IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA – CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v. WILLIAM H. COSBY, JR.

: : : : :

NO. CP-46-CR-0003932-2016

DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF INTENT TO INTRODUCE DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF UNAVAILABLE WITNESS PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA

RULE OF EVIDENCE 804(b)(1)

Defendant William H. Cosby, Jr. hereby provides notice of his intent to introduce

portions of the deposition of Sheri Williams pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence

804(b)(1).1

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides that if the declarant is deemed

“unavailable,” testimony that she has provided “at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether

given during the current proceeding or a different one” may be introduced against a party who or

whose predecessor in interest had an “opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct,

cross-, or redirect examination.” See Pa. R. Evid. 804(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d

1235, 1245 (Pa. Super. 2002). A declarant is considered “unavailable” if she is “absent from the

1 Mr. Cosby likewise introduces Ms. Williams’ deposition transcript pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 5919, which provides that “The testimony of witnesses taken in accordance with section 5325 (relating to when and how a deposition may be taken outside this Commonwealth) may be read in evidence upon the trial of any criminal matter unless it shall appear at the trial that the witness whose deposition has been taken is in attendance, or has been or can be served with a subpoena to testify, or his attendance otherwise procured, in which case the deposition shall not be admissible.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 5919; Pa. R. E. 804(b)(1), Cmt. (“Depositions are the most common form of former testimony that is introduced at a modern trial. Their use is provided for not only by Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1), but also by statute and rules of procedure promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Judicial Code provides for the use of depositions in criminal cases. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5919[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 445 A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“Prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness may be admitted in a criminal trial either by statute … or by common-law rule.”).

Montgomery County Clerk of Courts Received 4/19/2018 9:31 AM

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trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other reasonable

means, to procure the declarant’s attendance.” Pa. R. Evid. 804(a)(5)(A).

Here, Ms. Williams clearly qualifies as an “unavailable” declarant under Pennsylvania

Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5) as the defense has repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, tried to serve Ms.

Williams with a subpoena compelling her appearance at trial. As such, her testimony given

under oath in the civil litigation brought by Andrea Constand against Mr. Cosby, Constand v.

Cosby, No. 2:05-cv-01099 (E.D. Pa.), qualifies for admission under “former testimony”

exception insofar as Ms. Constand, the Commonwealth’s predecessor in interest, had a similar

motive and adequate opportunity to develop Ms. Williams’ testimony. Specifically, Ms.

Constand had the same interest in her civil litigation as the Commonwealth has here in

questioning Ms. Williams about what she knew about Ms. Constand’s motives in alleging that

Mr. Cosby sexually assaulted her and whether the alleged assault was a reason why Ms.

Constand left her employment as Director of Operations for the Temple University women’s

basketball team.

I. Ms. Williams Qualifies as an “Unavailable” Witness Under Rule 804(a)(5)

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(a) considers a declarant to be “unavailable” as a

witness if she “is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been

able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure … the declarant’s attendance.” Pa. R.

Evid. 804(a)(5). “Under Pennsylvania law, a witness, who has previously testified but cannot be

found to testify at trial, will be deemed unavailable if the [party] has made a good faith effort to

locate that witness and compel his attendance at trial.” Commonwealth v. Stinson, 628 A.2d

1165, 1169 (Pa. Super. 1993) (good faith effort found and witness deemed “unavailable” when a

party made numerous attempts to serve a subpoena on a witness, including going to the address

which the witness had given to the police, contacting the witness’ mother, checking to see if the

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witness had a forwarding address, and issuing a bench warrant.); see also Commonwealth v.

Blair, 331 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. 1975) (stating that witness may be considered unavailable “only if

a good-faith effort to locate the witness and compel his attendance at trial has failed,” and

finding good faith effort to have been made when there was notice to the witness that she would

be subpoenaed, attempt to serve a subpoena at her address, at her mother’s address, issuance of a

bench warrant and search of mother’s home.); compare Commonwealth v. Faison, 305 A.2d 44

(Pa. 1973) (no showing of good faith effort when Commonwealth knew where the witness

resided and made no attempt to secure compulsory attendance at hearing and the only efforts

were unsuccessful phone calls.)

Here, consistent with Stinson and Blair, the defense has made a good faith effort to

compel Ms. Williams’ attendance at trial. Specifically, the defense verified Ms. Williams’

current home address through a search of tax records. (See Ex. A.) Once her current address

was verified, the defense attempted to serve Ms. Williams with a trial subpoena seven times on

different days (including weekends), at different times of day. (Id.) Unable to locate Ms.

