERTERTNSRSERTERTERTNSRSERTERTNSRSNSRSERTERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSERTERT/OGCNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

07/09/8510/17/8507/10/8511/22/8508/05/8511/14/8510/24/8507/03/8508/20/8507/09/8507/08/8507/09/8511/08/8507/03/8507/09/8508/26/8507/05/8511/22/8507/10/8507/10/8511/22/8510/31/8510/07/8508/19/8510/01/8507/03/8507/09/8508/09/8509/26/8510/24/8510/30/8510/23/8510/28/8510/10/8510/17/8509/09/8510/03/8511/27/8510/02/85

.T.*T..T..T..T..T..T..T..T..T..T.

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.T.

.T.

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07/24/85 T/ /

09/23/85 T/ // // // // /

11/18/8509/11/,85 F09/05/85 T09/05/85 T

/ /07/30/85 F

/ // /

09/13/85 T/ /

07/26/85 T/ // // // /

09/24/85 T/ /

11/25/85 T07/24/85 T

/1// // // // // // // /

11/14/85 T/ // // /

07/24/85 WELDING/ / SECURITY

09/23/85 WELDING/ / HANGERS

08/05/85 MATERIAL11/20/85 ELECTRICAL

/ / WELDING/ / HANGERS/ / DESIGN/ / CIVIL

09/05/85 DESIGN09/05/85 DESIGN11/12/85 DESIGN/ / HANGERS

07/09/85 TESTING10/03/85 DOCUMENT09/13/85 CONSTRUCTI11/22/85 QA07/26/85 MATERIAL07/09/85 WELDING

/ / ELECTRICAL/ / QA/ / WELDING

10/10/85 OPERATIONS10/04/85 OPERATIONS11/27/85 OPERATIONS07/24/85 WELDING08/04/85 HANGERS10/03/85 WELDING/ / WELDING

10/30/85 CONSTRUCTI10/30/85 CRAFT/ / INSPECTION

10/16/85 HANGERS/ / OPERATIONS

11/20/85 HANGERS/ / QA

11/29/85 ELECTRICAL/ / TESTING

DATEINVESTCLOSED

KEYWORD

Page No.

12/05/85



QTC NUMBER SUBJECT INVEST DATE S DATEORG REPORT U RESPONSE

B

IN-85-544-001IN-85-544-002IN-85-581-002IN-85-612-X07IN-85-676-001IN-85-682-005IN-85-684-001IN-85-770-002IN-85-770-003IN-85-770-X07IN-85-778-X07IN-85-795-001IN-85-795-002IN-85-847-006IN-85-850-002IN-85-853-X02IN-85-897-001IN-85-913-004-85-915-003-85-965-001_-85-977-001

IN-85-977-002IN-86-055-003IN-86-068-002IN-86-081-001IN-86-087-004IN-86-090-001IN-86-090-003IN-86-102-001IN-86-102-002IN-86-103-002IN-86-143-002IN-86-155-004IN-86-167-005IN-86-167-X06IN-86-210-001IN-86-221-004IN-86-226-001IN-86-259-004NS-85-001-001PH-85-003-021PH-85-006-001PH-85-012-001

-85-018-001-85-003-001-85-003-X02

* WORK W/O WORKPLANVIOLATION OF PROCEDUWLDRS NOT QUAL ELECWELDER CERTIF FALSIFDISAGREE W/TVA POLICMGT ALLOW INSP HARASDEFECTIVE TUBE STEEMPROC FOR CER NOT PERUNCERTIFIED WELDERSWELDERS CERT FALSIFIWELDER CERT CARD FALCOMPRESS FITTINGCOMPRESS FITTINGCRFT SUP ALW UNAP PLQUANTITY VS. QUALITYVIOLAT TVA PROCEDUREINEXP CRAFTSMENCONSTRUCT VIOLATIONSDRAWING CONTROLWELDOR CER BACKDATEDTAPE NOT REPL ON RCSDOCUMENT OF TCS/SISHYDRAZINE SPILLRETUBIN OF HEAT EXCHINADEQ PLANT SYS STADIFFERENCE IN Q-LISTDIFFERENCE IN Q-LISTSIS APPROVAL W/O REVREQ FOR CONDUIT INSUNO ATTACH D/CONDUITREMOVAL OF INSULATIOWELDER CERT BACKDATEWELDS MAY NOT INSPECWELDER REQUAL BACKDTWELDER CERT CARD FALHEAT EXCH TUBES INADCLEANERS NOT APPVDHARAS FOR REP QCINADEQ CABLE PULLINACCUR WELD INSPECTENG EVAL NOT CONDUCTCHANGES TO 050 NOTESINSPECT OF WELDSAUDIT FINDS WITHHELDFALSE WELD CERTF CRDWELDER CERT CARD FAL

ERT

ERTNSRSERT/OGCNSRSNSRSNSRSERT

ERT

ERT/OGCERT/OGC

ERT

ERTNSRSNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSERTNSRSERTERT/OGCERTNSRSNSRSNSRSERTNSRSNSRSERTERTERTERT/OGC

10/22/8510/23/8510/17/8510/24/8510/31/8511/27/8509/16/8510/24/8509/26/8510/24/8510/24/8508/07/8508/07/8510/29/8511/07/8510/12/8511/07/8511/26/8510/22/8510/24/8510/10/8510/03/8510/17/8511/05/8511/19/8510/04/8510/04/8510/17/8510/11/8510/14/8511/13/8510/24/8510/22/8510/24/8510/24/8511/05/8510/10/8511/15/8510/31/8508/13/8510/10/8508/09/8507/19/8507/10/8510/24/8510/24/85

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I,: // // // // /I/I/ // // // // /

10/07/8510/07/85I/i/ // // // // // /I/// // /I/I/ /I/I/ // // // // /I/i/ // // /I/i/ // /I/I

09/27/85/ // // /I/I/ // /

/ // /

10/17/85/ // // /

09/16/85/ /

10/03/85/ // // // // /

11/12/8510/18/8511/12/85

/ //// // // // //// //// // // /

10/16/8511/15/85

/ /10/22/85

/ // // // // /

11/04/85/ /

10/16/8508/09/8507/19/8507/10/85

/ // /

DATE

INVESTCLOSED

KEYWORD

QA

QACONSTRUCTIWELDINGQAQAMATERIALWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGINSTRUMENTINSTRUMENTQAQAQACRAFTQADOC UMENTWELDINGQADOCUMENTOPERATIONSMAI NTENANCOPERATIONSQAQAOPERATIONSHANGERSCONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTIWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGDESIGNMATERIALQAELECTRICALWELDINGQAHANGERSWELDINGQAWELDINGWELDING

Page No.12/05/85



QTC NUMBER SUBJECT INVEST DATE S DATEORG REPORT U RESPONSE

B

WI-85-013-003 INSPECT THRU PAINTWI-85-016-001 PROCEDURE VIOLATIONSWI-85-055-001 WELDER RECERTIFICATIWI-85-056-001 NOT FOLLOW CODE REQU** Subtotal **

ERTERTERTERT

11/06/8511/01/8509/24/8509/24/85

/ // /

10/02/8510/02/85

INSPECTIONCIVILWELDINGWELDING

** MILESTONE: 2 CRITICALITYIN-85-016-003 TUBING NOT CLAMPEDIN-85-025-001 INCORE THERMO TESTIN-85-064-002 SHUTDN BDS TOP OPENIN-85-069-001 INADEQUATE INSPECTSIN-85-106-001 MN STM LOADS SUPPORTIN-85-109-002 BOLTS REPLAC BY WELDIN-85-186-002 INSL ON CONDT & CABLIN-85-216-001 WELDING SEQUENCEIN-85-217-001 CONDENS POTS, #1IN-85-246-001 INSUFFNT MOVEMT/NVRk -85-281-001 DIFFUSER FLOW

-85-281-003 TRNSM NOT READ SAME•N-85-415-002 CONCRETE ERCW LINESIN-85-439-006 SUBSTD WEAK CONCRETEIN-85-460-003 GOUGE IN LINE, 1#IN-85-460-X05 EXCAV ARC STRK SYS72IN-85-485-X01 SOFT CONCRETEIN-85-534-001 FIRE PROTECT SYSTEMIN-85-601-001 INADEQ SURVL INSTRUCIN-85-802-001 TARGET ROCK VALVESIN-85-845-002 SYS43 HANGER DESIGNIN-86-122-001 CRACKS IN WF 33 BEAMXX-85-020-001 SQN/ECNS APPLICABILI** Subtotal **

NSRSNSRSNSRSERTERTNSRSERTERTERTNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSERTERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

09/03/8507/03/8506/28/8507/10/8507/11/8511/07/8507/10/8507/10/8507/15/8508/09/8507/05/8508/15/8507/11/8511/07/8508/29/8510/21/8511/07/8510/08/8510/09/8510/25/8511/20/8510/10/8511/19/85

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/ // /

07/22/85 T10/10/85 F

/ // /

09/24/85 T08/05/85 F

/ /•/ /07/25/85 T09/17/85 T

/2// /09/24/85 T

/ // // // // // // // /

/ // /

07/22/85/ /

07/11/85/ /

10/10/85/ /

07/14/8508/09/8507/25/8509/17/8507/11/85

/ /10/17/85

/ // // /

10/09/85/ // /

10/16/8511/19/85

HANGERSTESTINGELECTRICALHANGERSDESIGNDESIGNELECTRICALWELDINGDESIGNDESIGNDESIGNDESIGN

MECHANICALCIVILMECHANICALWELDINGCIVILDESIGNQADESIGNHANGERSMATERIALOPERATIONS

** MILESTONE:IN-85-001-002IN-85-016-001IN-85-021-003IN-85-027-002IN-85-052-008IN-85-064-001IN-85-086-001IN-85-108-001-85-113-003-85-1--- b-01

--85-186-004

3 5% POWERWELD ROD CONTROLBROKN CONCRE AT PLATBACKDATE CERTF CARDSCOMPUTER ANALYSISPROCED FOR WELD RODSSPRAY ON SHUTDN BDSSTM GEN MATERIALSSYS 68 PIPINGWELDER CERTIFICATIONOPER WATCH VS PAPERBOARDS IN ELEC PANEL

ERTNSRS/ERTERTERTERTNSRSERTERTERTNSRSERT

07/10/8508/05/8508/19/8508/01/8507/10/8506/28/8507/10/8507/12/8507/10/8508/30/8507/05/85

/ // // /

11/20/8509/24/85

/ // // /

11/12/8510/16/8509/23/85

07/06/85 WELDING08/04/85 CIVIL

/ / WELDING

/ / DESIGN

/ / WELDING06/28/85 ELECTRICAL

07/10/85 MATERIAL07/12/85 MATERIAL11/20/85 WELDING10/16/85 OPERATIONS09/23/85 ELECTRICAL

DATEINVESTCLOSED

KEYWORD

Page No.

12/05/85



QTC NUMBER

IN-85-211-001IN-85-221-001IN-85-337-002IN-85-346-003IN-85-352-001IN-85-388-006IN-85-424-004IN-85-424-006IN-85-453-007IN-85-463-007IN-85-465-001IN-85-493-004IN-85-501-001IN-85-532-004IN-85-532-005IN-85-534-002IN-85-540-001IN-85-543-002•IN85-5 54-001

-85-612-006

N-85-671-004IN-85-705-001IN-85-725-X14IN-85-725-X15IN-85-778-001IN-85-824-002IN-85-845-004IN-86-055-002IN-86-119-001IN-86-169-001IN-86-173-001IN-86-259-006IN-86-262-003IN-86-268-003PH-85-001-002WI-85-053-003WI-85-053-006WI-85-054-003** Subtotal **

* MILESTONE:

IN-85-010-004-85-021-002-85-218-001-85-407-001

SUBJECT

ERCW LINE LEAKIMPROPER VALVE OPERWELD ROD CONTROLWELD CERTIFICATIONSUPDATE WELD CERTIFICHEAT CODE TRACEABILISTMFIT PERFM WELDINGACCOUNT OF WELD RODSINADEQ CERTF OF WELDDELAY IN DOCUMT DRWSLINES CLOSE TO HANGRINADEQ WELD CERTIFICUNUSED WLD RDS DISPOWELDER RECERTIFICATERECERT W/O VERIFICATFIRE PROT LINESINADE WELD CERTIFICAINADEQ WELD CERTIFICINCOMP STAIN STEL LNINADEQ WELD CERTIFICWELDS NOT PROP INSPEUNQUALIFIED PERSONNEINADQ RECERT PROGTEST PLATES INADQWELDER CERTIFICATIONUNAPPROV BEND PROCEDIMPROPER WELDINGLEAKING PIPEINADEQUATE CONDUITSCONDUIT HEAT DAMAGEDDESIGN CALCULATIONSINADQ SEPAR OF CABLEEXCEED MAX PULL TENSIMPROPER INSTAL CABLINST LNS SLOPE PROBIMPORP WELDING DOCUMTEST DIR NOT QUALDRAINS PLUGGED UP

5 100% POWERFIRE PROT PIPNG DSNSYS77 DRAINS IN FLRAPPROVAL OF AS-BUILTINACCURATE Q-LIST

INVEST DATE SORG REPORT U

B

NSRSERTERTERTERTNSRSERTERTERTNSRSNSRSERTERTERTERTNSRSERTERTNSRSERTNSRSERTERTERTERTERTERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRS

ERTERTERTNSRS

06/27/8507/05/8511/27/8509/26/8509/26/8507/03/8511/27/8511/27/8508/19/8511/22/8507/30/8509/26/8509/03/8509/26/8509/26/8510/22/8509/26/8509/26/8509/03/8509/26/8510/22/8509/28/8511/05/8511/05/8509/26/8508/23/8510/10/8511/22/8510/09/8511/26/8510/28/8511/01/8510/31/8511/01/8507/06/8511/14/8510/25/8511/22/85

09/16/8508/23/8507/29/8510/04/85

DATE ARESPONSE C

C

A?

/~ /09/23/85 T

07/26/85 T

/ /08/09/85 T

/7 /

/1

/1/

/-/1//

10/18/85 T/1/

/ // // /

/ /09/20/85 T

/ // // /

/ // /

08/22/85 T/ /

DATE

INVEST

CLOSED

06/27/8509/23/85

1//10/03/85i1003/8 5

07/26/85/ // /

11/27/8509/08/8510/03/85

1//10/03/8510/03/8510/22/8510/03/8510/03/8509/03/8510/03/8510/22/85

/ // // /

10/15/8510/30/8510/16/8511/27/85

/ // // // /

11/04/85/ /

09/23/8511/20/85

/ /11/27/85

09/24/8508/30/8508/22/85

/ /

KEY

WORD

MECHANICALOPERATIONSWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGMATERIALWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGDOCUMENTMECHANICALWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGDESIGNWELDINGWELDINGCONSTRUCTIWELDINGWELDINGCONSTRUCTIWELDINGWELDINGWELDING

QAWELDINGMAINTENANCELECTRICALELECTRICALDESIGNELECTRICALELECTRICALELECTRICAL

INSTRUMENTCONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTIMECHANICAL

DESIGNDESIGNINSTRUMENTDESIGN

Page No.12/05/85




B

DATE ARESPONSE C

C

IN-85-688-003 VALIDITY OF CRIT SYSIN-85-945-001 ELEC MANHOLES DISORGIN-86-087-002 EFFECT OF QA DEPT** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE: 6 01/01/86EX-85-012-001 UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEIN-85-078-001 UO/SAFTY RELATE SYSTIN-85-196-003 VALVE OPER INADEQIN-85-352-002 NO PORT WELD OVENSIN-85-424-001 NO PORT OVENSIN-85-453-009 PASS OF WELD RODIN-85-454-004 PASS OF WELD RODIN-85-496-002 LINER OF ERCW PIPINGIN-85-618-004 DAMAGED INST TUBINGIN-85-825-002 CLAIRTY IN PROCEDUREIN-'85-913-001 ELECT JUNCTION BOXES-85-913-002 ELECT JUNCTION BOXES-Subtotal **

NSRSNSRSNSRS

ERTNSRSERTERTERTERTERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

10/04/8510/22/8511/19/85

09/28/8510/14/8508/24/8511/27/8511/27/8511/27/8511/27/8510/03/8508/12/8510/22/8511/26/8511/26/85

** MILESTONE: 6 09/02/85IN-85-020-001 IMPROP INSTAL REDHDS NSRS/ERT 08/15/85 .T.** Subtotal **

/2// /11/21/85

/ /10/16/85

/ // // // // // // /

10/22/85

/ // /

/ /

DESIGNELECTRICALQA

CONSTRUCTIOPERATIONSOPERATIONSWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGWELDINGMECHANICALCONSTRUCTIOPERATIONSELECTRICALELECTRICAL

/ / CIVIL

** MILESTONE: 6 1ST REFUELIN-85-211-002 ERCW LINE NOT STAINL NSRSIN-85-234-001 REQUIRE FOR WELD ROD ERT** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE: 6 185-166WBNIN-86-145-002 CONCRETE LINING APAR NSRS** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE: 6 IN85-052008EX-85-021-001 INADEQUAT ACCOUNTABI ERT** Subtotal **

10/03/85 .F.11/27/85 .T.

10/03/85 .F.

11/27/85 .T.

MECHANICALWELDING

//

//

/ / MECHANICAL

/ / WELDING

MILESTONE:-85-021-002

N-85-426-002

6 IN85-113003VERIFI PROCESS/WELD ERTINADEQ WELD CERTIFIC ERT

09/26/85 .T.09/26/85 .T.

10/03/85 WELDING10/03/85 WELDING

DATEINVESTCLOSED

KEY

WORD

Page No.12/05/85



INVEST DATE SORG REPORT U

B

IN-85-815-001 CERTIFICATI OF WELDR ERTIN-85-835-002 WELDING CERTIFICATIO ERT** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE: 6 IN85-150001IN-86-167-001 NO TRACEABIL OF RODS ERT** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE: 6 IN85-352002IN-85-441-003 NO PORT WELD OVENS ERT** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE: 6 IN85-406001IN-85-445-002 UNAUT ACCS TO WLD SY ERTTN-85-458-007 CHNG OF WELD STATUS ERT

Subtotal **

09/26/85 .T.09/26/85 .T.

11/27/85 .T.

11/27/85 .T.

DATE ARESPONSE C

C

//

II

/ /

08/27/85 .T.08/27/85 .T.

DATEINVESTCLOSED

KEYWORD


/ / WELDING

/ / WELDING


** MILESTONE: 6 IN85-415002IN-85-196-004 INPROP INSTAL PIPINGIN-85-442-X12 LINING LOSS IN PIPEIN-85-589-001 LINER ON ERCW LINEIN-85-713-004 CONCRETE LIN IN PIPEIN-85-846-002 GOUT LINER/SAFTY HAZ** Subtotal **

NSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

10/11/8510/03/8510/03/8510/03/8510/03/85

10/16/85/ // // // /

MATERIALMECHANICALMECHANICALMECHANICALMECHANICAL

** MILESTONE:

EX-85-039-003EX-85-042-003IN-85-103-001IN-85-279-005IN-85-289-006IN-85-337-001IN-85-373-001IN-85-424-007IN-85-426-001IN-85-532-006IN-85-543-004IN-85-630-003-85-630-004

-85-915-002N-86-108-001

6 NO DATEDESIGN DEFICIENCYWELDERS REQUALIFICATIEB 79-02NO TRACKING SYSTEMVERMASCO APPL PREMATERCW LN W/CEMENT LINDAMAGED CABLELACK OF WELD ROD CONUNREQ PORT OVENSOVERSIZED WELDSDETERORIATE STEELERCW LINE IMPROP INSINADQ DOC FOR ERCWDRAWING CONTROLDRAWINGS NOT CURRENT

NSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSERTERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

11/07/8510/23/8508/09/8511/13/8511/27/8510/03/8506/28/8511/27/8511/27/8508/16/8507/29/8511/19/8511/19/8510/17/8511/01/85

/ // // // // ///I

07/25/85 T/ ///I/ /

09/26/85 T//1//i/ // /

/ /10/30/8508/09/8511/15/8511/29/85

/2/07/25/85/ /

/ // /

0 7/29/8 5/ // /

10/17/8511/04/85

DESIGNWELDINGDESIGNDESIGNELECTRICALMECHANICALELECTRICALWELDINGWELDINGHANGERSCONSTRUCTIMECHANICALMECHANICALDOCUMENTDOCUMENT

QTC NUMBER SUBJECT

Page No.

12/05/85




B

DATE ARESPONSE C

C

IN-86-110-001 INADQ ICE LOADINGIN-86-150-001 TRACEABILITY NOT ATTIN-86-190-003 ANCHOR NOT TEST INDIIN-86-199-001 CAB PULL/REQ PER QCIIN-86-201-001 CAB PULL LIMIT EXCEEIN-86-232-001 REPAIR ERCW VIOLATIN-86-259-001 FAILURE USE FUSE LININ-86-259-005 OVERFILLED CABLE TRAIN-86-259-Xll TVA PROC NO IEEE STDIN-86-262-002 OVERCROWDING CABLESIN-86-266-XO9 LACK OF COVERAGEIN-86-314-004 INADQ CABLE SEPARATIWI-85-040-001 NCR FOR ERCW LINEWI-85-040-002 INADQ PROC/INSP PLANWI-85-041-001 WELD MAT INADEQUATE** Subtotal **

NSRSERTNSRS/ERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSERT

10/25/8511/27/8510/24/8510/31/8510/31/8510/03/8510/31/8511/14/8511/14/8511/14/8510/31/8511/27/8511/19/8511/19/8511/27/85

10/30/85/ /

10/30/8511/04/8511/04/85

/0/11/04/85

/2// // /

11/04/8511/29/85

/ // // /

DESIGNWELDINGCIVILELECTRICALELECTRICALMECHANICALELECTRICALELECTRICALDESIGNELECTRICALELECTRICALELECTRICALMECHANICALMECHANICALWELDING

MILESTONE: 6 PH85-001002-85-119-001 IMPROPER LINE INSTAL ERT

** Subtotal **09/18/85 .T. 10/22/85 T 10/30/85 INSTRUMENT

** MILESTONE: 6 U2 FUEL LDIN-85-173-001 LEAK IN SPRINK SYSIN-85-189-002 ACCESS TO VALVES/#2IN-85-246-005 RUSTED WELDS/#2/RBIN-85-250-001 INSP PERF W/O WK RELIN-85-530-001 WLDS NOT ACCRD PROCDIN-85-615-001 OBSTRUCTED ACCESSIN-86-155-002 HANGER UNACCEP WELDS** Subtotal **

** MILESTONE:EX-85-008-001EX-85-009-001EX-85-010-002IN-85-021-001IN-85-032-001IN-85-091-001IN-85-130-001IN-85-277-001-85-411-001

-85-514o-00iIN-85-541-001

7 N/AUNQUAL SUBJOURNEYMENSUBSTN WK BY SUBJRMNUNQAUL SUBJOURNEYMENTUBE BENDERSPIPING CALCULATIONSLOST DOCUMENTATIONUNQUILIFIED PERSONNEINSTAL PIPE W/O DRWGSAFTY HAZ ON PLATFRMCONTAM DURING CUTTINREQ WELD ON 2 SIDES

ERTERTERTERTERTERTERTNSRSNSRSERTNSRS

09/28/8509/28/8509/28/8507/27/8511/26/8509/16/8509/28/8511/27/8507/23/8508/22/8508/15/85

/ // // /

10/22/85 T/ // // // /

08/09/85 T/ // /

/ // // /

10/30/8511/29/85

/ // /

11/29/8509/08/85

/1/08/ 15/8 5

CONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTIDESIGNDOCUMENTCONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTI

CONSTRUCTIDESIGN

DATEINVESTCLOSED

KEY

WORD

ERTNSRSERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

08/13/8510/04/8510/24/8511/27/8508/15/8510/04/8511/27/85

08/13/8510/04/85

/ /11/29/8508/15/8510/04/8511/29/85

MATERIALDESIGNWELDINGHANGERSWELDINGDESIGNWELDING

Page No.12/05/85




DATE ARESPONSE C

C?

