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Areport on IUU fishing of Baltic Sea

PUBLISHEDBY

The Fisheries Secretariat (FISH)

Svartviksslingan 28

167 39 Bromma

Sweden

ISBN: 978-91-976859-0-0

AUTHORORCA-EU

EDITORNiki Sporrong, FISH

LAYOUTBYTryckfaktorn AB, Hans Melcherson

PRINTEDBYOH-tryck, 2007

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A report on IUUfishing of Baltic Sea codA report commissioned by FISH from ORCA-EU

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Table of contents

A report on IUU fishing of Baltic Sea cod 1

Preface 4

Executive summary 5

Published information 5

IUU fishing activities 5

The cause of IUU fishing 5

How to reduce IUU fishing 5

Can ENGOs help to reduce IUU fishing 6

The policy and regulatory framework 6

Creating a culture of control and compliance 6

Part I 8

Describing and quantifying IUU fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea 8

Introduction 8

Published information 8The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 8Comment and analysis 9Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) report 10Comment and analysis 10Institute for Fisheries Management (IFM) study 11Comment and analysis 11

Gazeta Wyborcza Polish newspaper 11Comment and analysis 12

Personal perspectives and opinions on IUU fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea 12Methodology 12Describing the IUU fishing problem 13Unreported landings 13Mis-recorded landings 14Tampering with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 15Trans-shipping 15Late return of logsheets 15Fishing in closed areas 16Landing undersized cod 16

Small mesh size or illegal rigging of gear 16Targeted bycatch 16Exceeding 48 hour soak time for gillnets 16Fishing without a special permit 17Possible future IUU fishing activities 17What can be done to improve compliance? 17Reduce fleet capacity 17Improve deterrents 17More fisheries inspectors 18Monitoring the trade in cod 18Better use of technology 18Scientists and fishermen working together 19

What can ENGOs contribute to improve compliance? 19Conclusions 20

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Part II 21

Policy and regulatory frameworks21

Introduction 21

The policy framework 21The reformed CFP 21The development of a Baltic Sea cod recovery plan 21Comment 21Control and enforcement 22The Action Plan for Cooperation in Enforcement 22Was the Action Plan effective in the Baltic Sea? 27The Compliance Work Plan 28Support to national authorities and coordination between them 28Control and enforcement of the plan 28

The Commissions inspection priorities 29Administrative inquiries 29Redirecting EU inspectors 29Ensuring there is a deterrent 29Community Fisheries Control Agency 29Comment 32Transparency 33Reporting catch data 33Overfishing 33Reports on fishing effort 33Behaviour seriously infringing the rules 33Infringement procedures 37EU Commission inspections 37Effectiveness of the Compliance Scoreboard 37Tri-annual Commission evaluation reports 37Ad hoc stakeholder meetings 38

The regulatory framework 38The TAC and quota Regulation 39Technical and control measures 39Implementation of the technical and control measures 40The registration and accuracy of catches and catch information 40Misreported landings 41

Technical and control measures for the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea in 2006 42

Notes 46List of tables and figures 47

References 48

Annex I: Baltic Member States fishing and processing industries 49

Annex II: Members of the Administrative Board of the CommunityFisheries Control Agency 58

Annex III: Format for Serious Infringement reporting 59

Annex IV: Summary of the European Commissions Tri-annual

Evaluation Report 2000-2002 60Annex V: European Regulations that apply to Baltic Sea cod 67

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In 2005, the Fisheries Secretariat (FISH) commissioned a study

into illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Baltic

Sea to inform its existing and future work. In particular, FISH

was interested in how NGOs might be best able to contribute to

improving compliance.

As a result of this study, a report was produced that was inten-

ded for internal use.However, with the heightened interest in IUU

fishing associated with the Baltic Se cod fishery, FISH has decided

to publish an amended version of the report. We hope that it will

contribute to a better understanding of some of the issues associa-

ted with the illegal fishing problem in the Baltic Sea cod fishery.

The report is based on a review of the available

literature on IUU fishing within the Baltic Sea region, informal

meetings/interviews with individuals with an active interest in the

Baltic Sea cod fisheries, as well as a review and analysis of the EU

fisheries policy and regulatory frameworks for control and enfor-

cement that apply within the Baltic Sea.

Preface

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The cod fisheries in the Baltic Sea have gainednotoriety for non-compliance with fisheriesregulations. This is commonly referred to as il-legal, unreported and unregulated fishing or IUUfishing. IUU fishing is seen as the major contribu-tor to the unsustainable exploitation of the codstocks, particularly in the Eastern Baltic Sea, somuch so that this stock is now threatened withcollapse.

This report is divided into two parts. The firstdescribes the results of the literature search andpresents the views expressed by participants ofthe informal meetings/interviews. The secondpart provides a summary of the policy and regu-latory frameworks that are in place and providethe basis for Member States to implement Euro-pean fisheries policy.

Published information

Limited literature is available that describesor quantifies the IUU fishing within the Balticregion. The International Council for the Explo-ration of the Sea (ICES) has attempted to takeaccount of the quantities of unreported landingswithin its fisheries assessment advice to the Eu-ropean Commission. Using a variety of sourcesthat includes fishermen, fisheries inspectors andfirst-hand observations by fisheries scientists, itis estimated that in the Eastern Baltic, 35-45%more cod is landed than reported.

Other recent reports and news articles suggestthat possibly even larger quantities are landed.However, owing to the clandestine nature ofthe activity it is not possible to confirm withoutdoubt what the quantities might be.

IUU fishing activities

In discussions with a broad section of individu-als with an active interest in the cod fishery tenforms of IUU activity were cited. There was a

consensus view that unreported landings werethe most significant IUU fishing activity. These

appear to be more prevalent at different timesof the year, from year to year and within certainfleet sectors, such as trawl and gillnet fisheries.For example, tighter quota restrictions wouldlikely lead to increases in unrecorded landings;area closures would coincide with apparentfailures in VMS; and, a strong year class enteringthe fishery could result in increased landings ofundersize cod.

Poland was seen by many as the bad boy inthe Baltic, but those Member States that have thelion-share of the total allowable catch were alsoimplicated.

The cause of IUU fishing

In simple terms, the cause of IUU fishing wasdescribed as a function of fleet overcapacity, de-clining quotas, an inability to effectively monitorand control the fisheries, high consumer demand

and high economic value. In part or as a whole,these create an added incentive to fish.

Further detailed analysis offered by a Danishstudy concluded that the following are all factorsthat influence compliance:

the likely economic gains to be had fromcheating;

the risks of being detected and the severity ofthe sanction;

compatibility between the content of fishingregulations and fishing patterns/practices;

long-term non-compliant behaviour becomesnormal behaviour such that moral standardsare affected.

How to reduce IUU fishing

Reducing fleet capacity was seen as an importantfactor that would likely reduce IUU fishing. Somefishing industry representatives from the olderMember States considered that their national

fleet capacities are more in line with their quo-tas and that this balance needs to be quickly

Executive summary

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achieved by the new Member States. Indeed,significant decommissioning, relative to theirfleet size, is taking place in the four new MemberStates. However, what would constitute a morerealistic balance between the capacity of nationalfleets and the cod resource was a question that

nobody was able to answer.

There was a consensus that an increased likeli-hood of effective inspection combined with theapplication of sanctions that provide a real deter-rent would significantly reduce the level of unre-ported catches. Political will and commitment byMember States administrations is a prerequisitefor this to happen. Many people, including of-ficials within national and European institutions,are of the view that politicians are guilty of onlypaying lip-service to this problem.

The ability to freely trade in fish from IUU sourc-es was seen as a major challenge and also anopportunity to significantly reduce IUU fishingby application and enforcement of traceabilitythroughout the fish supply chain from the seato the consumer. It was suggested that becausesuch large quantities of unreported cod are beinglanded it is almost impossible for anyone dealingin large quantities of cod to be 100% confidentthat their fish is bone fide. While EU regulations

require traceability, there appears to be limitedmonitoring and enforcement of this aspect. Theability to conduct in-depth forensic auditingwas highlighted as a necessity to ensure improve-ments in combating the market in illicit cod. Atpresent, however, the Member States fisheriesinspectorates have limited capability for this.

Inadequate use of existing technologies washighlighted as a weakness in control, monitoringand enforcement. The use of Vessel Monitoring

Systems (VMS) was seen as being less than effec-tive, with the European Commission highlightingits concerns that the Member States were not us-ing it to its full potential. Also, the introductionof electronic logbooks was seen as a potentialimprovement in insuring that real time recordingof catch data could be used to more effectivelytarget enforcement efforts.

