pad 632 Foundations of Public Policy

Imperfect Virtues

A blueprint for how Sovereigns develop functional political institutions

Phillip Mitchell

7/24/2016

This journal provides scholarship and examples for how sovereigns create functional political institutions by balancing ethics, budgets, and other legislative power relationships to produce policy outcomes that can achieve policy goals and other public policy functions that represent greater policy equity and defining how power relationships are formed within political institutions.

Imperfect virtues (truths) create the environment for how political institutions to function.

These truths are realities that exist within political systems that define how relationships are

ordered. For example, budget scorecards, fiscal year budgets, capital and operating budgets,

morality and ethics, and absolute and nominal policy outcomes structure how power

relationships and ordered functions occur within political institutions. In addition, fiscal year

budgets, scorecards, operating budgetary expenses and authorizations determine how sovereign

entities meaning that agencies such as the DOD fund special military programs (with $1.4 billion

dollars) in terms of carrying out policy goals in the form of optimal policy outcomes making sure

military operations have war-planes, the latest technological advances, and submarine

capabilities to deter adversary conflict (Scully, M. & Burgess, R.R., 2015, p. 6-9). Moreover,

imperfect virtues structure the basis for policymaking to form and operate within nominal policy

outcomes because expenditure allocations determine how power relationships are brokered

within political institutions to form rational policy goals and incremental optimal policy

outcomes controlling Sovereign interest; meaning that citizen subject interests and other political

economy functions such as employment measurement, GDP growth, wage efficiency, and other

economic factors operate under capital operating budgets which offer nominal policy estimations

for how policy outcomes are brokered in a public policy environment (Ogujiuba, K.K. &

Ehigiamusoe, K., 2014, p. 299-314). In essence, imperfect virtues determine the order for how

policy outcomes achieve public policy recommendations and conclusions.

Political systems often clash between how public policy can be achieved and how policy

outcomes can be arranged within civil society. Often times power relationships broker optimal

policy outcomes creating nominal (utilities) and absolute (pure) bureaucratic arrangements which

define how power and influence are structured within a society to produce the most efficient and

effective way in creating a system of government shaping the relationship of men and institution

(Ogujiuba, K.K & Ehigiamusoe, K., 2014, p. 299-314). For example, this means that defined

bureaucratic arrangements help achieve utilitarian goals and egalitarian principles to help create

power structures to identify different assigned roles governments play inside a society and

political system to determine intergovernmental roles and relations among political institutions.

In this context, intergovernmental relationships define policy utility within the public policy

arena composing institutional craft of how political, constitutional, administrative, fiscal, and

financial arrangements are formed within intergovernmental settings creating optimal policy

goals for how institutions function (Sun, D., 2015, p. 165-169). Moreover, fiscal disparities,

fiscal expenditures, and budgetary constraints are three other policy utilities developed by

bureaucratic arrangements to produce power sharing arrangements to help solve revenue

shortages, budget deficits, and other fiscal equalization dilemmas local, state, and federal

governments face to produce greater performance management, service delivery, and equity of

resources to produce efficient government policies that are solvent and increase optimal

economic opportunity and development to generate ways in which governmental aid is arranged

(Zhao, B. & Coyne, D., 2015, p. 32-52).

Economic utility and income distribution are two other policy tools that shape

intergovernmental equity and define fiscal resources of governments creating power sharing

arrangements within political systems. Economic utility and income distribution structure and

delegate authority to determine how taxes, revenue, and income are collected to determine the

proper authority or role each level of government has in producing fiscal transfers, services, tax

authorities, and other defined policy goals to help shape redistributive policy efforts. These

redistributive policy efforts shape economic arrangements and create just economic policy for all

governments to produce the most egalitarian form of public administration (Huang, T-Y., Wu, P-

C., & Yan, C-W., 2014, p. 341-359). Finally, these policy arrangements between economic

utilities and income distributions form policy relationships in terms of crafting nominal public

policy outcomes that place emphasis on how power is ordered within political institutions to

foster greater policy development and policy outcomes within a public policy context.