Williams and serve her with the subpoena, the defense mailed the subpoena along with an order

from the Mecklenberg County Superior Court to appear for a hearing on April 2, 2018 to

domesticate that trial subpoena – at which Ms. Williams could have objected to the subpoena –

along with correspondence from defense counsel requesting that Ms. Williams contact her. (Id.)

The package was accepted and not returned to the sender. (Id.) Nevertheless, Ms. Williams

failed to appear at the hearing, did not object to the subpoena, and never contacted defense

counsel as requested. (Id.) Because defense counsel has clearly made a good faith effort to

compel Ms. Williams’ attendance at trial to no avail, Ms. Williams clearly qualifies as an

“unavailable” witness under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5).

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II. The Commonwealth, as a Party with “Like Interest” with Ms. Constand’s Attorneys, Had an Adequate Motive and Opportunity to Develop Ms. Williams’ Testimony in Ms. Constand’s Civil Suit Against Mr. Cosby

For prior testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible pursuant to Rule

804(b)(1), the issues in the former and current proceedings must be similar such that it can be

said that the present opponent (or some person in like interest) had an adequate motive and

opportunity to develop the testimony through either direct, cross or re-direct examination. Pa. R.

Evid. 804(b)(1)(B); see also Taylor, 445 A.2d at 178 (“For the prior recorded testimony to be

admissible the issues in the first proceeding and hence the purpose for which it was there offered

must have been such that the present opponent (or some person in like interest) had an adequate

motive for testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony now offered.”). A party

may not be prevented from presenting evidence at trial merely because the other party, despite

having the opportunity to do so, did not examine the witness as extensively as he might have

done at trial. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 152 A.3d 355, 358-59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding no

error in admission of defendant’s preliminary hearing testimony because the defendant had a full

and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness, but declined to do so); Commonwealth v.

Stays, 70 A.3d 1256, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The decisions of our Courts are clear that the

admissibility of former testimony ... derives not from the actual conduct or content of cross-

examination, but from its availability.” (emphasis original)); U.S. v. Paling, 580 Fed. Appx. 144,

150 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The fact that the [party against whom the testimony is offered] may not

have cross-examined [the witness] as aggressively as she would have had she known she was

facing criminal charges is a matter of tactics – not motive.”).

Here, the issues in Ms. Constand’s prior lawsuit against Mr. Cosby and Mr. Cosby’s

criminal retrial are virtually identical insofar as Mr. Cosby’s criminal and civil liability both turn

on the issue of whether he sexually assaulted Ms. Constand as she alleges. Because of the

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similarity in the issues, Ms. Constand, as the party with whom the Commonwealth shares a “like

interest,” had a similar motive to develop Ms. Williams’ testimony, and in fact did develop her

testimony through her civil deposition.

A. The Issues in Ms. Constand’s Prior Lawsuit Against Mr. Cosby and Mr. Cosby’s Criminal Retrial Are Virtually Identical

In order for former testimony to be admissible, there must be a similarity of issues in the

current and former proceedings. Taylor, 445 A.2d at 178. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

has observed, “[t]he requirement that the issue remain the same in both proceedings is designed

to insure that the defendant had the opportunity for full and effective cross-examination in the

first proceeding. This requirement is in accord with the common law rule that the issues in the

first proceeding and hence the purpose for which the testimony was there offered, must have

been such that the present opponent (or some person in like interest) had an adequate motive for

testing on cross-examination the credibility of the testimony now offered.” Commonwealth v.

Velasquez, 296 A.2d 768, 770 (Pa. 1972).

Here, the issues in Mr. Cosby’s criminal trial are virtually identical to the issues in the

civil lawsuit brought by Ms. Constand against Mr. Cosby. Whether or not Mr. Cosby was liable

civilly in Ms. Constand’s civil lawsuit or is now liable criminally turns on the exact same

question: whether Mr. Cosby sexually assaulted Ms. Constand. Because the issues in both

proceedings are substantially the same, the only issue that remains is whether Ms. Constand, as

the party with whom the Commonwealth shares a “like interest,” had the motive and opportunity

to develop Ms. Williams’ deposition testimony.

