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NeuroQuantology|March2010|Vol8|Issue1|Page3748

PylkknenP.,ImplicationsofBohmianquantumontologyforpsychopathology

ISSN13035150 www.neuroquantology.com

37

Article

ImplicationsofBohmian

QuantumOntologyforPsychopathology

PaavoPylkknenAbstract

ThisarticlediscussestheprospectsofquantumpsychiatryfromaBohmianpointof

view,whichprovidesanontologicalinterpretationofquantum theory,andextends

suchontologyto includemind. Atfirst, wediscussthemoregeneralrelevanceof

quantum theory to psychopathology. The basic idea is that because quantum

theoryemphasizestheroleofwholeness,itmightberelevanttopsychopathology,

wherebreakdownofunityinthementaldomainisakeyfeature. Wethendiscuss

the role of information in psychopathology, and consider the connections withquantumtheoryinthisarea.Inparticular,wediscussDavidBohmsnotionofactiveinformation,whicharisesintheontologicalinterpretationofquantumtheory,and

issuggested to playa fundamental roleas thebridge betweenmindandmatter.

Somesuchbridgeisneededifwearetounderstandhowsubtlementalproperties

areabletoinfluencemoremanifestphysicalpropertiesinthebrain(allthewayto

themolecularandpossiblymicrotubularlevel),andhowchangesinthosepossibly

quantumlevelphysicalprocessesareableto influencehighercognitive functions.

We also consider the implications of the notion of active information for

psychopathology. The prospects of implementing the Bohmian scheme in

neuroquantaltermsarethenbrieflyconsidered.Finally,wediscusssomepossible

therapeutic implications of Bohms approach to information and the relation of

mind

and

matter.

Keywords:quantumpsychiatry;ontologicalinterpretationofquantumtheory;

activeinformation;Bohm;quantumapproachestoconsciousness

NeuroQuantology2010;1:3748

1. Introduction 1The aim of this article is to provide a sketchof a further perspective on quantumpsychiatry, alongside other articles in this

volume (Globus, 2010; Mender, 2010; Woolfet al., 2010). Before presenting thisperspective let me, however, make somebrief comments on these other articles.

I think Menders (2010) article is auseful overview and raises the question ofthe need for quantum psychiatry in a

Correspondingauthor:PaavoPylkknen

Address:DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofHelsinki.School

ofHumanitiesandInformatics,UniversityofSkvde

Phone:+358919129249

email:[email protected],2010.RevisedMarch12,2010.AcceptedMarch

13,2010.

powerful way. Some of the ideas seem stillfairly condensed and I hope that in futureresearch this approach will be further spelledout and clarified so as to make the prospect

of the emerging field of quantumpsychiatry even more attractive andplausible to a wider audience.

Globus (2010) offers us an ambitiousattempt to explain certain neuropsychiatricdisorders (such as thought insertion) interms of thermofield brain dynamics (TBD).The key new idea in Globuss approach isself-tuning: Self-tuning from all levelsfunctionally attunes memory for theconvolution with sensory input.Consciousness (or existence) is the best

match of self-tuned memory with sensoryinput. Self-tuning can, however, go


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wrong, and this opens up an entirely new way of understanding splitting inpsychiatric disorders: if self-tuning weresplit, fragmented, dis-integrated, it would be as if two discrepant images weresimultaneously explicated from a hologram

to which they had previously been seriallyenfolded. This viewpoint can besummarized as follows: TBD offers a new way of understanding schizophrenicsplitting: as integration failure of the self-tuning function.

Globuss paper provides us with anelegant discussion of psychiatric disorders interms of disorders of self-tuning. He alsoapplies this scheme to radically rethink theclinical classification found in the diagnostic

and statistical manual of mental disorders(DSM). I shall, however, not enter into adetailed discussion of Globuss scheme here.One of the reasons is that the underlyingthermofield brain dynamics is very complex,and I am not in a position to fully evaluate it.However, I also have a feeling that thereexists a simpler way to develop a quantumontology, proposed by David Bohm, and thatit would be very useful for any quantumpsychiatry to also be aware of thisalternative. This is not to deny the potential

value of the TBD scheme, but rather toremind that, given the inherent difficulty ofquantum theory, and thus of any quantumpsychiatry, we ought to give proper attentionto the simpler schemes, as well as to themore complex ones. In the end, the variousschemes are likely to complement eachother, and each can play a role in unfoldingthe full meaning of any quantumpsychiatry.

Woolf et al., (2010) provide afascinating account of the possible role ofmicrotubule dysfunction in mental illness.Given that microtubules are widelyspeculated to be plausible sites for quantumeffects in the brain, there is a very concreteconnection to quantum psychiatry in thispaper. I am not in a position to evaluate Woolf et al.s proposals in any detail.However, I will make some suggestionsabout how Bohms ontological scheme mightconnect with their discussion.

