pakistan studies-course contents outlines

8/12/2019 Pakistan Studies-course Contents Outlines

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INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

COURSE OUTLINES FOR PAKISTAN STUDIES

Course Objectives

The course is designed to better understand the state, society, people, government and

ideology of Pakistan. The course will be instructed in purely academic and dispassionate

manner, it will be tried not to fuse any patriotic elements that can overshadow the better

understanding of the subject (Pakistan). An understanding of the prepartitioned !ndia"s

political scenes is imperative for the study of Pakistan, for this purpose a preliminary

study of the #ritish colonialism and its impact on Pakistan will be discussed. !ssues like

the failure of democracy and the rule of army in Pakistan will be given priority. The

objective of this course is to familiari$e the students with the issues and problems of

Pakistan. #y the end of the course students should be able to have created a strong base

of understanding the %tate, %ociety and Politics of Pakistan. &n the basis of this strong

understanding they would be capable enough to know the problems and solutions of

those problems, of Pakistan.

Orgai!atio o" t#e Mo$u%e&

The module is planned of a period of ' weeks, two sessions in a week each of minutes.

The students are encouraged and e*pected to actively participate in the classes, they are

also encouraged to develop their own points of view, supported by valid reasoning,

regardless of what other writers or the courseinstructor have. The instructor reserves the

right to delete, substitute and add new material during the course

Assess'et&

+. roup Presentation and -esearch Paper of / words. (%oft copies of all

the assignments and presentations must be emailed to the instructor on the day

they are due or before) ()*+

. 0onthlies (,*-+

/. 1omprehensive 2*am (,*-+

+


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CONTENTS&

./ Itro$uctio&

./ I$us 0a%%e1 Civi%i!atio

. Pakistan3 A %hort 4istory

)/ T#e I$ea o" Pa2ista

+. &rigins of the !dea of Pakistan

. %ir %yed Ahmed 5han (0uslim -eformation)

3/ Pa2ista Move'et

,/ Partitio o" I$ia

4/ Co"%ictig 0ie5s about t#e creatio o" Pa2ista/

3/ T#e State o" Pa2ista

+. The %truggle to #uild a %tate

. The 6isinterest in 6emocracy

/. Ayub and the 2nd of Parliamentary 6emocracy

7. Pakistan"s -uling 2lite8. The +98 :ar and the %econd Partition

9. ;ulfi. The ;ia 6ecade

'. Ten years of 6emocracy

. ?++ and Pakistan

.*/ Pa2ista6s Foreig Po%ic1

,/ T#e Ar'16s Pa2ista

+. #ritish 1olonial 1onnection

. !slam and the Army

/. The %trategy to 6efend Pakistan

7. The Army and Politics8. The Army and Pakistan"s =uture

7/ Is%a'ic Pa2ista

+. Fro' Po%itica% Is%a' to Mi%itat Is%a'

8/ Regioa%is' a$ Se9aratis'

+. 2thnonationalist Pakistan

. Autonomism and %eparatism Today

:/ Pa2ista6s Futures

+. The Present as the =uture

. A @ormal 6emocracy

/. Authoritarian Pakistan

7. An !slamic %tate

8. %tate #reakup


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INDUS 0ALLE; CI0ILIistorica% Narrative?

4egal, the famous erman philosopher, gave a not untypical nineteenthcentury

description of I$ia as a object o" $esire3 B=rom the most ancient times

downwards, all nations have directed their wishes and longings to gaining access to

the treasure of this land of marvels, the most costly which the 2arth presentsC

treasures of @aturepearls, diamonds, perfumes, roseessences, elephants, lions, etc.

as also treasures of wisdom. The way by which these treasures have passed to the

:est, has at all times been a matter of :orldhistorical importance, bound up with

the fate of nations".

4e added approvingly, Bthe 2nglish, or rather the 2ast!ndia 1ompany are the lords of

the landC for it is the necessary fate of Asiatic 2mpire to be subjected to 2uropeansD"

!ndiathe land of wisdom and wealth3

!ndia is real, the rest is plastic.

!


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!ndia seem like just one of the unhappy interludes in her long story". And on the

opening page of Bthe !ndian %truggle" %ubhash 1handra #ose emphasi$ed two

features critical to an understanding of !ndia3 first, its history had to be reckoned not

in decades or in centuries but in thousands of yearsC and second, only under #ritish

rule !ndia for the firs time in her history had begun to feel that she had been

con


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!n // #1, the year Ale*ander"s death in #abylon, the indoAryans of the anges

valley led by 1handragupta, the founder of the 0auryan empire defeated the reeks

in !ndica and reabsorbed the !ndus valley into #harat after a lapse of several

centuries.

6ue to many different historical names, the term %outh Asia is preferred over the

term !ndia.

INDUS 0ALLE; CI0ILI


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wealth and food. According to #handarkar and other indologists, the hymns of the

-igFeda are saturated with selfish sordid (ignoble) aims.

The -igFeda mentions mortal conflict with the local inhabitants, presumably

6ravidians who are identified as hostile in speech, noseless, irreligious and black.

The holy books were kept them to themselves. There possession ensured control over

the performance of the rituals and gave the #rahmans high social status and important

privileges in the Fedic society

T#e Cast S1ste'&The %anskrit for cast is verna and jati. Ferna is used to categori$e

the four groups3 #rahmana (priest and educators), 5shatriya (:arriors) Faisya

(cultivators and traders) and %hudras (dasasslaves). @ot all the indigenous people

became part of the shudras varna. !t appears some big clans were coopted in the first

three varnas because of their contribution.

Fedic interpretation done only by the #rahmansDlater on it was said that one had to

be born #rahman.

FURT>ER DE0ELOPMENT IN T>E INDIAN CI0ILI


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The 0auryan 2mpire had disintegrated politically but the !ndian 1ivili$ation

managed not only to retain the moral and cultural unity created by Ashoka the great

but indeed to flourish

Racia% Iter'ig%ig& As the @orthern and @orth :estern part of the %ubcontinent

had been mostly the place of habitat of the foreign invading forcesC therefore, the

racial conseE CLASSICAL AGE OF >INDUISM&

=T>E SECOND IMPERIAL UNIFICATION?

T#e Gu9ta Era&The second !mperial Hnification of the %ubcontinent. The upta

period is well known for the production of the secular and fundamentally optimistic

literature in poetry, prose and drama. The significant themes for poetry were love,

nature, story telling and morals.

ARAS AND CENTRAL ASIAN IN0ASION

Arabs3 >+ A6.

1entral Asian conE MUG>AL EMPIRE

The TurkoAfghans ruled form strong forts that were maintained as armed camps to

guard against the indigenous population. #ut the 0ughals established a compact with

the 4indu -ajputs, and in a way, began to live with and among them.

Akbar (deeniillahi)

Aurang$eb (the contradiction on Aurang$eb"s policies surfaced in the form of

widespread rebellion among his 4indu and %ikh subjects. These two communities had

been militari$ed at least partly by the negative impact of the strongarm 0ughal

policies.

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Aurang$eb"s messianic visionDthat his ancestors were at faultDhe wanted to make

the whole subcontinent an ideal !slamic state.

4e died in +>>, left behind an unstable, ungovernable and dying empire)

Na$ir S#a#6s Ivasio =.83?3 Fo%%o5e$ b1 Ab$a%i

6elhi massacre, looting, and plundering3 :hat the !ndians could not do against him,

however, the Afghans did. They assassinated @adir %hah in +>7>, took over hismantle and replaced !ranian invasion with Afghan invasion (Ahmad %hah Abdali).

T>E RITIS> AD0ENT IN MARITIME TRADE IN T>E INDIAN OCEAN

0ughals like 1hinese had ruled continental empires for centuries unaware of the

increasing role that naval power was beginning to play in the distribution of power on

the world. They were aloof from the changes taking place in 2urope. The other

significance fact is that, while the ottomans and the 1hinese did wake up to reality

and introduced moderni$ation in their countries, though a little too late, the 0ughals

never woke up.

The discovery of 1ape of ood 4ope in +7''3

Fascodeama arrived in !ndia in +7'3

=oreigners" struggle amongst each other3 =ranco6utch struggle, Anglo=rench and

Anglo6utch struggle and %truggle with !ndian princes

East I$ia Co'9a1/

The #attle of Plassey +>8>3

The 1rown -aj Post +'8>

I$ia Civi%i!atio cou%$ ot be c#age$& @ow, the Princes appeared to be the

buffers between the #ritish rulers and their subjects, they had to be created rather than

dispensed with (get rid of), they were going to be partners rather than adversaries in

governing !ndia. The attempt of imposing western culture and e*pecting the !ndians

to become totally westerni$ed, this policy was changed and the #ritish government

reali$ed this fact that east can never become west, as it is cleat from 5ippling famous

phrase the east is east and the west in west and never the twain shall meet.


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PAKISTAN& A S>ORT >ISTOR;

Pa2ista a strategica%%1 i'9ortat coutr1 since its creationDglobal and

regional strategic importanceD%trategic importance in the post +78 global

politicsDeographical and strategic location3 %outh Asia, 0iddle 2ast, 1entral

Asia, 1hina, Arabian %ea, !ndian &cean

Pa2ista& t#e 'ost $e%iuet (criminal) o" atios6, =rench intellectual

#ernard4enri Ievy (#4I). According to a senior !ndian diplomat, Pakistan

Brepresents everything in the forefront of H.%. concerns3 religious

fundamentalism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in possession of a failing

state, a military dictatorship mas


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(!ntroduction by !an Talbot)

Pakistan for much of its history has been a state searc#ig "or a atioa%

i$etit1. %trong nationalist sentiments among other ethnic groups about their

identity. 2.g. Pushtoon, #aluch, %indhi and %arieki etcDPunjabi$ation of Pakistan

is being blamed of these tendencies.

