persons cases

5/20/2018 Persons Cases

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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and the ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B. DANS, represented byCANDIDA G.DANS, and the DBP MORTGAGE REDEMPTION INSURANCE POOL,

respondents.G.R. No. L-109937 March 21, 1994

QUIASON,J.Facts:

In May 1987,

Juan B. Dans, together with his wife Candida, his son and daughter-in-law,applied for a loan of

P500,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines(DBP), BasilanBranch.

As the principal mortgagor, Dans, then 76 years of age, was advised by DBP to obtain amortgage

redemption insurance (MRI) with the DBP Mortgage Redemption Insurance Pool (DBPMRIPool).A loan, in the reduced amount of P300,000.00, was approved by DBP on August 4, 1987

andreleased on August 11, 1987

.From the proceeds of the loan, DBP deducted the amount of P1,476.00 as payment for the MRIpremium

. On August 15, 1987,

Dans accomplished and

submitted the MRI Application for Insurance and the Health Statement for DBP MRI Pool.

On August 20, 1987, the MRI premium of Dans, less the DBP service fee of 10 percent, was

credited byDBP to the savings account of the DBP MRI Pool. Accordingly, the DBP MRI Poolwas advised of thecredit.

On September 3, 1987, Dans died of cardiac arrest

. The DBP, upon notice, relayed this information tothe DBP MRI Pool.On September 23, 1987, the DBP MRI Pool notified DBP that Dans was noteligible for MRIcoverage, being over the acceptance age limit of 60 years at the time of application

.

On October 21, 1987, DBP apprised Candida Dans of the disapproval of her late husbands MRIapplication. The DBP offered to refund the premium of P1,476.00 which the deceased had paid,

butCandida Dans refused to accept the same, demanding payment of the face value of the MRI

or anamount equivalent to the loan. She, likewise, refused to accept an

ex gratiasettlement of P30,000.00,which the DBP later offered.

On February 10, 1989, respondent Estate, through Candida Dans as administratrix, filed

acomplaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Basilan, against DBP and the insurance poolfor

Collection of Sum of Money with Damages. Respondent Estate alleged that Dans became

insured by the DBP MRI Pool when DBP, with full knowledge of

Dans age at the time ofapplication, required him to apply for MRI, and later collected the insurance premium thereon


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.Respondent Estate therefore prayed: (1) that the sum of P139,500.00, which it paid under protest

for theloan, be reimbursed; (2) that the mortgage debt of the deceased be declared fully paid; and

(3) thatdamages be awarded.On March 10, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent Estate and

againstDBP. The DBP MRI Pool, however, was absolved from liability, after the trial court

found no privityof contract between it and the deceased.The trial court declared DBP in estoppel for having led Dansinto applying for MRI and actuallycollecting the premium and the service fee, despite knowledge of hisage ineligibility.

Issue:

1) Whether or not there is a contract made between DBP MRI Pool and the late Juan Dans;

2) Whether or not DBP should be held liable.

Held:1) No.

When Dans applied for MRI, he filled up and personally signed a Health Statement for

DBPMRI Pool (Exh. 5-Bank) with the following declaration:

I hereby declare and agree that all the statements and answers contained herein are true,

complete andcorrect to the best of my knowledge and belief and form part of my application for

insurance. It isunderstood and agreed that no insurance coverage shall be effected unless anduntil this application isapproved and the full premium is paid during my continued good health

(Records, p. 40).Under the aforementioned provisions, the MRI coverage shall take effect:

(1) when the application shallbe approved by the insurance pool; and (2) when the full premiumis paid during the continuedgood health of the applicant. These two conditions, being joined

conjunctively, must concur

.Undisputably,the power to approve MRI applications is lodged with the DBP MRI Pool. The pool,however,did not approve the application of Dans. There is also no showing that it accepted thesum of

P1,476.00, which DBP credited to its account with full knowledge that it was payment for

Dans premium

. There was, as a result, no perfected contract of insurance; hence, the DBP MRI Pool

cannot be held liable on a contract that does not exist.2) Yes.As an insurance agent, DBP made Dans go through the motion of applying for saidinsurance,

thereby leading him and his family to believe that they had already fulfilled all therequirements

for the MRI and that the issuance of their policy was forthcoming. Apparently, DBPhad full knowledge that Dans application was never going to be approved.