What I want to do in the rest of this

article is to discuss the prospects ofquantum psychiatry from what might be

called a Bohmian point of view, where theemphasis is upon trying to provide acoherent ontological interpretation ofquantum theory, and to extend this ontologyto include mind. My discussion is tentative,for although I am quite familiar with the

general field of consciousness studies,especially philosophy of mind, my knowledgeof psychopathology is very limited. For thepurpose of writing this article I have studiedsome recent reviews of the field, but Iapologize in advance if the discussion belowis too simplistic from the psychopathologicalpoint of view. In any case, I have found itpersonally rewarding to consider theprospects of the relevance of quantum theoryto psychopathology. I would like to thankthe authors of the other articles in thisspecial issue for opening up a whole newdimension of thinking.

I will start by discussing the verygeneral, indirect relevance which quantumtheory might have to psychopathology(section 2). This has to do with the newgeneral world-view that quantum theory andrelativity seem to demand. An importantfeature of this world-view is wholeness, atheme relevant to psychopathology, where breakdown of unity in the mental domain

seems to be a key feature. I will then discussthe role of information in psychopathology,and consider whether there are relevantconnections with quantum theory in thisarea (section 3). In particular, I will discussDavid Bohms notion of active informationwhich arises in the ontological interpretationof quantum theory, and is suggested to play afundamental role as the bridge betweenmind and matter. Some such bridge isneeded if we are to understand how mentalprocesses are able to influence physical

processes in the brain (all the way to themolecular and possibly microtubular level),and how changes in those possibly quantum-level physical processes are able to influencehigher cognitive functions. After presentingBohms notion of active information, I will briefly consider its possible implications forpsychopathology (section 4). The prospectsof implementing the Bohmian scheme inneuroquantal terms is then brieflyconsidered (section 5). Finally, I will discusssome possible therapeutic implications of

Bohms approach to information and therelation of mind and matter (section 6).


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2. WholenessIt is a fairly common idea that health ingeneral and mental health in particular areconnected with wholeness. As Bohm oftennoted, this is also indicated by consideringthe etymological meanings of some of the

relevant terms:

the word health in English is basedon an Anglo-Saxon word hale meaningwhole: that is, to be healthy is to bewhole, which is roughly the equivalentof the Hebrew shalem. Likewise, theEnglish holy is based on the same rootas whole. All of this indicates that manhas sensed always that wholeness orintegrity is an absolute necessity to makelife worth living. Yet, over the ages, hehas generally lived in fragmentation.

(Bohm, 1980; p.3)Mental disorders often have to do

with the breakdown of wholeness or unity, inone way or another (Globus, 2010; Stephensand Graham, 2007). One important generalimplication of quantum theory and relativityis that they underline the primacy ofwholeness, a primacy that to some extent has been lost in the emphasis upon themechanistic approach that classical physicshas helped to reinforce, and which hasspread to and been influential in other

domains, such as the biological,psychological and the social, includingmedicine and psychiatry. In thepsychological domain the mechanisticemphasis reveals itself in the tendency togive supreme importance to the self as aseparate enduring entity, interacting fairlymechanically with other such selves. In theneurobiological domain mechanism revealsitself in the assumption that psychologicalphenomena can in the end be fullyunderstood in terms of the interaction ofneural elements. In this whole approach, itis presupposed that the basic realities at eachlevel are entities that interact more or lessmechanically. Mental and physical illnesscan then be seen as a failure of suchconnections and interactions between theseseparate entities that are considered asprimary.

A holistic world view inspired byquantum and relativity takes undividedwholeness in flowing movement as primary

(Bohm, 1980). Separate entities (particles)arise from such movement as a result of

certain enfolded and generative orders thatprevail in the movement. Such entities arenot separate substances but relativelyautonomous sub-wholes, like vortices in astream. Speaking in very general terms, thisis strongly analogous to the notion that what

is primary in the mental aspect is a stream ofconsciousness, out of which emergerelatively autonomous entities such asthoughts, beliefs, sensations, perceptions,intentions, desires, emotions, feelings, andselves. In this view mental health isessentially connected to the undivided wholeness and coherence in the underlyingstream of consciousness; mental disorderresults in part when this wholeness is lost forone reason or the other. For example, onemight give too much emphasis to certain ofthe various divisions that naturally arise inthe stream, thus setting the stage for theemergence of conflicts between suchseparate parts of the mind.