%uccessive bouts (periods) of aut#oritaria ru%e #ave rei"orce$ cetri"uga%

="orce 9u%%ig a5a1 "ro' t#e ceter? et#ic %iguistic a$ regioa% "orces .

This was seen most dramatically in the #engal nationalists" struggle with the state

which culminated in civil war and the se9aratio o" East Pa2ista i .8..

Major reasos o" Pa2ista beig a u success"u% state3

+. The tendency to regard all dissent (opposition) as a law and order rather

than a political issueC =ito%erace to5ar$s $e'ocratic cu%ture?

. The manipulation and the repression of popular forces by successive

authoritarian regimesC and ='i%itar1 ru%e?

/. The uneven relationship between the Punjab and other regions in the

conduct of national affairs. =Pujabi!atio o" Pa2ista?

Pa2istai 9o%itics3 personalities count rather than ideologies or party

institutionali$ationD2lectoral politics dominated by elite families

T#e over$eve%o9'et o" t#e ue%ecte$ istitutiosof the Pakistan state has

perpetuated the problem of weak legitimati$ation as well as e*acerbating ethnic

politics by reinforcing the regional elites" claims of a Punjabisation of Pakistan.

Pa2ista6s 9osti$e9e$ece #istor1&Pakistan"s postindependence history has

thus been a fruitless search for stability with fre


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Ginnah"s aim and that of the professional elite who controlled the Ieague was to

wrest a state in which 0uslim economic, political and cultural interests could be

safeguarded, but ot to create a Is%a'ic state.

Po%itics o" i$etit1 i Pa2ista3 Lunas %amad, has argued that the 0uslims

nationalism of the freedom struggle and postindependence linguistic?ethnic

nationalism are alike vehicles for minorities" counterhegemonic aspirations.

Securit1 $i%e''a3 Pakistan is a garrison state surrounded by three of the world"s

top four military powers, haunted by a history of wars with !ndia.

Istitutioa% 5ea2ess3 Iawrence ;iring for e*ample has linked the introduction

of Pakistan"s first martial law regime in +8' with the institutional weakness

resulting in part from the collapse of the 0uslim Ieague.

Pujabi!atio3 The region, which accounts for 89M of the total population, has

become the arbiter of national authority not just under periods of martial law, but

during civilian ruleD.Punjab"s political predominance was greatly increased with

the breakaway of 2ast Pakistan in +>+. Punjabi domination of the Army has had

immense political repercussions, for the Army had been the most important

institution in the state and the selfappointed upholder of Pakistani stability and

national identity.

Re%igio as a 5ea2 'ea o" uio3 religion alone has proved an insufficient

means of building a nation out of separate ethnic groups who had never

9revious%1 coeHiste$ eHce9t u$er co%oia%is'.

The task of nation building in Pakistan had been hampered not only by unresolved

conflicts between regional, religious and nationalist identity inherited from the

freedom movement, but by the atte'9ts o" successive 'artia% %a5 regi'es to

"orcib%1 i'9ose a atioa% i$etit1 rat#er t#a ac#ieve it b1 cosesus/

IS PAKISTAN A FAILED STATE

@& 5#et#er Pa2ista "ai%ure is a strog 9ossibi%it1/ I" so 5ou%$ Pa2ista$isso%ve s%o5%1 or co%%a9se i a su$$e catac%1s' =Disaster?/ Or 5ou%$ it

beco'e a out%a5 a$ t#reat to t#e etire 5or%$ actig as a base "or

iteratioa% terroris' a$ 9er#a9s s#arig its uc%ear 5ea9os tec#o%og1

5it# ot#er states a$ terrorist grou9s Ca Pa2ista beco'e a or'a% state

at 9eace 5it# its eig#bors a$ itse%"

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+>+ catastrophe

A stable, prosperous, progressive Pakistan could trigger a new spurt of %outh

Asian development, in partnership with !ndia and Afghanistan.

Pa2ista #as ever #a$ a 9o9u%ar revo%utioC since its creation, it has been

oscillated between unstable democracy and benign authoritarianism.

Pakistan does well in many areas and arguably can still emerge as a successful

state and cohesive nation.

DEFINITION OF A FAILED STATE&

At least five kinds of failure can be identified3

+. The failure to live up to past e*pectations, one"s own and those of others3

. =ailure of vision3

/. 2conomic failure3

7. =ailure of leadership3

8. 1atastrophic failure3 internationali$ation of ethnic conflict spread of

nuclear weapons or dangerous conventional weapons and !slamic

radicalism.

PAKISTAN& A S>ORT >ISTOR;

0uslims" rule in !ndia3

#ritish Arrival3

+'8>3

0uslim -eformist 0ovements3

0uslim %eparatism (1reation of A!0I +9)3

Iahore -esolution +7

1reation of Pakistan +7>

=ounding =athers of Pakistan3 Toward +87, the 0uslim Ieague, whose

supporters were in large part migrants from !ndia, went into decline, losing power

in both wings. 1ontrol fell to a coalition of NmigrN politicians, bureaucrats, and,

eventually, the army. Also in +87, the four provinces of :est Pakistan were

combined into a single administrative entity under a B&neHnit" scheme, to

balance the more populous 2ast :ing.

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=irst constitution +89

+8' =irst 1oup by eneral Ayub 5han3 beginning of Pakistan"s long e*periment

with military rule, Pakistan has had four spells of direct or indirect military rule

and several failed coup attempts.

After winning ' percent of the votes in a Byes or no" referendum, Ayub became

president on =ebruary +>, +9.

-apid economic growth during Ayub"s tenure3

6efense pacts with H% i.e. %2AT& (%outh Asia Treaty &rgani$ation) O 12@T&

(1entral Treaty &rgani$ation)

0isadventure of +983 deception by H%

%trategic ties with 1hina

=all of Ayub

Lahya"s martial law +9

.8*& First ever "air e%ectios, Lahya denied 2ast Pakistan leader, %heikh

0ujibur -ahman, the prime ministership and instead allowed a military

crackdown in 2ast Pakistan. Pakistan was defeated, more than , Pakistani

troops surrendered. 1hina, which had developed a strategic and military tie with

Pakistan to maintain a balance with the %oviet Hnion and !ndia, declined to

intervene on Pakistan"s behalf, while the H% did little more than make political

and military gestures, which included the dispatch of a carrier, the 2nterprise, to

the #ay of #engal.

Post .8. Pa2ista3 the balance of political poor changed too. Punjab became

Pakistan"s dominant province, being both more populous than %indh, #aluchistan,

or the @:=P and economically far more prosperous as well as contribution the

overwhelming number of officers and soldiers to the ruling military.

#hotto"s era

+>/ constitution3

Peace treaty with !ndia in +>3 Si'%a agree'et, to secure the return of

Pakistani prisoners of war.

-uthless suppression of a separatist movement in #aluchistan that was modeled

after the 2ast Pakistan breakaway.

+7


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#utto6s Is%a'ic socia%is'3 to appease both his religious parties" critics and his

leftist supporters, but his autocratic style of governance (and the army"s wariness)

led to mass protests over delegitimi$ed parliamentary elections and a coup on Guly

7, +>> toppled #hutto"s government.


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)**: E%ectios& PPP 5is

Restoratio o" Bu$iciar1

PML =N? as a o99ositio 9art1

.:t#A'e$'et

T>E IDEA OF PAKISTAN&

(&rigins of the !dea of Pakistan)

0uslim !nvasion of %outh Asia3 Arab invasion >+ A.6, 6elhi %ultanate (++

+89), 0ughal !nvasion (+89+>>)

Is%a' i I$ia3 considerable adaptation and change in !slam. A ic%usivist a$

beig Mus%i' ru%e, 0ughal"s !ndiani$ation of !slam (or 0uslim citi$ens),

intermarriages between 0uslim ruling families and their highcaste 4indu

counterparts, as family ties were used to shore up political alliances. 4owever,

some regions e*perienced t#e 'i%itat eHc%usivist si$e o" Is%a', with the

+9


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destruction of 4indu temples and attacks on the #rahmindominated 4indu social

order taking place in such renowned pilgrimage destinations as 0ultan and

%omnath. The most vivid account of these con


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!n sum, !slam thrived in !ndia for a variety of reasons3 intermarriages,

conversion, the attractiveness of !slamic egalitarianism, and social and

political advantages in a conte*t of 0uslim rulers.

4indu and 0uslims engaged in '1t# creatio, a process that continues

unchecked today in both !ndia and Pakistan.

!n fact, scholars have found little evidence of massive cruelty and cultural

barbarism, or the wholesale destruction of temples, only some temples looting and

capture of holy images by 0uslim and 4indu rulers alike.

The #ritish -aj3

.:48& t#e %oss o" Po5er a$ I$etit1, in the words of Akbar %. Ahmed, the

0uslims of !ndia Blost their kingdom, their 0ughal 2mpire, their emperor, their

language, their culture, their capital city of 6elhi, and their sense of self".