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B. Ms. Constand, as the Party with Whom the Commonwealth Shares a “Like Interest,” Had a Similar Motive and Opportunity to Develop Ms. Williams’ Testimony Through Her Civil Deposition

Courts have routinely allowed the introduction of a witness’s testimony, including

testimony given in a civil deposition, in criminal proceedings where there is a similarity of

issues, and therefore a similar motive and opportunity to develop the witness’s testimony. See,

e.g., Taylor, 445 A.2d at 178 (finding trial court erred in not permitting the defendant to

introduce the former testimony of third party who was convicted after selling drugs to the same

confidential informant to whom the defendant was also alleged to have sold drugs when the

defendant and the third party had asserted entrapment defenses); Paling, 580 Fed. Appx. at 148

(“Rule 804(b)(1) does not require that a party had an identical motive to develop the testimony,

only that the party had a ‘similar’ motive.” (emphasis original)); see also Commonwealth v.

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. 2005) (affirming introduction of unavailable witness’s

deposition testimony in subsequent criminal trial for aggravated assault when witness’s

deposition was taken to perpetuate his testimony).

U.S. v. Paling, while not precedential, is a case most factually on point.2 There, the Third

Circuit affirmed the trial court’s admission of an unavailable witness’s civil deposition testimony

on direct appeal, finding that the defendant, against whom the testimony was offered, had a

similar motive and adequate opportunity to challenge the witness’s testimony in the civil suit.

580 Fed. Appx. at 146. Specifically, the defendant was on trial for various federal offenses

relating to a mortgage fraud scheme. Id. at 145. The defendant had been sued civilly for fraud

2 As the Comment to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) makes clear, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). Pa. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), Cmt (“Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1) is identical to F.R.E. 804(b)(1).”). Accordingly, an interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) should be persuasive in determining this issue under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1).

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by an individual who later became a government witness. Id. at 147. The government sought to

introduce the witness’s deposition testimony after the witness died and therefore became

unavailable. Id. In affirming the trial court’s admission of the evidence, the Court of Appeal

found that the defendant’s liability in both the civil and criminal matters “turned on whether she

knowingly engaged in fraudulent conduct,” and found “little difference” between the defendant’s

motive during the deposition to cross-examine the witness and her motive had the witness

testified at her criminal trial.” Id. at 149-50. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found that the

defendant had “sufficient motive and opportunity to cross-examine” the witness in the prior civil

deposition, and therefore that court did not err in admitting the testimony. Id. at 150.

Here, as in Paling, Ms. Constand had every motive in her civil lawsuit to ensure that Ms.

Williams testified truthfully regarding what she knew about Ms. Constand’s motives in alleging

that Mr. Cosby sexually assaulted her and whether the alleged assault was a reason why Ms.

Constand left her employment as Director of Operations for the Temple University women’s

basketball team. Indeed, just as evidence from Ms. Williams regarding Ms. Constand’s motives

would bear on Mr. Cosby’s civil liability, they, too, bear on Mr. Cosby’s criminal liability for the

alleged sexual assault. Accordingly, Ms. Constand had a similar motive to examine Ms.

Williams and develop her testimony.

Moreover, there can be no doubt that Ms. Constand had an adequate opportunity to

examine Ms. Williams during her deposition in the Constand v. Cosby matter and did so. In fact,

Ms. Constand’s questioning of Ms. Williams comprises 29 pages of the 219 page deposition

transcript.

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C. The Commonwealth Qualifies as a “Party in Like Interest” with Ms. Constand

Finally, the Commonwealth qualifies as a “party in like interest” with Ms. Constand.

Taylor, 445 A.2d at 178 (“[f]or the prior recorded testimony to be admissible the issues in the

first proceeding and hence the purpose for which it was there offered must have been such that

the present opponent (or some person in like interest) had an adequate motive for testing on

cross-examination the credibility of the testimony now offered.”); Velasquez, 296 A.2d at 770

n.3; see also Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185-86 (3d Cir. 1978)

(“Although Congress did not furnish us with a definition of “predecessor in interest,” [under Fed.

R. Evid. 804(b)(1)] our analysis of the concept of interests satisfies us that there was a sufficient

community of interest.”). Taylor is instructive on this point. There, the defendant was charged

with various drug offenses after selling drugs to a confidential informant and undercover police

officer and asserted a defense based on entrapment. Id. at 175-76. He sought to introduce the

trial testimony of a third party witness who was also charged and convicted of theft by deception

for a transaction made to the same confidential informant, and who had also asserted an

entrapment defense. Id. at 178. While the Commonwealth prosecuted both cases, there was no

indication that both cases involved the same prosecutors. Id. at 178-79. Still, the Pennsylvania

Superior Court found that the trial court erred in excluding the third party witness’s trial

testimony even when the issues were similar, and the Commonwealth had a similar motive and

opportunity to develop that witness’s testimony, and reversed the conviction. Id.

