petition for a writ of mandamus requesting u.s. attorney general holder to investigate
DESCRIPTION
Melvin Requests Attorney General Holder to Investigate acts that were committed against her during legal proceedings of a lawsuit that consist of Privacy Act claims and FTCA claimsTRANSCRIPT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTEASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
CIVIL NO. 5:10-CV-464-D
PAMELA MELVIN
Plaintiff, vs.
PETITON FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUSERIC H. HOLDER, JR., United States Attorney General of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant. ________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
A.
“In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent,
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to come a law unto himself.
It invites anarchy.” (United States v. Olmstead 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
By Justice Louis Brandeis
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2. In this civil action, plaintiff seeks an order requiring the defendant, United States
Attorney General Holder, to investigate her allegations of criminal misconduct committed by
federal employees of the federal courts, including but not limited to Judge Louise Flanagan and
the Clerks of District Court and the Court of Appeals, Dennis Iavarone and Patricia Connor;
employees and legal counsels of the Social Security Administration and the Veterans’
Administration; employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration; and United States
Attorney George Holding and his assistants Rudy Renfer and Edward Gray. Plaintiff alleges
that these individuals intentionally committed acts and conspired to commit acts against her that
were not only violations of the United States Constitution but were also violations of federal
criminal statutes including 18 U.S.C. § 241; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 18 U.S.C. § 245; 18 U.S.C. §
2071; 18 U.S.C. § 1001; 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
3. Because the acts plaintiff alleges in this petition were committed against plaintiff
by federal employees and individuals whom the Department of Justice has exclusion jurisdiction,
and plaintiff asserts that the acts were committed against her because of her race, plaintiff is
petitioning the court for an order requiring the United States Attorney General, Eric Holder, to
investigate her allegations and afterward, act according to his findings.
4. Within the Department of Justice, are two Divisions that exist for this purpose --
the Public Integrity Section and the Civil Rights Division?
5. The Public Integrity Section (PIN) has exclusive jurisdiction over and investigates
and prosecutes allegations of criminal misconduct on the part of federal judges and elected and
appointed federal, state and local officials. This exclusive jurisdiction also exists over
individuals who are supervised by the federal judges and elected and appointed federal, state and
local officials who participated in the criminal conspiracies and acts alleged in this petition. PIN
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oversees the federal effort to combat corruption through prosecution of individuals at all levels of
government.
6. The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice works to uphold the civil
and constitutional rights of all individuals, particularly some of the most vulnerable members of
our society. The Division prosecutes hate crimes and crimes committed in violation of federal
criminal statutes that were designed to protect the civil rights of individuals.
Parties
7. Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the United States and of Cumberland County,
State of North Carolina. In 2006, she filed civil action no. 5:06-CV306-Fl against SSA and its
Commissioner alleging that SSA violated her constitutional right to appeal SSA’s adverse
decisions, that SSA failed to provide in writing information regarding SSA’s adverse decisions
and that SSA failed to afford her opportunity to hearings and recoup-hearing before withholding
benefits as was required by the regulation and codes of the Social Security Act.
8. In April 2007, the case was dismissed with the court ordering Commissioner
Astrue to proceed to expedited administrative reviews of plaintiff’s appeals. Commissioner
Astrue refused to comply with the order. In August 2007, SSA reported to plaintiff that SSA
had neither her written appeals nor the court order of April 2007 in its record. On May 26,
2009, plaintiff submitted to the federal district court the documents required to file civil action
no. 5:09-CV0235-FL alleging damages against SSA for failing to maintain its record as required
by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a (e) (5) and (g) (1) (C), the Privacy Act’s maintenance provision, and
damages against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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9. Most all of the acts alleged in this petition resulted from conspiracies and acts
committed to force, intimidate and to threaten plaintiff into abandoning the civil action filed in
2009 and committed were against her for refusing to do so.
10. Defendant Eric Holder is the Attorney General of the United States of America,
and is named solely in his official capacity. Attorney General Holder, via Public Integrity
Section and the Civil Rights Division, is responsible for enforcing federal laws, civil rights and
the Constitution and has exclusive jurisdiction over the allegations of criminal misconduct
plaintiff alleges in this petition.
B. Jurisdiction and Venue
12. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this cause of action
pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 United States Code, Chapter 85, Section 1361 (mandamus),
and Title 28 United States Code, Chapter 85, Section 1331.
13. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Title 28 United States Code, Chapter 85,
Section 1361 (mandamus) and Title 28 United States Code, Chapter 85, Section 1331.
FACTS CONSTITUTING A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
II.
While Using Law Enforcement and/or Imprisonment, Federal Employees, Including Court Employees and Attorneys, Repeatedly Threatened, Harassed
and Intimidated Plaintiff
A. First threat and intimidation against plaintiff using law enforcement and/or
imprisonment
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14. On January 15, 2009, two important letters were sent to plaintiff that provided a
cause for retaliation and threats.
15. First letter: By letter dated January 15, 2009, Mr. Grant R. Vink of the Office of
Senate Legal Counsel of Washington, DC informed plaintiff that her Administrative Tort Claim
that included Senator Burr’s acts was received.
16. In January 2007, after plaintiff requested Senator Burr’s assistance, he instead
assisted VA in committing acts of harassment, intimidation and retaliation against plaintiff. He
again assisted VA in its harassment and retaliation in July 2007 after plaintiff sent a letter to the
Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs and the letter was given to Senator Burr because he was
the Senator for the state of North Carolina. In July 2007, Congress was receiving the first of
many reports regarding VA’s inadequate medical treatment and the harm caused by it.
17. Second letter: By email on January 15, 2009, plaintiff requested Mr. John
Carlo to send her the certified mail number that was required for plaintiff to receive the denial of
her Administrative Tort Claim. That same day, Mr. Carlo sent plaintiff a letter stating that the
certified #70070220000088781567 was used to send plaintiff her denial letter and that the
enclosed green card receipt reflected plaintiff’s signature and receipt of her written denial on
August 1, 2008. However, certified mail #70070220000088781567 was a letter denying the
Administrative Tort Claim of Mindy Zied-Campbell and Dennis Campbell of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, in the amount of one million dollars.
18. Upon information and belief, on January 15, 2009, (incorrectly dated in another
document) a Fayetteville Police Detective made phone calls to individuals who reside in South
Carolina. The detective alleged that she was attempting to contact plaintiff. The detective left
her name and phone number and asked the South Carolina individuals to have plaintiff return her
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call. The detective provided no further information nor requested information from the
individuals she called. Additionally, on January 15, 2009, someone had plaintiff's cell phone
turned.