0uslims now felt not only politically vulnerable but also concerned for their very

identity.

6islocation of the 0uslim community in the post+'8> !ndia3 also by promoting

democratic institutions, liberal #ritish authorities inadvertently (unintentionally)

bestowed a permanent minority status on 0uslims in greater !ndia, as they would

always be outnumbered by the larger 4indu community.

C%ass a$ Socia% $i""ereces stroger a$ i"%uetia% t#a re%igious3 0uch of

the 4indu0uslims tension in #ritish !ndia (and in !ndia and #angladesh today)

stemmed not from religious but from class and social differences.

Mus%i's6 cocers&by the time of the -aj, !ndia"s 0uslims had become a

politically and culturally mi*ed population. They had a dispossessed (e*pelled)

court, narrow elite, and large poor peasantry. =illed with fresh memories of

+'


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grandeur and glory, they grew increasingly frustrated and fearful as 4indus

adapted more swiftly than 0uslims to the -aj"s new political and social order.

T#e irt# o" a I$ea&

Sir S1e$ A#'e$ K#aa re"or'ist a e$ucatioist a$ a 'o$erist =.:.8

:?&although %ir %yed A. khan was dedicated to 0uslim moderni$ation, !slam"s

destiny, and the idea of a pan!slamic identity, he stopped short of advocating a

separate state for !ndia"s 0uslims. @evertheless, a separate status for !ndia"s

0uslims was in the works and became an important milestone on the road leading

to Pakistan.

!


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were a majority in four of eleven #ritish !ndian provinces. 6emocracy threatened

the minority 0uslim community, forcing it to establish its own political order,

Pakistan.

Pakistan has always lacked the industrial base to sustain a modern army, let alone

the technological capacity enabled its predominate Punjabi army to dominate

Pakistani politics. 0eanwhile, !ndia"s highly pluralistic officer corps remains both

apolitical and professional, and @ew 6elhi can draw upon superior fiscal and

material resources.

lorious Past, lorious =uture @& 5#1 t#e I$ia6 subi$etit1 is 'issig i

t#e i$ea o" Pa2ista As iroica%%1 t#e Arab a$ Cetra% Asia is 'uc#

9reset/

T#e i$ea o" Pa2ista beig a vague i$ea #as ever bee s#a9e$ ito 9ractica%

t#oug# c#age$ "ro' ti'e to ti'e/

PARTITION OF INDIA&

!n their book 0odern %outh AsiaQ, Ayesha Galal and %ugata #ose in the chapter

Partition of !ndia and the creation of PakistanQ, argue that the idea of partition of !ndia

was neither based on the !ndian nationalists viewthat the partition was the #ritish

imperialist policy of divide and rule which divided !ndia into two communitiesC nor what

most Pakistani historians say that the creation of Pakistan was motivated by the !slamic

ideology and was based on the Two @ation Theory, according to which !ndian 0uslims

were always a distinctive and separate community that had resisted assimilation into

their !ndian environment. #oth Ayesha Galal and 4am$a Alavi share the same views that

the partition of +7> was no more than a partial solution to the 0uslims minority

problem in the subcontinent. To 4am$a the Pakistan movement was a movement of


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0uslims rather than of !slam. :hat both the writers say that !slam should not be seen as

the only driving force behind the creation of Pakistan.

4istorically analysing, the failure of the +'8> rebellion had made the 0uslims

greatly discontent. !ndia was now under the total control of the #ritish raj. The 0uslims

bereavement was more than the 4indus as !ndia had been ruled by the 0uslims before

the arrival of the colonialists. This hatred and frustration towards the new rulers and the

rejection of the new #ritish set up had made the 0uslims politically, economically,

socially and educationally backward visRvis 4indus. This backwardness of 0uslims

was perceived by the great 0uslim reformist %iayed Ahmad 5han founder of the Aligarh

movement. 6uring +''s he proposed the concept of Two @ation Theory. This he did in

order to e*hort 0uslims to shun the predominant 4indu congress and to impress the

#ritish the need to view their importance in political rather than numerical terms. The

theory of Two @ationsQ, at that time, should not be confused with the demand of a

separate state.

To sooth the dissatisfaction of 0uslims and maintaining a balance between

communities the #ritish granted separate electorates to 0uslims in local government

bodies. To Galal the main purpose of these reforms was to confine !ndian politics to the

provinces, and to keep the centre e*clusively under the purview of the #ritish -aj. This

act of playing the region against the centre could surely secure the #ritish imperial

interests.

4ere it should be noted, as pointed out by both Galal and Alavi, that despite the

e*istence of All !ndia 0uslim Ieague since +9, 0uslims politicians which were

mostly landed notables hardly needed any assistance from organi$ed political parties at

the centre or in the provinces. !n the +/9> elections, 0uslim Ieague tried to get the

support of the 0uslimmajority provinces on the provincial level and to deal with

congress on the all !ndia levelC but was badly defeated on both the stages the Ieague won

on only 7.7M of the total 0uslim votes.

Though the +/9> election was a disastrous result for the Ieague, but it was a

fact that !ndian 0uslims, however divided and disorgani$ed, remained a separate

+


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foreclose alternative outcomes. :hat Ginnah was really aiming for a grouping of 0uslims

majority provinces enjoying a degree of regional autonomy, possibly with in an overall

!ndian federal union rather than the partition of !ndiaC especially if that was to entail

carving up Punjab and #engal. To both Alavi and Galal Ginnah was in Punjab. !n this kind of chaotic situation Iondon"s

main priority was to get out of !ndia as soon as possible with the least possible harm to

their interests. &n th =ebruary +7> the #ritish prime minister, 1lement Attlee

announced that #ritain would depart from !ndia by /th Gune +7'. The congress

immediately demanded the partition of Punjab and #engal as well. :hat Galal says that

from the congress (led by @ehru and vallahbhai petal) attitude it seemed that it was more

eager in the partition of !ndia than even 0uslim league. And according to her, congress

(@ehru and Petal) was ready of partitioning #engal and Punjab at the price of takingpower from the #ritish at the centre. Though ironically in 0ay +7>, the united and

independent state of #engal was agreed by the #engali nationalist leader 1handra #ose

and 0uslim league leader 4ussein shaeed suhrawardy. The scheme received the

endorsement of both andhi and Ginnah. #ut the implacable opposition of @ehru and

petal made 0ountbatten to partitioned #engal as well. And thus finally on +7 thAugust

+7> Pakistan came into being with partitioned Punjab and #engal as its parts.

Coc%usio&

Ayesha Galal has raised a very interesting and standard debate on the partition of

!ndia, and the creation of Pakistan and the role of Ginnah as a sole spokesman for the all

!ndian 0uslims. To Galal the creation of Pakistan was a one man show i.e. Ginnah. %he

didn"t give much importance to the role of 0uslim landlords, the student and teachers of

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Aligarh Hniversity and the 6eobandi and #arelwi Hlemas, who had also a much

influence on the ordinary 0uslims in the creation of Pakistan. &ne objection raised by

0ushirul 4asan about Galal"s work is that her work on the making of Pakistan is mostly

onesided, based on official sources, on 0uslim league records and on Ginnah"s private

records. !n his book !ndia"s partitionQ 4assan suggests to Galal that she should e*amine

the vast collection of private papers and newspapers in !ndian libraries and achieves, that

might will change her perspective, or perhaps not.

-egardless of both the views that 0uslims were in fact a nation and the #ritish

policy of divide and rule, Galal thinks that in fact it was the contradictions and structural

peculiarities of !ndian society and politics in late colonial !ndia which eventually led to

the creation of Pakistan. 4am$a Alavi view regarding the partition of !ndia is more or

less the same, that the Pakistan movement was neither a millenarian ideological

movement of the reali$ation of an !slamic state nor was it a movement of the 0uslim

feudal landlords, who wanted Pakistan to safeguard their own interests. To Alavi the

central driving force behind the Pakistan movement was one particular social group

which he calls theQ %alariatQthe urban western educated professionals(generally lawyers,

journalists and urban intellectuals) who emerged in the conte*t of the colonial

transformation of !ndian society. And who were the functionaries in the e*panding

colonial apparatus. &ne more important thing regarding Galal"s work on Partition of !ndia

is that she thinks of personalities as a shaping force behind the partition of !ndia, than

groups (what Alavi thinks). To her congress, in late colonial !ndia, was only @ehru and

Patel and 0uslim Ieague was only Ginnah.

Partition of !ndia

POST .:48 INDIA

E post+'8> !ndia (political democrati$ation introduced by #ritish in post+'8>

!ndia threatened 0uslims throughout #ritish !ndia, especially the 0uslims of the

Hnited Provinces (HP)

7


25/71

E According to one source, in +''9 the 0uslims, who constituted +/.7 M of the

population of the area, nevertheless occupied 78M of the administrative positions

(Gaffrelot, )

E 0uslims of the Hnited Provinces (HP) Karistocratic inheritors of the 0ughal

2mpireS

E !n +'>+, in #engal, of the >>/ !ndians holding responsible government jobs, the

0uslims, even though their numbers were appro*imately e


26/71

Province and the #engali nationalists were all secular in nature and of course

hostile to the Pakistan movement)

E 0uslim Ieague leaders (mostly secular)

E 0I labeling Pakistan 0ovement as an !slamic 0ovement (B!slam in 6anger" and

B4indu 1ongress")

E Targeting 0uslim 0ajority Provinces

E Punjab which held the key to the credibility of the Pakistan demand was targeted.