It was suggested that the relationship betweenscientists and fishers could and should be im-proved, and that it could indirectly contribute to

improved compliance. Examples of how this hadbeen achieved in the North Sea were highlighted

as being positive experiences for both fishersand scientists, although there was no evidenceor feeling that this had yet contributed towardimproved compliance.

Can ENGOs help to reduce IUU fishing?The majority of respondents considered thatenvironmental non-governmental organisations(ENGOs) have a legitimate right to engage in theIUU fishing issue. There was a general consensusthat IUU fishing could be significantly reduced ifthere was the political will to achieve it. Publicopinion is seen as the best way of creating orinfluencing this political will, and ENGOs wereseen as being particularly good or well equippedto undertake this role. There is a clear emphasisthat if ENGOs were to engage in this subject,they need to be very clear and up-to-date withthe issues. In particular, respondents involved inenforcement highlighted that ENGOs need to un-derstand the practical difficulties that are associ-ated with control and enforcement.The development of the Baltic Sea RegionalAdvisory Council (BSRAC) is seen as particularlyimportant for ENGOs to use to highlight andattempt to influence the Commission and othersin improving compliance. Although, it was em-

phasised that this is not a platform or stage fromwhich to launch or present campaigns, rather, itprovides an appropriate forum to discuss policyand practical measures in reducing IUU fishing.

The policy and regulatory framework

The Baltic Sea fisheries were managed under theauspices of the International Baltic Sea FisheryCommittee (IBSFC) until 2005. Following the ac-cession of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia

to the European Community in 2004, only theEU and Russia remained in the IBSFC. In 2005,the Community withdrew from the IBSFC andthe organisation ceased to exist at the end of thatyear. Bilateral agreements between the EU andRussia have since been adopted and EU regula-tions and management measures are replacingthose agreed within the IBSFC, including a pro-posed multi-annual plan for cod in the Baltic Sea.

Creating a culture of control and compliance

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)provides a new framework for a Community

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control and enforcement system which, in sum-mary: clarifies the responsibilities of the MemberStates and the European Commission; is designedto ensure that compliance with the rules of theCFP is achieved; and ensures that exploitation ofthe fish stocks is controlled throughout the whole

fisheries chain.

In order to take forward the new control andenforcement framework, the Commission hasundertaken a programme of work intended tobetter integrate and coordinate Member States.

The Commission is of the view that there hasbeen improvement on each. However, some ofthe new Member States are still finding it hardto meet all the basic requirements, mainly as aresult of resource constraints. Some of the otherMember States are facing cutbacks or caps onresources and so this has meant that progress hasbeen slower than might have been hoped.

As well as the inspection and monitoring workundertaken by the Commission, a CommunityFisheries Control Agency (CFCA or The Agen-cy) has also been established and was due to be-gin its operational activities in 2007. The overallaim of the CFCA is to support Member States intheir control and enforcement efforts.

According to the Agencys work programme itwill concentrate on organising coordination ofcontrol and inspection by Member States on afishery-by-fishery basis, apparently covering allstages of control and inspection of fishing activi-ties from fishing to the first sale of fish landedor entering the Community market. Fisheriessubject to recovery or multi-annual plans andhigh levels of IUU fishing are two criteria that

the CFCA identify as priorities and so means thatthe Baltic Sea will likely be the subject of theirattention.

In order to improve transparency with respectto control and enforcement, the Commission

publishes a compliance scoreboard, a seriousinfringement report and tri-annual evaluations.

All of these publications provide a means bywhich comparisons between Member States canbe made and inference drawn as to which aregood and not so good at meeting their CFPobligations. However, from the publications todate it is difficult to draw any firm conclusionswith respect to the Baltic Sea. As a result, there islittle reassurance that, at both the Member Stateand the Commission level, effective systems arein place to improve or report on compliance.The regulatory framework for the cod fishery isless complex compared to the North Sea and hasan emphasis on improving the chances and accu-racy of inspection. A suite of technical and con-trol measures are used. However, there is concernthat these are not being effectively implemented.

In its role of monitoring the monitors, theCommission undertook an evaluation of how

Member States have implemented technical andcontrol measures in the Baltic Sea in 2005/2006.Publication of the report has been delayed until2007. The report is expected to provide clearindicators as to how key control and monitoringmeasures are being implemented as well as an as-sessment of their effectiveness. Initial indicationssuggest that fundamental flaws exist in some ofthe Member States.

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Introduction

Scientific advice from the International Councilof the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) has indi-cated that the two cod stocks in the Baltic Seaare suffering from unsustainable exploitationlevels. The Eastern stock has declined in size to apoint where it may not be able to replenish itselfand is considered to be threatened with collapse.The Western stock is in a better state but is alsosubject to high levels of fishing that mean thatthe yields from the fishery are lower than theirpotential level.

Combined with less favourable environmentalconditions the ability of the two Baltic Sea codstocks to increase or, minimally, sustain them-selves is further compromised.

The cod fisheries in the Baltic Sea have gainednotoriety for non-compliance with fisheriesregulations. This is commonly referred to as il-legal, unreported and unregulated fishing, or IUUfishing. IUU fishing, particularly in the EasternBaltic, is seen as the major contributor to theunsustainable exploitation of the cod stocks.

In order to better understand IUU fishing in theBaltic and the measures that are in place to coun-ter the problem the study:

Undertook a review of the available literatureon IUU fishing within the Baltic region;

Conducted informal meetings/interviews withindividuals with an active interest in the BalticSea cod fisheries; and,

Reviewed and analysed European fisheriespolicy and regulatory frameworks for controland enforcement that apply within the BalticSea.

The report is divided into two parts. The firstdescribes the results of the literature search and

presents the views expressed by participants ofthe informal meetings/interviews. The secondpart provides a summary of the policy and regu-latory frameworks that are in place and providethe basis for Member States to implement Euro-pean fisheries policy.

Published information

An Internet search revealed quite an extensiveand relatively recent source of literature on IUUfishing, the majority of which focuses on the highseas. In contrast, very limited peer reviewed and/or grey literature has been published that at-tempts to describe and/or quantify IUU fishing inthe Baltic Sea. The following section summarisesthe most recent and readily available information

on IUU fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea, as wellas provides comment and analysis.

The International Council for the Exploration ofthe Sea (ICES)

The International Council for the Explorationof the Sea (ICES) officially recognises the seriouslevel of IUU fishing in the Baltic Sea cod fish-ery, particularly within the eastern Baltic. ICESdescribes the main IUU problem as, ...misrepor-ted landings, mostly in the form of unreportedlandings. It suggests that restrictive quotas, theabsence of fishing opportunities and inadequateinspection are the main causes, with the circums-tances being different in different Member States.

Because the problem is considered to be sosignificant, the ICES Baltic Fisheries AssessmentWorking Group has included its own estimatesof unreported landings in its annual reports since1993, referring to them as unallocated quota,and has highlighted that the scale of unreported

landings has severely compromised its assess-ments.

Describing and quantifying IUUfishing for cod in the Baltic Sea

Part I

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The Working Group uses information fromfishermen, at-sea-sampling and fisheries inspec-tors, as well as comparisons between import andexport data to estimate the unallocated quota.

In 20051, the Working Group chose to present

two stock assessments to the ICES AdvisoryCommittee on Fishery Management (ACFM)based on the official reported landing figures aswell as their own estimated landing figures, andleft it to the ACFM to decide on which to use (ifat all) in their advice to the European Commis-sion. ACFM chose to provide both2.

In the preamble to its 2005 assessment, theWorking Group emphasised that it would notdisclose the estimates or the sources of the prob-lem that particular Member States may provide.The reasons for its decision included not wantingto compromise the trust that has been establishedbetween fishermen and scientists or cause politi-cal problems if estimates are seen to be differentfrom the official figures, as well as the possibil-ity that Working Group members may lose theirjobs (presumably as a consequence of the formerreason).

However, in order to provide some transparencyand repeatability in the assessments, the Work-

ing Group has chosen to use, what it terms, araising factor (RF) which provides an estimateof the unreported landings year on year, with-out highlighting a particular Member State. Forexample, an RF of 1.40 implies that the WorkingGroup estimates that landings are 40% higherthan the official figures. Groupings of one ormore countries are given an RF value based onthe information they bring to the table, as fol-lows:

Group A, based on informal contacts with theindustry, is provided with a RF of 1.2.

Group B, based on information from informalcontacts with industry and enforcement sourcesis given a RF = 1.5

Group C is based on information available fromat sea-sampling, formal and informal contactswith the fishing industry, and inspection of im-port/export records. Taken together these sourcesof information indicate total catches about

100% greater than the reported figures, resultingin a RF of 2.0.

Group D, for which either no information isavailable, or information indicates no or negligi-ble misreporting, is provided with a RF of 1.0.

