o'neil - rev from within. inst approach - world pol 1996.pdf
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Revolution from within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and theCase of HungaryAuthor(s): Patrick H. O'NeilSource: World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Jul., 1996), pp. 579-603Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053982
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN
Institutional Analysis, Transitions from
Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary
By PATRICKH.O'NEIL*
THE
dramatic collapse of state socialism inEastern Europe poses a
number of questions still waiting to be answered. One of the most
interestingconcerns how communism
collapsedand how the process
varied across theregion.
The transitions in EasternEurope
are charac
terized by diversityin
timing, manner, and central characteristics. Thus,
there were theearly, negotiated developments
in Poland andHungary,
the sudden downfall of regimes inEast Germany and Czechoslovakia,the
ambiguous"revolution" of Romania, and the
palace coup in Bul
garia. Moreover, each oneshaped
the prospects for consolidated
democracy differently.
Hungary is especially striking in that within theparty itselfover the
course of 1988 and 1989 there developeda rural-based political
move
ment, the so-called reform circles, whichplayed
animportant part in
undermining the ability of the leadership to dictate the course of the
transition. Such differences aresuggestive
of thediversity
of state so
cialism within theregion, contradicting the appearance of
uniformity
amongthese
politicalstructures.
This study,an analysis of the dissolution of theHungarian Socialist
Workers' Party (Magyar SzocialistaMunk?sp?rt,orMSZMP),makes the
case that understandinghow authoritarian rule was first institutional
ized in agiven
case is akey
to a betterunderstanding
of variations in
authoritarian transitions. Institutional orders determine the context
thatshapes
notonly
the transition event itself but also thesubsequent
political order, that is, how authoritarianism dies and whatreplaces
it.
In this study the strong connection between institutional forms and the
*The research for this study
wassupported
in 1992 and 1993 bya
Fulbright-Hays Grant from the
Center for International Education of the U.S.Department
of Education, aswell asby
a grant from
the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX),with funds provided by the U.S. Departmentof State. None of these organizations is
responsiblefor the views herein
expressed. My thanks toAn
drew K. Milton for his comments onprevious versions of this article.
WorldPolitics 48 (July 1996), 579-603
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580 WORLD POLITICS
trajectory of authoritarian collapse inHungary will serve to illustrate
this argument.
Current Perspectives on Authoritarian Transitions
Authoritarian transitions in EasternEurope
and elsewhere aretypically
explained byreference to either "structural" or
"process" arguments.
Structural arguments tend to stress the macrolevel conditions (for ex
ample,economic
development, urbanization, levels of socialprogress)
that arenecessary for the creation of
democracyout of a nondemocra
tic form of political control. Process arguments takea
different ap
proach, focusingto a
greaterextent on the means and patterns by
which actual authoritarian dissolution takesplace
andconcentrating
on
the interaction of elitepolitical figures
and the success or failure of such
negotiationsto
producestable
democracy.1
Both sets of arguments stand inopposition
to one another. Struc
turalism can be criticized in that socioeconomicdevelopment and po
litical democratization are often taken aslargely axiomatic, and the
question of how a nation-state moves from an authoritarian system to a
democratic one is notgiven
due consideration. Process-oriented per
spectives, by contrast, can be criticized formoving
to the other extreme.
The oft-cited Transitionsfrom
Authoritarian Rule, forexample, provides
no framework forcontextualizing
events and opts instead to document
the actions ofpolitical elites and to stress their resourcefulness as a
keyvariable in the transition, to the exclusion of both state and
societyas
analytical components.2Currentapproaches
to thestudy
ofpolitical
transitions thus remain
unintegrated.Macrolevel structuralist
approaches paintthe broad brush
strokes of state, economy, andsociety
but fail to link these conditions
to thedynamic of actual
political change;microlevel process approaches
catalogthe actual transition
phenomenabut do not connect them to
the environment from whichthey emerge. Each framework, while es
sential tounderstanding political transitions, excludes the other, to the
detriment of both.One way of
bridging the gap between process- and structure-based
1Well-known
examples of structural arguments include Seymour MartinLipset,
"Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Re
view 53 (March 1959); notable among process-oriented works is Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.
Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., Transitionsfrom
Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).2O'Donnell, Schmitter, andWhitehead (fn. 1).
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 581
analyses is tostudy theway inwhich organized activities become fixed,
self-replicatingsocial forms. The "new institutionalism," which has en
joyeda
strong resurgence within social science, stresses theimpact
of
institutions on theordering
and formation of social andpolitical
rela
tions.3 As to what makes this area ofstudy theoretically valuable and
how thesefindings apply
toanalyses of state socialism and authoritar
ian decline ingeneral,
there are nosimple answers, since institutional
approachesare characterized by
adiversity
of views that are not neces
sarilyreconcilable.
However, several centralassumptions
threadthrough
much of this
research. Tobegin with, they
start from a
rejectionof the individual
based marketanalogies
of the rational choice, pluralist,or behavioralist
approaches.These
approaches typicallyview institutions as little more
than instrumental structures created to servespecific
utilitarian func
tions, "arenas within whichpolitical behavior, driven
bymore funda
mental factors, occurs."4 By contrast, institutionalperspectives
rest on
the assumption that theseorganized
forms are notsimply transparent
constructs but rather are a morecomplex
and influential aspect of
human behavior. Institutional arguments stress that these forms do not
necessarily follow frompurposive
humandesign
but instead often arise
through unintended actions and replicationor
by default. Institutional
conformityto rational
expectationscan be
dramaticallyaffected
bythe
pullof internal and external activity
as theorganization
strives to main
tain and define its ownintegrity.5
Second, institutions, asself-replicating structures, develop
their own
particular characteristics?resources, values, norms, routines, and pat
terns?which arepassed
on to individuals both inside and outside the
structure. This tends to bestow on institutionsindependent power, the
abilityto create and
shapethe
objectivesof individual and collective ac
tion. In contrast to more atomisticapproaches
to social choice, institu
tions can "establish the very criteriaby
whichpeople
discover their
preferences."6 ThedaSkocpol nicely
summarizes thispoint: "Organiza
tionalconfigurations, along
with their overall patterns ofactivity,
affect
political culture, encouragesome kinds of
groupformation and collec
3See in
particular James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: OrganizationalFactors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78
(September 1984); Walter W. Powell
and Paul J.DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism inOrganizational Analysis (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1991).4March and Olsen (fn. 3), 734.5JohnW. Meyer andW. Richard Scott, Organizational
Environments: Ritual andRationality (Bev
erly H?ls, Calif.: Sage, 1983).6Paul J.DiMaggio andWalter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Powell and DiMaggio (fn. 3), 11.
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582 WORLD POLITICS
tive political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of
certainpolitical
issues (but not others)."7
Third, animportant corollary, organizational
"lock in," is central to
understanding institutionalization itself. Institutionalization typicallyinvolves the formation of
policiesand patterns of behavior to
respondto the
surroundingenvironment. Over time these
practices tend to
harden, becomingan
inseparable part of theorganization's objectives
and thereforeblurring the
relationshipbetween means and ends. As a
result, dramatic reorganization becomes more difficult. Indeed, when
highly institutionalizedorganizations
are confronted with environmen
tal or internalchallenges, they
are more
likelyto
suppress
or
ignorethese contradictions than to
respondwith corrective measures.8
This has twoimplications. First, suboptimal systems may persevere
over along period
of time. Second, if thegrowing
obsolescence of an
institution fosters internal or external pressure, the institution is likelyto
respond by attemptingto
preserve the status quo regardless, until
such time as the tension succeeds ineliminating
the institution en
tirely.9Institutional
developmentthus appears
as apunctuated rather
than a gradual form of change.10 This corresponds well to our under
standingof transitions and revolutions, such as those in Eastern
Europe?situations that arise without
warningand
bringdown the authoritar
ian system within arelatively
shortperiod
of time.
