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O N C O M M E R C I A L A V I A T I O N S A F E T Y

ISSUE 52 THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THEUNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE ISSN 1355-1523

AUTUMN 2003

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The Official Publication ofTHE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ISSN: 1355-1523 AUTUMN 2003 ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY

contentsEditorial 2

Chairman’s Column 3

New ETOPS Regulations 4

The Boeing Company

UKFSC Members List 12

DVT - What is all the fuss about? 14

Part II or, are airliners flying surgeries?

Simon Phippard

737-600/-700/-800/-900 Approach Navigation Options 16

The Boeing Company

Air Safety Report Administration made Easier 20

Simon Earthrowl

Human Factors and Occurrence Reporting Systems 22

From a Maintenance Organisation’s Perspective

C. R. Clark

UKFSC Seminar 2003 24

Front Cover: C17 in RAF livery

Photo kindly supplied by Flight Images

FOCUS is a quarterly subscription journaldevoted to the promotion of best practises inaviation safety. It includes articles, eitheroriginal or reprinted from other sources, relatedto safety issues throughout all areas of airtransport operations. Besides providinginformation on safety related matters, FOCUSaims to promote debate and improvenetworking within the industry. It must beemphasised that FOCUS is not intended as asubstitute for regulatory information or companypublications and procedures.

Editorial Office:Ed PaintinThe Graham SuiteFairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking,Surrey. GU24 8HXTel: 01276-855193 Fax: 01276-855195e-mail: admin@ukfsc.freeserve.co.ukWeb Site: www.ukfsc.co.ukOffice Hours: 0900-1630 Monday-Friday

Advertisement Sales Office:UKFSCThe Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking,Surrey GU24 8HXTel: 01276-855193

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FOCUS is produced solely for the purpose ofimproving flight safety and, unless copyright isindicated, articles may be reproduced providingthat the source of material is acknowledged.

Opinions expressed by individual authors or inadvertisements appearing in FOCUS are thoseof the author or advertiser and do notnecessarily reflect the views and endorsementsof this journal, the editor or the UK Flight SafetyCommittee.

While every effort is made to ensure theaccuracy of the information contained herein,FOCUS accepts no responsibility for anyerrors or omissions in the information, or itsconsequences. Specialist advice shouldalways be sought in relation to any particularcircumstances.

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Editorial

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Changing the Law

For a number of years the Department ofTransport (DfT previously the DTLR) hasbeen holding twice yearly discussionswith aviation industry representativebodies on disruptive passengerbehaviour.

These meetings resulted in theintroduction of a disruptive passengerreport that is submitted to the CivilAviation Authority (CAA) by aircrewfollowing any disruptive passengerincident. The response from airlines andtheir aircrew to this initiative has beenvery good. These reports are categorised,collated and used to produce meaningfulstatistics to monitor and illustrate thescale of the problem. They are also usedto indicate the trend of the incidents ofdisruptive passenger behaviour and tobrief various government officials.

As a result of discussions at thesemeetings it was decided that the powersof the police were inadequate to dealeffectively with such disruptivepassengers. A proposal was made tochange the law to increase the powers ofthe police attending to calls from aircrewwho have experienced disruptivepassenger incidents on their aircraft.

The proposed changes to the law werepresented to Parliament in a PrivateMembers Bill by Frank Roy MP forMotherwell and Wishaw. This Bill passedits second reading on the 7th February2003 and became Law on the 9th July2003.

The provision of the new AviationOffences Act gives the police greaterpowers of arrest of suspected air rageoffenders and will help the police

prosecute anti social behaviour thatsometimes occurs onboard aircraft. Thisbehaviour can be frightening to bothpassengers and crew. Hopefully thischange to the law will increase thesuccess rate of the police in dealing withdisruptive passengers and help to deterwould be offenders.

Credit for these changes must go toFrank Roy MP but also those crewmembers who have diligently submittedthe disruptive passenger reports thathave enabled the number and type ofincidents to be monitored. Without theircoopertion there would have been noinformation for analysis.

It is hoped that following the smallsuccess aircrew will continue to submitthe reports so that we can continue tomonitor the situation. It will be interestingto see what effect the changes to the lawhas.

UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE OBJECTIVES

■ To pursue the highest standards of aviation safety.

■ To constitute a body of experienced aviation flight safety personnel available for consultation.

■ To facilitate the free exchange of aviation safety data.

■ To maintain an appropriate liaison with other bodies concerned with aviation safety.

■ To provide assistance to operators establishing and maintaining a flight safety organisation.

Chairman’s Column

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Close Encounters

Runway incursions have been with us forsome time now. They are a very realthreat to Flight Safety and are increasing inrisk exposure as traffic continues toincrease.

The CAA has recently requested theaviation industries participation in their“Runway Incursions – Research intoCauses” initiative. This research is beingconducted in parallel with similar initiativesfrom other regulators and flight safetybodies.

The UKFSC welcomes this and is fullyendorsing and supporting it through ourOperational Safety Committee. Most ofour members will have received a copy ofthe CAA’s questionnaire via e-mail andthey are urged to ensure that theircompany responds.

Those involved in safety managementsystems continue to examine thedifficulties of communication and companyprocedures with a view to preventingsimilar events. Perhaps it is appropriatefor us to reflect where our organisationsstand in relation to previous groundcollisions: Chicago F27 and DC6, poorweather compounded by communicationerrors. Tenerife, 2 x B747s in poor visibilitycompounded by communication errors.Paris, MD80 and Shorts S360, at night withvisual distractions compounded bycommunication errors and the Linate (Italy)accident, ground collision involving andMD80 and an executive jet have beenmade available and highlight poorcommunication as being a significantcontributory factor in the final link of theaccident chain.

A recent FAA report states that in theperiod between 1999 and 2002 there werein excess of 1,400 reported runwayincursions in the USA. The majority ofthese incidents contained an element of

communications error, more significantperhaps is that in each event no oneindividual involved appears to have hadthe total picture of the event that unfoldedbefore them. Digging down a further layeron this element we can observe theclassic HF issues of confusion and lack ofcomplete communications – a situationwhere everyone has a clear picture of theirversion of the plan but not that of the otherperson and no one in that loop had theoverall picture.

This maybe the time to stand back a littlefurther from the coal face, reflect a littleand consider the uncomfortable. We areall fallible; we all get it wrong sometimes.To paraphrase Lincoln: We can’t all beright all of the time, but all of us can beright some of the time. The problem iswhen we get it wrong at the same instantas someone else who is operatingsomewhere in the same loop as ourselves.How do we realistically protect againsthuman fallibility? Perhaps we need toconsider developing a simple mechanicalsystem on the established premise that

humans do fail every now and then(usually at the most inconvenient time) andone that does not require judgemental orinterpretation skills. Additionally such asystem would need to meet the strictcertification requirements on both sides ofthe Atlantic at a cost that is not prohibitiveto smaller airports and is demonstrablyreliable.

by John Dunne, Airclaims

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Extended-range operations with two-engine airplanes (ETOPS) rank amongthe safest and most reliable of all flightoperations. Pending rulemaking by theU.S. Federal Avaition Administration mayexpand these reliability enhancementsand operational protections to allextended-diversion-time operations (i.e.,flying on routes with the potential for anextended diversion), not just thoseperformed with two-engine airplanes.

As airplane range capabilities continue toincrease, flights across remote regions ofthe world are becoming more common.The global aviation community - whichcollaboratively defined and proposed withU.S. rulemaking - believes that applyingETOPS rules to all extended-diversion-time operations will raise the industry to ahigher and uniform standard.

On December 16, 2002, the AviationRulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) -an advisory committee of the U.S. FederalAviation Administration (FAA) - presentedto the FAA its findings andrecommendations on extendedoperations (i.e., operations on routes withthe potential for an extended-durationdiversion). Initiated by the FAA taskingstatement of June 14. 2000, thisproposed U.S. rulemaking marks theculmination of more than two years ofglobal collaboration to review currentrequirements for extended-rangeoperations with two-engine airplanes(ETOPS) and proposes updated andstandardized requirements that willembrace all extended-diversion-timeoperations, not just those performed withtwo-engine airplanes.

The ARAC ETOPS Working Groupcomprised expert representatives frommany of the world’s airlines, airframe andengine manufacturers, pilots’associations, regulatory authorities, andnon-governmental organizations. Inkeeping with its proposal that theextended-operations protection beapplied broadly to protect all airplanes,regardless of the number of engines, theETOPS Working Group furtherrecommended that the term ETOPS itselfbe redefined to simply mean extendedoperations. (See “ARAC ETOPS WorkingGroup Participants”).