E propaganda campaign against the Punjab"s Hnionist Party.

POST .38 ELECTIONS STRATEG; OF AIML

E %ind (the %ufis (Pirs) played an important role in %ind in populari$ing the

Pakistan cause (Ansari, + cited in Talbot, , p. +79).

E @orth :est =rontier Province KB5hudai 5hidmatgars" (%ervants of od)S

E @onreligious 0ovements were countered through local Pirs.

E +79 2lections (0uslim Ieague secured >8 per cent of the total 0uslim vote in

comparison with 7.7 per cent in +/>)

T>E IDEA OF PAKISTAN (The revisionist school of modern %outh Asian

historiography)

E !ts victory in the +79 elections enabled the 0uslim Ieague to demand a separate

state on behalf of the 0uslims of !ndia, but the idea of Pakistan was still not clear.

E Ginnah as hailed by %arojini @aidu as the Bambassador of 4indu0uslim unity",

having support of 0uslim majority provinces was still struggling for grouping of

0uslim majority provinces which could have enjoyed a degree of regional

autonomy, possibly within an overall !ndian =ederal Hnion rather than

Partitioning !ndia.

CAINET MISSION PLAN

E .,7& CAINET MISSION PLAN =t#reetiere$ a%% I$ia "e$eratio?

E Ginnah interpreted the scheme to be a defacto recognition of his Pakistan 6emand3

the groups would have constituent assemblies of their ownC the constitution of the

9


27/71

federal central could eventually be designed to be a mere agency with e*ecutive

and not legislative powers. The 1ongress also was amenable to the scheme.

E #ut 1ongress argued that the provinces were free to opt out of a group to which

they did not wish to belong. 1ongress had a ministry in northwestern province

which was in roup # and under the 1ongress reading it should have a choice to

opt out.

E The plan provided only the choice between an undivided !ndia with a weak

federal structure with compulsory grouping of 0uslim and 4indu majority

provinces, or a separate independent sovereign centre, that would constitute only

of the 0uslim majority districts of #engal and Punjab.

E Ginnah accepted @ehru rejected.

E The idea of partition of !ndia was neither based on the !ndian nationalists" view

that partition was the #ritish imperialist policy of divide and rule nor, what most

Pakistani historians declare that it was motivated by !slamic ideology and was

based on Two @ation Theory.

E BPakistan movement was a movement of 0uslims rather than of !slam" (Alavi)

E To the revisionist school Bthe partition of +7> was no more than a partial solution

to the 0uslims minority problem in the subcontinent"

E Ginnah the sole spokesman (a grand strategist)

E Pakistan -esolution (0arch +7, the gist of that resolution was the acceptance of

0uslims as a nation and not a minority, as had been presumed in the past)

E :hat Ginnah really aiming for was a grouping of 0uslim majority provinces

enjoying a degree of regional autonomy, possibly within an overall !ndian federal

union rather than the partition of !ndiaC especially if that was to entail carving up

Punjab and #engal (#ose O Galal, )

E Ginnah had always kept the demand for Pakistan vague, mainly as a bargaining

chip to negotiate with 1ongress to have e


28/71

E 1ongress (@ehru and Petal) was ready for partitioning #engal and Punjab, at the

price of taking power from the #ritish at the centre.

E #ritish hasty withdrawal.

E 1ongress demand of partitioning #engal and Punjab.

E Ginnah was


29/71

>ORRORS OF PARTITION

+ to +7 million people were caught up in the process of mass migrationC over one

million were killed in violent encounters, and an estimated >8, women were abductedand subjected to se*ual violence.

CONFLICTING 0IEJS AOUT T>E ORIGIN OF PAKISTAN&

(PA5!%TA@ The =ormative Phase (+'8>+7') by 5alid bin %ayeed.)


30/71

There are so many different and opposing views about the origin of Pakistan that

it seems very difficult and challenging to adopt a single view, with authority,

about the origin of Pakistan.

a) #ritish policy of 6ivide and -ule3 0ahatma andhi, whilst speaking in the

second session of the -ound Table conference in Iondon in +/+, said that the


31/71

d) Another popular view regards Pakistan as no more than a personal triumph of the

brilliant strategy and willpower of UuaidiA$am. %ome have gone so far as to

suggest that had Ginnah died earlier, there would not have been Pakistan.

e) -evisionist"s %chool of Thought3 Galal"s view.

2ach, perhaps, contribute its share and Pakistan was brought about by a

multiplicity of factors. #ut perhaps a dominant or decisive cause of

Pakistan is that there has never taken place a confluence of the two

civili$ations in !ndiathe 4indu and the 0uslims (5#%).

) Ag%oMus%i' Coci%iatio a$ t#e egiigs o" >i$uMus%i' Tesio

i I$ia .:48..,

Post+'8> !ndia3 Persian ceased to be the official languageD4indus holding all

the lucrative positions.

!n +'>+, in #engal, of the >>/ !ndians holding responsible government jobs, the

0uslims, even though their numbers were appro*imately e


32/71

The Arya %amaj a reformist 0ovement which was less violent in its nature

started in +'>>.

1hatterjee"s Anandamath (the Abbey of #liss) an anti0uslim novel which incites

the 4indu against the 0uslims and to work for the revival of 4induism. !t was in

this novel that the famous song B#ande 0ataram (hail mother) appeared.

Another 4indu movement which advocated militancy is that of Tilak. Talik

believed in killing one"s enemy by deception. 4is men were engaged in killing

#ritish officers. The movement took a clear anti0uslim turn and was run and

organi$ed on 4indu lines.

The #ritish gained their first foothold in the coastal areas of the provinces of

0adras, #ombay and #engalin these areas 4indus were in majority therefore

were e*posed first to the impact of #ritish or :estern ideas, education and culture

or traditionsDuniversities in 1alcutta, 0adras and #ombay were established in

+'8>.

T>E PARTITION OF ENGAL& .*4

A relieve to the poor 0uslims of #engal from the commercial and

professional supremacy of the western 4indu #engalis

%evere opposition from the 4indus of every field.

The partition of #engal was an administrative issue, an area of , s'.8 million people of great headache to administer

for the #ritish governor of #engal.

The @ationalists vehemently opposed the idea they thought was a deliberate

blow aimed at the growing solidarity and self consciousness of the #engalis

speaking population. A clear and vocal anti0uslim stance was taken by

several 4indu #engali @ationalists in their writings.

T>E AOLIS>MENT OF T>E PARTITION OF ENGALA SETACK

TO AIML& ...

The annulment of the partition of #engal in +++ was a turning point in the

history of !ndian 0uslims. !t was a shock for 0uslims particularly for A!0I

the followers of %ir %yed, who were greatly disappointed by the #ritish

decision of the abolishment of the partition of #engal due to 4indu"s pressure.

/


33/71

The decision of the #ritish government created mistrust between the 0uslims

and them.

%hibli"s criticism against A!0I about its political methods and appreciation

of congress human resourced policies. 1ongress had never elected its

presidents from the landed gentry where as the A!0I leadership was

completely in the hands of such people. %hibli argued that situation in villages

is very much brotherly between the two communities. 4e believed in the

combined efforts of 4indus and 0uslims to achieve political objectives.

T#e K#i%a"at Move'et& .)*s

At this time constitutionalists like Ginnah were relegated in the background

and men like andhi and 0ohammad Ali Gohar, who were e*perts in

e*traconstitutional methods, were called upon to guide the political

destines of 4indu and 0uslims.

The anti0uslims policies all over the world by the :est infuriated the

0uslims.

The intensely heated journals of 0ohammad Ali and A$ad stirred up the

0uslims, these journals contributed immense vigor to the 5ilafat

0ovement.

A$ad"s criti


34/71

0opala rising.

1hauri1haura

4indu revivalist movement of %huddhi and %angathan, used to train the

4indus of swordsmanship and physical e*ercises to train them for

fighting.

0ustafa 5amal Pasha abolished the 5hilafat in +7.

The murder of %wami %hradhanandthe founder of %huddi 0ovement in

+9 heightened 4indu0uslim animosity.

=rom the beginning it was detected that the 4indu0uslim unity was not

on firm foundation.

!t failed because it was a wrong ideology, romantic and out of touch with

actualities.

5hilafat 0ovement was the first and only 0ovement in which both 4induand 0uslims had played a joint role on a mass scale. #ut freedom of !ndia

was not the first and only objective.

T>E EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN&

Iahore -esolution a vague resolutionmultiple interpretation.

!t may be suggested that the vagueness of the Iahore -esolution was

perhaps deliberately designed. %ome writers have argued that this gave

room to Ieague leaders for bargaining and maneuvering.

!t has been reported that 0ountbatten pointed out to the Ieague leaders

that the area of Pakistan as envisaged in the Iahore -esolution did not

include the entire provinces of Punjab, #engal and Assam because the

Iahore -esolution carefully used the phrase Bareas in which the 0uslims

are numerically in a majority". This shows that the Ieague leaders were

not sure and confident about the majority in the #engal and Punjab.

Pakistan 0ovement was a movement started with the objectives of

securing the interests of the !ndian 0uslims which later on turned into the

demand of a separate state.

0ountbatten never seriously tried to bring about an understanding

between the congress and the league on the basis of the 1abinet 0ission

Plan.

