phenomenology of direct evidence

8/13/2019 Phenomenology of Direct Evidence

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International Phenomenological Society

Phenomenology of Direct EvidenceAuthor(s): Herbert SpiegelbergSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Jun., 1942), pp. 427-456Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103084.

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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHA Quarterly Journal

VOLUME II, NO. 4 JUNE, I942

PHENOMENOLOGY OF DIRECT EVIDENCE*I. Phenomenology and the Untrustworthiness of Self-evidence.

II. On Genuine Self-evidence.a. Subjective Self-evidence.b. The Carriers of Objective Self-Evidence.c. The Nature of Objective Self-evidence.d. The Subjective Factor in Objective Self-evidence.e. The Cognitive Actualization of Objective Self-evidence.Apparent Self-givenness.f. The Degrees of Self-evidence.

III. Self-evidence and Necessity of Thought.IV. On Pseudo-Self-evidence.

a. Speciousness.b. Semblance. The First Impression.c. The Significance of Speciousness and Semblance.

V. A Discussion of Some Specific Cases.a. The Self-evidence of the Geocentric View.b. The Self-evidence of the Impossibility of Antipodes

VI. Conclusion.Appendix: A Discussion of Professor Blanshard's Objections toSelf-evidence as a Test of Truth.

II. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE UNTRUSTWORTHINESS OF SELF-EVIDENCE

One of the none too numerous tenets shared by all phenomenolo-gists; is the principle that intuitional experience (Anschcauung) con-stitutes the ultimate source for the justification of all our concepts andbeliefs. As the editorial preface to the first volume of the phenomenolo-gical yearbook put it in 19I3: It is not a system that the editors havein common. . . . What unites themris rather the common convictionthat only by a return to the primal sources of intuitional experiencesand to the insights into essential structures ( Wesenseinsichten ) whichcan be derived from it shall we be able to utilize the great traditionsof philosophy with their concepts and problems, and that only in this

*Part of this paper was read at the Meeting of the American Philosophical Association,Eastern Division, in Philadelphia (December 27, 1940).

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428 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHway will it be possible to clarify the concepts intuitively, to reformulatethe problems on an intuitive basis and thus, ultimately, to solve them,at least in principle. 1 Thus, as other forms of intuitionism, phenom-enology adopts as its final test of truth the direct evidence or self-evidence of the intuitive data.Consequently, phenomenology must face all the attacks which havebeen levelled at self-evidence as a reliable criterion of truth. Is it in aposition to put up a better defense than other intuitionists have beenable to do? It is the contention of this paper that it is. A phenomen-ology of self-evidence offers not only an illustration of phenomenolo-gical method; it is at the same time an indispensable buttress of itsmethodological principles.In pursuing this double purpose, I do not propose, however, toexamine all the arguments which have been brought forward againstself-evidence as a test of truth. I shall concentrate on the most currentand most influential one, taken over, for example, by Professors Cohenand Nagel,2 which states that self-evidence changes from period toperiod. Stock examples in support of this claim are drawn from thefact that at one time it appeared self-evident that the sun turns aroundthe earth, that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones,'that there canbe no antipodes, and the like, whereas nowadays all these beliefs havelost their self-evidence. Now, the argument runs, since truth is some-thing unchangeable, its changing criterion, i.e., self-evidence, must befallible.

This line of argument, to be sure, has been attacked by HastingsRashdall and others who have pointed out that what is self-evidentneed not be self-evident to everybody,3and even judicious opponents ofself-evidence as a criterion of truth, as 'Professor Blanshard, forexample, admit this.4 In the case of self-evidence as in any other case,whether it is a question of truth or values or whatever else, the fact ofdisagreement has as little significance as the fact of agreement.However, it seems to me that such a defense of self-evidence isfar from sufficient. It shows only that changes in our assertions aboutself-evidence are compatible with objective self-evidence. It fails toexplain why it is that sometimes this self-evidence does not appear self-evident to everybody. Also, it does not indicate how we can continueto use self-evidence as a criterion. For how can we determine what

1. Cf. Jahrbuch ur Philosophie und PhdnomenologischeForschung, ed. by E. Husserl,Halle, Max Niemeyer Verlag, vol. I, 1 (1913).2. Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, New York, Harcourt, 1934, p. 131.Cf. also MorrisR. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 1932, p. 139.3. The Theory of Good and Evil, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1924, vol. 1, p. 85.4. The Nature of Thought, London and New York, Macmillan, 1939, vol. II, p. 239.For a detailed discussion of his specificarguments cf. the Appendix.

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PHENOMENOLOGYOF DIRECT EVIDENCE 429is really self-evident, if the self-evident is not necessarily self-evidentto us and if what is self-evident to us may not be really self-evident?To raise self-evidence above the level of human dispute is likely tomake it a sword without a handle, unfit to serve as a criterion for ourguidance in actual problems.

How can phenomenology meet this dilemma? One of the mainfeatures of the phenomenological method consists in the careful obser-vation and description of phenomena in their irreducible nature and intheir full variety. If this method is applied to the phenomenon of self-evidence, it seems to offer one important help which other kinds ofintuitionism have not been able to develop. There are phenomenaldifferences between one self-evidence and another self-evidence. Suchdifferences may serve to reduce, if not to remove, the seeming contra-dictions between the conflicting phenomena which all aspire to begenuinely self-evident. More specifically, they may allow us to separategenuine self-evidence from pseudo-self-evidence.

In Husserl's writings we occasionally find the distinction betweenadequate and inadequate self-evidence. A thing in the real world,for instance a three-dimensional object, can appear only with inade-quate self-evidence.5 Such inadequate self-evidence, as distinguishedfrom adequate self-evidence, is capable of increase and decrease.'Besides, Husserl stresses the difference between assertoric self-evidence,referring to empirical individual objects or states of things, andapodictic self-evidence or insight into general essences and essentialrelationships, which apodictically excludes any alternatives; as a ruleonly the latter is considered to be really adequate.7 There are, further-more, distinctions between pure and impure self-evidence, according towhether or not such self-evidence includes an element of matter offact,8 between purely formal ( analytic, logical ) and material( synthetic a-priori ) self -evidence,9 between theoretic, axiological,and practical self-evidence,'0 and even between immediate and mediateself-evidence. In the Formale und Transcendentale Logik Husserl con-trasts, horover, self-ev'idence of distinctness ( Evidenz der Deut-

5. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W. R. BoyceGibson, New York, Macmillan, 1931, ? 138. In Formale und transzendentale Logikthere is only one passing reference to imperfect and perfect, possibly spurious andgenuine self-evidence (p. 179).6. Ideas, p. 386.7. Ibid., ? 137.8. Ibid., pp. 383 f.9. Ibid., p. 383; cf. also pp. 68, 78.10. Ibid., p. 389.11. Ibid., ? 141. What is self-evidentin such a mediate sense, however, should, properly,hardly be called self-evident but at best simply evident.