Power relationships help structure policy utilities and tools in assisting governments in

being partners of collaboration and avenues for governance. These policy avenues define

jurisdictional authorities, power functions, units of policymaking, and governance arrangements

as policy utilities or power tools in shaping imperfect intergovernmental relations by

streamlining government to maximize efficiency institutional capacity within civil society

(Martin, S.A. & Long, C.N., 2014, p. 589-617). In addition, other policy avenues such as

intergovernmental politics and economics form policy utilities. Moreover, budget balances,

policy outcomes, debt obligations, socioeconomic factors, spending per capita, GDP functions;

debt-level politics, pork, electoral success, and political loyalty all serve as utilities that structure

effective bureaucratic arrangement of government (Stokes, A., 2015, p. 2-7). These sovereign

utilities create equitable revenues based on merits such as economic conditions and expenditure

revenues to provide better control over resources to assist all levels of government to be better

stewards of spending resources and revenue disbursements (Kemahlioglu, O., 2015, p. 51-74).

Moreover, economic and political arrangements intergovernmental arrangements inside political

systems to achieve political goals and fiscal alignments between governments to produce policy

harmony in structuring sound policy development in terms of creating policy equity in

contributing to governmental welfare, structuring urban communities, and defining how health-

care services are distributed, among other GDP functions of government in developing policy

regimes for governmental taxes and other sub-national capacities that require policy rationale in

the form fiscal capacity equalization grants, bonds, and other delegated sovereign debt to

determine economic harmony and other harmonious elements of a political system (Grewal, B.,

2008, p. 602-637).

Finally, intergovernmental relations structure functional political institutions in the form

States, local governments, sub-national governments, inter-sovereigns, intra-sovereigns,

partnerships, and other shared power arrangements between local, state, municipal, and federal

governments to create functional operations in terms of defining how authority, power, order,

influence, and other capacity elements are arranged to make government a positive tool of

policymaking inside civil societies.

Civil societies structure political behavior differently. Legislative ethics are part of

everyday institutional behavior that defines how ordered political activity is arranged. For

example, legislative ethics are essential frameworks for how political institutions determine how

legislative means and ends are ordered inside political systems to produce strong legislative

strategy, management, and other scholarship and knowledge to carry on political norms and

political scholarship of policy development and implementation. Legislative ethics measure

institutional capacity and moral obligation to identify collective practices to help shape

professional standards to increase legislative product, which oversee rational policy outcomes,

while reducing corruption, nepotism, and increase public trust to help increase effective

bureaucratic arrangements inside political systems (Holzer, M. & Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 311-

315). Finally, increasing bureaucratic arrangements inside political institutions requires

administrative standards that provide self-triggering mechanisms in the form of statutes, codes,

and legal language that identifies how bureaucrats perform institutional behavior and

responsibilities in terms of defining how legislative product is developed, implemented,

executed, and chosen to determine the proper accountability for measuring institutional success,

policy outcomes, and ethical dilemmas by finding the proper balance between institutional

loyalty and fiduciary duty to determine how ordered behavior exists within political institutions

(Holzer, M. & Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 315-333).

In sum, legislative ethics are defined by several different stakeholders to produce

accountability, transparency, and policy outcomes that respond to men’s materials within a

political system.

Legislative ethics determine how efficient stakeholders are in representing power

relationships. Stakeholders (sovereigns; e.g. legislatures, Parliamentarians’, legislators,

committees, government agencies, task forces, municipal governments, local and state

governments, and city councils) produce effective institutional standards for measuring

professional conduct which determine how defined authority is distributed within citizenry

functions. In addition, stakeholders define legislative virtues by balancing pure ethical standards

and policy morality creating democratic relationships between political institutions and men.