The maximum age for MRI acceptance is 60 years as clearly and specifically provided in Article

1 of the Group Mortgage

Redemption Insurance Policy signed in 1984 by all the insurance companies concerned (Exh. 1-

Pool).

Under Article 1987 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,


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the agent who acts as such is not personally

liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the

limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers.

The DBPs liabili

ty, however, cannot be for the entire value of the insurance policy. To assume thatwere it not for DBPs concealment of the limits of its authority, Dans would have secured an

MRI from

another insurance company, and therefore would have been fully insured by the time he died, is

highlyspeculative.Considering his advanced age, there is no absolute certainty that Dans could obtainan insurance

coverage from another company. It must also be noted that Dans died almostimmediately

, i.e., on the nineteenth day after applying for the MRI, and on the twenty-third day from thedateof release of his loan.

One is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as

hehas duly proved(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2199).WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appealsin CA G.R.-CVNo. 26434 is MODIFIED and petitioner DBP is ORDERED: (1) to

REIMBURSE respondent Estate of JuanB. Dans the amount of P1,476.00 with legal interest

from the date of the filing of the complaint until fullypaid; and (2) to PAY said Estate the amount

of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damagesand the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees. With costs against

petitioner.

UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO 510 SCRA 172 (2007)

Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.

To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of

justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society.FACTS: In 1982, respondent Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to settle

the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.

They surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate ofregistration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused

never came to see him again.


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Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondentsbusiness establishment, where

it was visible and accessible to the public.

It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis toGabutero by Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to

petitioner corporation.

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation andcontinued the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments.

Nine years later, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Avesco-AVNE

Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.

The leader of the police team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. WhileP/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the

establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

Unable to find respondent, the policemen on petitioner Uypitchings instructionand over the clerks objection,took the motorcycle.

Petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-

Fencing Law against respondent but was dismissed. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC The trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice

and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed

a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courtsdecision.

ISSUE:WON the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law warrantedthe award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of respondent.

HELD: YES.They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but alsofor making a slanderousremark and for taking the motorcycle from respondents establishment

in an abusive manner .Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect

its foreclosure right there on. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of

possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged

property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a

preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure .Petitioner corporation failed to bring the propercivil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching

descended on respondentsestablishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle

without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of themotorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.

Petitioners acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the propernorms of human relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article 19, also known as the

"principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty

and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to

prejudice or injure another.


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The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and

must not be excessive or unduly harsh;

there must be nointention to harm another.In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended

by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with

the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle wasutterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.

Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez

12 SCRA 648Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages

Exemplary Damages - Breach of Promise to Marry

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule

it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sendingwedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding

necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer

advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to saidwedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her

that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.

This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and

eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral

damages in favor of Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of

fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his

promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded.

He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

ISSUE:Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD:Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also

unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise,

Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from thewedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is

supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully

causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public

policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award formoral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of

exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in

breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive mannerthiswarrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.


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Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes

TI TLE: Nikko Hotel M anila vs. Reyes

CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in

reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to RobertoReyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of NikkoHotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes,

Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General

Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a

basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but tohis great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to

leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave theparty and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart

ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimedby the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida

Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr.

Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking

over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the

celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who partof the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.

During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she

approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed

each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request

only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know whathappened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave theparty. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the


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necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave

the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is

experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be heldliable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals

219 SCRA 115Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry - Article 21 of

the Civil Code

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales,then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who

was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account,

she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then

introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married. Marilousparents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for

animals to slaughter for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual

intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou.Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already

married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be

adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was notfamiliar with Filipino customs and traditions.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD:Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his

breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and

fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His

promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As foundby the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met

Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry

her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditionson marriage and on the reputation of


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Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying

the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is

expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of theCivil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts andquasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is

not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of

moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish inthe statute bookssuch as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made

and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence

of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were madebecause of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

Pe et. al vs. Pe

G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.