19. The individuals in South Carolina contacted plaintiff's relatives in North
Carolina and informed of the detective calls. Immediately after obtaining this information, one
of plaintiff’s relatives residing in Fayetteville, North Carolina, contacted the detective who
refused to acknowledge that she had attempted to contact plaintiff. During that phone call, the
detective did not request any information regarding plaintiff nor attempted to obtain information
about how she could make contact with plaintiff. The detective made no further attempt to
contact plaintiff.1
B. The second threat and intimidation using law enforcement and/or imprisonment
20. In February 2009, plaintiff received information that Senator Burr was
communicating with an organization known to blacks as a certain white supremacist
organization. Plaintiff was advised of this and that she needed protection.
21. On May 7, 2009, plaintiff wrote a letter requesting protection from the United
States Attorney General Eric Holder. However, she did not mail the letter.
22. On May 12, 2009, believing that VA had obtained access to her emails,
plaintiff sent herself an email that referred to the white supremacist organization and she jokingly
asked Mr. Sessoms, VA Regional Counsel in Winston Salem, to proof read the rough draft of her
1 An address that the Fayetteville Police Department could have used to contact plaintiff was listed with the Cumberland Co. property tax office and the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle and License. However, it was impossible for the police department to use that address to contact plaintiff without there being a witness whose permanent address is Fayetteville, North Carolina. Additionally, plaintiff was in traffic court the following week and no attempt was made to contact her.
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complaint against SSA. The rough draft in the email was a complaint to stop the harassment
against plaintiff and did not consist of the claims alleged in the civil action plaintiff submitted to
the court on May 26, 2009.
23. On May 14, 2009, plaintiff received a letter from James Terry, Chair of the
Board of Veterans' Appeals of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. The letter talked about
plaintiff’s service connected compensation claim and Mr. Terry alleged that this country’s leader
had requested that he write the letter. The letter had no date but its envelope was stamped dated
by the United States Postal Service with the date of May 12, 2009. This country’s leader had no
knowledge of plaintiff’s existence.
24. Plaintiff believed that Mr. Terry’s letter reminding her of the service connected
claim evidenced VA’s access to her emails and that the service connected claim was used to
attempt to intimidate her into not filing a civil action against SSA and the United States or
against the United States. VA had used the service connected claim twice before, in February
2007 and November 2008, to intimidate plaintiff.
25. Because plaintiff believed Mr. Terry’s letter of May 12, 2009, evidenced VA’s
access to her emails and in her email of May 12, 2009, she referred to the white supremacist
organization, on May 16, 2009, she mailed her letter dated May 7, 2009, to the U.S. Attorney
General’s office. See Exhibit A. According to the U.S. Postal Service, plaintiff’s letter was
delivered to U.S. Attorney General’s office on May 20, 2009 at 11:45 via certified mail 7009
0080 0001 3699 3746.
26. Upon information and belief, because the U.S. Attorney General’s office
possesses the responsibility of representing all federal employees in legal matters, plaintiff’s
letter dated May 7, 2009, was sent to VA and to Senator Burr.
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27. Ten days after mailing the letter to the U.S. Attorney General’s office, on May
26, 2009, plaintiff filed civil action no. 5:09-CV-306-FL against SSA and the United States
alleging six claims for relief under the Privacy Act (both the maintenance and access provisions),
the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).
28. On or about June 3, 2009, during the morning at about 10:00 a.m., four
Cumberland County Sheriff’s vehicles packed with black men drove very slowly north on the
street plaintiff resides. The vehicles turned around and very slowly drove south. The two black
males in the front seat of each vehicle were in uniform. The others in the back seat were in
civilian clothing. Plaintiff resides in the city that is serviced by the Fayetteville Police
Department and not by the Cumberland County Sheriff Department.
29. In the 1960s, and 1970s, in Fayetteville, North Carolina, a certain white
supremacist organization would line several of their vehicles back to back and slowly drive past
the homes of blacks. Often, they stopped on the side of the road to burn their crosses. All
individuals who possess authority and are involved in the acts committed against plaintiff are
fully aware that plaintiff, a black female, is old enough to have experienced and remembered the
acts of the white supremacist organization of the 60s and 70s.
30. On May 26, 2009, this district court received all five pages of plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis. On June 17, 2009, after being in the court’s case file
for three weeks, from May 26, 2009 thru June 16, 2009, the fifth page of plaintiff’s application to
proceed in forma pauperis disappeared from the court’s file and plaintiff’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis was not granted.
C. The third threat and intimidate using law enforcement and/or imprisonment
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31. On May 26, 2009, plaintiff submitted to this court documents to file civil action
no. 5:06-CV-235-FL against SSA and the United State. The case was filed with the court on
June 24, 2009, after the 5th page of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis dis-
appeared from the court’s case file on June 17, 2009, and plaintiff paid cost on June 23, 2009.
32. On November 25, 2009, at 11:31 a.m., via certified mail, the U.S. Postal Service
delivered to the Clerk of Court's office plaintiff’s document entitled “Memorandum in
Opposition to Mr. Astrue's Opposing Response to Motion to Strike and Motion for Entry for
Default.” An employee of the clerk's office, Teri Carpenter, signed for and received the
document. However, the document was filed with the Clerk’s office on November 30, 2009.
33. On January 8, 2009, plaintiff called the U.S. District Court case manager's office
of civil action no. 5:06-CV-235-FL. Plaintiff told the employee who answered the phone that
in the past, she did not receive documents that were filed with the court and asked the employee
whether documents had been filed in civil action no. 5:09-CV-235-FL by the Court, Mr. Astrue,
Defendant SSA or Defendant United States since November 19, 2009. The employee harshly
stated, "You need to go to them,” and she refused to check the case file.
34. Plaintiff continued asking the employee to check the case file and the employee
finally checked the file. The employee reported to plaintiff that the last document was filed on
November 30, 2009 and that it was plaintiff’s memorandum dated November 24, 2009.
35. Plaintiff told the employee that the memorandum was delivered to the clerk’s
office on November 25th. The employee replied the memorandum was delivered to the building
on November 25th but the Clerk’s office received it on November 30 and filed it on the day it was
received.
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36. After talking with the employee, plaintiff sent Ashley Harder, Commissioner
Astrue’s attorney, an email advising her that plaintiff’s memorandum dated November 24, 2010,
was received by the Clerk’s office on November 25th and not on the 30th. After that email was
sent, plaintiff’s access to that email account was blocked.
37. During the following week, someone had plaintiff’s cell phone turned on and left
a message on the voice mailbox of that phone. Plaintiff discovered the message on Friday,
January 15, 2009. The next day, plaintiff checked the voice mailbox of her cell phone and
received the message. A few minutes after plaintiff received that message, another message was
left on her cell phone. The caller of that message alleged that he had a friend who had gotten
himself in trouble and he wanted to know whether the person he called wanted to go with him to
see his friend in jail.