Of course, analysis into parts can work very well up to a point as anexplanatory strategy both in thepsychological domain and in the underlyingneurophysiological processes. However, it isimportant not to lose sight of the underlyingundivided wholeness in flowing movement

in our stream of consciousness. Quantumtheory and relativity, and the general world view arising from them (and possibly eventhe more specific neuroquantal models),can play an important role in helping to giveattention to this wholeness. Thus, one of themore general underlying messages of anyquantum psychiatry could be that we needto consider the importance of suchwholeness for mental and physical health.

A holistic perspective can alsoradically change the way we understand therelationship between the individual and hisor her social and physical environment. In amechanistic view, we assume that society canbe reduced to individuals in interaction. In aholistic view, we say that each individual is amanifestation of the whole, which includessociety and the physical environment,information about which is enfolded in thememory of the individual. Thus, we nolonger reduce society to a group ofindividuals, but rather regard the individual

as a state of the whole. This turns themechanistic view upside down (cf. Bohm,


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1978). I think this is also important whenconsidering psychiatric disorders. When weare feeling psychologically unwell, we easilysee the disorder as a property of ourseparately existing self, which in turn canmake us feel worse and even more isolated

from other people. However, if the holistic view is correct, our mental disorders arelikely often to be manifestations of the stateof the social groups in which we participate.Suffering is universal. This is nicelycaptured in a Sikh story about the man in avillage who one day climbed to the roof of hishouse, and to his amazement saw that manypeople in the village, out in their backyards,seemed to be suffering in very similar waysthat he himself was. If the holistic view iscorrect, it implies that an important part ofthe efforts to maintain mental health oughtto be directed to detecting various kinds ofincoherence at the social level (e.g. inpractises and failures of communication),instead of an exclusive focus upon theindividual, whose suffering to some extent isjust a manifestation of the social incoherence(Bohm, 1995).

3. InformationMany mental disorders can be understood interms of failures in the flow of informationand in the response to information. Inhallucination one mistakes one sort ofmental event, an imagined experience, foranother, a veridical sense perception(Stephens and Graham 2007; p.199). Forexample, a person might believe that he seesa giant rabbit in front of him. Thehallucinatory subject misattributes his orher self-generated private events to a sourceexternal to him- or herself (Slade andBentall, 1988, quoted in Stephens and

Graham, 2007; p.199). Thus, inhallucination certain information is missing(i.e. information that the given mental evenis self-generated), and as a consequencecertain mistaken information prevails (i.e.information signifying that there is a giantrabbit in front of me out there in theworld).

In thought insertion, the patientexperiences thoughts that do not have thefeeling of being his own, but he feels thatthey have been put into his mind without his

own volition, from the outside (Sims, 1995;Stephens and Graham, 2007; Globus, 2010).

When looked at in terms of information, ithas been suggested by Frith (1992) thatthought insertion essentially involves lack ofinformation about volition or intention behind thoughts. For some reason thepatient lacks information that he or she has

intended certain thoughts appearing in his orher mind, and further attributes them tohaving been produced by someone else. Frithsuggests that this might involve a breakdownin the system that monitors whether thesubject intended to think a given thought.Stephens and Graham describe the ideasuccinctly: Pathological impairments of thismonitoring system might lead me toexperience my intended thoughts asstimulus-driven responses to external eventsand thus not as mine. This explanation hasan air of plausibility, but is itphenomenologically fully accurate? Frith writes: If we found ourselves thinkingwithout any awareness of the sense of effortthat reflects central monitoring, we mightwell experience these thoughts as alien and,thus, being inserted into our minds (1992:81, quoted in Stephens and Graham, 2007;p.202). However, it is at least my experiencethat thoughts often just unfold, withoutany sense of effort or deliberate choice (e.g.when one is driving a car, or thinking whilealso engaging in some other activity; or justlost in thought while relaxing); yet onedoes not typically experience these thoughtsas alien. But there are also thoughts whichtypically require more effort and deliberatechoice for their production; and if suchthoughts should appear in my mind withoutmy having any sense of having producedthem, they might well feel alien, in line withFriths explanation. One should also be opento the possibility that something more subtle

might be going on in thought insertion,perhaps something more like Globussintegration failure of the self-tuningfunction which gives rise to the splitting ofagency at a deeper level.

Some explanations of misattributionsmight be offered by neural studies:electrophysiological studies recentlyconducted by Ford and Mathalon (2004)found that talking and inner speechresulted in a dampening of responsivity ofthe auditory perception areas in the

temporal lobes (a process that they identifiedas indicating a corollary discharge from the


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frontal cortex which prevents ones ownspeech from being attributed externally) butnot in hallucinating patients (Bentall, 2007;p.135). This is an example of how amechanistic explanation (emphasizing therole of separate parts/areas and their

connection/interaction) might play a usefulrole in understanding mental disorders.Such explanations need to be compared andcontrasted with the more exotic, quantum brain dynamical models of mentalsplitting, such as that offered by Globus(2010).