Application and Misinterpretation
in Institutional Analysis
The institutionalperspective has
gaineda
great deal of currency over
the pastten years,
asmany scholars now utilize it to
augmentor
sup
plant earlier theories of political activity that had stressed individual ac
tion without reference topersistent
social constructs. Research on the
state, includingstate socialism, is one clear
exampleof this.11 In some
7Theda
Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringingthe State Back In
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985),21.
8DiMaggio and Powell (fn. 6), 14-15.
9G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional
ApproachtoAmerican Foreign Economic Pol
icy,"inG.John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, andMichael Mastanduno, eds., The State and American For
eignEconomic
Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 224-25.10
StephenD. Krasner, "Approaches
to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynam
ics," ComparativePolitics 16
(January 1984), 240-44.11
Notable examples include Ellen Comisso, "Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and
Collective Choice in CMEA States," InternationalOrganization
40(Spring 1986); Ken Jowitt, "Weber,
Trotsky and Holmes on the Study of Leninist Regimes," Journal ofInternational
Affairs45 (Summer
1991); Victor Nee and David Stark, "Toward an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism," inDavid
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 583
ways, earlier studies of socialismanticipated
this current wave of re
search, asWeberian-influencedorganizational theory, beginning
in the
1950s, strongly shapedwork on theUSSR and Eastern Europe.12Nevertheless, although
institutional analysisis
winning converts, at
least withinpolitical
science theperspective
tends to suffer from weak
nesses in both definition and theoretical power. For onething,
institu
tions are often characterized as little more thanself-reproducing
constructs, linked to sunk costs and vested interests, rather than as ac
tors in their ownright, creating
their ownorganizational
culture and re
sources. As RonaldJepperson notes, "Institutions are not
justconstraint
structures;all institutions
simultaneously empowerand control.13
A second problem lies in overstating institutional effects.While the
institutionalperspective
hasrightly
been accorded a role in under
standing politicalorder and
change,some have utilized the
approachin
away that exaggerates the
uniquenessof
politicalinstitutions as vari
ables, which leads to the conclusion thatpolitical
institutions are so
context-dependentas to be
largely noncomparative.This then limits
thedegree
to which institutional effects can begeneralized.
One finds this particularly in institutional analyses of state social
ism.14Certainly,
the introduction of institutionalperspectives
into stud
ies of state socialism is awelcomechange
from earlier attemptsto
place
these systems under the rubric ofWesternpolitical
orders. But when
the institutionalperspective
isoveremphasized,
the arguments lose
their theoretical character and shift away from aconcept stressing
process toward anideographic symbol emphasizing character, differenti
ation, that is, overshadows
causality. Following
this
logic,
the institu
tions of state socialism thus become "novel" because, to use Ken Jowitt's
well-worn term, theyare "Leninist," but we then fail to
identifythe un
derlying dynamics that institutionalized Leninism in the first place. A
generalizable process of institutionalization isconsequently
lost. Jowitt
evenrejects
the use of the term "state socialism," in that its use has "in
creased the analytic familiarity of Leninist regimes by denying their in
stitutionalpeculiarity."15
As others have noted, such advice does not
Stark and Victor Nee, eds., Remakingthe Economic Institutions
ofSocialism: China and Eastern
Europe
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1989); and Valerie Bunce and M?ria Csan?di, "Uncer
tainty in the Transition: Post-Communism inHungary,"
EastEuropean
Politics and Societies 7(Spring
1993).12
See, forexample, Barrington Moore Jr., Terror and
Progress,U.S.S.R.: Some Sources
of Changeand
Stabilityin the Soviet
Dictatorship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).13
Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in Powell and DiMaggio (fn.
3), 146.14
See inparticular Jowitt (fn. 11); and Nee and Stark (fn. 11).
15Jowitt(fn.ll),40.
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584 WORLD POLITICS
lend itself to either theory buildingor
generalization. Nor does it en
rich the analytical process by searchingfor
illuminating concepts else
where within the social sciences.16
ENRICHINGTHE "NEW"INSTITUTIONALISMITH LESSONS
FROM THE "Old"
Manyof the
shortcomingsin the so-called new institutionalism in po
litical science areaggravated by
the fact that ourunderstanding
of the
intellectual origins of this field is rather limited. Notable for its absence
isany
reference to thepioneer
of institutionalanalysis,
thesociologist
Philip Selznick, whose work onorganizational development
in the
1940s and 1950s paved theway for later studies in the field. This ispar
ticularly ironic, giventhat Selznick's
approachismore consistent with
arguments currently employedin
politicalscience than with those
found insociology
itself.17
AmongSelznick's many contributions in the area of organizational
study,one of the most
importantwas his
emphasison the link between
co-optation (defined as both the informal linkage of a unit to externalactors as ameans of
pacificationas well as the formal
incorporationof
individuals into the unit itself) and the institutionalization process.Selznick made the case most
strongly in his 1949 TVA and theGrass
Roots, arguingthat one of the
keyfactors influencing institutionaliza
tion was thedegree
towhich organizations, seekingto validate their ac
tivities and/or fill administrative demands, createlinkages
and/or
formally incorporateactors external to themselves. By doing so, the or
ganizationconnects itself to the broader environment and, it is
hoped,
increases its technical power and legitimacyas a result.
How anorganization responds
to the external environment is neither
predeterminednor uniform, however; existing
social patterns maycre
ate certain obstacles oropportunities,
andorganizational
leaders may
attemptto realize different forms and
degreesof
linkageas a result. The
givensocial
landscapeand the way in which an
organizationcan and
doesrespond
makes a difference in the institutionalizationprocess.
Institutionalization can thus be seen as a basic tactic fororganiza
tional survival, thoughone that over time often generates its own set of
16See the criticism of Jowitt's approach
inPhilippe C. Schmitter and Terry Karl, "The Types of
Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europeand South and Central America," in Peter
M. E. Volten, Bound toChange: Consolidating Democracy
inEast-Central Europe (New York* Institute
for East-West Studies, 1992), 43-45.17W. Richard Scott, "Unpacking
Institutional Arguments,"in Powell and DiMaggio (fn. 3),
179-80.
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REVOLUTION FROMWITHIN: HUNGARY 585
dangers.While the process of
co-optationcreates a set of environmen
tal relations that legitimizes the organization, there is also the risk that
these relations will gaina
greater prioritythan had been envisioned in
the original policy objectives and consequently that distinctions be
tween means and ends will be blurred.Organizations
thus become "in
fuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at
hand."18 The organization,no
longer simplyan instrument of a
larger
policy goal,becomes valued for its own sake, and
self-replicationbe
comes theprimary objective.
As a result, an institution may grow increasinglyinflexible even as
the social environment remains
dynamic.
This raises the
possibility
that
the institution will be less willingor able to respond to succeeding
waves of externalchallenges.
One way ofdealing
with theproblem
is
to continue with the policyof
co-optation, buildingnew
linkagesand
incorporatingnew members. However, the more
deeplyinstitutional
ized theorganization
and the greater theblurring
of the means-ends
relationship,the more resistant itwill be to
assimilatingnew actors
whose loyalty to the institution (as opposed to its ostensible goals) is
in doubt. This is the essence of the struggle within state socialism,described as the battle between the institutional "red"and the independent
"expert"?termsthat have become part of the lexicon of
organiza
tional behavior.19
Reinterpreting State Socialism as an Institutional Form
State socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europeis a clear case
of extreme institutionalization. Stalinism represented above all a
process ofco-optation
andpenetration
into all aspects ofsociety
and
economy,a
process thatparalleled
the formation of alarge
nomen
klatura whose power derived fromloyalty
to the organization itself.