The FAA will evaluate the proposed ARACfindings and recommendations, makewhatever changes it deems appropriate,and publish the results in a Notice ofProposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for public

New ETOPS Regulations

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review and comment. Following commentresolution, the FAA is expected to enactnew extended-operations rules, perhapsas soon as late 2004.

This article discusses the reasons behindthis global activity and describes thespecific regulatory changes that theARAC has proposed.

THE ETOPS PARADIGM SHIFT

When the conservative ETOPS programbegan in 1985, its intent was to ensurethat the safety of two-engine airplaneswould match that of three- and four-engine airplanes on long-rangetransoceanic routes. Implicit in the ETOPSrules was the initial assumption thatturbine-powered airplanes with twoengines were inherently less safe thanthose with three or more engines. As aresult a separate set of more stringentrequirements was deemed necessary foroperating two-engine airplanes on routeswith the potential for an extended-duration diversion.

Since then, however, extensive ETOPSservice experience has brought about aprofound revision to that initial thinking.After nearly two decades of highlysuccessful ETOPS around the world, theglobal aviation community today viewsETOPS in a different light. Characterizingthis profound data-driven paradigm shiftare the present-day industry perceptionsthat

1. ETOPS is the state of the art inintercontinental air travel.

2. Engine reliability is no longer thesingle focus of safety concerns.

3. A uniform standard is desirable for allextended operations.

1. ETOPS IS THE STATE OF THEART IN INTERCONTINENTAL AIRTRAVEL

ETOPS is the dominant mode oftransatlantic flight operations today andaccounts for a rapidly growingcomponent of transpacific and otheroperations as well. Since 1985, more than3 million ETOPS flights have been loggedusing the twinjets of severalmanufacturers. Today, about 125operators worldwide log an additional1,100 ETOPS flights each day. Of thisindustry total, Boeing twinjets alone haveperformed more than 2.6 million ETOPSflights, and 94 Boeing operators fly nearly1,000 more each day (fig. 1)

This vast service experience reveals thatETOPS ranks among the safest and mostreliable of all flight operations. Thissuccess results from the preclude andprotect philosophy of ETOPS, whichenhances flight operations in two ways:

■ ETOPS-related design improvementsand maintenance practices increaseairplane systems and engine reliabilitymaking it less likely that an airplanewill need to divert from its intendedcourse and land at an alternateairport.

■ ETOPS operational requirementsintroduce proactive measures thatprotect the airplane, passengers andcrew should a diversion occur.

This philosophy has indirectly benefitedthe entire industry. All commercialoperations today - including thoseperformed with three- and four-engineairplanes - benefit from gains in thereliability and robustness of airplaneengines and systems initially achievedthrough ETOPS programs.

Operators flying three- and four-engine

airplanes are not currently required tomeet the high ETOPS standard.Nevertheless, some operators alreadycomply with key ETOPS safelyenhancements on a voluntary basis. Thiselective application of ETOPS bestpractices suggests that the maintenanceand operational benefits of ETOPS arewell recognized by the global industryand that operators find them costeffective.

2. ENGINE RELIABILITY IS NOLONGER THE SINGLE FOCUSOF SAFETY CONCERNS

In the past, concerns about flight safetyfocused first and foremost on thereliability of propulsion systems. Whenocean-spanning commercial flightoperations began after World War II, thatnarrow focus was appropriate in light ofthe limited reliability of piston engines.During the 1940s and l950s, in fact,piston engine-related events were thepredominant cause of airliner accidentsand contributed to a worldwide fleet hull-loss accident rate that was some 60times higher than today’s.

The limited reliability of piston engines ledto an operating restriction being placedon two-engine airplanes 50 years ago.The intent of the so-called 60-Minute Ruleof 1953 (U .S. Federal Aviation Regulation[FAR] 121.161) was to bar two-enginepropeller airplanes, such as the DouglasDC-3, from flying extended routes thenmore safely served by four-enginepropeller types, such as the DC-4. Thatpiston-era operating restriction remains ineffect at the time of this writing.

During the late 1950s, however, thetransition to turbine power brought abouta quantum leap in propulsion systemreliability. Engine reliability has continuedto improve in the jet age, so much so that

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today’s high-bypass-ratio fan jet enginesare at least 50 times more reliable thanthe large piston engines that inspired the60-Minute Rule.

By the l970s,. advancing technology hadset the stage for two-engine, turbine-powered airplanes to safely exceed the60-min operating restriction. The resultwas ETOPS, which began in 1985 with120-min diversion authority and therequirement for an average engine in-flight shutdown (IFSD) rate of just 0.05per 1,000 engine-hours. With 180-minETOPS authority, which followed in 1988,an even more stringent reliability target ofjust 0.02 IFSDs per 1,000 engine-hourswas specified.

In this way, ETOPS drove manufacturersand operators alike to pursue dramaticgains in propulsion system reliability. Theindustry met this challenge and betteredit. During the past few years, in fact, theaverage IFSD rate of the worldwide 180-min ETOPS

So profound has this trend been thatpropulsion reliabilities unachievablejust 15 years ago are today routine in

the modern twinjet fleet.

fleet has typically been at or below 0.01IFSDs per 1,000 engine-hours - twice thereliability required for such operations. Soprofound has this trend been thatpropulsion reliabilities unachievable just15 years ago are today routine in themodern twinjet fleet.

In light of these advances, and becausethe safety and reliability of two-engineairplanes equal or exceed those of three-or four-engine airplanes, the industry nolonger views propulsion system reliabilityas the primary safety and reliabilityconcern in extended operations. Instead,current rulemaking recognizes that avariety of airplane systems and

operational issues (e.g., cargo firesuppression capability, weatherconditions and facilities at alternateairports) are relevant to overall safety andreliability on routes with the potential foran extended diversion.

3. A UNIFORM STANDARD ISDESIRABLE FOR ALLEXTENDED OPERATIONS

All airplanes flown on extended-diversion-time routes face similar operatingchallenges in terms of weather, terrain,and limitations in navigation andcommunications infrastructure. Given thatthe operating environment is common toall extended operations and that allcategories of jetliner are safe, the globalaviation community believes a uniformstandard is desirable for extendedoperations. The global community furtherrecognizes that applying ETOPSrequirements to all airplanes - not justthose with two engines - will raise theindustry to a higher and uniform standard.

Although diversions are rare, any airplanemight someday need to divert to anairport other than its intended destinationfor various reasons (e.g., passengerillness, smoke in the flight deck or cabin,turbulence, adverse winds, weather, fuelleak, cargo fire, in-flight engine failure orshutdown). Thus, the dual ETOPSphilosophy of precluding diversions andprotecting the passengers, crew, andairplane on those rare occasions whendiversions do occur is applicable to allextended operations, not just thoseperformed with two-engine airplanes.

As a result of ETOPS, the industry hasachieved significant improvements in thereliability and robustness of airplaneengines and systems. However, suchefforts can never entirely preventdiversions because most are unrelated tothe airplane, its systems, or its engines. In

fact, fewer than 10 percent of alldiversions during extended operations areairplane related, and fewer than 3 percentare the result of an in-flight engine failureor shutdown. In general, of course,engine failures tend to occur duringtakeoff and initial climb rather than duringthe cruise phase of flight where ETOPS isflown.

PROPOSED U.S. REGULATORYCHANGES

This paradigm shift created growingawareness around the world that theregulatory framework currently governingtwinjet and other extended operationsshould be reviewed. Consequently, theFAA - which meets its responsibility toupdate regulations through the provenARAC process - initiated the collaborativeARAC activity previously described.

The ARAC-proposed regulations (table 1)might change as a result of the currentFAA review and pending NPRM commentprocesses. We at The Boeing Companyare proud to have participated in thisglobal ARAC effort, which will make flyingeven safer and more reliable in thecoming years. Pages 8 through 10 detailthe proposed changes.

ETOPS Authorization

The ARAC has recommended that FAR121.161 (the 60-Minute Rule) andassociated guidance and advisorymaterial be revised to

■ Establish the basis and requirementsfor operating twin-engine, turbine-powered airplanes beyond 60 min offlying time (at single-engine cruisespeed with no wind and in standardconditions) of an adequate alternateairport.

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■ Apply this same regulatory frameworkto the operation of turbine-poweredairplanes with more than two enginesbeyond 180 min (at one-engine-inoperative cruise speed with no windand in standard conditions) of anadequate alternate airport and alsomake it applicable to all operations inpolar areas (see Polar Operations. p.10).

■ Make the designed and certifiedoperating capabilities of the airplanetype the basis for determining themaximum diversion authority of thattype.