Common psychiatric disorders suchas depression and anxiety can also be seen toinvolve information in an essential way.According to Bentall (2007; p.132), evidence

suggests that they are associated withsystematic biases in the extent to whichdifferent kinds of stimuli become available toawareness. For example, [] depressedpatients preferentially recall negativeinformation [], whereas feelings of anxietyare associated with excessive attention tothreat-related stimuli. Further, obsessionalproblems, too, can be understood asessentially connected to the way we respondto and try to control information, as Bentall(2007; p.132) points out: Unwanted,

intrusive thoughts (e.g., about embarrassingpast experiences) seem to be an almostuniversal phenomenon and obsessionalpatients appear to differ from ordinarypeople in their catastrophizing response tothese kinds of experiences (Salkovskis,1998).

Thus, it seems clear that manymental disorders essentially involveinformation, and more specifically lack ofinformation, mistaken information(misattribution) and various kinds of failuresto respond to and control informationadequately. Can quantum theory throw anynew light upon the nature of information, which might also help us to understand therole of information in psychiatric disorders?I suggest that the best place to startexploring this issue is David Bohmsontological interpretation of quantumtheory, some features of which will now be briefly described (for an extensivepresentation see Bohm and Hiley, 1993).

One of the famous questions inquantum theory concerns the nature of

quantum systems, such as electrons. Is anelectron a particle or a field? This questionarises because in classical physics it is a basicpoint that elementary systems are typicallyeither particles (such as atoms) or fields(such as the electromagnetic). However, in a

typical quantum experiment (such as thetwo-slit interference experiment) anindividual system exhibits both particleproperties (it arrives at the detector at asingle spot) and wave properties (the placewhere the spot appears is determined by themathematics of wave behaviour). Bohmsinterpretation resolves this duality bypostulating that an electron is a new kind ofentity that has always both a particle aspectand a wave aspect. To simplify thediscussion let us say that the electron is aparticle always accompanied and guided by anew type of field.

In the two-slit experiment, when bothslits are open, the particle goes through oneof the slits, and then appears at a point in aphotographic place (which explains why wesee the appearance of a spot - note especiallythat in this interpretation there is no need toassume that there is a collapse of the wavefunction). The accompanying field goesthrough both slits, interferes afterwards, and

guides the movement of the particle so thatthe particles collectively, spot by spot, buildup an interference pattern. The key featurefor our discussion is that according to Bohmthe quantum field contains something hecalls active information. The quantumfield typically contains information about theentire environment of the particle (e.g. slits)and is able to mediate this to the particle.The field gives rise to a potential, whichBohm called the quantum potential. Theradically new feature is that this field does

not push and pull the particle mechanically;rather the influence of the field upon theparticle only depends upon the form of thefield (mathematically the quantum potentialdepends on the second spatial derivative ofthe quantum field, which reflects the shapeof the field). If you like, the field literally IN-FORMS (or puts form into) the energy of theparticle. This influence should not, however, be understood in too mechanical terms.What is involved is not a mere form imposedfrom without. The active information

contained in the quantum field can rather beseen as an ordered and structured inner


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movement that is essential to what theelectron as a whole (i.e. as a union of aparticle and a field) is (cf. Bohm 1980; p.12).Information is a key factor of the being of anelectron. In Bohmian quantum field theory,this idea is even more fundamental, for

information contained in the so-calledsuper-quantum field plays a key role in thecreation, sustenance and annihilation ofparticles.

The relevant idea here is thatinformation is an important part of theessence of physical processes. Somethinglike this is at least implicitly recognized in biology, where information contained in theDNA-molecule is assumed an importantgenerative part of the essence of the

organism. In addition, of course, as we cometo the psychological domain, it seemsobvious that information is a key factor ofmental phenomena. This has, of course, beenrecognized in cognitive science, with itsassumption that the human brain/mind canbe seen as a system that receives and storesinformation, and uses such information inthe intelligent control of behaviour. Bohmsradical suggestion is that there is at least astrong analogy between the operation ofinformation at the quantum level, and the

operation of information at the various levelsof mind.