Table 1. The Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group overall RF

for cod landings from the eastern Baltic between 2000 and 2005

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

RF 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.45 1.41 1.38

Source: The report of the ICES Baltic Fisheries Assessment Group

(WGBFAS), 18-27 April 2006, Rostock

Using these RF figures against the reported land-ings, the estimated quantities of unreported codlandings have remained relatively stable for thelast 6 years, averaging just over 20,000 tonnes.However, the 2005 Working Group reportstresses that the estimates are considered to besubstantial underestimates of the true catches(recent misreporting estimates imply that truecatches have been at least 40% greater thanreported catches).

For comparison, in Table 2 below, reported land-ings of cod from the Baltic Sea between 2000and 20053are set out, along with ICES estimatesof total landings and unallocated quota.

Table 2. A comparison of Member State reported landings and ICES

estimates of total landings and unallocated quota for the Eastern

Baltic.

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Reported

landings 66,171 67,651, 49,456 49,239 49,015 40,041

ICES

estimate

of total

landings 89,289 91,328 67,018 71,386 68,578 55,032

ICES

estimate of

un alloca-

ted quota 23,118 23,677 17,562 22,147 19,563 14,991

Source: Adapted from the report of the Baltic Fisheries Assessment

Group (WGBFAS), 18-27 April 2006, Rostock

Comment and analysis

Owing to its clandestine nature, estimating thelevel of IUU is extremely difficult. For a pre-emi-nent advisory body like ICES, which bases itsadvice on best available science, the willingnessto use empirical and anecdotal information onIUU fishing to inform its advice makes a pointed

statement about the scale and seriousness of theproblem and emphasises the significance with

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which it has undermined their ability to providescientific advice.

Also, the fact that national experts and advisorsare not willing to go public, because they mightloose their jobs, confirms the highly political

nature of Baltic Sea fisheries management and,more specifically, IUU fishing.

There is a danger that continuing to attempt toaccount for misreporting will contribute to a de-cline in the quality of the data and, therefore, inthe quality of the resulting stock assessment. Inaddition, accounting for misreporting in the as-sessment could also create incentives for furthermisreporting, as a higher estimated catch is likelyto lead to a higher estimate of stock size and thusincreased catching opportunities in the future.

The Working Group has provided estimates ofunallocated quota since 1993. The continuedneed to do so and the apparent stability in itsestimates over the last 5 years suggests that BalticStates are unable, unwilling or not seriouslycommitted to effectively reducing the IUU fishingproblem.

Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) report

The WWF European Policy Office commissioneda report on IUU fishing in the Polish Baltic Seacod fishery in 2005. WWF chose not to publishthe report but allowed access to it for the pur-pose of this project. Poland was chosen as thefocus owing to common and consistent allega-tions, made by people within or associated withthe Baltic Sea cod fishing industry, of non-com-pliance by the Polish cod fleet.

Having spoken with the authors, the report pro-

vided them with a significant challenge, prima-rily due to difficulties in gathering credible andsubstantiated evidence. Despite this, the reporthighlights two pieces of work, one of which isreferenced, which provide additional insight intothe potential IUU problem.

The Marine Institute in Gydnia, Poland, pro-duces a quarterly publication called Wiadomo-sci Rybackie (Fisheries News) which is aimedat the fishing industry and those with an interestin the fishing industry. In the March-April 2005

edition4, an article compares import and exportfigures for cod and cod products with reported

landing and national consumption figures. Theresults show a discrepancy in export figuresequivalent to 49,000 tonnes of whole cod.

The inference is that this discrepancy was causedby unreported landings which, if it were true,

would be over 3 times the reported national an-nual landings. Table 3 below shows the figuresthat appear in the article. The WWF report at-tempted to analyse import and export data butfound that detailed information on whole cod orcod products was difficult to obtain. The reportrecommends that further information needs tobe gathered before a definite conclusion can bedrawn.

The un-referenced work that was mentionedrefers to a study carried out by the Swedish fish-ing industry in 2002. Using non-scientific com-parison between like-for-like fishing vessels andinformation on working practices provided byPolish crew working aboard Swedish and Danishfishing vessels, the study speculates that in 2003all the Baltic States and Russia could potentiallyhave exceeded their combined quota by as muchas 4 times, and that Poland could have exceededit by as much as 8 times. This would suggest anunbelievable and unrealistic figure in excess of350,000 tonnes.

Table 3. Showing the reported import, export, landing and national

consumption figures of cod for Poland in 2003

Reported Figures for 2003

Reported landings of cod 15,100 tonnes

Imported quantities of cod 18,000 tonnes

Polish national consumption of cod 18,000 tonnes

Exported quantities of processed cod 23,000 tonnes

(Estimated live weight equivalent) 65,000 tonnes

Difference 49,000 tonnes

Comment and analysis

The report provides a wide-ranging estimateof the levels of unreported cod landings, whichserves to show the difficulties in accurately esti-mating the scale of the problem. The analysis ofofficial statistics is considered to be a good wayof highlighting discrepancies; indeed, this is usedto inform some of the ICES estimates. However,uncertainty as to which sources of informationare likely to be the most appropriate and calcu-lating whole cod equivalent from the variety of

cod products (e.g., frozen filets, steaks, etc.) aretwo significant problems with this approach.

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For the purpose of this report, an analysis of thelatest trade statistics5and attempts to comparelanding and national consumption were under-taken for all the Baltic Member States. The at-tempt only proved to confirm the difficulties thatthe authors of the WWF report experienced and

it was decided that this was a study in its ownright.

Rather than concluding a likely figure and fur-ther contributing to the uncertainty of how muchcod is being caught and landed, a safer conclu-sion from the WWF report is that the Polish codfishery appears to be a significant contributor tothe overall IUU fishing problem in the Baltic Sea.

Institute for Fisheries Management (IFM) study

In 2003, two researchers Jesper Raaker Nielsonand Christoph Mathiesen from the Institute forFisheries Management and Coastal CommunityDevelopment (IFM) published a research paper6:Important Factors Influencing Rule Compliancein Fisheries Lessons from Danish Fisheries.Their research focused on three Danish fisheries,one of which included the Baltic Sea cod fishery.They undertook a quantitative and qualitativesurvey asking fishers opinions and views on theiracceptance of imposed fisheries regulations and

their respect for the management system. Ofthose questioned in the Baltic fishery:

98% said that the profit from the allocatedquota has a major or medium impact on theircompliance behaviour, i.e., when profits fromlegitimate fishing are good the incentive forIUU fishing is reduced. However, there was anadded caveat that some fishers (25%) wouldcontinue to fish after catching their quota ifthe probability of detection was low;

90% said that the risk of detection comparedto the economic gain from IUU fishing hasmajor or medium impact on their compliancebehaviour, giving a strong indication thateconomic incentive is the driving force behindnon-compliance in the Danish fishery;

88% considered it morally wrong to discarddead fish even if they had exceeded theirquota;

85% said it was morally wrong to violateminimum landing sizes;

20% said it was wrong to land more than

their allocated quota; 77% completely or partially agreed with clo-

sed areas to protect fish from overfishing; 57% completely or partially agreed that

days-at-sea regulation is a better measure toregulate the fishery than closed areas; and

90% said that practical difficulties to complywith regulations have a major or medium

impact on their compliance behaviour.

The report concludes that, in Danish fisheries,the following factors have a major impact oncompliance:

the economic gains to be obtained; the risks of being detected and the severity of

the sanction; compatibility between the content of the regu-

lation and fishing patterns/practices; norms7, in particular, the behaviour of

other fishers and the moral of the individualfisher; and

co-management is important for rule compli-ance.

Comment and analysis

Unfortunately, this paper was not found andreviewed until the very late stages of the studyand so it was not possible to discuss the work indetail with the authors.

While this research did not aim to describe orquantify the IUU problem within the Baltic codfishery, it did attempt to look at factors thatinfluence the behaviour of fishermen and high-light some important attitudes and behaviouralreaction to rules and regulations.

Only 56 fishers were interviewed in the courseof the study and there is no indication as to howmany of these represented fishers from the BalticSea cod fishery. With nine nationalities and their

different economic, social and cultural differenc-es, a similar study across the Baltic could providesome interesting comparisons and potentiallyinformative results that may contribute to betteror more informed management approaches anddecisions.

Gazeta Wyborcza Polish newspaper

In the May 4th2006 edition8of the Polish news-paper Gazeta Wyborcza, an article appeared

under the headline Big Cod Fraud. Representa-tives from the Polish Fishermens Association and

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the Association of Fish Processors were reportedas confirming large scale catching and trading inillegal cod.

The article reports that the lack of inspection,the large number of licensed fish buyers and the

numerous places where the first sale of fish ispossible make it easy for fishermen to land unre-ported cod and for illegal fish to enter the supplychain as much as 80% of the cod that goes toprocessors is claimed to be illegal.