With the institutionalization of the partycame the subversion of its in
strumental nature: the partycame to be venerated as the revolution in
carnate and the infallible manifestation of the people's will; it signaledthe
complete mergingof means and ends. And as it became the em
bodiment andjudge
of knowledgeand truth, itwas the sole evaluator of
all information. This was carried to extremelengths
andapplied
even to
18Philip Selznick, Leadership
inAdministration (Evanston, 111.:Row, Peterson, 1957), 17.19
As Alvin Gouldner argues, this is in fact a basic part of political developmentin all societies; in
the longrun the intellectual "expert" segment must be "either coopted
into theruling
class or itmust
be subjectedto the
repressivecontrol of a
burgeoning bureaucracy."See Gouldner, The Future of the
Intellectuals and theRiseof
theNew Class (New York:Seabury Press, 1979), 24.
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586 WORLD POLITICS
economic and scientific relations, sinceobjective
criteria were feared as
a source of autonomous, noninstitutional power. Subsequently,this
highly institutionalized Soviet form was replicated in Eastern Eu
rope?irrespective of the nature of the local environment.
With the death of Stalin and attempts at reform in the Soviet Union,communist leaders in Eastern
Europerealized that their domestic in
stitutional linkageswere
extremely weak, leavingthem vulnerable to the
impactof
changesin Soviet domestic and international
policy.Domes
tic institutional ties now attracted greater attention.By the 1960s many
communist leaders initiated policies of limited political and economic
reform inhopes
ofco-opting
the"experts" among
theintelligentsia
and
in thatway building local legitimacy and increasing technical power. It
seemed the intellectuals were on the road to classpower.20
These actionsreignited
thestruggle
between red and expert. As in
tellectuals across theregion
raised calls for the reorganization of social
ism and its reformulation on new, objective grounds, party leaders,
whose claim topower
was basedsolely
on theirloyalty
to these very in
stitutions, struck back. The end of Prague Spring in 1968 wasonly the
most evident example; intellectuals all over the region were purged
from or left the party, leavingthe
institutionally loyalin clear control.21
Where domestic institutionalization was stillpursued,
itwas nolonger
predicatedon increased intellectual autonomy but instead
appealedei
ther to narrow and limited technocratic claims(rationalizing
but not
liberalizing the centralized economy)or to traditional legitimizing
forms, definingand
justifyingthe party-state with the same
myths used
by their ruling predecessors.
After 1968 the Czechoslovak party returned to a highly centralized
form, legitimized byits
conformityto Soviet strictures rather than
by
the domestic environment. EastGermany
also soon launched its own
offensiveagainst
theintelligentsia, merging
technocratic reform with
extreme ideological ridigity inwhat has been termed "computer Stalin
ism."22 In Poland, the party triedvariously repression
and technical
rationalization, with results so disastrousthey
eroded domestic institu
tional linkages and paved the way for the rise of Solidarity and theparty's desperate
recourse to martial law. Even in Romania and Bui
20George Konr?d and Iv?n Szel?nyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979).21
Iv?n Szel?nyi, "The Prospects and Limits of the EastEuropean
New Class Project: An Auto
Critical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power," Politics andSociety 15, no. 2
(1986-87).22
Leslie Holmes, "The GDR: 'Real Socialism' or'Computer Stalinism'?" inLeslie Holmes, ed., The
Withering Away ofthe State?
Partyand State under Communism (London: Sage, 1981).
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 587
garia,where liberalization had been modest to
begin with, those steps
forward werequickly
reversed. Instead, domestic institutionalization
wassought through traditional, "Balkan" institutional forms, such as
the development of sultanistic and dynastic party apparatuses, as well
as the resurrection of nationalism andprecommunist history,
which
viewed the partyas the
expressionofthat national
destiny.
Only inHungary did the process of institutionalization continue to
depend upona liberalized
policyas a means of
co-opting societyand
the intelligentsia in particular.While this had the intended effect of
blocking the formation of socialopposition,
it also moved animportant
segment
of intellectual dissent into the ranks of the
party
itself. As a re
sult of this form of institutionalization?legitimacy attempted throughsocial reconciliation and the formal incorporation of the intelli
gentsia?the party bothperpetuated
its rule and created the means of
its eventual downfall.
The Institutionalization of Socialism inHungary:
From Stalinism to "Goulash Communism"
To explain why Hungary followed the institutional path that itdid, one
must first understand the effect of the 1956Hungarian revolution, sig
nificant for having totally destroyed organized party power. Followingthe rebellion, a violent reaction to the
repressive policiesof General
Secretary M?ty?s R?kosi, the party resorted to coercive ruleduring
the
years 1956-62. However, the newgeneral secretary, J?nos K?d?r, even
tually chose to create a new institutional base forHungarian
socialism
by pursuing a policy of reconciliation rather than continued force. Shat
teredby
the revolution, shorn of members, its heroicmyths,
and much
of its leadership, the chaoswithin the party gave K?d?r the opportunityto
incorporatewithin the structure a new set of administrative ideolo
gies upon which to construct apolicy
of broadco-optation.
From the 1960s onward thispolicy
of"goulash
communism" was
typified bya number of reformist
policiesunknown elsewhere in the re
gion.K?d?rism in essence
represented
a form of institutionaldualism,
where a whole array of ad hocorganizational
forms were created to
compensate for, but notreplace,
the intractable Soviet model. Eco
nomic reforms allowed for a more decentralized and mixed socialist
economy, with agreater role for
entrepreneurial activity. Simultaneously
the party initiated arapid liberalization within society in general.
While the core institutions of the party-state remained intact, new rou
tines andpractices
formed around theedges
of thepolitical system,
an
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588 WORLD POLITICS
informalco-optation process known to
Hungariansocial scientists as
the "dual" or "second"society.23
A more formal process of party co-optationalso took
place,as the
MSZMPexpanded
its recruitment to thegrowing
nonmanual sector.
This focus was notonly
on the clerical andmanagerial
sectors but also
on the younger intelligentsia.For many of these young intellectuals,
party membership took on a highly charged political edge; exposed to
neo-Marxist and antiestablishment views, theyarrived with a mission
to create amodern socialist order.
Thus, while elsewhere in Eastern Europea conservative counter
offensive hademerged by
the late1960s, driving
intellectuals out of the
party andsowing
the seeds of later opposition movements, inHungary
reforms and co-optative policieswere
largely keptin
place.K?d?r as
well as the Soviets knew that since 1956 stability inHungary had been
predicatedon a
temperedform of one-party rule, whose rollback could
spell disaster. In other words, the process of institutionalization?of
building linkagesto an external, legitimizing
environment?involved a
system of routines and norms that maintained thesanctity
oforganiza
tional form, while allowing for alternative activity on the margins of the
party-state. Reform andco-optation
were not intended torectify
the
shortcomingsof state socialism, but rather were intended to compen
sate for it.
This created acontradictory
situation for many intellectuals in the
MSZMP. On the one hand, it became evident that the currentsystem of
socialism had clear limits to reform. On the other hand, theHungarian
party remained at least superficially committed to liberal policies. As
opposedto elsewhere in the region, many intellectuals retained their
party ties in the hope that change could somehow be effected from
within. As a result, this group slowly beganto
developas an internal
"party opposition [that] did not identify with the R?kosi or the
K?d?rist model, or the Stalinist orpost-Stalinist systems that they had
created. 'This is not oursystem,
not our socialism. We joined theparty
so
that we couldtransform
this modeV"
(emphasis added).24
The party leadership, in the meantime, while simultaneously co-opt
ing intellectuals, took stepsto
prevent theascendancy
of an intelli
gentsia"new class." Recent studies have shown that while in
Hungary
the party actively courted theintelligentsia, they
were directed primar
ilyinto state
positions,while their ascension into
important offices
23Elem?r Hankiss, East
EuropeanAlternatives (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), chap.
3.24
L?szl? Lengyel,Micsoda ev (What a
year ) (Budapest: Sz?pirodalmi Konyvkiad?, 1991), 20.