■ Define allowable diversionauthorizations for different regions ofthe world based on the overalloperational needs of each region.

■ Apply current ETOPS best practices toall extended operations.

It should be noted that, although theseproposed ETOPS requirements areconsistent for all jetliners, the thresholdvaries at which they would take effect. Fortwo-engine airplanes operating under FARPart 121, ETOPS will be in effect - as iscurrently the case - on routes where theairplane is at some point more than 60min flying time from an alternate airport.For FAR Part 121 operations by airplaneswith three or more engines, these newETOPS rules will apply on routes that areat some point more than 180 min from analternate airport. They also will apply to alloperations in the polar regions (i.e., theareas north of 78 oN latitude and south of60oS latitude).

Definitions

The ARAC has proposed that ETOPS-applicable definitions be added to FARPart 121. Many of the terms used in the

new regulations and guidance material forETOPS are unique to extendedoperations and demand precise definitionto ensure common understanding andproper compliance.

To encompass all extended-diversion-timeoperations, not just those flown with two-engine airplanes, the term ETOPS wouldbe redefined as extended operations (asused in this article) and shall no longermean extended-range operations withtwo-engine airplanes. Another noteworthychange is the addition of the term ETOPSalternate, which is an airport that meetsstated requirements for planned diversionuse and at which the weather conditionsare at or above the operating minimumsspecified for a safe landing. This newterm would replace the current ETOPSterm, suitable, which denotes an alternateairport that is both aboverequired weather minimumsand available for diversionuse. Under the new rules,suitable would no longerhave an ETOPS-specificmeaning; where it appearsin the new regulations andassociated guidancematerial, therefore, it shouldbe interpreted onlyaccording to its broadlyaccepted, everdaydefinition.

It should be noted that long-range operations (LROPS) isnot proposed as an ETOPSterm. Although used bysome segments of theglobal industry, LROPScurrently does not appear orhave legal standing in theFARs. The ARAC ETOPSWorking Group did notpropose adding LROPSbecause the term would bemisleading - extended

operations are defined by distance to analternate airport, not by overall length offlight - and because it invites confusionwith the similar but unrelated term ultra-long-range operations, which dealsprimarily with flight crew duty time, crewrest, and other human-factors issues.

Communications

Current regulations require reliablecommunications. Recognizing thatadvances in technology occur and thatverbal communications can beparticularly valuable, the proposed rulepromotes the adoption of voicecommunications for extended operations.

This proposed rule states that the mostreliable communications technology -

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voice based or data link - shall beinstalled in all airplanes operating beyond180 min from an alternate airport.Alternative means of communication mustalso be available in the event the mostreliable means is not available for anyreason (e.g., lack of satellite coverage).Examples of these communicationstechnologies (e.g., SATCOM voice link,SATCOM data link, HF data link) are givenin the associated guidance material.

The proposed rule is not intended torequire operators to continually upgradeexisting installations on an incrementalbasis. Rather, the rule is meant to furtherthe adoption, as appropriate, of newtechnologies that significantly enhancethe quality and reliability ofcommunications. One example of suchinnovation is today’s transition from HFradio to satellite-based technologies.

Dispatch

The ARAC has proposed a new regulationspecifying airplane dispatch requirementsfor ETOPS alternate airports. The operatorwould have to select en route alternateairports that meet the weatherrequirements set forth in its operationsspecifications.Because alternate airport weather ischecked before airplane departure, andweather conditions can vary over time,the conservative weather minimumsrequired for dispatch are higher thanthose that would be required to performan instrument approach at that alternateairport. As proposed, this dispatch rulefurther requires the crew to verify thecontinuing availability of a valid alternateairport by means of en route weatherupdating at the beginning of the ETOPSphase of flight. For this en route updating,the crew would be required to ascertainonly that the planned alternate is abovenormal landing minimums, not above the

higher minimums applied before dispatch.

One of the distinguishing features ofETOPS is the identification of and relianceon alternate airports to which airplanescan divert should an unscheduled landingbecome desirable or necessary, Underthis proposed regulation, operators flyingthree- and four-engine airplanes inextended operations would be required todesignate ETOPS alternate airports within240 min or if beyond 240 min, designatethe nearest available ETOPS alternate.

Propulsion-Related Diversions

The ARAC has proposed no substantivechange to the rule that governs diversionfollowing an in-flight engine failure orshutdown. However, the committee didoffer guidance to further clarify existingdiversion requirements for two- engineairplanes in the event of engine failure orshutdown.

To aid flight crews, the proposedguidance lists factors (e.g., airplanecondition and systems status, weatherconditions en route, terrain and facilitiesat the alternate airport) that the pilot incommand should consider when decidingwhich alternate airport to divert to. Toensure that safety always remainparamount the ARAC further identifiedfactors that shall not be consideredsufficient justification for flying beyond thenearest available alternate airport (e.g.,additional range capability based onremaining fuel supply, passengeraccommodations beyond basic safety,maintenance and repair facilities at theavailable alternate airports).

Fuel Reserve

The ARAC has proposed that all airplanesflown in extended operations shall carry

an ETOPS fuel reserve to protect thepassengers, crew, and airplane in theevent of a cabin depressurization followedby a low-altitude diversion.

Cabin depressurization is a very rareevent that can occur on any jetliner and islargely unrelated to the number ofengines. If it does occur, the flight crewmust immediately descend to anappropriate altitude, as defined byoxygen availability or oxygen systemscapability. A diversion is then generallyrequired because of the increased fuelconsumption of turbine engines at lowaltitudes and the corresponding reductionin range.

This ETOPS fuel reserve requirementassumes that decompression wouldoccur at the most critical point along theroute in terms of total fuel consumption (aconcurrent engine failure is furtherassumed if it would add to the total). Thereserve thus calculated would ensuresufficient fuel for an extended low-altitudediversion followed by a descent to 1,500ft at the alternate airport, a 15-min hold,and an approach and landing. Furtherallowance is made for possible airframeicing and wind forecasting error.

Following extensive review of data relatedto the accuracy of wind forecasting, aswell as review of the icing scenario basedon the Canadian Atlantic Storms Program(CASP II), the ARAC proposed revisingthe ETOPS fuel reserve requirement.Under this proposed rule, two-engineairplanes on extended operations wouldcarry somewhat less reserve fuel than inthe past. Airplanes with more than twoengines would be required to carry anETOPS fuel reserve for the first time,although many three- and four-engineoperators do currently carry adepressurization fuel reserve as a matterof internal airline policy.

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Maintenance

The ARAC has proposed making currenttwin-engine ETOPS maintenancestandards applicable to all airplanes flownin extended operations. This wouldrequire three - and four - engine operatorsto also have an ETOPS maintenanceprogram in place before flying routes withthe potential for an extended diversion.

ETOPS maintenance requirements havesignificantly reduced the incidence of in-flight engine failures. Such events can beenormously costly and disruptive forairlines, which is why some operators ofthree- and four-engine airplanes havealready voluntarily raised theirmaintenance standards to ETOPS levels.Passenger Recovery Plan

The ARAC has proposed that all extendedoperators shall develop a plan to ensurethe well-being of passengers andcrewmembers at diversion airports. Thisplan should address their safety andcomfort at that airport in terms of’ thefacilities and accommodations and theirretrieval from that airport.

Currently, passenger recovery plans arerequired only for cross-polar operations.Because diversions can occur anywhere,however, the ARAC has proposed thatevery operator flying routes over remoteareas of the world should anticipate thepossibility of a diversion within thoseregions and devise a plan outlining how itwould recover the passengers, crew, andairplane.

Cargo Fire Suppression

To further ensure safety, the ARAC hasproposed that all time-critical systemsaboard airplanes flown in extendedoperations shall have sufficient capabilityto protect the airplane throughout the

longest potential diversion for that route.In particular, each flight shall havecontinuous fire suppression capability fora period equivalent to the maximumplanned diversion time plus an additional15 min to cover approach and landing atthe alternate airport.

Two-engine airplanes flown in extendedoperations have met this requirementsince 1985. In contrast, although all jetshave fire suppression systems, those withmore than two engines are not currentlyrequired to carry sufficient firesuppressant during extended operationsto protect the airplane continuouslythroughout a maximum-durationdiversion.

The ARAC has proposed that three- andfour-engine airplane operators that do notcurrently comply with this requirementshall have six years after ETOPSregulations take effect to bring theirexisting fleets into compliance with thisnew rule.

Many airplane systems enhance safetyduring flight. Of these, cargo firesuppression is generally the most time-limited.