Comparisons of the 2004 Polish cod quota andthe export of Polish cod products were used toshow apparent discrepancies: 16,000 tonnes codquota v52,000 tonnes of exported cod prod-ucts, which could equate to as much as 70,000100,000 tonnes of whole cod.

Apparently, attempts to establish larger stateowned auctions have had limited success andare not profitable as the supply of legal fish islimited. The Chairman of one of these auctions isreported as saying that EU money has been madeavailable to support the building these large auc-tions but they are not profitable because of lowquotas and their inability to trade in illegal fish.

While Poland and Sweden were given particular

mention, according to a representative from theSea Fisheries Institute in Gdynia, all countriesexceed their national cod quotas. He also pro-poses that a considerable increase in the quotabut with longer closed seasons is a solution tothe problem.

The Chairman of the Fishermens Associationis reported as blaming inadequate quotas as thereason for illegal fishing. He says that fishermenknow that there is more fish in the sea. He isalso reported as saying that fishermen only catch

mature fish and highlights that small mesh indus-trial fishing carried out mainly by the Danes andSwedes catches everything.

Comment and analysis

If this newspaper article is accurate and theindividuals have not been mis-represented, thenit is a scathing self-analysis and admission of theillegal fishing problem in Poland.

Comparing exports with the annual nationalquota to provide an estimate of unreportedfishing may be misleading. It does not take into

account the significant quantities of cod that areimported into Poland (see table 3 above).

The article seems to suggest that the state-ownedauctions restrict the sale of illegal fish. Whilethe consequence of this may be to compromise

their ability to compete with other auctions, itdoes raise the question as to how they are able toachieve this.

Personal perspectives and opinions on IUUfishing for cod in the Baltic Sea

A series of informal meetings with individu-als with an active interest in Baltic Sea fisheriestook place throughout the course of the project.Fishermen/fishermens representatives, fish proc-

essors, fisheries inspectors and fisheries scientistswere targeted as they were considered likely toknow most about the IUU fishing problem. Anumber of individuals within environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) with eitherexperience of working with IUU and/or BalticSea fisheries issues were also contacted, as were anumber of academics that had previously con-ducted research on Baltic Sea fisheries. Latterly, ameeting was held with investigative TV journal-ists who had undertaken work on IUU fishing inthe Baltic Sea and, more recently, the Barents Sea.

Methodology

In preparation for these interviews, the literatureand Internet search described above enabled aprofile of each of the EU Member States andthe Russian Federations fishing industries tobe drafted and provided an important sourceof background information. These profiles arepresented in Annex I.

A list of general and more specific questions, thelatter being tailored to particular target groups,was prepared and formed the basis of an infor-mal interview. Depending on the answers to thesequestions, supplementary questions were asked.It should noted that the questions were not partof any analytical framework that allowed forobjective analysis and conclusions to be drawn;rather, it was purely a subjective process but onethat was considered to provide better under-standing of the IUU fishing problem.

Face-to-face interviews, phone interviews andwritten responses through email correspondence

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were all used. Face-to-face interviews were thepreferred and most common option. The inter-views lasted anywhere from 14 hours, thelength of time largely determined by the partici-pants time constraints. The majority of meetingswere one-to-one, but as many as six people were

involved in any one interview.

In total, 80 people were contacted, includingrepresentatives from all the Baltic Member Statesand the Russian Federation. Of these, 52 wereable or willing to provide a response to some orall of the questions. All participants were as-sured that any information or views that theyexpressed would be non-attributable.

It should be noted that of the three key groupsthat were initially identified, fishermen and/orfishermens representatives were comparativelyunder-represented. This was mainly a result oflanguage barriers.

Describing the IUU fishing problem

From the responses received it was possible todraw up a list of IUU fishing activities for cod(see Table 4). Participants that were able to pro-vide more detailed information on these activi-ties suggested that they were likely to be more

prevalent at different times of the year, from yearto year and within certain fleet sectors, such astrawl and gillnet fisheries. For example, withthe uptake of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC),tighter quota restrictions would likely lead toincreases in unrecorded landings; area closureswould coincide with apparent failures in VMS;and, a strong year class entering the fishery couldresult in increased landings of undersized cod,particularly in trawl fisheries owing to the less ef-fective size selectivity of this gear and/or deliber-

ate rigging to reduce mesh size.

Table 4. A list of the IUU fishing activities associated with the Baltic

Sea cod fishery described in interviews

IUU fishing activity

1. Unreported landing2. Mis-recorded landing3. Tampering with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)4. Trans-shipment5. Late return of logsheet and landing declaration6. Fishing in closed areas7. Landing undersized cod8. Small mesh size or illegal rigging of gear9. Targeted bycatch

10. Exceeding 48 hour soak time for gillnets11. Fishing without a special permit

The following section provides information oneach IUU activity and is based upon views andinformation that was provided by participants.

Unreported landings

Without exception, unreported landings wereconsidered to be the most serious IUU fishing ac-tivity owing to the scale and likely consequencesfor the long-term sustainability of the EasternBaltic cod stock. All Member States were impli-cated but responses suggest that the top threeoffenders are those with the lion-share of theTAC: Denmark, Sweden and Poland.

In the course of interviews, the majority of par-ticipants who were willing to estimate the likelyquantities of unreported landings suggested that4560% more cod was landed than reported.Those that expressed a view said that the onlysure way of reducing this problem is to inspect asignificant proportion of all the cod landings.

Measures designed to reduce the likelihood ofunreported landings, such as designated ports,were considered to be limited - large ports canprovide for many landing sites and so make itdifficult for inspectors to cover all possible op-tions. Specific points and times for landing were

recommended as possible improvements.

In Denmark and Sweden (and quite likely inother countries too), avoiding inspection resultsin a cat and mouse game between skippers andinspectors. Some fishermen have their own coun-ter measures and tactics to ensure their landingsare less likely to be inspected. It is relatively easyto have look-outs in ports and harbours, out-side offices and even the homes of inspectors toforewarn of any likely inspection activity. Mobile

phone scanners may also be used to monitor con-versations between inspectors.

In Poland, the likelihood of inspection has beenlow. As a result, fishermen have not needed tobe as organised or sophisticated in their avoid-ance tactics. The lack of manpower in the threeregional fisheries inspectorates, combined withlimited resources (e.g., mobile phones have onlybeen made available to them in the last year orso), has meant that effective and coordinatedinspection has been difficult.

The reality of fisheries inspectors living within

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or close to fishing communities was highlightedas a potential serious impediment to effectivemonitoring and application of EU rules andregulations. Furthermore, the civil service sal-ary that fishery officers are paid often belies therole, function and conditions within which they

are expected to operate. An individual able towork in intimidating circumstances, understandcomplex European legislation, and effectivelygather and present evidence needs to be of a highcalibre. To attract and retain such individualsrequires appropriate remuneration and is some-thing that a civil service salary does not necessar-ily provide.

It was also noted that owing to the civil servicestatus of fisheries inspectors, their ability to fittheir working hours around an industry thatdoes not operate within normal working hourscreated an additional challenge. Limited fundsto cover unsocial working hours and over-time,combined with time-off-in-lieu, the necessity towork in pairs and/or teams, means that enforce-ment coverage can be significantly reduced. Thefishing industry is fully aware of these constraintsand able to adapt quickly to counter any changesin inspection patterns or priorities.

Also, physical inspection time is significantly

reduced owing to the administrative burden thatinspectors have to deal with. Up to 50% of theirtime can be spent cross-checking log sheet, landingdeclaration and sales note information, and input-ting data onto the catch administration system.

In Poland, there appeared to be a general ac-ceptance by those responsible for control andenforcement as well as the fishing industry thatthere is a significant under-reporting of landings.In contrast, the official and industry views in

Sweden and Denmark were much less acceptingof a potential problem.

Unreported landings in Poland were commonlyestimated to be two to three times more than thereported landings. Given that members of fisher-ies inspectorates were among those that providedthese estimates there may be some credence orvalidity in this figure. No estimate was offeredfor either Sweden or Denmark other than re-marks that suggested that, at times, the problemwas not insignificant.

Opinion both from within and outside of Polandtalked of a culture of non-compliance withinthe Polish fishing industry. It was suggested thattogether the political history of Poland and thedetermined characteristics required to be a fisher-men have contributed to this culture. Beating

the system has become habit, a way of life oreven a badge of honour.

Furthermore, the economic benefit that waspromoted before joining the EU has not beenrealised by many in the fishing industry. This hashardened the resolve of many and created a mili-tant element that seek political influence. It wasreported that distinct groupings in the Polish codfishery are beginning to form. The more radicaland forceful groups appear to have become morepolitically influential, both at national and EUlevel, and appear to have seized the opportunityto try and influence their government and ensurethey protect and not negotiate down their fishinginterest.