/7


35/71

@ehru and Patel acceptance of Pakistan as inevitable.

0ountbatten under @ehru"s influence.

0ountbatten"s haste decision of Partition caused 4indu0uslim conflict.

0uslim Ieague"s Propaganda of reminding the 0uslims of their past

glory.

0uslim educated elites neither were nor interested about their religiousand cultural rights but about their share in the government.

Total absence of competition from other 0uslims political organi$ations.

Ginnah a sole spokesman of A!0I

!t has been said that no political leader in the subcontinent could e*cel

Ginnah in the ferocity and biting sarcasm with which he attacked his

political opponents.

%ome went as far that if there were no Ginnah there would be no Pakistan.

/8


36/71

T>E STATE OF PAKISTAN&

To the founding fathers Pakistan would be a democratic, liberal, and just state. !t would

live peaceably with its minority 4indu population, and relations with !ndia would be

normal, possibly encompassing regional cooperation. 4ow this vision was reali$ed during

the subse


37/71

Kas#'ir 9o%ic1. 4e foresaw cooperation, despite the personal strains between

him and the 1ongress leadership and the rivalry between the 0uslim Ieague and

the 1ongress.

Is t#e 9reset Pa2ista 5#at Bia# 5ate$ Jou%$ Bia# recogi!e t#e

Pa2ista to$a1

CONSE@UENCES OF PARTITION&

0ass migration3 the migrated 0uhajirs taking control

Partition confirmed many Pakistanis" worst fears about !ndia especially among

migrants.

Co''ua% vio%ece& 'iorities i 9er9etua% t#reat

Partitio create$ #atre$ t#a goo$ re%atios#i93 many refugees nurtured, as

their descendants still do, a deep hatred against B4indu !ndia or artificial

Pakistan". =rom the perspective of the new Pakistani elite, the ensuing violence

simply proved how right they had been to seek a separate country.

ritis# %egac13 educated and efficient bureaucracy and trained army and landed

gentry. The task of protecting and caring for the NmigrNs hence fell to Pakistani

bureaucrats and young arm officers. They performed their impossible task with

valor, a$ t#e eH9eriece 9ro9e%%e$ t#e' to t#e e5 state6s ceter stage .

Animosity and mistrust between !ndia and Pakistan.

Kas#'ir

T#e Le"t e#i$3 whenever a crisis with Pakistan has occurred, or whenever

5ashmir flares up, all eyes have turned to !ndia"s 0uslims population for their

reaction. =or a state whose creation was justified as necessary for the continued

survival of %outh Asian 0uslims, the presence of these 0uslims on the other side

of the border is inconvenient.

Partition transformed the economies of the regions that became Pakistan. !n :est

Pakistan as a whole, ' percent of industrial firms had been owned by non

0uslims. !n 2ast Pakistan, a 4indu trading caste, the 0arwaris, had controlled

almost all the trade and industrythough the e*odus from 2ast Pakistan was not as

dramatic or complete as from the :est :ing. The e*odus of 4indu merchants

and business families living in what would become Pakistan was matched by a

/>


38/71

heavy migration of 0uslims families leaving !ndia out of fear for their lives and

property. The !ndian state of ujarat e*perienced the largest outflow, but #ombay

and 1alcutta also saw important families depart. 2.g. 4abibs of ujarat,

!spahanis, %aigols and Adamjees of 1alcutta.

T#e Kas#'ir Curse3 After partition, the 5ashmir ruler was faced with an

invasion of tribal warriors sent from the @:=P. 4e invited the !ndian army to

repel the invadersbut !ndia first demanded his accession, which he provided.

Thus, 5ashmir became the only 0uslim majority state in !ndia.

Kas#'ir issue3 a strengthening factor to the idea of Pakistan and to the Two

@ation Theory.

Pakistan has had a military strategy for 5ashmir but not a political one, e*cept to

try to embarrass !ndia in international forums. The obsession with 5ashmir for

over fifty years can be said to have seriously damaged Pakistan"s prospects as a

state, but it is a cost that several generations of Pakistani leaders have been

willing to pay, and the same can be said of their !ndian counterparts.

T#e Strugg%e to ui%$ a State&

4aving failed to establish enduring and credible political institutions, Pakistan

continued to face instability. Actually, a number of factors were to blame3

+. An immediate leadership crisis3 Ginnah (died, +7') and IA5

(assassinated, +8+). 0uslim Ieague soon fractured3 its leaders, newly arrived from !ndia,

lacked a political base in the provinces that became :est Pakistan.

/. 2ast Pakistan, + miles away3 deep differences between the populations

of the 2ast and the :est :ings. 2ast Pakistanis (#engalis) in majority but

were sidelined from the state affairs.

A%t#oug# it 'a1 ot #ave %ive$ u9 to its "ou$ers6 eH9ectatios Pa2ista $i$ 'ove

a#ea$ ecoo'ica%%1 i stri$e 5it# t#e 'uc# %arger I$ia a$ estab%is#e$ its o5

iteratioa% i$etit1/ T#ree "actors cotribute$ to t#ese successes/

+. 6espise to disprove !ndia3

/'


39/71

. 5ashmir3 several policy issues Pakistan faced had the effect of

strengthening the state and reinforcing the idea behind it. &ne of these was

5ashmir.

/. =oreign Aid (economic and military)3 12@T& O %2AT&

T#e Disiterest i De'ocrac1&

The ruling groups (civil bureaucracy, army, landed gentry) in Pakistan lacked

commitment to democratic forms.

Pakistan"s international supporters were ambivalent (uncertain) about democracy

too. The American agenda was clear3 a pro:estern Pakistan, a stable Pakistan, a

prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic Pakistan were all desirable, but in that

order.

=rom the beginning having a constitutionally uncertain environment, Pakistan did

not take long to move in an authoritarian direction. 0any Pakistanis, especially in

the :est :ing, felt comfortable with this authoritarian arrangement for it was

modeled on the (#ritish) -aj, which had been a benevolent and usually benign

authoritarian system.

A Jit#ere$ Bu$iciar1&

Pakistan"s courts have become increasingly sensitive to political and physicalpressures to bend their rulings in favor of the military or civilian government in

power.

T#e $octrie o" ecessit13 that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes it

lawful.

Atte'9ts at ui%$ig a Costitutio&

!n its 8> years, Pakistan has had three constitutions, those of +89, +9, and

+>/. The +89 constitution replaced the governorgeneral with a president, but

with power in the hands of a prime minister elected by a national parliament. !t

preserved most of the #ritish !ndian constitutional structure and declared Pakistan

to be an !slamic -epublic. &ther than that, there were no significant !slamic steps

introduced, to the disappointment of the !slamic parties. The constitution of +9

/


40/71


41/71

politicians, food crises, and the e*ploitation of Pakistan"s masses had compelled

his action. T#us bega Pa2ista6s %og eH9eri'et 5it# Mi%itar1 ru%e bro2e

o%1 b1 s9e%%s o" #ig#%1 9ersoa%istic so'eti'es autocratic civi%ia

gover'ets a%% o" 5#ic# 5ere care"u%%1 5atc#e$ a$ evetua%%1 $e9ose$ b1

t#e ar'1. 0ilitary rule was bitterly opposed by a few Pakistani politicians, but

most found a role in the new system or dropped out of politics.

Mi%itar1 Raj&

Pa2ista& Fro' a >o'e%a$ "or I$ia Mus%i's to a e5 visio o" a

Fortress/

Iike the (#ritish) -aj, it justified its rule in strategic and moral terms.

Grave 'atters o" state securit1 5ere ta2e out o" t#e #a$s o" 9o%iticias .

Pakistan was to e*perience a transition "ro' a #o'e%a$ "or I$ia

Mus%i's to a "ortress, where its citi$ens could live more or less B!slamic"

lives secure from the predatory !ndia.

After he became president, Ayub took the lead in articulating this new vision

of Pakistan. It was Brahmin chauvinism and arrgance that had 'rced us t

seek a hmeland ' ur wn where we culd rder ur li'e accrding t ur

wn thinking and 'aith. %hey wanted us t remain as ser's, which was

!recisely the cnditin in which the #uslims minrity in India lived tday.

%here was the 'undamental !!sitin between the idelgies ' India andPakistan. %he whle Indian sciety was based n class distinctin in which

even the shadw ' a lw-caste man was enugh t !llute a member ' the

high caste. (=riends not 0asters)

4is dismissal of the defense of 2ast Pakistan became a major #engali

grievance after the +98 war. !f Pakistani generals thought that 2ast Pakistan

could be sacrificed to !ndia to save :est Pakistan, why should #engalis stay

in the Pakistani federation !t was a


42/71

into 5ashmir, supported by regular Pakistan arm troops. The !ndians rejected

the proposal. !n return, @ehru offered a Bno war" agreement between !ndia and

Pakistanwhich was rejected by Pakistan.

Do'estic Re"or's&

Ayub"s years were a break from the chaos and disorder that preceded his

coup. 6omestically, Ayub set about transforming a coup d"etat into a

revolution.

Pakistan became a widely admired case study of nation building directed by

the army.

+9 constitution3 it created a presidency indirectly elected by ', union

councilors. 1ivil military coalition.