D. Officers of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration attempt to forcibly enter plaintiff’s apartment without a warrant and without plaintiff committing a crime
38. In the first three claims for relief in civil action no. 5:09-CV-235-FL, pursuant to
the maintenance provision of the Privacy Act, plaintiff alleged she was damaged as a result of
SSA failing to maintain her disability claim record as required by the Act. SSA never appeared
before the court order of May 13, 2010, and to date, SSA has not responded to those three
claims. The United States never responded to the one claim, the sixth claim for relief, that was
alleged against it under the Federal Tort Claim Act for SSA’s violation of the court order of
April 2007.
39. In the Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R) dated March 24, 2010, the
Magistrate Judge determined that plaintiff’s first three Privacy Acts claims alleged under the
Act’s maintenance provision were sufficient claims and that SSA should be required to respond
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to the first claim within 20 days of an order. Additionally, the Magistrate recommended
dismissing the claims that requested documents and hearing tapes, the 4 th and 5th claims, along
with the sixth claim, the FTCA claim.
40. On April 21, 2009, United States Attorney Rudy Renfer responded to plaintiff’s
objections to the magistrate’s M&R dated March 24, 2010. That was the only document filed
by a defendant in case before the court issued its order on May 13, 2010.
41. In Mr. Renfer’s document of April 21, 2009, he stated that plaintiff’s first three
Privacy Acts claims that were alleged under the maintenance provision of the Privacy Act were
Bivens claims that should be dismissed. He also admitted that SSA violated the court order of
April 2007.
42. In the Bivens’ civil action, while acting under federal authority, six agents of the
Federal Bureau of narcotics entered Bivens’ home by forced, without warrant and probable
cause, and while using unreasonable force, arrested him on false narcotics violations.
43. On the morning of April 27, 2010, at about 7: 43 a.m., six days after Mr. Renfer’s
assertion that plaintiff’s first three claims for relief were Bivens claims, plaintiff heard men
surround her apartment from front to back.2 Seconds later, one man grabbed the handle of the
front screen door and attempted to force it open but it did not open. He then shouted, "It's
locked from the inside, she's in there." Plaintiff then heard someone attempting to force open
the back door.
44. At one point, plaintiff looked out her front window and saw about nine men.
Two men were at plaintiff’s front door. Another two were in the front yard. About five men
were standing at the front right corner of her apartment. Each man was wearing a black gym
22 Plaintiff resides at the end of a triplex apartment.
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shirt with the word "POLICE" printed in large white letters on the front of the shirt. (On back of
the shirts, the letters “DEA” were printed.)
45. Parked directly at the steps of plaintiff's front door was a Cumberland County
Sheriff's vehicle.
46. At one point, one officer stated, "She's in there, let's go in." At that time, the
two officers at the front door began pushing hard against the door. Seconds later, plaintiff
heard men pushing hard against the backdoor. At the same time, one or two others began
banging on the front window then attempted to open it. Another was attempting to open the
back window and was also banging on it. To plaintiff, the sounds the officers made on the
windows and doors indicated that they were going to break the windows and doors and enter.
At that point, she began having chest pains and difficulty breathing. Plaintiff called 911 for
emergency help.
47. Plaintiff explained to the 911 operator that about nine men wearing black gym
shirts with the word, "POLICE" printed on the front of the shirts were attempting to break into
her home. She stated that she had not committed a crime and that there was no reason for the
officers to be at her home. She further stated she has a pending lawsuit against the federal
government, that the federal government had committed other acts against her to prevent her
from continuing with the lawsuit and that she was certain that federal attorneys sent the police
officers to her home to get her because of the lawsuit. Plaintiff further stated that she was
having chest pain and difficulty breathing. She asked the 911 operator to get her help fast.
48. The officers did not state why they wanted to get into plaintiff's apartment or
why they wanted plaintiff. They did not knock. They did not asked to come in and made no
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attempt to talk with plaintiff. They simply appeared, surrounded the apartment then attempted
to force their way inside.
49. The 911 operated asked plaintiff whether she had experienced chest pain and
difficult breathing in the past. Plaintiff replied she had and had been hospitalized because of
those symptoms. The operator asked plaintiff for her phone number and other information.
Plaintiff was unable to provide the information due to what was occurring at that time.
50. The 911 operated asked plaintiff to hold on while she checked with the
Fayetteville Police Department to determine whether it had sent officers to plaintiff's home.
Plaintiff asked the operator to check the sheriff department instead. (Plaintiff had not reported to
the operator the sheriff’s vehicle parked at her front door.) The operator responded that plaintiff
resides in the city and that the city police service her area and not the sheriff. The operator
checked with the police department and discovered that no city police officer had been sent to
plaintiff's home nor were there reports of city officers being at plaintiff's home. (Law
enforcement officers are required to call in their locations.) The operator also checked with the
sheriff department and discovered that no deputy sheriff had been sent to nor was a deputy
checked out at plaintiff's home.
51. Plaintiff asked the operator to check to see whether there were warrants on her.
The operator checked and afterwards, stated that there no warrants on plaintiff. The operator
also stated that she was sending the Fayetteville Police and EMS to assist plaintiff.
52. DEA officers continued their efforts to force entry, pushing against and
banging on the doors and windows. Fearing that she would die via heart attack or be killed or
arrested by the officers once they entered, plaintiff asked the 911 operator to call her mother.
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53. At one point, the 911 operator discovered that DEA officers were at plaintiff's
home and told plaintiff that the officers at her home were not of the local police or sheriff
departments as plaintiff had believed. Not understanding that the operator was stating that
officers were at her home but were not of the local police and the sheriff departments, plaintiff
replied that they were (officers at her home) because the sheriff's vehicle was parked at her front
door.
54. At hearing this, the 911 operator left the conversation for a short period and
immediately, the sheriff's vehicle disappeared.
55. After several minutes of talking with the 911 operator, plaintiff heard the siren
of EMS. But EMS did not immediately appear. While EMS waited not far away, the officers
ceased all attempts to forcibly enter plaintiff’s apartment. When plaintiff looked outside of her
window to see if they had left, the officers were standing in the front yard. No officer was at her
doors or windows. After several minutes of silence, plaintiff hear EMS’ siren outside her
apartment. She did not see the DEA officers. A Fayetteville Police Office also arrived to
assist EMS.