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 589
within the party itselfwaseffectively prevented; these remained in the
hands of apoorly educated, aging leadership.25
Thissegregation
of red
and expert between party and statewas a useful way of both pacifyingand controlling party intellectuals. At them?tropole level of Budapestthe party intelligentsia found thatmembership provided opportunitiesand privileges,
even a limited part in political developments if they
stepped carefully. These actors, as anecessary part of socialist
legiti
macy,were thus
incorporatedinto the
rulingstructure and
brought
under control in the process.
Obstacles to Party Power for the Rural Intelligentsia
Yet this segment represented only part of the MSZMPintelligentsia.
Outside ofBudapest
itwas anentirely
different story: intellectuals were
far from the center of power and thus of much less concern to the party
leadership.Resources were fewer, forcing
intellectuals to remain within
the party for what little access and connections were to be had. More
over, whereas theco-optative policies
of them?tropole
served topacify
the intellectual class, rural political power acted as a conservative bas
tion, overwhelminglystaffed
byolder hard-liners of
proletarianback
ground.Conservative county secretaries insulated the party
center
against local/sectoral interests and threats bymeans of a
peripheralca
reer track forpolitically loyal
but notnecessarily
talented party cadres.
This position usually representedthe limit to which the county party
secretaries could rise; they occasionallyrotated from county
to county
but almost neverupward.26
While this method was not uncommon in
Eastern Europe,what is notable is that in
comparisonwith other East
ernEuropean states, the
demographicsof
Hungary's regionalcadre in
the 1980s mostclosely
resembled that ofpost-1968 Czechoslovakia,
where younger party leaders had beenpurged
in the wake ofPrague
Spring?a realityinconsistent with
Hungary's imageas
beingin the
vanguardof reform.27
Theselong periods
of tenure for party officials in effectencouraged
thecreation
of party fiefdoms, dynasticclans where
personaland famil
25Ferenc Gazs?, "Cadre Bureaucracy and the Intelligentsia," Journal of
Communist Studies 8 (Sep
tember 1992); see also the formerly classified Statisztikai adatok ak?der?llom?nyr?l (Statistical data on
cadrepositions) (Budapest:
MSZMP KB Part- ?sT?megszervezetek Oszt?lya, 1983), esp. 10,67.
26For details on the class origin, age, and tenures of county party secretaries in
Hungary,see Sta
tisztikai adatok (fn. 25), esp. 48; and Andr?s Ny?ro, Sege'dk?nyv apolitikai bizottsdg tanulm?nyoz?s?hoz
(Resource guideto the study of the Politburo) (Budapest: Interart, n.d.).
27Data derived from Central Intelligence Agency publications
on Communist Party cadre demo
graphics in Eastern Europe. See, for example, Directory ofHungarian Officials (Washington, D.C.:
Central Intelligence Agency, 1987).
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590 WORLD POLITICS
ial ties, overlapping membership,and
patron-client relationshipsdom
inated.28 This was made even moreegregious by
the fact that whereas
elsewhere in EasternEurope
central authoritiescommonly
usedpolit
ical power to enrich themselves, the Hungarian central party elite was
relatively poorly rewarded with benefits, a reflection of K?d?r's own
personal asceticism.29 Intellectuals, naturallyseen
bylocal party cliques
assuspicious, typically
found themselves shut out of these patronage
systems. Talented yet not apart of the elite of the
m?tropole,these re
gional"second tier" intellectuals
frequently complainedabout their
marginalstatus "Isten h?ta
m?g?tt"?"behindthe back of God."30 Re
form policies directed by them?tropole inHungary were thus able to
neutralize much of the power of the intelligentsia in the capital but had
theunanticipated
effect ofreinforcing center-periphery
friction and en
couragingmobilization below. In response to this situation, members of
this intellectual second tier used the partyto cultivate their own informal
networks, largely ignored by central party elites.These "solidarygroups,"bound
bycommon values and interaction, were critical in that
they
commonly served as akey building
block ofpartisan organization.31
The Emergence of the Reform Circle Movement32
By the mid-1980sHungarian society
was in a state ofdeep
crisis in
dicative of thegeneral stagnation of socialist economies as awhole. The
economic "miracle" of the past decadesbegan
todisintegrate
under the
pressure of massiveforeign debt and new
pressures forchange
from
28Andr?s A. Gergely, Az?llamp?rt
var?zstalan?t?sa (The disenchantment of the party-state) (Bu
dapest: TTI, 1992); and L?szl? Bogar, "Amegye p?rtszervek szerepe amegyei tan?csi ter?letfejleszt?si
d?ntesi mechanizmusban" (The role of county party organs in the county council'sregional develop
mentdecision-making mechanism) (Manuscript,
TTI collection, Budapest, 1989).29
One journalist hasprovided
a cleverexample
in his observation that the further one traveled from
thecapital and out from under the gaze of "az
Oreg (the old man), meaning K?d?r, the more audacious
wereparty elites and thus the more
sumptuous their food: "Nowhere else could one find amore ex
ceptionalkitchen than at the county party committee." L?szl? Hovanyecz, "H?bor?s gyerek" (Chil
dren of wartime), N?pszabads?g, May 15,1993, p. 21.30
Zsolt Szoboszlai, "V?zlat a vid?ki ?rtelmis?grol" (Outline of the rural intelligentsia), Juss 2/3 (De
cember1989-January 1990), 103-12; Pal B?nlaky,
"A kisv?rosok?rtelmis?ge
a'helyi t?rsadalom'
koz?let?ben" (The small-town intelligentsia thepublic life of "local
society"),inTibor Husz?r, ed., A
magyar ?rtelmis?gaW-as ?vekben (The Hungarian intelligentsia in the 1980s) (Budapest: Kossuth,
1986).31William Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, 111.:Dorsey, 1968), esp. 32-37.
32The following discussion of the reform circles is based on an
analysis of approximatelytwo hun
dredunpublished reform circle documents collected by the author, MSZMP archival research, and in
terviews with reform circle participants and former Politburo members (Imre Pozsgay,Resz? Nyers,
and K?roly Gr?sz) inHungary. Specific interviews or documents will be cited as
appropriate. For an
expanded analysis of this topic,see Patrick O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Social
istWorkers' Party 'Reform Circles' and the Transition from Socialism" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University,
1994).
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 591
Moscow. While during this period K?d?r had tolerated further political
changeswithin the state, such as in the
parliamentaryelection process,
those who called tooopenly
for dramaticorganizational change
still
faced serious repercussions. Even with the final ouster of K?d?r and his
replacement by K?roly Gr?sz inMay 1988, dramatic change seemed
unlikely,and
opposition forces themselves remained too weak to chal
lenge party authority."Reform communists"
spoke largelyof a trun
cated democratization, a limitedsharing
of power whilemaintaining
the constitutional"inviolatability
of socialism."33 Even under these cir
cumstances, multipartyelections were not
anticipateduntil 1995. The
MSZMP,which had institutionalized a set of limited reforms to balance
domestic and Soviet pressure,was
incapableof
reactingto a
changedinternational environment.
Theresulting
social tension extended to many party intellectuals,
particularly those at the rural level. And it is from thisposition within
the party but on the margins of power that the catalystfor
self-organization
emerged:the party reform circle. The
originsof the reform cir
cles lie inCsongr?d county and its capital, Szeged, long dominated by
conservative party leaders (as is testified by its nickname of "Pol Pot
county").After decades of hard-line, often corrupt leadership, by
1988
a series of scandals finallyundermined the county leadership, leaving
themgrasping
for the meansby
which theirauthority
could be re
asserted. One such idea, a consultativebody
of local intellectuals to
"advise" theleadership,
wasproposed. Though
thebody
never materi
alized, several of those involved in the attempt continued to discuss the
ideaprivately.