Ecoo'ic Gais&

Pakistan"s e*port during these years surpassed those of Thailand, 0alaysia,

and %ingapore combines. 1ountries such as %outh 5orea and 0alaysia saw

Pakistan as a model for e*portled growth strategies. Today they are regarded

as models for Pakistan. Pakistan was also the darling of the developed world

in the +8s and +9s, and massive American, 2uropean, and Gapanese aidand investment flowed in, along with substantial military grants and sales

from :ashington.

Ecoo'ic ieua%ities(concentration of wealth in a few hands)3 according to

0ahbubul4a< that 99M of the country"s economy, >M of insurance, and

'M of banking assets were controlled by families. This number later

on became a symbol of Pakistan"s grave economic ine+. The industrial licensing policy clearly

favored :est Pakistani businesspersons over 2ast Pakistanis.

7


43/71

Ayub"s economic policies allowed the military to forge an alliance with the

business community. 4is purpose in doing so was to reduce the power of the

political classes, both popular politicians and the feudal landowners.

A i$eo%og1 o" Pa2ista&

!t was during Ayub years that Pakistan began the process of official mythcreation

in earnest (serious). A large central bureaucracy was created to manufacture an

ideology for Pakistan, oe t#at g%ori"ies t#e ar'1 as t#e state6s 2e1 istitutio.

As the #ritish scholar notes, the ideology of a monolithic 0uslim community was

erected to counter the Bother" of !ndian nationalism and provincialism within

Pakistan.

%tate controlled te*tbooks and electronic media. 2ven today, many young

Pakistanis do not have access to an objective history of their own history.

Pa2ista6s Ru%ig E%ite&

Ayub"s 2stablishment3 senior ranks of military, the civil service, key members of

the judiciary, and other elites. !t resembles a classic oligarchy, and its roots lie

deep in the psychology of the #ritish -aj and the social structure of Pakistan"s

:est :ing. &ther members of the 2stablishment included members of the

business community, journalists, editors, and media e*pertsC and a few academics

and members of think tanks and at time some foreign ambassadors.

T#e .74 Jar a$ t#e Seco$ Partitio&

The war"s objective had been to put pressure on !ndia to negotiate on 5ashmir,

and the 5ashmiris themselves were e*pected to rise up en masse. !nstead, !ndia

escalated the conflict across the international border, the 5ashmiris did not stir,

and a stalemate ensued. @one of Pakistan"s :estern allies came to its rescue, and

Pakistan"s newest ally, 1hina, only made sympathetic noises.

&peration ibraltar3

rave miscalculationsD foreign policy errorsD diplomatic defeatD 2ast

Pakistan left unguardedD 8M army for :est Pakistan.

2conomic growth hampered after the +98 war3

7/


44/71


45/71

!n addition, the breakup of the country merely empowered the most regressive

and conservative 0uslims in the :est.

7, the Pakistan

government was believed to control 9M of the country"s financial and

nonfinancial assets, with direct authority over critical sectors such as banking,

insurance, and heavy industry. 2conomic growth dropped to 7M after topping 9M

under Ayub.

T#e


46/71

Te ;ears o" De'ocrac1& =a bro2e a$ 5ea2 $e'ocrac1?

:hen civilian government did return to Pakistan after ;ia"s death, it was called

democracy it was really one struggling regime followed by another, with the army

again looking over the shoulders of its leaders. There were elections in +'',

+, +/, +>, and , but the actual turnout in each succeeding election

declined from 8M in +'' to a governmentdeclared /8M (but probably closer to

9M) in +>, and 8/M in .

#oth @awa$ and #ena$ir understood that the army had placed certain limits on

change when it came to relations with !ndia, and both gave the army a free hand

in the nuclear and missile program. =or ten years, the elected democratic

governments of Pakistan accommodated and fronted for the army while gingerly

(cautiously) attempting to e*pand their own authority and power. !n the end,

neither leader built a political coalition strong enough to contain the army.

S1ste' Co%%a9se&

The government"s enthusiastic support for the Afghan Taliban and for !slamic

militants in !ndian administered 5ashmir eventually backfired when the Taliban

wound up supporting al Uaeda.

The 5argil war led to a civilmilitary crises and the return of the army to overt

political power.

Pakistan"s nuclear program alienated the Hnited %tates, and its support for !slamic

radicalism in Afghanistan and at home worried both America and !slamabad"s

most important friend, 1hina, both of which began to court Pakistan"s major

strategic rival, !ndia.

=oreign terrorist combined with Pakistan"s homegrown sectarian terrorists to

target foreign journalists, 1hristians, minority 0uslim sects, and others.

.. a$ Pa2ista&

!slamabad once again became the capital of a Bfrontline" state.

Pakistan absolutely needed international economic support to remain viable, and

the west was clearly prepared to crash Pakistan"s economy if the government did

79


47/71

not cooperate. %econd, 0usharraf knew that if he did not accede to American

demands, :ashington had alternatives in %outh Asia.

6ismantling the past polices

=ighting others war

ARM;6S PAKISTAN

All countries have armies, but here (Pakistan) an army has a country.

Pakistan is rule by three as3 Allah, America and Army.

enerations3

T#e ritis# Geeratio&

+. %andhurst (H5) trained officer

. !ndian 0ilitary Academy (!@A) at 6ehra 6un trained officers

!t is often assumed that the %andhursttrained officers were superior soldiersC

however, there is substantial evidence to indicate that the !0A officers were

better


48/71

of Pakistan. A common view, held by many Pakistani officers through the years,

and taught at the staff college, was that had !ndian 4indus treated the 0uslims

fairly to begin with, there would have been no need for a Pakistani state.

The Pakistan army retained the basic structure of the old !ndian army, and most of

the new Pakistani officers continued to see their #ritish predecessors as

professional role models.

T#e A'erica Geeratio&

:hen Pakistan joined the #aghdad Pact (later 12@T&) in +88 and developed

close ties with !ran, Turkey, and the H%, a new generation of officers emerged.

This generation of army was fully e*posed to the American military. 0any of

them received training in America or from Americans. The American connection

led to a complete revision of the army"s structure. Along with American

e


49/71

had let Pakistan down. The +98>+ period came to be known as the Bsawdust

years", during which military honor and professionalism slipped away from the

Pakistani army. The myth of the army"s invincibility was shaken in +98 and

shattered in +>+, and its corollary, the corrupt ineptitude of the !ndia army, was

no longer taken for granted.

;ulifi>.

;ia generation became embedded in the army, and that it was socially more

conservative, more !slamic in its orientation. =urthermore, inasmuch as this

generation"s chief foreign policy e*perience was the +>+ humiliation, it was seen

as vengeful as well. There is no strong evidence that ;ia"s tenure created a

distinct group in the army. 4owever, his influence was important in three

respects3 +. his emphasis on !slam, . his stress on irregular war or lowintensity

conflict and /. his acceleration of the nuclear program.

T#e NeHt Geeratio&

The officers who will occupy top staff and command positions over the ne*tseveral years have a different orientation toward society. 0any come from the

middle class and joined the army simply to improve their standard of living. The

army is now considered just another profession

7


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Pakistanis %hias and !ran"s influence in Pakistan. The %%P (%ipahi%ahaba Pakistan,

%unni 0ilitant organi$ation) was founded in %eptember +'8 at Ghang, to counter the rise

of %hiaism, and apparently had the financial support of the %audi Arabia and !ra with

indiscriminate gunfire on ordinary citi$ens who were not involved in sectarian activities

and whose only fault was to be either %unni or %hia. (0ariam Abou ;ahab 3++')

MADARIS &= se'iaries?

At the time of Pakistan"s independence there were an estimated 8 0adaris in

the country. #y +'> it rose to ,'9, producing around /, graduates each year,

presently there are estimated > to ' 0adaris in Pakistan and between 9, to

>, students are attending them. 0ostly in +'s, these 0adaris were established by

;ia"s regime, as these 0adaris were needed to produce anti%oviet fighters for the

Afghan :ar and could also be used to counter the %hia influence at home. 4uge

investment was made, to strengthen various %unni institutionsin particular. (@asr 3

) BThe 0adaris received their fundings from larger religopolitical parties or outside

donors, and instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs and agenda to

those donors (%audi Arabia, !ra< and 5uwait). Their focus is less on training Hlema and

more on producing sectarian activities, less on spiritual matters and more on sectarian

8/


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hatred. 0any 0adaris provide military training to their students, combining sectarian

vigilance with a Gihadist outlook, %tudents that come out of these seminaries have few

skills that would encourage them to follow traditional careers in scholarship and religious

services, or would allow them to join the mainstream economy. 0any join the ranks of

e*tremist !slamist parties and sectarian organi$ations".

AFG>AN JAR3

(-ashid +93+9+) BThe Afghan war that spanned the decade between +> and

+' not only flooded Pakistan with weapons and drugs, but also embedded militancy in

the country"s !slamism. The Afghan war spawned several militant !slamist groups with

international connectionsC according to one estimate over 8, volunteers from thirty

countries were trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan". !n addition, the afghan

scene itself was wrought with sectarian tension as %hias and Persian speaking pro!ranian

factions vied for power and position with the %audi and American backed 0ujahideen

groups based in Pakistan" (-oy +). (@asr 3 7) BThe rivalry between these two

groups and the competition for control of Afghanistan ineluctably spilled over into

Pakistan. Pakistan"s sectarian conflict, therefore,


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whole world countries was that Byou are either with us or against us". The Taliban

government which showed no compliance, and refused to handover B#inIaden number

one suspect behind the %eptember ++ attacks, had to go. (Gones 3 ) B0usharraf

reali$ed that once the H% had made up its mind to topple the Taliban there was no point

for Pakistan continuing to support them". =or eneral 0usharraf it was not an easy task,

it was not only the overthrow of Taliban government, but also directly confronting

thousands of !slamic radicals within inside his own country, who took to the streets in all

the major cities of Pakistan, swearing loyalty to their !slamic brethren in Afghanistan.