Bautista Angelo J.:

Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla.

Facts:Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of

age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted

her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the

parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affaircontinued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where

she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador

The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed

the action and plaintiffs appealed.

Issue:W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

Held:The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to

any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the

latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn

from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,

succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with

her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact

that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolitas family in a manner

contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New

Civil Code.


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Quisumbing vs MERALCO

TI TLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO

CITATION: GR No. 142943, Apri l 3, 2002

FACTS:

The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94

Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors

headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of allsingle phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission

and was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had

been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to

the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for

further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had totemporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and

informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of

P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. Theplaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without dueprocess, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and business reputation and

therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing

differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary

damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals

including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law areviolated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction

for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use ofelectricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of thepeople. Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect

electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause

is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized

representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official

or ERB representative was present.


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Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was

premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the

injure position where it was before it was injured.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and

JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. 26795

July 31, 1970

Facts:

This is an appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance ofZamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), dismissing a complaint for

support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.

Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex with Quimiguing, a student, several times by

force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts

and drugs supplied by Icao, and had to stop studying. Quimiguing claims support at P120.00monthly, damages and attorneys fees. Icao moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of

action since complainant did not allege that the child had indeed been born; trial judge sustained

defendants motion. Plaintiff amended the complaint but trial court sustained the dismissal and

ruled that no amendment to complaint is allowable. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is covered by Article 40 of the New Civil Code which will entitlethe child to claim support through the mother.

Held:

Yes.Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the intercourse, she had

later given birth to a baby girl. The Supreme Court says that since, as provided in Article 40 of

the New Civil Code (the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it,provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following article), petitioner

Quimiguings child, since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the requirement of havingbeen born later, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee.

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herselfhad a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it

for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case beremanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs

against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.


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GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS

176 SCRA 778

August 25, 1989

Facts:

10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and

administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases

and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of

several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to

the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report,

Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave.

When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler,

ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and

initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private

investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from

Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in

favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal

cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January

1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company

(RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by

Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on

alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor ofprivate respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual

damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos

(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and

costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held:

Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant

circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causingdamage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry

told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until

he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be

trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to

RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing

of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners

are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private


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respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the

investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the

Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

University of the East vs Jader

TI TLE: University of the East vs. Jader

CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000

FACTS:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1st

semester,he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given anincomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by

Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after

the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave

him a grade of 5.

The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the

invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from

work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning ofsuch deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam.

Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety,

besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UEs negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER

satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral

damages?

HELD:

SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latters

actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic

status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should nothave been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he

was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as


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what CA held because its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed

all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he

should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with hisacademic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt only entail a

mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and

submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand

Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6%per annum computed from

the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is

DELETED.

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.

CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.

G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he presented his credit card in someestablishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when he

tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase

plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the

respondent bank.

To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a computer print-out,denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT,

issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that

his card in question was DECLOVERLIMIT or declared over the limit.

The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack ofmerit. It held that as between the computer print-out presented by petitioner and the Warning

Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent, the latter had more weight as their due execution

and authenticity was duly established by respondent.

Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la Pea ruled that thecomputer print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of business in the

modern credit card industry and Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country and

cannot be reached by subpoena. The same took judicial notice of the practice of automated teller

machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out bank account status, thereforethe print-out can be received as prima facie evidence of the dishonor of petitioners credit card.


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On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an electronic document

which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence

or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court by anyone who saw the documentexecuted or written; Petitioner, however, failed to prove its authenticity, thus it must be

excluded.

Issues:

i. Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic document?

ii. Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report constitutes electronic

evidence?

Held:

The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.

Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT

ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by Ingtan Agency, to prove that

his credit card was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words

DECLOVERLIMIT.

As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be consideredadmissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule

132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is

received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone whosaw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document executed or

written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature orhandwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001,

and which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the authentication of the computer print-out

would still be found wanting.

Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the other evidenceshowing integrity and reliability of Exh. G to the satisfaction ofthe judge. The Court is not

convinced. Petitioners testimony that the person from IngtanAgency merely handed him the

computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered

as sufficient to show said print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by JudgeMarcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. G does not show on its face that it was issued by

Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out


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from the agency. Petitioner also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the

computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its

business address was not reflected in the print-out.

Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was

generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.

CARPIO v. VALMONTE

G . R . N o . 1 5 1 8 6 6 ; S e p t e m b e r 9 , 2 0 0 4 ; T i n g a , J .

FACTS:

Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosarioa n d J o nS i e r r a e n g a g e d h e r s e r v i c e s f o r t h e i r c h u r c h w e d d i n g . O n t h a t

d a y , V a l m o n t e w e n t t o t h e M a n i l a H o t e l t o w h e r e t h e b r i d e a n d h e r

f a m i l y w e r e b i l l e t e d W h e n s h e a r r i v e d a t t h e S u i t e ,s e v e r a l p e r s o n s w e r e a l r e a d y t h e r e i n c l u d i n g t h e p e t i t i o n e r

S o l e d a d C a rp i o , a n a u n t o f t h e b r i d e wh o wa s preparing to dress up for the

occasion. After reporting to the bride, Va lmonte wen t out of the suite carrying thei t e m s n e e d e d f o r t h e w e d d i n g r i t e s a n d t h e g i f t s f r o m t h e p r i n c i p a ls p o n s o r s . S h e proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She

went back to the suite after, and found several people staring at her when sheen te re d . . I t

was a t th i s juncture tha t pe t i t ioner a l l egedly u t t e red the fo l lowingwords to

Valmonte:Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mongbag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw

lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.

Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmontes bag.

It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties,

peti tioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room inapaper bag were lost.A f e w d a y s a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t , p e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e d al e t t e r f r o m V a l m o n t e demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted

to be circulated to thenewlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her smeared

reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to theletter. Thus,on 20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE:

W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages

RULING:Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach

against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her ownaccount nobody knew

that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside thepaper bag. True, petitioner had theright o ascertain the identity of the malefactor,but to malign respondent without an iota of proof

that she was the one who actuallys t o l e t h e j e w e l r y i s a n a c t w h i c h ,

b y a n y s t a n d a r d o r p r i n c i p l e o f l a w i s i m p e r m i s s i b l e .

P e t i t i o n e r h a d w i l l f u l l y c a u s e d i n j u r y t o r e s p o n d e n t i na manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justiceand good

faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudicerespondent.


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Cer tai nly, pet i t io ner t ran sgre ssed t he pr ovi s ion s of Ar t icl e 19 in relation to

Article 21 for which she should be held accountable

VILLALVA vs. RCBC SAVINGS BANKG.R. NO. 165661Augus t 28, 2006

FACTS:The petitioners in this case are spouses, Mario and Corazon Villalva. Theyissued 48checks amounting to P547, 392.00 to cover installment payments dueon promissory notes

executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue (TQA) for thepurchase of a 1993 Toyota

Co rol la . Th e p romi ssor y no tes were sec ure d b y a Chattel Mortgage executedby the pet it ione rs on the vehicle in favor of TQA.U nder t he Dee d of Ch a t t e l

Mor t gage , pe t i t i one r s wer e t o i n s u r e t he veh i c l eaga i ns t l o s s o r damage b y

acc ide nt , the f t a nd f i re . Th ey are to end orse and del iver the pol icies to the

mortgagee, which is the respondent, RCBC SavingsBank. On June 22, 1993,promissory notes and chatt el mortgage were assignedt o Riza l Commercia lBanki ng

Corporation (RCBC). They were later assigned byRCBC to RCBC Savings Bank.