Local intellectualsbegan
to outline the concept of apolitical
move
ment within the party, a kind of "reform cell" that could link local partyreformers scattered
throughoutdifferent basic party organizations
into
onehorizontally
based group. Notonly
could such anorganization
concentrate on the local level, but it could also broaden itsobjectives
and foster similar groupings elsewhere in the country. A grassroots
movement orparty platform
that could link up with reformers at the
center ofpower
was envisioned as a final outcome.34
ByNovember this loose group sought
to enter thepublic sphere,
33Author interview with K?roly Gr?sz, G?d?ll?, June 2,1993; also transcripts of Central Commit
teemeeting, December 15, 1988, Hungarian Ministry of Education MSZMP archival collection 288f
4/248 o.e.34
Author interview with Csongr?d county reform circle members, Szeged, February 9,1993, and
Budapest, October 20, 1992, and March 23, 1993; J?zsef Lov?szi, "P?rttagok reformk?re Csongr?d
megy?ben" (The party members' reform circle in Csongr?d county) (Unpublished document, dated
March 28,1989).
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592 WORLD POLITICS
hopingto raise the ranks of its members within the party. On Novem
ber 29,1988, the first declaration of the Csongr?d county reform circle
appeared in the local press. Titled "Reform Circles in the Party as
Well "?a reference to the rise in political "circles" spreading outside of
theparty?the
declarationopened
with a radical call to action:
In Eastern Europe, the countries of so-called existing socialism are in deep cri
sis.This crisis canonly be fought against with radical and complex reforms; the
historic task is toliquidate the structure of the Stalinist model. The economy,
politics,various
spheresof
society?andour own socialist
conceptas well?we
must irreversibly liberate from the captivity of the bureaucratic mechanism This
will simultaneously require the following: 1.A clear strategy for r?int?gration
into the world economy (above all a functioning market and the revival of re
jected bourgeois values); 2. Political and ideological reform which will rediscover
and support every legitimate value of the socialist movement; 3.The reform of
political institutions, such that they will give space to individual and communal
autonomy andregard
amultiparty system
as a natural state.
The quarter-pagestatement continued with a number of
points:It dis
cussed the need for a criticalanalysis
of the past and the role of the
partywithin it. It called for the
developmentof a
dialoguewith those
outside of the party and for reformers within the partyto unite
against
hard-linersseeking
tosabotage
reforms. Andfinally
it exhorted other
party members tojoin
the reform circle and create others so as to build
ahorizontally based national political movement.35 A subsequent open
meetingof the reform circle on December 2,1988, attracted some 120
people,and over 65 signed
thefounding
statement.36
The timing of the declaration could not have been lesspropitious.
That same day General Secretary Gr?sz spoke to party activists in Bu
dapest, warningof the rise of "strident, bourgeois restoration-seeking,
counter-revolutionaryforces" who
soughtto
bringabout
"anarchy,
chaos ... and awhite terror" toHungary.
Struck first bythe
reactionary
tenor of thespeech,
the members of the Csongr?d reform circle were
then further alarmed bythe
general secretary's appearance inSzeged
two weeks later at a local party conference, where hetargeted
the re
form circle, brandingit as factionalist and divisive.37
In response theCsongr?d
reform circlekept
a lowprofile
for some
weeks, fearinga conservative counteroffensive. However, their reserva
35"Reformk?r?k a
p?rtban is " (There are reform circles in the partyaswell "), D?lmagyarorsz?g,
November 29,1988, p. 2.36
"Megalakulta
p?rttagokreformk?re" (The party members' reform circle has been established),
Csongr?dMegye Hirlap,December 3,1988, p. 3.
37"Gr?sz K?roly besz?de a
megyei p?rtertekezleten" (K?roly Gr?sz sspeech
at the county partycon
ference), Csongr?d Megye Hirlap,December 12,1988, pp. 3-4.
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 593
tions were soon overcomeby increasing
rifts at the top.When in late
January1989 Politburo member and noted reformer Imre
Pozsgayat
tempted to break the political stalemate by declaring that the "counter
revolution" of 1956 had in fact been a "popular uprising" against an
oligarchic regime, the Csongr?d reform circle publicly backed him
againstthose
callingfor his ouster. The reform circle statement received
national press coverage and called attention to the existence of an alter
nativecounterorganization
in theparty.38
This was not lost on other
party members elsewhere inHungary.
Thesubsequent
decision not toexpel Pozsgay
from the party proba
blyhad little to do with the
protestationsof the
Csongr?dreform circle.
However, theirpublic presence, combined with the
implicationsof
Pozsgay'sradical act, did
beginto mobilize other members of the party
intelligentsia. By the middle ofMarch reform circles had appeared in
Somogy, Hajd?-Bihar, B?cs-Kiskun, Zal?, and B?k?s counties, and bythe end of the month they
were to be found in Fej?r,Tolna, Szolnok,and
Gy?r-Sopron?that is, in over half of the counties inHungary.
Re
form circles wereparticularly strong in
Csongr?d, Zal?, Somogy,and
B?cs-Kiskun?all southern counties well known for lower levels of
heavy industry, underdeveloped infrastructures, and conservative, often
corrupt local leaders. While inBudapest party intellectuals remained
hesitant andkept
within thegiven parameters for reform, at the pe
ripherythe
intelligentsiawas in open revolt.
Despitethe lack of direct connections, the
spreadingreform circles
mirrored one another to anamazing extent, suggesting the same
party
cohort in each case. Noneincorporated
a formalleadership,
as all ex
plicitlyeschewed any semblance of
hierarchyor vertical
organization.
Nor was there any registeredor delimited
membership. Participants
themselves wereusually thirty-five
toforty years old, university gradu
ates who held minorpositions
in party cells or committees at the work
place.39
Reflectingtheir common socialization, early reform circle declara
tions focused on similar themes, based on theirexperiences
within the
party-state system. Despite 1956, Hungary remainedan
organizationallyStalinist state. Socialism could only be
predicatedon true
democracy and
not vice versa. To that end, the institutional framework for a true multi
38Radio
Budapest, January 28,1989, cited inAlfred Reisch, "HSWP Study Re-Evaluates the 1956
Revolution, Imre Nagy, and Forty Years of Hungarian History,"Radio Free
EuropeResearch (February
24,1989), 5.39
Gy?rgy Ker?nyi, "Reformkor-kor-k?r-k?p" (A portrait
of the reform time/circle/malady), Jelzb" 1,
no. 6 (1989).
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594 WORLD POLITICS
party democracymust be created, both for
Hungaryand for the
MSZMP.This would include the formation of ahorizontally based party
reformplatform
and the convocation of anextraordinary party congress
to effect a radicalreorganization
of the party (the current timetable did
not allow for such acongress until after the 1990
parliamentary elections).
As the number of reform circles grew throughout Hungary during
thespring
of 1989, they beganto form connections with one another
on a horizontal basis, direcdy challengingthe vertical structure of the
party. InApril delegates
from a number of reform circles met at aparty
reform conference (where many hopedin vain that
Pozsgaywould an
nounce the formation of aparty platform
or a newparty itself)
and set
in motionplans
for ameeting
of their own. Reform circlesfrequently
issued manifestos onpolitical
reform andscathing critiques
of the
party; theseappeared
first in local papers and then made their way into
the national press. These continuous attacks increased discord within
the party, demoralizing leaders as well as the rank and file. Reform cir
cles inmany counties and cities also demanded local party conferences,
wherethey sought
to oust entrenched bosses.
But in spite of these rapid successes, the transformation of the re
form circle movement into anorganized party platform
was not soeasy.
There wereattempts
atlinking up with
Pozsgayand his supporters, but
giventhe latent
hostilityof some rural intellectuals toward
m?tropole
elites, little was achieved. Rather than surrender theiremerging influ
ence to a centralpolitical faction, reform circles chose instead to act au
tonomously.Even as reform circles
developedties to each other, they
rejecteda unified
leadership.As some
participants later noted, they
viewed themselves as a "reform virus," livingoff the structure and re
sources of the partyto kill it from within?a clear result of their spe
cific institutional origins. This gave the movement much of its
anti-institutionalstrength,
but it also hindered coordination and the
formation of asingle policy.