56. On May 13, 2010, two weeks and two days after DEA’s attempt to forcibly
enter plaintiff’s apartment, the Honorable Judge Louise Flanagan issued an order that converted
plaintiff’ first three Privacy Act claims into Bivens claims and she dismissed the three claims for
no longer being the very Privacy Act claims that plaintiff filed in the complaint and that the law
required those claims to be.
E. The Fifth threat to use law enforcement and imprisonment to intimidate plaintiff: Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010
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a. Judge Flanagan’s uses prisoners’ civil rights cases Scinto v. Preston, 231 F. App'x 250 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) and Tisdale v. South Carolina, 157 F. App'x 593 (4th CiT. 2005) (per curiam)
57. In civil action no. 5:9-CV-235-FL, in Judge Flanagan order of May 13, 2010,
while she converted plaintiff’s first three Privacy Act claims into Bivens claims and dismissed
the claims for no longer being Privacy Act claims, she granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the
complaint to add two claims under 42 U.S.C. §1985 against Commissioner Astrue and one of his
employees.
58. However, she refused to allow the required process of serve on the two
defendants. On August 27, 2010, plaintiff filed civil action no. 5:10-CV-347-D that consists of
several claims alleged under 42 U.S.C. §1985 against federal and non-federal individuals in their
individual capacity.
59. In case no. 5:10-CV-347-D, plaintiff alleged that as a result of a predetermined
agreement (conspiracy) made between the defendants and/or their attorneys and Judge Flanagan
in case no. 5:9-CV-235-FL, plaintiff was deprived of federally protected rights, that her
Constitutional rights were violated and that DEA officers were sent to her home. 3
60. Plaintiff also alleged that SSA and VA’s attorneys conspired to ensure that
plaintiff did not receive the medical treatment and medication her medical problems required,
and did not receive testing for diabetes (which develops as a result of the treatment VA
provided).
61. In case no. 5:9-CV-235-FL, in Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010, on
page 6 (Exhibit B) she wrote:
33 The case will be divided into two: one will consist of violations and acts occurring before the civil action filed on June 24, 2010 and another afterwards.
15
“It appears to this court that plaintiff’s notice of appeal has been filed prematurely. See, e.g., Scinto v. Preston, 231 F. App'x 250 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal of district court order denying motion for default judgment because order was neither final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order); Tisdale v. South Carolina, 157 F. App'x 593 (4th CiT. 2005) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal of district court order denying motion for judgment on the pleadings on the same grounds). Moreover, the court finds no other justification for staying its consideration of defendants' motion where any disposition of the same will either be favorable to plaintiff or will ripen her now-pending appeal. As such, plaintiff’s motions for a stay are DENIED.”
62. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was invalidated and void at the time district court
received it on May 21, 2010, because she had also filed a motion for reconsideration regarding
the order of May 13, 2010. Therefore, the notice of appeal was void at the time it was filed with
the Clerk’s office of the Court of Appeals. However, without focusing on the notice of appeal at
this time, within Judge Flanagan’s statement quoted above, plaintiff construes threats and
intimidation.
63. Because VA employees are and have been attempting to prevent plaintiff from
filing in federal court the claims she alleged in Administrative Tort Claims that VA received, VA
employees and attorneys have had plaintiff under surveillance since 2007. They have access to
her emails and trace all websites she visits. As a result, federal employees and attorneys are
fully aware of plaintiff’s regular use of Google.
64. “Scinto v. Preston, 231 F. App'x 250 (4th Cir. 2007)) (per curiam)” as Judge
Flanagan has written in her order of September 14, 2010, did not exist until Judge Flanagan’s
order of September 4, 2010, was written. It is not a citation of a decision as Judge Flanagan
asserted in her order. However, a search under Google of “Scinto v. Preston, 231 F. App'x 250
(4th Cir. 2007)) (per curiam)” as Judge Flanagan has written it, produced three reference sites in
the following order:
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1. Melvin v. Social Security Administration- Laws, Life and Legal…
2. Scinto v. Preston , 170, Fed. Appx. 834, 836 (4th Cir. 2010); and
3. Claims Related to Medical Care For Prisoners with Diabetes. See Exhibit C.
65. The first reference site provided by Google, “Melvin v. Social Security
Administration- Laws, Life and Legal…,” is Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010, in
civil action no. 5:09-CV-235-FL.4 Exhibit D.
66. The second reference site provided by Google is that of Scinto v. Preston, 170,
Fed. Appx. 834, 836 (4th Cir. 2010) which is not the one provided by Judge Flanagan. Exhibit E.
In the complaint of Scinto v. Preston, the plaintiff, Paul Scinto, alleged that while he was
incarcerated, the defendants prevented him from receiving medical treatment for his diabetes.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, a civil rights statute, Scinto further alleged that the defendants
conspired to falsely arrest and prosecute him. With the exception of Scinto being incarcerated,
the civil action that plaintiff Melvin in the above captioned case, file on August 12, 2007, no.
5:09-CV-347-D, resembles Scinto’s case.
67. In Judge’s Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010, instead of providing a citation
that pertains to a premature appeal as she explicitly stated she was doing in her order of
September 14, 2010, she provide a contrived citation that lead to another citation where the
plaintiff, Scinto, had twice been jailed and the Court of Appeals affirmed district court’s denial
to grant Scinto relief on his civil rights claims.
68. The real citation and decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ dismissing
Scinto’s appeal for being premature is Scinto v. Preston, 234, Fed. Appx. 106 (4th Cir. 2007).
44 Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010, can be found at: http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=in%20fdco%2020100914994.xml&docbase=cslwar3-2007-curr
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Exhibit F. However within that written decision, the Court of Appeals did not indicate that
Scinto’s case pertained to claims alleged under 42 U.S.C.§1983 and that the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed district court’s denial to grant Scinto’s relief on his claims. However, the
case law that Judge Flanagan created and provided in her order of September 14, 2010, lead to
one that did.
69. The third reference site provided by Google is, “Claims Related to Medical Care
for Prisoners with Diabetes.” This site talks about prisoner’s civil actions alleging malpractice
claims including claims of the defendants failing to provide treatment for diabetes. 5
70. Judge Flanagan’s Tisdale v. South Carolina, 157 F. App'x 593 (4th CiT. 2005)
(per curiam) provided in her order is a case that plaintiff has been unable to find that Judge
Flanagan alleges pertains to a premature appeal. A Google search under Judge Flanagan’s
Tisdale v. South Carolina, 157 F. App'x 593 (4th CiT. 2005) (per curiam) produced her order of
September 14, 2010. Exhibit G.