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lichkeit ), which is supposed to occur in a judgment that is explicitlyperformed and is not only passed in the vague and confused way of acasual idea or of a sentence which is merely read or faithfully takenover, and self-evidence of clearness ( Evidenz der Klarheit ), which,in addition to being distinct, presents even the object to which thejudgment refers.12 Of particular significance is, moreover, Husserl'sscale ( Stufenfolge ) of self-evidences, here introduced, in which theself-evidence referring to particulars stands out as primal and basic. 3

A complete phenomenology of self-evidence would have to explorethese phenomena in detail. It would, in particular, have to determineto what extent they represent intrinsically different types of self-evidence, as distinguished from the extrinsic differences which dependupon the different kinds of objects involved.

-Valuable as all these distinctions may be, Husserl does notattempt to utilize them in order to meet the objections against the trust-worthiness of self-evidence as a criterion of truth. At the stage ofthe Logische Untersuchungen and the Ideen his defense is muchsimpler. Here, he makes self-evidence simply a correlate of actualself-givenness, as it occurs particularly in the processes of the intuitivefulfillment of our unverified significative meanings (anticipations,mere thought of, etc.) 14 In fact, self-evidence has been identified evenwith self-givenness, e. g., by Ludwig Landgrebe.15 Now, it seems to mebegging the question if we grant to a phenomenon the title self-

12. Formale und transzendentaleLogik, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1929, ? 16, especi-ally p. 53.13. Ibid,, ? 84.

14. In view of the strict interpretation of the concept of self-evidence which wehave here taken as our basis, it is obvious that such doubts as have occasionally beenbrought forth in recent time are absurd: namely, whether with one and the same datumA there might not be connected in one person the experience of self-evidenceand in anotherthat of absurdity. Doubts of this kind were possible only as long as self-evidence and ab-surdity were interpreted as peculiar (positive or negative) feelings which, attached to theact of judgment by accident, allot it that peculiardistinction which we evaluate logically astruth or falsehoodrespectively. [Incidentally, justifiedas this protest against a psychologisticinterpretationof self-evidenceas a feeling may be, it seems doubtful whether the assertionthat self-evidence differs in different observersdepends upon the view that it is a feeling.Even if self-evidence should be a characterof the object, like familiarity or strangeness, theobjection could still hold.] If somebody experiences the self-evidence A, it is self-evidentthat nobody else can experience the absurdityof the same A; for the fact that A is self-evident means: A is not only referredto, but it is also actually given exactly as what is.referred to; it is in the strictest sense itself present. Now, how shall it be possible that fora second person this same A is referredto, but that by an actually given non-A the viewis genuinely ruled out that it is A? We realize that we are here concerned with a situa-tion based on essential structures(Wesens-Sachlagen),the same situation which is expressedby the principle of contradiction. (Translated from Logische Untersuchungen,2nd ed.,Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1921, vol. II, 2, p. 127.) Cf. also Log. Unters, vol. I, pp. 190 f.;and Ideas, ? 145, p. 400, against the interpretationof self-evidence as a mystical voiceindicatingtruth.15. Cf. his Einletung (p. 11) to Husserl's posthumous, but highly important book on.Erfahrung und Urteil, which had at least Husserl's general approval.



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PHENOMENOLOGYOF DIRECT EVIDENCE 43Igivenness (leibhaf tige Selbstgegebenheit). For the problem is preciselywhether what is given to us is really the object itself or only a misi-leading pretender. To be sure, the self-evident phenomenon'does makethe claim to be the object in person. But it would not be in accordancewith the attitude of phenomenological suspension of judgment(epoche'), to accept such a claim without further examination of it atits face value. All the more would it involve a petitionprincipii, if weshould use such an account of self-evidence as proof that self-evidencealways implies actual self-givenness of the object and that it can neverbe misleading. A cautious account of the phenomenon does not allowus to say more than that a particular given makes the impression,has the appearance or look of self-givenness of the object which itpretends to be.

Besides, to fuse self-evidence and self-givenness would be toimply that the term self-evidence could legitimately only be used whereit is absolutely certain that the self-evident object is actually, and notonly apparently, given in person. In thus taking self-evidence out ofthe actual controversy; such a procedure disqualifies it as a usablecriterion of truth. For how shall we make sure that the speaker reallyhas the self-evidence he claims and that the matter is really self-giverito him and not merely one that purports to be self-evident? Can weestablish this directly without any further criteria? If Husserl's defensewere accepted, we should not be entitled to speak of A's being self-evident to anybody before we have made absolutely surc that whatappears to be self-evident exists exactly in accordance with suchappearance-a fact which a cognitive subject can never establish in amore direct manner than by self-evidence. Until this fact has beehascertained, we could at best speak of A's appearing to be self-evident.It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that in the Formale undTranscendentale Logik Hiusserl reverses his earlier stand almost com-pletely. Here it seems a foregone conclusion that self-evidence by itsvery nature includes -the possibility of illusion; and that is supposed coapply even to apodictic self-evidence. To be sure; self-evidence canbe refuted only by better self-evidence. But never does it hold outan absolute guarantee which would enable us to use it as an infalliblecriterion of truth.16There is no explicit statement of the reasons for this strikingIt may be suspected, however, that it took place as a consequence ofthe more radical interpretation of the phenomenological reduction whichwas bound to affect even the interpretation of the phenomenon of self-evidence.17 Such a reflective critique is supposed to show straight

16. Formale end transzendentaleLogik, ?? 58, 59, pp. 139 ff.17. Ibid., ? 69, pp. 156 f; ? 107, p. 255.



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self-evidence (gerade Evidenz, Evidenz geradehin) as a secondaryachievement (Leistung) of constitutive intentionality; the adequateevaluation of such a view would require a much more detailed examina-tion of the concept of intentionality in Husserl's later philosophy.

It may be questioned, however, whether in the light of a closerobservation of the phenomena this complete reversal in Husserl's ap-praisal of the reliability of self-evidence is not somewhat too sweeping.At any rate, it seems as if some of the difficulties in the doctrine ofself-evidence might be overcome by a development and application ofHusserl's earlier distinctions. Not all of them are significant for ourproblem. Only the relevant ones, such as that between adequate andinadequate self-evidence, will be taken up. But we shall also have todraw further distinctions with a view to separating genuine andpseudo-self-evidence.

II. ON GENUINE SELF-EVIDENCEIt would be out of the question to give here a full analysis and

description of the whole phenomenon of self-evidence. Besides, muchas further investigation is still needed, it should be acknowledged thatmost valuable pioneer work has already been done, not only byHusserl's analyses but by medieval and modern scholasticism as well.'8For, though the term 'self-evidence' (and its equivalents in otherlanguages) is comparatively recent in its epistemological application-it occurs only occasionally in Thomas Aquinas and in the later greatclassical systems-the phenomenon referred to under different names,has long been known.a. Subjective Self-evidence.

