Goitia vs. Campos Rueda

Facts:

In January 1915, Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila and thereafter lived together in Calle San Marcelino for about a month. Petitioner went back to her parents because of the following reasons:

1) Defendant demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on her genitals

2) Defendant made other lewd demands

3) Defendant maltreated petitioner by word and by deed on the ground that the latter refused to do any of defendant’s demands other than legal and valid cohabitation

Petitioner filed an action against her husband for support outside their conjugal domicile.

Issue:

WON defendant may be compelled to render support to his wife

Held:

Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife.

Ratio Decidendi:

Upon termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the spouses. The reciprocal rights arising from this partnership is governed by the law and controlled by the state or government, upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties.

Because marriage is a social institution vested with public interest, the contracting parties may not terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. Campos Rueda cannot, by his wrongful acts, be relieved of the duty to support Goitia as imposed by law. Where a husband, through is wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct drives his wife away from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to sever the law concerning marital relations and repudiate his duties there under.

Lacson vs Jose lacson

Facts:

- Feb 14, 1953 – when they got married

- Jan 9, 1963 – when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila

- March 12, 1963 – Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila

o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen

o This was affirmed by the CFI

- May 7, 1963 – respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old.

- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too.

ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time

- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."

o Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise

o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) – already 1968

o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.

Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.

- However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)

Corroborated by already 5-year separation

Tenchavez vs Escano

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Ty vs CA

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.

Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

lilius vs. manila railroad company

FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.

Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint.

The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said judgement.

ISSUE:

1. WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages

2. WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages proper

1. Injuries sutained by Lilius

2. for injuries sustained by wife and child

3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband

HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification on interest to be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.

1. YES

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees — the flagman and switchman, for not having remained at his post at

the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train

Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.

2.

a. With respect to the plaintiffs’ appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as a result of his illness. As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of his wife’s services in his business, which services consisted in going over his writings, translating them into foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act in her stead.

b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife — in the language of the court, which saw her at the trial — “young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk”, and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to her for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.

As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.

c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law “consortium” of his wife, that is, “her services, society and conjugal companionship”, as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now under consideration.

Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband’s rights is to count on his wife’s assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful to society and to the nation, are

demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become man’s equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife’s domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing

NOTES:

However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the accident.

It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and child, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it was because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already become inevitable.

Narag V Narag

FACTS: Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories. After several hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed

abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred.

HELD: Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members. Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal actor so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards

DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA VS VILLANUEVA

Facts:

Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, instituted an action against her husband Rafael to obtain separate maintenance (monthly allowance), custody of her two younger minor children Guillermo and Sergio and attorney’s fees and other costs.

The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, upon hearing the cause of the trial (in light of a doctrine laid down in a former case)—a decision that the plaintiff now appeals.

Aurelia sought separate maintenance on the ground of cruelty and infidelity. Proof showed that the defendant is guilty of repeated acts of infidelity (illicit affairs with 4 different women and another one before the action was begun) and exhibited brutality against the plaintiff, pushing the latter to finally leave their home and establish a separate abode with the children.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiff-appellant can ask separate maintenance from respondent-appellee after she left their domicile

Ruling:

Yes. While the Court ruled in Arroyo vs Vasquez de Arroyo that unproved or insufficient charges of cruelty are not enough to establish a case for separate maintenance, it maintained that in cases where spouses are found guilty of conjugal infidelity, innocent parties are entitled to right to relief.

In the case at bar, the Court holds that “the law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.” The respondent, being a recurrent, gravely offends the sanctity of the marriage tie and should thus, not be relieved from his duty to support his wife as provided by law.

The Court ruled that the plaintiff’s right to custody of her children will no longer be disturbed and that she is entitled to P500 monthly allowance, attorney’s fees and other expenses.

GARCIA VS. SANTIAGO AND SANTIAGO

FACTS:

1. April 8, 1910- alleged date of marriage between the plaintiff, Cipriana Garcia and the defendant, Isabelo Santiago.

2. February 3, 1925- the date when the plaintiff was compelled to leave her conjugal dwelling due to continued family dissensions.