Moreover, policy morality and ethical standards are partial virtues or interests served in terms of

administering legislative material and institutional duty to structure policy outcomes and men’s

interest in an effective and functional way (Sabl, A., 2004, p. 221-233). In sum, partial virtues

determine how human nature exists within political institutions by developing how political

power is arranged within legislative committees, procedural votes, floor votes, and other

administrative functions of the legislative branch which determine how political power is

arranged to meet the demands of institutional duty and material men’s interests (Sabl, A., 2004,

p. 221-233). Partial virtues determine how political power is arranged within legislative-political

settings by structuring actors of ethical conduct that seek to increase public integrity and

strengthen institutional capacity by crafting legislation that responds to moral needs but still

achieves desired policy outcomes that strengthen institutional capacity and increases public trust

in political institutions.

Institutional behavior is always criticized by critics. Authority and power are the terms

for identifying critics of political power and legislative dissatisfaction. Institutional arrangements

are created by legislators who define the conditions of procedural rules, academia journals,

liberal and conservative media outlets, legislature inaction, government inaction/shifting

policymaking authority, and other institutional intolerances define imperfect structures of the

Sovereign which can be defiant authorities of the sovereign making legislative dissatisfaction the

norm for how institutional behavior exists (Mamora, A. O., 2006, p. 22-24). Furthermore, the

absence of intolerance and lack of institutional character define rational actors (policymakers) by

creating agents of moral peril who force legislative intolerance upon political institutions by

forcing institutional pain, suffering, policy dissatisfaction, political infighting, and other

institutional pain associated with institutional error or poor stewardship of political power and

ethical policymaking (Tuckness, A.S., 2002, p. 17-35). Moreover, moral peril plagues all

political institutions because moral intuitions guide policymakers which means that principles of

accountability are tested putting legislative virtue at risk of achieving ethical legislative product

and political power because misapplication and error can lead to policy punishment in terms of

reducing institutional capacity within political institutions creating a disservice to bureaucratic

arrangements in structuring moral policy outcomes and other norms of legislative power

(Tuckness, A.S., 2002, p. 36-56). Finally, the absence of institutional intolerance and

accountability plagues policymakers because at times political power and other power struggles

harbor institutional goals with men’s interest, creating the presence of immoral political

institutions who do not have the confidence of the public or public integrity to carry the public’s

will.

An added feature of political institutions is the implementation of ethics. In practical

terms, the administration of legislative ethics is one of institutional interpretation, meaning that it

depends on the Authority, Sovereign, or political entity implementing the ethics standards to

determine the impact they have on a political system. For example, sovereign authorities create

incremental policy choices that structure uniformity between state boundaries for determining

ethical standards. Strong regulations determine how state boundaries and other shared interests

structure the national identity of programs like the ABA or other legal, political, or analytical

field of study (Coquillette, D.R., 2011, p. 124-128). Defined regulatory authority and legal norms

can be guideposts for creating stronger accountability standards within legislative political

institutions meaning that stronger administrative functions could take place inside political

institutions to create a greater policy outcomes within institutional arrangements to increase

legislative product, policy outcomes, and other materials to increase public trust and integrity of

men within a political system (Coquilette, D.R., 2011, p. 124-128). Moreover, greater policy

outcomes can structure greater legislative product in terms of creating political institutions that

pass laws to make the legislative process an efficient end to representing men within a political

system to create a working relationship between government and the citizenry. Finally,

increasing legislative product fosters stronger confidence, public trust, and integrity within a

political system to give people hope that political institutions can still be agents of citizenry

needs.

Public policy can be arranged in many different ways to fit citizenry needs. For example,

monitoring institutional goals and arrangements requires a strong vision for how legislative and

political settings should look like in terms of defining the moral obligations of political

institutions. Furthermore, ethical standards such as strong civic engagement, dialogue, and

discourse to determine how training is administered, how theory and application are applied,

how the political environment is crafted and structured, how collective purposes are defined, and

finally how collaboration and other methods of cooperation can be achieved are elements of

strong ethics that can be installed within political institutions (Blacksher, E., Maree, G.,

Schrandt, S., Soderquist, C., Steffensmeier, T., & Peter, R. St., 2015, p. 485-489). Greater

political and legislative freedom establish greater public policy goals making moral obligations,

moral claims, and civic response be agents of change and institutional memory in terms of being

strong advocates for public trust, integrity, and confidence to affirm men’s interest are being

represented (Blacksher, E., Maree, G., Schrandt, S., Soderquist, C., Steffensmeier, T., & Peter,

R. St., 2015, p. 485-489). Finally, institutional performance should be at the heart of all

legislative memory and policymaking delegation because political power should be a test of how

institutional behavior is formed to create effective political institutions that govern and represent

the will of the citizenry and create avenues of trust and reciprocity to increase legislative-

political policy outcomes within a political system.