We saw above that the suggestion isthat at the quantum level information acts it actively guides the movement of particles.Similarly, in human subjective experience,information content acts. When I seesomething that in a given context meansdanger (e.g. a snake), this informationcontent acts within the brain, not only viaelectric action potentials, but also via variousneurochemical processes to prepare the bodyfor appropriate response (cf. Thagard(2002)). Bohm emphasizes that this isnot merely a mental process, but includes aninvoluntary and essentially unconsciousprocess of hormones, heart-beat, andneurochemicals of various kinds, as well asphysical tensions and movements (1990).But how does information content act uponmatter? How does such an abstract quality asthe experienced meaning of information(e.g., danger) result in a wide range of

electrical and chemical processes in thebrain?

This question is very difficult toanswer in contemporary philosophy of mind,which is still based upon a very strict division between the categories physical andmental (Kim, 2006). Meaning is typicallyconsidered to be located at the mental side

of the division, and there is currently nocoherent theory that explains how meaningqua meaning can influence physicalprocesses. It is assumed that meanings aretypically carried by some physical vehicles,and any causal influences associated withmeaning are assumed to be the result of theoperation of the physical vehicle that carriesthe content or meaning. The meaning itselfis assumed to be causally inefficacious.

Bohms approach changes this in a

subtle way. Notice that in Bohms model ofthe electron, the information is carried bythe quantum field that is a qualitatively newtype of field in physics (it has some veryexotic properties; not only does it influencethe movement of particles via its form, it alsolives in a multidimensional configurationspace and is able to mediate Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type non-local influences between particles). Thus we have a moresubtle aspect (information in the quantumfield) guiding the behaviour of a more

manifest aspect (the particle). We couldgeneralize this to a principle that applies whenever meaning influences matter inother contexts. Bohm proposed such aprinciple and called it soma-significance.In this terminology a process in whichmeaning organizes the manifest levels ofmatter is called a signa-somatic process.

Thus, in the context of the humanmind we could speculate that informationcontained in mental processes and consciousexperience is carried by some subtlemedium. Of course, it seems likely that agreat deal of information that entersconsciousness is at some stage carried byneurophysiological processes that exist at theclassical level of reality (e.g. in processes where quantum effects have a negligibleeffect). But it is possible that theinformation that is experienced inconsciousness is carried by some much moresubtle medium, analogous to the quantumfield, but capable of much more complex

properties, including qualia, subjectivity andconscious experience. This information then


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typically acts downwards toward themanifest levels of the brain, ultimatelyguiding behaviour. But how could such avery subtle field carrying informationpossibly be able to act upon the moremanifest processes e.g. in the motor cortex?

One possibility is that it would act via thequantum field. Indeed, Bohm (1990) writes:

that which we experience as mind, inits movement through various levels ofsubtlety, will, in a natural way ultimatelymove the body by reaching to the level ofthe quantum potential and of the danceof the particles. There is no unbridgeablegap or barrier between any of theselevels. Rather, at each stage some kind ofinformation is the bridge. This impliesthat the quantum potential acting on

atomic particles, for example, representsonly one stage in the process.

Bohm was not too specific about whathe meant by the various levels of subtlety. Are these new types of fields, similar to butmore complex than the quantum field? Orcan they include levels of processing in themore classical domains of brain function(e.g. the various levels of processing of visualinformation)? I think Bohms view was quiteinclusive; he did not deny the obvious role which classically describable processes play

in the processing of information that entersconsciousness (Bohm & Hiley, 1993; p.179).However, I also think he felt that the moresubtle aspects of mind and consciousexperience involve more subtle levels ofinformation, which have not yet beendiscovered by cognitive neuroscience. Thediscovery of the quantum potential is veryimportant as a first guide to what the natureof such more subtle levels could be. Indeed,Bohm suggested that by extending theontological interpretation in a natural way, we could include the subtle mental aspectsinto the theory. But how can such anextension be done?

one could begin by supposing, forexample, that as the quantum potentialconstitutes active information that cangive form to the movements of theparticles, so there is a superquantumpotential that can give form to theunfoldment and development of this firstorder quantum potential. This latter would no longer satisfy the laws of the

current quantum theory, which latter would then be an approximation,

working only when the action of thesuperquantum potential can beneglected. Of course, there is no reasonto stop here. One could go on to supposea series of orders of superquantumpotentials, with each order constituting

information that gives form to theactivity of the next lower order (which isless subtle) (Bohm, 1990).

This, then, is a schematic view of the way mind acts on matter in Bohmsextended ontological interpretation of thequantum theory. In my view, it is to date themost elegant attempt to tackle the problemDescartes left behind himself: how can mindand matter, which seem so completelydifferent, nevertheless manage to influenceeach other? Bohms solution has two parts.On the one hand he argues on the basis ofquantum theory that matter has far moresubtle properties than Western mechanisticscience has thus far assumed. On the otherhand he suggests that minds are very subtlebut adds that it is a mistake to assume thatminds are entirely non-physical. Instead heassumes that every mental process has asubtle physical aspect which carries theinformation that is part of the essence of thatprocess. Quantum theory is important evenfor this second hypothesis, for quantumtheory makes plausible the idea that it ispossible for there to exist very subtlephysical processes. In Bohms extendedquantum theory, these physical processes areassumed so subtle that they can justifiably becharacterized as mental (for a furtherdiscussion of this view see Pylkknen 2007;for a critical review see Globus 2007).