3. Alejo Santiago (Defendant No. 2) -Son of Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1)-allegedly seduced Prisca Aurelio

4. Prisca Aurelio–daughter of Cipriana Garcia (the Plaintiff)-gave birth to a child that was allegedly Alejo Santiago’s child

5. Isabelo Santiago-failed to see the vindication of the honor of Prisca Aurelio, the plaintiff’s daughter by requiring his son to marry her.- refused to get involved with the matter, thus seemingly countenancing the illicit relations between his son and the plaintiff’s daughter-has allegedly conveyed/been conveying their conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latter’s whims & caprices and thus, damaging & prejudicing her rights. Some of these properties include lands acquired during the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marriage with money belonging to the conjugal partnership.-publicly maintained illicit relationship with Geronima Yap

6. February 3, 1925-separation of the plaintiff and defendant.-the separation was necessary to avoid personal violence

7. Isabelo Santiago-continually refused to provide for the plaintiff’s support

8. Cipriana Garcia (the plaintiff)

-could not live in their conjugal dwelling because of the illicit relationship between her daughter, Prisca Aurelio and Alejo Santiago, countenanced by the other defendant, Isabelo Santiago.-demanded that she is entitled to P500.00 pendente lite monthly pension from conjugal partnership-claimed that her husband, Isabelo Santiago (Defendant No. 1) has shown himself unfit to administer the property of conjugal partnership and the court should therefore order its administration to be placed in her hands.

ISSUE/RATIONALE:

1. Whether their separation is unjustified

NO. They were having a stormy life

prior to the separation due to the

frequent fights.Isabelo ordered her to

leave the house & threatened to ill-

treat her if she returned. Prisca’s

situation is embarrassing for her

mother. Highly possible that Alejo

caused Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling

them to cohabit could lead to further

quarrels.2. Whether transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal

NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidence even show that it was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage.

3.Whether Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance

NO. That’s too much. P50.00 would be enough.

4. Whether Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal property

NO. No sufficient reason found to deprive him of this right.

5. Whether Cipriana is entitled to an allowance of attorney’s fees

NO.

HELD:That the judgment appealed from is

therefore modified. Separation is allowed. Isabelo is ordered to provide Cipriana with a P50.00 monthly allowance to be paid within the first 10 days of the month. No costs allowed.

Pilar Atilano vs. Chua Ching Beng

Facts:

Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City. After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit Pilar’s parents. Chua returned to Manila with the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she did not.

In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents.

Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she lives in Manila with him. He was also willing to establish a conjugal dwelling separate from his parents.

Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment granting the Pilar’s allowance after finding that the latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she had experienced someprevious in-law troubles.

Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remitallowance to her in Zamboanga.

His petition was denied, thus this case.

Issue:

Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with Chua

Held:

The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art. 209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing

the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized norm of morality.

Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutualrespect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the obligation of giving any support. (G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958)

Arroyo v Vasquez (1921)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees

Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:

1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home

2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:

1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be

necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.

“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.

Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

PEREZ v PEREZ (1960), 109 Phil 657

FACTS: Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant AngelaTuason de Perez at the CFI Manila. He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place underguardianship based on the following allegations:

she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloixo

she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have

children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrassher husband.

CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court.

HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction.Material injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations between man and wife) and not patrimonialor financial

Doctrines

Goitia vs Campos Rueda

Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. - A husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of

her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.

Lacson vs Jose lacson

NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."

Tenchavez vs. Escano

The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy for which No. 10 of Article 2219 authorizes an award for moral damages.

Ty vs. CA

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. The Court defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

lilius vs. manila railroad company

in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the accident.

Narag vs Narag

- Good moral character is a continuing qualificationrequired of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects onhis fitness to practice law, nor

should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Dadivas v Villanueva

ART. 72 (FC). When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a)”

The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in

marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separatemaintenance from her husband, it is not necessary that the husband should bring aconcubine into the marital domicile. Repeated illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough. The law is not so unreasonable as to require awife to live in marital relations with a husband whose propensity towards otherwomen makes common habitation with him unbearable.

Garcia v Santiago

1. Whether their separation is unjustified

NO. They were having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the frequent fights.Isabelo ordered her to leave the house & threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Prisca’s situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly possible that Alejo caused Prisca’s pregnancy. Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further quarrels.

2. Whether transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are illegal

NO. Failed to prove that property was community property. Documentary evidence even show that it was acquired by Isabelo before their marriage.

3.Whether Cipriana is entitled to P500.00 monthly maintenance

NO. That’s too much. P50.00 would be enough.

4. Whether Isabelo is unfit to administer their conjugal property

NO. No sufficient reason found to deprive him of this right.

Atilano v Chua Eng Bng

Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109), and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal justification she

establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband.

Del Rosario v Del Rosario

Art. 378 CC - The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action tothe latter.

“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual

accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and

wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

On granting the restitution of conjugal rights.

It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.

Perez v Perez

Material injury cases pertains to personal injury of personal relations between man and wife the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTESL-2877 (38 SCRA 284)March 31, 1971

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

HELD:

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Facts:

Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that duet the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967.