Al lt he 48 ch ec ks is su ed by th e pe ti ti on er we re encashed by the respondent.Fr o m

A u g u s t 1 4 , 1 9 9 6 t o A u g u s t 1 4 , 1 9 9 7 , p e t i t i o n e r s p r o c u r e d

t h e n e c e s s a r y i n s u r a n c e b u t d i d n o t d e l i v e r t h e s a m e t o t h er e s p o n d e n t u n t i l J a n u a r y 1 7 , 19 9 7 . As a c o n s e q u en c e , r e s p on d e n t h a d t h e

mor t gaged veh i c l e i ns u r ed f o r t he pe r i od o f Oc t ober 21 , 1996 t o Oc t ober

21 , 1997 and pa i d an i ns u r ance p r emi um wor t h P14 , 523 .36 . The i ns u r ancep o l i c y o b ta in ed b y t he r e s p o n d e n t w a s l a t e r c a n c e l l e d d u e t o t h e

i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y s e c u r e d b y petitioners over the mortgaged vehicle. And so the

respondent was reimbursedP10, 939.86 b y the Malayan Insurance Company s ince theamount paid by therespondent exceeded by P3, 583.50.On Fe b r ua r y 1 0 , 199 9 , t he

r e sp o nd ent se n t a le tt e r o f de man d to th e petitioners for the amount of P12, 361.02

representing unpaid obligations on thepromissory notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999.

And theydemanded thatpeti tione rs surrender the mortgaged ve hicle withinfive days

from notice. Thepetitioners ignored the demand letter.O n A p r i l 5 , 1 9 9 9 , t h er e sp o n d e n t f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t fo r r e c o v e r y o f possession with replevin with

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City in orderfor them to get the Toyota Corolla car. Twoweeks later, the respondent causedthe enforcement of a a writ of replevin and recovered the

car.On June 18, 1999,the pe ti t io ne rs f i led th eir an swe r wit h com pul sor y

c o u nt e rc l ai m f o r m o ra l d a m a g e s , e x e m p l a r y d a m a g e s , a n d a t t o r n e y s

f e e s . T h e y a s s e r t t h a t t h e y i n s u r e d t h e m o r t g a g e d v e h i c l e a n dc o m p l i e d w i t h t h e D e e d f o r C h a t t e l Mor t ga ge . The MTC re nde red a

dec i s i on i n f avor o f pe t i t i one r s and o r de r ed

respondent to pay the former P100,000 in moral damages, P50,000 in exemplarydamages,P25,000 in attorneys fees, and the costs and expenses of litigation. R e s p o n d e n t

f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d i t w a s d e n i e d .T h e respondent then appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.The RTC

affirmed the judgment of the MTC.T h e r e s p o n d e n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w

w i t h t h e C o u r t o f Appeals assailing the decision of the RTC. The CA reversedthe decis ion of theRTC an d o rdered the pe t i t io ner s to pay the r espo ndent the

a mo un t o f P 3, 5 8 3 . 5 0 w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s o f t h e f i n a l i t y o f t h e d e c i s i o n


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and issued a writ ofreplevin with regard to the mortgaged vehicle. The

peti tioner s fi led a mot ion for reconsideration and it was denied. Thus, they filed a petition for

c e r t i o r a r i . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r s , t h e C A e r r e d w h e n i t f a i l e dt o recognize the two pieces of evidence: an acknowledgement receipt which showsth a t t he

p remi um f o r t he sec ond i n sur ance p ol i c y h a s been re fu nded to

t he r es ponden t , and an endor s emen t by t he Mal ayan I ns u r ance Companyw hi ch s h o w s t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r s d e l i v e r e d t h e r e q u i r e d i n s u r a n c ep o l i c y t o t h e respondent . On the ot her hand, the re sponde nt s contend that the CA

did notmake reversible errors and that setting aside its decision would result in

theunjust enrichment of the petitioners.ISSUES:Wh et he r t he pe ti t io ne r s fa il e d t o

c om pl y wi th th e ir o bl i ga ti o n to i n su re t he vehicle under the Deed of ChattelMortgage.Whether or not the petitioners unjustly enriched themselves.RULING:Petition was

granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution arereversed and set aside.

The resolution of the Metropolitan Trial Court and thedecision of the Regional TrialCourt were reinstated. The petitioners had notfailed to comply or defaulted on the

their obl iga tion to insure the mort gaged vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.For

the second issue, the petitioners were not enriched when the respondentobtainedinsurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioners hadalready obtainedthe required insurance coverage for the vehicle.