One of these groups was reported to have metwith Commissioner Borg when he visited Polandin 2005. During their meeting, the fishermenapparently handed the Commissioner their reallanding figures. Their intention being, to ensurethat these were taken into account when setting

the proposed TAC for 2006. Whether this hadany effect is difficult to say. However, in discus-sion with Commission officials it was clear thatthey wanted the starting point for their proposedmulti-annual cod plan (see page 21) to match thereality of the fishery, and the 2006 TAC was setat a level that some observers considered higherthan would have been reasonably expected.

Mis-recorded landings

Mis-recorded landings were described as be-ing different to unreported landings. It refers tothe practice of deliberately under-estimating thelanded weight of cod and, in some instances, therecording of cod as another species. This canonly happen when fishing vessels are not or areimproperly inspected.

The reason for mis-reporting a landing as op-posed to not reporting is not entirely clear. Itcould be a way of lessening the potential forattracting attention to a vessels activity; it could

also be indicative of the guilt that some skippersundoubtedly feel when they break the rules.

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An overfilled box of cod can contain significantlymore than its apparent volume would suggest.The weighing of boxes on landing is required byEU regulations; however, ensuring that certi-fied scales are available is not always a realisticoption for inspectors. Unless a landing inspec-

tion is continued at the point of first sale, wherethere is a possibility of more accurate weighing,the skipper merely has to ensure that the salesnote or landing declaration that accompanies hislogsheet indicates that his landing was within8% of his estimated figure.

Mis-recorded landings were considered to be amore common practice when multiple landingswere taking place and inspectors were only ableto count boxes being discharged from vessels,rather than undertake a full inspection and weighsample boxes.

Tampering with Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)

Apparently, it is common practice to smotherthe VMS transmitter with a metal object, such asa bucket, so it is unable or its ability disruptedto transmit. One fisheries officer reported thatsometimes there are tell-tale signs as the exhaustsoot that can settle on the VMS transmitter an-tennae can show signs of having been disturbed.

More subtle measures have also been employed,an example being the use of a syringe to injectfluid into the tamper-proof VMS equipmentrendering it inoperable.

Tampering with the VMS should attract the at-tention of the national inspectorate. However,the odds are in favour of the vessel making anunreported landing before being inspected. Also,notification of vessels not transmitting does notalways get passed down to inspectors on the

coast or at sea in time to allow for preventativemeasures to be put in place. While a skippermight run the risk of a delay in returning to sea,owing to the authorities wanting to ensure thatthe system is functioning correctly before thenext fishing trip, the financial benefit from anunreported landing is likely to be worth the at-tention or the inconvenience.

Trans-shipping

Trans-shipping (i.e., the transfer of cargo be-

tween vessels at sea) of cod is not permittedunder EU fisheries regulations. However, two

different forms of trans-shipping were describedby a number of participants. The first involvestrans-shipping of cod from the catching vessel toa vessel that is unlikely to attract the attention offisheries inspectors. It was suggested that this wasan occasional but, at times, common practice in

a number of Member States. To avoid attentionand suspicion, skippers would be sure to landand record some cod, but a significant part oftheir catch would be trans-shipped beforehand.

The only way of effectively combating trans-shipping is to observe the activity and inspect thevessels while at sea.

The second example involves a specific case,where fisheries inspectors suspected that codwas being transferred to Russian Federa-tion vessels under the guise of licensed pelagicklondyking9. Pelagic vessels were suspected oftrans-shipping catches that had high levels of codbycatch. However, it was not possible to under-take an inspection as the coastguard vessels weredeployed on higher priority tasks.

Late return of logsheets

It seems likely that late return of logsheets andlanding declarations is the most common and

widespread breech of fisheries legislation. How-ever, even though it is a key factor in determiningthe uptake of individual and/or national quota,it is also considered to be a relatively minor of-fence.

It is unlikely that many inspectorates wouldsanction or take an offender to court for a latereturn of a logsheet, unless there is a consistentfailure to submit them within the required 48-hour-period after landing. Rather, the tendency

is for late returns to be taken into considerationalong with a more serious offence.

It is easy to understand and even forgive afisherman for forgetting to return logsheets andlanding declarations within the required 48-hour-period. However, reports suggest that late or noreturns increase when quota restrictions are moresevere. The likely reason for a deliberate late orno return is to allow an individual time to assessthe risks of not reporting or providing an inaccu-rate landing of cod.

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Fishing in closed areas

EU fisheries regulations provide for seasonal,temporary and permanently closed areas to allor specified forms of fishing. On occasion, somefishermen are known to deliberately breach theseregulations. Indeed, in 2005 Polish fishermen

conducted a mass demonstration against theseasonal closure of the cod fishery by fishing dur-ing a closed period. However, the extent to whichdeliberate fishing in closed areas takes place isuncertain.

Unless a vessel is boarded in the act of fishingor without their nets appropriately stowed, itis extremely difficult to prove that they are orhave been fishing. While VMS will confirm thata vessel is in transit within a closed area it will

not confirm, without reasonable doubt, that it isfishing.

Landing undersized cod

The minimum landing size (MLS) for cod fromthe Baltic is 38 cm. This means that any cod un-der this length should not be landed. The catch-ing, retaining and landing of undersized cod washighlighted as an occasional widespread problemand often associated with a strong year class

entering the fishery at, or close to, the MLS.

As a result of the comparatively strong 2003 yearclass, more small cod are presently recruitingto the fishery and this has apparently coincidedwith an increase in landings of undersized fish.ICES estimate, that in 2004, 47% of the codcaught in the eastern Baltic Sea were 3 years oldor younger and 34% were 4 years old.

Individuals involved in discard sampling in Swe-

den reported that landing of undersized cod wasmore prevalent in some inshore areas where codstocks have declined or become less common.Apparently some fishermen have the attitude thatthey cannot afford to wait for the cod to growany bigger and/or be left for others to catch.

In Poland, there appears to be a market forundersized cod or bolek and it was sug-gested that this was one of the reasons that someapparently good year classes had not resulted inthe predicted increase in stocks.

The MLS increased from 33 cm to 35 cm in

2002, with a further increase in 2003 to thepresent 38 cm. It was suggested that these chang-es may be a contributing factor in the apparentcontinued landing of small cod, with some fisher-men unable to get out of the habit or mindset ofcatching and keeping, what are now, undersized

fish. Limited or ineffective enforcement plus amarket for small cod will likely mean that thelanding of undersized cod will continue.

Small mesh size or illegal rigging of gear

The increase in MLS has also been coupled withthe required use of more size-selective fishinggear such as the BACOMA trawl. However, withthe apparent market and the potential mindset offishermen to catch and retain undersize cod, in-stances of rigging fishing gear so that mesh sizeswere restricted have been reported.

The gillnet fishery tends to target larger fish andso it was suggested that the landing of undersizedfish and the illegal rigging of gear were morelikely and characteristic of the trawl fishery.

Targeted bycatch

Pelagic vessels are allowed a maximum 3%bycatch of cod. Some vessels are known to oc-

casionally and deliberately exceed this limit. Iflanding inspection is avoided, then the bycatchwill go undetected.

When inspectors monitor the landing from apelagic vessel, visual inspection and sampling areused to indicate the percentage bycatch. It takesan experienced inspector to be able to estimatethe percentage of cod bycatch, particularly as theprocess of landing pelagic species does not neces-sarily easily lend itself to inspection. Pelagic spe-

cies are often rapidly pumped from the fish holdsashore in large quantities. This is in contrast tocod and other demersal species that are common-ly boxed and winched ashore. It was suggestedthat the bycatch would need to be significantlyabove the 3% before some inspectors have theconfidence to suspend a landing and take appro-priate action.

Exceeding 48 hour soak time for gillnets

Exceeding the 48 hour soak time for gillnets was

highlighted as a common complaint by trawlerfishermen. It was unclear as to whether this is a

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genuine concern for spoiling and wasting of codleft in nets for too long a period, or whether itis more to do with a territorial dispute betweenmobile and static fishermen.

Fishing without a special permit

In order to legitimately fish for cod in the BalticSea, Member States are required to issue specialpermits to fishermen. The number of permitsis capped in order to ensure that the cod fisheryis not subject to any increase in fishing capac-ity. While it was suggested that in some MemberStates anybody that had initially applied for thespecial permit got it, there were still fishermenwithout them who deliberately targeted codunder the guise of fishing for flatfish, such asflounder, turbot and dab. A 10% bycatch of cod

is allowed in these fisheries, but it was suggestedthat this is exceeded in some regions at certaintimes of the year. There was a suggestion thatsmaller vessels are often the culprits as they areless prone to inspections or are not inspected asthoroughly as larger vessels.