Applying ETOPS cargo fire suppressionrequirements to all extended operationscan thus further protect passengers,crews, and airplanes on routes withextended diversion times.

Performance Data

The ARAC has proposed that existingregulations be modified to require thatperformance data be available to supportall phases of extended operations. Flightcrews and dispatchers must have dataavailable that describe the specificperformance of the airplane in normal andnon-normal situations, including those

that might be encountered during anextended diversion.

Polar Operations

The ARAC has recommended that theNorth Polar area (i.e., everything north of78 oN latitude) shall be designated anarea of ETOPS applicability. The samedesignation shall be applied to the SouthPole and surrounding region (i.e.,everything south of 6O˚S latitude).

Within these areas, ETOPS requirementsshall apply to all airplanes, regardless ofthe number of engines or distance froman adequate airport. This proposedrequirement recognizes the challengesassociated with these areas and setsforth steps to protect diversion.

Polar operators require training andexpertise to support airplane diversionsand their subsequent recovery. Theseoperators must consider requirements foren route alternate airports, a strategy forand monitoring of fuel freeze, apassenger recovery plan and reliablecommunications capability.

Rescue and Fire Fighting

The ARAC has proposed a rule specifyingrescue and fire fighting (RFF)requirements at ETOPS en route alternateairports. If adopted, this rule will furtherensure the safety of all airplanes whenliving extended operations, regardless ofhow many engines an airplane has.

Before dispatch, ETOPS operators havealways had to designate alternate airportsthat are above ETOPS-specified weatherminimums. In addition, these designatedalternates must provide the necessaryfacilities and equipment to ensure thesafety and well-being of the passengers

and crew through-out an extendeddiversion, after landing at the alternateairport and for as long as they remain atthat airport before being retrieved. RFFcapability is a key element of thisprotection.

During nearly two decades of ETOPS andmore than three million ETOPS twinjetflights around the globe, there has notbeen a single landing accident followingan extended diversion from the ETOPSphase of flight. The fact that RFF serviceshave not been needed does not meanthat such an event will never happen.Therefore, the ARAC finds it prudent toformalize RFF requirements for alternateairports in the regulations.

Other Proposed Changes

The proposed regulatory changesdescribed above would affect FAR Part121, the section of the FARs governingthe operation of transport-categoryairplanes. In response to the FAA taskingstatement, the ARAC ETOPS WorkingGroup also has proposed changes toother parts of the FARs.

In particular, the ARAC has proposedchanges to FAR Part 25 which governsthe design and testing of transport-category airplanes and FAR Part 33,which governs engine design and testing.If adopted, these regulatory modificationswill benefit the development of futuretransport airplanes - regardless of thenumber of engines - by formalizingETOPS-inspired improvements that havebeen shown in service to further protectairplanes and reduce the likelihood thatthey will need to divert.

The ARAC has further recommended thatoperators must comply with all ruleswithin FAR Parts 25 and 33 whenconsidering the longest flight and longest

diversion time for which approval issought. The rigor of this practice willensure that all airplanes designed tothese requirements will have thenecessary redundancy and reliability toensure safe extended operations.

To further protect airplanes duringextended operations, the ARAC hasidentified the factors that ensure highlevels of safety on flights with the potentialfor a long diversion. In the case of two-engine airplanes, the most significantelement is propulsion system reliability.

Using several methods to assess risk, theARAC concluded that diversion time canbe significantly increased without addedrisk if the IFSD rate is sufficiently low. AnIFSD rate of 0.01 per 1,000 engine-hours- or twice the engine reliability levelrequired for 180-min ETOPS - has beendetermined to allow unconstrainedoperations with two-engine airplanes.Currently, the world-fleet average IFSDrates for the 767 and 777, which togetherperform the majority of ETOPS, are bothbelow this threshold.

Other key elements that support extendeddiversion times are proper testing andvalidation of an airplane type (i.e.,airframe-engine combination (to ensureETOPS safety at service entry. The Boeing777 Early ETOPS program processesprovided a successful template on whichto base future such programs.Consequently, the design, analysis, andtest features from the 777 Early ETOPSprogram are incorporated in theproposed ETOPS regulations.

OTHER INDUSTRY EFFORTS

In addition to this ETOPS-related ARAC-FAA rulemaking, the European JointAviation Authorities (JAA) are developingstandards for extended operations. In

light of the ARAC, JAA and other effortstaking place around the world, theInternational Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO) - a branch of the United Nations -is reviewing the current annexes andassociated guidance materials and plansto propose changes as appropriate for allairplanes. The Boeing Company supportsthe harmonization of aviation standardsamong regulatory authorities worldwideand actively supports these JAA andICAO efforts.

SUMMARY

As airplane range capabilities continue toincrease, and flights become morecommon in remote regions of the world,expanding ETOPS to embrace allextended-diversion-time operations - notonly those involving two-engine airplanes- will raise the industry to a higher anduniform standard.

The proposed U.S. ETOPS regulationsreflect broad recognition within the globalaviation community that ETOPS-relatedpractices can further enhance the safetyand reliability of all operations on routeswith extended diversion times. Theproposed rules recognize the highstandard of safety that has been achievedduring nearly two decades of highlysuccessful twinjet operations worldwideand are the next logical step in enhancingaviation safety.

The FAA will evaluate these ARAC-proposed regulations, make whateverchanges it deems appropriate, andpublish the results in an NPRM for publicreview and comment. After commentresolution, the FAA is expected to enactthe new TOPS rules, perhaps as soon aslate 2004.

10

11

1 Proposed ARAC Rulemaking and Guidance

ETOPS authorisation Modify existing rule FAR 121.161 to codify ETOPS in the U.S. federalaviation regulations; describe the redefinition of ETOPS and the updated requirements beingproposed for the authorisation of all extended operations.

Definitions Add a new rule, FAR 121.7, to add the definitions of ETOPS-applicable terms toensure understanding of and compliance with the updated ETOPS requirements now beingproposed.

Communications Add a new rule requiring voice communications, where available, and themost reliable communications technology, voice based or data link, for all extendedoperations beyond 180 min; require that another form of communications be available in casecommunication is not possible with the most reliable technology.

Dispatch Add a new rule specifying dispatch or flight-release requirements for weather atETOPS alternative airports; further require that weather be updated at the start of the ETOPSphase of flight to verify the continuing availability of a valid ETOPS alternate.

Propulsion-related diversions Issue new guidance clarifying the requirements for twinjetdiversion in the event of an in-flight engine failure or shutdown; specify what factors shall andshall not be considered sufficient justification for the crew to fly beyond the nearest suitablealternative airport.

Fuel reserve Add a new rule specifying the reserve fuel to be carried to protect the airplanein the event of a cabin depressurisation followed by an extended diversion at low altitude toan alternate airport.

Maintenance Add a new rule making ETOPS maintenance standards applicable to allairplanes flown in extended operations.

Passenger recovery plan Modify existing rules FARs 121.135 and 121.97 to require allextended operators to develop a plan that ensures the well-being of passengers at diversionairports and provides for their safe retrieval without undue delay.

Modify existing rule FAR 121.415 to require training for crew members and dispatchers in theirroles and responsibilities in the operator’s passenger recovery plan.

Cargo fire suppression Add a new rule requiring that ETOPS diversion times shall notexceed the time limit, minus 15 min. specified in the Airplane Flight Manual for that airplane’smost time-limited system, which is typically cargo fire suppression.

Performance data Modify existing rule FAR 121.135 to require all ETOPS operators to havethe applicable performance data available to support their extended operations.

Polar operations Modify existing rule FAR 121.161 to define polar-area zones of ETOPSapplicability in which ETOPS requirements apply at all times. This requirement applies to alloperations north of 78°N latitude (North Pole) and south of 60°S latitude (South Pole).

Rescue and fire fighting Modify existing rule FAR 121.106 to require rescue and fire-fightingequipment to be available at any airport designated as an ETOPS en route alternate.

Other proposed changes Modify the rules governing transport-category airplane andengine design to incorporate ETOPS enhancements that reduce the rate of airplane diversionsand protect airplanes when they divert.