Public trust is an important feature for political institutions to possess. Adequate funding

for strong legislative ethics is an imperative for how political institutions develop public trust and

other mutual relationships with the public. Furthermore, legal aid programs, state legislatures,

political advocacy, legal service grants, scholarships, policy initiatives, public-private

partnerships are all methods for funding strong legislative ethics within political institutions

(Albiston, C.R. & Nielsen, L.B., 2014, p. 62-95). In addition, strong service initiatives such as

public scholarships, grants, legal service grants, state legislature appropriations, political

advocacy, and public-private partnerships all form powerful political actors and players who help

foster together academia experts, policymakers, former government officials who develop policy

papers, recommendations, and analyses for how ethical standards should be applied throughout

political institutions (Albiston, C.R. & Nielsen, L.B., 2014, p. 62-95). Moreover, this means that

membership dues, fees, monthly donations, contributions, and monthly giving-efforts are all

funds raised to pay for ethical programs to help increase institutional capacity and being a strong

broker in structuring legislative-political institutions increase uniform standards for increasing

professionalism and integrity within political institutions. In essence, funding for legislative

accountability is essential to preserving institutional integrity, public trust, and confidence within

a political system to increase legislative representation and civic engagement in making sure the

political system does not become a moral peril of its animal instincts and tendencies.

Ethical arrangements inside legislative-political institutions should be based on criteria.

Criteria should be justified. For example, avoiding conflict-of-interest scenarios, unethical

conduct, quid pro quo, racketeering/corruption, and other unprofessional conduct should be the

basis of the criteria. In addition, this means that ethical arrangements should be determined based

on institutional benefit, merit, and policy outcomes meaning that the will of the people are

represented to make public integrity, trust, and public confidence the ways to justify funding for

stronger ethics inside political institutions. Essentially, stronger ethical arrangements enhance the

legislative process by increasing legislative product to produce functional political-legislative

institutions inside a political system.

Public sector budgets control the legislative process forming spending priorities for how

Sovereigns develop policy. Subjective policy actors are formed within public sector budgets to

become part functional states of sustained optimal health, meaning that allocations and defined

resources, adjustments, bond allocations, bond authorities, and other sovereign capacities help

implement optimal utility for how policy goals are achieved by governments. Functional

authorities of public sector budgets create the conditions for how political institutions function,

meaning that budgetary policy decisions create the basis for how budgets are formed, requested,

implemented, produced, and structured to satisfy sovereign master’s. In addition, these

subjective authoritative authorities (budget committees, state legislatures, city councils, and

county executives) have the financial capacity to control how money is spent within a political

system allowing for budget surpluses to be formed, budget deficits to be racked up, and optimal

costs to be administered for line-item budgets and short-term capital budgets or continuing

resolutions to solve resource-exchange problems within political systems (Holzer, M. &

Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 259-280). Moreover, these optimal values (budget components)

measure how government performs by creating self-triggering mechanisms the form of

budgetary means within political institutions controlling how spending is prioritized for how

policy choices and political attitudes are administered to create expenditures within a political

systems to make governments function (Holzer, M. & Schwester, R.W., 2016, p. 259-280). In

essence, these budgetary actions and constraints form the basis for how federal and state budgets

are administered to create lasting continuing resolutions and policy choices in the form of

statutes, public laws, and other ordinances to structure performance management for how policy

goals and political attitudes are achieved to help national and state governments function.