IN-85-556-001 SUBJ DOING JOUR WORKIN-85-589-002 SUBJ DOING JOURN WRKIN-85-748-001 TIE-IN OF SEAL DRAINNS-85-002-001 BFN/SUPTS ON RHR SYSXX-85-001-001 SQN/D-G BATTERIESXX-85-013-001 SQN/WRONG WELD RODXX-85-019-001 BLN/AUDIT FINDINGSXX-85-051-001 SQN/RADIATION MONITOXX-85-052-001 SQN/INADQ DESIGN DOOXX-85-054-001 SQN/VIOLAT SIGN-OFFSXX-85-086-003 SQN/DESIGN DEFICIENCXX-85-093-003 BFN/INADQ TRAIN ENGIXX-85-096-004 VOID/XX-85-096-005XX-85-096-005 SQN/MONITOR TUBE PRO** Subtotal **

ERTERTERTERTNSRSERTERTNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRSNSRS

09/28/8509/28/8508/16/8510/12/8511/18/8508/22/8507/10/8511/26/8511/26/8511/26/8511/29/8511/29/8511/26/8511/26/86

/ // /

08/16/85/ // /

08/27/8507/10/85

/ /

/2/11/29/85

/2// /11/29/8511/29/85

CONSTRUCTICONSTRUCTIDESIGNOPERATIONSQA

QAOPERATIONSDESIGNQADESIGNOPERATIONSOPERATIONSOPERATIONS

*** Total *** 25

DATEINVESTCLOSED

KEYWORD

TVA 64 (OS-9-65) (OP-WP-5-85)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

emorandum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : W. C. Bibb, Site Director, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

FROM : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE :DEC 4 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-621-BFN

Subject TRAINING OF BROWNS FERRY SHIFT ENGINEERS AND ASSISTANT SHIFTENGINEERS ON ELECTRICAL STATION OPERATION

Concern No. XX-85-093-003

The attached report contains two Priority 3 [P3] recommendations which

require you'to take some form of investigative or corrective action

within the next four months (April 1, 1986). No formal response is

required for this report unless you disagree with the proposed action.

Please notify us if actions taken have been completed sooner. Should you

have any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone __

2277

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes No X

Director, NS S esignee

RCS:JTHAttachmentcc (Attachment):

R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-CB. C. Morris, BFND. R. Nichols, ElOA14 C-KQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantEric Sliger, LP6N48A-CW. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

n .... r, c, v _. v.. i^ - n ..... v.. -.... t.• n r.. it c ., : D i•

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-621-BFN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN NO. XX-85-093-003

SUBJECT: TRAINING OF BROWNS FERRY SHIFT ENGINEERS AND ASSISTANT SHIFTENGINEERS ON ELECTRICAL STATION OPERATION

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: OCTOBER 2-10, 1985

LEADINVESTIGATOR:

INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

N. T. HENRICH

C. L. BREEDING

R. C. SAUER

DA 4-DATE

DATE

DATE

DATEM. S. KIDD

I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted todetermine the validity of an expressed employee concern as receivedby Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT).The concern of record as summarized on the Employee Concern Assign-ment Request Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-093-003, stated:

"Browns Ferry: Shift engineers (SE) and assistant shiftengineers (ASE) are inadequately trained inelectricalstation operation (switchyard, offsite power feed, etc.)such that there could be an excessive delay in restoringoffsite power feed to the plant in the event of anemergency. C/I feels that SE/ASE personnel should receivebetter training in this area. The C/I has no furtherinformation."

II. SCOPE

A. The scope of this investigation was defined by the statedconcern of record and entailed investigating four issuesin order to either validate or refute the concern.

1. SEs are inadequately trained in electrical stationoperation.

2. ASEs are inadequately trained in electrical stationoperation.

3. As a result of inadequate SE/ASE training, excessivedelays in restoring offsite power feed to the plantcould result in the event of an emergency.

4. SEs and ASEs should receive better training in thisarea.

B. Documentation which delineates SE and ASE training re-quirements were reviewed. Typical duties of the SE andASE in switchyard operation were reviewed along withapplicable operating procedures. A review of the type,scope, and quantity of electrical training provided the SEand ASE was conducted. The investigation attempted todetermine the adequacy of this training based on Instituteof Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) guidelines and evidenceof problems with switchyard operation.

0046U

III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Requirements and Commitments

1. 10CFR55 (ref. 9) is the basic implementing regulationfor licensing reactor operators and senior reactoroperators. With Appendix A to lOCFR55, "Requalifica-tion Programs for Licensed Operators of Production andUtiliziation Facilities," this regulation establishesthe basic requirements and the regulatory basis forlicensing operators.

2. Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Commission (NRC)Regulatory Guide 1.8 Ri (1975), "Personnel Selectionand Training" as committed by TVA in TVA TopicalReport Table 17D-3 endorses industry standard A1NSI/AJNS3.1-1981, "Selection, Qualification, and Training ofPersonnel f or Nuclear Power Plants," which estab-lishes the criteria for the selection, qualification,and training of personnel for stationary nuclear powerplants.

3. NUREG-1021 (ref. 10), "Operator Licensing ExaminerStandards," provides guidance and establishesprocedures and practices for examining and licensingof applicants for NRC operator licenses. Thisdocument endorses ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981.

4. Area Plan Program Procedure 0202.05 (ref. 6), "NuclearPlant Operator Training Program," summarizes andconsolidates training requirements for all nuclearoperating personnel.

B. Findings

1.01CFR55 establishes the procedures and criteria forissuance of reactor operating licenses to operators ofnuclear facilities including senior reactor operators(shift engineers and assistant shift engineers). Inorder to obtain a license as a reactor operator orsenior reactor operator, the candidate must demon-strate an understanding of the design and operation ofthe Browns Ferry facility including auxiliary systemswhich affect it (switchyard and offsite powersupplies).

0046U

2. ANSI/ANS Standard 3.1-1981 (ref. 11) has been adoptedby the NRC and committed to by TVA and identifiestraining requirements for reactor operators and seniorreactor operators to be licensed by the NRC. Section5.2 of this standard requires plant specific systeminstruction on power plant systems including elec-trical systems. In addition, it also specifies thecontent of required nuclear power plant fundamentalstraining which includes fundamentals of: electricaltheory.

3. NUREG-1021 (ref. 10) provides guidance to NRCexaminers in determining the qualifications of anapplicant for reactor operator and senior reactoroperator licenses. Section ES-402 category 6specifies that the candidate be able to reproduce frommemory sketches and descriptions of various plantsystems including electrical-distribution systems andtheir mechanical components (in plant andswitchyard). The candidate must also be able todiscuss the design intent, construction, operation,and interrelationships of those systems on nuclearpower plant operation and reactor safety.

4. NUREG-1021 (ref. 10) Section ES-502 specifies controlmanipulations and plant evolutions for which anapplicant for a SRO license must demonstrateproficiency. control manipulations not performed atthe plant may be performed on a simulator. one of thespecified plant evolutions is a response to loss ofelectrical power and/or degraded power sources. ForBrowns Ferry an individual's performance during theseevolutions can be evaluated using the Browns FerryNuclear Plant simulator which meets the intent of NRCRegulatory Guide 1.149 (ref. 14) and ANS 3.5 (ref. 15)on power plant simulators.

5. A comprehensive operator training program has beendeveloped and implemented to ensure that Browns Ferryreactor operators and senior reactor operations meetthe qualifications and training requirementsestablished or endorsed by the NRC. This trainingprogram is described in Nuclear Power ProgramProcedure 0202.05 (ref. 6), revised March 15, 1985,entitled "Nuclear Plant Operator Training Program."

6. The electrical training program for nuclear operatorsis presented in four steps in Nuclear Power ProgramProcedure 0202.05 (ref. 6).

0046U

a. Step 1 is a 13-week program on basic electricaltheory and equipment. It is presented during theNuclear Plant Operator Training Program (NOTP)during the student level II phase (prior totraining for reactor operator or senior reactoroperator). All ASEs and SEs must have had thistraining or its equivalent.

b. Step 2A is a 2-week inplant electrical trainingprogram on plant electrical systems (onsite andoffsite) presented during the student level IIIphase. All ASEs and SEs must have had thistraining or its equivalent.

c. Step 2B is defined as unit operator upgradeelectrical training and is a 4-week program ofin-plant training on plant electrical systems andstation service. All ASEs and SEs must havesuccessfully completed this training or itsequivalent.

d. Step 3 is a 6-week ASE upgrade electrical trainingprogram required prior to taking the accreditingexamination for ASE. All ASEs and SEs must havesucessfully completed this training or itsequivalent. This training addresses both offsiteand onsite electrical systems.

Attachment 1 to this report provides an outlinedefining course content for each of these electricaltraining programs.

7. INPO has published a recommended qualification programfor control room operators, senior control roomoperators, shift engineers, and supervisors at BoilingWater Reactors (BWRs). This guideline was publishedin June 1985 as INPO publication INPO 85-025 (ref.3). It provided specific recommendations for SROqualification training programs.

8. Browns Ferry has committed to implement an SROoperator training program which fully meets theseguidelines and have this program accredited by INPOand in place by April 1986. The accreditation processentails (1) a utility self-evaluation report, which isscheduled for submittal to INPO in December 1985 forBrowns Ferry Operator Training and (2) an INPO onsiteevaluation of this training program which isanticipated to be complete by April 1986.

0046U

9. As part of the accreditation process, all duties andresponsibilties of the ASE and SE positions have beenidentified and evaluated against INPO guidelines forjob and task analysis. Procedures for doing this wereset forth in 1983 as INPO publications 83-008 (ref. 1)and 83-009 (ref. 2). In accordance with theseprocedures, high training priority (HTP) tasks wereidentified for the ASE/SE positions at Browns Ferryrelated to switchyard operation. Attachment 2 is alisting of those tasks.

10. The content of the operator training program outlinedin program procedure 0202.05 (ref. 6) is currentlybeing evaluated to ensure training for the HTP tasksexists and is adequate using INPO's methodology in atraining to task matrix. This is being done forBrowns Ferry SE and ASE positions and must becompleted as part of the self-evaluation report.

11. If any HTP task is not addressed by the existingoperator training program or if existing training isnot adequate for a HTP task, then a task analysis mustbe performed on that task. This identifies theknowledge and skills necessary to perform the task andthe operator training program must be modified toaddress this task. This process is outlined in INPOpublications 83-008 (ref. 1) and 83-009 (ref. 2).

12. Activities identified in paragraphs III.B.9 - III.B.11are scheduled for completion by December 1985.

13. The existing operator training programs for ASEs andSEs at Browns Ferry include instructions on thefollowing subjects as part of unit operator or ASEupgrade electrical training.

* Offsite power for the 500-kV system* Offsite power from the 161-kV system* Protective relaying* Spanning out line breakers using PSO switchyard

prints* 161-kV capacitor banks* Delle and General Electric power circuit breakers* Readings and checks on PCBs on switchyard

inspections* Switchyard clearance procedures* Transmission line protection0 Protective relays

5 0046U

14. A HPT task to existing training matrix had not been com-pleted as of this investigation. However, a cursory lookat these tasks reveals that at least a portion of themappear to be covered by existing lesson plans. It shouldbe noted that the Nuclear Power Operator Training Programoutlined in program procedure 0202.05 Cref. 6) isapplicable to all of TVA's nuclear generating stations.The existing operator training program~appears to implementrecommended INPO guidelines as evidenced by the fact thatthe Sequoyah Nuclear Plant operator training program hasalready been accredited-by INPO. Browns Ferry's operatortraining program is similar although each program is plantspecific.

15. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Operations Section InstructionLetter (OSIL) No. 41 (ref. 4) entitled, "SwitchyardOperations Procedures - Station No. 6055," containsprocedures developed by the Division of Power SystemsOperation for switchyard operations assigned to the BrownsFerry Operations Section. These procedures includeadditional Browns Ferry operating instructions related toswitchyard operations. Attachment 3 is an index of theseprocedures and instructions.

16. The routine procedure for switchyard operations is asfollows:

a. Switching operations are under the jurisdiction of theWilson Load Dispatcher.

b. The Browns Ferry ASE must contact the load dispatcherprior to any operation and obtain step-by-stepinstructions for the operation.

c. The ASE must repeat these instructions to the loaddispatcher to confirm that they were copied correctly.

17. If communication with the load dispatcher cannot beestablished, procedures in OSIL-41 (ref. 4) are availableto the ASE and SE in the units 1 and 2 main control roomsand in the shift engineer's office.

18. The investigation did not identify any specific examples ofproblems with switchyard operation as a result ofinadequately trained ASEs or SEs. This was based ondiscussions with cognizant PSO personnel. However, apotential problem exists with ASE availability when PS0needs a switching operation. This delay can adverselyaffect operation of the TVA power system. The termemergency in the concerns of record refers to power systememergency.

0046U

19. Browns Ferry is designed to be shutdown safely andmaintained in a safe shutdown condition in the event of aloss of all offsite power.

IV. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMHENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

The concern of record is not substantiated'because:

1. The ASEs and SEs electrical training program is designed togive them the knowledge and skills needed to meet the NRC'srequirements for an SRO license. This includes training onoffsite power supplies and switchyard operations.

2. The existing electrical training program appears to beadequate since:

a. Browns Ferry has been able to license ASEs and SEs assenior reactor operators and

b. No specific examples of faulty switchyard operations dueto inadequately trained ASEs and SEs were uncovered.

B. Recommendafions

1. R-85-621-BFN-01, Evaluation of BFN Operator TrainingProgram to INPO Guidelines

Although the concern over ASEs' and SEs' training could notbe substantiated, it is recommended that Browns Ferryproceed to evaluate the operator training program againstINPO guidelines under the plant's current commitmentschedule. Modifications and upgrades to existing trainingshould be made so as to receive INPO accreditation of theprogram in 1986. The training program should be evaluatedto ensure the ASEs and SEs are not just trained in the useof PSO switchyard operating procedures but that they gainan understanding of what they are doing in any givenoperation. NSRS will track this commitment-related itemfor further followup. [P3]

2. R-85-621-BFN-02, ASE Availability for Switching operations

It should be noted that the investigation identified thefact that ASEs availability when needed by PSO is a problemarea which can result in delayed switching operations.This is not related to ASE and SE training and was notaddressed further by this investigation. Plant managementshould evaluate this concern and take appropriatecorrective action. NSRS will evaluate further in afollow-up review of this concern. [P3]

0046U

ATTACHMENT 1

SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATOR ELECTRICAL TRAINING

I. Step 1 - Basic Electrical Theory and Equipment Training - 13 weeks

a. Basic electrical theory

b. Print reading

c. Components

d. Electrical safety

e. DC circuits

f. DC equipment

g. AC principles

h. AC equipment

i. Transformers

j. Batteries

k. Solid-state electrical theory

i. Instrumentation

m. Low-voltage AC systems

n. Relays

o. Plant systems

p. Offsite power

II. Step 2A - In-Plant Electrical Systems Training - 2 weeks

a. Offsite power supplies

1. Common station service transformers2. Start buses3. 6.9-kV (4.16-kV), 480-V common boards

b. Unit boards (6.9-kV, 4.16-kV, 480-V)

c. Shutdown boards (6.9-kV, 4.16-kV, 480-V)

d. Diesel generators

0046U

e. Batteries and chargers

f. Plant 250-V DC systems

g. Emergency lighting

h. Plant 120-V AC systems (preferred and nonpreferred power)

i. Plant 125-V DC systems

j. Plant computer power systems, vital and nonvital instrument powersystems

III. Step 2B - Unit Operator Upgrade Electrical Training - 4 weeks

a. Main generator

b. Main single line to pneumatic circuit breakers

c. Station service single line

d. Station service boards

e. Circuit breakers

f. Transformers

g. Station 120-Volt AC systems

h. Station batteries

i. Plant communication systems

j. Annunciator systems

k. Diesel generators

1. Miscellaneous plant systems and components

m. Operation of motors and generators

n. Plant clearance procedure

o. Plant operating instructions

p. Technical specifications for plant electrical systems

q. Electrical system safety

r. Control room operation of plant electrical systems9 0046U

IV. Step 3 - ASE Upgrade Electrical Training -6 weeks

a. Main single line

b. Main transformers

C. Circuit breakers

d. Motor-operated disconnects

e. Relay protection

f. Instrumentation and control

g. In-plant low voltage (AC) systems

h. Plant battery (DC) systems

i.. Plant lighting systems

j. Procedures

k. Communications

1. Transformer and switchyard safety

0046U

ATTACHMENT 2

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

HIGH TRAINING PRIORITY ELECTRICAL TASKS

INPO JOB ANDTASK ANALYSIS NO.

262005010226200601022620090102

2620170102262019010226202001022620210102

2620020202

26200302022620080202

2620100202

262011020226201202022630010102

26300301022630180102

3410110302

3420040302

3420050302

TASK DESCRIPTION

Monitor the AC electrical distribution systemDeenergize a motor control center bus to serviceBackfeed unit auxiliary transformer from maintransmission switchyard (main turbine generatorlinks removed)Perform ground isolationRack IN/OUT a high voltage bus breakerManually operate theelectrical disconnectsPerform switching orders in switchyards/transformer yardPerform circuit or equipment grounding usingmanual devicesPerform equipment/bus testing for ground faultsPerform operation of circuit breakers anddisconnectsPerform circuit or equipment grounding usingbuilt-in devicesPerform switchyard checksPerform switchyard relay checksStart up a battery charger in the capaciterbanksShift battery chargers in the capaciter banksOperate the cooling tower subsystem in differentmodes (electrical portion done in theswitchyard)Approve jumper and lifted lead removal/placementReview tagging (equipment removal andrestoration requests for plant equipment)Authorize hanging and clearing of tags on plantequipment

0046U

ATTACHMENT 3

SWITCHYARD MANUAL - STATION NO. 6055INDEX OF PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS

TAB

1. Capacitor Discharge and Visual Confirmation of MOD & PCB Operationfor Clearances

2. Clearance Procedure--General - Switching, Clearance, Grounding, andOperating Letter No. 7

3. Communication Room Alarms

4. Emergency Plan for the Power System Control Center (PSCC)

5. General for Generating Plants

6. Oil Circuit Breaker General Information--161-kV

7. Offsite Power Loss Due to Severe Weather

8. Oscillograph Operation

9. Power Circuit Breaker--General Information--500-kV

10. Potential Transformer Ferroresonance

11. State Relay Operation and Target Report

12. Switching Operation in 161-kV and 500-kV Switchyards

13. Switchyard Emergency Procedure--161-kV

14. Switchyard Emergency Procedure--500-kV

15. Switchyard--Reenergizing Switchyard or Lines from Remote Source

16. System Interruption--General Procedure for Partial or Total SystemInterruption

17. Transfer Trip Tests

18. Transformer Cooling and Temperature Limitations (Thermal ProtectiveDevices)

19. Voltage Control:

a. Abnormal and Normal Voltage Conditions, Generator ReactivePower-,-Offsite Power Supplies, and Grid Requirements

b. Capacitor Banks--161-kV

c. Unit Station Service Transformer 'B'12 0046U

'V

SECTION III - DIVISION PROCEDURE MANUAL

N-7202 - 1/14/72:Procedures for energizing 500-kV transformers

N-7301 - 1/29/73:Reenergizing switchyards from a remote source

N-7306 - 3/7/73:161-kV and 500-kV air blast circuit breaker clearances

N-7401 - 3/13/74:General procedure for total or partial system interruption

BF7505 - 11/11/75:500-kV main transformers

N-72A14 - 5/12/72:Nuclear plants - materials, components, or spare parts procurement

N-73010 - 6/14/73:Visual confirmation of MOD and PCB operation

N-73017 - 4/8/80:Static relay target report

N-73019 - 11/14/73:Retention of protective tags

BF74013 - 9/29/78:500-kV switchyard operating procedure - BFNP

N73014 - 7/31/73:Power transformer thermal protective devices

SECTION IV - GENERAL INFORMATION

A. General for generating plants

B. Operating procedure letter No. 7

C. Main transformer cooling

D. Potential transformer ferroresonance in high voltage substations

E. Capacitor bank information

F. Offsite power supply - Grid requirements

G. Oscillograph No. 1 changes

0046U

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTIGATION I-85-621-BFNAND REFERENCES

1. INPO Publication 83-008, "Job and Task Analysis Retrieval Manual,"dated May 1984

2. INPO Publication 83-009, "Job and Task Analysis Procedures Manual,"dated May 1984

3. INPO Publication 83-025, "BWR Control Room Operator, Senior ControlRoom Operator and Shift Supervisor Qualifications," dated June1985

4. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Operations Section Instruction Letter(OSIL) No. 41, "Switchyard Operations Procedures - Station No.6055," dated September 24, 1984

5. Browns Ferry Operating Instruction 01-57, "Unit Electrical BoardChecklist," dated June 6, 1985

6. Area Plan Program Procedure 0202.05, "Nuclear Plant OperatorTraining Program," revised March 15, 1985

7. Browns Ferry FSAR, Section 8, "Electrical Power Systems," revised byAmendment 3 dated August 21, 1985

8. Browns Ferry Technical Specifications revised October 15, 1985

9. 10CFR55, "Operators Licenses," dated May 31, 1984

10. NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," dated October1983

11. ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981, "Selection, Qualification and Training ofPersonnel for Nuclear Power Plants," dated December 17, 1981

12. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training,"revision 1-R, dated September 1975, reissued May 1977

13. Miscellaneous TVA correspondence related to Operator TrainingAccreditation Program

14. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.149, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators forUse in Operator Training," dated April 1981

15. ANS 3.5-1981, "Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in OperatorTraining," dated April 13, 1981

16. TVA Topical Report, TVA-TR75-1, "Quality Assurance Program Descrip-tion for Design, Construction, and Operation," Revision 8

0046U

TVA 64 (OS-9-65) (OPTWP-5-85)



TO : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant


DATE : BEC 4 1g98SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. 1-85-558-SQN

Subject POTENTIAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVING AND REPLACINGSTEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY MANWAY COVERS


The attached report contains one Priority 3 [P3] recommendation which

requires you to take some form of investigative or corrective action

within the next four months (April 1, 1986). No formal response is

required for this report unless you disagree with the proposed action.