4. The possible role of activeinform ation in psychiatric disorder s What might be the relevance of Bohmsontological interpretation of quantum theoryto psychiatry, what might a Bohmianquantum psychiatry look like? It wouldclearly approach mental disorder from theperspective of active information. We sawabove briefly how psychiatric disorderessentially seems to involve failures in theflow of information, and in the response toinformation. Bohms emphasis on the ideathat information is typically active seems to

be very useful if we want to understand how


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various failures at the level of informationlead to psychiatric disorders.

In hallucinations self-generatedinformation is mistaken for externallyproduced information; as a result this

information acts to give rise to a perceptionof, say, a giant rabbit. This perception, inturn, can give rise to all sorts of reactions inthe person, as the state of the body unfoldsthe meaning in subtler levels of thought.

We saw earlier that it has beensuggested that thought insertion involves a breakdown in the system that monitors whether one intends to think certainthoughts, which can result in misattributionsof these thoughts to external agents. Thissuggests that our sense of agency depends

upon the presence and activity of a certainkind of information, namely (what seems to be a kind of) self-referential informationabout our own intentions. Usually we arenot aware of the activity of this kind ofinformation, but only realize its importance when considering puzzling clinical casessuch as thought insertion.

We also considered the idea thatdepressed patients preferentially recallnegative information compared to positive

information (Bentall, 2007; p.132). InBohmian terms, this could be seen as asituation in which for some reason negativeinformation is overactive while themeaning of positive information is inhibitedfrom entering into awareness positiveinformation has become somewhatinactive.

Bentall further suggests feelings ofanxiety are associated with excessiveattention to threat-related stimuli, as inpanic disorder. In Bohmian terms anxiety

can be understood as a failure to deal withactive information. While a normal personcan usually deal fairly calmly with differenttypes of information, the person with ananxiety disorder cannot very well deal withthe information consisting of certain kinds ofstimuli, and as a result a panic attack can betriggered. Panic attacks are an example ofthe power of information to act, whether ornot the subject likes or intends it. Wouldan increased understanding and awarenessof this relatively autonomous power ofinformation help to relate to information in

such a way as to control that power? It is aninteresting question whether an increasedunderstanding of the active nature ofinformation along Bohmian lines could helpto develop therapeutic techniques that inturn could help to tackle anxiety and even

depression. I will return to this issue at theend of the article.

We noted above that obsessionalproblems, too, could be understood asessentially connected to the way we respondto information. Recall Bentall: Unwanted,intrusive thoughts (e.g., about embarrassingpast experiences) seem to be an almostuniversal phenomenon and obsessionalpatients appear to differ from ordinarypeople in their catastrophizing response to

these kinds of experiences. Bentall suggeststhat obsessional patients are dysfunctional intheir attempts to control the contents ofconsciousness. It seems that normalpeople are able to deal with their unwanted,intrusive thoughts in a fairly calm way. Incontrast, Bentall (2007; p.132) points outthat obsessional patients have excessiveexpectations about their mental efficiency,catastrophic fears about losing control oftheir thoughts, and superstitious beliefsabout the consequences of this happening

(If I did not control a worrying thought, andthen what I worried about really happened, itwould be my fault) (Wells and Papageorgiu,1998). The worry here seems to be, at leastin part, about the active and autonomouspower of thoughts, and the sense of a need tocontrol this power.

5. NeuroQua ntal considerations We saw above how Bohm suggestedschematically that that which weexperience as mind, in its movement through various levels of subtlety, will, in a naturalway ultimately move the body by reaching tothe level of the quantum potential and of thedance of the particles. In other words,mind involves a hierarchy of levels ofsubtlety, which includes the level of thequantum potential at the bottom of thehierarchy. By controlling the shape of thequantum field, the mind can control themovement of particles, such as electrons.Electrons, in turn, can control more

macroscopic, classical neural behaviour viaamplification of quantum effects.