In reality, sovereigns assign optimal values to budgets to determine rational policy

choices. In practical terms, policy choices are rational adjustments and mathematically

proportions administered by sovereigns, meaning that budgetary allocations are achieved by a

utility value determined by fiscal budgets, funding levels, and other fiscal measurements for how

political economy are structured. Sovereign appropriations (utilities) determine how political

economy policy goals are structured based on capital-budgets or short-term resolutions that put

temporary sovereign authority in control of debt consolidation, funding projects, identifying

fiscal challenges, structuring optimal funding levels for how budgets are developed to make sure

sustained budget controls and policy equity is achieved to help governments produce optimal

utility in achieving zero-based budgeting requirements (balanced scorecards) (Keown, A.J. &

Martin, J.D., 1978, p. 21-27). In addition, this means that self-triggering budget controls help

structure sovereign policy choices and outcomes, in terms of producing funding goals for how

political-social objectives are meant, funding allocations for agencies and departments, and

defined optimal values (monetary constraints, e.g. nominal policy values ($180,000, $225,000, &

$280,000) for expenses and costs are arranged to produce policy utility and political unity for

how programs function (Keown, A.J., & Martin, J.D., 1978, p. 21-27). Moreover, operating

budgets are a sovereigns dream because better optimal values for how policy utility and costs can

be achieved for how sovereigns implement fiscal year adjustments and budgetary deadlines for

how services, revenues, expenses, and costs are achieved within a political and administrative

policy context. In sum, this means that zero-based budgets are the primary source for how

sovereign masters produce functional political institutions because investment projects, project-

funding goals, and other debt-ceiling authorities are created within capital budgets to illustrate

how optimal values are achieved and defined within a policy context (Keown, A.J. & Martin,

J.D., 1978, p. 21-27).

For example, political attitudes define how policy choices are arranged within a political

system to structure defined budgetary arrangements for implementing how the sovereign

produces an efficient state. Furthermore, defined resource allocation is the center for how

political attitudes are achieved within a policy context to serve the sovereign’s needs, creating

different relative values and political economy functions for how budgetary decisions are crafted.

In addition, these resource allocations, budgetary constraints, and optimal adjustments help

structure output levels for how grants are matched and distributed, meaning that defined political

economic activity can be created in terms of producing wage mechanisms, wage efficiency

standards, wage setting goals, and other optimal funding levels that structure budgetary

arrangements for how government functions (Johansen, K. & Strom, B., 2003, p. 215-228).

Moreover, optimal (monetary goals, funding allocations) output levels structure budget outcomes

meaning that wages are arranged and rearranged to make sure government agencies and

departments maintain their operating costs at sustainable levels maximizing employment and

optimal wage levels in producing budget utility allowing policy goals and choices in the form of

labor functions being achieved, wage growth increasing, elasticity forming, and grants increasing

wage conditions and optimal employment levels creating strong wage and labor utilities that

reduce inefficiencies and increase internal policy interaction within different political-economic

sectors of national and state governments (Johansen, K. & Strom, B., 2003, p. 215-228). In sum,

policy choices are continuous political attitudes that always get restructured to maintain balanced

scorecards and other streamlined functions of how the sovereign operates within a public

administrative context to produce the best possible policy solution for how capital and operating

budgets are structured to produce political attitudes that work for all agencies and departments

within a political system.

Effective maintenance of budget scorecards produces imperfect functions of the

sovereign. Furthermore, this means sovereigns structure revenue/cost distributions to produce

optimal utility in measuring absolute values (costs/revenues) and optimal values (profits/losses)

helping structure performance results for how governments collect revenue to disburse to select

agencies (Robinson, M., 2002, p. 17-33). In addition, this means that optimal and nominal values

help structure strong performance indicators by structuring strong fiscal policy goals and

management features of the sovereign to create greater spending allocations, adjustments,

savings, and performance delivery for how government agencies work to achieve greater policy

goals. For example, budgetary decisions determine how capital targets, budgetary

rewards/sanctions are administered, define how funding levels are achieved, and how allowances

(surpluses/shortfalls) in the form of additional/excess funding are administered and implemented

throughout government to produce efficient cost/ benefit analysis for greater governmental

efficiency and departmental output to help make government perform more efficiently

(Robinson, M, 2002, p. 17-33). Moreover, absolute values produce efficient policy outcomes to

help allow sovereign’s to be efficient public administrators of capital and operating budgets

while achieving defined authorities, political attitudes and policy goals to make sure the public

sector is an efficient agent of budgetary constraints and attitudes.