One of the most significant distinctions brought out by the modernscholastics is that between subjective and objective self-evidence.Objective self-evidence is supposed to appear in the object of ourcognition. It contrasts with subjective self-evidence, which is said toinhere in the act of cognition itself.19 In using the terms objectiveand subjective in this context, we should, of course, be on our guardagainst including any connotation of objective epistemological stabilityand reliability or subjective instability and untrustworthiness respec-tively.

18. Cf., e.g., CasparIsenkrahe,Zum Problem der Evidenz, 1917.19. Self-evidence(in abstract) is that very visibility or perspicuityof a thing thanksto which the thing is clearly seen. Self-evidence is to the intellect what the lucidity ofexternal things is to the eyes. But from this objective meaning the word is also extendedto a subjective meaning. Self-evidence, as seen from the point of view of the subject,is the perspicuityof knowledge which removesall uneasinessor, it is the clarity of perception

in the one who, as it were, 'sees' the thing. Self-evidence, therefore,is twofold, one of theobject, the other of knowledge . . . (Translated from the Latin of Tilman Pesch,PhilosophiaLacensis.vol. I, L. II, cap. V, ? 3.)



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 433Subjective self-evidence is clearly the secondary phenomenon.From the point of view of language the subjective use of the term self-evidence is entirely unnatural.20 Unfortunately, however, this sub-

jective self-evidence has so far been the center of interest in thephenomenological investigation of self-evidence. To be sure, Husserldoes emphasize the double-meaning of self-evidence as noetic and asnoematic in accordance with the essential parallelism in the structureof consciousness.21 Nevertheless, his main accounts are concernedwith the self-evident acts, not with the self-evident objects or statesof things (Sachverhalte). In fact, in these cases he does not evendescribe self-evidence as a special character in the act, as the scholasticsdid, but he identifies it with the complete acts of cognition (Erkennt-nis), insight (Einsicht), experience (Erfahrung), and the like.22 Onthe other hand, it should be noted that Husserl is very anxious to keepthis experience apart from anything like a feeling, for instance, fromthe blind feeling of certainty or convictions. In fact, he considers afeeling of self-evidence as a mere fiction.23

Still, this self-evidence ot our cognitive acts, according to itsstructural meaning, seems to refer to the self-evidence of the experi-enced object as its basis. The permeation of an act with the illuminatingcharacter of self-evidence has its apparent foundation in the self-evidence which appears in the object of the cognitive act.24 It is,

20. One is hardly inclined to speak of an act of judging as being self-evident, if itsobject is self-evident. Even in German the extension of the use of the word evidentto experiences (Erfahrung, Wahrnehmung etc.), seems to be somewhat artificial. Thatapplies to Franz Brentano's mit Evidenz wahrnehmen as well as to Husserl's use of thephrase ich habe eine Evidenz. English is apparently much stricter in this respect. Itseems to me significant that, in a very important passage of the Ideas, W. R. Boyce Gibsonhad to translate Evidenz, as equivalent to Einsicht, by evidentialvision (p. 383).21. Ideas, ? 136, p. 382; Formale und transzendentaleLogik, ? 46, p. 113. In Ideas,(? 145, p. 401) self-evidenceis even described as belonging primarilyto the noema ; stillimmediately afterward this peculiar way of positing ( Setzungsmodus ) seems to beascribedprimarily to the act as a whole, not to its object.22. Cf. Logische Untersuchungen,vol. II, 2 (translated) self-evidenceas the experienceof truth (p. 122) or as total coincidence between the acts of merely empty intentionand those of intuitive fulfillment ; similarly in Ideas: evidential vision (Evidenz) asapodeictic in-seeing (apodiktisches Einsehen); also Formale und transzendentale Logik,pp. 143 ff., pp. 245 ff., p. 249; self-evidence as an active achievement ( Leistung ), p. 251:self-evidence as the experience of self-presentation ( Selbstgebung ). In Landgrebe'sEinleitung to Efahrung und Utriel self-evidence appear'sat first as the subjective char-acteristicof intelligibility ( Einsichtigkeit, p. 8), and every consciousness which is self-piesenting is characterizedas evident (p. 12). Later on, however, self-evidence is identifiedwith self-givenness (Selbstgegebenheit). In this kind of account of self-evidence Husserl isfollowed even by neo-scholastics such as Joseph Geyser in his Erkenntnistheorie Pader-born, 1922): Self-evidence,to put it briefly, is intuition of states of things (Sachverlhalts-schauen) (p. 194).23. Ideas, ? 21.24. The prerogativeof objective self-evidence ( gegenstaendliche Evidenz ) over the

subjectiveself-evidenceof our judgment ( Urteilsevidenz ), as presupposing the former, isnow brought out with gratifyingexplicitness in Erfahrungund Urteil (p. 14) by Landgrebe,as it seems, with Husserl's personalapproval.



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434 PHILOSOPHY'ANDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHtherefore, this objective self-evidence upon which I propose toconcentrate.b. The Carriers of Objective Self-evidence.

Before discussing its nature we must make a full survey of thefield of objective self-evidence. At first sight, there seem to be twochief classes of objects to which wveascribe self-evidence in this sense:namely propositions, or more specifically, asserting propositions (e.g.,S is P), and the states of things (Sachverhalte) to which these propo-sitions refer (the fact that S is P, the being-P of S), Now it seemsto me that the meaning of the term self-evidence is slightly different inthese two cases. Can we properly say that a proposition, conceived ofas a meaningful combination of subject, predicate, copula, and otherelements, is self-evident, i.e., evident by itself? Do its terms in theirjuxtaposition tell us anything about its truth? I should hardly thinkso. Not unless we consider the state of things delineated by such aproposition can a judgment become evident. Strictly speaking, then,propositions are never self-evident; at best they may possess indirectself-evidence. This may seem to be a rather hair-splitting distinction.Its serious background is, however, that all too often we call proposi-tions self-evident without examining the things and states of things towhich they refer; in other words, we fail to inspect the phenomenawhich are the real basis of the alleged self-evidence of the proposition.

Ultimately, the only legitimate claimant to objective self-evidence,then, is the self-evident state of things. We say: it is self-evidentthat the' whole is bigger than its parts, etc. Everywhere, it is sucha that combination to which we ultimately ascribe self-evidence. Wecannot meaningfully say that a thing, for instance a stone, or a rela-tion, for example equality, or''anything perceived is self-evident. Onthe other hand, we should be well aware that the basis of the self-evidence of states of things, e. g., of' the one that snow is white,' isthe perception of the concrete object with its concrete properties, e.g.,of the white substance snow. And there is something in this supportingperception which makes us sure that it' is the real thing we face. Incommon usage, this criterion of veridical perception is, however, notcalled self-evidence. If we name it'at all, we might call it apparentself-givenness, (or self-presence, or self-presentation; anscheinendeSelbstgegeben-heit,Selbstgegenwart; cf.:p. 56)'. But although we do notordinarily call such a character self-evidence, it is certainly closelyrelated to what we mean by that term. Actually, it is even the'morefundamental phenomenon. I should, therefore, like to include it in ourdiscussion of self-evidence. The following analyses will, then, underthe name of self-evidence refer to apparent self-givenness regardless



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 435of whether it occurs in states of things (objective self-evidence in thestrict sense) or in concrete perceived objects (objective self-evidence inthe wider sense)..c. The Nature of Objective Self-evid ence.