Here, Ms. Constand and the Commonwealth share a “like interest” in ensuring that Ms.

Williams’ testimony regarding what she knew about Ms. Constand’s motives in alleging that Mr.

Cosby sexually assaulted her, and her testimony regarding why Ms. Constand left her

employment at Temple University was truthful and accurate. This is because Ms. Williams’

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testimony would bear on the success (or failure) of both Ms. Constand’s and the

Commonwealth’s cases. According, the Commonwealth qualifies as a “party in like interest”

with Ms. Constand.

III. Mr. Cosby’s Rights to Compulsory Process and Fair Trial Require Admission of Ms. Williams’ Deposition Testimony

The U.S. and Pennsylvania constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a fair

trial and of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor. U.S. Const. Amend VI, XIV;

Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 9; Commonwealth v. Mejia-Arias, 734 A.2d 870, 874 n.8 (Pa. Super. 1999)

(finding that the defendant’s right to compulsory process and to present a defense required access

to the subpoenaed personnel files) “The right to compulsory process encompasses the right to

meet the prosecution's case with the aid of witnesses, and the right to elicit the aid of the

Commonwealth in securing those witnesses at trial, both of which are fundamental to a fair

trial.” Mejia-Arias, 734 A.2d at 874, n.8; Commonwealth v. McClure, 172 A.3d 668, 695 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (“The right to compulsory process entitles a defendant to request “any potentially

exculpatory, non-privileged information.”). The constitutional right of compulsory process,

though fundamental, is not absolute, and gives way to evidentiary rules based on legitimate state

interests. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 324 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. 1974). “Exceptions to the demand

for every man’s evidence,” however, “are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they

are in derogation of the search for truth.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 197 (1997).

Indeed, “The law is clear that a criminal defendant is entitled to know about any information that

may affect the reliability of the witnesses against him.” Commonwealth v. Copeland, 723 A.2d

1049 (Pa. Super. 1998). “The remedy for erroneous exclusion of relevant defense evidence, as it

is for the improper admission of evidence, is the award of a new trial.” Commonwealth v. Davis,

650 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa. Super. 1994)

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Here, Mr. Cosby is entitled to present Ms. Williams’ sworn deposition testimony

regarding Ms. Constand’s motives in accusing Mr. Cosby of sexual assault. Commonwealth v.

Davis is instructive on this issue. There, the Superior Court conditionally vacated the judgment

of conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing after the defense asserted that the

defendant’s rights to confront witnesses and compulsory process were violated when the lower

court found the victim’s medical records, which the defense claimed would demonstrate that the

alleged victim was a “pathological liar,” to be privileged from production by the statutory sexual

assault counselor privilege. 650 A.2d at 483-84. Specifically, the defense contended that the

victim was biased, untruthful, and had fabricated his claim of sexual assault based on a clinical

observation it asserted that the records contained that the victim was a “pathological liar.” Id.

Finding that such an observation would be relevant and admissible to impeach the victim’s

credibility at trial, the Superior Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for an

evidentiary hearing to determine if the records did, in fact, call the victim a “pathological liar.”

Id. at 462.

Similarly to the medical records in Davis, Ms. Williams’ deposition contains sworn

testimony that is relevant and would impeach the alleged victim’s, Andrea Constand’s, testimony

regarding her allegations of sexual assault by Mr. Cosby. To deny Mr. Cosby the ability to

impeach Ms. Constand’s credibility using Ms. Williams’ own sworn testimony when admission

of such evidence is clearly supported by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) and 42

Pa. C.S. § 5919, and when Ms. Williams clearly qualifies as “unavailable” under Pennsylvania

Rule of Evidence 804(a), would violate Mr. Cosby’s constitutional rights.

* * *

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Given the foregoing, Mr. Cosby intends to introduce certain portions of the sworn

testimony Sheri Williams gave in a deposition in the matter of Constand v. Cosby, No. 2:05-cv-

01099 (E.D. Pa.).

Dated: April 19, 2018 Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Lane L. Vines Lane L. Vines (Pa. Bar No. 80854)

BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C. 1622 Locust St. Philadelphia, PA 19103 Tel.: 215-875-4658

Thomas Mesereau, Jr. (pro hac vice) MESEREAU LAW GROUP 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 300 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel.: 310-651-9960

Kathleen Bliss (pro hac vice) Jason Hicks (pro hac vice) KATHLEEN BLISS LAW PLLC 1070 W. Horizon Ridge Pkwy., Suite 202 Henderson, NV 89012 Tel.: 702-463-9074 Becky S. James (pro hac vice) Jaya C. Gupta (pro hac vice) Rachael A. Robinson (pro hac vice) GREENBERG GROSS LLP 601 S. Figueroa St., 30th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 Tel.: 213-334-7060 Attorneys for Defendant William H. Cosby, Jr.