=rom the beginning of his rule, eneral 0usharraf has never made any secret of

his modernist views. :hile ;ia had used his military might to try to !slami$e Pakistan,

0usharraf was indicating that he wanted to moderni$e the Pakistani %tate. (Gones

3) BThe first act he did, in April , he backed a proposal to reform Pakistan"s

notorious blasphemy law. The !slamic parties, however, strongly opposed the change and

on 0ay , 0usharraf backed down. 6espite his failure to change the blasphemy law,

0usharraf continued to e*press opposition to religious e*tremism. !n Gune +, well

before the attacks on the twin towers in @ew Lork, he gave a keynote speech to leading

Pakistani !slamic scholars and clerics whom the government had transported to

!slamabad for the purpose. 4is comments, which struck many of his audience dumb,

comprised one of the clearest statements of !slamic modernism ever made by a Pakistani

leader. B4ow does the world look at us" he asked, Bthe world sees us backward and

constantly going under. !s there any doubt that we have been left behind although we

claim !slam will carry us forward in every age, every circumstances and every landD

4ow does the world judge our claim !t looks upon us as terrorists. :e have been killing

each other. And now we want to spread violence and terror abroad. @aturally the world

regards us as terrorists. &ur claim of tolerance is phonyDwe never tire of talking about

the status that !slam accords to women. :e only pay lip service to its teachings. :e do

not act upon it. This is hypocrisy". (Gones3 +) The Gune speech was a major political

event in Pakistan. %ince the +8s no Pakistani leader had dared to speak to the clerics in

this way.

(Gones 37) B=rom the moment eneral 0usharraf took power, he made it

clear that he considered those involved in sectarian violence to be terrorists. !n August

+, he felt strong enough to ban BIashkareGhangvi" and B%ipahe0ohammad"

Pakistan. The ban marked a significant development, which indicated that 0usharraf was

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prepared to take some risks in confronting the !slamic radicals. #ut once again there were


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aircrafts and tens of thousands of troops to the Pakistani border. The prospect of yet

another military conflict, possibly fullscale war, between two nuclear powers put

0usharraf under still more pressure. (#ennett Gones 3>)

The general now reali$ed that he had little choice but to reverse Pakistan"s long

standing policy of backing the 5ashmir insurgency. &n + Ganuary he delivered a

landmark speech in which he announced a ban of almost all the most prominent Pakistan

based militant groups, he said B@o organi$ation will be able to carry out terrorism on the

prete*t of 5ashmir".

CONCLUSION&

!slam has always been e*ploited and politici$es by different leaders in Pakistan.

The most prominent amongst them was eneral ;iaul4a


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of events in Afghanistan. &nly one of his predecessors, Ayub 5han, attempted to

confront the radicals. 4e failed. !t is not yet clear whether 0usharraf will succeed (Gones

3///)

DR/ KAISER ENGALIS LECTURE IN DEC *8

ON

MAKING SENSE OF PAKISTAN AND ITS ECONOM;

Lou have heard for the last 8 years at least, stories of economic miracles. :hy is it that

this miracle has begun to evaporate overnight :hat kind of miracle can it be that is not

sustainable

Co%oia% I$ia3 @ow remember +>8'. +97/ was when the first #ritish individual set foot

on south Asian soil, but +>8' is important as the beginning of formal presence. The first

#ritish formal presence in what is now Pakistan came '8 years later, '8 years after +>8',

when the #ritish con


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there is only one railway line that runs from Peshawar to 5arachi, thereWs no other railway

line. %o this was the backyard.

.4*s&%o we begin in +7>, the governments that came from +7> onwards, lets say in

the +8s, were committed to development. 6evelopment was a major objective, they

were acutely aware of the lack of industry, the lack of food production, the lack of

schools, hospitals, electricity, roads, and so on and so forth. They were aware of it.

The whole effort of the overnment was to provide these economic assets. !n conceptual

terms Pakistan was a development state. The objective of the state was to promote

development, thatWs what it was, so it was a development state. :eWll see as we go into

detail how this development state progressed over the 8Ws, 9Ws and >s.

Deve%o9'et State versus t#e Natioa% Securit1 State3

!n +>> Pakistan ceased to be a development state. =rom +>> till today, Pakistan is a

national security state, where national security is the main objective of the state.

6evelopment is no longer the main objective of the state and WnationalW is being

increasingly defined narrowly from the perspective of the military. :hatever the military

thinks is national security is national security, and to the military, the military is national.

.7*s& Ayub 5han promoted development, pushed development. :e saw the e*pansion

of the economic infrastructure on a very large scale. !n fact, out of the eight 8year plans

that Pakistan created only the second was successful which was in the 9s under Ayub

5han. !t was successful in the sense that most infrastructure project targets were crossed.

Pakistan graduated by the end of the +9Ws from a mere producer of consumer

goods to a producer of intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are those which are

made for use in agriculture and industry itself, for e*ample fertili$er. :e donWt consume

fertili$er but it is produced as an input into agriculture. These are called intermediategoods. %o by the end of the +8s Pakistan was producing a lot of consumer goods, and

by the end of the +9s we were also producing a lot of inputs that went into the

manufacture of consumer goods. Previously these inputs were imported, now we began to

manufacture ourselves. %o, there was a marked upwards shift on the development level of

the country.

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.8*s& Then came the +>s. The +>s represents the big push. Although the +>s are

very maligned but completely wrongfully. !n fact, ! consider the +>s to be the golden

period of PakistanWs economic development and !Wll tell you why. 2conomic development

has to be measured by how you are creating economic assets. So ecoo'ic $eve%o9'et

#as to be 'easure$ b1 t#e eHtet o" asset creatio t#at ta2es 9%ace/ It is t#is creatio

o" assets t#at gives 1ou a "%o5 o" ico'e i t#e 1ears to co'e/

Asset creation started in the +8s and accelerated in the +9s.

#ut the +>s saw an even higher push. =or the first time in +>s, capital goods

industries were introduced, very large projects were introduced, and the basis for future

growth was created.

=irst, in the +8s we began to produce consumer goods, letWs say toothpaste. !n

the +9s we started producing the ingredients for toothpaste and in the +>s we started

producing the machinery that would produce toothpaste. %o we see the graduation that

took place of our economic capacity over this period. And this is very significant because

if you look at data and if you plot industrial production, you will see that there is a line

which is sloping upwards gently from +>7 to +' and then shoots up and continues

upwards gently again. :hat happened in +' The steel mill started production. %o

when you create an economic asset you have an intercept jump in production that

provides income for years to come.

T#e 3$eca$e 9erio$ o" t#e .4*s .7*s a$ .8*s is t#e 9erio$ o" t#e

$eve%o9'et state/ The stateWs objective was to develop the economy, and there was a lot

of political capital invested into it. The 1olombo plan, the first 8 year plan, creation of

the planning commission, the second 8 year plan, the third 8 year plan, and so on and so

forth. Iet us see what happened to the economy3 per capita income rose + foldC food

production tripledC fibre production went up 7 foldC manufacturing output increased 7

timesC electricity output increased /8 timesC telephone connections per +, people rose

+ times. Pri'ar1 ero%'et rose 4 ti'es

@ow of course for those of you who deal with numbers, if you have a low base

then obviously the percentage will be very large, and this of course is the reason for this

+ fold and 7 fold increases, there were only 9 industries so if another 9 came into being

there was + percent increase, +M looked very impressive but itWs only 9 more

9


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factories. @evertheless having said that you cannot deny that there were absolute

increases in the economy, and this increase did not take place by itselfC there was very

conscious effort on the part of the state to push the economy forward.

The rate of growth of development e*penditure, between +> and +>> was + percent

per annum. %o every year the budget went up by +M and the 6P growth rate at that

time was about 8 percentC which means that development e*penditure was 7 times the

6P growth rateC which means that the surpluses that were being generated by the

economy was being ploughed back into the economy to maintain the infrastructure and to

e*pand it. This reflected the commitment of the state to development. This is what the

development state is. !n +>> the development state sei$ed to e*ist. The national security

state took over.&f course in the +'s there was also very high growth rate. !t picked up

evenhigher than the +>s. :e were in the 9 M range, rather than the 8M range. #ut this

growth happened for largely e*ternal reasons. &ne being the investments that were

made in the +>Ws, like the construction of the steel mill started in +>7 but it started

production in +', so obviously growth increased in the 'Ws. %o a %ot o" t#e gro5t#

t#at 5as ta2ig 9%ace i t#e .:*s 5as because o" t#e ivest'et t#at 5as $oe i

t#e 8*s/ T#e "ruits 5ere beig 9%uc2e$ o"" t#e trees t#at 5ere 9%ate$ i t#e .8*s/

%econdly, there was inflow of remittances from the 0iddle 2ast. The oil shock

took place in +>/. That doesnWt mean that PakistanWs remittance income started in +>/,

because it took %audi Arabia and the other gulf countries almost 78 years to put their

institutional framework for starting development. The development process in %audi

Arabia and the rest of the ulf %tates started towards the end of the +>s. And the first

remittance flow into Pakistan started coming in +>' and peaked in +'. %o

+'s also benefited from the flow of remittances, very large remittances coming in.

