On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a federal decree “On Suspending the Russian Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements.” Beyond the political fallout, Russia’s decree raises several questions about when a state can suspend its treaty obligations and the legal consequences that flow from such a suspension.

Russia has not articulated a legal basis for its unilateral suspension of the CFE Treaty other than to state generally that its suspension “is in conformity with international law. Most likely, Russia relies on the CFE text itself to authorize suspension. (CFE Article XIX)

Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it

decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme

interests. A State Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the Depositary and to all other States Parties. Such notice shall be given at least

150 days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. It shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the

State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in

Paris On November 19, 1990, following the successful completion of

20 months of negotiations between the members of NATO and the

Warsaw Pact.

The Treaty consists of over 110 pages of text encompassing 23 Treaty articles, protocols, and two annexes.

It limits five categories of weapons between the NATO and Warsaw Pact (tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, helicopters, and attack aircraft).

The purpose of zones was to force the relocation of Soviet forces eastward from the inner-German border, and the flank. Additionally to prevent their concentration within the Soviet Union

Despite the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1990, the treaty remains in the best interest of Turkey; since it has, prevented arms racing, increased the level of transparency, reduced the possibility of both surprise attack and miscalculation, enhanced conventional deterrence.

The most meaningfull part of the Treaty is so called “Flank Regulations”

What are Flank regulations?

AreaEuropean island territories, of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of

Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of

application (portion of southeastern Turkey is excluded from the treaty due to Turkish concerns

about security issues relating to Syria and Iraq) and that part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasia

and North Caucasus Military Districts.

Flank limitations Defined By the Article V of the treaty to prevent destabilizing concentrations of

Soviet forces opposite Turkey and Norway.

Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It also consists

of the North Caucasus and Leningrad Military Districts of the Russian

Federation and the southeastern portion of Ukraine.

(4700 BT, 5900 ACV, 6000 ARTY)

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union the successor states agreed to

limitations for each state at Tashkent on May 15, 1992. Additional adjustments

were made upon the division of Czechoslovakia.

The Russian portion of the flank zone represents approximately one-third of Russian territory west of the Urals, an area more than five times the size of

Germany, in which Russia can hold no more than 1300 Tank, 1380 ACVs, and

2400 Artillery Pieces including designated permanent storage sites

(DPSS).

Russian forces in this area is 700 tanks, 580 ACVs and, 1,280 artillery pieces in

active units for this area.

The treaty is designed to be implemented by stages with each country reducing by 25 per cent of its overall requirement the first year,

60 per cent in 1994, and 100 per cent by November 1995 with a period of four months

(until March 1996) to verify residual levels.

This resulted for the Soviet Union to destroy roughly 14,500 pieces of TLE east of the Ural

Mountains

All states parties with the exception of Armenia and Azerbaijan (due to the ongoing conflict in Nagorno

Karabakh) reached their reduction goals in September 1993 and also for 1994. Overall, roughly 18,000 pieces of TLE have been destroyed in the former Warsaw Pact

alone and approximately 6,000 of this was accomplished by the Russian Federation

Despite the optimism generated by the obvious pprogress, serious difficulties have arisen which may

imperil final implementation of the CFE accord.

The most serious of these is the request by the Russian Federation and Ukraine to be relieved of the Article V limitation on the amount of TLE that can be

located in the flank areas of their country which consists of the Leningrad and North Caucasus

Military Districts.

In 1993 Russian Federation proposed the suspension of Article V of the treaty as a means to solve the problem and further suggested that Russia would be willing to

consider certain additional guarantees such as a prohibition on any increase in the military forces

assigned to the Leningrad Military District, no "over concentration" of forces in the North Caucasus, and a willingness to limit forces in the Kaliningrad Region.

Any alteration to these documents such as those proposed by Russia can not occur until the review conference which will

occur in spring 1996.

Russian troops in the North Caucasus could be "light" forces equipped with equipment that is not limited by the CFE Treaty.Such a force would also seem more appropriate to the terrain of the Caucasus as well as the threats of internal instability.

There is no flank limitation for their aircraft (eitherfixed or rotary wing) which can be rapidly moved from zone to

zone.