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PUBLIC ACCESS POLICY CERTIFICATION

I, Lane L. Vines, certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the Public Access

Policy of the Uniform Judicial Systems of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial

Courts that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential

information and documents.

Dated: April 19, 2018 /s/ Lane L. Vines Lane L. Vines

EXHIBIT A

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

COUNTY OF MECKLENBURG

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Plaintiff,

vs.

WILLIAM H. COSBY, JR.

Defendants.

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION

l 8-CVS-5180

AFFIDAVIT OF TIM REID

The undersigned, TIM REID, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am over the age of 18 years old and am competent to make this affidavit.

2. I am a resident of Union County, North Carolina and a citizen of the United States.

3. I am a private investigator for Barefoot Professional Investigations. I have been a licensed private investigator in North Carolina for nine years and have nine years of experience in this field. Prior to becoming a licensed Private Investigator, I was a Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer and Detective for 28 years.

4. On or about March 19, 2018, I was requested to assist Defendant William H. Cosby, Jr. in the matter of The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. William H. Cosby, Jr. in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, by serving court orders on Sheri Lynn Williams located at , Charlotte, North Carolina 28211.

5. On or about March 19, 2018, at approximately 6:45 p.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at her residence located at Charlotte, North Carolina. This information was verified through tax records. No one came to the door and there were no lights burning inside the residence. No cars were seen and the two door garage was closed. A Skybell video doorbell was observed at the residence which would enable Sheri Lynn Williams to monitor who is at her front door.

6. On or about March 20, 2018, at approximately 7:30 p.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at her residence located at

Charlotte, North Carolina. No one came to the door and there were no lights burning inside the residence. No cars were seen and the two door garage was closed. The garbage cans for the residence were not placed on the street as the rest of the neighborhood.

7. On or about March 21 , 2018, at approximately 7:22 p.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at her residence located at Charlotte, North Carolina. No one came to the door and there were no lights burning inside the residence. No cars were seen and the two door garage was closed.

8. On or about March 22, 2018, at approximately 11:04 a.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at her residence located at Charlotte, North Carolina. No one came to the door and there were no lights burning inside the residence. No cars were seen and the two door garage was closed.

9. On or about March 24, 2018, at approximately 1:36 p.m. and 8: 18 p.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at her residence located at

Charlotte, North Carolina. No one came to the door and there were no lights burning inside the residence. No cars were seen and the two door garage was closed.

10. On or about March 25, 2018, at approximately 6:11 p.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at a friend's residence located , Mooresville, North Carolina 28115. Sheri Williams vehicle was not at this residence and no other vehicles were seen at this location.

11. On or about March 25, 2018,, at approximately 8: 10 p.m., I attempted service on Sheri Lynn Williams at her residence located Charlotte, North Carolina. No one came to the door and there were no lights burning inside the residence. No cars were seen and the two door garage was closed.

12. On or about March 27, 2018, I sent a FED EX package to Sheri Lynn Williams residence containing the Court Orders from the Common Wealth of Pennsylvania and from the Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Also enclosed in the package was a letter instructing Sheri Lynn Williams to contact attorney Kathleen Bliss upon receipt. The FEDEX package was delivered to Sheri Lynn Williams residence located at , Charlotte North Carolina on March 28, 2018 at approximately 12:02 p.m. The package was accepted and signed for by W. Livingston. The FED EX package was not returned to my office after being accepted.

13. On or about April 2, 2018, at approximately 2:00 p.m., I attended a hearing for Sheri Lynn Williams at the Mecklenburg County Courthouse located in Charlotte, North Carolina in court room 6310. Attorney Anna Smith Felts was present to represent the interests of William H. Cosby, Jr. in the matter of The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams H. Cosby, Jr. Sheri Lynn Williams did not appear for the hearing.

14. Further Affiant Sayeth Not.

This the /6 ~ ay of (J/!u/ , 2018.

Tim Reid, on behalf of: Barefoot Professional Investigations

. I c~fy that -n r<\ \2Q.,\ {l personally appeared before me. l[%' I have personal knowledge of the identity of the principal; or [] I have seen satisfactory evidence of the principal's identity by a current state or federal

identification with the principal's photograph in the form of a driver's license or passport.

This the \ D dayof~\

My ~ission expires: \~o-0 .