Thirdly, there was foreign assistance coming in because of the Afghan :ar. They

were historic because never before in PakistanWs history had there been that level of

foreign assistance coming in.

And fourth, the government in +'s was borrowing heavily from banks and

printing money. And of course because o" t#e A"g#a Jar a$ t#e "avourab%e vie5

A'erica #a$ o" Pa2ista t#e IMF $i$ ot co'9%ai/ Ot#er5ise IMF a%5a1ss#outs

5#e 1ou 9rit 'oe1 but t#e1 5eret co'9%aiig t#e/

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Iarge debts were created, to the e*tent that if we calculate debtto6P ratio, namely

what percentage of your national income is indebted. I .88 t#e $ebt GDP ratio5as

),- or ),- o" our GDP or atioa% ico'e 5as i$ebte$/ I .:: it #a$ju'9e$

to ,:- t#is 5as t#e eHtet o" i$ebte$ess t#at t#e s, in the +'Ws it dropped to

.>M. :hich means that the surpluses that were being generated in the economy because

of the output that came out of investment in the +>s, because of the steel mill, because

of remittances, because of foreign aid, even by printing money or loans V was not being

ploughed back into the economy. :e were not reinvesting.

@either of the two was happening in the +'s. :e had a mere .>M growth in

development e*penditure. This .>M growth rate of e*penditure was half the average

6P growth rateC whereas, in the +>s, the rate of growth of development

e*penditure was 8 times the average 6P growth rate. 4ere it was half the 6P growth

rate. So 5#ere 5as t#e 'oe1 goig 0oney was being generated, the economy was

booming, but where was the money going T#e 'oe1 5as goig ito$e"ece/ Against

average 9M 6P growth rate, defence e*penditure during the +'s was going up by M.

%o unlike in the first phase +8s, +9s, and +>s where the economic surplus that

was generated was ploughed back into e*panding and strengthening the economy, in the

+'Ws the economic surplus that was generated was ploughed into the militaryWs

e*pansion rather than the economyWs e*pansion.

.*s &

The military was in charge of Afghanistan and they gave money to the Taliban to buy

arms, they paid the Taliban government salary but they did not do anything that would

help PakistanWs economy. #ecause their entire focus was not development at allC their

focus was to support the Taliban because they were anti!ndia, and because they provided

a socalled +strategic de!th". And as longas they provide strategic depth, and as long as

they donWt provide the !ndians anyfoothold, thatWs fine with us. %o the entire mindset was

military. !t was all aboutmilitary strategic depths and military objectivesC development

didnWt figure at all.2ven when they were making public statements that this was an

opportunity, they did not take it up. They were not listening because this was the national

9


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security state to them, national security issues, and as ! said at the outset, national security

is increasingly narrowly defined. 0ilitaryWs interest is now national interest

%o what happened since the +s :hen you donWt invest, everything begins to

creakC the infrastructure began to crack. And in the +s the growth rate began to

decelerate. The governments in the +s also could not put money into investment and

the rehabilitation of infrastructure because the debts that were incurred in the

+'s matured in the +s. And bot# ea!irs a$ Na5a! S#ari"s gover'ets #a$

o "isca% s9ace as t#e1 #a$ to re9a1


64/71

up to '.M. #ut it was onelegged development, development that was standing on one

leg and shaky.

:hat is 6P 6P is the sum of value added. Falue added comes from four sources

all the wages that are earned by employees and workers, all the rent that is earned by

property owners, all the interest that is earned by owners of capital and all the profit that

is earned by businessmen. Lou add these four things and that becomes national income

&ther than wages, all the other three rent, profit and interest they are usually earned

by property owners. %o, 6P will go up if only wages go up or if only profits go up.

Jagecetre$ GDP gro5t# 'eas t#e icrease i atioa%ico'e is goig to 5age

earers 9ro"itcetre$ GDP gro5t# 'eas t#e icreasei atioa% ico'e is goig

to 9ro9ert1 o5ers/

Iet us now e*amine 6P3 it grew at '.7M, but banking sector 6P grew at /M. !f in

this group you are all years old, and ! am 8 years old, the average age will be well

above . Lou remove me and your average age drops to . %o, one sector growing at

/M pulled up the average 6P growth rate. #ut that was not the only sector that pulled

up the average 6P growth rate. #ecause of consumer banking you could also buy cars,

suddenly everybody was buying carsC we can see the traffic on the road because of that.

The automobile industry output also went up. The automobile industry for / years

running was growing at 778M per annumC that shot up the large scalemanufacturing

sector from >M to +>M. @ow of course 6P is looking very good, but itWs looking good

because consumer financing allows banks to make e*orbitant profits. #anks are giving

money for cars, so automobile firms are making e*orbitant profits. #ut what will happen

if you remove consumer financing @obody will buy cars, so the automobile growth rate

drops. #anks are not making the same profit, so the banking sector growth rate dropsC in

turn the 6P growth rate drops. So t#e1 create$ a bubb%e 5#ic# 5as sta$igo

ba2 cre$it/ ;ou re'ove ba2 cre$it a$ ever1t#ig e%se co%%a9ses . Then the other

aspect of this is that by bank credit you only increase the consumption e*penditure. #ank

credit was not going into investment, bank credit was not going into setting up factories,

and bank credit was not going into promoting e*ports.

That is why if you look at another few ratios that we have, one is a ta* 6P ratio that out

of your total national income what is the proportion of ta* collected The total ta*

collection in Pakistan is e


65/71

i" t#e ecoo'1 is gro5ig so "ast 5#1 aret taHes icreasig Our eH9ort GDP ratio

is costat/ I "act it #as s%ig#t%1 $ec%ie$/ I" t#e ecoo'1 is $oig so 5e%% 5#1 aret

5e eH9ortig 'ore ecause t#e 5#o%e stress o" t#e gro5t# 5as cosu'9tio

rat#er t#a ivest'et or eH9asio o" t#e ecoo'ici"rastructure a$ t#e "ai%ure

to t#i2 o" i"rastructure/ !magine, %haukat A$i$ every week would say so many

refrigerators have been soldX so many air conditioners have been sold and so on. 4e

completely forgot that fridges, air conditioners and deep free$ers work on electricity.

%ince + till mid>, the government did not put in investment to produce even one

mw of power. :hen this huge crisis blew up they started searching all over the world for

thermal power plants. And 5#e t#egover'et i t#e .*s t#e Peo9%es Part1

gover'et 'a$e agree'ets 5it#"oreig 9o5er 9ro$ucers to 9rovi$e 9o5er at 7

cets 9er uit t#ere 5as a #uea$ cr1/ ut o5 t#e1 #ave 'a$e agree'ets "or ..

cets a uit/ ut 5e #ave oc#oice rig#t o5 5e #ave a 9o5er s#ortage a$ just 5e

#ave to 9a1 5#atever9rice t#e1re as2ig "or ot#er5ise t#ere 5i%% be o 9o5er/

These are all e*amples of a mindset of a state that is not thinking development. !f

they were thinking development they wouldnWt make these blunders. They would have

seen that if production is going up, then credit should go into supporting that production.

J#at cosu'er "iacig #as $oe is t#at it #as icrease$ our i'9ort bi%%/ 1ars are

imported, they are assembled here. A1s are imported but only their housing is built over

here. Je are tec#o%ogica%%1 a ver1 $e"iciet coutr1/ :e donWt know how to make

rickshaw or ta*i metersC we donWt know how to produce simple office e


66/71

%haukat A$i$. :hen you create something that has no basis, it cannot lastC we did not

create economic assets and assets created in the +9s and +>s are deteriorating.

E$ig Re'ar2s&

! think this is a great country and let me make this final statement. ! am saying this with

full authority and responsibility. Pakistan is a resourcerich country. :e can become a

developed country like Portugal, the least developed 2uropean country. :e can become a

country like Portugal in years. :e can have $ero poverty, $ero unemployment and

$ero illiteracy. !lliteracy we can wipe out in 8 years, it is possible because we are not an

overpopulated country. :e talk about a high population growth rate but we are not an

overpopulated country like !ndia or 1hina or #angladesh. !ndia, given its present socio

economic structure, cannot abolish its poverty even in 8 years. !ndia will become a big

economic power but will not be able to abolish poverty.

:e can eradicate poverty in years, we can achieve effective literacy in 8 years. All

these are doable things. :e can become a strong economic power in this area. :e can

become a respectable country. :e can actually give aid to street children of #ombay.

All this is possible. #ut we have to first become a developed state ourselves.

Today, we are like a factory most of whose revenue is spent on chowkidars and there is

no money left to buy raw materials or spare parts. That factory will close down. Pakistan

is like that factory. :e have to change it. Lou have to change it.

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Pa2ista6s Future& =4ope and?or =rustration)

!s Pakistan at a critical juncture

!s Pakistan a failed state

So'e "uture scearios&

A straightline projection of the present system

The emergence of a moderate, democratic state

The rise of authoritarianism

The rise of an !slamist state

Pakistan"s possible breakup

Pakistan after a major war with !ndia

The present system is likely to continu

pakistan studies-course contents outlines

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