Please notify us if actions taken have been completed sooner. Should you

have any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone __

2277


Director, NSkS

RCS:JTH

Attachmentcc (Attachment):

R. P. Denise, LP6N35A-CB. C. Morris, BFND. R. Nichols, ElOA14 C-KQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantEric Sliger, LP6N48A-CW. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

.39U

n .... r C



NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-558-SQN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN: XX-85-052-001

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH REMOVING AND REPLACINGSTEAM GENERATOR PRIMARY MANWAY COVERS


INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

'2

M. W. ALEXANDER

R. C. SAUER

DATE

DATE

DATEAPPROVED BY:

M. S. KI]

I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted todetermine the validity of an expressed employee concern as received byQuality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT). Theconcern of record, as summarized on the Employee Concern AssignmentRequest Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-052-001, stated:

"Sequoyah - Manway'door at the bottom of steam generator takesapproximately 20 minutes to open and 3-4 hours to close due tocomplicated process necessitated by poor design. If a comealongslips, it is most likely that personnel would be pinned between theswing-arm and hand rail. There are 5 rems/hour escaping while thisdoor is open. A way to open/close this door must be found thatwould take only 20 minutes total."

II. SCOPE

A. The scope of the investigation was determined from the concern ofrecord to be that of four specific issues requiring investigation.

1. Closing the steam generator primary manway cover takesapproximately 3-4 hours.

2. If a hoist were to slip, it is possible that personnel could bepinned between the swing-arm and hand rail.

3. Radiation levels of 5 Rem/hour are present at the open manways.

4. A way to open and close the manway covers must be found thatwould take only 20 minutes total.

B. The investigation required interviewing plant personnel who weredirectly involved in the industrial safety, health physics,technical services, and operational aspects of primary side steam4enerator opening and closing. Plant and vendor procedures werealso reviewed for similarity comparisons in the steam generatoropening and closing process.



1. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, "Standards forProtection Against Radiation."

2. TVA Code VIII, "Occupational Radiation Exposure."

3. Westinghouse Technical Manual 1440-C228, September 1971,"Vertical Steam Generators for Tennessee Valley AuthoritySequoyah Nuclear Plant."

0037T

B. Findings

I. The Sequoyah steam generator primary manway cover handlingsystem was designed by Westinghouse and is similar to that foundon other Westinghouse plants of Sequoyah vintage. Removal isaccomplished by attaching a swing-arm assembly to the cover andlowering the cover by means of a hoisting device (come-along).Reinstallation is the reverse sequence with manual torquing ofhold-down bolts. The manway covers weigh about 650 pounds each,and the work space is somewhat limited. Plant procedures forthe removal and reinstallation of the covers are provided inMaintenance Instruction (MI) -3.1 (ref. 1) and are based onWestinghouse Technical Manual 1440-C228. During the U2C2refueling outage recorded closing times were approximately 24hours per generator (2 manway covers). This included sealingsurface preparation and inspection and other activities inaddition to bolt torquing.

2. MI-3.1 includes safety precautions to be observed duringhandling of the manway covers. Personnel involved in openingand closing the steam generators are briefed on these proceduresand are made aware of the safety aspects of this activity priorto beginning work.

3. During the recent Environmental Qualification (UlC3) outage, theunit 1 steam generators were opened for eddy current testing andtube plugging. Radiation levels inside the primary heads weremeasured to be 15-25 R/hr. At the manway openings, levels were4-10 R/hr; and in work areas outside the primary heads,radiation levels were 500 MR/hr and less. MI-3.1 containsseveral cautionary notes which emphasize the need to minimizepersonnel exposure at all times. Prejob ALARA plans are alsoprepared for each primary side entry to identify exposureestimates and any special health physics controls that may berequired. All work in this area is controlled by a RadiationWork Permit (RWP). Each employee is assigned an allowable worktime and must leave the area when his time expires. Healthphysics personnel are on duty continuously to monitor personneland working conditions. There have been no recorded incidencesof radiation over-exposure during primary side work. Plantprocedures RCI-1 (ref. 6) and IP-15 (ref. 7) specify that if,for any reason, an employee were to become incapacitated whileparticipating in steam generator primary side work, an emergencysituation would be declared and the employee's safety would takeimmediate precedence over all other activities and requirements.

0037T

4. During the recent unit 1 steam generator entry, an improvedmanway cover closing technique was introduced by plantmaintenance personnel. To resolve previously experiencedmechanical problems (galling of bolt threads and difficulty inachieving proper bolt torque) and reduce the time required toclose the inanways a new hydraulic torque wrench and speciallyhardened steel washers for the bolts were used. The hydraulictorque wrench is much faster than previous manual boltingtechniques and the hardened steel washers reduce torquingfriction between the bolts and covers.', Maintenance recordsindicate closing times were reduced considerably (11-19 hours.per generator) over past experience (24 hours per generator)resulting in reduced personnel exposure. This technique isplanned for use on all future manway cover handling operations.

5. The Sequoyah Site Services group is investigating furtherimprovements in cover handling techniques. Several studtensioning devices especially tailored for application to steamgenerator manway covers are now available. They involve thereplacement of the cover bolts with studs and nuts which aredesigned to fit a stud tensioner. Reports indicate thesedevices could further improve opening and closing times andsolve other technical problems that have been experienced.Studies are underway at Sequoyah and Watts Bar to determine thebest approach for TVA application. Site Services has maderecommendations to plant management on this new concept (ref.2). A final decision has not been made.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

The concern of record was substantiated based only on the issuesraised, not on any technical or administrative deficiencies.

J.Plant maintenance records indicate that closing operations havehistorically taken aproximately 12 hours for each manway cover.

2. Safety hazards are present during manway cover handlingactivities. However, these are appropriately emphasized inplant procedures and personnel training. Involved personnelshould be aware of them and take the necessary precautions toprevent possible injury. If, for any reason, an employee wereto become incapacitated while participating in steam generatorprimary side work, an emergency situation would be declared andthe employee's safety would take immediate precedence over allother activities and requirements.

0037T

3. Radiation surveys taken during the recent U1C3 steam generatorwork show levels in the range of 4-10 R/hr at the manwayopenings. However, it is recognized by plant personnel thathigh radiation levels exist in the vicinity of the steamgenerator primary heads. From reviewing plant maintenanceprocedures and prejob ALARA planning documents and interviewingmaintenance and health physics personnel, it appears that anappropriate level of attention has been given the health physicsaspects of working in this area.

4. Manway closing time is excessive; however, thethe need to improve manway handling operationsmade some improvements to reduce closing time.recently in the UIC3 steam generator work. Inplant has underway studies which could furtheroperations.

plant recognizesand has alreadyThese were used

addition theimprove these

B. Recommendations

1. I-85-558-SQN-01, Plant Evaluation of Improved S/G Primary ManwayCover Handling Fixtures

The plant should complete the evaluation of proposed new manwaycover tensioning systems that is underway and make a decision asto what new equipment, if.any, will be purchased. This is anNSRS tracking item only. (P3]

0037T

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTIGATION I-85-558-SQNAND REFERENCES

1. Maintenance Instruction 3.1, Revision 15, "Removal and Installation ofSteam Generator Primary Manway Cover."

2. Undated notes, "Proposed Project for Replacement of Steam GeneratorPrimary Manway Bolts with Studs and Nuts and Tensioning System,"prepared by Mike Hodge (Site Services) and used in June 1985presentation to site management.

3. Prejob ALARA Planning Report No. 85-063, dated September 2, 1985, coveringeddy current testing of unit 1 steam generator during the recentoutage.

4. Westinghouse Technical Manual 1440-C228, September 1971, "Vertical SteamGenerator for Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant."

5. TVA Radiation Protection Plan, Section A, "Nuclear Power Plants," datedAugust 18, 1983.

6. Sequoyah Radiological Control Instruction (RCI)-1, Revision 27, datedSeptember 12, 1985.

7. Sequoyah Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) Implementing ProceduresL Document (IP)-15, Revision 4, December 27, 1984.

0037T

TVA 64 (OS-9-65) (OP-WP-5-85)



TO : E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant


DATE : DEC 3 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. I-85-478-WBN

Subject UNAPPROVED USE OF UNISTRUT HANGERS/SYS 43/SAMPLING & WATER QUALITY

Concern No. IN-85-845-002

and associated recommendations for your action/disposition.

It is requested that you respond to this report and the attached

recommendations by December 23, 1985 Should you have any

questions, please contact M. A. Koltowich at telephone 3700-WBN

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes X No

Director, NSRS/Designee

MAK:JTHAttachmentcc (Attachment):

H. N. Culver, W12AI9 C-KQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantW. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------

--Copy and Return--

To : K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

From:

Date:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-478-WBNSubject UNAPPROVED USE OF UNISTRUT HANGERS/SYS 43/SAMPLING AND WATERQUALITY for action/disposition.

Signature Date

N=UCEAR AEI F REV EW ST AFF

ESPLOYEE T CNCERN I N-0-..-4-1"42

MILETCNE 2 - RT :A.4.TY

NAPF'ROVE:J3E CF LUISTRUT MA EU: ThN .EETITEM 43,VA1PLING AND 1A 'TER-UL:T

JLiON : , 1 -m-t -c er 3 1 . ! 8

LEAtD VNYEST IGT*.f

5EET r TOR:

-. J. - k s-er

* r-, I

Harrison

D t

IDat~

B ACGON

NSRS has invetigated emolovae cncern !N8-4-0 which the Qual~ityTechno.ly .. .(OTC) ietified during the Watts B:ar EmnloveeConcern Program. The acncern is worded:

Quest ionbe hanger- design an system 47 (Sampling).Unistrut is usaz and not uniqul identified. Fastener.sthat- secure tubing to hanger have na guides ins tal ledand existi:.ng amndition will not work und.-F operation.-Dw, 47.,.... ,Mere is no mention of Luni - trut. There

is rno d.cumentatin to support the u~se of L.iF trutte.nstr-uctio-n debt. concern.

*Note: .w. 47WA050 is beli ee to be 47A.CE.. The "W" and "A'"designations are drawing .izes only.

The scm investigation was dtrmine the d cncerncover the -ollowing. five () i tems for =t _43:

(1) Un-strut usec as su ocrt/hanrer material is not uniquely,, idcuentified.

(2) Fastener-s securing tubing to hangurs,"uport- do nIt have guidesinstaled.

(3) Due to (2) above, the e:istin c...ofiguratin will not work pr.erlyduring plant oneratton.

(4) Drawing 47•C5• dCes nt cmver the use of uni 'trut.

5). No documentation eists approving or supporting the use cf unistrut.

The investigaticn results contained in this re.crt are given for eachitem above.

During the investigation NERS merformed the following activities.

A. Review of Office of Construction (OC) WBN plant procedures including:

1. WN-OCI- 1.2, R6. "°remaration and Documentation of SeismicSuDocrt Variance"

2. W. ..-OCI-.. .R4, isemizally' Qualified InstrumentationSuamcrts"'

3. WBN-.CI-7.T.I-i. '4, "Seismically Qualified Instrument Supportsand Instrumentation Lines"

4. W.N-C.-... 11. PI1 and R14. "Insoection and Documentation ofInstrument Line Sending and Supports"

5. WBN-CCP-. :1-1. R6, "Inspection and Documentation cfInstrumentation Supports''

6. WBN-QCF-Z. 112.- P, "Inspection and Documentation of InstrumentLi nes"

rB FReview -f TV'A'• commitments and reouirements including:

1. 1,CFR50- - ---- B, "Qu: it;. . ssu.... Criter.ia for N-u-learFPwer Plants and Fuel 1 .:m •s _ Plants''

ANI4.2, -C Program ReqiAlrements for Nuclear5 Power Plants"

.TVT75-1,Ž RS, TVA Tzoicail s-ort. paragraph 17.1.8, Table17D-2. Table 17B-4

4. Final. Safety A-nal'ysis Reoort "WBN) Section 3.., "ei ofCategory I Structures;" Section 3.10, "Seismic Designn ofCategory I instrumentation and Electrical Equipment''

f. .C Quai:ty A-ssurance PFrogram Policy (-APPF') 8. "Identificationand Control of items"

6. TV.A General Construc-ti•on• S.-ea c ifcat im=n 6--e-4,, "S.uccort- and.nstallatimn of PiFino Systems in Cateoorv 1 Structures"

7. TvY. Construction Soecififcation N•C-.12. . "Suoport andinstal-lation of F'iming Systems in Categor'y I Structures"

S. TVA Construction Soacification N2:G-281. "Identification ofStr..-ure-=. v-atem, and Components Covered by the Watts BarNuclear Plant Quality Assurance Prooram"

9. TVA Nuclear- C.omonent-s Manual (NCM). Section 3.7, "MaterialControl and Identification;'" -acti on 4.1. "P,-c Control -WBN:" Section I .2. "Nonconforming items and Activities"

C. Interviews with sits personnel associated with instrumentation

system desion and installation practices.

D. Review of documentation/drawing incl udig:

1. CEB-75-9, "Sequovah and Watts Bar Nuclear Plants - Design Datafor Supocrt of Category I Stainless Steel and Cooper Tubing"(RIMS CEB 830907 003)

2. Memorandum from R. 0. Barnett to J. C. Standifer dated 9/26/83."Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - CONST Application of47A05.1. Instrument Sensing Lines: 47•,5.. Instrument SamplingLines; and 47AO54. Control •Air Line Drawings - StandaloneQuality Information (RIMS CEB 930926 014)

Z WBEF •SD ED- Design Guideline No. 12. "Instrument Support LoadEvaluation and Design Qualification Requirements (Pipes)''

4. TVA Contract 75C55-79305. Unistrut Channel and Accessories

5. TVA Contract 77K71-545253. Unistrut Channel and Acssories

6. 27 "Installation Operation Sheets (IOSs)," Test 52(W•N-QCP--. 1, WBN-QCP-.. 11-2)

7. 3. ystem 4_3 WEN CC isometr-ic Drawings

S. Noconforming Consition Report (NCR) No. 6~22E3

C?. TVA 47AOtCO Hanger Drawing General Notes

IC0. TVA 47AO51 Typical Drawings Seismic Category I SupportInstrument S~ensing Lines

!I. TVA Drawing~s 47W625-3 and 47W625-31

E. Observation of field conditi.ons.

II.SUMiMARY CF FINDINGS

The results for each concern item listed in section !I of this reportare discutssed below.

A,. Concern item (1) regarding unistrut used as hanger/support materialnot being u~niquely identified was substantiated. During a partialwalkdown of system 43. by NSRS. it was noted that not all Unit 1-unistrUt supports are utniquely identified. Neither the supports northe material parts are uniquely identified. The majority of thesesupports bear- the Fabrication Operation Sheet (FOS) number only.Interviews with Employee A, the review of several system 43Zisometric drawings, and review of OC WON plant procedures indicatethat up to 100 l!Ake supports may be fabricated using one FQS. itwas also indicated that the FQS numbers appearing on the supportsare depicted on the isometric drawings. The review of theisometrics showed instances of multiple use of one FOS number. Assome Unit 1 and all Unit 2 uni strut supports for system 4j. werepresently being uniquely identified in accordance with recentlyrevised WON site procedures, the problem appears to be applicable toUnit I.. in addition, the isometrics showed subassembly elements;e.g., supports, lines, panels, but did not reflect actual fieldconditions such as locations of supports, distances betweensupports, and lengths of instrument lines. These lines were fieldrouted, and actual line routings were not shown on OE drawings. OEdiesignated the start points, termination points, and penetrationsonly. This situation applies to both Units 1 and 2.

Further review of TVA procedures, commitments, and requirementsindicates that the requtirement to uniquely identify non-ASME,seismic safety-related supports was not adequately implemented inTVA documents. (See the "Conclusions and Recommendations" sectionof this report.) The requirements concerning materialidentification are as follow:

1.. 10CFR50 Appendix~ 2, Criterion VIII, requtires that "measuresshall be established for the identification and control ofmaterials, parts, and components, including partially fabricatedassemblies. These measures shall assure that identification ofthe item is mnaintained . . . either on the item or recordstraceable to the item, as required through fabrication,erection, installation, and use of the item.

Four A4) items were not substantiated and one (1) item was substanti atedas previously di scussed. Numerous hangers/supports used for Unit 1system 43. applications are not uniquely identified. As other Unit 1isystems using instrumentation lines (e.g., system 30, ventilatino) wereWinstalled in accordance with the same procedures as system 43., theproblems noted are considered generic for the plant.

The issues oi not uniquely identitying instrumentation supports (Uirt 1)_andi n.t rovidig ulni strut Summort material traceability (t Untsand 2) snould be evaluated through the NCR process by CC and CE tojustify equi valence to the FSAR commitments. This evaluaticon shouldinclude the following as a minimum:

A. Addressing -FF'C50 Appendix 8 and ANSI N45. 2 requirements regardingmaterial identification (see Section III.A of this report) in TVApolicies an-d sit smecific procedures. This assessment should

luetraceabil-it of the reCLuiremenes from the higher tierdocuments down .• the lower tier imolementing procedures.

B. The inability to trace material to the point of installation and usesm•uld a IOCFF50 Part 21 notice be received. TVA contracts-7=rE-.",- and 7M , -54 .=5 recuire Certificates of COmpiiance only.

C. The iff•,culty in relating specific hardware-item location in thefield to the as-constructed drawings (isometrics) and inspection MArecords (IO~s). This affects the ability to readily identify andlocate nonconforming conditions in the field while the plant is inaoeration.

E. E-eeric a.plicali ty to other plant systems that use non-S•S.E.seismic safety-related supports. This evaluation should addressunistrut material traceability plant-wide and unicue identificationof instrumentation sumoorts for all Seismic Categorv 1 systems.

TVA 64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7.84)


Memorandum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



DATE : NOV29 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL


Subject FALSIFICATION OF OC INSPECTION RECORDS





questions, please contact T. 0. Frizzell at telephone 3651-WBN


r o, NSRS/Designee

TPF:JTHAttachmentcc (Attachment):

R. C. Parker, LP4N44A-CQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantW. H. Thompson, E12B15 C-K--Re: I-85-522-WBN-04W. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--Copy and Return--


From:

Date:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-522-WBNSubject FALSIFICATION OF QC INSPECTION RECORDS foraction/disposition.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITV


NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-647522-WBN

EMFLOYEE CONCERN ,N.r-8-.-005

MILESTO•Ei 1

SUBJECT: FALSIFICATION OF OC INSPECTION RECORDS

DATES OF !N •ESTIC-- TION: : c......... .... ..

INVESTIGATOR:

~Eww BY:

APPROVED BY:

~\ •. z.a.S5Date

0.0

AC: GROUND

NSRS has investigate. Employee Concern iE - ...... hih wa,-communicated to the Quality Techno.oqy Company (QTC) in response to theWatts Bar Employee Concern Frogram. The specific concern reviewed anddiscussed in this report was exPressed by YTC to the NSR a'R fol lows:

Management (department known) allows inspectors (namesknown) to do anything they want. To make this pointclear, the concerned individual states these inspectorsfalsify inspection cards, harass and laugh at otherinspectors.

This particular concern was categorized as a Milestone 1nuclear-safety-related issue due to the accusations of quality controlinspector harassment and falsification of inspection cards. In aneffort to obtain clarification and specific details on the actualSubmitted concern, QTC personnel were contacted, and the followingadditional information was provided.

A. The Construction Quality Control Unit in which the allegedactivities of concern were occurring.

B. The name and position of the manager of concern.

C. The timeframe over which the alleged activities oc concern should beinvesti cated (late 1I83 to early 19P 4)

The elementts of concern submitted to CTC included la- manaoement/leadership of the insoection unit and t.,,e allowance byt management o-Lncon~istent i'Lementation 0+ procedure, b various inspectors.

Ti ' SCOPE

DUra Q the .,er-FOra•.Ce of this i2 vestwo - -- inf-,or,-m. th" AT.waS_ Conductino thl-e review re- • at to a :j 4- tin,, of t aUt0: tteconcern dealin- with Qual it.' control na!tor a. the?review re-u.lIts wouId te contained in 04TC Raocrt No. HI-8-C,7,7. "Ccon sequken ce_ h , s NSRS re ort t wi 1 onl. add ress t sub;'-,_,a S'briJt• - -ct corncerI-*-.iss ues -.s-so •i a-.ted with ,alsification of inspection." carda_= an.: i.anaoementoversight of the particular Qualit'V control unit.. nVesti at.1nconclusions ozn:,- tle"e iSSUeS were b a. Set on rmaI :nter: eVe c t e dwith co-ni- c e-scnnel: an e-am-natizro the for : ti 7,processin .. and rev,.ewino i nsrec•i on, cards: a r-ev:iew =j, tn-_- t,_....ning,qualificat- n=o, and performance aporaisals oT .......review oF cartair, ind icators C- t,-e aecaccv o- managementf co-ntrol seichas the maintenance .ofLor-,, nets .ersonel nseccd,-lt: on ent :at.c,and •iecat.on o T re s cnMiiSit wi.' ' V;.i - the (n'' anoM t EM e.k i esn,-,E.,,._ ofthe adeouacyV of aTclicaol insoection oroce-CLUres J.:n ol-c-• d•ur":•t- thetime-+rame of concern.