At first sight it seems rather doubtful whether a rigorous definitionof such a simple phenomenon as self-evidence can be given at all. Butthat is not even the most important task of a real phenomenologicalaccount. The first and essential thing is that we determine the genericstructure of a phenomenon and that we describe it with all of itsbasic properties in such a way that it can be identified unfailingly amongall related phenomena. In the case of objective self-evidence, this taskhas been rather neglected so far, even in phenomenological analyses.

But before attacking it we shall have to eliminate one particularlydangerous source of confusion. Self-evidence has often been char-acterized, to be sure, mostly by its opponents, as a mere feeling. Husserlhas clearly shown that such a characterization is utterly misleading. Itconfuses self-evidence, which always appears on the side of the object,with the feeling of certainty, i. e., with a merely subjective state of mind.The two are, independent of each other. There may be self-evidencewithout the feeling of certainty, e.g., in the case of the overscrupulousskeptic, and there occurs certainty without the presence of self-evidence,as in the case of the gullible person, although in the ideal case the twowould go together. For this reason the fickleness of our feeling ofcertainty is no valid argument against the reliability of self-evidence,whether subjective or objective.

Objective self-evidence, then, is primarily a property which residesin self-evident objects. This property, however, is not to be comparedwith shape or size which, it is generally assumed, belong to the intrinsicmake-up, to the inner structure, of the object without reference to anyother object outside. Nor is it a relation, such as equality or differencein size. Self-evidence is not located between objects, as a relation is.It attaches in a peculiar way to the object. Yet at the same time itrefers to the subject to whom the matter appears self-evident. Thus, inits generic structure, objective self-evidence seems to form a relationalproperty of certain states of things (in a wider sense also of concreteobjects), inherent in them but referring in some fashion to a subjectbeyond.

What is the peculiar nature of this relational property? It is alwaysinstructive to investigate the literal meaning of such a term as evidence,although we must never rely exclusively on a philological interpretation.The Latin term e-videri seems to suggest something which moves outof the backgroundto the fore, which puts in an appearance. This wouldThis content downloaded from 200.137.223.148 on Thu, 23 May 2013 13:58:30 PM

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436 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHimply the idea of a somehow intensified phenomenon stepping out of itsenvironment and, as it were, introducing itself personally. Exaggeratedthough this interpretation may be, it indicates the spontaneous appeal,i. e., the capacity of provoking immediate assent, which seems to dis-tinguish any self-evident phenomenon.

Yet, we must not be misled by such first suggestions as languagecan give us, however valuable they may be. Rather we must try topenetrate into the thing meant by the linguistic symbols. Such anattempt should be based on the examination of a case of unquestionedself-evidence. Of the many examples suitable for consideration I sug-gest the following: I am now seeing something white with small blackfigures on it ; or, Of two contradictory propositions one must be false.

What we mean to assert in claiming self-evidence of such states ofthings or truths, as they are often termed, can be partly indicated bya number of more expressive synonyms. Manifest, obvious, patent,plain are perhaps the most fitting and telling ones.25 What they allexpress is the fact that the object lies open to our view, is freely acces-sible. Or, to put it negatively, the meaning is that there are no obscuri-ties left, that every aspect of the object is so clearly presented that itcould not possibly hold any further surprises: no dark corners remainin such pervading clearness.

In fact, clearness is the expression most frequently used in thecharacterization of objective self-evidence, especially with the scholas-tics.26 Clearness is certainly very closely related to self-evidence, eventhough it is perhaps not fully identical with it, since even illusions anddreams may be clear in certain respects.Thus, the description as unobstructed cognitive accessibility orplain visibility is the best approximation to an adequate. account ofobjective self-evidence which I can suggest.d. The Subjective Factor in Objective Self-evidence.

There can hardly be any doubt that all these synonymous terms,including even plain and clear, if taken in their epistemologicalmeaning (as distinguished from their ontological meaning, as in clearwater, plain dress, etc.), have some reference to a cognitive subject.To be sure, obviousness, accessibility, etc., have their ultimate founda-

25. G F. Stout ( Self-evidence and Matter of Fact in Philosophy, vol. IX, p. 392)points out that What is self-evident need not be obvious. Apparently, he takes obvious-ness in a more restrictedsense and the same may happen with the other terms mentionedabove. It is certainly not essential to self-evidence that it strikes one at first sight, thatcela saute aux yeux.26. Cf., e.g., Josef Gredt, Elementa philosophies Aristotelico-Thomisticae, Freiburg,Herder, 2nd ed. 1932, vol. II, p. 596: Self-evidence (enargeia) in general is the clarityof the object by which it manifests itself actually (actualiter) to the cognitive faculty.(Translatedfrom the Latin original.)



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 437tion in certain structural properties of objects which facilitate cognitiveaccess, particularly in their simple and transparent patterns. Still, self-evidence itself is a relational property based on the relation betweenthe lucid object and the subject who faces it.

But what kind of a subject is meant in this case? Certainly notthe empirical subject, the real man in the street. Primarily we think ofan ideal, normally equipped, unprejudiced observer with sound judg-ment. For self-evidence it is not necessary that every actual subject seethe self-evident object. As Rashdall put it: Self-evident truths are nottruths which are evident to everybody.This seems to imply a serious danger: On the one hand, to detachself-evidence from the empirical subject would seem to make it moreobjective. On the other hand, the question will at once arise: How canwe know what would be self-evident to such an ideal subject exceptfrom our own experience, i. e., from what is self-evident to us? Thus,

self-evidence would again become utterly subjective. Complete rela-tivism would be inescapable, and that for reasons contained in the verynature of self-evidence. At least this reference to an ideal normal sub-ject would involve us again in the old dilemma of saving objectivity atthe price of isolating self-evidence from the subject, or of sacrificingits objectivity to its applicability. At any rate, in the former case, sucha criterion, by implying that self-evidence refers to a subject which isnot ourselves, would appear to require an additional criterion, allowingus to see what would be self-evident to such a subject.I should maintain, however, that every individual has a very clearsense of what is self-evident only to him, because of his special natureand position, and what is unqualifiedly self-evident, i.e., self-evident toevery normal observer, such as the principle of contradiction. Besides,the objection involves a considerable misunderstanding of the concep-tion of normal subject as here applied, which does by no means implythe idea of a subject which would be permanently different fromourselves. What we have in mind, is rather ourselves in a state ofnormalcy. By normalcy I refer, then, to a state in ourselves which wecan identify as such not only when we have attained it, but also when itis affected by circumstances such as exhaustion. Whenever we knowthat our understanding is not hampered by these purely subjectivefactors, such as our not being sufficiently equipped or adequately trainedto perform a certain mental operation, we are clearly and immediatelyaware of fulfilling the requirements of normalcy in this sense.Very often, in this context, we hear the phrase: This is self-evident to me. Does this not clearly imply a reference to our actualempirical selves regardless of the consciousness of normalcy? But wehave to consider that this expression is rather ambiguous. The follow-