71. A Google search under Tisdale v. South Carolina and not the citation provided by
Judge Flanagan, Tisdale v. South Carolina, 157 F. App'x 593 (4th CiT. 2005) (per curiam),
produced two cases that do not pertain to a premature appeal as the judge alleged. At
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/southcarolina/scdce/
0:2009cv00403/164877/10/, a Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Clayton Howard
Tisdale’s civil rights action against officials of the state of South Carolina pursuant to 42
U.S.C.§1983. Mr. Tisdale was in prison at the time and also requested, in his civil action, to be
released. His request was denied and his case was dismissed. The Magistrate Judge
55 See, http://www.diabetes.org/assets/pdfs/know-your-rights/for-lawyers/correctional-institutions/atty-prison-cases-memo1-11-10.pdf .
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recommended that service of process on the defendants not be performed. In plaintiff’s Melvin
civil action no. 5:09-CV-235-FL, Judge Flanagan denied plaintiff the right to serve process on
Commissioner Astrue and his employee although plaintiff paid cost of court and did not proceed
in forma pauperis as Mr. Tisdale.
72. In another case found on the web that has a Tisdale as a party, South Carolina v.
Antonio Tisdale, Antonio Tisdale appeals a conviction of entering a bank with intent to steal,
armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The
court sentenced him to a total of thirty-two years imprisonment.
b. Judge Flanagan’s use another prison’s case law: Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028 , 1031 (4th CiT. 1986)
73. In the order of May 13, 2010, in civil action 5:09-CV-235-FL, Judge Flanagan
altered plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings by changing the date the motion was
filed, the relief sought in the motion and the caption of another document indicating that that
document was the motion for judgment on the pleadings. She then denied the motion as “docket
entries 50 and 51.” Without reviewing the court’s case file, it was impossible for plaintiff to
know what Judge Flanagan had denied at docket entries 50 and 51; only the defendants and/or
their attorneys knew what Judge Flanagan had denied.
74. In order to appeal the denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiff
needed a specific denial that the Court of Appeals would accept. On June 17, 2010, plaintiff
requested the judge to provide an emergency explicit and specific denial of her motion for
judgment on the pleadings to appeal the denial. In Judge Flanagan’s’ orders of July 14, 2010,
and September 14, 2010, she alleged that plaintiff had filed a motion for reconsideration of the
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denial when plaintiff requested an explicit and specific denial. The judge denied the alleged
reconsideration.
75. On July 19, plaintiff moved for Judge Flanagan to provide evidence that plaintiff
had moved for a reconsideration. In Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010, she
asserted that Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th CiT. 1986) supported her liberally
construing plaintiffs request for an explicit and specific denial as one seeking reconsideration of
the denial of the motion at docket entry 50.
76. Plaintiff contends that the four points below constitute an intentional scheme to
use the case of a prisoner of Carter v. Hutto to accomplish a goal other than proving the authority
to liberally apply the judge’s own comprehension to the writings of a pro se plaintiff.
77. First, at Google’s site under Judge Flanagan’s Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028 ,
1031 (4th CiT. 1986), was Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010.
78. Second, Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1986) provides many
cases filed by prisoners alleging civil rights violations. Each case was dismissed.
79. Third, Judge Flanagan’s assertion that Carter v. Hutto 781 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th
Cir. 1986) provides the authority to liberally construe her own meaning, that is different from the
meaning intended by a pro se plaintiff and that is different from the explicitly and
unambiguously written statements and words of the pro se plaintiff, constitutes an unlawful
violation of the Constitution to which she had taken a sworn oath not to violation.
80. Carter v. Hutto 781 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1986) and the many prisoners’
cases cited within it authorized the court to provide a liberal reading “in the light most favorable
to the pro se plaintiff,” which include construing the meaning of the written statements to be
what the pro se plaintiff says, wants and/or needs the meaning to be and construing the meaning
20
of the written statements, as in Carter v. Hutto, as the plaintiff complying with the requirements
and orders.6
81. Fourth, Judge Flanagan had never before used prisoners’ law cases and could
have selected one of the many available non-prisoners’ cases to support her assertion that she
had the authority to liberally construe her own meaning to plaintiff’s pleading if she had that
authority. More importantly, the judge could have used a more recently prisoner’s case,
Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197- Supreme Court 2007, to demonstrate her point. In that
prisoner’s case, the Supreme Court elaborated on the “liberally construed.”
“A document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed," Estelle, 429 U.S., at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, and "a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(f) ("All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice").”
82. Plaintiff asserts that Judge Flanagan’s use of prisoners’ civil right cases, her use
of two citations that she created and falsely asserted the citations to be of prisoner’s civil rights
cases and her misuse of a prisoner’s civil rights case, Carter v. Hutto, evidenced intentional
intimidation and threats that include but is not limited to the threat to imprison plaintiff. 7
III.
66 Despite that fact that Judge Flanagan alleged to have construed the request for an emergency explicit and specific denial as a request for reconsideration needed for the appeal that was pending with the Court of Appeals, her assertion to have construed the authority that requires the courts to liberally read a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff to mean in the light most adverse to a pro se plaintiff is not the case. Plaintiff asserts that Judge Flanagan is fully aware that Carter v. Hutto required a reading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and that she used Carter v. Hutto as a vehicle for intimidation and threats. 77 It is not uncommon for individuals who conspire to commit a crime to also conspire to present as the guilty party of the crime, a person who is less likely to be convicted because of a defense of being a juvenile, a self-defense claim, a mental illness defense or an immunity defense.
21
The Removal of Plaintiff’s Documents from the Court’s Case File in Civil Action 5:09-CV-245: Violation of Federal Criminal Law 18 U.S.C. 2071
A. The destruction of the fifth page of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.
82. On May 26, 2009, upon plaintiff approaching the counter of the office of the
Clerk of Court of this district court to file civil action no. 5-09-CV-235, Jackie, an employee of
that office, stated to plaintiff that she had to receive from plaintiff $350 before taking plaintiff’
documents to file a civil action. When plaintiff replied she wanted to proceed in forma
pauperis, Jackie handed her a package that consisted of many documents including an
application to proceed in forma pauperis.
83. Plaintiff completed the application, made a copy of it and again approached the
Clerk’s counter. Before accepting the documents plaintiff had to submit, Jackie first requested
and received from plaintiff a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis. Jackie
counted all five pages of the application and inspected those pages. After counting and
inspecting the application, Jackie accepted plaintiff’s other documents.
84. Afterwards, while the two were discussing whether plaintiff’s documents could be
stamp dated before plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and the civil
action filed, Teri Carpenter walked into the office and stated she would take over. As a result,
plaintiff and Ms. Carpenter started over with Ms. Carpenter inspecting plaintiff’s documents.
85. Ms. Carpenter counted the required five pages of the application and inspected
each to ensure that the application consisted of all required information. Afterwards, she
compared the original five pages that the court was to receive to the copied five pages plaintiff
would keep.