PRINCIPLES/DOCTRINE OF LAW:

As a rule, demand is required before a party may be considered in default. Ther e s p o n d e n t

f a i l e d t o d e m a n d t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s s h o u l d c o m p l y w i t h

t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n t o s e c u re i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r t h e m o r t ga g e dv e h i c l e . T h e respondents right to pay the insurance premium over the mortgaged vehicle

hasnot been established.Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage,

so long asit isappreciable in mone y. It ma y also take the form of avoidance ofexpensesa n d o t h e r i n d i s p e n s a b l e r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e p a t r i m o n y o f ap e r s o n o r e v e n prevention of a loss or injury.

Tenchavez vs Escano

TI TLE: Tenchavez vs. EscanoCITATI ON: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry gotmarried on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officerbefore Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair

of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be

their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written

by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are

supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However


18/37

after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta

continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left

for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on

approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought forthe annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran,an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8,

1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have

dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of thePhilippines.

HELD:Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition

on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation

of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who canafford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American

husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of

Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinossought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to

validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one

spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from

defendant Vicenta F. Escao;(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the

amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of

his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA

TI TLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

CITATION: 133 SCRA 179

FACTS:


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Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay

Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times

where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was

republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramilshouseand not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to bepublished. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an

explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it

was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr.

Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, StLouis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or

explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the

April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

HELD:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated

publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It

just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000

as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed thejudgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under

articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful

house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by thatcontretemps.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.


TI TLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA

CITATION: 133 SCRA 179

FACTS:




St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This wasrepublished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils house


20/37

and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be

published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an

explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that itwas received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr.

Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St

Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology orexplanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During theApril 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.


HELD:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulatedpublication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It


The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the

judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under





TI TLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CACITATION: 133 SCRA 179

FACTS:


21/37




St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was

republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils houseand not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to bepublished. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an

explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it

was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr.

Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, StLouis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or

explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the

April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.


HELD:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated

publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It


The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000

as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed thejudgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under




Conjugal Partnerships; Effect of the spouses signing as suretyALFREDO CHING and

ENCARNACION CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS[G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.]

CALLEJO, SR.

FACTS:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000 fromthe

Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive

Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay

onDecember 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As an added security for the said

loan,Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing

guarantywith the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all

the PBMCIobligations owing to the ABC. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.


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Hence, on August21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ

of preliminaryattachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests,

penalties andother bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo

Ching, EmilioTaedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. Citing as

one of the groundsfor the writ was the fraud defendants employed in incurring the obligations by

representingthemselves as having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did nothave suchcapacity.In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied

onattachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.

OnNovember 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a

Motion toSet Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of

stocks levied onby the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of

conjugal fundsafter the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore,

the indebtednesscovered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed

by petitionerAlfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the

conjugal partnership.She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-

party claimant entitledto file a motion for the release of the properties. She attached therewith acopy of her marriagecontract with Alfredo Ching.The petitioner-spouses aver that the source of

funds in the acquisition of the levied sharesof stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking

the presumption of the conjugal nature ofstocks under Art. 160 and that such presumption

subsists even if the property is registered only inthe name of one of the spouses, in this case,

petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners,the suretyship obligation was not

contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband's profession orbusiness. And where conjugal

assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation contracted bythe husband, the wife should

exhaust her motion to quash in the main case and not file a separatesuit. Furthermore, the

petitioners contend that under Art. 125 of the Family Code, the petitioner-husband's gratuitous

suretyship is null and void ab initio, and that the share of one of the spouses inthe conjugalpartnership remains inchoate until the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership.The trial

court initially granted the lifting of the preliminary attachment but on appeal, thedecision was

reversed, the appellate court holding that petitioner Encarnacion Ching was not aproper party to

the action and that even if she possessed such right, her action was already barredby laches. The

appellate court also ruled that the presumption under Art. 160 was inapplicable inthe present

case, when petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquirethe shares

of stock. Hence this present petition.

1.Do the 100,000 shares of stock in the name of Alfredo Ching belong to the

conjugalpartnership?2.Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?

HELD:

1.