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438 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAIESEARCHing meanings may be distinguished: I. The expression may refer towhat is plain to me or to some other subject, while implying that onlyhe or I have immediate access to it: it is true, but it is self-evident onlyto somebody in our peculiar position. Thus, the fact of a certaincrime may be self-evident to the eye-witness but not to the judge whoseevidence can only be mediate. One might call this sort of self-evidenceto me objective self-evidence as restricted to subjects in a peculiarposition. 2. If I say: It is self-evident to you that all red-hairedpeople are inferior to brunettes, I imply that I consider this by nomeans to be true. In fact, I do not even admit that it is really self-evident to the other person: he only believes it is. So, this -usage isslightly ironical and will generally only be applied to judgments of otherpeople whose assertions we doubt. One might call this purely subjec-tive self-evidence. 3. Suppose I say: This mathematical axiom isself-evident even to me, a non-mathematician, I imply that it is not onlyself-evident in itself, but, besides, that it has penetrated into my under-standing. Self-evidence to me in this sense includes unqualified self-evidence. Whatever is self-evident in this sense, is certainly also self-evident in itself for any normal observer, the reverse, however, notbeing necessarily true. One might call this objective self-evidence,subjectively realized.

Only self-evidence to me in this third sense, which implies self-evidence to any reasonable observer, can be taken as, a sufficient cri-terion of unqualified objectivesself-evidence and, ultimately, of truth.e. The Cognitive Actualization of Objective Self-evidence.Apparent Self-givenness.

Self-evidence has been described so fat as unobstructed cognitiveaccessibility or plain visibility. That implies that it constitutes notonly a relational property but also a potential property of an object,i. e., a latent possibility which is capable of being actualized.

This will provoke the question of how such a potentiality canpossibly serve as a criterion independent of any actualization. Canwe know directly about possibilities of access to objects without actuallyhaving approached them? How can we verify possibilities at all? Isthere any other way except by actualizing them, either in perceptualexperience or in developing imagination?

Indeed, there seems to me no other method of verifying potential-ities in general, and in particular the cognitive potentiality contained inself-evidence. Unobstructed accessibility is given to us only by actualapproach, i.e., by the actualization of the possibility which self-evidenceindicates. In using the immediate access to the object which self-evidence supplies and in bringing it to full presentation we realize



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 439at the same time the potentiality in the object for giving such accessand allowing such presentation. In principle, the situation is similar tothe case of elasticity which is revealed to us by its characteristic resist-ance to pressure. Likewise, we cannot appraise self-evidence clearly,unless we have tested it by cognitive actualization.

Does this not imply that self-evidence is not the real criterion oftruth which it pretends to be? Yes ana no. Certainly we have niodirectaccess to a potentiality except by its actualization. On the other hand,in this actual presentedness we are given more than an indirect criterionfrom which we may infer the potentiality. In the plain presentednesswe are at the same time immediately aware of the lasting potentialityof presentation which a self-evident object contains. Full presented-ness alone, if not at the same time seen as an expression of such apotentiality, would not be able to function as a criterion of truth. Still,I should not hesitate to admit that the real ultimate test of truth is notthe potentiality of full presentedness, which we literally mean by self-evidence, but the actualized form of such potentiality in actual pre-sentedness, in which the self-evident is apparently self-present.27f. The Degrees of Self-evidence.

The prevailing view seems to be that there can be no degrees ofself-evidence.28 Self-evidence is supposed to be something absolute.Either a state of things is self-evident or it is not. Tertiumnnon datur.On the basis of the preceding account of self-evidence, bothobjective and subjective, I cannot, however, see any good reason foraccepting such a view without proof. Quite apart from the gradationwhich may occur in the presentational modi of self-evidence, the natureof self-evidence itself as free cognitive accessibility does by no meansexclude degrees. States of things and objects may be more or less

complicated and, accordingly, more or less plainly visible. Thus,although self-evident, they may be more ol less accessible to our under-standing. For instance, the axiom that two points determine a straightline seems to me to be much less complicated, clearer, and, to thatextent, more self-evident than the one that in a plane through one pointthere can be only one parallel to a given line, a circumstance which wasso important in the controversy over the parallel axiom.

27. As to the reasonswhy it seems to me necessaryto speak of apparentself-givennessand not of self-givennessand self-presenceunqualifiedly, I refer to the discussion on pp. 430f. Moreover, it seems to me desirable to speak of self-presence,instead of self-givenness, inview of the fact, to be discussed later, that self-evidence may be given more or lessadequately. And it would certainly sound odd to say that self-givenness is given inade-quately.28. Notable exceptionsare Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy,Home UniversityLibrary,pp. 182 ff.) and BrandBlanshard,The Nature of Thought, vol. II, pp. 246 ff.).



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440 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHIII. SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY OF THOUGHT

Self-evidence is often identified with, or, at least, treated as anequivalent of, necessity of thinking (Denknotwendigkeit).29 Suchnecessity is even frequently interpreted as psychological compulsion.By such an account, our awareness of self-evidence would be reducedto a mere subjective feeling. And such a feeling can, naturally, haveas little claim to objectivity as any other feeling.

It is not only self-evidence which seems to be in this plight. Theconnections between premises and conclusions likewise involve a cer-tain logical necessity. And this necessity is again manifested psycho-logically by experiences which have been described as feelings of com-pulsion. The question therefore seems urgent: Is there really no wayof distinguishing between the necessity of thinking, conceived of ascorresponding,to logical necessity, and self-evidence, on the one hand,and mere psychological compulsion on the other. Only a phenomenolo-gical examination of the case can decide this.

There are, as far as we can see, cases where the course of ourthinking is subjected, if not to inescapable compulsion, at least to apressure which comes very close to it. The plainest case is perhapsrepresented by pathological obsessions ( Zwangsvorstellungen ), asoccurring in persecution mania. However, to most of us, such abnormalstates are accessible and understandable only to a very limited degree.For this reason the case of posthypnotic suggestion has certain advan-tages over that of obsessions, but again it cannot be sufficiently repro-duced and inspected at will for purposes of phenomenological analysis.Perhaps the closest we can come in normal awareness to an experienceof absolute psychological compulsion is in the case of certain populartunes, which seem to pursue us against the most -determined efforts toshake them off. Of course, as soon as the normal resistance againstthe usual stream of ideas ceases, nearly all of our thinking takes arather automatic course. Dream is the extreme example of such a con-dition. However, in such states there is hardly any awareness of beingforcibly compelled to think along definite lines. The real experience ofpsychological compulsion implies that the.subject is the powerless victimof a pressure from without, suffering more or less painfully from theoverpowering flood of ideas.0 In everyday life, we seem to have this

29 Cf. e.g., Christoph Sigwart (Logik, 2nd ed., vol. I, General Introduction, ?6),who, however, tries to draw a distinction between a mere psychological and a logicalnecessityof thought, the latter being based in the nature of the object of our thought. Cf.also A. K. Rogers,The Nature of Truth, 1923, p. 32: And what I mean by self-evidence ..is this: I find it impossible, even in imagination, to think of myself as conceivably in astate of mind where I should consider the propositionopen to doubt, the ground of maassurancelying within the content of the proposition itself.