This dilemma could be clearlyseen in lateMay at the first reform
circle conference, where some 440delegates
were in attendance, repre
senting 110 reform circles and by now over 10,000 participants.40 Dele
gates drafted an extensivecritique of state socialism and reiterated their
demands formultiparty elections, economic reform, and the democratic
transformation of the party. Press coverage was extensive, and guest
40For details on the conference, see Istv?n Tanacs and Eva Ter?nyi, "B?k?s ?tmenettel a demo
kratikus szocializmusba" (With apeaceful
transition to democratic socialism), N?pszabads?g, May 22,
1989, pp. 1,4-5; Judith Pataki, "First National Conference of HSWP Reform Circles," Radio Free Eu
ropeResearch (May 30,1989).
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 595
participants included several members of the Politburo and Central
Committee.Despite
such visible power, however, the movement was
still unable to unify its actions, as the delegates struggled unsuccessfullyto draft a common
platformstatement. Jealous of their own autonomy
andoverly
democratic in nature, noagreement could be reached on a
singlestatement
despitehours of debate.
On the Offensive and the Party Center in Retreat
While still chaotic, this public show of strength by the reform circles
had a clear effect on theincreasingly
anxiousparty leadership. Many
members of the Politburo and Central Committee now sawpolitical
changeas inevitable and
beganto retreat in the face of reform circle de
mands, leavingthe
general secretary with fewer and fewer allies. Si
multaneously, opposition forces tookadvantage
of this growing disarray
within the partyto
organizetheir ranks
againstthe MSZMP.
By earlysummer numerous civil groups formed nascent
political parties, pres
suring the party into roundtablenegotiations and
eventually achieving
their demand for open parliamentary elections in 1990.
Importantly,this internal
disintegrationof communist power dra
matically changedthe incentive for collective action, removing the ne
cessityfor the
oppositionto
unifyin a broad-based "front" movement,
as seen elsewhere in the region. Stable, competitive,and articulated po
litical organizations thusdeveloped
much earlier in theHungarian
transition process than elsewhere in theregion,
wherecounterhege
monic movementsdeveloped
tochallenge
still-formidable regimes.
The influence of the reform circles on thepath
of transition was
most obvious at the Central Committee session onMay 29, 1989,
where members confronted a number of reform circle demands, in
particularthe call for an
extraordinary party congress priorto
parlia
mentary elections (as opposedto the
planned conference, whose au
thoritywas much lower). The
assemblyalso heard a confidential report
on the reform circle nationalmeeting,
which outlined the movement's
growing strength.41 Over Gr?sz's protestations, the Central Committee retreated, approving
the party congress for October, withdelegates
to be elected as soon aspossible.
Gr?szcomplained
in asubsequent
in
41"Taj?koztat?
az MSZMPK?zponti Bizotts?g?nak
az MSZMP reformk?r?k 1989m?jus
20-?n
Szegeden rendezett munkatan?cskoz?s?r?r (Information for the MSZMP Central Committee on the
MSZMP reform circles' May 20,1989, work conference in Szeged),MSZMP Central Committee meet
ing,May 29, 1989, Hungarian Ministry of Education MSZMP archival collection 288f. 4/263 o.e.,
125-29.
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596 WORLD POLITICS
terview that the partywas
unpreparedfor such a
meeting,but had to
yieldto demands from the party ranks, such as those heard from the re
form circles.42
By the summer of 1989 the reform circles were no longer engaged in
tryingto defend reform but were
preparingto
carry it out. With elec
tions for the party congress under way, reform circleshoped
to win the
backingof as
many delegatesas
possible, isolatingconservatives at the
congress andforcing the transformation of the
party.43In anticipation
of this showdown, a second reform circle conference was held in Bu
dapestin
early September,but as before attempts
to form a unitedplat
form failed.
Importantly, delegates struggled
less over the actual
content of aplatform
statement than over theauthority implied by
such
organization. Created as an anti-institutional responseto the old order,
delegatescould not
accept the formalization of the movement and the
notion ofhierarchy that it contained. In the end, the conference ap
provedan
ambiguous"statement of
platform reconciliation," coveringvarious
policyissues on reform and democratization. Also formed was
acoordinating council, charged with the daunting task of building
a
central strategy to dominate the party congress, now one month away.44As the process of congress delegate
nomination and election un
folded, the reform circles fought hard to field candidates andwin rank
and-file party support. However, despitevictories in many electoral
contests, theyremained constrained
bytheir
minoritystatus within the
party. When the process finallycame to an end in late
September,
prospects for the congress remained unclear. On the surface, delegate
demographics gave the reform circles some reason forhope.
Over 80
percent were underfifty,
had some form ofhigher education, and were
classified as either white collar orintelligentsia. Nearly
90 percent had
never taken part in aparty congress before.45 In this aspect,
at least,
they clearly resembled the reform circle cohort. Less clear was how
many would commit themselves to the reform circleplatform. By
one
estimate over 40 percent of the samedelegates
came from the ranks of
42See the text of a television interview with K?roly Gr?sz,
"
'Tagadom, hogya
n?gy ?vtized zs?kutca
volt" (I deny that the last four decades were a dead end), Magyar Htrlap, May 31,1989,4^5.43
"Reformkongresszust Felh?v?s azMSZMPtags?ghoz" (Reform congress Call to the MSZMP mem
bership) (Unpublished joint document of six reform circles, June 14, 1989); "ABudapesti Re
formkor?nek ?ll?sfoglal?saa
p?rtkongresszusr?T (The Budapest reform circle statementregarding the
party congress), N?pszabads?g, June 12,1989, p. 7.44
Gy?rgy Kerekes and Zsusza Vars?di, eds., Reformk?r?kes
reform-alapszervezetek budapestitan?c
skoz?sa (The Budapest conference on reform circles and reform cells) (Budapest: Kossuth, n.d. [1989]).45
SeeKongresszus '89, no. 23 (October 6,1989), 1.This was a
special party publication disseminated
to alldelegates
fromSeptember
1989 until the last day of the congress.
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 597
the nomenklatura and party apparatus, particularlythose
delegated
fromBudapest.46
Reform circle estimates concluded that the number of
thosesympathetic
to the reform circleplatform
made up less than a
quarter of the over twelve hundreddelegates,
and within that group
onlyabout one hundred were
actuallyreform circle
participants.47
The Final Party Congress and the End of the mszmp
Under these uncertain circumstances the party congress openedon Fri
day,October 6.48Delegates had the option of allying themselves with
formal party platforms, includingthat of the reform
circles,now known
as the Reform Alliance. This was the first moment ofreckoning
for the
reform circles, and asurprising
one at that. Of theeight platforms reg
istered, nonecompared
in size with that of the Reform Alliance, which
boasted some 464delegates. (The next
largest group, the neo-Marxist
Peoples' Democratic Platform, had sixty-eight.) Not only had the Re
form Alliance been able to gather the proreform leadership within its
ranks (including Pozsgay, Prime Minister Miklos N?meth, and Foreign
Minister Gyula Horn), but hundreds more had also flocked to theirranks. The alliance, in other words, dwarfed all the others.49
Yet itwas still opento
questionas to how many alliance supporters
ac
tuallybacked the reform circle demands, as
opposedto
joiningin order to
be on thepresumed winning side.
Initiallyevents went the alliance's way,
blockingCentral Committee voting rights, steering congress proceed
ings, andhaving
aproposal accepted
that would lead to the election of
a newparty
leadership
on the basis of
competing,
winner-take-allplat
form lists. This last victorywas
particularly importantfor the alliance,
as a means ofwinning
a decisivevictory
overparty conservatives.
However, the sheerpolitical weight
of the alliancebegan
to work
againstit.