Possible future IUU fishing activities

During the interviews, some participants high-lighted an additional EU fisheries regulation thatmay result in further IUU fishing activities: theestablishment of two separate TACs in the Baltic(for the western and eastern stock).

The change in the TAC system does provide anopportunity to misreport area of capture. As fish-ermen start to work within the new system, mis-reporting may well be used as a way of optimis-ing quota. Depending on in which area they planto record their catch, vessels with a functioningVMS will have to ensure that they actually enterthe western or eastern Baltic. As long as they are

not closely monitored, they will be able to logtheir catch to whichever sea area they like.

What can be done to improve compliance?

In response to this question, the majority ofpeople concluded that there was a need for a re-duction in fleet capacity, more forceful deterrents,adequate numbers of well-trained enforcementofficers, a greater focus on the first point of sale,better use of existing and new technologies, andan improvement in the understanding and par-

ticipation of fishers in the scientific assessmentprocess.

The following briefly describes the main pointsthat were highlighted:

Reduce fleet capacity

Fleet overcapacity is considered to be the under-

lying driving force of IUU fishing for Baltic Seacod. With limited stocks and increasing fishingcosts, fishermen and vessel owners feel forced tobreak the rules to ensure continued payments ontheir vessels and a decent living for themselvesand their crews.

Capacity will decrease in the Baltic Sea overthe next few years. The Accession countries arereceiving decommissioning funds that will likelysee a significant reduction in their cod fleets. Forexample, Poland is aiming to reduce its capac-ity by approximately 40%. In the older MemberStates, fishing capacity has been capped andreduction will likely be left to economics andnatural wastage, though funding for decom-missioning is still available. Whether decom-missioning money will find its way back intothe fishing industry (i.e. decommissioning fundscould help fund the buying of licences and newvessels) is uncertain. However, those that ex-pressed an opinion suggested that fishing was notan attractive option for younger people and that

EU funds were anticipated to help countries likePoland to develop its economy and create jobsoutside of the fishing industry.

Some fishing industry representatives from theolder Member States considered that their fleetcapacities were more in-line with their quo-tas and that this balance needed to be quicklyachieved by the new Member States.

Improve deterrents

Deterrents to IUU fishing was recognised as asignificant shortfall in the present managementregime (see page 30). The sanctions imposed foroffences are considered to be woefully poor andinadequate to act as deterrents. The time betweendetecting an offence and bringing it to court wasalso seen as reducing the deterrent effect.

Of those that expressed a preference, administra-tive sanctioning rather than a judicial system wasfavoured. The benefits of an administrative sanc-

tioning system were considered to include admin-istration by people who knew and understood

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the fishing industry and, therefore, were morelikely to administer an appropriate and propor-tionate sanction. However, it should be notedthat in Poland, where an administrative system isin place, it appears that the majority of sanctionsare appealed and, as a result, reduced.

More fisheries inspectors

The number of well-trained fisheries inspectorsand the ability to work in a way that respondsto the working practices of the fishing industrywere considered to be important requirements,particularly with respect to tackling the majorproblem of unreported landings. There was afirm view that a high likelihood of effective in-spection (combined with an adequate deterrent)would significantly reduce the level of unreportedcatches. It was highlighted that it requires high-level political commitment and will to ensurethat fisheries inspectorates are well resourcedand able to effectively combat the IUU fishingproblem. Without it, inspectors become disillu-sioned and their effectiveness and commitment issignificantly affected.

Monitoring the trade in cod

A large number of respondents considered that

finding out where the IUU cod goes is the keyto reducing the problem. There was a strongbut unsubstantiated view that unreported cod islanded and transported overland to China whereit is processed before returning to the EU market its origin being lost along the way.

More than half of those that expressed an opin-ion suggested that, rather than spending largesums of money chasing fishing boats around thesea (particularly with the technological capa-

bilities at hand), resources should be directedtoward the traceability of cod and cod products.

Under EU regulations, all buyers and sellers of fishhave to be registered, however, there appears to beonly limited enforcement activity directed to-ward them. In Poland, there are an estimated 400registered buyers of fish, who move between portsbuying fish directly from vessels, but the numberof inspections directed at them is significantlylower than the number of at sea inspections.

There was some concern raised as to the trans-parency with which large fish processing com-

panies operated in the Baltic Sea. This concernhas not gone unnoticed by the largest buyer andprocessor of Baltic Sea cod, Espersen Ltd10.

Information readily supplied by Espersen madeit clear that it is very aware that dealing in large

quantities of cod will mean that, knowingly orunknowingly, there is a likelihood of dealingwith fish that originates from an IUU source.For this reason, as well as European food regu-lations (e.g. Reg. (EC) 178/2002)11 , Espersenhas in-place a paper traceability system, which itis satisfied provides traceability of cod before itenters the processing chain.

Espersen buys in the region of 25% of the codthat is caught in the Baltic Sea. This is purchasedfrom approximately 23 companies that buy froman estimated 80100 vessels operating in Poland,Denmark, Lithuania and Sweden. It is then trans-ported over-land to their filleting and breadingplants in Poland and Lithuania. None of the fishis exported to China for processing. Frozen codis also purchased from the Barents Sea but isnot mixed with the fresh Baltic Sea cod duringproduction.

Espersen has contractual agreements with itsbuyers regarding their supply of fish. For ex-

ample, cod must be landed in designated ports;have been caught within the quota regime; and,must have been reported in accordance with theappropriate regulations. The agreement explicitlyabsolves Espersen from receiving illegally caughtfish by ensuring that it is the suppliers responsi-bility to ensure it operates correct business proce-dures to avoid this happening.

Espersen has recently decided to contract an au-thorised third party to undertake regular audits

of its Supplier Agreement. Also, through its asso-ciation with the fast-food chain McDonalds, (towhom it supplies all the fish for their Europeanoutlets) Espersen has worked with ConservationInternational12on sourcing sustainable fisheriesresources.

Better use of technology

With respect to using existing or new technolo-gies, the European Commission highlighted itsconcern that VMS was not being used to its fullest

extent as a monitoring and an enforcement toolby the Member States. Among the problems are:

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Ineffective sharing of VMS informationbetween Member States

Limited cross-checking of VMS data withlogsheets and landing declarations.

Some Member States are not using VMSdata as supportive evidence in prosecu-

tion cases Closed areas are not being effectivelymonitored by VMS

Failure to take action when VMS is notfunctioning

Excessive equipment failure

Some Member State inspectorates also indicatedthat electronic logbooks would help to ensuregreater compliance, as real-time catch recordingwould assist shore and sea-based inspections inconfirming quantities of fish. However, such ameasure would only be effective if supported byadequate inspections.

Scientists and fishermen working together

Finally, a number of participants suggested thatfor a number of reasons, fishermen were acciden-tally or deliberately detached from the scientificassessment process. Reasons included: no, limitedor misunderstanding of the part which their in-formation plays in the stock assessment process;

a lack of cooperation with scientists owing to theassociation of fisheries science with government;the perceived or real arrogance of some scientiststo fishermen; and, the fear that scientists willonly provide advice that causes a reduction intheir fishing opportunities.

It was suggested that the relationship betweenscientists and fishers could and should be im-proved, and that it could indirectly contribute toimproved compliance. Examples of how this had

been achieved in the North Sea13

were highlight-ed as being positive experiences for both fishersand scientists, although there was no evidenceor feeling that this had yet contributed towardimproved compliance.

What can ENGOs contribute to improvecompliance?

The majority of respondents considered thatENGOs had a legitimate right to engage in theIUU fishing issue. There was a general consensus

that IUU fishing could be significantly reduced ifthere was the political will to achieve it. Public

opinion was seen as the best way of creating orinfluencing this political will, and ENGOs wereseen as being particularly good or well equippedto undertake this role. There was a clear empha-sis that if ENGOs were to engage in this subject,they needed to be very clear and up-to-date with

the issues. In particular, respondents involved inenforcement highlighted that ENGOs needed tounderstand the practical difficulties that are as-sociated with control and enforcement.The development of the Baltic Sea Regional Ad-visory Council (BS RAC) was seen as particularlyimportant for ENGOs to use to highlight and at-tempt to influence the Commission and others inimproving compliance. Although, it was empha-sised that this was not a platform or stage fromwhich to launch or present campaigns, rather anappropriate forum to discuss policy and practicalmeasures in reducing IUU fishing.

Direct action that had recently been undertakenby some NGOs on Mediterranean and High Seasfisheries was not endorsed by anyone exceptENGO respondents. Those involved with en-forcement considered this sort of action to bemisguided and very unlikely to lead to success-ful prosecution of offenders. ENGOs confirmedthat their intention was not necessarily to gather

evidence for prosecutions but to raise awarenessof abuse or weaknesses in the system. They alsoconcluded that if such action was to be takenin the Baltic, then communication with andpotential support from national authorities wasimportant.