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 44Iexperience only exceptionally and scarcely in pure form and fullintensity. But that does not mean that we have not a perfectly clearidea of what such compulsion means.

Is there any element of such compulsion in the case of our drawingconclusions from given premises, e.g., S is P, therefore some P's areS ; or in the case of our hitting upon a necessary solution of a mathe-matical problem, or in that of our being won over by the self-evidentimpression that this paper is white or that the straight line is theshortest distance between two points? Is it really physically impos-sible for us to deny such assertions and to conceive of their opposites?Certainly, nothing forbids us to assert it. It is not only in a freakishmood that we do assert it; every lie is a flat contradiction of the self-evident. But even our abstract (pre-intuitive) thought ( signitives or

symbolisches Denken in Husserl's terms) and our rudimentaryimagination, as we ordinarily practice them, may easily contradict mate-rial necessities. Although we are unable to visualize a regular polyhe-dron of a thousand faces, we may conceive of it in the same way inwhich we may conceive of parallels which intersect; in fact, this latterpossibility forms the basis of all non-Euclidian geometry.

Yet, it cannot be reasonably denied that, for anybody who lookscarefully at the facts themselves, there is, in these cases, a kind ofcompulsion to acknowledge the real structures and relations of theobjects. However, such pressure compels only those who want to know,who are willing to accept the verdict of the facts themselves and tofollow their structure and relations as guides in their thinking. In thispurely phenomenological discussion the metaphysical issue of free willand thought has, of course, to be disregarded. But it can hardly bedenied that, phenomenally at least, we are free to go our own way, assoon as we abandon our cognitive purpose. There is no more compul-sion for the thinker to follow truth than for the engineer to make cor-rect calculations, for the musician to play according to the score, orfor the driver to follow the open highway. Only as long as he wants

30. Cf. the phenomenological descriptions of abnormal processes given by Karl.Jaspers(Allgemeine Psychopathologie,2nd ed., Berlin, 1920) who, in summing up, givesthe following account of Zwangsideen : The thoughts of the patients all center around abasic idea which, against the will of the patient, recurs unceasingly in his consciousness( Denkzwang, compulsion of thought) and the correctness of which thrusts itselfupon the patient with overwhelming persuasiveness ( Geltungszwang, compulsion ofvalidity; a more adequate term might be persuasivecompulsion : Ueberredungszwang,p. 65). Particularlynoteworthy is the following general remark on the consciousnessofpsychologicalcompulsion as an ultimate fact : (In abnormal life) all the psychologicalprocessesmay occur with the characteristicof psychical compulsion (p. 66); observe alsoJaspers'distinction between different types of such compulsion. Experiencesof compulsionmay, besides, occur in Ideenflucht (flight of ideas) as described by a patient of Forel's(Ibid., p. 99): In my head, like a clockwork, a compulsory, tormentingly uninterruptedchain of ideas ran its inevitablecourse.



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442 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCH

to get ahead, is he compelled to keep to it. At any moment he is atliberty to run off the road onto soft shoulders or into a telegraphpost.

It appears from the above discussion that the necessity implied inour logical thinking is never absolute or categorical, but only hypothe-tical, conditioned by our will to know. Only as long as this will remainsalive, is there any compulsion or even directing resistance on the partof the object of our thought and, consequently, any necessity of ourthinking along certain lines. In other words, necessity leads our think-ing only in so far as thinking is prepared to follow it. So, ultimately, thenecessity of thought derives its compulsory influence from the subjecthimself who submits to this objective necessity. The object of ourthought does nothing but indicate the direction in which correct think-ing would have to move. The compelling object can at most be likenedto a signpost in the way it influences the person who consults it.

In this free and always revocable subjection to compulsion,necessity of logical thinking differs even from such cases of hypothe-tical compulsion in which the hypothetical necessity cannot be inter-rupted, once it has been released; this applies to the cases where thenecessity of thinking depends upon the realization of certain externalconditions, as the taking of a narcotic drug or being hypnotized, eithervoluntarily or involuntarily; as soon as we are under its influence, thecourse of our ideas is irrevocably determined and in fact compulsory,although we may not experience the compulsion as such.

But there is another and perhaps more significant phenomenolo-gical difference between mere psychological necessity and logicallydetermined necessity of thinking. In the case of self-evidence as wellas in that of logical deduction, the experience of compulsion is by nomeans that of a blind, and, in that 'sense, of a mechanical compulsionby some brute force which we cannot recognize directly. Here we areinfluencedand guided by the clear and direct insight into the master thatconfronts us and into its nature and relations. (In speaking of insightI do not mean to say that a full understanding of the object, of its struc-ture and of its relations is required; I refer only to insight into itsphenomenal givenness.) In the light of this insight we can even under-stand why there is such a (hypothetical) necessity. It is not a case ofa vis a tergo, overpowering us from behind but that of a frontalappeal to the self-determination of free minds.

For the same reason we can also recognize that such a logicalnecessity exists not only for ourselves personally, but for any reason-able person who has access to the matter under consideration. For suchnecessity has nothing to do with the individual person but is derived



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PHENOMENOLOGYOF DIRECT EVIDENCE 443

solely from the nature of the object. In principle, even God, conceivedas the perfect knowing being, would be subject to this necessity.The case of compulsory ideas is entirely different. Such ideasare not accompanied by any insight, nor by the awareness that thecompulsion is a function only of full insight into the matter before us.Here, without any cooperation on our part, we succumb blindly tothe sheer force of the compulsory ideas. In the case of posthypnoticsuggestion we may try subsequently to rationalize our way of thinkingand acting under the compulsion of the hypnotic instruction; but evenphenomenologically such behavior seems to have a character quite dif-ferent from thought and action if guided by free and full insight. Inthe case of blind psychological compulsion there are certainly causeswhy one idea calls forth another in our mind. But they are of anentirely factual, non-intelligible character.We may say, then, that logical necessity of thinking is an hypo-thetical insight-necessity, whereas mere psychological necessity isabsolute, blind compulsion. There is a distinct phenomenological dif-ference between the two. Regardless of whether or not self-evidenceand mediate evidence are identical with, or are only closely related to,necessity of thinking, they are clearly different from a mere subjectivefeeling of momentary compulsion that cannot claim any objectivevalidity.IV. ON PSEUDO-SELF-EVIDENCE

However, there are other adjacent phenomena which are muchmore easily confused with genuine self-evidence and which constitutean immediate threat to our confidence in self-evidence as a criterionof truth. It is one of the tasks and practical services of phenomenologyto identify these phenomena and, thus, to make us safe against con-fusing them with the genuine types.a. Speciousness.I shall here omit criteria so closely related to, and partly identicalwith, self-evidence, as clearness and distinctness, which are hardlylikely to create any confusion. There is, however, one particularlydangerous phenomenon which we shall have to investigate, namelyspeciousness (Trug). As here used, the term speciousness is notmeant to imply at once an unfavorable connotation. Certainly we shallhave to give an unprejudiced account of what is phenomenally presentwherever we speak of speciousness as something fully and adequatelygiven. For speciousness has a clear and definite nature of its own,which phenomenology has to unfold. As an example we might take aspecious argument, represented by a fallacy like the fallacy of the un-distributed middle term, or a specious phenomenon, such as a percep-tual illusion.