ARAC ETOPS Working GroupParticipants

AirlinesU.S.- American Airlines, American Trans Air,Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, NorthwestAirlines, United Airlines, United Parcel Serviceand US Airways

Non-U.S.- All Nippon Airways, along withBritish Airways, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, andScandinavian Airlines System, representing theAssociation of European Airlines (AEA)

Industry AssociationsEuropean Association of Aerospace Industries(AECMA), General Aviation ManufacturersAssociation (GAMA), International Civil AviationOrganisation (ICAO), National BusinessAviation Association (NBAA), Air TransportAssociation (ATA), National Air TransportationAssociation (NATA), National Air CarriersAssociation (NACA), and InternationalFederation of Air Line Dispatchers’Associations (IFALDA)

ManufacturersAirframe - Airbus Industrie, The BoeingCompany, Bombardier, Cessna, andGulfstreamEngine - GE Aircraft Engines, Pratt & Whitney,and Rolls-Royce

Pilots’ AssociationsAir Line Pilots Association (ALPA), IndependentAssociation of Continental Pilots (recentlymerged with ALPA), Allied Pilots Association(APA), Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations(CAPA), International Federation of Air LinePilots’ Associations (IFALPA)

RegulatorsU.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),Transport Canada, Joint Aviation Authorities(JAA) of Europe as represented by the U.K.Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), DirectionGénérale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC) France,and Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)Australia

Other PartiesAir Crash Victims Families Association (ACVFA)

Reprinted from AERO magazine bypermission of The Boeing Company

12

Full members

ChairmanAirclaimsJohn Dunne

Vice-Chairmanflybe. british europeanStuart McKie-Smith

TreasurerAir 2000Capt. Martin Pitt

External Affairs OfficerRAeSPeter Richards

Aegean AirlinesCapt. Dimitris Giannoulatos

Aer LingusCapt. Tom Curran

Aerostructures HambleDr. Marvin Curtiss

AIG AviationJonathan Woodrow

Air ContractorsCapt. Tony Barrett-Jolley

Air MauritiusCapt. Francois Marion

Air ScandicJonathan Annet

Air SeychellesCapt. Curtis Allcorn

ALAEDave Morrison

Astraeus LtdCapt. Nick Carter

BAA plcFrancis Richards

BAC ExpressCapt. Steve Thursfield

BAE SYSTEMS Reg. A/CAlistair Scott

BALPACarolyn Evans

bmi regionalCapt. Steve Saint

British AirwaysSteve Hull

British Airways CitiExpress LtdCapt. Ed Pooley

British InternationalCapt. Terry Green

British Mediterranean AirwaysRobin Berry

Buzz Stanstead LtdPeter Walton

CAADave Lewis - MRPSChrys Hadjiantonis - Safety Data Dept.Ed Bewley - Flight OperationsAlison Thomas - Intl. Services

Cardiff International AirportGraeme Gamble

CargoLuxCapt. David Martin

Cathay PacificCapt. Richard Howell

Channel ExpressRob Trayhurn

CityJetCapt. Mick O’Connor

DHL AirPeter Naz

DragonairAlex Dawson

DUO Airways LtdCapt. Christopher Morley

Eastern Airways UK LtdCapt. Jacqueline Mills

easyJet

Emerald AirwaysCapt. Roley Bevan

European Aviation Air CharterDerek Cottrill

EVA AirwaysRichard Lovegrove

Excel AirwaysPeter Williams

FlightLineCapt. Derek Murphy

FLS Aerospace (IRL)Frank Buggie

Ford Flight EuropeRichard Newton

GATCORichard Dawson

Goodrich Actuation LtdKeith Joyner

Independent Pilots AssociationCapt. Mike Nash

Members ofTHE UNITED KINGDOM FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ADVERTISING IN THIS MAGAZINEADVERTISING IN THIS MAGAZINE

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Safety Professionals worldwide.

If you or your company would like toadvertise in Focus please contact:

Focus is a Quarterly Publication which has ahighly targeted readership of 32,000 Aviation

Safety Professionals worldwide.

If you or your company would like toadvertise in Focus please contact:

Advertisment Sales Office:

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13

Irish Aviation AuthorityCapt. Bob Tweedy

KLM UK Eng.Andy Beale

LAD (Aviation) LtdSteve Flowers

LoganairDoug Akhurst

London City AirportSimon Butterworth

London-Manston AirportWally Walker

Manchester Airport plcPeter Hampson

Monarch AirlinesCapt. Tony Wride

MyTravelPhil Oakes

NATSPaul Jones

PrivatAirCapt. Boris Beuc

RyanairCapt. Gerry Conway

SBACMartyn Graham - SecretariatVic Lockwood - FR Aviation

ServisairEric Nobbs

Shell AircraftCliff Edwards

South African AirwaysTshepo Peege

The Boeing Co.Thor Johansen

Thomas Cook AirlinesCapt. Graham Clarke

Virgin Atlantic AirwaysCapt. Jason Holt

Willis AerospaceIan Crowe

Group members

bmiCapt. Ian Mattimoe

bmi Eng.Peter Horner

Bristow HelicoptersCapt. Derek Whatling

Bristow Helicopters Eng.Richard Tudge

Britannia AirwaysJez Last

Britannia Airways Eng.Adrian Vaughan

CHC ScotiaPeter Cork

CHC Scotia Eng.Colin Brown

EurocypriaCapt. Constantinos Pitsillides

Cyprus AirwaysCapt. Spyros Papouis

flybe. british europeanStuart McKie-Smith

flybe. british european eng.Chris Clark

GB AirwaysCapt. Aaron Cambridge

GB Airways Eng.Terry Scott

Lufthansa Cargo AGBernd Pfeffer

Condor/Lufthansa & CityLine

MODDASC Col. Arthur GibsonDASC Eng. Cdr. Ian PeckHQ STC MOD - Sqn. Ldr. Paul Cox

RAeSPeter Richards

RAeS Eng.Jack Carter

Co-opted Advisers

AAIBCapt. Margaret Dean

CHIRPPeter Tait

GASCoJohn Campbell

Royal Met. SocietyDr John Stewart

14

Since our report in the Spring 2003 issueof FOCUS the lawyers have been busywith the passengers’ attempt to appealagainst the High Court judgment in theEnglish DVT (Deep Vein Thrombosis)group litigation. This was unsuccessful,although a further bid is in hand topetition the House of Lords for leave toappeal to our highest Court. In Australia,we await the outcome of the 28 Julyappeal hearing in the Povey case, onwhich we also reported six months ago,which was interpreted by some asreaching the opposite conclusion fromthe English group litigation decision.

Airline management should be pleased tonote that the English Court of Appeal wasclear in its conclusions that the law largelyprotects the airlines. The three judgeswere unanimous in the result and theMaster of the Rolls, Lord Phillips, ourmost senior civil judge, conceded that hewas so clear in his conclusions that hewas tempted to dismiss the appeal in asingle sentence, as did a bench of theOntario Court of Appeal in a recentdecision.

Perhaps because of general disquietabout the case, or because of loyalty to aconstituent, the Welsh Labour MP JohnSmith, who has been outspoken on the

DVT issue, introduced a Private Member’sBill in Parliament entitled ‘The AviationHealth Bill’ in early July 2003. In fact itreceived its first reading the day beforethe Court of Appeal delivered itsjudgment. The bill, if it became law, wouldradically alter the relationship betweenairlines and passengers and imposesignificant burdens on the industry.

The bill would impose a primaryobligation upon certain airlines to “protectand promote the health, welfare and well-being of their passengers”. That generalresponsibility would include specificresponsibilities:

(a) to seek to prevent the occurrence oraggravation of any injury, illness ordisease;

(b) for the mental and psychologicalhealth, welfare and well-being ofpassengers;

(c) for the provision and maintenance ofequipment that is, so far as isreasonably practicable, safe andwithout risks to the health, welfare andwell-being of passengers;

(d) for the provision of such information,instruction, training and supervision ofstaff as is necessary to protect and

promote the health, welfare and well-being of passengers; and

(e) for the provision of such informationand instruction to passengers as isnecessary to protect and promotetheir health, welfare and well-being.”

The Secretary of State must issue codesof practice defining compliance.

The bill is curiously drafted in itsapplication insofar as it is expressed toapply to carriers to whom Warsaw/Hagueor certain of the Application of ProvisionsOrders apply. Leaving aside the omissionof carriage subject to other permutationsof the Warsaw system, it is misconceivedinsofar as the Convention applies byreference not to the carrier, but to thecarriage. The bill would apply to functionsor activities performed or carried out inthe UK or on a UK-registered aircraft.Such activities would include the mannerof operation of an aircraft which may besaid to have contributed to a healthproblem. It would therefore poseparticular jurisdictional issues in relationto international carriage: many overseasaircraft spend the majority of their timeoutside the UK, but the activities andfunctions likely to be in issue may beperformed both within and without theUK. One assumes that the political intent

DVT - What is all the fuss about? Part II or, Are airliners flying surgeries?by Simon Phippard - Barlow Lyde & Gilbert

15

is to assume jurisdiction over all carriersoperating to the UK.