SUMMARY GF FINDINGS

A. Several randomly selected inspection procedures which areimplemented by the quality control unit of concern and which were ineffect during the timeframe of concern were reviewed and assessed asadequate with regard to implementation guidance, defines acceptancecriteria, and documentation requirements. Also, a majority, of t.einscector personnel from the particular unit were interviewed andfound to be knowledgeable of the inspection procedure contents andconsistent in their approach to conductino -yctual CC insoections.

B. The process of initiating inspection assignments and documentinginspections within the quality control unit of concern wasexamined. It was noted that supervisorv personnel (unit manager andgroup leaders) did not routinely make inspection assignments to theuni ÷• personnel except during work back.log periods. instad," -- Cinepectors were normallv allowed tc "sion up for conduct:_ing neiedinsoections based on their own motivation. The obvious advantage o.this type work-assignment process was that it reduced the likel :hoodof falsification of inspection records (test cards). Specifically,if a CC inspector had no desire or motivation to conduct neeedinspections, he simply would not "sign uo" in the c logok toperform the work. However, one disadvantage of this systemT, asrepeatedly e;oressed by the interviewees, was that it resulted in apoor distribution of the unt's work oa•. When questi oned., theunit's manager stated that he did not-attempt to distribute worklod•amono the insectors. As a result of the lack .o continual' directmanagement involvement in this area, many of the individual OCinspectors- indicated the existence of animcsity between high- andlow-output performers which had caused an overall detrimental. immacon the unit's morale.

C. With the su'ppor t of superv•sorry personnel o:f the .... tructiocumn •ontrol Unit (DCU-A), the proces- f test .-ard rsreipt

inspection -filing, indexingo and retrieval was e:xamined,. Itnoted that since ,•?1 the eCU -as mac resoonsibc:i4itv to revie.incoming CA records to assure adecuacy and verify compliance wit-,the MA Records Criteria of Quality Control instruction C,-- I.O,"Quality Assurance Records." This instruction Stlpulates tha.ot th.-review of incomino QA" records be conducted in accordance withdeveloped records review checklists, and it established genericrecords review criteria. The DCU nad, in implementino the receiptinspection program, expanded the generic review •riteria indocumentedcheklists which were specific and unique ±,or eachincoming test card. Thiis records review program could not detect adeliberate flsification c- test cards; however, it di.d a.,uately

assure that the submitted documentation of insectioon. had beerproperly filled out and orocessed. it also assured that theindividual completing the documentation was certified to theaporopriate inspection procedure revision level on the date of theinspectio n and that the procedure revision level was in eff•ct whenthe individual sioned the test card record. Unfortunately, duringthe timeframe of concern, the DCU was not maintaining any logsrecords Mhich would have indiated the number of tet• cards whichfail. , the receipt ins.p .cions or •he cause of the ;ailuras. The

test cards were simply returned to the responsible unit forresolution and reorocassing. This program weakness was eliminatedapproximately one year ago when DCU initiated a program for loqgingthe cause of all returned test cards. A discussion with the I.CUSupervisor concerning the records inspection failure log and theadeauacy of QA test card records submitted by the uali"ty controlunit of concern did not identify any noteable or particular problemswhich would indicate or support the falsification-of-recortsaccusation.

D. Signifi cant emphasis was placed on assurinq, the confidentiality oresponses given during the formal interviews conducted withpersonnel of the Quality control unit. As a result -f this emphasisand due to the consistency of both the positive and negative remarksor criticisms directed at the adequacy of the inspection programactivities and the management of that program, it was assessed thatthe overall information obtained from the interviews was reliable.A summary of key responses related to the principle elements of theNSRS investigation follows.

1. Not a single interviewed insmector nor the unit's supervisoryipersonnel provided any indication or information which wouldsupport the allegation that inspection records had been or werebeing falsified. To the contrary, all interviewed personnelexpressed a great deal of confidence relative to the integrit• .

and adequacy of the actual CC inspection performance by theunit' s employees. Even those who were most critical of theunit's management and low-output coworkers clearly expressed theopinion that none of the unit's personnel would falsify aminspection or "buy off" a commonent which was not acceptablewithin the limits of the inspection oriteria.

2. The unit's manager indicated that he tried to ignore theconsiderable pressure -from his su-cervision. the crafts-, andConstruction Engineering to get his unit's QMC inmaoti:ons donequickl-.y due to his concern or" the ob ject•:e of . tting the jOm3done right. The validity of this statement was•uported by theunit's subord nate supervisory personnel who indicated Mtat themanager shielded the unit from external pressures of thisnature. This was also substantiated by the unit's QC insc•-t.rswho consistently 'stated that they were not su-"acted t= anyabnormal emphasis by their superva.ision to conduct neededinspections or complete the associated documentation.Additionally, positive responses were received from a majorityof the un t's personnel when questiaoned about the managementsupport of their decisions rel ated to i npection results.

3. Each interviewee was asked to relay any kn-wn situations of whenthe CC inspectors in the unit of concern were harassed in anyway by the r management or bv personnel inie - or outside theunit. As with the inquiries discussed in •I..I . above, thepurpose of this questioning was to assess whether or not aworking environment existed within the unit of concern whichwould promote the need to. f alsify inspection records. The onlysituation which was prasented and discussed during theinterviews was related to an interpersonal problem between twoof the unit's CC insuectors. It was indicsted by several

individuals that due to a lack of management intervention, thissituation had grown from a series of inappropriate "practicaljokes" to near physical confrontations. This situation wasconsidered a contributing factor to the unit's reported lowmorale and had caused several individuals to Question theadequacy of the unit's management. When this particular problemwas discussed with the manager of concern, he acknowledged thathe had been reouested by one of the involved insoectors toresolve the situation. However, the manaoer indicated that hehad not taken any significant steps to :eliminate the problembecause he felt the best way for handling problems amongemployees is to let them work it out themselves.

4. The memorandum from R. M. Pierce to H. G. Parris dated 7/2:•/5provided the WBN response to the INFO Construction FrojectEvaluation conducted in June 1985. The submitted response toINFO Finding F.3-l stated that by Seotember 1985: "Qualitycontrol supervision will require reinspection of a oercentage offinalized features to provide individual performance assessmentand to identify inconsistencies netween inspectors, and toverify adequacy and interpretability of acceptance criteria.'It was v that the CC uni of concern had initiated aprogram of reinspection, the results of which had not supportedthe fal-sification-of-i nspection-record- accuation Howevercontrary to the submitted response commitment, the manager ofthe CC unit stated that he was not utilizing the reinspectionresults as a tool for individual erf ormance assessment or toicentifv inconsistencies among inspectors.

5. Feri-od• c unscheduled observati-ons by manag aement of theindividual CC inspectors' s actual wor: performance could serveas a control method for assuring that inspections were notfalsified. Work observation s of this tp..e could .. sao •rovi deappromriata inout for th s.ervice esvaluatitons ocf unitwersonnel. However, it was repeatedly r.or.etd - the istaff that not until recently had the unit's amanager conductedany observati-ons of the performance of ongoing CC insmect:ons.It was also reported by v rtually every interviewes tnat the •unit's manager did not conduct periodic perf-ormance aoprai=sale..(other than the formal yearly service review) with the unit'spersonnel. These two consistently reported concerns, combinedwith the reported inadeouacies in workload distribut on.contributed to the onvious attitude by the unit'sa personnel thatmanagement control and oversight were l acki:no.

E. An interview was conducted with the aprropriate AssistantConstruction Engineer- whose area of resoonsibility includedcognizance of the CC inspection the unit of concer-n. The c'ro.se ofthe interview was to determine if the WEN Construction Encineeringpersonnel were aware of and had reported any instances of known orsuspected inspection falsifications. The inter" indicated thathe had a reasonable level of confidence regarding tMe adeuacv andquality of the insoectiion serviaes provided by the CC unit. it wa.also indicated that the inspection program was acceptable in that itfulfilled established requirements. However. --nsiderable -riticis-

was directed at the manager of concern due to a perceived la-k ofinsoection unit responsiveness. Specifically, it was stated thatthe engineering and construction schedules had been adverselyimpacted as a result of untimely notifications of CC inspectionacceptability 1 nd untimely processing of inspection documentation.It was also relayed that several meetings had been held with themanager of concern and his immediate supervision concerning theinadequate responsiveness of the CC unit.

F. A review of the Personnel History Record (F0:HR) of the manager ofconcern was conducted to assess the documented level of managementex:perience and training_ and to verify compliance with his currentjob description qualifications requirements. It was determined thatthe OC Unit Manaoer was adequately oualified with regard to theStipulated education and experience criteria and had satisfactorilycompleted several management skills development courses. It wasalso determined that his previous engineering ant managementpositions within TVA were appropri ate foundations for his selectionas the supervisor of his particular Construct•on CC unit.

G. Each of the manaoement appraisals on the superviso:- C4 the Q-C unitof concern was reviewed in deta: l to assess the dcumented reort.-on the adequacy of • his performance. Al l Manaement PerformanceAppraisals, which were comoleted by the Assi stant ConstructisonDuality Manaoer who had direct supervi sory responsibil it y' for the..manager of concern, indicated a superior performer. In fact theseperformance appraisals stated he possesses and implements suoeriormanagement skill-s=, such that his unit is planned and organized toprovide timely resmonse to needed !nSMEtiOnS and to oromptlycomplete the associated documentation. The unit manager had als•obeen highl rated for his skil l- in the= areas of -upervision. unitc-ontrol teamwork, and dec-i sion maki ng. Of .arti cu ar note was threcognition of his total .ommitment to - - ,ty smi te of tieproductio, n ressures to which his unit was s cc: t-d.

H. As an additional ind cator of managenent control, reiews were ma.deof the records of inspector-:ertificaticn expi.rations caused byfailures to maintain required Qual i ficati ons by personnel in theunit of concern. it _Was ient•fied that the unit manager hadassigned responsibility to one of his grou,. leaders to srve as theunit's training coordinator. Interviews with this individual andother unit personnel, as wel. as the records revie:•. indicated thatthe unit manager adequately supoorted the trainino neens of thestaff. it was also consistently reported by the i nterv ewed CCinspectors that the unit manager placed proper emohasis oncompliance with the W•BN industri al Safety and Equal EmploymentOpportunity Programs.

CONCLUS.IO.NS A ND RECOMMENDTIONS

Concl LLs1 onl

A. Several key programmatic and implementation areas were investigatedin an effort to assess the validity of the accusation concerningfalsification of MC insmection records. The investigation rsultsdid not provi,',e any support ive evidaence w.•,ic•- would ni-"cate that OCinspection records had or were being falsi.4ied. Therefcr,, thisaspect of the submitted concrn s not substantiated.

B. That portion of the submitted concern reoarding the adequacy ofmanaoement control over the oarticular Construction OC unit was alsoaddressed curirn this investigation. .To begin with., the unitmanager's documented performance appraisals clearly indicated thatthe unit's functional and administrati ve objectives were being met.Additionally, investioation results reveaed that manaer ofconcern placed approoriate emphasis on other program implemTentation.considerations such as emolcvee safet' , personnel training, andbudgetary restriti ons. However, formal i ntSrviews conducted withthe manacer's subordinate personnel identified a significant moral.problem within the unit which was acknow edged by the unitsmanager. This problem had ,evelo..d .ue to manament inattentionin such areas as work distribut ion within the unit , resolution z-,disruptive interpersonal conflicts, and-conduoting periodic servicereviews. The lack of management presence in these issues haddefinitely caused some employees to conclude that control of theunit was lacking. Other issues raised by the unit personnel, whichin their minds indicated poor management, included inappropriatedistribution of merit money, overtime, and a perceived preferentialtreatment of some inspectors. It was concluded by thisinvestigation, however, that a contributino factor to this "ituticmwas the personality and style differences between certain asset iveQC inspectors and the manaqer cf concern. though the .. e... "submitted statement of concern (i.e., management a llow inspector-sto do anvthing they want) was nct substantiate d , the fol lowingrecommendation-, are being made in an effort to improve themanagement-work.:er relations within the unit.

Recommmend 4 igons

I-85-5..'-WB-, ... 1 - Di stri buti on of Unit Work- cad..

Within the OC unit of concern, management and group leaders shouldestablish and imolement a work-assignment process such that the unit'songoing workload is equall/y distributed among all inspection personnel.This orocess should not simply consider the number of ,C inspectionsassigned but should be based on the location and difficulty cf soecificinspection assignments.

..-.......2 WN-O2, - M~onitor-ino of D.C ins•t"-c-tors

As committed in response to the INPO Construction Przqram Evaluati•o•the manager_ of concern should begin utilizing the results of theComponent Reinyoection Program to provide individual inspectorperformance assessment and to identifv inconsistencies amonginsOectors. Information obtained from these assessments should beconsidered as an input factor for individual service evaluations, andidentified inspection inconsistencies should be rEs.lve. throuq.additional unit or individual training sessions.

... ...2-W•,,N ... - ,==•= Fa dic -. ... = .ma, .- :opraisa-- -

The manager of concern should continue to utilize input from tne un .t'group leaders in the development of inspector oerformance svaluations.However, the frequency of discussing the performance assessment with theindivi dual unit members should be increased• from the current annualsession to at least a cuarterlv basis. .ddit. onal ly. ncreased _ .rby the manager of concern to observe actual i n-mrocess merformanc, bythe unit personnel amears warranted. This wou.. d sere to imorovecertain unt members'-s concept ons reg ardin.g the lack of managementpresence and provi.e additional aoropriate input for individualperformance asse•m ents.

definite- ,Nonti , --Rs~to .. ..taoronlCon

A definite contributor to the overall t's =erca-tcn concerning M.lack of management control was related to the unit manager's .ailurskF toinitiate cecisive action fcor the resolution oM an inter.ers.• a•' --n-i.tbetween two of the OC inspectors. This adversely affected theperformance of the individuals and had been disruptive to th unit as Ewhole. Due to the unit manager's .acknowled -m-et of his lack of concernfor these types of personnel pro.blemsi it t is recommendae that the Offzca.of Employeee Relations be requested to investigate and assure resolutionof this situation.

TV.- 64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7-84)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT e

Memorandum TENNESSEE VALLEY- AUTHORITYpTO : E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

FROM K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

DATE NOV29 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL


Subject CONDUIT HEAT DAMAGE




recommendations by December 31, 1985 . Should you have any

questions, please contact W. M. Berry at telephone 3695-WBN

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes X NopA


WMB:JTHAttachmentcc (Attachment):

R. C Parker, LP4N44A-CQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantW. F. Willis, EI2B16 C-K (4)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--Copy and Return--

To K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

From:

Date:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-474-WBNSubject CONDUIT HEAT DAMAGE for action/disposition.

Signature Date




NSRS INVESTIGATION REFORT NO. I-850474-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-36- 16g-c0O 1

MILESTONE Z

SUBJECT: CONDUIT HEAT DAMAGE

DATE OF INVESTIGATION: October 17-1S. 1?3f

INVESTIGATOR: 0 111srw

IEWED BY:

1//-2 6&Date

Date

/_APF'PROVED BY:

BACKGROUND

NSRS .... lye oc~-~investigated Employee Concern IN-8-169-00' which was identified byQuality Technology Company (OTC) in the Watts Bar E..oloyee ConcernProgram. The concern as received by CTC was as follows:

A piece of flexible (el-ectrical conduit has extensiveheat damage located in the AuxiliaryE Building atelevation 713', 6 feet east of A and 3 $eet southof V.

The QTC form used to report the concern to NSRS indi -cated that theconcerned individual. did not notify the supervisor of the oroblem.

I I. SCOPE

The plant area identified by the concerned indiv dual was i.nspectd inan attempt to locate the damaged conduit. A close v,'ual inspection wasmade in an attempt to determine the mechanismi by which the conduit wasdamaged. With the assistance of the NUC FR Electr-ical MaintenanceSecti or.. the functi• n of the a~fected electrica rcuits was i'dentifed.

Ill. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.

Four physically parallel short sct ions mf d"maged flexibl conduit atfloor level in, the descri-bed location n the Unit 2 auxilia nuildi nwere found. The conduits were taoged P5007. P5008, P5022* and PE0"..The-lastic outer was parti.ally . The heatingappeared to be uniformlv distributed alono the l-ength 4ach cand uniformly oartitioned amon• the four conduits. it seem likely thatthe heat was internally g enerated, A likely cause was high aamoeraoamass.in through the fl.i..• e metal spiral m ,oss-ib causael y using alotherwis uCLngrounded sunport bra~kat as a waitiggru=.Te lxil.. ~.. .4 - I i1 .-metal so:ral was pull away f-rom the ,--xible-t--rigi. -c.u-i, in .,mecases. The affected electrical circuits wars- fcr the Unt Caia.]and volume control s•vstemT ,o-ic acid blender, he a trac.in. ecau.se thEassociated heat tracing transformer was warm to the toLuch, it wasevident that circuits were eneroized.

Because there was an immediate concern o-F a fire or electrical shockhazard to the many construction workers in the area., the condi t o n wasbrought to the attention of ,UC PR industrial ai.et- by ..RS. AMaintenance Request (.-4773) was initiated to have the conditiornevaluated and corrected as necessary to alleviate the immed•ate hazard.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CTone l.ui on

The employee concern was substantiated in that damaged flexibleconduit was found. Damage to related cable insulation was notobvious but is possible. The immediate corrective action ou.ld beto deenergize the circuits; however, the flexible conduit needs tobe replaced, the cable evaluated for damage, and the root cause cfthe damage conclusively determined and corrected.

Recommendati on

I-85-474-WBN-OI - Evaluation and Reolacement of Condui t and Cable

Replace the flexible conduits previously described, and evaluate andreplace as necessary the associated cable. Determine and eliminatethe root cause of the damage.

B. Conclusion

The concerned individual did not inform his suervisr of acondition that had potential for -ausing equipment damage orpersonnel injury. The paths available to each employee to bring aconcern to various levels of TYA management or outsideorganizations' attention should not be substituted for the mostdirect supervisory contact in instances where immediate action maybe needed.

Recommendation

1-85--474-WBN.-C:.2 - E-mphoasi:e Hazardous Co-ndi ti on F,,eozr... •n,

Reemphasize to construction personnel that potentially hazardousconditions noted during the performance of work: activities should beimmediately reported to the super'.visors or designated org atnizionsfor corrective action. For clarity, ex.. an the establishedreporting methodology.

TVA 64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7-84)UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT /PL4

Memorandum TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITYITO : E. R. Ennis, Plant Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant


DATE :N0V 2 9 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is NSRS Report No. 1-85-524-WBN

Subject ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION VIOLATIONS

Concern No. IN-85-913-001, -002, -004




questions, please contact W. M. Berry at telephone 3695-WBN


/Director, NSRS/Designee

WMB:JTHAttachmentcc (Attachment):

R. C. Parker, LP4N44A-CQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantW. F. Willis, EI2B16 C-K (4)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--Copy and Return--


From:

Date:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of NSRS Report No. I-85-524-WBNSubject ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTION VIOLATIONS for action/disposition.

Signature Date27U



NUCLE•P SAFETY REVIEW STACFF

NSRS INVESTIGAT ION REPORT NO. I-85-524-WBN

EMPLLOYEE CONCERNS I N-35'-9 13-001 , I N-85-91-002. AND IN-85-913 004REFERENCE OE-INYESTIGEA TED I T N -859 C3-03

MILESTONE 6, 6, A. RESPECTIVELY

ELECTRICAL CIr.JSTR"CTTCN 5

DATES OF iNVESTIiGrTION:, Seotmtrer- 14-November 4., 1?35

INVESTIGATOR:

* ED P Y:

APPROVED BY:

-. - -Steven -

<ir1----n

SUBJECT:

4-te

D-te//- - -Zia.te

• I. f.BAC..GROUND

NSRS investigated Employee Concerns I,- :-.13-0014 I"-85-913-0... and!N-85-913-004 which were identified by Quality Technclogy Comoanv (OTC)in its Watts Par Employee Concern Program,. The concerns as stated byOTC were as follow:

I N-S5-9 1 -OO 1

Electrical junction boxes are not per 5-40 (ConstructionSpecification) and Electrical Standard Draw•ngs in thatthey are manufacturered of galvanized steel instead ofsheet steel with paint on both sides. These junctionboxes may be found throughout the plant, q.secially inthe ADGE (Additional Diesel Generator Building).

because of the QTC formatting, this concern was reworded into thesimilar IN-85-913-002:.

Electrical CC bur/s-off (accepts) electrical junctionboxes which do not comply with G-40 and ElectricalStandard Drawings. These junction boxes should besheet steel with paint on both sides, not galvanizedsteel. The boxes may be located throughout the plant,especially the ADGB.

A related electrical concern was investigated by the Office m+Enoineerino as IN-85-913-::..

480-V welding receotacles located throughbcut theplant (particularly the ADGB; are desioned toaccept a maximum wire size of #4 and mninimum of#6. TVA has installed 42 wire which creates apersonnel safety hazard.

The above three concerns were made into an enveloping employee-supervisot interaction concern. IN-85- , - 004:

A foreman was informed of two constructi on ,.:oa-t:ons and refused to institute corrective actionbecause the schedule did not allow for the timewhich would be reouired.

H1. SCOPE

The G-40 Construction Specification, "Installing Electrical Condu• tSystems and Conduit Boxes," and Electrical Standard Drawing SD-EIZ.6. C-were reviewed with regard to references to electrical junction boxmaterial and corrosion protection. The Watts Bar Quality ControlProcedure WBNP-QCP-3. 03, Revision 18, "Inspection of Electri-cal Conduit.and Junction Boxes," was reviewed to determine the acceptance criteriain use with regard to electrical junction box material (and corros:cnprotection). The National Electrical Code was reviewed with regard to"Metal Boxes" corrosi on resi stance. Vari ous procurement documents andreferenced vendor catalog material were reviewed with reoard to theacceotability of galvanize. Discussions were conducted with theConstruction Enoineering Unit, Construction Qualit• Control, cognizantelectrical foreman, and Office of Engineering personnel in relatedareas. A sample of the welding receptacles was inspected to come to aninde.endent conclusion on the acceptability of the wire hook.p and therelated CE resoonse. Followum input by OTC was provided to help clarifythe •nvivdu, l's concerns in !N-85-•, 3-03,.

III• SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Nei ther the G-40 ConStruCtio ., n 3 f i C n or t..h. SD-E IasoecifIC E 1l y d sc Uses the u.se of oaIvaniz n Q as a corrosion prat- _=ction ,coatlnp for sheet steel electrical junct ion boxes. However. bot hdocuments m.ake statements reouirinn the paintinq -F JLt2.on boxes forcorrosion protection and/o1- -arhitectural ntln L'/4

In Fection 2.1 of 0-40. Materias (General, the folIowinq .taIementI imadr. a1iatr al s . . shall meet the reoui rements of an r rmrvedreco gnizad s tandard. I 1thoug-I not specificall.• reranced, theNational Electrical Code (NEC) is an approved (nationally) recognizedstandard-. l4-ouph the NEC does4 no claim conae over eleatricalqenerati nq plant=ts to the depree it represents a set c- safe praCtt - Es,it can Se consti-ued ag having some applicability. In tt he NEC. Article370 on boxes and f tti m s constru.c tion n soecifications, the 0 1 ,w ingirexi sts. "Corrosi on-Fesi stant. Metal box,,es, conduii' t bodies and -f t-, ngsshall be corrosi on-resi stant or shall be wesl 1 ca vani. zea aname orotherwi se propery 1 coated in-side and out to prevent orrosi on." Toperform its function a .unction box o s .a rsially only a lonp-iifetimephysical housino. If i t i s made of common sheet steel, i t Rust havesome form of corrosion protection to have a lionip lf e. The NEC allowsfor either oaintQnp or Qalvaniz v :roze to Pro ida the corrosion t:tý ..... , ion.

A 1.imited review cf nrocLr-ement documents sho-wed that t-her Er....were Painted junction boxes were spaeiT iiTere were also caseswhere a given manufacturer's cataroC number was speci-fied, and thecatalog showed this type of junction box to be cal vanized. Other thanthe need to monitor the amount of -Rlv.niZe uE U m t-h reactorS containment building, Office of Engineering personnel stated that th4is no technical repuirement to -emand galvanized or paint for corrosionprotection on any given junction box.

There were two key sections of the applicable puality controlprocedure. QCFp-..Uc3 for junction box acceptance criteria makes the+ollowing two statements.

1. 7.2.1 - Installation - "Materia l' . . . are in accordance with theapplicable drawing and General Specificat-Ion G-4.

2. 7.2.2 Cleanliness - "Junction box is free ofý di, or debris andthere is no condensation or moiStur- inside the b"x. "Inteiorsurface of the junction box is painted or galvanized and , free oFrulst. "

Discussions withi Ccnstr-uct ion, 'Elect r 4. ca iQuICALa 11 t" Coto r ou d-athat the grOup intarpreted QCF L.03 Section 7.2. 2 to al1ow eitInerpainted or alvaniz ed jun ction boxes to be used in an. -iven instanCE.

A memo from R'. W. Cantrell to 1:. Whitt dated O-ctober ..... 1P 5:, was theOffice of Engineering reoort on employee concern 1 ,-4--_Istated that the w:re-size concern did not const.t4-ute r, a er Sonne,-- safetyhazard. Both the employee concern assiQnment rECUeSt .r-rn. a d E..draft- of the OE re.port were reviewed by a cognizant 'Constructioý,electrician foreman, and it was the faoreman's belief tnat z Z .a.-correctly addressed a .roblem that had been experiencec. ThI oreT, anbeliev-.,edreor was rea-Monabl c-. ,-t iwmportantrlyoý ,.

_ved _hatthe installation work, k .aIt I-. ýtua- ri ra i n-" s. e cal-cdid resul',t in an accectabe .nstallation.

COCNCLUE:CNS A0 F:ECCM'iSi4;ATCONS

A. Concern N-85-91.3-001 was not substantiateo• The G-4.0 Coznstruct.ionSpecification and Electrical Standard Drawinga .....re :ai.tir,

because some method. of corrsi on orctection is requires for seetsteel. However. the intent was nit to exclude galvanized steel.

B. Concern IN-85-91-002 was not substantated. Electrical MC did noterr in accepting either painted or alvanized junction boxes.However, the corrosion protection acceptance criteria appeared to bemisplaced in the "Cleanliness" section.

I-85--u.4-WBN-oI - Quali~ty Control Prcedure 'ocentance Crilter-a

WBNF'-QCP-3.0._3 should be revised such that "Painted or Gal vanz isaddressed in Section 7.2.1 • nd•-r "Material ." and Sect•on 7.2.2reserved for only cleanliness criteria.

C. Indeoendent from 0Es res-onse. Concern ! N5-913-.003 ws f d t,be unsuLbtantiated. The cable-to-,-n electrical -onnation app earedto work as well or better with 02 wire tnan it wouln with #4 wire.

D. Concern tN-•S•-93-004 was not sat e. Sin "thr was nobasis for the technical concerns it cculm rot be -mcutaw that timeconstraints caused the oerc-ivec reiusa.l to insti tut correctiveactions. However, discussions with the invl vei sur,'-i.ndicated th~at the sumervisc r did not Kno at the tme the : asus 0:raised that a -olid techncal basis awi.-.: or- not p •rsuig Zre-so.lutirn of the weldin: reces-amle and junction bow concerns.Furthe.more. the supervsor made .n attem- _ t r;" to.-,rata tthe• co~ncer-ued indiiv-ta-,al, wn-y. tn~e-e two-.=cn,=ern... == nczr•T repre.-ent

constr-uctir violations~.

Management should r. evi•w with tna C,, -...... z..-...=.s... ElasEngineering Un-"-. it ... meTneD rs the .-cc.eptedi matn= mfE.• h-,.ntliing --oten-tial'

cons-truction violation.•' .•n Stre a importance .. rfeedback< to inoivinual a raisi:no th cmn.ern.

TVA 64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7-84)





DATE : NOV 29 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL

Transmitted herein is ERT Report No. EX-85-021-001

Subject WELD ROD CONTROL

Concern Nos. (see ERT Investigation Report)




questions, please contact W. M. Kemp at telephone 3200-WBN

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes X NoIDI ctor, NSRS/Designee

WMK:JTHAttachmentcc (Attachment):

R. C. Parker, LP4N44A-CQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantW. F. Willis, ElZB16 C-K (4)

--Copy and Return--


From:

Date:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of ERT Report No. EX-85-021-001for action/disposition.

Signature Date

L Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NSRS Recommendations: EX-85-021-001

E-85-021-001-01 "Weld Rod Control"

WBN CONST should process an NCR to document, evaluate and resolve theissues addressed in this report including:

Lack of weld rod traceability

Control of unused rod

Control of rejected weld rod

Testing of weld rod for extended exposure.

This issue should be evaluated for reportability to the NRC.

L0129U

AQUALITYTECHNOLOGY

C• COMPANYP.O. BOX 600 Sweetwater, TN 37874 (615)365-4414

ERT INVESTIGATION REPORT,REV.1 PAGE 1 OF 14

CONCERN NO:•IN-85-337-002, 5-42006, -424006,IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001, GIN-85--441-003GIN-85-352-002, jIN-85-424-001, 4I-85-041-001\IN-86-167-001, i;N-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009\IN-85-454-004, =N-85-424-007, &X-85-021-001

Concern: Control of weld rod is insufficient

INVESTIGATIONPERFORMED BY: W. M. Kemp, Jr.

DETAILS

This report contains the findings derived from a generic investigationof the concerns listed below:

IN-85-337-002

Control of weld rod is insufficient. Welders can keep rod outovernight (no oven). There are no portable ovens on site so weld rodis kept out at least 8 hour shift. Unused rod and stubs are turned in(tossed in) at the end of shift but no count is made. Welderscertification is not always checked before issuing rod. Welders canand go get rod from other welders to finish weld.

IN-85-424-006

No accountability of weld rod during issuance or return of stubs andunused filler material.

IN-85-424-004

QA training class of June 5, 1985, informed craft that steamfitterscould withdraw and control weld rod if they had a welder signed weldslip and the welders card.

IN-85-234-001

7018 Weld Rods are not required to be kIept-.in-rod ovens after issuanceto craft welders. The rod can be kept unheated for 8 hours at a timein a leather pouch.

ERT INVESTIGATION REPORTREV.1

CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-85-424-006, IN-85-424-004,-'IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001,--IN-85-441-003",IN-85-352-002,/IN-85-424-001- WI-85-041-001.IN-86-167-001/IN-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009-'IN-85-454-004,-IN-85-424-007.;' EX-85-021-001l

DETAILS, continued

IN-85-426-001

Portable ovens are not required.entire shift.

Weld rod is kept out of ovens for an

IN-85-441-003

No portable ovens at Watts Bar. The rod sometimes collect moisture bythe end of the shift and cannot be used.

IN-85-352-002

No portable ovens are used at Watts Bar. Weld rod can be kept out ofoven for an entire shift and returned to oven for later use.

IN-85-424-001

No portable oven used/required on Watts Bar.moisture and should not be used.

The rod often collects

IN-85-454-004

Welders frequently get rod from each other instead of withdrawing fromrod room.

IN-85-424-007

Lack of Weld Rod Control: Welders get additional rod from other weldersrather than going back to the Rod Room for more. Site policy allowsleaving rod with other welders, or letting subjourneymen check-out rodand return rod. (can also leave rod in tool boxes).

The Rod Room does not count rod when it is issued, and does not requireaccounting for rod stubs. Occasionally, welders are reprimanded for notturning in rod withdrawal slips, even though the rod slip really doesnot account for anything.

IN-85-453-009

Welders frequently give weld rod to other welders.

PAGE 2 OF 14


CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-85-424-006, IN-85-424-004,IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001, IN-85-441-003IN-85-352-002, INý85"424-001i WI-85-041-001IN-86-167-001, IN-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009IN-85-454-004, IN-85-424-007, EX-85-021-001

DETAILS, continued

IN-86-167-001

CI is concerned that there is no traceability of weld rods to actualjob performed.

IN-86-150-001

There is no program for material traceability of welding rod at WBNP.When welding rod is drawn, it could be used any place in the plant.Material traceability is not even attempted.

WI-85-041-001

Weld (AWS & ASME) filler material (rod) control records/documentationis inadequate for AWS welds; rod slips are not retained as records anddo not identify heat/lot numbers and location of use; for ASME welds,rod slips do not identify heat/lot numbers and location of use.

EX-85-021-001

Weld rod issue and accountability is inadequate. Rod Slips do notreference where rod was used; Work Packages do not reference Rod IssueSlips; there is no Rod Stub Accountability; excessive weld rod layingaround on floors, etc., in buildings. CI stated that on one occasion,he/she noticed several rods laying under the window of the IssueStation in the Aux. Bldg., Elev. 713. Apparently there was no one atthe Issue Station when 3rd shift was ready to return un-used rod.

DOCUMENTS/PROCEDURES REVIEWED:

QCI 4.01 Rev. 4, Storage, Issue & Control of Welding MaterialsQCI 4.02 Rev. 4, Welder & Welding Operator QualificationP.S. l.M.3.1 Rev. 7, Specification for welding Material ControlASME Section III NA/NB/NC/ND/ 2000 & 4000TVA Topical Report TVA-TR-75-1AANSI N45.2ANSI N45.2.510 CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria XIIIQAM 3.6 Receiving Inspection, Storing, Preventation Maintenance & Issue

of Code Items


CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-85-424-006, IN-85-424-004,IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001, IN-85-441-003IN-85-352-002, IN-85-424-001, WI-85-041-001IN-86-167-001, IN-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009IN-85-454-004, IN-85-424-007, EX-85-021-001

DETAILS,continued

DOCUMENTS AND PROCEDURES REVIEWED, continued

OAM 3.7 Material Control & IdentificationQAM 5.1 Rev. 20, Welding ControlNCR 4615 Rev. 0, 1 & 2Memorandums:NEB 83 0116 253SME 83 02404 017DOC 82 1116 403NCR 6198/NCR 6197CTM-065-02 Training for Steamfitter

PERSONNEL CONTACTED: CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

These concerns are substantiated.

The review and investigation of these concerns have determined that theprogrammatic requirements and implementation for the control,traceability and accountability of filler metal does not satisfycommitments, codes and standards.

FINDINGS:

The Findings Section isdivided into four areas. These four areasaddress the following:

I. Weld Rod ControlII. Portable Rod OvensIII. Exposure of ElectrodesIV. General Concerns



DETAILS,continued

FINDINGS, continued

I. Weld Rod Control

A. Requirements

(1) ASME III NA 4442.1 - Establishment and Maintenance ofIdentification and Control Measures states:

"Welding and brazing materials for all classes ofconstruction shall be controlled in accordance withNB-4122"

(2) ASME III NC/ND refer to NB requirements. NA 4442.1 furtherstates:

"These measures shall assure that identification ismaintained either on the item or on records traceable to theitem throughout manufacture or installation" "these measuresshall be designed to prevent the use of incorrect ordefective items..."

NB-4122 - Materials Identification states:

"Welding and brazing materials shall be identified andcontrolled so that they can be traced to each componentand/or installation of a piping system or else a controlprocedure shall be employed which ensures specific materialsare used."

(3) NB-2152 - Welding and Brazing Materials Identification,states:

"Welding and brazing materials shall be controlled during therepair of materials and the manufacture and installation ofcomponents so that they are identifiable as acceptable untilthe material is actually consumed in the process (See NB4122)".

ERT INVESTIGATION REPORT,REV.1


DETAILS, continued

FINDINGS, continued

(4) ANSI N45.2.5 Section 5.5, Welding states:

"Inspection of structural steel welding shall be performed inaccordance with the provisions of AWS D1.1, Section 6,entitled "Structural Welding Code," and supplementaladdenda. This inspection will include visual examination ofpreparations, welding processes, and post-weldingoperations. Prior to welding, verification of weldingprocedure and welder qualification shall be documented andshall include all essential variables identified in theprocedure. In-process inspections shall include joint fitup prior to start of welding, preheat and interpasstemperature requirements, filler metal, control ofdistortion, and post-weld heat treatment and cleaningrequirements. Procedures shall be established to controlthe purchase, receiving, distribution, storage and use ofwelding electrode."

"Weld repairs necessitated by visual or nondestructiveexaminations shall be made in accordance with the procedureused to perform the original weld or a qualified repairprocedure and re-inspected by the same method whichdisclosed the repairable defect. All weld repairsnecessitated by nondestructive examination shall bedocumented."

10CFR50, Appendix B. VIII. Identification and Control ofMaterials, Parts, and Components

"Measures shall be established for the identification andcontrol of materials, parts, and components, includingpartially fabricated assemblies. These measures shallassure that identification of the item is maintained by heatnumber, part number, serial number , or other appropriatemeans, either on the item or on records traceable to theitem, as required throughout fabrication, erection,installation, and use of the item. These identification andcontrol measures shall be designed to prevent the use ofincorrect or defective materials, parts and components.

PAGE 6 OF 14


CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-85-424-006,> IN-85-424-0041'IN-85-234-001,' IN-85-426-001, IN-85-441-003.'IN-85-352-002,/IN-85-424-001p WI-85-041-001 /IN-86-167-001,/IN-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009 -"IN-85-454-004,.'IN-85-424-007,-"EX-85-021-0011--

DETAILS, continued

FINDINGS, continued

(5) Material (weld filler metal) is received onsite at thewarehouse via QAM 3.6. Per QAM 3.6 Para. 2.3.4 states: "theissue of welding filler metal is covered in Section 5.1 ofthis manual".

QAM 5.1 Para. 2.3.1 states: "Supply of welding materialsissued to the control center from the warehouse on aStoreroom Requisition Form, TVA 575". (refer to Section 3.6Exhibit 3.6-2) Welding quality control unit is responsiblefor issuing welding materials from the warehouse to thecontrol centers via form TVA 575 which will include fillermetal, amount, type, heat and lot number. Therefore, fromthe point of receiving in warehouse to issuance to thecontrol centers heat and lot and type istraceable.

B). Summary of Requirements:

.Programs and procedures must address the measures established tocontrol the identification and traceability of materials.

C). Inspection and Documentation Review

1. Store Room Requisition Review

Storeroom Requisition forms (TVA 575) were reviewed to determine ifheat, lot,and type was traceable from the warehouse to the controlcenter (i.e., Rod Shack). The following store room requisition formswere reviewed and were found to be acceptable.

Store Room Requisition #8928 to TB Rod Shack

400 lbs. 1/8 E7018 Heat 8578 Lot 4270

Store Room Requisition #8928 to TB Rod Shack

400 lbs. 1/8 E7018 Heat 8578 Lot 4270

PAGE 7 OF 14



DETAILS,continued

FINDINGS, continued

C). 1, continued

Store Room Requisition #8792 - to Rod Shack inside security

120 lbs. 3/32 E7018 Heat N28400 Lot 026006100 lbs. 1/8 E7018 Heat 8578 BN 4270

Store Room Requisition No. 8790 to Rod Shack outsidesecurity.

400 lbs. 3/32 E7018 Heat N28400 Lot 0260006

Store Room Requisition No. 8791 to Rod Shack TB El 729

200 lbs. 3/32 E7018 Heat N28400 Lot 0260006100 lbs. 1/8 E7018 Heat 8578 BN 4270

2. Rod Shack Inspection

After the welding material is at the control center (RodShack), accountability and traceability of weld rods to aheat and lot number stops. At any time, 2 to 4 different heatand lot numbers per item (i.e., E-7018 Rod) is available forissue. However, only the item (i.e., E-7018) is noted onissue slip and not the heat and /or lot number.

The following is a summary of a walkdown performed to observethe traceability of weld rod from the rod shack to the field.

In Rod Shack #1 in the Turbine Building, the followingE-7018 weld rod was available for issuance.:

Lincoln E7018 3/32 Lot 132LArco E7018 3/32 Lot 026C006 Heat N28400Hobart E7018 1/8 Heat 9202 SGMcKay E7018 1/8 Heat 8578 Bn 4270

PAGE 8 OF 14


CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-854424-006, IN-85-424-004,IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001, IN-85-441-003IN-85-352-002, IN-85-424-001, WI-85-041-001IN-86-167-001, IN-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009IN-85-454-004, IN-85-424-007, EX-85-021-001

DETAILS,continued

FINDINGS, continued

C). 2. continued

One of the Hobart cans (50 lbs.) of E-7018 weld rod had apuncture in the can and the label describing heat and lotnumber was faded to the point of being unreadable. The QCInspector per QCI-1-1 R12 tagged (Non Operative ConditionTag) the Hobart can to be returned to the warehouse.

In Rod Shack #2; Reactor Building, Unit 1, the followingE-701,8 weld rod was available for issuance.

Arco E 7018 3/32 Heat N28400 Lot 026C006McKay E 7018 1/8 Heat 8578 BN 420

Since the heat and/or lot number is not listed on the issueslip, it can not be determined which weld rod was used where,thus traceability of the weld rod is lost. This violates theASME Code and 10CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion VIII.

QCI 4.01 Storage, issue, and control of welding material, was reviewedthrough all revisions (11 years) starting when QCI 4.01 was QCP 4.1Rev. 0 6/20/75. This was done to determine the controls utilized fortraceability and accountability of weld material issued from thecontrol center,(Rod Shack). QCP4.1 Revision 0 to Revision 6 requiredissue slips to be kept as a duration of construction document.Revision 7 through Revision 4 required non ASME issue slips beretained for 24 hours. ASME issue slips were to be kept untilprocessing was complete and then could be destroyed. Since weld rodissue slips were not kept, traceability to a particular item via-welderwithdrawal versus inspection reports cannot be done, so traceabilityvia documentation can not be established.

During this investigation, it was noted that weld rod stubs and un-usedrods are not returned to the rod shack, thus accountability is notmaintained. This violates QCI 4.01.


CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-85-424-006,IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001,IN-85-352-002, IN-85-424-001,IN-86-167-001, IN-86-150-001,IN-85-454-004, IN-85-424-007,

IN-85-424-004,IN-85-441-003WI-85-041-001IN-85-453-009EX-85-021-001

DETAILS ,continued

FINDINGS, continuedII. Portable Rod Ovens:

A) Requirements:

A review of requirements for extended time for electrodeto the atmosphere was conducted.

exposure

QCI 4.01 Rev. 4, states: "each electrode classification from eachelectrode manufacture shall be tested if desired to extend itsmaximum exposure without drying"..."moisture content of all 5samples shall not exceed 0.4% by weight."...."electrode moisturecontent test in accordance with Section 25 AWS Specification A5.5."

QCI 4.01 Rev.4, states in paragraphs 6.3.1.1.4.3, 6.3.2.5 and6.3.6.5 that: "any electrode that becomes wet shall not be used.-"

B. Documents Reviewed:

The following Singleton Material Engineering Laboratory TestsReports for extended exposure time were reviewed.

MISC-212MISC-376MISC-524

MISC-251MISC-357WB-341

By utilizing weld rod which has been tested for extended exposurethe use of portable ovens is not required. This is allowable perprocedures QCI 4.01/QCI 4.02.

III. Exposure of Electrodes

A. Requirements - See Section IIA in this report.



DETAILS,continued

FINDINGS, continued

III. continued

B. Documents Reviewed:

A review of the NCR log from 1980 to present was conducted tolocate any problems identified with over-exposure of electrodes.

The following nonconformance were noted during this review:NCR 4615, issued 1/27/85, addresses a concern with Westinghousewelding electrodes (E-7018, 1/8", heat 9281F1, lot 22144)

NCR 6198, issued 7-22-85 addresses E7018 over exposure

NCR 6197 issued 7-22-85 addresses the reconditioning (drying) ofcoated electrodes (E7018 - E308-15-E309-15.)

The following is a summary of discrepancies noted in reviewingNCR4615:

(1) Test for moisture content, Singleton Test Report # Misc. 362,was conducted to PS 1.M.3.1 F on 1/28/83. However, thecorrect procedure, PS 1.M.3.1 Rev. 7, was issued 1/13/83.