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444 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHThe view about the nature of speciousness as here advocatedimplies, however, a certain conception of knowledge in general, which

needs a brief statement.3' It maintains that every aspect of an objectis closely connected with other aspects of it. In other words, aspectscontain anticipating references to one another which may be either ful-filled or foiled. Thus the aspect of a cube from a certain angle impliesthe anticipating reference to the aspect which it would present after achange of the observational angle. These anticipating references needby no means always be fulfilled. The frustration of these anticipationsis the basic feature of all our illusions and of the speciousness whichthey contain.Any kind of illusion, if there is such a phenomenon at all, couldillustrate this point. As an example I choose the familiar Mueller-Lyerillusion, where one of the two equal sections of a line is hedged in byconcentric arrow processes, the other set free by eccentric ones. Unlesswe are already warned against this illusion and have trained ourselvesto eliminate it, our impression is here that the two sections are definitelyunequal. And the implied anticipation is that the removal of the sur-rounding pattern would not make any difference to that impression. Itis the frustration of this anticipatory reference which is responsiblefor the speciousness of these phenomena. Once we analyze more closelyand check on the anticipatory references, notably by testing with ameasuring tape and, possibly, even by eliminating in imagination thearrow processes, we discover that our anticipatory reference was mis-leading, that, after the removal of the processes, the structure of theobjects does not agree with what we were made to expect. Thus, ouranticipatory references cannot make any ultimate claim to be veridical.In passing from an anticipatory reference to its fulfillment, we hit insuch cases upon a discontinuity, a break in the structure of the phenom-enon which is incompatible with the pervading lucidity of genuine self-evidence.

Speciousness, by its very nature, has a certain superficial appeal.At first sight, it leads to the surface of the matter a peculiar clearness,obviousness, transparency, which makes us expect that it pervades thewhole object. Without further examination we are therefore bound tofall victims to this misleading surface. Only if we penetrate moredeeply and see where the structure of the object deviates from thissuperficial pre-delineation, are we able to discover the deception andto unmask the speciousness as such.

Likewise, in the specious argument, there is an apparent continuityof argument between premises and conclusions. Take, for instance, the

31. Cf. Critical Phenomenological Realism in Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch,vol. I, p. 160.



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PHENOMENOLOGYOF DIRECT EVIDENCE 445following syllogism: White is a color; snow is white; therefore, snowis a color ; or Chicago is west of Moscow; Moscow is west of Tokyo;therefore, Chicago is west of Tokyo. On the surface, the logical con-nection between the parts of these arguments seems to be'unbroken. Itis only if we penetrate into their meanings, into the ambiguities andimplications of the middle terms that the fallaciousness of such argu-ments appears.

Speciousness, thus, may be described as the epistemological prop-erty of a phenomenon which contains superficial traces of pervadingself-evidence, while its deeper structures belie the anticipatory refer-ences to its deeper structure. In other words, speciousness is incom-plete, superficial self-evidence combined with hidden self-evidence tothe contrary, where this hidden self-evidence at the same time possessessuperior verdical dignity. It implies both the promise of full self-evidence extending to all the aspects of the phenomenon and the non-fulfillment of that promise.

Speciousness, once it is unmasked and identified, no longer pre-sents, of course, any real danger of confusion with genuine self-evidence. That danger exists only so long as we stick to the superficialstrata of the objects under consideration, without following up the anti-cipatory references which they imply. So long, we shall, indeed, easilyfall prey to the trap which the surface of speciousness undoubtedlypresents.b. Semblance. The First Impression.

Self-evidence and speciousness are. as a rule, not given in fulladequacy. They appear in various modi of givenness, are more or lessfully, completely, adequately presented. Here, according to the letterat least, I shall have to depart from one of Husserl's distinctions. I donot think there is such a thing as adequate or inadequate self-evidenceas special types of self-evidence. There is only more or less adequateor inadequate givenness of self-evidence. According to our distinc-tion between various degrees of self-evidence as corresponding tospecific objects, things may have more or less self-evidence dependentupon whether they have a more or less complicated structure. Thus toeach object corresponds its specific type of self-evidence which, how-ever, is always a full and adequate self-evidence, whatever degree itmay have. But such full self-evidence may be more or less adequatelypresented. There are, in other words, degrees in the adequacy of given-ness. We, therefore, have to distinguish between degrees of full self-evidence, as based on the nature of the object, and degrees of adequacyin the presentation of such self-evidence as based in the varying com-



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446 PHILOSOPHYND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHpleteness with which the self-presence of the self-evident is actuallyexhibited to the cognitive subject.

To investigate the various types and degrees of such givenness isthe task of a special type of phenomenology which is concerned exclu-sively with the modi of presentation of phenomenal objects (Gegeben-heitsweisen). One may call this the phenomenology of presentationalmodi (Phdnomenologie der Gegenheitsweisen). It contrasts with thephenomenology of the phenomenal objects as given through such modi;the latter type of phenomenology, because of its prevalent interest inthe object and its characteristics, may be called ontological phenomen-ology. These objective characteristics would in a wider sense includenot only the immediate ontical properties of objects, such as round orblack, but even such secondary characteristics as occur only in relationto a subject, for instance, epistemological characteristics like clearnessand distinctness, or all that is implied in Husserl's account of the noe-matic object as Sinn im Modus seiner Fiille, im Wie seiner Gege-benheit. 32 In this extended sense even the preceding analysis of spe-ciousness would be a specimen of ontological phenomenology. Theanalysis of the various forms of givenness of such characteristics,however, would be an example of a phenomenology of presentationalmodi.

Even self-evidence, then, may be given with various degrees ofadequacy. Very rarely do we take the trouble to bring the free visibilityof the self-evident, as revealed by its apparent self-presence, to fullpresentation and examine it calmly and thoroughly. Generally we aresatisfied (and, as far as practical matters are concerned, even by rightssatisfied) when something looks evident, i.e., gives a general or firstimpression of self-evidence. In that case, the self-presence of the self-evident appears as if given only through a veil. Nevertheless, even this

first impression or semblance of an object, as I suggest to call it, thisgivenness in an indistinct and largely anticipatory way, is an objectivephenomenon of its own. One may think here of the first impression ofself-evidence in a mathematical theorem or in an introspective insightbefore they have undergone thorough examination.