Fearingthat the alliance was
goingtoo far in
transforming
the party and inforcing political change, many delegates
turned to the
46L?szl? Bihari, "Amult?t v?gleg elt?r?lni" (To finally break with the
past), Kapu (October 1989),
4-5.
47Supplement
to invitations for the first meeting of the Reform Alliance congress platform, Sep
tember 25,1989.48
For details on congress events, see Emil Kimmel, ed., Kongresszus'89: r?vidett, szerkesztett je
gyz?'k?nyvaz 1989 oktober 6-9 k?z?tt tartott
kongresszus anyag?b?l (Congress'89: Shortened, edited
transcriptsof the material from October 6-9,1989, congress) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1990); Judit Benk?,
Gy?rgy Kerekes, and J?nos Patk?s, A sz?let?s sz?ps?ges ktnjai, avagya
rendhagy?h?rad?s az MSZMP kon
gresszusr?l1989 Okt?ber 6-9 (The beautiful agony of birth, or
irregularinformation concerning the Oc
tober 6-9,1989, MSZMPcongress) (Budapest: Kossuth, n.d. [1990]).
49Benk?, Kerekes, and Patk?s (fn. 48), 20.
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598 WORLD POLITICS
Peoples'Democratic Platform, whose
left-wing,"third-road"
ideology
seemed anacceptable counterweight
to the radical demands of the al
liance.50During
the course of October 7 thePeoples'
Democratic Plat
form nearly doubled in size, with over 40 percent of the new affiliates
fromBudapest.51
As the balance of power shifted, reform circledelegates grew anxious
that the majority of delegates (including many in the alliance) would
oppose their radical demands. Platform negotiations, primarilybe
tween the alliance and thePeoples'
Democratic Platform, arguedover
the future of the party. Despitefears on both sides that too much would
begiven up
in acompromise,
theonly
otheroption
seemed anopen
party split?a dangerous prospect given the uncertain state ofpolitical
transition. After a fullday
ofnegotiations,
a basic agreementon the na
ture of the newparty
wasagreed
to and putto a vote.
Bya
large major
ity,with only 159 opposed and 39 abstaining, the congress manifesto
wasapproved
on October 8, and a newparty, Magyar Szocialista Part?
theHungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)?was finally established.
Had the victory sought by the reform circles been achieved? Initially,
it had been imagined that the alliance would be able to instigate a clear
showdown in the party, winningover the
delegates, dissolvingthe
MSZMP, andhiving
off party conservatives. Now most congress dele
gates claimed tosupport reform, though
not in the manner the reform
circles had envisioned.Compromise,
apseudoreform
toreengineer
power, seemed in the offing.
Lackinga set of clear
strategiesand a formal
leadershipand
havinga
largenumber of
questionablesupporters, the alliance
quicklylost the
initiative.Having emerged
as an anti-institutional reaction, theylacked
theorganizational
tools necessary tocompete in an
open political
forum. The issue of the party leadershipnow became uncertain aswell,
as the mechanism of electionby
closed lists raised the fear that in fact
an alliance ticket would lose. Platformrepresentatives began
to discuss
asingle, compromise
list to preserve party unitybut were soon at
log
gerheads. The partywavered on the brink of asplit.But towhat end? If
alliance members were to withdraw from the congress and found theirown
party, whose support couldthey
count on? How many of the del
50Rudolph Tok?s, "Beyond the Party Congress: Hungary's Hazy Future," New Leader, October 30,
1989, p. 6.51
Calculated bythe author. Nearly half of the
delegatesfor the
Peoples'Democratic Platform were
from Budapest,as
opposedto less than a
quarter for the Reform Alliance; L?szl? Vass, "AMagyar Szo
cialista Part," in L?szl? Bihari, ed., Atobbp?rtrendszer
kialakul?sa magyarorsz?gon (The formation of
multiparty democracyin
Hungary) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1992), 149.
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 599
egates, even within the platform, would follow? And would this not
leave the party in the hands of conservatives and moderates whose
commitment to democratization wasquestionable?
These doubts forced the alliance into a finalcompromise,
asingle
electoral list for the newparty leadership,
whose compositionconserv
atives and reformers alike could accept. This back-door manner of lead
ershipselection was denounced
bya number of
delegates,but to little
effect. Havingearlier
accepteda closed-list format for elections, with
nowonly
one listbeing forwarded, the
delegateshad in effect surren
dered most of their power, reduced torubber-stamping
the list assem
bledby
a handful ofplatform representatives.52
On October 9 the new
socialist party elected its leadership, with the older centrist politicianRezs?
Nyersmade party president.
The MSZMP had been transformed; a new, avowedlydemocratic
party stood in itsplace.
Yet few werehappy
with either the results or
the methodby
whichthey
came about.Among
reform circledelegates
inparticular, many felt that too much effort had been spent
on dis
mantling the old party, and too little attention paid towhat would be
constructed in its place.53 Yet the change had been made: the old order
had been overthrown. With theirobjective
more or less achieved, the re
form circles lost their motivating force, and their ranks soon dissolved.
With thisincomplete
transformation the stagewas set for open elec
tions in 1990, and for many the renouncement of one-party rule
seemed to bode well for the MSZP.Nyers expressed
confidence that the
MSZP expected to lose only half of the MSZMPmembership, leavingthem with a base of
nearlyfour hundred thousand or more, well
beyond
themembership
of all the otherparties combined.54 Upcoming
direct
presidential elections, scheduled for November, also seemed certain to
bringa
victory forPozsgay,
who remained one of the mostpopular
and
well-knownpoliticians
in the nation. Hisvictory
wouldhelp
the party
in its bid for political power.Soon enough, however, the
shortcomingsof the
party'stransforma
tion became apparent. As it became clear to former MSZMP members
that membershipno
longer guaranteed economic security, few foundthat they had any real socialist (or even
political) inclinations. By No
52L?szl? K?ri and Maria Zita Petschnig, "Ez a n?v lesz a
v?gso" (This name shall be your last), pt.
2, Els? k?zb'ol (October 16,1989), 9-10.53
Erzs?bet Sulyok, "Antipolitikus sorok, reformk?rben" (Antipolitical ranks in the reform circles),
Szegedi Egyetem,October 16,1989, p. 1.
54Rezs? Nyers,
"AzMSZPv?rja tagjait
az MSZMP-b?l es azon kiv?lr?l is" (The MSZP expects mem
bers from both inside and outside the MSZMP), N?pszabads?g,October 14,1989, p. 14.
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600 WORLD POLITICS
vember only fifteen thousand of themore than seven hundred thousand
former MSZMPmembers had joined theMSZP,many from the old ap
paratus.55 Moreover, with the old party monolith nowclearly gone, op
position forces were free to mobilizefully against the socialist system
and quickly developed strong organizations that could check the feeble
attempts of the MSZP to hold on topower.
Thecampaign
battle now turned on anticommunism, a litmus test
that the MSZPclearly
could notpass. Hopes
for apresidential victory
weresimilarly dashed when an
oppositionreferendum
managedto
block the direct election of thepresidency, something
made much eas
ierby
the enervation of the socialists.Having given up
the onemajor
appeal of theMSZMP?to hold the status quo?the MSZPbecame much
like any other party, making promisesabout an unknown future.
The first open multiparty elections for parliamentwere held in
March andApril 1990, based on a combination of single-member dis
tricts and county and national lists.56 Far from itsoriginal predictions,
theMSZP took fourth place in the elections, netting some half million
votes (about 11 percent of the total) and 33 out of 386 total seats.A
coalition of conservative parties formed the first postcommunist cabi
net, while the MSZP and liberalparties
went intoopposition. The era of
socialist rule wasofficially
over.