(2) Memorandum NEB 83-0116-253 dated 1/16/83 states that 0.60%moisture content by weight is acceptable. This is contraryto the requirements of PS 1.M.3.1 and QCI 4.01 (.40%).

3) Memorandum SWE 83-0128-002 dated 1/28/83 stated that the testto be conducted on the Westinghouse Electrodes should bedone at 53 F/50% humidity and, 34 grains moisture/lb dryair. PS l.M.3.1 requires 0.0247 lb/lb dry air or 172.9grains/lb dry air, and the test to be done at 8 and 10 hourintervals. The test was conducted at 4 and 8 hourintervals.

4) Singleton materials engineering laboratory chemical analysistest reports were reviewed for extended exposure.

. CONCERN NO: IN-85-337-002, IN-85-424-006, IN-85-424-004,IN-85-234-001, IN-85-426-001, IN-85-441-003IN-85-352-002, IN-85-424-001, WI-85-041-001IN-86-167-001, IN-86-150-001, IN-85-453-009IN-85-454-004, IN-85-424-007, EX-85-021-001

DETAILS, continued

FINDINGS, continued

III. B., 4., continued

Report #MISC-362 Failed .40% 4 hoursReport #MISC-362 Failed .69% 8 hours

Since the filler metal failed the exposure test it wasto have been removed from site. However,

40,000 lbs. where received 10/27/79 WBN-79-0926-5057018 WIZ 18 1/8 9281F1 - 22144

30 lbs. unaccounted for per NCR 46152450 shipped off site. Requisition #568745

37520 lbs unaccounted for.

Since weld requisition slips from rod shack do not identifyheat and lot to item 37520 as to code/non code use isindeterminate.

However, NCR 4615 Rev. non ASME was closed9/28/83 (Rev. 0 and Rev. 1 was identified ASME)

The following are discrepancies noted in NCR 6198:

Finding 1) NCR 6198 does not address that and lot number of 7018rod, therefore with the possibility of 2 to 4 heat and lotnumbers of 7018 being issued there was no determination as totraceability and accountability as to where used.

No NCR was issued to identify the discrepant condition of theOrelikon Rod E 7018 which was returned to the manufacture forrebaking.

IV. General Concerns:

Per QCI 4.01 earlier revisions, welder's helpers could withdrawfiller metal for a welder if the helper had the welder's card andfiller metal withdraw slip. WEU personnel,stated that QCI 4.01will be revised to delete this and only the welder can obtainfiller metal.

ERT INVESTIGATION REPORT,REV. I PAGE 12 OF 14



DETAILS,continued

FINDINGS, VI. continued

The class on June 5, 1985 was to CTM-065-02 and there is noevidence that the statement: "That steamfitter could withdraw andcontrol weld rod if they had a welder sign the weld issue slip"was made.

OBSERVATIONS:

From ERT Investigation Report #IN-85-052-008, Oerlikon Rodbeen on hold in Hut 12. This filler material was frommanufacturer and' contract as at BFN. Extended exposureperformed. WBN weld rod passed while BFN weld rod failed.sites ordered on the same contract, all rod from both sitesonly) were sent back for rebaking at the manufacturer.

E7018 hadthe same

test wereSince both(Oerlikon

There is no NCR was issued addressing condition, however none ofmaterial in question was issued to the field.

CONCLUSION:

These concerns are substantiated.

The investigation and research of the concerns have determined that theprogrammatic controls do not reflect the original commitments thereforeallowing the lack of traceability control and accountability of fillermetal. Procedures were not fully and strictly implemented and followed Aallowing the following conditions to exist.

1) unused filler metal is not returned to rod shack per QCI4.01/QCI 4.02

2) unused rod is accessible to anyone through lack of proceduralimplementation

i -



DETAILS,continued

CONCLUSIONS, continued

Concerns associated to use of portable rod ovens:

Portable ovens are not used. Instead, coated electrodes are tested forexposure and those electrodes that meet the acceptance criteria areallowed to be kept out in the atmosphere up to 8 hours.

PREPARED BY

REVIEWED BY

DATE

DATE

PAGE 14 OF 14

FINALREQUEST FOR REPORTABILITY EVALUATION

1. Request No. IN-85-337-002(ERT Concern No.) (ID No., if reported)

2. Identification of Item Involved: Filler Metal Control(Nomenclature, system, manuf.,SN,

Model, etc.)3. Description of Problem (Attach related documents, photos,

sketches, etc. )Control of weld rod is insufficient.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------

------------ ---------------------------------------------------------4. Reason for Reportability: (Use supplemental sheets if necessary)

A. This design or construction deficiency,- wer-e. it to haveremained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safetyof operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughoutthe expected lifetime of the plant.

No - Yes X If Yes, Explain: Measures not established to

trace filler metal i.e. heat and lot to specific item by verification of

documentation will allow indeterminate material to be used...AND

B. This deficiency represents a significant ýbreakdown in anyportion of the quality assurance program conducted inaccordance with the requirements of Appendix B.

No - Yes X If Yes, Explain: 10CFR 50 Appendix B Criteria XIII

ASNE III NB/NC/ND/NA 2000 & 4000 ANSI N45.2/ANSI N45.2.5

-7 ---------- --------- ---------------

ORC. This deficiency represents a significant deficiency in final

design as approved and released for construction such that thedesign does not conform to the criteria bases stated in thesafety analysis report or construction permit.

No __)__ Yes . If Yes, Explain:

---------------------------------------

---------------------- - ---------------------------

OR

ERT Form M

REQUEST FOR REPORTABILITY EVALUATION

D. This deficiency represents a significant deficiency inconstructior, of or significant damace to a structure, system orComnOcnent which will require extensive evaluation. extensiveredesign, or extensive repair to meet the criteria ana bases:-stated in the safety analysis reoort or,'..construction oermit orto otherwise establish the adequacy of the structure, system,o-r component to pertfc rm its intended safety function.Nc, If Yes, Explain:

E. This deficiency represents a significant deviation from thePerfo mante specificatjions which will require extensiveevaluation, *XtpnSjv. redesign, or ejtjsjv repair toestablish the adequacy of the structure. system, or componentto Perform its intended safety function.No _._..._yes If Yes, Explain:

- -------- - ---------- - -----IF ITEM vA, - -4• QOR 4C OR 4DOQR 4E ARE MARKED "YES*, JMMflIATELYHAND-CARRY THIS REQUEST AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION TO NSRS.----

This Condition was Identified bys ...- 2?5.ŽI

.ro.P Manager Phone Ext.

ERT Project Manager Phone Ext.Acknowledgment'lof receipt by NSRS

Date Time

ERT Form M

TVA 64 (OS 965) (OP-WP 7-84)



TO : S. Schum, QTC/ERT Program Manager, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant


DATE NOV29 1985SUBJECT: TRANSMITTAL OF ACCEPTED FINAL REPORTS

The following final reports have been reviewed and accepted by NSRS and

are transmitted to you for preparation of employee responses.

IN-85-032-001- '

I-85-710-WBN (IN-85-250-001)P

I-85-674-WBN (IN-85-277-001)1

I-85-705-WBN (IN-85-289-006)1

1-85-852-WBN (IN-85-527-001) /

I-85-501-WBN (IN-86-155-002)W/

I-85-706-WBN (IN-86-314-004)

W. Whitt

Please acknowledge receipt by signing below, copying and returning thisform to J. T. Huffstetler, E3B37 C-K.

NAME DATE

JTHAttachmentscc (Attachments):

R. C. Parker, LP4N44A-CE. R. Ennis, WBNW. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

I 0047U


QUALITYTECHNOLOGY

\ COMPANY

P.O. BOX 600 Sweetwater, TN 37874 (615)365-4414

ERT INVESTIGATION REPORT

CONCERN NO: IN-85-032- 001

CONCERN: Past piping cal6ulations were not adequately analyzed.Recontact has determined that calculations are being reviewed and theindividual wishes to drop this concern. -

INVESTIGATIONPERFORMED BY: Charles Wilson

DETAILS

PERSONNEL CONCTACTED:

1CUMENTS REVIEWED:

On May 16, 1985 at 7:00 p.m. ERT Investigator contacted the concernedindividual by telephone at CI's residence. CI stated the concern is nowresolved because the calculations are now being reanalyzed by CivilEngineering in the Office of Engineering in Knoxville. CI stated thatthe concern is no longer valid and should be dropped. CI was informed",by ERT that this concern has been dropped-. 0

PERFORMED BY

hiIEWED BY:

DATE

PAGE 1 OF 1

r~ ALREQUEST FOR REPORTABILITY EVALUATION


2. Identification of Item Involved: _PipinCalculations(Nomenclature, system, manuf.,SN,

... Model, etc.)3. Description of Problem (Attach related documents, photos,

sketches, etc. )Past piping calculations were not adequately analyzed. Recontact has determined

that calculations are bein& reviewed.

---------------- --------------------------------------------------

--------------------- M;----------------------------------

4. Reason for Reportability: (Use supplemental sheets if necessary)

A. This design or construction deficiency, were it to haveremained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safetyof operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughoutthe expected lifetime of the plant.