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86. After determining that she received all five pages of the application to proceed in
forma pauperis and that the application was complete, Ms. Carpenter stamped dated plaintiff’s
copy. Exhibit H.
87. On May 29, 2009, the Clerk’s office filed plaintiff’s documents in the electronic
filing system as received but not as filed but the application to proceed in forma pauperis was
stamped dated as filed on May 26, 2009. From May 29, 2009, through June 16 th, 2009, all five
pages of plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis were in the court’s electronic case
file. However, on June 17, 2009, the 5th page of that application disappeared. That same day,
in an order, Magistrate Judge David Daniel declared the 5th page of plaintiff’s application un-
received and ordered plaintiff to submit a complete application by July 1, 2009. See Exhibit I.
He further ruled that the case would be dismissed if a complete application was not filed with the
court by July 1, 2000.
88. On June 23, 2009, plaintiff paid the court $350, the cost of civil action 5-09-CV-
235-FL because: (1) the 5th page had mysteriously disappeared from the court’s case file after
being in the file for 3 weeks; (2) the court had never before (plaintiff’s case) waited 3 weeks to
make a decision on an application to proceed in forma pauperis (plaintiff checked the courts
filed and discovered this to be the case): (3) plaintiff had no control over the documents she filed
with the court and could not prevent another document or page from disappearing; and more
importantly (4) if, after plaintiff filed another application as ordered and a page of that new
application disappeared, the court would dismiss plaintiff’s case without further notice to
plaintiff, barring plaintiff from re-filing the claims because the statute of limitation had expired
on the sixth claim (against the U.S.) and other claims were due to expire in the near future.
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VI.
While Under Judicial Sworn Oath, The Honorable Judge Flanagan Presents
Before the United States District Court Information and Statements While Knowing
Same to be False: Civil Action no. 5:09-CV-235
A. Hearing Tapes
89. In plaintiff's August 4, 2010 motion to withdraw her July 2010 motion to compel
SSA to produce documents and hearing tapes, plaintiff specifically wrote that she received
cassette tapes from SSA that did not consist of her hearings. Plaintiff further specifically wrote
in that motion that the original tapes of her hearings had been destroyed or no longer exists.
90. However, in Judge Flanagan’s order of September 14, 2010, (Exhibit B), at the
bottom of page 3, she wrote that plaintiff stated that she received some of the requested hearing
tapes.
“She later moved to withdraw this request, stating that she received some of the
requested hearing tapes and found them to be inaudible.”
91. Before the court sent plaintiff a copy of the Judge Flanagan’s order of September
14, 2010, the order with Judge Flanagan’s false statements was put on the web under Melvin v.
SSA; Scinto v. Preston, 231 F. App'x 250 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) and Tisdale v. South
Carolina, 157 F. App'x 593 (4th CiT. 2005) (per curiam); and
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=in%20fdco
%2020100914994.xml&docbase=cslwar3-2007-curr.
B. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
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92. In the order of May 13, 2010, Judge Flanagan denied plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings as docket entry 50, falsely alleged that in it plaintiff sought relief in
relation to the Magistrate’s M&R and falsely alleged that the motion was filed on April 21, 2010.
93. Plaintiff requested monetary relief on her first and sixth claims for relief and she
requested documents and hearing tapes of her SSA disability record upon her fourth and fifth
claims for relief. Plaintiff did not request relief in relation to the M&R as Judge Flanagan
stated. The provisions of the Privacy Act, the FIOA and the FTCA do not permit any relief other
than the relief plaintiff requested.
94. Plaintiff did not file a document on April 21, 2010, as Judge Flanagan stated.
But The United States did and provided evidence that supported plaintiff’s first and sixth claims
for relief. The United States admitted that SSA had violated the court order of April 2007 and
that it was not maintained in the record as plaintiff alleged in her first and sixth claims for relief.
In plaintiff’s supplement motion for judgment on the pleadings and in the alternative, motion for
default that plaintiff filed on April 30, 2010, plaintiff asserted that the United States’ statements
were evidence supporting her entitlement to relief on motions.
C. Judge Flanagan changes the caption of the court order of April 2007 from Melvin v.
Astrue to Melvin v. Barnhart
95. In Judge Flanagan’s order filed with the court on April 11, 2007, the defendant,
Commissioner Astrue, was ordered to proceed to expedited reviews of plaintiff’s appeals.
Commissioner Astrue refused to comply with the order.
96. In Judge Flanagan’s order of May 13, 2010, she changed the caption of the order
of April 2007 from Melvin v. Astrue to Melvin v. Barnhart. Plaintiff had amended the
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complaint by adding intentional emotional distress and civil rights claims against Commissioner
Astrue and his employee as a result of his receiving the order and violating same.
Commissioner Barnhart left the Social Security Administration several months before the order.
D. Creating new first three claims to replace plaintiff’s Privacy Act Claims
97. In the complaint filed in district court on June 24, 2009, plaintiff asserted the
court’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e)(5), (g)(1)(C), (d)(1), (g)(1)
(B).
98. In the first, second and third claims for relief, in paragraphs 104, 105, 116, 117,
126, and 127 of the complaint, plaintiff specifically wrote the words, “ In violation of 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e) (5 and (g) (1) (C).”
99. In paragraphs 105, 117 and 127, plaintiff also wrote the words of the statue
5 U.S.C. §552a (g)(1)(C):
“In violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (5) and (g) (1) (C), ….. SSA has willfully and intentionally failed to maintain its record concerning plaintiff with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to plaintiff that may be made on the basis of said record, and consequently a determination was made which is adverse to plaintiff.
100. On pages 15 and 16 of the M&R (attached as Exhibit J), the Magistrate Judge
determined plaintiff's first three claims for relief contain the elements required by 5 U.S.C.§ 552a
(g) (1) (C):
"In order to maintain a cause of action for violation of the provision of the Privacy Act, plaintiff must allege: (1) the agency's failure to maintain accurate records; (2) an adverse agency decision resulting from the inaccurate records (the causation element); and (3) the willful or intentional quality of the agency's action. Id. (citing White v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 840 F. 2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also5 U.S.C.
26
§ 552a (g) (1) (C), (g)(4). "
"At this juncture of the litigation, there appears to be no basis on which this claim may be disposed of sua sponte by the court. Therefore, this claim survives review of the court at this time and, for the reasons stated below, it is recommended that Defendant SSA be permitted to answer or otherwise respond to this cause of action."