Russia could deploy additional ACVs and other tracked vehicles with their internal security forces as allowed in Article

III and XII

NATO’s Counter Arguments

The resulting agreement is based on an approach that was initially designed by NATO, and endorsed by all CFE States Parties in November 1995 at the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna.

The Flank Agreement has three basic elements:

* a map realignment, which reduces the geographic area covered by the treaty's

flank limitations;* additional constraints on equipment in

areas removed from the flank zone through the realignment; and

* additional transparency measures for the revised flank zone and those areas removed

from the flank zone.

ADAPTATİON OF THE CFE TREATY

The subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO’s expansion to include several former

Warsaw Pact states, however, threatened to undermine the CFE Treaty’s continuing relevance.

To accommodate the shifting strategic environment, the parties met in Istanbul in 1999 and negotiated and concluded an “Adaptation

Agreement” to amend the CFE Treaty.

Although Russia and a few other states have ratified it, the Adaptation

Agreement has yet to come into force. NATO member states have delayed their ratifications pending Russian compliance

with certain political commitments it made at Istanbul in concert with the

Adaptation Agreement's conclusion (e.g., withdrawal of Russian forces from

Georgia and Moldova).

Adapted Treaty is intended to build on the success of the original agreement by:

• Realigning equipment limits on a state-by-state basis rather than zones designed for a Cold War

environment; • Addressing specific needs that emerged in the 1990s, like Russia’s need for additional military

flexibility in the Treaty’s “flank” region; • Expanding security by allowing additional

European states to join CFE; and • Reinforcing and expanding Treaty provisions that

affirm the right of sovereign states to decide whether or not to allow foreign forces on their

territory.

Turkey supported the adapted Treaty as a positive step toward a stable and secure Europe. But, along with the great majority of Treaty parties, we have made clear we can only ratify the adapted CFE Treaty in the context of

fulfillment by Russia of key political commitments it made at the Istanbul Summit, which created the conditions that

allowed the Agreement on Adaptation to be signed. (Russia still remains military base in Gudauta/Georgia,

and completed withdrawal of Russian military forces and ammunition stocks from Moldova, remain unfulfilled).

Russian President Vladimir Putin has argued that the current CFE Treaty does not address Russia’s security needs, and that all States Parties should

immediately ratify the adapted Treaty. On December 12, 2007, Russia carried out its

threatened “suspension” of implementation of the current Treaty, and subsequently did not provide its annual CFE data as the Treaty requires. The United

States deeply regrets Russia’s “suspension,” which is not provided for under the terms of the Treaty, and

not justified under customary international law.

UNKOWN FACTS

The concept of the new article V of the Adapted Treaty was prepared bi-laterally with Russia (Ankara Agreement between general Dandin

and Kuznetsov)

Gist of the Turkish Approach to the Adapted Treaty is:

To keep the neighboring state parties in an agreed flank regime which is the sole meaningful part of the

Treaty

To prevent destabilizing force accumulation either in Caucasus or in Balkans

To force the Russia to withdraw her forces from Armenia and Georgia or to limit her military presence

there to the extent possible

Russia has been obeying the agreed flank limits since 2002

There is no Russian troops in Georgia

Russian Presence in Armenia has been reduced substantially

Most of the new NATO members has not obeyed the Adapted Treaty Limits yet

CFE membership of the Baltic States has been being hampered by The USA

The US is deploying force in Romania and

Bulgaria

NATO is not willing to ratify the Adapted CFE and using Turkey in her reasoning

(unfortunately)

ABM Treaty and the Anti-missile defense (missile shield) project

US stated that ABM hinders her government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from

future terrorist or rogue-state missile attack.

TURKEYBAD GAMER FOR THE GOOD GAME

IF THERE İS NO MORE CFE

- New arms race -New utopias and dangerous threat games

- Effects on the other sub-regional arms control regulations

- No more transparency for the States who has no intelligence asset

- Cold war type suspicions and concerns- Categorical dependence to the US and NATO

- No more hope for the stability in Caucasus- New affiliations on energy lines

- Threatening force deployment in BalkansNew affiliations On Montreuxs