Toward the end of the interview phase of theproject a two-part, investigative TV documen-tary on IUU fishing for cod in the Barents Seawas televised in Sweden (Kalla Fakta Cold

Facts on TV4)

. The programme generatedenough public and political interest for there tobe follow-up TV coverage, including interviewswith the Swedish Fisheries Minister, prominentfisheries representatives and ENGO representa-tives. Greenpeace and WWF were both involvedwith the making of the documentary; Greenpeaceproviding information through undercoverwork and WWF providing more of a policy angleto the issue.

As a result of the documentary, and questions

asked by the Swedish Government and others,the European Commission was forced to become

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very active on the issue and, at the request ofthe Swedish Government, it was made a specificagenda item at the next Fisheries Council meet-ing (20/02/06). The Council concluded to workwith Russia and Norway in combating IUU fish-ing in the Barents Sea and ensuring that IUU cod

does not enter the EU market14.

The opportunity to meet with one of the in-vestigative journalists confirmed that within asustained and intense six month period, withthe support of key individuals and organisationssuch as the Norwegian Coastguard and ENGOs,they were able to obtain enough informationon which to base a television programme whichshowed that cod has become an expensive com-modity and, as a result, has attracted sophisticat-ed business networks and operations that adopttactics reminiscent in style and approach to theMafia in their attempts to conceal fishing vesselownership/activity and trade in cod.

Conclusions

Owing to its clandestine nature, IUU fishingis extremely difficult to confidently estimate.Rather than attempt to estimate the quantitiesof fish that are caught and landed and furthercontribute to the uncertain situation, it is reason-

able to conclude that there is a high level of IUUfishing, particularly in the form of unreportedlandings from the Eastern Baltic. The Polish codfishery appears to be a significant contributor tothis aspect of the IUU fishing problem, however,the cumulative effect of IUU activities in otherMember States could also be significant.

Other forms of IUU fishing exist and these arelikely to vary throughout the year in response tothe availability of fish and the technical conserva-

tion measures in place.In some instances, there is chronic non-compli-ance caused by no or ineffective enforcementaction and deterrent. This was described at alocal, regional and national scale. Such long termnon-compliant behaviour may mean that thishas become normal behaviour with little or nofeeling of moral obligation to comply.

Reducing overcapacity is seen as an importantway to reduce IUU fishing. Current decommis-sioning programmes in the new Member Stateswill mean significant reductions in their nationalfleets. However, in the absence of any clear un-derstanding of what a balance between capacity

and resource may look like it is uncertain wheth-er this will contribute to reducing IUU fishing.

Improving the quality of control and enforce-ment is seen as an important factor in contrib-uting to a reduction in IUU fishing. However,detecting and successfully compiling a case willonly help reduce IUU fishing if the sanction thatis imposed acts as a deterrent. If the cost of sanc-tions are only viewed as a cost of doing businessthen they will have limited effect.

It seems likely that anyone trading in largeamounts of cod runs a high risk of dealing withfish that has come from an IUU source. In someinstances, traceability appears to be operationalfrom the point of first sale. However, there is anonus on buyers of first sale fish to ensure that itdoes not come from IUU sources. Without inde-pendent monitoring to confirm that these buyersare making necessary checks to ensure that this isthe case, the system is flawed and open to abuse.

VMS appears to be under- or ineffectively uti-lised by the Member States. Until these short-fallsare resolved the monitoring, control and enforce-ment regime will not be as effective as it couldor should be. Further, new technology may beof value, e.g. electronic logbooks, although withthe likely need to integrate these systems thereis concern that the potential benefit and addedvalue they bring might not be fulfilled.The political will to improve compliance with

fisheries regulations needs to be created and theENGOs are seen as being well placed to contrib-ute to this. It appears that high profile and factu-ally based media events, in particular throughtelevision, provide a very effective way of creat-ing public awareness and help to stimulate politi-cal will to tackle IUU fishing.

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Introduction

European fisheries policy and regulatory frame-works for control and enforcement apply withinthe Baltic Sea. The following sections describeand analyse these frameworks.

The policy framework

The reformed CFPA reformed EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)was adopted in December 2002. Given theconsiderable time and effort that went into thewhole reform process, the final outcome is a sur-prisingly short, 21-page document15that providesthe new framework regulation for the CFP.All other regulations related to the conservation,management and exploitation of living aquaticresources and aquaculture must be in accordancewith this regulation. Seven chapters and two an-

nexes provide the basis for measures concerning:

conservation, management and exploitationof living aquatic resources;

limitation of the environmental impact offishing;

conditions of access to waters and resource; structural policy and the management of the

fleet capacity; control and enforcement; aquaculture; common organisation of the markets; and international relations

Chapters II, V and VI of the reformed CFPprovide for three important additions within thepolicy areas associated with conservation andsustainability, control and enforcement, and deci-sion-making and consultation. They also haveparticular relevance with respect to the Baltic Seaand the cod fishery in that they provide for:

The development and implementation of

recovery plans for fisheries that exploit stockswhich are outside of safe biological limits;

A new legal framework for a Communitycontrol and enforcement system; and

The establishment of Regional AdvisoryCouncils (RACs) to help meet the objectivesof the CFP and to advise the Commissionand the Member States on matters of fisheriesmanagement in respect of certain sea areas orfishing zones.

The advent of a reformed CFP did not mean thateverything changed overnight; further policydevelopment was required to ensure that the newobligations were met. The Commission was giventhe major task of developing and presenting pro-posals that would lead to the implementation ofthe new CFP. This is an ongoing process which isbeing undertaken in incremental steps.

The development of a Baltic Sea codrecovery plan

The International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission(IBSFC) adopted a long term management plan forcod in 1999. Despite the plan, however, the stateof the stocks continued to worsen and a recoveryplan was agreed and adopted in 2001 and furtherrevised in 2003. With the accession of Poland,Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to the EuropeanCommunity in 2004, only two parties the EUand Russia remained in the IBSFC. In 2005,the Community withdrew from the IBSFC andthe organisation ceased to exist at the end of thatyear. Bilateral agreements between the EU andRussia have been adopted and EU regulations andmanagement measures are replacing those agreedwithin the IBSFC, including the long term manage-ment and recovery plans for cod in the Baltic Sea.

Following two consultations on versions of anon-paper on long term management for codstocks in the Baltic Sea in 2005 the EuropeanCommission published its proposal for a multi-annual cod management plan in July 200616. Itexpects that it will be adopted in June 2007. In

the meantime, technical conservation measuresare in place that reflects the recommendations

Part II

Policy and regulatory frameworks

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that were adopted within the IBSFCs recoveryplan.

The following provides a brief summary of thekey points in the plan:

Based on scientific advice, target fishing mortal-ity rates are set for both stocks. In order to reachthese targets an annual 10% reduction in fishingeffort and fishing mortality is proposed. AnnualTACs would be set so that they correspond withthe effort limits. In order to avoid large annualchanges in the TAC a maximum 15% variation,up or down, would be allowed.

Fishing effort would be limited by annual clo-sures in both the western and eastern Baltic Sea,initially; these would correspond to approxi-mately 2 months in the spring and summer, re-spectively. Thereafter, if the fishing mortality rateis at least 10% higher that the target rate, thetotal number of days allowed for fishing wouldbe reduced by 10%. A further three seasonal areaclosures are proposed that correspond to spawn-ing areas.

Monitoring, inspection and surveillance meas-ures are highlighted with the intention of betterensuring Member States improve the accuracy of

landing data and enable improved coordinationand cooperation between each other.

The plan would be evaluated after the first threeyears and, thereafter, annually to review the rateof progress toward the targets. If there is an indi-cation that targets are not likely to be achieved,the Council would decide on a proposal from theCommission on additional or alternative meas-ures.

Comment

The main difference between the existing man-agement approach and that which is described inthe multi-annual plan is the proposed adoptionand use of target fishing mortality rates againstwhich to assess the recovery of stocks. Also, byclearly linking TACs and fishing effort to thesetargets and introducing annual maximum vari-ations in them, the Commission has attemptedto strike a balance between bringing the stockswithin safe biological limits and the likely eco-

nomic and social consequences of doing so.

In theory, this approach is an improvement onthe existing regime. However, the outcome ofthe TAC negotiations for 2006 left some peoplefeeling that the European Commission and theCouncil of Ministers took a backward step and,indeed, created a worse situation from which

their own recovery plan will start if adopted in2007. A cynical view may suggest it confirmsthe lip service that the European institutions payto the management of fish stocks; a pragmaticview may suggest it more accurately reflects thepresent reality of the fishery by taking accountof the unreported landings and will thereforeprovide a more realistic basis for a new recoveryplan.