There is express provision for an airline tobe liable in damages for negligent non-compliance. If that responsibility conflictswith the existing provisions of the Warsawregime, the proposed Act would takeprecedence and a carrier would beunable to limit its liability under Art. 22 inany claim for breach of this Act. To thatextent, if the bill as presently draftedbecame law, it would put the UK inconflict with its treaty obligations to othercontracting States to the Warsaw system.

Taken at its most extreme it is plain that ifsuch a bill were to become law theimpact on airlines would be colossal. It isalready recognised that not everypassenger is truly “fit to fly” in the currentcabin environment and many take little orno effective steps to minimise the risksinherent in lengthy or frequent exposureto the cabin environment, limited as theyare. The bill is not limited to the healthissues associated with air travel: airlineswould have to train their staff “as is

necessary to protect the health of theirpassengers” – thus imposing obligationsregardless of the condition of apassenger before boarding. Dealing withmental health would be enormouslydifficult: if there is a responsibility for themere psychological well-being ofpassengers, is every passenger whosuffers slightly from fear of flying entitledto one-to-one counselling? Or need onlytrained psychologists apply to becomecabin attendants?One should not be deceived by thesuggestion in some parts of the bill thatmeasures need only be “reasonablypracticable”. This does not apply inrelation to all aspects but moresignificantly compliance is very difficult togauge. Airlines generally now provideguidance on self-help in magazines andin-flight videos: one finds it hard tobelieve that a Secretary of State would beable to resist the temptation to make suchaction mandatory and to increase thosesteps steadily. Even if the codes ofpractice were drafted in such a way as tolimit the specific steps an airline musttake there would in any event be litigation

from disgruntled passengers or those onthe make. The training for all manner ofhealth prevention issues would no doubtact as a significant distraction from flightcrews’ primary responsibility for safety ofpassengers.

The bill does not, however, haveGovernment support and is thereforelikely to struggle to secure Parliamentarytime. It is listed for a further reading inmid-November, but it is thought unlikely toproceed at that stage or indeed soonthereafter. Nevertheless, readers shouldnote that Gwyneth Dunwoody, theTransport Select Committee chairman,has put her name to the bill. It is,therefore, unlikely simply to disappearquietly.

The reason given by the Master of theRolls for not dismissing the DVT appeal ina single sentence is perhaps informative.He had sympathy for the passengers andbelieved they deserved a full explanationof why the appeal failed. But he went onto observe that the result might be ablessing in disguise insofar as it wouldspare many DVT claimants from pursuingcases “involving difficult issues ofcausation which would have been verycostly to resolve”. The sympathy felt byJohn Smith MP is an overreaction: notonly does it pander to a nanny stateapproach but there must be a highlikelihood of raising all manner ofexpectations. Passengers may beencouraged to regard a health problemoccurring shortly after a flight as groundsfor compensation. This may prove justas difficult to resolve, and costly for bothpassengers and airlines to deal with, asthe issues associated with DVT. Better,surely, to put the emphasis onpassengers’ own responsibility for theirown health.

16

Boeing will soon offer a suite of newintegrated flight deck navigation optionsthat enhance the proven approachcapability of 737-600/-700/-800/-900airplanes. Available in 2003, theseoptions enable pilots to fly precise three-

dimensional paths that smoothly intercepta variety of final approach legs. TheCategory IIIB Autoland, Global NavigationSatellite System Landing System,Integrated Approach Navigation, andNavigation Performance Scales options

work together or separately to improvesafety and performance while decreasingoperating costs.

Operators will be able to enhance theapproach capability of their 737-600/-7O0/-800/-9O0 airplanes this year with asuite of new flight deck navigationoptions: Category IIIB Autoland, theGlobal Navigation Satellite System(GNSS) Landing System, IntegratedApproach Navigation, and NavigationPerformance Scales.

Together with the excellent existingapproach capabilities of the 737, theseoptions offer a flexible navigation solutionfor airlines that want to increase theircompetitive advantage by improvingairplane safety and performance,decreasing operating costs, andreducing flight crew training requirementsthrough advanced technology.

The new navigation options work togetheror separately to enable pilots to fly safe,stable, and precise three-dimensionalpaths that smoothly intercept a variety offinal approach legs.

The options improve landing capability inadverse weather conditions, in areas ofdifficult terrain, and on existing difficultapproach paths. In addition, they willallow crews to take advantage ofemerging air traffic control technologiesdesigned to improve airport operations.

To help operators understand thesenavigation options and their features, thisarticle describes

1. Category IIIB Autoland.2. GNSS Landing System.3. Integrated Approach Navigation.4. Navigation Performance Scales.

The article also discusses how the optionsand procedures are compatible withcurrent and emerging approach navigationtechnologies such as the Instrument

737-600/-700/-800/-900 Approach Navigation Options

17

Landing System, mixed-mode, andconstant-angle nonprecision approaches.

1. Category IIIB Autoland

The new 737-700/-800/-900 Category IIIBAutoland option (fig. 1) provides thesame all-weather, precision approachautopilot guidance currently available onother Boeing airplane models.

This option, which is in flight test, will beoffered with the 737-700/-800/-900 over-under engine format. The over-underformat provides the display spacenecessary for Category IIIB Autolandsystem messages. (The 737-600 is notcurrently being certified for Category IIIBoperation.)

2. GNSS Landing System

The 737-600/-700/-800/-900 GNSSLanding System (GLS) option usesGlobal Positioning System navigationsatellites and a Ground-BasedAugmentation System (GBAS) to providesignals similar to Instrument LandingSystem (ILS) signals (fig. 2). Ultimately,the GLS could replace the ILS as theprimary means for guiding airplanes tothe runway in low visibility. The GLS alsomight be expanded to support curvedapproaches. (See “Global NavigationSatellite System Landing System,” Aerono. 21. January 2003.)

The initial 737-600/-700/-800/-900 GLSoption supports a Category I instrumentapproach capability and the ability tocomplete the approach with an automaticlanding. This system is being expandedto support full Category IIIB Autolandoperations.

Retrofit for the 737-600/-700/-800/-900 GLSrequires new multimode receiver (MMR)hardware and software, a navigationcontrol panel with GLS capability, hardware

and software upgrades for the enhancedground proximity warning system(EGPWS), flight management computer(FMC) Ul0.5 software, and commondisplay system (CDS) Block Point 2002software. A future curved GLS approachcapability might require autopilot and CDS

software changes.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) plans to deploy GLS groundstations in Memphis, Chicago O’Hare,Juneau Alaska, Seattle. Phoenix, andHouston to support operational evaluation

18

testing. The program calls for thepurchase and deployment of as many as40 ground stations per year after the initialphase. The FAA projects a total of 160GBAS ground stations are needed in theUnited States. Europe also plans todevelop and install GBAS ground stations.

3. Integrated Approach Navigation

Integrated Approach Navigation (IAN) isan approach option designed for airlinesthat want to use ILS-like pilot procedures,display features, and autopilot controllaws for nonprecision (Category I)approaches. This option does not requireadditional ground facility support.The FMC transmits IAN deviations to theautopilot and display system. The pilotprocedures for IAN are derived fromcurrent ILS pilot procedures and areconsistent for all approach types:Select the approach on the FMC controldisplay unit, tune the appropriate station,and arm the autopilot approach mode.The IAN function supports the ILS for

glideslope inoperative,localizer only, andbackcourse approach types.

The IAN function will alert the crew toapproach selection or tuninginconsistencies. For example, if an ILSstation is tuned and an area navigation(RNAV) approach also is selected on theFMC, the flight crew will be alerted andthe ILS approach mode will takeprecedence automatically, with theappropriate display format.

While the IAN display (fig. 3) is similar to anILS display, there are sufficient visualdifferences to ensure that the crew doesnot confuse a nonprecision IAN approachfor a precision ILS or GLS approach (fig.4). As on all nonprecision approaches, thealtimeter is the primary method of ensuringthat altitude constraints are honored.

Retrofit of this option involves softwareupdates for the FMC, CDS, flight controlcomputer, and digital flight dataacquisition unit (DFDAU) and hardwareand software updates for the EGPWS.

4. Navigation Performance Scales

Navigation Performance Scales (NPS) isa new display feature that integrates thecurrent lateral navigation (LNAV) andvertical navigation (VNAV) with actualnavigation performance (ANP) andrequired navigation performance (RNP).The primary display format of the NPS(fig. 5) can be interpreted easily, therebyallowing the crew to monitor flight pathperformance relative to flight phaserequirements and airplane systemnavigation performance.