A Political Resurrection
The disastrous results of the 1990 election proved to be ablessing in
disguise. First, many MSZMP cadres who had
clung
to the new MSZP
deserted the partyonce elections made it clear that the old
spoils sys
tem hadtruly
come to an end. Second, election results gave weightto
the arguments of MSZP reformers that the party had in fact failed to
change radically enough;within the year the party leadership
under
went apurge of more conservative elements.
Nyers stepped down, re
placed by former Foreign Minister Horn.
Inparliament,
whileantagonism
between coalition andopposition
parties intensified, the MSZP took advantage of its outcast position, tak
ing moderatepositions
andironically calling
attention to itspolitical
55Zoltan D.
Barany, "The Hungarian Socialist Party:A Case of Political Miscalculation," Radio
FreeEurope/Radio Liberty Research
Report (December 22,1989), pp. 1-2.56
For detailed information on the outcome of the elections, seeGy?rgy Szoboszlai, ed., Parlamenti
v?laszt?sok 1990(Parliamentary elections 1990) (Budapest: MTAT?rsadalomtudom?nyi Int?zet, 1990);
ananalysis of the Hungarian electoral system can be found in John R. Hibbing and Samuel Patterson,
"ADemocraticLegislature in theMaking: The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990," Comparative
Political Studies 24(January 1992).
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 601
experienceand
expertisein contrast to the other
political parties.57
These tacticspaid
off far better than anyone expected.As the
popular
ity of the coalition government deteriorated in 1992 and 1993, hurt byits inconsistent economic policies and authoritarian leanings, public
support began to shift toward the MSZP.A population increasingly
weary of the costs of economic transition found theparty's
social mar
ket ideology?its imageof
politicaland technocratic expertise?more
attractive than the liberalopposition's promise
of more radical reform.
As aconsequence the May
1994parliamentary elections led to an
overwhelming victory for the MSZP, avictory that no one would have
predicted justone
yearbefore. The MSZPwon 149 seats in
singlemember districts (as opposed to 1 in 1990) and another 60 on national
and territorial lists, for a total of over 54 percent of the seats inparlia
ment. A subsequent coalition, formed with the liberalAlliance of Free
Democrats, gave the governmenta two-thirds
majorityin
parliament.58
In this success, agreat debt is owed to the reform circles. As one reform
circle founder concluded in 1990, the reform circles were in fact victori
ous in their defeat.Although
unable to realize theirobjectives
asswiftly
or conclusively as they had hoped, in the end they were instrumental in
bringingabout the destruction of the old order so that a democratic sys
tem and amodern socialist party could be built in itsplace.59
Conclusions and Comparisons
Selznick and other scholars haveargued
that institutionalization, the
process bywhich
organizationslink themselves to the external environ
ment as a means ofstability,
has the effect ofbinding
the organizationto certain routines that inform collective action and influence the
path
oforganizational
success or failure. There are two different issues at
work here: first, the process of institutionalization itself (a questionof
degree)and second, the
comparativeforms of institutionalization de
pendingon the
specificcase (a question
of kind). Overall, extreme in
stitutionalization tends to causepolitical ossification, as we can see
across EasternEurope,
but theparticular routines, norms,
and struc
tures involved in the institutionalization processare critical in under
57Barnabas Racz, "The Socialist-Left Opposition
in Post-Communist Hungary," Europe-AsiaStud
ies 45, no,4 (1993), 660-63.58
For details, see Judith Pataki, "Hungary's New Parliament Inaugurated," Radio FreeEurope/Radio
LibertyResearch
Report (July 22,1994), 7-11.59
J?zsef G?czi, "J?tt?nk, l?ttunk, buktunk... bukvagy?'zt?nk?" (We came, we saw,we failed ... in
failure were we victorious?), N?pszabads?g, June 23,1990, p. 17.
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602 WORLD POLITICS
standingthe construct of institutional power and the
trajectoryof its
failure. Indeed, it can be asserted that transition modalities, such as
those outlined by Philippe Schmitter andTerry Karl?imposition (co
ercive, elite dominant), pact (negotiated,elite dominant), reform
(nego
tiated, mass ascendant), and revolution (coercive, mass ascendant)?can
be much better understood ifwe trace their forms back to theparticu
lar institutional order from whichthey emerged.60
In theHungarian
case the process oflinking
the partyto an external
legitimizingenvironment took the form of social
pacification, predicated on a reformist
ideologyand the
co-optation of intellectuals.
When thispolicy
was stifledby
economicdecay,
theparty
lacked the
means torespond, having
staked itslegitimacy
on these routines and
unable to formulate new alternatives. Yetco-optation inadvertently
providedthe means
bywhich anti-institutional elements could attack
the party from within, weakeningthe MSZMP and
creating greater space
for political opposition to form.
As mentioned earlier, the incremental process of transition inHun
gary meant that no mass movementalong
the lines ofSolidarity
in
Poland, Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the Union of Democratic
Forces inBulgaria,
or the Romanian National Salvation Front ever
arose tochallenge
state socialism. Rather, theprolonged
erosion of the
party encouragedthe rise of smaller, more articulated
political organizations. This
dispersalof
political power also meant that no side was
able to dominate the transition processor elections as
clearlyas else
where in EasternEurope.
Power continued to shiftduring negotiations
between andwithin regime and oppositionas theMSZMP
disintegratedand the newpolitical organizations jockeyed
for power. Political out
comes that thusemerged
came about lessthrough
institutional "craft
ing,"which supposes political authority, than by default, influenced by
changesin the
negotiatingcontext.
Thispoints
to a second area of research, investigatingthe connection
between institutions, transitions, andpolitical reconstruction. Beyond
the transition moment, the patterns of reinstitutionalization that follow
will be influenced by the legacies of the previous order and its failure.61Taking again the
exampleof party formation, in
Hungarythe slow
decayof power that
producedmore cohesive
political parties subse
quently limited the degree of party fragmentation in parliament, in
60Schmitter and Karl (fn. 16), 59-61.
61This last point ismade most
clearly by L?szl? Bruszt and David Stark, "Remaking the Political
Field inHungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of
Competition," Journal ofIn
ternationalAffairs 45 (Summer 1991), esp. 19 fn. 11.
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REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN: HUNGARY 603
contrast to the eventualdisintegration
of mass-basedparties that swept
into power elsewhere. Hungary thus exhibited amuch higher level of
parliamentary stabilityafter 1989: the first democratic coalition gov
ernment held power for its entire term, an occurrence unprecedented
for theregion.
The second set of national elections in 1994 also re
turned the same sixparties
toparliament, indicating
that thepolitical
spectrum has institutionalized ratherearly
in the transition process.
In a secondexample the inability of any
one side to dominate the
Hungariantransition meant that attempts
to create apowerfid, direcdy
electedpresidency
were blocked, asopposed
to other cases in theregion
(Poland, Romania, and
Bulgaria
in
particular),
where
strong presidenciesemerged
as theexpression
ofpolitical
actorsseeking
to institution
alize their ownpower within the state. Instead, Hungary
has apresident
with more limited, butambiguous, political powers, enough
to vex the
governmentat times. This
ambiguitystands as a
legacyof the MSZMPs
strategy in early 1989 to build a strong presidency for itself, an attemptthat was undermined
bythe revolt of the reform circles.62
Organiza
tional patterns that now influence the process ofpolitical
reconstruction
are thus informed by the institutional matrix that gave rise to them.Yet institutions alone will not dictate the form of
politicaltransition.
Chance, individuals, and unforeseen domestic or internationaldevelop
ments can have a tremendousimpact,
one that overrides institutional
forces and turnshistory
in aradically
different direction.Keeping
these
pointsin mind, an institutional
approachcan
complementour current
understandingof the
impactof micro- and macrolevel forces.
Byform
inga more theoretical base without
sacrificingthe
unique aspects of the
circumstances under consideration, we can allow for the broader forces of
theoryto merge with the more
inexplicable aspects of time andplace.
62Patrick "Presidential Power in Post-Communist The Case in Com