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DOMINGO VS CA, G.R. NO. 104818FACTS:Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for support and subsistence.Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge and consent.In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of property.ISSUE:Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.RULING:Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is aninviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;as such, itshall be protected by the State.As a matter of policy,there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ,petitioner,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ,respondents. July 31, 1996Petition on a pure question of lawFacts:1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later had 5 kids.2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through joined efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be governed by the regime of co-ownership6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community of property 7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.Issues:WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at barWON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36Ruling:WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMEDRatio:1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 1482. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal capacity of a party to contract marriageNotes: Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147 Trial courts decision The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations; The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other. The petitioner and respondent aredirected to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common propertiesas defined byArticle 147of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles50, 51 and 52of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Alleged Errors: "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared voidabinitio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. "Assumingarguendothat Article 147 applies to marriages declared voidab initioon the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129. "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay."NICDAO CARIO VS YEE CARIOG.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage]FACTS:SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively denominated as "death benefits." Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the funeral of the deceased.In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.ISSUE:Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.RULING:No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through theiractual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same.By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs.And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.Under Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.Vincent Mercado vs Consuelo TanJudicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity ofFACTS:In April 1976, Dr. VincentMercadomarried Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991,Mercadomarried a second time. He married a certainConsueloTan.In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case againstMercado.In November 1992,Mercadofiled an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be declaredvoid ab initiounder Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy againstMercado.In May 1993, Mercados marriage with Oliva was declaredvoid ab initio.Mercadonow sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his second marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.ISSUE:Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.RULING:Yes.Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous, , marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also necessary even if the earlier marriage is characterized by statute "void."In the case at bar, Mercado was already married to Tan but did not file a declaration of nullity of marriage with Oliva until Tan filed bigamy case. The crime had already been consummated by then. To file a petition to have his first marriage void after Tan charged him with bigamy is not a defense in a bigamy charge.Joel Jimenez, plaintiff-appellee vs. Remedios Canizares, defendant and Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant GR No. L-12790Aug 31, 1960Facts: Joel filed a complaint praying for a decree of annulment of his marriage to Remedios upon the ground that the orifice of her vagina was too small for penetration. This condition made Joel leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. He alleged that it existed at the time of marriage. Remedios did not file an answer and so the court directed the Zamboanga City Atty. to inquire whether or not there was collusion and intervene to see that evidence is not fabricated. Remedios was also ordered to submit to a physical examination, which failed as she had refused to be examined. Procedural history: After hearing, Remedios was not present. The trial court entered a decree declaring the marriage null and void. The city attorney filed an MR contending that the impotency had not been satisfactorily established since there was no physical examination and that instead of annulling the marriage, the court should have punished her for contempt and compelled her to undergo physical examination. He further argued that the decree would open the door to collusion simply by alleging impotency.Issue: WON the marriage may be annulled on the strength of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that the wife was and is impotentHeld: NORule: Article 45 (5) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage that either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable;Application: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself."Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.Dispositive Portion: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Menciano vs. Neri San JosePosted on October 10, 2011 G.R. No. L-1967 May 28, 1951Facts:Matilde Menciano, in her and her childrens behalf, filed a motion for declaration ofheirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944 before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S.J.; that they lived together before the said marriage, hence, Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, the child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child; that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 25, 1945 and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of his parents, thus he is a legitimate child in lawful wedlock.On the other hand, on an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose (the executrix of the deceased) and Rodolfo Pelaez (designated universal heir in the will of the deceased datedDecember 19, 1940), denied the substantial allegations of Mencianos motion for declaration of heirs and further alleged that the deceased was suffering from senile dementia from 1943which became worse a year later; that the marriage between Menciano and the deceased was in violation of the legal provisions and requisites because of the latters age, sickness, and bombardment; that Menciano took advantage of the deceaseds condition, forced the latter to marry her by means of deceit and threat; and that the deceased was congenitally sterile and impotent. Moreover, the defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of 286,000 in cash, for jewels and certain properties which, as presumed, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.Issue:1. Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano valid?

2. Are the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the legitimate children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde Menciano?

3. Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties aforementioned?Decision:(1) Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2 applications for a marriagelicense, dated September 28, 1944, the first one, signed by the deceased to marryMenciano and the other one, signed by Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificatefor immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by the Acting Local CivilRegistrar and the deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract signed by thedeceased and Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer,and the witnesses L. B. Castaos and Samson Pagan. The 4 documents are official andpublic; there validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and convincingoral testimony. In this case, the oral evidence presented by the defendants is notconvincing so as to declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures ofthe deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could not havebeen written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically and intellectuallyincapacitated, as the defendants witnesses represent him to have been. Also, the testspertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to show the capacity to contractmarriage of the deceased. Although the said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity,there is no reason why is should not be applied to the capacity to contract marriage,which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did not err in declaring validthe marriage of the deceased and Menciano.(2) Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the deceased and Menciano. The requisitefor potency being met, the necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., isconclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased with Menciano in lawfulwedlock.No. The court declared that Carlo Magno Neri has not been acknowledged as a naturalchild and, consequently, cannot be legitimized by the subsequent marriage of hisparents.(3) No. After a careful and exhaustive review of evidence, the trial court correctly reachedthe conclusion that such allegation has not been substantiated. The testimonies ofmother and son- Paz Neri San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the sum of money arecontradictory. Moreover, Clotilde Galarrita de Labitads testimony is unbelievable. Withregard to the jewels, no satisfactory evidence was presented to prove that Mencianomisappropriated them. Page 70