YES.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired duringthe marriage

are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that itpertains exclusively


23/37

to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it isnot even necessary to

prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. Aslong as the properties

were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to beconjugal in nature. In

fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does notappear, the

presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. Thepresumption

of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in theabsence ofclear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.In this case, the evidence

adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 sharesof stocks in the Citycorp

Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate booksin the name of the

petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14,1979. This was done

during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares ofstocks are, thus,

presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The privaterespondent failed

to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with hisexclusive money. The

barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporatebooks of Citycorp

Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does notconstitute proof that

the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.2.

NO.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to thehusband alone,

there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly,to make a

conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of thespouses is

to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for thesolidarity and

well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power toassume

unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.In this

case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitionerswas

benefited by the petitioner-husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty andsuretyshipagreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of

loan wasbetween the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No

presumptioncan be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an

accommodationagreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be

benefited. Theprivate respo

Mercado vs Tan

Mercado vs. Tan

337 SCRA 122

FACTS:


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Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted

marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy

against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage

against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and

void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the

former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can

be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtainingsuch judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is

characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right

after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He

contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first

marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

Morigo vs People

Morigo vs. People

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but

after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became

sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she

filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married

Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground

that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a

suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy

case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab

initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.


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ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete

before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no ac tual marriage

ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a

marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage

when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and

is acquitted in the case filed.

Donato vs Luna

TI TLE: Donato vs. Luna

CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 withthe lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz

Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and

Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with

petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz

consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous

knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30,

1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a

marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by

private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of

the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit

of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for

which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the

Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home

upon learning that Donato already previously married.


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ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended

in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic

relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

HELD:

Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of

marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused

if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress

violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and

cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by therespondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

Spouses Yu vs PCIB

TI TLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB

CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation

over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine

Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a

loan.

As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed

petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on

July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the

auction sale on September 10, 1998.


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Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest

bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1,

1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-

parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on

annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante

Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14,2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the

filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety

of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale

and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for

annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a

special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and

take their own direction independently of each other.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the re solution of which is a logical antecedent

of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It

generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both

pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the

criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure

of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

Quimiguing vs Icao

TI TLE: Quimiguing vs I cao

CITATI ON: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:


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Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan

City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he

succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation

and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by

defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120

per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court inZamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the

complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that

no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional

personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted

by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in

Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of

parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violatesarticle 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his

wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is

entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to

the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appelleeFelix Icao. So ordered.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR

LAZO, respondents

2 SCRA 801


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July 20, 1961

FACTS:

Oscar Lazo, now husband of Nita Villanueva, impregnated her before they were legallymarried. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner

Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the

COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself an abortion again by

Geluz. Less than two years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in

consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband knew not, nor consented to the abortion.

Private respondent sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion. The trial

court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as

attorneys fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this

petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover

damages from physician who caused the same to their unborn child.

HELD:

No. It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under

Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional

personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the

present case, the child was dead when separated from its mothers womb. This is not to say that

the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly

upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child. Even if a

cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-

natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical

personality.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without

costs.

De Jesus vs Syquia


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TI TLE: De Jesus v Syquia

CITATI ON: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by

the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age

and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in

the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a

consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his

name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to

Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend

Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila

where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,

defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the

arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar

Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to

Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted

possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that

as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael

Loanco.


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HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters

are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement

is that the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status

of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution toadmit the status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to

Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in

civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the

defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to

modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount

of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has

jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante

TI TLE: L imjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante

CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public

convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is

financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued

a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate


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Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent

jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of

certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil

Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose

of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of

juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which

survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application forpublic convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572

of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of

Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public

Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Dumlao vs Quality Plastics

TI TLE: Dumlao v Quali ty Plastics

CITATION: GR No. L27956, Apri l 30, 1976

FACTS:

Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants

Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum

of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or

else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the

amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title

No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the

sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond.


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Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not

aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24,

1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf

and his co-defendants.

Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in

Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment

of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in

his capacity as administrator of Orias testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the

ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:

Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead

prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality

Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-

defendant.

However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent

nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his

person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity

which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.

The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does

not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.


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WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case

No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of

Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.

Frivaldo vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)

Facts:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January

1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities,

Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his

personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and

procl

persons cases

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