No X Yes If Yes, F:plain:z-

-------------------------------------

~~~--------- --------------- ------------- -------------

AND "B. This deficiency represents a significant breakdown in any

portion of the quality assurance program conducted inaccordance with the requirements of Appendix B.

No X__- Yes If Yes, Explain:EEEEEEEEEEEEEE

------------------ ------------------------------

ORC. This deficiency represents a significant deficiency in final


No X Yes ---- If Yes,.Explain:.

-- R-----------------------------------

65----- ------------- -------- ---------------------

ERT Form M

T7 AL

REQUEST FOR REPORTABILITY EVALUATION


2. Identification of Item Involved:_,__Pip:in Calculations

(Nomenclature, system, manuf.,SN,Model, etc. )

3. Description of Problem (Attach related documents, photos,sketches, etc.)Past piping calculations were not adequately analyzed. Recontact has determined

__that__calculations are bein_ reviewed.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Reason for Reportability: (Use supplemental sheets if necessary)

A. This design or construction deficiency, were it to haveremained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safetyof operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughoutthe expected lifetime of the plant.

No _ X Yes If Yes, Explain: -

----------------------------------------

AND -B. This deficiency represents a significant breakdown in any

portion of the quality assurance program conducted inaccordance with the requirements of Appendix B.

No _X Yes - If Yes, Explain:___

----------------------------------------------------------

------------- :-----------------------------------------

ORC. This deficiency represents a siqnificant deficiency in final


No X Yes If Yes,. Explain:

S--------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------

-

OR

ERT Form M

TENNESSEE VALLEY A.UTHORITY

NUCLEAFR SAFETY RP'IEW STAFF

NSRS INVESTIG'TICN REPORT NO. T-3=-1 -i t-W-BK

EMPLOYEE CONC(ER1 41 N-6,:-.50-,.0 1

MILESTONE6

REINSFECTIO OF SY$-TE,,M F2 PIPE SUPPORTS

=EAD INVESTIGATOR:

*STIGATOR:

REVIEWED . BY:

APPROVED BY:

Nc'vember-l-•( S

A. M. Gentryry

J.J. i:K.niah-tiy

A. Harris-on

Date

DaNt e -

D~t 7

SUBJECT:

H LJ"S F .JINVES.. & .L I .ý.~4

BACKG• UND

NSRS has investigated Emplojee Concern N-85-5c,-, idetified bQuality Technology Company (QTO) Emplovee Response Team during the WattsBar Employee Concern Frogr-am that stated:

Craft (known) on second shift wasre.uested to have pioesupports re-insoected by 0. C. after work on these hangerswas performed without-appropriate work releases. C/I isnot certain whether these pipe supoorts were ever re-inspected. This occurred during Jan. or Feb. 1985- inReactor Building #2 on pipe supports in System 32 near theraceway area and accumulator rooms. Construction- deart-ment concern.

!I. SCOPE -.

The investigation was conducted by reyiewing applicabie commitments,requirements, and procedures, and interviewing Construction personnel.


A. Interviews were conducted with' Construction Engineering personnelwho acknowledged that they were aware of system Z2 supoorts in thedescribed area that were removed or altered. The. specifi: time cfthe tampering could not be determined.

B. The tamoering was documented on Ncnconformance Reports (NCR)6091 RI, 6135, and 6149 R! written 6/17/85 6/17/85, and 6"26/•'5respectively.

C. The resolution in each case was to reinspect and redccament thesesupports. The required reinspection and redocumentation has beencompleted .


Conc.usions

The employee concern is substantiated. However, the concern ismitigated by the fact that the supoorts were addressed by nonconformancereports.

Recommendations

None.

,ENNE•SE -Y.-,.,LLE. AUTHOR ITY

NUCLEF'Wi'. SAFETY R=-VIEW STAFF

NSRS INVESTIGATION REFORT -=I-,5--• .74-.eN,

EMPLTOYEE CONEN--r T N-35- 7 7•0.1

MILESTONE 7

INT-L-IT-ONOF P.i""E WITHOUT Dn", 0rS

DATES OF INVESTIGATTION:

LEAD 'IN,.VE-STIGATO0R-

'November I.S-l?. i,:pc,

Date

REVIEWEID BY:

AFPMOVED BY:

J. J. K -,g tly

-~-h- ---- --- -- -

-ari aon

Date

Z l-te

SUB"JECT:

";.~ ~~ ~~~ 7-• • • . ':,:' • £ • • '. ('C • ' :' :':g '•. ' '

•• ." • " " . .. . .. . ....

S AC GEuN

NSRS ha-= investicated Emolovee Concera-- , ent lv.ie bth,uali tv Technoloag_ Commanv an,,(ATCC Einlovee Res mcnse Team that stated:

Craft (known) was instructed by foreman (name kCnown) toin=stal. ." ..e run in turb4-e building wi -thout an- design

drawincs fromm engineercing in the work ,aoi.::age. ThismLcurred netween Set., 192Z to Semt. 1084. Constructiondemartment czncern. C/I could not crv`Z r ar-v additional

setai,/s,- i - cs.

I:. SCOPE

The investigat.Zn was czntucted by reviewinq the aoli - -ca ; -e Commitns.Irments. and _ and by ccndlutiino interview- with

Con1Struction Z ersnrZMei.

Tf. £!SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Interviews were cmnduotea with Construction Encineering mersonnelc-ih re veald tto-• rie in st aIIation =s ot t; tyoe in the turbinebuildino are not safety, related and are not within t-he szoce f the

oU SIt aS SLL r a, n ce C roram. This was conf rmed by rev1ewino theWBN C-List a- t-e WBNP S-ýstem Descrizti ons i.lanua..

B. Three d:fferent worI" m ac:aages were located th t had -n._stallations of

3-inch Mize in- the turbine M i n durin-Cthis ti i SZ;e -C Te- azackaea=_ were reviewe- and it wa.s noted hat thie w o C t e d n ewas described. t-,at drawins, were listed, and tfhlat, drawinos wereicIuded. I was also Mn-e-d that theese insta-Iations were some of

the last in t- e _i rbne b1L-,1nc and cZnse uentlY were "fieldrc1ted" w i t h t hem i -. al :on.+ ou r at on noted on field chan.n reoue tsa p. the Fff ic.. tf s 011 " EnCi neer i no (C. The CE-apc.,..- cn=,... e.•.~eie later i nc .-orate_ -Into as-constructed drawinos. Due -O thenature o. *the wa this work was done, it is likely tIhat the foremann-tr"-ted,. the- craft mersonnel to beoin at oint A and F-to: na -intB and route the CiMe based on est - isa h. sed=Z craft practices. Therewere no adverse effects on r outi4,•in, the nioe in rhit J-s manner.

IV. C ,C,, , .. , ND "F. - ,

Con u lsi onsThe concern IS sub=tnti ated since thereb is a nrobatilit' that he_ work

was dons in the manner de scribed. However. the concern is mitigated bythe fact t1-1,lat this is an t ractic= and was used onnonsafetv-related work.

Rec mmendat :ons

None.


NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF"

NSRS INVEST I GATION REPORT NO. I W5 -W-BN

EMPLOYEE C'ONCERN I ,-8.-,8 -,,l

MILESTONE 6

SUBJECT:

DATE OF INVESTILGATION:

INV'E STI1GAT OR:

IEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

CABLE OVERHEATING DUE TO FIRE-RETRDIN- C0QT TNG

November 19, .11-•,-.

o R. .

-ir,+th

-- z

1M,/A.Harrison zate

E. ACKG.ROUND

Concern IN-35-239-0'06 was received by the Quality Technology Comoan-y(OTC) Emoloyee Response Team that stated:

Vimasco was applied to cables prematurely. Penetrationsand conduits were sealed. Vimascc was determined to keepheat in and deteriorated the insulation. This applicationwas di scontinued 112 years ago but the Vimasco alreadyapplied has not been -removed.

Note: Further information obtained from QTC clarified that the concernwas related to the deterioration of the. cable-jacket insulation due topotential excessive heat buildup caused by the Vimasco coating.

The concern implied that the Vimasco czating was discontinued because ofthe determination that it ke_-s heat within the cables sufficient to'cause unacceptable deterorat_.on of the cable-jacket insUlatio6. Theactual reason for discontinuing large-scale use was because it had beendetermined that the application of fire-retardant coatings (such as

-imasco) to MEE-M-"ualified cables does not significantlv enhance thelevel of fire protection. This was brought out in the following.A. L. M. Mills memo to Harold Dention (NRC) dated 10./,8/S4 . NME 84..022

8'3 ~)

B. John Hutton memo to Those Listed dated 12/7/84 (L.. 2S II8 "02)

C. F. W. Chandler memo to• . A. Raulston dated 2/28/85 (EEB 850223 ?47)

Since TVA primarily purchases IEEE-ZS3-qualified cables, the Vimascocoating was therefore discontinued for most cases. The exceptions arepresented in WBN plant procedures MAi-14 and QCF-1.55 and design drawing45NE?1-1 M. Since the existing Vimasco coating did not comoromise thelevel of fire protection and because of the removal difficulty., it Wasleft in place as installed.

I I. SCOPE

NSRS Investioation Report I-89-5u-WBN was iound to encompass theconcern related to cable overheating due to Vimasco coating. Theinvestigation findings in that report therefore apply here.

Note: Overheating is defined to be any temmerature conditions inducedin the cable that exceed the cabling specifications. NSRS InvestigationReport -85-569-WBN addresses the amoacity effects necessary to maintainacceptable cable temperatures.

I!I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

None; not reinvestigated.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.Refer to NSRS investigation Report I-S,-•9-WBN. No additional responseis necessary. This item is closed; corrective action is tracked byI-65-569-WBN.



NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-65-85.2-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-95-5527-.1

SMILESTONE 1

CABLE APPARENTLY PULLED WITHOUT FUSE LINIK

DATES OF INVESTIGATION:

LEAD INVESTIGATOR:

. STT3TOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

October 31-November 14, 1985

P. Wherm n

/t-- ", -rSDate

Date

//- 2 7-e'Dat-e

A. Harrison

SUBJECT:

BACKGROUND

NSRS has investigated Employee Concern IN-85-527-001 which QualityTechnology Company (QTC) identified during the Watts Bar EmployeeConcern Program. The concern is worded:

An A-train cable was apparently pluled without +use link.Supervisors said to cut off excess cable even with adja-cent cable that had been pulled correctly. When a craftworker wrote a note documenting this order, the supervisortold the crew to hold off because "day shift might besetting us up." The supervisor said he would send the OCinspector on a wild goose chase so craft could cut the wire.

Additional information was requested and received from QTC. Thisadditional information consisted of:

Unit: 2Date of Occurrence: 3/7/85Time of Occurrence: 6:30 p.m.Location: A8 0 Line, Elevation 737 - junction box 8.6: brown train cable

II. SCOPE

The issues of the investigation were determined from the stated concernto be that cable was pulled without a fuse link (break rope); and, craft

_ supervisor wanted to cover, up the fact that cable had been pulledimproperl y.

Incorrect cable pulls have been the subject of the following previousSnvesti•ations. I-85-466-WBN, I-S-467-WBN, I-a5-56S-WBN, I-•B5-573-WBN,I-85-5iS-WBN, I-85-575-WBN (previous 6 investigations were issued as asingle report), and I-85-06-WBN.

Based on the description given in the concern, NSRS reviewed the programand procedures related to cable installations. Interviews were madewith Electrical Quality Control personnel. NCRs issued around thetimeframe of the catle pull were reviewed to determine if one existed asa result of the cable pulling in question. Visual inspections of thegeneral area were made to determine if the junction box could be located.


A. Based on the additional information received on the concern, thelocation of junction box 836 was determined. This junction box waslocated inside the reactor building, not in the auxiliary building.This junction box contained no class 1E cables. The originalconcern stated that cable was an A-train cable; the additionalinformation stated the cable was a B-train cable. This conflictinginformation was not detrimental to the investigation since bothdescriptions indicate that it wasa class IE cable.

B. A review of NCRs issued during this timeframe was made to detyrmineif this concern had been documented with a Nonconforming ConditionReport. This review revealed that NCR 6001 was initiated on3/13/85, six days following the event in the concern. The NCR wasworded as folows

After running into pulling tension problems andstopping due to inspectors concerns.

The following Gca~bles were pulled approximately20 feet without an inspector present and apparentlywithout anyone to monitor pull tension:

2-2PM-1-4425-B These are Appendix R cables.2-2PM-3-4456-B2-2PM-3-4436-B2-2PM-3-4496-B2-2PM-3-4498-B"•

2-2PM-3-4501-B

These cables were contained inside conduit 2-2_M-292-740C-B.

Location: Aux. Bldg. A 10 0 Elev. 737 ceiling.

Apparent Cause: Unknown

Further investigation revealed that conduit 2-2. 'M-2• 2-7400-Bterminates in junction box 830. An additional contact with CTCverified the correct ji•nction box number to be S30 instead of 836.Based on the matching of the timeframe, cable types. location, andjunction box number 830, it was determined that the NCR was relatedto the employee concern.


A. Conclusions

The concern that a cable was pulled without a fuse link wassubstantiated to the degree that cables were nulled without aninspector present and, apparently, no one present to monitor pulltension. Although the concern about the craft supervisor wanting tocover up incorrect pulls was not specifically substantiated, pullingcable without an inspector present is a violation of procedure.This violation of procedure indicates either a lack of understandingof the procedures or a willingness of person(s) responsible for thecable pulling to cover up or conceal installation problems.

This particular incidence was corrected through the NCR process.The cables in question were cLt and abandoned in place. New cableswere installed. This concern is typical of other concerns relatedto the cable pulling problem.

B. Recommendations

The soecific resolution to this concern has been implemented throughthe NCR process. The overall cable pulling concern will be resolvedthrough NSRS Reoort I-85-06-WBN which encompasses the programmatic

issues of this concern. No further specific action is required.


NUCLEAR, SAFETY REVIEW STAFF

NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-501-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN I N-86- •5"-002

MILESTONE 6

HANGER WELDS

DATES OF INV)EST IGTI ON: Octobr1Nj~br2 3

IN ESIGATOR:

EWE ED BY:

AF'F'l OVED BY:

P. R. Ea sedae

S Ha-rs or,

SUBJECT:

Date

Date

Date,

BACKGROUND

NSRS has investioated Emplovee Concern IN-86-15•-•02 which QualitvTechnology Companv (QTC) identified during the Watts Bar EmployeeConcern Program. The concern is worded:

Hanger has unacceptable welds. Raceway, RB-#2,AZ-,5-, Elev. 702', Hanger No. -- 62A24Z.

I I. SCOPE

A. Unacceotable welds made during fabrication and installation ofhanger 2-62A-245 was determined to be the primary concern.

B. The concern was .nvei '. e tgaed by reviewing associated cmcuments.interviewin• apcropriate per.sonnel, and Visually insoecting thesubject hanger location point. The hanger work package was reviewedand discussed with the Hanger Ena-ineer, Hanger Seneral Foreman, andHanger Quality Control (0C) Supervisor.

.SUMMARY OF FINDINS

A. Recuirements and Commitments

1. Gner-al Construction Specification G-43 "Su'port andInstallation o. FPiping Systems in Category I Structures"

2. General Construction Specification G-2?C, Process SpecificationO.C.1., (RI), "Soeciication for Welding of StructuresFabricated in Accordance with AISC Rejuirements for Buildings"

3. General Construction Soecifcation " -29C, • rocess Soecification3...4(2) Wa•tts Bar Nuclear Plant Final Visual Weld

Examination"

4. MCP-2.04, "Fabrication, Erection, and Inspection of Structuraland Miscellaneous Steel"

5. CFC-4.1.-VTC. "Final Visual Weld Examination'

6. Mechanical Hanoer Drawing General Notes 47A050

7. Hanger Drawing 2-62A--245

B. Findings

1. The WBN Hanger Information and Tracking Computer Printout,located in Hanger Engineering and Hanger QC, was reviewed toobtain a current installation status on Chemical and VolumeControl,. System 62, hanger 2-62--24Z. The computer printoutshowed the hanger as being in work with no welds accemted by

ah Hanoer OC as of I./2'•/'5.

2. Resoons•ble personnel from Hanger Engineering, Hanger CC. andConstruction Steamfitter Superintendent's Office wereinterviewed to obtain additional information on th itoy-

hanoer 2-62,-24-. The interviews revealed that in March 1984Design issued Hole Order H71 which controlled the time andnumber of hangers-worked at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. On 5/17/25Design released hanger 2-6ZA-241 for work. Hanger Engineeringconducted a walkdown insoection and found that the hanoer hadalready been installed. However, Hanger Engineering was notable to retrieve documentation to showlithat the anchor ml-ltests and weld inspections had been performed by' Hanger CCpersonnel. Therefore, the hanger was released to hanger craftpersonnel for inspection preparation. Craft personnel contactedCC to obtain an anchor pull test. The CC insoector could notperform the pull test due to the hanger base plate location andinitiated IRN H-TEA-82. At this point, craft personnelevaluated the base plate location and inspected the hangerwelds. The hanger weids were unacceptable due to excessiveporosity. Anchor pull tests could not be performed until thehanger base plate was removed from the wall. The combination ofrepairing bad welds and removing the hanger base plate from thewall would have been very timeconsuming. Therefore, craftpersonnel determined that it would be more cost efficient tzbuild a new hanger than to prepare the existino one for CCinspection. Han 2-6Ze-.45 was cut out on Work Release 248wZ.

.3 Inspection of hanger 2- 6 2A-245 loc•tion moint confirmed that theinitial hanger had been cut out and that the replacement hangerwas in work.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDAT IONS

Conclusions

The concern that hanger Z-62A-245 hat unaccectable welds was notsubstantiated. The condition of the wels on the previous version ofhanger 2-62A-245 could not be determined since it had bsen taken down.The current in-work hanger did nct have unacceptable welds at the timeof this investigation.

Recommendertions

None.



NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-S5-706-WBN

EMPLOYEE CONCERN IN-86-314-004

MILESTONE 6

-UE ,ECT: CABLE SEPARATION

DATE OF INYESTIGATION: November 22, 1935

i NVEST I GATOR: /- F. Owen~s

Q".lEW4ED BY:

:/,j th - - - - -

Date

Date

APPROVED" BY: /7 ,A. Harriso

I. BACKGROUND

Concern IN-86-314-004 was received by t-he CualitV Technology CompanyEmployee Response Team thit stated: "Cable separation is inadequate andin many cases nonewistent:"

Note: Based on other concerns related to this same sub ject, it isassumed the concern on inadequate cable separation does not addressseparation between redundant safety divisions but is concerned withseparation between individual cables within a respective cable tray.

II. SCOPE

NSRS Investigation Report i-85-570-WBN was found to encompass the aboveconcern. The investigation findings in that report therefore apply here.


None; not reinvestigated.


* Rfer to NSRS Investigation Report I-05-57-WBN. No additional responseis necessary. This item is closed; corrective action is tracked byI-85-570-WBN.

TVA 64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7-84)



TO : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant


DATE : NOV 2 9 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL


Subject MAINTENANCE/OPERABILITY OF PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR/1-RM-90-104


and associated prioritized recommendations for your action/disposition.

It is requested that you respond to this report and the three attached

Priority 2 [P2] recommendations by December 20, 1985 . Should you

have any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone 2277.

S Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes No X



G. B. Kirk, SQNR. C. Parker, LP4N44A-CQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantJ. H. Sullivan, SQNW. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)






SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE AND OPERABILITY OF PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR1-RM-90-104


INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

//N. T. HENRICH

R. C. SAUER

M. S. KIDD

DAT

DATE

DATE

I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted todetermine the validity of an expressed employee concern as received by.Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT). TheConcern of Record, as summarized on the Employee Concern AssignmentRequest Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-051-001, stated:

"Sequoyah: The Radiation Monitor (1-RM-90-104) has notbeen maintained and is not always operable."

It was also noted that no further information cpuld be provided by QTCas it would compromise confidentiality.

II. SCOPE

A. The scope of the investigation was defined by the concern of recordand entailed investigating two issues in order to either validate orrefute the concern.

1. Process Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-104 has not been maintained.

2. Process radiation monitor 1-RM-90-104 is not always operable.

B. Plant procedures which define the calibration and maintenancerequirements of process radiation monitor 1-RM-90-104 werereviewed. Instrument calibration records were reviewed to determinecalibration history, and plant maintenance requests (MRs) werereviewed to determine maintenance history.



1. Sequoyah FSAR Section 11.4.4 (ref. 8) defines the calibrationand maintenance requirements for process and effluent radio-logical monitoring systems of which 1-RM-90-104 is part.Specifically this section requires the following.

a. A monthly response check on each monitor. This responsecheck includes tripping the ratemeter setpoints and checkingthe high radiation and instrument malfunction annunciation.

b. Instrument calibration every 18 months for each monitor.The calibration procedure includes:

(1) Recalibration of each monitor using nuclide sources.

(2) Electronic recalibration of the control room ratemetersand recorders.

1 0036T

(3) Verification that "Instrument Malfunction" annunciationis initiated on loss of power, low monitor flow, etc.

(4) Verification that "High Radiation" annunciation andinterlock functions are initiated on upscale ratemetertrip.

In addition, maintenance will be performed if abnormalitiesare detected during any of the above checks. Unscheduledmaintenance will be performed as required.

2. NQAM, Part II, Section 2.4, dated 9/8/82 defines ComplianceInstrumentation as installed process instrumentation which isused to determine or verify compliance with plant technicalspecification requirements for parameters such as flows,pressures, temperatures, levels, voltages, and currents.

3. TI-54, Rev. 8, "Compliance Instruments," (ref. 10) implementsthe NQAM requirements on compliance instrumentation and furtherdefines Tech Spec Instrumentation as installed instruments orequipment which either has a specific allowable value listed inthe plant technical specifications or is required'to be operableduring at least one operational mode by the technicalspecifications.

B. Findings

1. 1-RM-90-104 is a liquid process radiation monitor which isdesigned to continuously monitor the reactor coolant normalletdown for indication of reactor coolant system (RCS) radiationlevels which may be indicative of failed fuel, activation ofcorrosion products, etc.

2. 1-RM-90-104 does not perform any automatic control or protectivefunctions. The monitor is used for indication and alarmfunctions only. The radiation monitor's high radiation andinstrument failure alarms, analyzer readout module, and stripchart recorder are located on panel O-H-12 in the main controlroom. It also provides an input to the technical support centerdata system as paint R9013. This monitor is thus intended toprovide the operator with continuous monitoring capability ofRCS radiation levels.

3. Other redundant means exist for monitoring RCS radiation levels;the gross failed fuel detector and daily manual sampling andanalysis of RCS effluent.

0036T

4. Sequoyah procedures SQA 134 (ref. 13), Appendix A, Part IV,implements criteria for instrumentation defined as criticalstructures, systems, and components (CSSC). 1-RM-90-104 is nota CSSC instrument based on this document. In addition, theSequoyah Quality Assurance List (Q List) identifies thisinstrument as a nonquality assurance device.

5. 1-RM-90-104 is not a technical specification instrument (it isnot specifically addressed by plant technical specifications).

6. Sequoyah procedure TI-54 (ref. 8) defines those instrumentsrequired to verify compliance with a plant technicalspecification. 1-RM-90-104 is not a compliance instrument basedon this document.

7. Instrument Maintenance Instruction (IMI) -90 (ref. 1)establishes the frequency for testing and calibrating theplant's process radiation monitoring system including monitor1-RM-90-104. Although RM-90-104 is not a CSSC, technicalspecification, or compliance instrument, this IMI referencesthree surveillance instructions (SI) which are applicable tothis monitor, SI-204 (ref. 2), -205 (ref. 3), and -206 (ref. 4).

8. SI-204 (ref. 2) establishes monthly functional test require-ments for 1-RM-90-104. This procedure functionally tests: (1)the upscale rate meter trip (high radiation alarm), and (2) therate meter failure trip (instrument malfunction) in the ana-lyzer readout module electronics. It also adjusts (calibrates)the high voltage supply to the detector.

These monthly functional tests are being performed on1-RM-90-104 as required by the SI.

9. SI-205 (ref. 3) establishes 18-month calibration requirementsfor 1-RM-90-104. This SI was scheduled to be performedSeptember 27, 1982; February 25, 1984; and June 6, 1985. Ineach instance, 1-RM-90-104 was not calibrated. Data sheets weremarked to show the monitor as being "out-of-service." Referencewas made to design change request (DCR) 1596 (ref. 5) which waswritten to remove the monitor.

Note that Appendix B, page 1, to SI-205 shows 1-RM-90-104 as acompliance instrument. This is in conflict with TI-54 (ref.10). Based on discussions with Compliance Section, it wasdetermined that the reference in SI-205 is incorrect.

0036T

10. SI-206 (ref. 4) establishes the 12-week sample flow calibrationand functional test requirements for 1-RM-90-104. The SI wasscheduled to be run on this monitor June 22, 1984;September 14, 1984; December 7, 1984; March 1, 1985; andMay 24, 1985. In each instance the calibration and functionaltests were not performed on this monitor. Data sheets weremarked to show the monitor as being "out-of-service" andreference was made to DCR 1596 (ref. 5).

11. DCR 1596 (ref. 5) initially written in 1982 requests theremoval of 1-RM-90-104. This DCR is currently under review bythe Office of Engineering. During normal operation, themonitor reads greater than 106 cpm. This is the last decadeof the monitor's range (101 to 107 cpm). In addition, itis above the alarm setpoint of 5 X 105 cpm. The monitor isthus ineffective in detecting small increases in RCS radiationlevels.

A temporary alteration (TACF 82-1001-90) was made to reduce thesensitivity of the monitor, but it did not alleviate theproblem.

12. A review of available plant maintenance requests (MRs) showsthat at least 12 MRs have been worked on instrument loop1-R-90-104 since December 1980. The majority of these havebeen on recorder RR-90-104 and the monitor sample pump. Onlytwo MRs were available to document maintenance on the monitoritself. There are currently no outstanding MRs on thisinstrument loop. It should be noted that since the monitor isnot CSSC, all MRs on this monitor are not necessarily kept onpermanent file.


A. Conclusion

The concerns of record were substantiated. However, the monitor isnot a technical specification instrument, nor is it a complianceinstrument, nor is it used in any analysis to detect or mitigate anaccident. In addition, the monitor performs no automatic safetyfunction depended upon during a fuel failure accident. Therefore,failure to maintain the instrument is of no safety significance.

0036T

B. Recommendations

1. I-85-613-SQN-01, Disposition of DCR 1596

Evaluation of DCR 1596, which the plant has submitted forremoval of 1-RM-90-104, should be expedited. This DCR ispriority 7 and scheduled to be worked post unit 2, cycle 3. Ifthe monitor is not needed, it should be removed from service.If the evaluation of the DCR determines that the monitor isrequired, then the monitor should be modified or replaced on apriority basis. (P2]

2. I-85-613-SQN-02, Removal of 1-RM-90-104 in SIs 204, 205, and 206

Since 1-RM-90-104 is not a technical specification or complianceinstrument, the calibration of this monitor and other processradiation monitors in this category should be renumbered from200 series surveilance instructions and incorporated intosurveillance instructions numbered greater than 500. [P21

3. I-85-613-SQN-03, Revision of IMI-90

IMI-90 should be revised to reflect changes made as a result ofcorrective actions taken in resolving recommendationI-85-613-SQN-02 above. [P2]

0036T


1. SQN Instrument Maintenance Instruction IMI-90, Radiation MonitoringSystem Units 1 and 2, revision 6, 9/27/84.

2. SI-204, "Functional Test for Radiation Monitoring System (monthly) Units0 and 1," Revision 15, 8/14/85.

3. SI-205, "Channel Calibrations for Radiation Monitoring Systems (18months) Units 0 and 1," Revision 11, 7/11/85.

4. SI-206, "Radiation Monitoring System Sample Flow Calibrations andFunctional Tests, Units 1 and 0 (12 weeks)," Revision 13, 7/13/84.

5. DCR 1596, dated April 26, 1982, and Revision 1 dated September 15, 1983.

6. Temporary Alteration (TACF) - 82-1001-90 dated December 31, 1981.

7. TI-18, "Radiation Monitoring Units 1 and 2," Revision 18, May 31, 1985.

8. SQN FSAR Section 11.4, Process and Effluent Radiological MonitoringSystems.

9. SQN Unit 1 Technical Specifications.10. TI-54,-"Compliance Instruments - Units 0 and 1," Revision 8, August 5,

1985.

11. IMS Calibration Cards for Loop 1-R-90-104.

12. Plant Maintenance Requests for Loop 1-R-90-104.

13. SQA 134, "Critical Structure, Systems, and Components (CSSC) List,"Revision 7, August 12, 1985.

0036T

TVA'64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7-84)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT /W


OTO : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant


DATE : N0V 29 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL


Subject QC HOLDPOINT SIGNOFF VIOLATION


No response or corrective action is required for this report. It is

being transmitted to you for information purposes only. Should you have

any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone 2277

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes No XIDirector, NSRS/Designee






NSRS INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85--346-SQN


SUBJECT: QC HOLDPOINT SIGNOFF VIOLATION

DATES OF INVESTIGATION: SEPTEMBER 23-30, 1985

INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

E.(F. HARWELL

R. C. SAUER"

M. 1. "KIbD

Z//Z - /IsKTE

Date

D AE/

I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted todetermine the validity of an expressed employee concern as received bythe Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT). Theconcern of record, as summarized on the Employee Concern AssignmentRequest Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-054-001, stated:

"Sequoyah - QC holdpoints are signed off by craftsmen(craft known) performing the work. Personal friendshipbetween inspectors and craft allow this to occur withoutbeing reported. Time frame is between 1979 to 1984. Nospecifics provided."

Further information was requested from the ERT follow-up group regardingwhether this concern involved Construction or Nuclear Power-typeholdpoints, type work, and crafts involved. QTC relayed that the CIidentified the crafts as Construction fitters and welders. Although theCI did not identify the type work, it is assumed that it dealt withwelding during pipe installation. The CI also identified anotherindividual (individual A) who was familiar with the above practice.

II. SCOPE

A. The scope of the investigation is defined by the concern of recordwhich entails determining if QC holdpoints had been signed off bycraftsmen because of their friendliness with inspectors during theperiod 1979 to 1984.

B. Construction procedures and instructions were reviewed to determinethe documentation required for welding, fitup, and QC holdpointsignoff that were applicable for the timeframe of interest. Arandom review of computer weld data cards was performed, includingoperation checklists and individual inspections, for welds performedduring the subject concern time period. Interviews were conductedwith 18 personnel of various welding-related backgrounds includingfitter welders, fitters, fitter foremen, welding engineers, weldinspectors, lead inspectors, records clerk, and supervision. Alsointerviewed was the individual named by the CI as having knowledgeconcerning this type occurrence.



1. ANSI Standard B31.1.0 (1967), "Power Piping" - Governedinstallation and inspection requirements for piping systemsother than TVA Safety Class A, B, C, and D.

0044U

2. ANSI Standard B31.7 (1969) and 1970 Addendum, "Nuclear PowerPiping" - Governed installation and inspection requirements for'TVA Safety Class A, B, C, and D piping systems.

3. CONST-QAP 9.01, "Assignment of Special Processes."

4. TVA General Construction Specification G-29, "ProcessSpecifications for Welding, Heat Treatment, NondestructiveExamination, and Allied Field Fabrication Operations."

5. TVA 47B333 series drawings, "Weld and Nondestructive ExaminationProcedure Assignment."

B. Findings

1. The Sequoyah Construction Procedures and Instructions wereevaluated and determined that adequate controls were written toprohibit signoff of QC holdpoints by anyone other than aqualified, certified inspector. The use of computerizedoperation checklists, individual inspection data cards, andshift inspection logs provided a crosscheck to ensure thatinspections were properly done by qualified individuals. Whenholdpoints were missed, corrective actions were taken to rectify.

2. Construction Procedure W-3 "Weld Procedure Assignment andWelding Surveillance" did allow the foreman to verify preheat onwelds on subsequent shiftwork after it had been released forwelding by the Weld Inspection Unit. He denoted this on theback of the operation checklist. Also, he could note anyadditional welders that worked on the weld joint. This normallyapplied to heavy support welds. However, per discussions withwelding engineers and lead inspectors for critical pressureboundary welds, an inspector was present almost on a continualbasis. In addition, to assure compliance with weldingparameters, a general welding surveillance of each work area wasrequired twice per shift by Standard Operating ProcedureSOP-700, "Weld Surveillance".

3. A random sample of weld data cards was compared to the operationchecklist and no discrepancies were found.

4. For nonsafety class welds, the craft foreman was and isresponsible for assuring that correct procedure was used,correct filler material was used, and a sound weld was installed.

5. After the weld data cards were turned in, the QC Records Unitchecked the cards for proper signoff by a qualified individualwith up-to-date certifications and signature verification. Anydiscrepancies were returned to the Welding Inspection Unit forcorrection or resolution.

0044U


A. The allegation appears to be unsubstantiated for the followingreasons:

0 The individual identified by the concerned individual as havingknowledge concerning this problem did not acknowledge seeing anycraft personnel signing any QC documentation or know of anyinstances where it occurred.

* The weld documentation system with all its crosschecks andreviews would have a high probability of not allowing thesignoff of a QC holdpoint by an unqualified individual.

0 None of the people interviewed knew of any instance where acraftsman signed off on a QC holdpoint.

0 Since inspections were performed by the next availableinspector, assurance of getting a particular inspector (personalfriend) could not happen with any degree of certainty.

B. The concerned individual may have witnessed the signing of theoperation checklist on the back for preheat verification andadditional welder assignments (as permitted by procedures) andmisconstrued this as a QC holdpoint signoff. The operationchecklist was considered, at that time, to be an information tool toassist the foreman in controlling the work and not a QC record,except when additional welders were noted on the back for completingthe weld.

0044U

SEQUOYAH - WELD SIGNOFF CHRONOLOGY

before Jan. 1977

January 31, 1977

February 11, 1977

April 25, 1977

October 14, 1977

December 4, 1978

Welding was governed by M-3, "Welding Surveillance andWeld Procedure Assignment," and M-7, "Erection andDocumentation Requirements for Piping Systems"

Joe Wilkins, New Project Construction Engineer, mandatedthat the welding records be computerized. W-3, "WeldProcedure Assignment and Welding Surveillance," was issuedto use computer data cards for welding documentation.

M-3 deleted.

Standard Operating Procedure SOP-700, "WeldingSurveillance," was issued that required each rod shackinspection team to perform a random surveillance ofwelding in their area twice each shift and documentresults.

W-3 was revised to include an operation checklist thatidentified welding procedure, size and configuration ofweld joint, and QC holdpoints. Holdpoints had to besigned off on the checklist before next operation was tocommence. The operation checklist remained in the area ofthe weld.

W-3 revised to allow craft foreman to verify preheat onsubsequent shifts and sign back of checklist. However,the initial inspection, fitup release, and preheatverification was done by the Weld Inspection Unitinspector.

0044U

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED IN INVESTIGATION I-85--346-SQNAND REFERENCES

1. SNP Construction Procedure M-3, Revision 2, dated May 1, 1975, "WeldingSurveillance and Weld Procedure Assignment"

2. SNP Construction Procedure M-7, Revision 14, dated November 19, 1976,"Erection and Documentation Requirements for Piping Systems"

3. SNP Construction Procedure W-3, Revision 3, datedDecember 4, 1978,"Weld Procedure Assignment and Welding Surveillance"

4. SNP Standard Operation Procedure SOP-700, Revision 0, dated April 25, 1977,"Weld Surveillance"

5. SNP Inspection Instruction No. 63, Revision 13, dated May 20, 1983,"Piping Inspection"

6. TVA General Construction Specification G-29, "Process Specifications forWelding, Heat Treat, Nondestructive Examination, and Allied FieldFabrication Operations" dated March 9, 1983

7. TVA General Construction Specification G-43, "Support and Installation ofPiping Systems in Category I Structures," Revision 8, dated August 8,1985

8. Microfilm copies of computer weld data cards for various bIDE examinationand operation checklist cards

9. Standard Operation Procedure SOP-550, Revision 0, dated December 14, 1977,"Review of Quality Assurance Records"

Note: Document Revision Histories were also evaluatedfor the entire timeframe in question.

5 0044U

t TVA 64; OS-9-65) (OP-WP-5-85)


Memorandum

TO

FROM

DATE

SUBJECT:


H. G. Parris, Manager of Power & Engineering (Nuclear), MR6NOl1 B-C

K. W. Whitt, Director of Nuclear Safety Review Staff, E3A8 C-K

OV 29 1985NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL


Subject BOX HANGER WELD DESIGN DEFICIENCY - SoN


and associated prioritized recommendations for your action/disposition.


Priority 2 [P2] recommendation-by December 20, 1985 Should you

have any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone 2277.

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes X No

(7R ieDirector, NSRS/Designee


H. L. Abercrombie, SQNC. Bonine, 12-108 SB-KR. W. Cantrell, W12A12 C-KG. B. Kirk, SQNR. C. Parker, LP4N44A-CQTC/ERT, Watts Bar Nuclear PlantJ. H. Sullivan, SQNW. F. Willis, E12B16 C-K (4)

Buy U.S. Savins Bonds Resularlv on the Payroll Savings Plan



INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. I-85-560-SQN


SUBJECT: BOX HANGER WELD DESIGN DEFICIENCY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT


INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

E. (. HARWELL

R. C. SAUER

1/1/.12DATE

DATE

DATE

APPROVED BY:

I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted todetermine the validity of an expressed employee concern as receivedby Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT).The concern of record, as summarized on the Employee ConcernAssignment Request Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-086-003,stated:

"Sequoyah: A design deficiency has a wrong weld requiredon box hangers which, if performed per design, causes theweld to run into the pipe (SS or carbon steel code pipe)."

The ERT follow-up group was contacted to see if any additionalinformation was available that would indicate the location orsystem. QTC called back stating that the CI had indicated that thedrawings in question were 47B100 sheets 2 and 4.

II. SCOPE

A. The scope of the investigation was determined from the statedconcern to be that of a single specific issue:

0 A butt weld if made as shown on the typical drawings, couldextend to the pipe and result in the collar plate beingwelded to the pipe eliminating the freedom of move- mentwhich the pipe should have.

B. NSRS reviewed generic drawings of the 47B100 series and thosespecific engineered drawings associated with ECN L6319. Cog-nizant personnel of Sequoyah Design Services and ModificationsGroups and the Knoxville Office of Engineering were inter-viewed. The associated construction specification and pro-cedure which governed the installation of seismic supports werealso reviewed.



1. Sequoyah FSAR, Section 3.7, "Seismic Design," and Section3.8, "Design of Category I Structures."

2. Sequoyah Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-V-13.3, "DetailedAnalysis of Category I Piping Systems."

3. Sequoyah Design Criteria No. SQN-DC-V-l.3.3.1, "AdditionsAfter November 14, 1979 - Reinforced Concrete, Structural,and Miscellaneous Steel."

4. General Construction Specification G-43, "Support andInstallation of Piping Systems in Category I Structures."

0018S

B. Findings

1. The Sequoyah 47BI00 series drawings as designed, do show abutt weld on the rear plate of some seismic class I sup-ports that could extend to the pipe if made as the typicaldrawing specifies. Cognizant Design Services and Office ofEngineering personnel (Individuals A, B, and C) identi-fied ECN L6319 (ref. 6) as the only application of seismicbox anchors at Sequoyah which references the Sequoyah47B100 series drawings for use.

2. There are eight box anchors associated with ECN L6319(ref. 6) and only one has been installed. The detaileddrawings for some of these anchors show welds that couldextend to the pipe. The cognizant engineer (individual E)for the installation of these supports stated that on theinstalled anchor shown on drawing 47A491-3-6, a thin,approximately 1/8-inch land was left adjacent to the pipeprior to welding. When the plate was welded together, thethin land area was fused together meeting the drawifigconfiguration but not to the point that the weld extendedto the pipe. After completing the weld, the plate waschecked to make sure it was free to move along the pipe.

3. Evaluation of the preparation for the remaining seven boxanchors indicates the preparation does not include thespecial precaution utilized by Sequoyah on the first anchorof placing a land adjacent to pipe to prevent extending theweld to the pipe.

4. A generic evaluation of this problem to WBN and BFNrevealed:

a. A similar weld extension to pipe problem exists onsheet 4 of the Watts Bar generic drawings of the 47B100series.

b. Browns. Ferry has specific versus generic hanger draw-ings. An evaluation of these drawings reveals simi-lar weld extension to pipe configuration requirementsspecified on some drawings.

c. Though no hardware discrepancies were identifiedrelated to the inadequate drawing requirements, ageneric deficiency exists whereby if the weldingportion of drawings were followed verbatim, a noncon-forming condition would result with the clearancerequirement of the same drawing.

2 0018S


A. The allegation was substantiated by virtue of the fact that thetypical drawings do show a weld configuration such that itcould extend to the pipe when made. There is no concernrelated to the one installed anchor since special steps weretaken to prevent a problem.

B. I-85-560-SQN-01, FCR Revision Required to ECN L6319 Drawingsand 47B100 Drawing Series

To assure that problems do not occur when installing theremaining seven anchors at Sequoyah, the modificationscognizant engineer (Individual E) is processing FCRs to havethe ECN and typical drawings revised for further clarifica-tion. The revised drawings will be included in the affectedworkplans. These corrective actions, when completed, willresolve the Sequoyah concern. NSRS will track this as an openitem. [P3]

C. I-85-560-SQN-02, Nonconformance Evaluation for Box AnchorWelding

Because of the generic aspects associated with box anchor weld-ing described in paragraphs III.B.3 and 4, a constructionissued NCR 6264 dated August 24, 1985, for Watts Bar should besent through design to the other plants for a generic reviewfor applicability in accordance with Office of EngineeringProcedure OEP-17 (ref. 9). [P2]

0018S


1. Sequoyah drawing 47B100 series, 47B200 series, 47A053 series notes.

2. ECN L6319 drawings 47A491-3-6, 47A491-68-5, 47A491-68-6, -6A,47A491-68-7, -7A, 47A491-68-8, -8A, 47A491-68-9, 4A491-68-10,47A491-79-3, -3A, all Revision 0, dated June 27, 1985

3. Sequoyah Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-13.3, Revision 3 dated August 13,1984, "Detailed Analysis of Category I Piping Systems"

4. SQN-DC-V-1.3.3.1, Revision 4, dated September 4, 1984, "AdditionsAfter November 14, 1979 - Reinforced Concrete, Structural, andMiscellaneous Steel"

5. General Construction Specification No. 43, Revision 8, datedAugust 8, 1985, "Support and Installation of Piping Systems inCategory I Structures"

6. ECN L6319, "Relocate Sprinkler Head for Appendix R," Revision 0,dated January 24, 1985 (SQP 841218 005)

7. BFN specific drawings

8. WBN 47B100 sheet 2, Revision 5, dated September 7, 1983, and 47B100sheet 4, Revision 0, dated February 7, 1978

9. Office of Engineering Procedure OEP-17, "Corrective Action," Revision2, dated August 30, 1985

0018S

TVA 64 (OS 9-65) (OP-WP 7-84)



D TO : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant


DATE : NOV 29 1985SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW STAFF INVESTIGATION REPORT TRANSMITTAL


Subject INCORE INSTRUMENTATION - THIMBLE TUBE EJECTION ACCIDENT

Concern No. XX-85-096-004: -005

No response or corrective action is required for this report. It is

being transmitted to you for information purposes only. Should you have

any questions, please contact R. C. Sauer at telephone 2277

Recommend Reportability Determination: Yes __ No X


RCS:JTH

Attachmentcc (Attachment):






EMPLOYEE CONCERNS: XX-85-096-004XX-85-096-005

SUBJECT: INCORE INSTRUMENTATION - THIMBLE TUBE EJECTION ACCIDENT


INVESTIGATOR:

REVIEWED BY:

APPROVED BY:

N. T. HENRICH

R. C. SAUER

DATE

DATE

I. BACKGROUND

A Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) investigation was conducted todetermine the validity of an expressed employee concern as received bythe Quality Technology Company (QTC)/Employee Response Team (ERT). Theconcern of record, as summarized in the Employee Concern AssignmentRequest Form from QTC and identified as XX-85-096-004, stated:

"The Radiation Monitor Tube problem at Sequoyah could happenagain. The way it was designed, it cannot be properly fixedduring operation."

Further information was requested from the ERT follow-up group regardingthe type of radiation monitor problem being questioned and if it wasrelated to the thimble guide tube event which occurred in April 1984.The result of this inquiry led to a second Employee Concern beingidentified by the ERT as XX-85-096-005. This new concern stated:

"Sequoyah: The Radiation Monitor tube problem (thimbleguide tube incident) in unit 1 in April 1985 could occuragain because the equipment is not properly designed to befixed during plant operation."

Since XX-85-096-004 was not deleted as a result of XX-85-096-005 beingissued, both concerns will be addressed by this investigation report.

II. SCOPE

A. The scope of this investigation was defined by the concern of recordwhich entails investigating if the incore instrumentation thimbletube accident could happen again because the system was not designedto be fixed during operation.

B. Investigation reports and recommendations resulting from the unit 1incore instrumentation thimble tube ejection accident on April 19,1984, were reviewed. In addition, NSRS report No. R-85-02-SQN/WBNon manufacturer-identified potential application of Swagelok tubefittings at Westinghouse reactor seal tables was reviewed. Plantprocedures were reviewed which describe the method of incore fluxthimble cleaning.and lubrication. Corrective action taken by theplant as a result of NSRS recommendations were also reviewed.



NUC PR requirements applicable for providing control overmaintenance activities on CSSC equipment are delineated in Part II,Section 2.1, "Plant Maintenance," of the Nuclear Quality AssuranceManual (NQAM). This section of the NQAM contains the followingrequirements:

0042T

1. Paragraph 1.3 - Specifies that maintenance on CSSC shall beproperly preplanned and performed in accordance with writtenprocedures or documented instructions appropriate to thecircumstances.

2. Paragraph 3.3.1.2 - Specifies that maintenance instructionsshall contain enough detail to permit a task to be performedsafely and expeditiously.

3. Paragraph 3.3.1.3 - Specifies that the instructions-shallcontain requirements for verifying the quality of maintenance orrepair and shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitativeacceptance criteria.

4. Paragraph 3.3.1.4 - Specifies that upon completion of mainte-nance on any item of the CSSC list and before release forservice, appropriate testing shall be performed to verifyoperational acceptability.

5. Paragraph 4.4.1 - Specifies that maintenance shall be plannedand scheduled so as not to compromise the safety of the plant.

B. Findings

1. On April 19, 1984, a unit 1 incore instrumentation systemthimble tube was ejected into the seal table room during brushcleaning of the thimble guide tubes with the reactor at 30percent power. A high pressure seal on the 'thimble tube at theseal table failed resulting in the ejection of the thimble tubeand an unisolatable reactor coolant leak of approximately 25-35gpm. The leak lasted approximately 11 hours.

2. On May 18,,1984, the accident was reported to the NuclearRegulatory Co~mmission as Reportable Occurrence ReportSQRO-50-327/84030 in accordance with 1OCFR5O.73, paragraphsa.2.i and a.2.iv. This report described the event andidentified the most probable cause of seal failure based ontests performed on an assembly mock-up.

A long-term corrective action was committed to which stated,...that future thimble tube cleaning will not be performed

during power operations."

3. On October 11, 1984, the reportable occurrence report wasre~ised. This report identified the following long-termcorrective actions to which the plant committed.

0042T

a. Future thimble tube cleaning will not be performed usingthe same dry brush cleaning technique as was used duringthe thimble tube ejection with the reactor at temperatureand pressure.

b. A program for identification and control of special toolswould be implemented.

4. NRC IE Information Notice No. 84-55, "Seal Table Leaks at PWRs,"was issued on July 6, 1984. The Sequoyah thimble tube ejectionaccident was described in this notice. K~eNRC notice concludedthe following.

"Maintenance was conducted on a high-pressure system with whatwas equivalent to single valve protection. For both personneland plant safety considerations, maintenance is not normallyconducted on high-pressure systems while at high pressure andtemperature and with only single valve protection. To precludethe type of events just described from occurring, every effortshould be made to schedule seal table maintenance during coldshutdown conditions. Also, the need for maintenance of anysystem under hot, pressurized conditions should be thoroughlyevaluated before allowing personnel to perform the work.Licensees are urged to review their maintenance procedures toensure that maintenance under these conditions is minimized."

5. Following the accident the Office of Nuclear Power conducted anindustrial safety evaluation of the accident (ref. 4). Theinvestigation team, headed by L. C. Ellis, recommended that allcleaning and brushing of the thimble guide tubes be done withthe reactor at mode 5 (cold shutdown).

6. The Nuclear Safety Review Staff conducted an independentinvestigation of the April 19, 1984, thimble tube ejectionaccident between April 25 and May 18, 1984. WSRS report No.I-84-12-SQN (ref. 5) describing their conclusions and*recommendations was issued August 1, 1984. This reportidentified 23 recommendations to preclude similar accidents.

7. Based on NSRS recommendations, the site committed to a number ofcorrective actions to preclude recurrence of the thimble tubeejection accident. Some of these actions are described belowand are identified more fully in J. P. Darling's memorandum toH. N. Culver dated September 18, 1984 (S53 840918 905).

0042T

a. Revise or cancel Special Maintenace Instructions SMI-0-94-1and -2 (refs. 12 and 13).

b. Revise Maintenance Instruction MI-1.9 (ref. 10) to includeappropriate cautions and warnings to prevent damage to thehigh-pressure mechanical seals.

c. Maintenance procedures will be revised to includepostmaintenance inspections and testing requirements.

d. Review the MR system and QA review.:process to ensure noprogrammatic deficiencies exit. This will be done toensure the process meets the requirements of StandardPractice Maintenance Instruction SQM-2 (ref. 15).

.e. Administrative Procedure AI-8 (ref. 16) will be revised toclarify what moveable detector system maintenance requiresa hold order. Hold order requirements for RWPs will bemodified to indicate AI-8 will be followed.

f. A review of "special tools" controls will be conducted todetermine if modifications are needed.

Each of the commitments made by the site was provided to the NRCon October 11, 1984, by Reportable Occurrence Report No.SQRO-50-327/84030, Revision 1. Thesp commitments have beenentered into the site Commitment Action Tracking System (CATS).

8. NSRS report I-84-12-SQN concluded that Special MaintenanceInstruction SMI-0-94-1 issued July 10, 1981, was a poorinstruction and inappropriate for controlling the guide tubecleaning activity. In addition, the instruction stated that theTeleflex-supplied equipment was not to be used at power.SMI-0-94-1 was cancelled following the accident effectiveOctober 9, 1984. It was superseded by SMI-0-94-2.

9. SMI-0-94-2 was written after the accident to clean the tubesusing a Nuclear Utility Services Corporation method. The NSRSinvestigation concluded that this procedure could promoteaccidents of -a similar nature in the future. SMI-0-94-2 wascancelled effective December 11, 1984, in accordance withInstruction Control Form ICF No. 84-1714 which PORC approved onNovember 1, 1984. SMI-0-94-2 was replaced with MaintenanceInstruction MI-1.10, "Incore Flux Thimble Cleaning andLubrication." This procedure prohibits maintenance on thehigh-pressure fittings when the primary system is pressurizedabove atmospheric or head pressure from the guide tube. Thisprocedure was also reviewed to include a section onpostmaintenance checks.

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10. MI-1.9 (ref. 10) was revised to include cautions and warningsto prevent seal damage during maintenance activities onSeptember 9, 1985. In addition, the revision also included asection which addresses postmaintenance testing, checkout, andreturn to service.

11. NSRS investigated manufacturer-identified potential misappli-cation of Swagelok tube fittings at the Sequoyah reactor sealtables January 22 and 23, 1985. The investigation focused onthe use of components from different manufacturers in making upthese high-pressure mechanical seals.

NSRS did not identify any conditions that constituted animmediate safety concern related to the operation of eitherunit at Sequoyah. However, NSRS report R-85-02-SQN/WBN(ref. 7), issued March 25, 1985, did contain two recommen-dations to enhance the consistency and clarity of sealmaintenance instructions, lessen the probability of sealdegradation during maintenance activities, and reduce theconsequences of any seal failure that may occur. The site'scommitment to these recommendations is being tracked by thecommitment action tracking system.

12. In response to NSRS recommendations (ref. 18), Sequoyahmaintenance instructions were revised to provide guidance forthe proper use of all Swagelok and mixed fittings used for bothunits 1 and 2. Maintenance Instructions MI-1.9 and MI-l.10have both been revised in accordance with that commitment. Inaddition, Special Maintenance Instructions SMI-1-94-5 (ref. 19)and 0-94-3 (ref.20) are scheduled to be revised or cancelled byDecember 26, 1985.

13. NSRS report R-85-02-SQN/WBN identified there was some evidencethat the use of low-pressure seals during refueling operationsresulted in some degradation of five high-pressure mechanicalseals on SQN unit 2. Inspections and evaluations of these havedetermined that both units were safe to operate, and noproblems have been encountered with the seals in subsequentunit operation. The investigation also concluded thatmaintenance instructions have been modified to includeWestinghouse and Crawford Fitting Company (CFC) recommendationsto prevent degradation of seal integrity during maintenanceactivities. Details of previous NSRS findings are outlined inthis report.

14. On July 22, 1985, Sequoyah submitted to the NRC (ref. 8) arevised response to notice of violation and proposed civilpenalties EA84-119 related to the April 19, 1984 thimble tubeejection accident.

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Some of the corrective actions identified in this response topreclude recurrence of the event include.

a. Cancellation of SMI-0-94-1 replacing it with MaintenanceInstruction MI-1.lO incorporating lessons learned from theaccident.

b. A review of the maintenance request process and QA reviewprocess to ensure compliance with SQM-2, "MaintenanceManagement System."

c. Issuance of Standard Practice SQH-63, "Special or ModifiedTooling - Primary System," to outline requirements for useand modification of "special tools."

Full compliance on each of the corrective actions committed toin this response has been achieved.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMM1ENDATIONS

A. The concern of record is substantiated in that the incore instrumentthimble tube system is not designed for maintenance activitiesduring reactor operation. However, the incident cannot occur againbecause the maintenance is no longer allowed to be performed atpower.

B. No additional corrective actions are recommended since Sequoyah hascommitted to accomplish specific corrective actions made in responseto the NRC and NSRS to preclude recurrence of the thimble tubeejection ,accident of April 19, 1984. These commitments are trackedto closure by the site Commitment Action Tracking System wih eachcommitment assigned a unique CATS number. Pertinent correctiveactions have been completed. This includes procedure revisionswhich prohibit maintenance on the incore instrument tube system whenthe primary system is above atmospheric or head pressure from insidethe guide tube.

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1. Reportable Occurrence Report SQRO-50-327/84030

2. Reportable Occurrence Report SQRO-50-327/84030 Revision 1

3. NRC IE Information Notice No. 84-55: "Seal Table Leaks at PWRs," datedJuly 6, 1984

4. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 - Incore Thimble Ejection - Investigationand Review of Events for Industrial Safety Implications DatedMay 17, 1984

5. NSRS Investigation of Unit 1 Incore Instrumentation Thimble Tube EjectionAccident on April 19, 1984 - NSRS Report No. I-84-12-SQN datedAugust 1, 1984

6. Memorandum from J. P. Darling to H. N. Culver dated September 18, 1984,regarding NSRS report I-84-12-SQN (S53 840918 905)

7. Special Review of Manufacturer - Identified Potential Misapplication ofSwagelok Tube Fittings at Westinghouse Reactor Seal Tables - NSRSReport No. R-85-O2-SQN/WBN dated March 25, 1985

8. Letter from J. A. Domer to J. M. Taylor dated July 22, 1985(L44 850723 801)

9. SQN Maintenance Instruction MI-1.10, "Income Flux Thimble Cleaning andLubrication," Revision 3, dated September 9, 1985

10. Maintenance Instruction MI-1.9, "Bottom Mounted Instrument Thimble Tube

Retraction and Reinsertion," Revision 7, dated September 9, 1985

11. Plant Instruction Change Form 84-1714 dated November 1, 1984

12. Special Maintenance Instruction - SMI-0-94-1, "RPV Bottom MountedInstrument Thimble Tubes Cleaning and Flushing," Revision 1, datedOctober 9, 1984

13. SMI-0-94-2, "Incore Flux Thimble Cleaning and Lubrication," Revision 1,dated December 11, 1984

14. Memorandum from H. L. Abercrombie to J. W. Hufham, "Sequoyah and WattsBar Nuclear Plants - Special Review of Manufacturer IdentifiedPotential Misapplication of Swagelok Tube Fittings at WestinghouseReactor Seal Tables - NSRS Report No. R-85-02-SQN/WBN," datedApril 17, 1985 (S53 850415 838)

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15. Sequoyah Standard Practice SQM-2, "Maintenance Management System,"Revision 14, dated July 17, 1985

16. Sequoyah Administrative Instruction AI-8, "Access to Containment,"Revision 15, dated October 11, 1985

17. Sequoyah Standard Practice SQM-63, "Special or Modified Tooling - PrimarySystems," Revision 0, June 9, 1985

18. Memorandum from J. P. Darling to K. W. Whitt, "Sequoyah and Watts BarNuclear Plants - Special Review of Manufacturer Identified PotentialMisapplication of Swagelok Tube Fittings at Westinghouse ReactorSeal Tables - NSRS Report No. R-85-02-SQN/WBN," dated May 6, 1985

19. Special Maintenance Instruction - SMI-1-94-5, "Thimble Tube Installa-tion," Revision 1, May 25, 1984

20. Special Maintenance Instruction - SMI-0-94-3, "Field Cable High PressureSeal Repair," Revision 0, November 12, 1984

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