October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) – she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.

April 25, 1972 – Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.

February 27, 1973 – lower court dismissed the complaint. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.

Issue

WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of thespouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw.

Held

YES. The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court of appeals that Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which is self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence.

Tolentino vs. De Jesus – Court held that the findings of facts by the Courtof Appeals in conclusive on the Supreme Court, unless:

Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to

those of the trial court When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is

premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.

Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA29 SCRA 864October 30, 1969

FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious.

HELD:

Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of dismissal sustained.

Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

People’s Bank and Trust Co. vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil 167

FACTS: Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of instrument entitled “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” in which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property, trustee was

to redeem mortgage constituted on such property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof, grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and collect the rents to be derived from said property while remained unsold.

ISSUES: 1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wife’s property which therefore belongs to CPG, 2. WON management belongs to husband3. WON contract is null and void since husband did not give consent

HELD:Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. She may likewise do such without consent of the husband, subject to recourse by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such contract merely voidable or void.

PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES DEVELOPMENT CO., vs. POIZAT

FACTS:

Appellant, Doña Gabriela Andrea de Coster, executed to and in favor of her husband, Juan M.Poizat, a general power of attorney. It authorized him to do "in her name, place and stead, and making use of her rights and actions"; to loan or borrow any amount of cash under the conditions he may deemed convenient, executing and signing private and public document and making these transactions with or without mortgage.

Poizat obtained from the plaintiff a credit for the sum of 10,000 Pounds Sterling to be drawn on the "Banco Español del Rio de la Plata.

To secure payment he executed a mortgage upon the real property of his wife.

Plaintiff then brought an action against the defendant for failure to pay, to for lose the mortgage. The trial court's decision issued an order directing the sale of the mortgaged property to satisfy the judgment. Consequently, the property was sold to the plaintiff for P100,000.00.

Appellant personally appeared and objected to the confirmation of the sale. She alleged that the mortgage in question was illegally executed thus null and void, because the agent of the defendant was not authorized to execute it. That the plaintiff was aware of such fact and that the mortgage was executed to secure a loan, which was not made to this defendant or for her benefit but was made to him personally. Such objections were overruled, which prompted the appellant to appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of defendant Poizant, in his capacity as attorney in fact, binds her wife?

HELD:

No. The mortgage is declared null and void ab initio. The sale is set aside.

RULE:

Juan Poizat may have had the authority to borrow money and mortgage the real property of his wife, but the law specifically provided how and in what manner it must be done. The law requires that a power of attorney to mortgage or sell real property should be executed with all the formalities required in a deed. In this case it was not excersiced. His personal signature, standing alone, does not bind his principal. The deed in its face does not purport to be the deed of the principal, made and signed by him in his name and as his deed. The mortgage in question was held to be executed by him and him only thus it is not binding to his wife.

Castro v Miat Feb. 11, 2003

FACTS:Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in 1978), originally intended his two properties, one in Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984.Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, CerefinoMiat, who said testified the original agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons. This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the Philippines.The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on the latter date and title was secured under Moises name as widower. Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives and paid its realty taxes and fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal reasons. February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC, petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s neighbor, that the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty thousand peso downpayment was made by godmother to Moises for her son.April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his brother because “he had lots of work to do and the title was already in Romeo’s possession.” Downpayment information corroborated by VirgilioMiat (brother of Moises) and Pedro Miranda (who worked with

Moises in two hotels: Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander later said that he did not consider the money to be a downpayment but a personal debt due to Romeo. Romeo had possession of the title because he borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the Paco property to parents of petitioner VC. December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to discuss status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer, petitioner, VC admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance of Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son. Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel Moises and Alexander to execute deed of conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which modified the decision by saying that: (1) the deed of sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner). VC subsequently brings the action to the SC.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:

(1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital.Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had long been dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code (which was applicable because marriage was celebrated before FC):Art 153 (1) - “The following are conjugal partnership property:(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x xx.” Records show that property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s reliance on Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it

into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.(2) WON valid oral partition between Moises and his sons involving the said property is valid.Yes. The validity of the agreement is apparent in (a) latter of the father to his sons (the one which stated that he didn’t favor any of his sons), (b) the testimony (see above) of Moises’ brother, Ceferino, and the oral agreement between the brothers to divide the property between themselves (attested to by extended Family members).We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, CeferinoMiat and Pedro Miranda, who testified regarding the sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were intensely questioned by petitioners’ counsel.(3) WON Castro spouses were buyers in good faith.Ruling of the CA which was affirmed by the SC:“In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property.“Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another person’s possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value.”