Furthermore, some have raised concern that theproposed plan does not meet the requirementsof the CFP in that stocks outside safe biologicallimits must have a recovery plan. However,because the plan aims to manage two stocks, oneof which is at or slightly above the safe biologi-cal limit, the Commission has proposed a com-promise and called it a multi-annual plan. Thestated intention being to conform with the over-all objectives of the CFP, aid recovery and, at thesame time, allow fishing in a less restrictive waythan would be required with a recovery plan.

Control and enforcement

The reformed CFP provides a new frameworkfor a Community control and enforcement sys-tem which, in summary: clarifies the responsibili-ties of the Member States and the Commission; isdesigned to ensure that compliance with the rulesof the CFP is achieved; and ensures that exploita-tion of the fish stocks is controlled throughoutthe whole fisheries chain. The following representa summary of some of the key points afforded by

the new framework: The Member States are primarily responsible

for the control and enforcement of the CFP,while the Commission is responsible for mo-nitoring and enforcing correct application ofCommunity law by the Member States.

Member States shall ensure: enforcement measures are taken to ensure

compliance with the rules of the CFP; effective control, inspection and enfor-

cement, and provide adequate financialand human resources to achieve this;

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measures that provide sufficient deterrentto discourage infringements;

cooperation with each other to ensurecompliance with the rules of the CFP;

that fisheries products are subject to anaudit and that anybody commercially

trading in fishery products must be registe-red.

The Commission will: evaluate and control the application of the

CFP by Member States, and facilitate coor-dination and cooperation between them;

take preventative measures where there isa risk of a serious threat to the conserva-tion of living aquatic resources;

evaluate and report every three years onMember States application of the CFPrules.

In order to take forward the new control andenforcement framework, the Commission pro-duced two Communications17, 18 in 2003 whichdescribed a step-wise approach with the ap-plication of an Action Plan for Cooperation inEnforcement followed by a Compliance WorkPlan which the Commission would implementin coordination with the Member States. Bybetter integrating national control strategies, the

Commission aimed to promote a European cul-ture of control and enforcement3. The ActionPlan was viewed as a short-term initiative, i.e.2003-2005, providing the platform from whichthe long-term Compliance Work Plan would belaunched.

The Action Plan for Cooperation in Enforcement

The aim and objectives of the Action Plan wereto achieve more effective use of national means

of inspection and surveillance through: better using the means available in selected

fisheries or stocks; adopting Specific Monitoring Programmes

(SMPs); and periodically evaluating the effectiveness of the

SMPs.

To implement the Action Plan, the Commis-sion called upon two of its advisory bodies the Management Committee for Fisheries andAquaculture and the Expert Group on Fisher-ies Control to provide advice, feedback andsupport. The Management Committee is made

up of senior representatives from Member Statesadministrations responsible for the whole gambitof fisheries management issues. In this instance,individuals from Member State policy, scientificand inspectorate divisions are all potential par-ticipants. Similarly, the Expert Group on Fisher-ies Control is made up of senior representativesfrom Member States but, more obviously, fromthose parts of national administrations that areresponsible for monitoring, control and surveil-lance of fisheries.

The Action Plan was meant to establish the basisfor the Compliance Work Plan and 2006 marksthe transition between the two. It is thereforetimely to consider and review how the ActionPlan has been applied in the Baltic Sea. Table 5describes each of the Action Plans eleven actionpoints and, drawing upon discussions with rep-resentatives from the Commissions DirectorateD and from some Member State inspectorates,provides an analysis of each. Figure 1 provides apictorial explanation of how the Action Plan and

Work Plan relate and the intended outcomes.

Figure 1. The relationship and planned outcomes of the Action Plan

for Cooperation in Enforcement and Compliance Work Plan

Action Plan for

Cooperation in

Enforcement

Commission

ComplianceWork Plan

Support to national

authorities & pro-

motion of

coordination

between them

TransparencyControl and

enforcement with

the support of the

CFCA

20022005

2006 & beyond

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5.2.2 Was the Action Plan effective in the Baltic Sea?Action Point and its Aim

1. Select relevant fisheries orstocks:

Demersal fisheries in regions

2 and 3; Highly migratory species in

the Mediterranean; Cod, herring and sprat fish-

eries in ICES divisions III b, cand d, (i.e. The Baltic Sea);

Industrial and pelagic fish-eries in regions 1, 2 and 3;and

Landings of IUU vessels inCommunity ports (this refersspecifically to vessels enga-ging in high seas fisheries).

Aim:The prioritisation ofthe use of existing means of

inspection and surveillance inselected fisheries or stocks.

2. The Commission will adoptregulations laying down speci-fic monitoring programmes forthe relevant fisheries or stocksand establish:

Common inspection andsurveillance priorities;

Benchmarks for inspectionand surveillance of fishingactivities; and

Checks to be made byinspectors.

Member States should ensure

that their competent authori-ties will achieve the com-mon inspection priorities andbenchmarks.

Aim:Enhanced effectivenessof inspection and surveillanceactivities.

A description and analysis of how the actions have been applied in the Baltic Sea region

The Baltic Sea cod fishery has been selected as a key fishery on which to focus inspection and sur-veillance effort.

The Commission has chosen to use the Working Group on Control and Enforcement, which was

originally established by the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC), as the main focalpoint for improving integration and cooperation of national control strategies. The Working Group ischaired by the Commission and brings together representatives from all the Baltic Sea Member Statesfisheries inspectorates.

Unlike the IBSFC, the Commission does not publish reports of these meetings. It appears that owingto sensitivities that some Member States have with respect to having their shortfalls being made pu-blicly available and, given the role of facilitator, coordinator and encourager, the Commission is keento establish meetings where Member State representatives can talk openly and not feel too guarded inwhat they say.

Feedback received in the course of this study suggests that the Commission is of the opinion that theeffectiveness of inspection and surveillance at sea would be greatly enhanced by better coordinationand more frequent inspections of landings. In particular, the Commission believes:

VMS data is under-utilised by and between Member States with limited use or capacity to use

real time information to direct inspections. Given that Community funds have contributed to thedevelopment and implementation of VMS, the Commission is keen to see better use of the system.

Coordinated at-sea inspections appear to happen more on an ad-hocbasis owing to poor coordi-nation between the relevant Member State departments as well as difficulties in ensuring that ves-sels, which are often tasked with multiple roles, are available. The Community Fisheries ControlAgency (CFCA) (see page 30) and any vessels it may charter may be able to provide a solution tothis situation.

There is a need for an increase in the frequency of landing inspections: concerted actions needto be taken targeting those fleets or ports where landings of cod are most likely; more inspectorsneed to be employed by the Member States; and/or more specific designated places and times(i.e. than the existing designated ports) need to be set for landings to improve the chance ofinspection.

Annex III to Council Regulation 52/200619 (also page 42) provides the basis of a specific monitoringprogramme (SMP) for the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Its origin is the IBSFCs cod recovery plan, which wasagreed in 2002 and has been annually rolled forward and adapted since. An EU cod recovery plan isanticipated in 2007 (see page 21) and will provide a new framework for the SMP.

Member States are required to take the necessary measures to facilitate implementation of theseprogrammes, particularly as regards the human and material resources required and the periodsand zones where these are to be deployed. Baltic Sea Member States are required to publish thisinformation on their authorities websites. In the same vane, benchmarks for inspection are requiredto be publicised on official websites. While all Member States have published this information somedeficiencies are noted, for example, the Polish website does not give information on how they imple-ment effort management.

The Commission is keen to ensure that uniform inspections are being conducted and that criteria areestablished for what constitutes a full inspection. Common rules for national control programmes

have been set but a standardised inspection protocol or criteria have yet to be established for theBaltic Sea.

In 2005, the Commission undertook an evaluation of how Member States had implemented measuresset out in Annex III (see page 40). In its interim assessment, the Commission presented broad con-clusions for four unnamed Member States (subsequently found out to be Poland, Latvia, Lithuania,Estonia). They concluded that:

The interim and additional conditions for monitoring, inspection and surveillance in the contextof recovery of cod stocks in the Baltic Sea were mostly being implemented. However, some mea-sures (undisclosed) were not achieving the intended outcome or were not considered to be useful.

Extra enforcement effort had been deployed in most cases but there were unlikely to be any moreadditional resources for at-sea or onshore enforcement in the near future.

Comprehensive and efficient catch registration systems are in place.

There was scope for better cooperation between Member States.

Table 5. An analysis of the 11 Point Action Plan for Cooperation in Enforcement with respect to the Baltic Sea cod f