NPS can be especially valuable forapproaches with tight airspacerestrictions because of terrain, traffic, orrestricted areas. LNAV and VNAV withNPS supports Category I approachesdown to 0.l0-nmi RNP. NPS also isdesigned to smoothly transition to an ILS,GLS or IAN approach. (For a detaileddescription of NPS, see “Lateral andVertical Navigation Deviation Displays,”Aero no. 16. Oct. 2001.) Retrofit of thisoption involves software updates for theFMC, CDS, and DFDAU.

Summary

This year, operators will be able toenhance the approach capability of their737-600/-700/-800/-900 airplanes througha suite of new flight deck navigationoptions: Category IIIB Autoland, GLS,IAN, and NPS. These options enablepilots to fly paths that smoothly interceptvarious final approach legs. Thisintegrated, flexible approach navigationsolution improves safety and performanceand decreases operating costs. Theoptions are designed to meet the currentand future approach requirements ofBoeing customers worldwide.

Reprinted from AERO magazine bypermission of The Boeing Company

1919

This book is targeted at all thoseengineers with a responsibility for the taskof managing, supervising or undertakingmaintenance activities. Indeed, in thisage of increasing maintenance relatederrors in the aviation industry and greateremphasis on corporate responsibility itshould also be read in the boardroom.

The authors, Professor James Reasonand Alan Hobbs, are both well respectedspecialists in the field of Human Factorsand they have produced an easily readand down-to-earth practical guide tomanaging mainenance errors. Whilstthey draw on examples from a variety ofindustries the resulting guide isparticularly relevant to aviationmaintenance.

The first part of the book gives the readera sound understanding of thefundamentals of Human Performance,error categories and the local factors thatare known to increase the frequency ofmaintenance errors. This is then wellillustrated by examples of maintenanceinvolved accidents from 3 different

industries - aviation, rail and oil. Theremainder of the book thencomprehensively examines the buildingblocks that contribute to a managementof maintenance error. The concludingchapter recognises the human fallibility ofthe Manager and provides a message onthe management of Error Management.

The book is a stimulating read for allprofessional maintenance practitionersand will provide a useful basis for theestablishment of an essentialmanagement tool - Error Management.

Reviewed by:Jack Carter C Eng, BSc(Eng), MRAeS

Managing Maintenance Error - A Practical Guide

The Chairman’s column reminds us that accidents stilloccur from adverse pitch-up trim on take-off.

At the onset of such an occurrence, whether arising fromaerodynamic mistrim, misrigging or excessively aft balanceof the load, isn’t there an immediate remedy in the hands ofthe pilot?

If one sets up bank, with aileron and rudder, it is likely thatsufficient pitch-down moment may be generated by the fin inthe vertical plane to counter the pitch-up moment from faulttrim or balance. Once the aircraft has settled in a controlledturn the crew have time to assess the situation.

Climb rate would be reduced, in the interests of keeping themargin of speed over the stall in a turn. Obstacle clearanceissues may arise too, that could dictate the direction of turn.But in such an emergency the priority must surely be to buytime and keep the aircraft flying.

Is this simple technique taught in early flying training?

Sincerely,Captain Harry Hopkins

Letter to the Editor

by James Reason and Alan Hobbs ISBN 0-7546-1591-X

10 good reasons to join the world’s foremost aerospace society■ over 19,500 members in 100+ countries■ international network of 70 Branches■ a thriving youth section with more than 4000 members worldwide ■ prestigious headquarters in central London ■ 20 groups focusing on specialist areas within aerospace ■ 300+ lectures and conferences each year ■ two magazines and one technical journal published monthly ■ dedicated careers centre providing expert careers advice ■ internationally renowned aerospace library and archive resource■ the influential voice for the aerospace community

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www.aerosociety.com@�

20

I recently had the opportunity to look indetail at a new software product thatmakes the submission and administrationof safety reports so easy that I amsurprised nobody had thought to producesuch a product sooner.

We are all aware of the importance ofsafety in airlines. The ongoing quest bymanagement to reduce the operatingcosts, whilst increasing productivity andcommercial flexibility creates a complexenvironment in which to work.

Operational costs reduction has beenachieved by reducing turn around times,improving staff work practices, andstreamlining administration. This mayresult in greater stress for staff as theirjobs change.

Flight Safety Officers (FSO) are notimmune to these pressures as they tooare expected to be more efficient. Manyadvise that they do not seem to haveenough time to do everything required ofthem. The completion and analysis AirSafety Reports are one of the timeconsuming areas of the Flight SafetyOfficers job and a tool that would help tocreate, edit, track and monitor thesereports would greatly enhance theefficiency of the FSO. Currently they haveto transfer hand written and faxed reportsinto digital format for onward transmissionto other departments and organisations.They have to chase staff to check thatindecipherable words are corrected andthat the report is written in an accurate

and coherent way so that the event maybe understood by all the readers. Thiscan at times be very time consuming ifthe crew are flying or have gone on leave,or are just not contactable. It issometimes just not possibly to completethe reporting process within the timespecified.

With all the tasks that need to be donefew Flight Safety Officers have enoughtime to spend on thorough investigationand analysis of incidents. Maintaining anaudit trail of incident management andanalysis becomes almost impossible.

The requirement to show that a report hasbeen correctly managed, and that allresponsible personnel have beeninformed, as well as showing that all thenecessary actions have been taken isputting a strain on safety departments.Additionally, audits of this process arebecoming more common. Questionssuch as: How do you know that the ABCmanager was informed of this incident?What did XYZ do about this incident whenthey were informed? Why did it take solong? can sometimes be very difficult toanswer and more difficult to prove. Withour society becoming every more litigiousthis aspect of the job could becomemuch more important.

It is this whole area that the First Launch’sSafety Report System (SRS) isaddressing.

The system is simple to use, intuitive andvery time saving. Once correctlyconfigured it will prevent many of theerrors that Flight Safety Officers spendmany hours checking and conforming.

The system has been purposefullydesigned for aircrew, ground crew, andstaff who are not skilled typists ornecessarily computer literate. It has beenmade friendly and intuitive, with helpprompts to assist the individual completingthe report. Pull down selections helpremove typographical errors as well asacting as a memory aid, pre-filling entriesthat are common to an aircraft, andproviding a spell checker all save time.

Having assisted the crew or staff withcompleting the report, a local copy of thereport is printed for their personal record.The completed report is now, at the touchof a button, emailed to all the responsiblemanagers. For example, an ASR reportwould be sent to the safety office, dutyoperations manager and engineering. Anaudit record is kept to show when thereport was filed, and to whom the reportwas sent.

Following the ASR example, engineeringwill carry out an investigation if necessary,and can add additional comments to thereport, as well as identifying anyreplacement part fitted. The updatedreport would not be sent to the safetyofficer and the duty operations manager.The engineer would also get a printedcopy for their records.

Air Safety Report Administration made Easierby Simon Earthrowl

2121

The report being emailed is viewed andprinted in the airline’s approved format.All fields on the report are now typed, andcan be viewed with Microsoft Word. Thesafety officer can review the report anddecide what the appropriate priority of thereport should be and what action shouldbe taken. The report once checked canbe sent to airline management, and ifnecessary to the CAA as an MandatoryOccurrence Report.

In the same way, voyage reports can besent directly to the commercialdepartment, and other reports can betailored to the airline’s requirement.

MOR reports are identified where theyhave been raised, and have not been sentto the CAA within the prescribed time.The administrator is alerted if there areany unsent MORs, and additionally if thereare any MORs that have to be sent to theCAA before start of work the next day.All Air Safety Reports (and optionallyGround Occurrence Reports) can beeasily exported into the airlines trending

and risk management software packages(e.g. British Airways WinBASIS).

Having had the opportunity to see thesoftware in operation there is no doubt inmy mind that it would save many hours oftedious work for the pilots, engineers andthe Flight Safety Officer, freeing up time todo the more important functions of theirjobs. The acquisition of such a system iscertainly worth consideration.

22

The recent Amendment 5 to JAR 145mandated changes to a maintenanceorganisation's responsibilities with regardto human factors and occurrencereporting. Both these important areashave long been part of the regulation butnow clear criteria for inclusion in theorganisation's procedures, processes andculture have been established.

For many small to medium sizedorganisations compliance with theserequirements can seem a daunting task.Investment in the resource needed toprovide effective systems is difficult tojustify when benefits are initially theoretical.Additionally, available statistics to supportthe requirement tend to be global andsenior managers view 'accidents' ratherthan in-house incidents as their guide toan organisation's health check.