Then on page 25 of the M&R, the magistrate judge recommended that SSA respond to plaintiff's
cause of action arising under the maintenance provision of the Privacy Act:
"It is recommended further that Defendant Social Security Administration be allowed twenty (20) days from the date of the entry of an order on this Memorandum and Recommendation by District Court to answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiff's cause of action arising under the maintenance provision of the Privacy Act. "
101. However in Judge Flanagan’s order of May 13, 2010, (attached as Exhibit K),
on page 6, she alleged that the magistrate judge construed the claims to be Bivens claims and that
the magistrate recommended that the claims be dismissed. She further alleged that the plaintiff
had not objected to the recommended dismissals and the conversion of the claims. She then
dismissed the first three claims based on this false information. In other words, Judge Flanagan
converted the first three claims for relief in to Bivens claims then dismissed the claims for no
longer being Privacy Act claims as the law required while falsely reporting to the court that the
Magistrate Judge did it and that plaintiff had not objected to his doings. She wrote:
"The magistrate judge construed these Fifth Amendment claims as alleging that SSA violated her right to procedural due process by failing to maintain accurate and complete records . . . The magistrate judge recommended dismissing these claims, which seek monetarydamages for an alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rightsbecause they are not cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureua of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens action can be brought only against federal agents, not against federal agencies such as the SSA. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483-86 (1994). Moreover, the magistrate judge held that
27
the Privacy Act provides a comprehensive remedial mechanism for such alleged constitutional violations, barring relief under Bivens. See Williams v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 879 F. Supp. 578, 586-87 (E.D.
Va. 1995)."
V.
Unlawful Access to and the Destruction of Plaintiff’s Emails and Information
A. While plaintiff’s access to emails was blocked preventing her from receiving an email regarding Judge Flanagan’s acts, U.S. Attorneys and SSA prepared and sent plaintiff a letter and a threat/act of retaliation before the blockage was removed 102. On July 27, 2010, SSA reduced plaintiff’s disability benefits but neither
verbally nor in writing advised plaintiff of this decision nor provided plaintiff any information
about her benefits.
103. On August 3rd, Aug 17th and September 20, 2010, plaintiff sent United
States Attorney Edward Gray and Ashley Harder emails requesting information regarding her
benefits including information regarding the reduction. On August 9 and September 15, 2010,
plaintiff sent Mr. Gray letters requesting information about her benefits and the reduction.
104. Plaintiff received only one response to her many emails and letters and
that response was a letter from Mr. Gray dated September 2, 2010, (attached as Exhibit L)
advising plaintiff to write SSA to request the information regarding SSA’s July 8, 2010 decision.
105. In July 2010, plaintiff received SSA’s July 8, 2010 decision that granted
plaintiff a waiver of the alleged overpayments. SSA’s July 8, 2010 decision reviewed and
decided only SSA’s 2006 denial of plaintiff’s application for a waiver of the alleged
overpayments and neither reviewed nor indicated a reduction of benefits nor a matter that
constituted a reduction.
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106. SSA’s June 30, 2010 notice of the hearing scheduled for July 6, 2010,
(filed in court by Mr. Gray on July 1, 2010) neither indicated that the hearing would review
plaintiff’s application for a waiver of the alleged overpayments nor a hearing on a matter that
would result in a reduction of benefits. The notice of the hearing explicitly indicated that a
hearing would be held on July 6, 2010, to review whether plaintiff’s disability has ended.
However, SSA’s decision of July 8, 2010, did not decide whether plaintiff’s disability had ended
nor did it decision a reduction of benefits. 2
107. On September 24, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for a voluntary dismissal
and in it, she alluded to the reduction of benefits that occurred on July 27, 2010, resulting from
her filing a complaint against Judge Flanagan.
108. In the complaint against Judge Flanagan, plaintiff alleged that the judge
wrongfully converted plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims into Bivens claims and dismissed the Bivens
claims for not being Privacy Act claims after the conversion; in order for Judge Flanagan to
convert the claims into Bivens claims and to dismiss plaintiff’s Privacy Act claims, DEA officers
were sent to plaintiff’s home to unlawfully arrest and/or to injure plaintiff (including but not
limited to mental and emotional injuries); and the judge intentionally disguised and hide the
denial of plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
109. On the night of September 24, 2010, plaintiff’s email account received an
email advising her to file a complaint with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees against
Judge Flanagan and to put the complaint on Google. Exhibit M .
2 Evidence of a reduction of benefits constituted evidence supporting a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985. Evidence could not be provided in writing until a compelling need existed.
29
110. After plaintiff’s email account received this email, plaintiff was unable to
log into her email account and to access her emails. According to Gawab.com, plaintiff could
not login because the account “[email protected]” did not exist, which prevented
plaintiff from accessing the account by others means such as via questions and answers
established on the account when it was created.
111. From the evening of September 25th (the time plaintiff attempted to access
her emails) to the evening of September 29, 2010, plaintiff was unable to access the email
account and wrote this in her declaration (incorrectly entitled affidavit) dated September 29,
2010, that was filed with the Court of Appeals on October 1, 2010, with her motion to stay.
112. On the morning of September 29, 2010, plaintiff received a letter via
FedEx from SSA informing of SSA’s decision to reduce of her disability benefits. Exhibit N.
SSA’s letter is dated July 23, 2010, a date that occurred more than two months before plaintiff
received the letter. However, the reduction occurred on July 27, 2010, and the letter delivered
by FedEx was the first time plaintiff received the information. Attached to SSA’s letter was
another letter alleging to be from another agency. This letter consists of retaliation and/or
threats.
113. On the evening of September 29, 2010, FedEx documented on the web
that it had delivered to plaintiff SSA’s letter dated June 23, 2010. Exhibit O. That same
night, after FedEx made its documentation, plaintiff was allowed access to her emails and the
blockage no longer existed. It was at that time that she discovered the email of September
24, 2010, advising her to file a complaint with the House and Senate Judiciary Committee.
B. Ads on plaintiff’s emails advertising attorneys who can help get people out of jail
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114. During the weeks of October 11 and 18, 2010, written in the ad section
above the received and saved emails and drafts of plaintiff’s email account with gmail.com were
advisements alleging to be of attorneys and bondsmen who could get people out of jail. The
Gmail email accounts of others did not receive these ads. Because of the prior threats and acts
of intimidation, plaintiff considered the ads to be threats and intimidation.
115. Federal attorneys and employees had used plaintiff’s emails in numerous
other ways in the past: to covertly provide plaintiff information or to threaten and intimidate her.
On July 10, 2009, they create and sent her an email that appeared to have been written and sent
by plaintiff to herself. Believing that VA employees were involved and because plaintiff feared
that the individuals would produce additional emails and allege that she had written them,
plaintiff sent Secretary Eric Shinseki an email informing him of the fake email she received that
was created by others.