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Alternatively, in a quantum field theoreticmodel, the mind can control the behaviour ofe.g. the electromagnetic field by controllingthe form of the super-quantum field. This isthe nave idea, or the general principle. Toimplement the principle into concrete

neuroquantal models we need to look forsites in the brain, where amplification ofquantum effects is likely to play a role indetermining more macroscopic neural behaviour (e.g. resulting in the activation ofmotor neurons). Hiley and Pylkknen (2005)considered Beck & Eccless quantum modelof synaptic exocytosis (Beck, 2008) from thepoint of view of the ontologicalinterpretation. We wrote there: [the]action of the quantum potential effectivelyreduces the height of the barrier to increasethe probability of exocytosis. Thus we couldregard the mind-field as initiating asubsequent neural process which finallyactivates the motor neurons to produce theoutward behaviour. In this sense, activeinformation is merely the trigger for theusual classical processes that follow thegating of ion channels. Later on, we added:There may be other brain processes wherethe notion of active information could bemore appropriate. One suggestion that wepresently investigate is the behaviour ofdendritic fields, where it has been suggestedthat important information processing maybe going on (Pribram 2004). Here statisticalprocesses involving active information may be important, as discussed in a preliminaryway by Hiley (2004).

In recent years, much attention has been given to the idea that quantumprocesses in neural microtubules might beessentially connected with higher cognitivefunctions and even conscious experience. It

is tempting to consider the microtubulesfrom the point of view of the ontologicalinterpretation of quantum theory. Forexample, standard quantum theory has noclear notion about what an individualelectron is (i.e. it has no coherent ontology).Thus, for example, when we try to consideran electron being in a tubulin dimer,standard quantum theory provides us withno clear ontological picture of the situation.In contrast, Bohms ontologicalinterpretation provides, in principle, an

unambiguous model of the electron in thedimer. If one could calculate the quantum

potential for this situation, one could look atthe behaviour of the electron in the dimer,and study in a more concrete way how theeffects of the electron behaviour might beamplified to control more macroscopicneural behaviour. In the Bohmian mind-

matter scheme, the microtubules are onepossible site where the quantum field mightpersist in a form that could be influenced bymind (when the latter understood asinvolving a hierarchy of super-quantumfields). The changes in the form of thequantum field in the relevant microtubules would result in the change of the behaviourof the electrons, which in turn might, inprinciple, be amplified to control large-scaleneuronal behaviour.

Of course, to account for cognition wealso need to discuss perception, where(typically) information about the manifest,classical world is carried toward the moresubtle, quantum levels. This requires thatthe Bohmian scheme is modified to includeback-action, i.e. an influence from theparticle to its guiding quantum field (or inthe field theory from e.g. the electromagneticfield to its guiding super-quantum field). Theneed for this has been emphasized especiallyby Jack Sarfatti, and here is a sample of his

take on developing Bohmian mind-mattertheory in the context of microtubules: the back-action of the electro-chemical signals,from the nerve cells via the [tubulin] dimers,on the wavefunction of the collectiveFrhlich mode provides the informationstream required for perception. The reversequantum force of the wavefunction on thenerve matter is the action stream for intent(volition or free will). The two opposingstreams of bits, nerve matter to mental wavefunction and vice versa, form a new

kind of feedback-control loop which isabsent in dead matter

An eager and able defender ofBohms ontological interpretation ofquantum theory is Mike Towler of CavendishLaboratory, Cambridge University. He writes in his 2009 lecture slides:Experimentalists have been able to diffract60 C-atom fullerene molecules passingthrough small holes, so such objectsdefinitely fall on the quantum side of the

classical-quantum boundary. The TCMgroup in Cambridge is a leading centre for


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doing molecular dynamics (e.g. with theCASTEP code). So if trajectories dont exist,and particles dont have objective reality, what exactly do we imagine our moleculardynamics movies are depicting?. Towler isreferring to the fact that standard quantum

theory allows for neither the notion ofparticles existing when not observed, nor forthe notion that particles move alongtrajectories. In contrast, the ontologicalinterpretation provides a mathematicallyprecise hypothesis of what might be going onat the level of, say, 60 C-atom fullerenemolecular motion. At least in principle, theontological interpretation should also makeit possible to make movies about electrondynamics in the microtubules, and suchvisualizations might well be useful as we tryto understand microtubules better. I admitthat such suggestions are very general and vague, no doubt reflecting my limitedknowledge of this area, but I have a strongintuition that more attention to theontological interpretation ought to be givenin the research on the role of microtubules inquantum mind theories. At the very least,this would complement the pictures offered by the two other paradigms, the Penrose-Hameroff Orch-or theory and the TBDtheory. On the whole, Towlers lecturesprovide an excellent overview of the differentaspects of the deBroglie-Bohm theory (asthe ontological interpretation is often called),and I highly recommend the reader to visitthe website of the course (Towler, 2009).