However, systems that meet JAR 145requirements can be introduced whichare both cost effective and simple. Moreimportantly, they greatly enhance safetywith the added bonus of givingtransparency to an organisation's failuresacross the spectrum of minor to veryserious. At flybe. Aviation Services, amedium to large organisation spreadacross the United Kingdom and parts ofEurope, the Quality AssuranceDepartment were tasked with introducinga system to satisfy the requirements andbenefit the organisation.

The main objectives:1. Enhance safety.2. Effect positive awareness.3. Create an open reporting culture.4. Cost reductions from identified errors.

These objectives are supported by:1. Total and ongoing support from senior

management.2. Positive reporting processes.3. Feedback to all employees.4. Effective investigations.5. Employee involvement with corrective

measures.6. Analysis of all occurrence reports.7. Training programmes tailored to the

organisation.

To ensure consistency, the well publishedprinciples associated with human factorsand maintenance error management formthe basis of the initiative as well as thoseelements of safety management systemprocesses that suit our organisation'srequirements.

The reporting elements of our systemconsist of Mandatory Occurrence Reports(MORs) - otherwise referred to as AirSafety Reports (ASRs), EngineeringOccurrence Reports (EORs) and ErrorAvoidance Programme (EAP) reports.

MORs/ASRs meet the CAA requirements,with all technically related reports beinginvestigated and subsequently reviewedby both the Authority and our airline'sFlight Safety Committee. EORs areinternal reports raised by any employee oncompany related occurrences. They donot replace the MOR process but recordissues of a non-mandatory nature. Finally,EAP reports relate to our confidential errorreporting process and are an integral partof the Human Factor initiative.

All reports are logged, investigated,reviewed and recommendations raised.

Follow up verification is a vital part of theprocess to ensure corrective actions havebeen effective. Allied to this investigatoryprocess is the Quality ManagementReview (QMR) meeting chaired by theEngineering Director, held on a monthlybasis, where issues raised by thereporting process are discussed by thesenior management team.

To ensure full employee awareness amonthly Quality Department FeedbackReport (QDFR) is issued both on thecompany Intranet and by hard copy givingvisibility to the investigation process andresultant corrective actions. In order toget a measure of the success of theprocesses that make up our system, allinformation is stored on a central QualityActivity Summary database and thenanalysed to determine rates, trends,repeat hot spots and improvements. Costanalysis is carried out at the investigationstage of each report. An annual review isalso carried out at the beginning of eachyear and forms part of the QMR agenda.

This may seem a labour intensive systembut in reality, as long as each departmentplays its part fully, and simple buteffective processes are maintained, it isremarkably easy to administer. Two keycompany requirements must be present.Firstly, senior management have to takethe lead and be seen to take the lead ifthe initiative is to succeed. Secondly, adisciplined approach is essential i.e. timescales must be met and all meetingsmust happen as planned.

Finally, review the processes regularly,learn from mistakes, listen to employeesand keep them informed at all times. Theever increasing Human Factor elementassociated with occurrence reporting willbe discussed in a future article.

Human Factors and Occurrence Reporting SystemsFrom a Maintenance Organisation's Perspectiveby C R Clark, Head of Quality and Training flybe. Aviation Services

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Human Factors and Occurrence Reporting Systems

EngineeringOccurrence Reports

Internal reports investigatedand findings publishe to reporter.

Summarised findings alsopublished in QDFR to satisfyJAR145.60 (b) requirement.

EOR’s which meet CAP382 criteria are raised to MOR’s

Relevant EOR &MOR investigation

report findingsforwarded directly

for inclusion incontinuation training

Feedback from Continuation training asrequired by JAR145 AMC145.30 (e) 7

Feedback from Error AvoidanceProgramme as required by JAR145

AMC145.30 (e)7

Relevant EORinvestigation reportfindings forwardeddirectly for action toTechnical Services

S McNair, Quality Managerflybe. Aviation Services

Technical Services

Feedback from QDFR and EAPintegrated into workpack task

cards to meet JAR145AMC 145.65 (b) requirement

Error AvoidanceProgramme

EAP workshops includeexperience from incidents and held

against appendix 9 to JAR145 criteria.EAP feedback reports published

monthly. Satisfies JAR145AMC 145.30 (e) requirement.

Continuation Training

Syllabus reviewed at regularmeetings. Feedback from

incidents included in continuationtraining. Satisfies JAR145.35 (d)

requirement.

Quality DepartmentFeedback Report

Published monthly on Intranet and hardcopied to line stations to include:-■ Closed MOR’s■ Open MOR’s■ Closed EOR’s■ Open EOR’s■ Failed on fit EOR’s■ EOR’s raised to MOR’s■ Additional procedural and

airworthiness informationSatisfies JAR145.60 (b) requirement

MandatoryOccurrence Reports

Monthly meetings held with CAAand JAR OPS operator. Reports

investigated and findings publishedto reporter. Summarised findingsalso published in QDFR. Satisfies

JAR145.60 (a) requirement.

UK FLIGHT SAFETY COMMITTEE

ANNUAL SEMINAR 2003

AVIATION SAFETY - THE BALANCE BETWEEN COST AND VALUE

29th/30th September 2003

The Radisson Edwardian Hotel Heathrow

Seminar Objective

Safety Management can be seen as expensive for all forms of Industry. Regulatory obligations notwithstanding, there are many choicesthat could be made. This Seminar will examine how value judgements are made and attempt to demonstrate how ‘Best Practice’ neednot be ‘Cost Prohibitive’.

Programme

29TH SEPTEMBER 20031530 – 1700 Registration 2000hrs Seminar DinnerThis will take place in the Hotel Foyer After Dinner Speaker - Andre Clerc - Willis Aerospace

30TH SEPTEMBER 2003

1210 - 1240 Discussion

1245 – 1400 Lunch

1400 – 1430 A Manufacturer’s View

Thor Johansen - Boeing

1430 –1500 Economic Considerations in Designing for

Safety

Kwok Chan/Mike Carver

Airbus S.A.S

1500 –1530 Development & Use of Non-Mandatory

Safety Tools & the Benefits

John Savage - BA

1530 -1550 Discussion & Summary

Simon Phippard

Barlow Lyde & Gilbert

1550 -1600 Closing Remarks

John Dunne, Chairman UKFSC

24

0800 – 0900 Registration

Session Chairman - Ian Crowe, Willis

0900 – 0910 Welcoming Introduction

John Dunne, Chairman UKFSC

0910 – 0940 Keynote Speech

Mike Hirst - Loughborough University

0940 – 1020 Regulatory Minima

Dave Chapman/Dave Wright - CAA

1020 – 1050 Board Decisions Cost v Benefits

Dave Henry - Consultant

1050 – 1110 Refreshment Break

1110 – 1140 Development of an Affordable System

Mike Wood - flybe. british european

1140 – 1210 Examples from the Space Industry

Philip Smaje - InSpace

SEMINAR INFORMATION

Hotel Accommodation

Hotel Accommodation is not included in the Seminar Registration Fee. If you require accommodation please contact the hoteldirectly on Tel:(+44 (0) 20 8759 6311) and quote Block Booking Code 0929 UKF when making your reservation.

Seminar DinnerDress for Dinner – Black Tie

If you are unable to attend why not nominate a colleague to take your place. If so, please advise the UKFSC Fairoaks office of anychanges prior to the Seminar.

SEMINAR REGISTRATION FORM

Please complete one registration form per person (photocopies accepted).

REGISTRATION INFORMATION(Please print clearly)

First Name: Surname:

Company: Job Title:

Address:

Tel No: Fax No: e-mail:

PAYMENT INFORMATION

Seminar Fee: £150 UKFSC Member £200 Non-UKFSC Member

This includes the Seminar Dinner on the evening 29th September, lunch, refreshments and car parking. This does not include hotelaccommodation – please see ‘Seminar Information’ above.

Payment is by sterling cheque only. No credit cards are accepted. Bank transfer is available, details on request (please note anadditional cost of £6 will be added to cover handling charges). The UKFSC is not VAT Registered.

Sterling cheques should be made payable to UK Flight Safety Committee.

Do you plan to attend the Seminar Dinner on Monday 29th September? Yes No

Do you require a Vegetarian alternative? Yes No

PLEASE SEND YOUR COMPLETED REGISTRATION FORM WITH YOUR CHEQUE TO:

UK Flight Safety Committee, Graham Suite, Fairoaks Airport, Chobham, Woking, Surrey, GU24 8HXTel No: +44 (0) 1276 855193 Fax No: +44 (0) 1276 855195 e-mail: ukfsc@freezone.co.uk

Confirmation will be faxed to you on receipt of your Registration Form and payment.

✂

25

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