116. On October 17, 2010, plaintiff received in the ad section of her emails the
written statement: “Tread softly because you tread on my dreams." Plaintiff believed this to be a
threat and sent herself an email praying to God will keep her alive to file her next document in
court. Exhibit P. About 30 minutes later, plaintiff discovered that her internet service had been
turned off. It was turned on later that day.
C. Removal of information and emails
117. On October 22, 2010, plaintiff discovered the Court of Appeals’ decision
on the web that dismissed her appeal alleging that she had not appealed a final order. Plaintiff
had not received the decision in the mail. However, no claims were pending with the district
31
court when the Court of Appeals made this decision and the district court’s decision to dismiss
plaintiff’s four claims for relief for lack of jurisdiction were final and appealable in May 2010.
118. In addition, the Court of Appeals’ order indicated an altering of the bases
of plaintiff’s appeal. The order further evidenced that U.S. Attorney Edward Gray’s two
documents that were filed with the Court of Appeals on September 23, 2010, had been removed
and was no longer in the court’s case file. On September 23, 2010, Mr. Gray filed a written
appearance as the attorney of record for SSA and he filed a brief on behalf of SSA. He replaced
Ashley Harder as SSA’s attorney of record. In U. S. Attorney Gray’s brief filed on behalf of
SSA, he indicated the appeal to be a sufficient appeal and reviewable by the Court of Appeals.
119. As a result, plaintiff accepted the Court of Appeal’s decision to dismiss
her appeal as an explicit intentional deprivation of due process and she immediately began her
research in preparation for her Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. She saved the information from her research on her emails.
120. While performing her research on the web for her Writ of Certiorari, the
owner of plaintiff’s apartment began cutting the grass around the apartment and continued for
about 3 hours. He was even working on cutting grass where no grass existed. He had cut the
grass on July 20, 2010, two days before. In the past, federal attorneys had used the owner as a
vehicle to harass and to threaten plaintiff.
121. During the two weeks prior, while ads for attorneys who could get people
out of jail displayed at the top of plaintiff’s Gmail emails, ads for attorneys who help in eviction
cases were displayed on the right side of plaintiff’s emails.
122. On the night of October 22, 2010, plaintiff discovered that a few of her
saved researched information and emails, even those from weeks before, had disappeared from
32
her email accounts. She immediately went to her yahoo account of [email protected]
where evidence of events of the past two years was saved. She sent the email of October 17, to
several other emails. See Exhibit P. And she did so just in time. A few minutes later, several
emails that were saved on [email protected] disappeared, even those in the sent section,
and the email of October 17, 2010, was one that had disappeared.
123. On Sunday, October 24, 2010, plaintiff discovered more emails and
information missing.
D. Plaintiff’s email accounts were terminated and some were permanently blocked without her consent and knowledge
124. Since August 2009, several of plaintiff’s email accounts were terminated
or information such as the passwords was changed preventing plaintiff’s access. Because
plaintiff could not afford resources to save information on other devices as she used the public
library’s internet service, she saved information needed for her court case on the email accounts
that were later been terminated and blocked. Those emails include but not limited to:
iii. [email protected]
vi. don.hodges64@ yahoo.com
vii. nope nissessom [email protected]
33
FIRST CAUSE FOR ACTION
Violation of the Criminal Law of 18 U.S.C. § 241: Using Law Enforcement and/or Imprisonment to Threaten, Harass and to Intimidation Plaintiff
125. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.
126. In violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245, two or more individuals who
were federal employees of the federal courts including but not limited to Judge Louise Flanagan
and Clerk of Court Dennis Iavarone; employees of the Social Security Administration, the
Veterans’ Administration and the Drug Enforcement Administration; and/or United States
Attorney George Holding and his assistants Rudy Renfer and Edward Gray, (and possibility
Senator Burr), conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate plaintiff in the free exercise
or enjoyment of rights and privileges secured to her by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
SECOND CAUSE FOR ACTION
Violation of the Criminal Law of 18 U.S.C. § 242: Using Law Enforcement and/or Imprisonment to Threaten, Harass and to Intimidation Plaintiff
127. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.
128. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, while under color of law, Judge Louise
Flanagan and Clerks of Courts Dennis Iavarone and Patricia Connor; employees of the Drug
Enforcement Administration; and United States Attorney George Holding and his assistants
Rudy Renfer and Edward Gray, willfully subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, by reason of her black race and color.
34
THIRD CAUSE FOR ACTION
Violation of the Criminal Law of 18 U.S.C. § 2071:Removal and destruction of documents from the courts’ case file
129. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.
130. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2017, Judge Louise Flanagan and/or Clerks of
Courts Dennis Iavarone and Patricia Connor willfully and unlawfully concealed, removed,
mutilated, obliterated, falsified, or destroyed documents filed or deposited with the clerk or
officers of District Court and the Court of Appeals.
FOURTH CAUSE FOR ACTION
Violation of the Criminal Law of 18 U.S.C. § 2701: Unlawful Access, Destruction and Blocking of emails
131. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.
132. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2701, employees and legal counsels of the
Social Security Administration and the Veterans’ Administration; and/or United States Attorney
George Holding and his assistants Rudy Renfer and Edward Gray, intentionally conspired to and
did access without authorization, plaintiff’s electronic communication while it was in electronic
storage, altered the electronic communication and prevented plaintiff’s access to same.
FIFTH CAUSE FOR ACTION
Violation of the Criminal Law of 18 U.S.C. § 1001: Presenting false and fictitious information and documents before a U.S. Court
133. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.
134. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, while not acting as a party in a civil
action, while under judicial sworn oath and before a United States District Court, Judge Louise
35
Flanagan willfully falsified, concealed, and covered up by trick, scheme or device a material
fact; made materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements and/or representation, and/or
made and used her false writing, documents and information knowing the same to contain
materially false and fictitious.
SIXTH CAUSE FOR ACTION
135. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs.
136. The acts alleged in this action will not be investigated by another federal
agency and if ignored, serious adverse effects will result to plaintiff, to all people of this country,
to our judicial system and to the power and authority given to judges and appointed individuals.
137. Attorney General Holder is responsibility of ensuring that all individuals comply
with the laws and the Constitution of this country and not just people who possess no power and
no authority.
138. He has exclusion jurisdiction over the allegation alleged in this action and should
be required to investigate and to take appropriate actions.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that this Court order United States Attorney General
Eric Holder to investigate the facts and allegations alleged in this Petition.
Respectfully submitted this the 27th, October 2010.
36
________________________________ Pamela Melvin, Pro Se 4949 Fieldcrest Drive
Fayetteville, North Carolina 28302
37