The prominent role Bohmsinterpretation gives to information makes itat least prima facie a very strong candidateto be considered in attempts to developquantum mind theories. It is almostuniversally accepted that information is a

key factor of mental processes. Ifinformation also plays a key role in guidingquantum processes, there is at leastpotentially a new kind of connection betweenmental processes and physical processes at a very fundamental level. Different quantummind theories postulate different reasons why quantum theory might be relevant tounderstanding the mind-brain relationship.The possibility that information plays anobjective and active role at the quantum levelcertainly adds to the initial plausibility of

quantum mind theories (see also Smith,2002; for criticisms of the active information

at the quantum level hypothesis, see e.g.Riggs, 2009; for an early discussion of theissues that Riggs considers, see Hiley, 1994).

6. ConclusionLet us return to our discussion of what mightbe the relevance of Bohms partly quantum-inspired theorizing about information in apsychiatric context. Firstly, we rememberthat Bohm draws attention to the idea thatinformation should be seen as typicallyactive, even if we typically may seeinformation as a fairly passive entity that weare free and able to manipulate at will. Wehave seen above how many psychiatricdisorders can be seen as connected toinformation and our response to it. Our

failure to perceive and understand the activenature of the various kinds of information inour mental lives might well explain some ofthese disorders. This is at least implicitlyunderstood in cognitive behaviour therapy,where one has developed clinical techniquesthat try to manipulate cognitive processesthat seem to give rise to disorders. Bentall(2007; p.38) writes: Most cognitive behavioural interventions involvechallenging the dysfunctional belief systemsof patients, and these approaches have

shown considerable promise in thetreatment of both the common psychiatricdisorders and also the psychoses (Rector &Beck, 2001). Also in the Bohmian picture itseems that incoherent information whichconstantly appears in cognition - plays a keyrole in mental disorder, and thus the road tomental health is the movement towardcoherence. However, challenging incoherent beliefs may not be the only way to tacklethem. Indeed, Bentall (2007; p.138)observers: there has been recent interest

in the development of strategies to helppatients change their attitude toward theirthoughts and feelings, rather than thethoughts and feelings themselves. Theseapproaches, which have borrowed from themindfulness meditation techniquesdeveloped within the Buddhist tradition,have shown especial promise in thetreatment of patients with chronic, recurringconditions (Segal et al., 2002).

In Bohmian terms this would involve

trying to be aware of the meaning of theactive information contained in the various


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incoherent and disturbing thoughts, withoutaccepting or condemning this content. Theidea is that this very awareness is able toreveal to the mind that these contents lackcoherent meaning, and in such awareness,these incoherent meanings dissolve. Bohms

approach is similar to that of Krishnamurti, with whom he had many discussions.Krishnamurti spoke of choicelessawareness in this context, but Bohm feltthat the use of the term choice was not veryapt here. Rather, it is the question of beingable to be aware of the meaning of thevarious mental states, without judging them(this reminds one of Pyrrhonian skepticism,which held that such suspension of judgmentis an important means to achieving peace ofmind). Thus, one does not argue withincoherent thoughts that might justproduce more confusion. Instead, whentrying to understand their meaning, onemight be able to perceive their incoherence,and this very perception might start amovement toward coherence (Bohm andPylkknen, 1991).

In this article, I have with someenthusiasm and optimism considered thepossible role Bohms notion of activeinformation could play for a better

understanding of psychiatric disorders. Ofcourse, there is a great danger of being overlynave about the extent of the relevance of thisnotion. The fruitful way of making use of thenotion of active information in this context isnot to try to replace existing approaches topsychiatric disorder by a theory based on

this notion. Rather, the notion of activeinformation can be used to sharpen up the views provided by existing theories. Inparticular, this notion draws attention to theway information content acts to organize thelower, physiological levels of the brain, and

how changes in these lower levels can, inturn, cause changes in the higher cognitivelevels. This idea, I think, is potentially veryimportant for understanding the mind-matter relation in general and psychiatricdisorders in particular.

One of the advantages of GlobussTBD scheme is that he has connected it tothe hermeneutical-phenomenologicalphilosophical tradition, which includes avery sophisticated way of understanding the

human condition. This allows Globus tomake use of, say, and Heideggersphilosophical notions in a quantumneuropsychiatric context. Much further workneeds to be done if the active informationscheme is likewise to be properly connectedto the various more humanistic schemes thathave proved successful in the attempts tounderstand psychiatric disorders. Inaddition, the neuroquantal implementationof the Bohmian scheme is still at very earlystages. In this paper, we have only been

scratching the surface of quantumpsychiatry from a Bohmian perspective, buthopefully we have been able to show that theidea is at least worthy of furtherdevelopment.


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