Budgetary constraints and political attitudes are at the core of how budget decisions and

functions are administered within a political system, meaning that the sovereign’s ability to

function is dependent upon imperfect budget plans. These imperfect budget plans form

budgetary assumptions that often times produce partial optimal policy goals, meaning that

mathematically errors occur based on GDP forecasting, revised economic jobs reports, policy

readjustments of economic stabilization reports, and of reassessments for how GDP and other

economic factors form the basis for how budgetary political attitudes are formed (Bhatti, I. &

Phaup, M., 2015, p. 89-105). Mathematically proportions, estimations, and budgetary

adjustments produce normal budget distributions for how budget variance and legislative errors

are crafted, meaning that appropriation bills and fiscal year policy goals become unpredictable

legislative products forming economic fluctuations that create economic contractions and other

regressive economic growth activities that harbor the sovereign’s ability to function (Bhatti, I. &

Phaup, M., 2015, p. 89-105). Moreover, self-triggering mechanisms impact sovereigns ability to

achieve legislative-political policy goals harder by creating an impression of decreasing policy

opportunity for flexibility and improve its ability to be an efficient agent of public policy in

structuring legislative-political goals, optimal policy solutions, and other political attitudes that

expand its ability to function in a political setting (Bhatti, I., Phaup, M., 2015, p. 89-105). In

essence, long-term operating budgets and capital investments in terms of increasing multi-year

capital budgets would allow legislative-political sustainability to be the norm within the

policymaking process by creating a legislative avenue for the sovereign to be a positive agent of

change that would transform the budget process and create growth within the public sector

allowing congressional action to achieve budgetary policy goals.

As sovereign entities are imperfect creatures of the political system, they fall victim to

unpredictable legislative environments. For example, short-term budget agreements, budget

constraints, debt ceiling adjustments, and other legislative products decrease its ability to bring in

revenue and monitor its debt obligations in an efficient way. However, structural obstacles can

be mitigated by reforming how entitlement programs are structured; how income security is

rearranged (reform how benefits are calculated), how economic growth is structured, and how

trade agreements are developed (restructure treaties to benefit U.S. economic interests) to

represent the budgetary challenges the nation government faces here in the United States. Policy

realignments and restructured policy agenda items would require how political-economic activity

would work inside our current political system by redefining the wage system, tax code, how

Congress functions, creating and granting new powers to the presidency by creating new

authorities that grant emergency authority to political institutions to administer structural reforms

for how we expand (readjust structural imbalances and trust funds) Social Security, Medicare,

and Medicaid, while also increasing international treaties and giving the executive branch greater

authority to reduce unnecessary troop presence to curb national debt totals would all be a part of

a five to ten year plan that would restructure the entire political system which would be very

costly in the first two years, put would pay for itself after that by finding new sources of revenue

and reducing unnecessary waste in federal programs. Moreover, sovereign reforms would

generate greater efficiency and distribution policy benefits that would create greater absolute

policy outcomes and other legislative-political goals that could serve public policy functions

well.

In conclusion, a more efficient sovereign creates greater legislative capacity to furnish

greater political utility to better represent balanced scorecards. Each legislative victory would

produce greater political attitudes within political institutions to foster efficient and specific

policies directed at making the sovereign an efficient representative of political and legislative

products meaning that service delivery would create greater public policy goals and objectives

within political institutions. Greater political utility creates efficient sovereign entities that

structure greater egalitarian attributes in terms of being strong policy alignments and

distributions for how public policies are formed, meaning that political institutions would

produce greater institutional memory and efficiency. Furthermore, legislative goals would

measure the progress of how political utility was being administered within political institutions

to make sure an abundance sovereign trust, confidence, and public integrity in how sovereigns

govern and produce efficient scorecards for how policy goals are achieved.

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