There are any number.of degrees and types of such inadequategivenness of self-evidence, depending partly upon the specific natureof the object under consideration and ranging from a faint and sketchyidea through first indications or impressions up to a fully adequatepresentation.

Incomplete givenness of self-evidence often betrays itself by theassiduous use of certain phrases or by suspicious intonations. Thus

32. Ideas, ? 132.



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 447the indiscriminate adverbial application of such terms as evidently,undoubtedlyly naturally, or of phrases like without doubt, ofcourse, if uttered in a somewhat hasty and negligent or overemphaticway, may raise a doubt as to whether the speaker has not failed to bringself-evidence to a fully adequate presentation.33 Likewise, excessivelyemphatic assertions are all too often the sign of a scientifically badconscience. Besides, even honest formulations, such as it seems to me,if not mere expression of modesty, may indicate that self-evidence hasnot yet been fully and adequately attained.c. The Significance of Speciousness and Semblance.

Semblance is, however, not only the forerunner of self-evidence.It may just as well precede speciousness, the intrinsically discordantcounterpart of plain self-evidence. It is this fact which seems to melargely responsible for the alleged contradictoriness and fallibility ofself-evidence. As long as we do not pass on to adequate givenness, wecannot possibly determine whether semblance heralds self-evidence orspeciousness. To decide this with adequate safely requires a muchmore thorough examination than we are generally prepared to give tothe matter. In the twilight of first impressions, self-evidence and spe-ciousness are actually indistinguishable.But phenomenology forbids us to take the easy-going claims ofsemblance at their face value. It is wary of the trap of speciousnessbehind every semblance. And it enables us to separate genuine self-evidence from its misleading substitutes by the identification of spe-ciousness and of semblance.

V. A DISCUSSION OF SOME SPECIFIC CASESIt remains to be shown how this distinction would work in casesof alleged changeability and misleadingness of self-evidence. Is it safeto say that in all of them people have been the victims of semblanceswhich had not been interpreted with sufficient care?There is a sense in which even today the refuted self-evidenceshave kept some plausibility. That the sun turns around the earth, thatthere can be no antipodes, are beliefs which have a certain indestruc-tible appeal to us if we are not sufficiently on our guard; we easilyrelapse into them, for instance, in the aesthetic attitude. From this in-stinctive understanding of the earlier so-called self-evidences we shallhave to start.

a. The Self-evidence of the Geocentric View.How are we to decide whether the semblance of truth in the geo-

centric view is the precursor of self-evidence or of speciousness? The33. Cf. also B. Russell's remark in Analysis of Mind, p. 263.



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448 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHmost obvious way of deciding this would be to cross-examine our sup-posed self-evidence and to ask ourselves: Do we really see directly howthe sun revolves around the earth? Once we are honestly self-critical,I do not think we can seriously uphold this interpretation. Even if weabstract from the fact that we do not see the earth as such, i. e., as acosmic body, we could never claim more than that we see how the sunmoves across the sky from one side of the horizon to the other. But dowe even see how it moves? I cannot convince myself that there is anysound basis for claiming direct observation of any such motion. Atbest we notice, after certain intervals, a discontinuous change in theposition of the sun in relation to the horizon. From this we infer thatit must have moved. In so doing we simply assume that the horizonis stationary. But is this assumption supported by phenomenal evi-dence? It is at this point that self-evidence ends and speciousness enters.Once we disregard this habitual prejudice, nothing is plainly given tous but the relative change of position or, at best, the relative motion.Without delving into the vast but fascinating phenomenology and psy-chology of motion,34 I should maintain that, if we are really critical, wehave not even phenomenally any self-evident perception of absolutemotion in relation to absolute space. At best there may be the semblanceof such motion. If we look critically at all the parts and at all theaspects of the situation, the speciousness of the geocentric view isapparent even without any additional knowledge about the heliocentricor other systems.

The difference between such alleged self-evidence and genuine self-evidence becomes even clearer if we contrast this case with instancesof self-evidence as expressed by such propositions as, I am now seeingblack signs on a white background or Purple is between red and blue.Here all the aspects of the situation are equally and fully presented. Noobscurity remains, as in the case of the alleged motion of the sun aroundthe earth. No new experience may possibly interrupt this closely knitconnection, no hidden assumptions may suddenly be exposed. And ourassertions do not go beyond what is actually and, with proper penetra-tion, adequately given.b. The Self-evidence of the Impossibility of Antipodes.

The situation is slightly different in another famous case, that of

34. Cf. Husserl's stimulating if not fully convincing sketches about the constitutionofspatial experienceand motion in his Notizen zur Raumkonstitution, Phenomenology andPhenomenologicalResearch, vol. I, pp. 21 ff. and 217 ff. As to the psychologicalside ofthe problems cf. K. Duncker, Uber induzierte Bewegung, PsychologischeForschung. vol.XII, pp. 180 ff., and E. Oppenheimer, Optische Versuche jiber Ruhe und Bewegung,1. c., vol. XX, pp. 1 ff.



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PHENOMENOLOGYF DIRECTEVIDENCE 449the alleged impossibility of the existence of antipodes. 5 The real reasonfor this belief seems to be the assumption that all heavy bodies mustfall downwards, i.e., in a direction parallel to that of the bodies at ourpresent location. And so the antipodes would of necessity fall off fromany place opposite us.

Now, in examining a proposition such as All bodies must falldownwards, we must consider that the type of fact to which it refersis a necessity. In order to ascertain necessity we have not only to makesure that bodies actually do fall as asserted but, even that there is noalternative to this kind of a fall. In other words, this is a case where weneed, in Husserl's terms, not only assertoric but also apodeictic self-evidence.

What, then, is the evidence for our asserting that all bodies mustfall downwards in the way just described? That, other things beingequal, bodies in our immediate neighborhood do fall approximately inthis way may be obvious. But does this entitle us to generalize and toinfer that the same is true of freely falling bodies everywhere? Do wederive any real understanding at all of falling and of its causes fromsimply watching falling bodies? To assume that bodies have a naturaltendency to fall downwards and parallel to each other, is nothing buta habit of thought. Once we know that the earth is a sphere, would itnot be-rather strange to expect that it should possess one preferentialdirection of the type asserted, with regard to the whole cosmos, by theEpicureans, and that bodies should everywhere fall exactly parallel tothis direction and away from the opposite side of our sphere? If wewere to make this assumption, we should have no real understanding ofthe downward fall and its causes. Nothing is, in fact, self-evident inthis case but the simple observation that in our position heavy bodiesdo tend to fall downward. Beyond that, the primary situation is farfrom clear and lucid but full of obscurities and mysteries. Only thehypothesis of the mutual attraction of masses throws some light onthe matter. In view of this lack of intelligibility of the free fall thereis certainly no basis for any predictions or general assertions aboutnecessity, impossibility, or the like. There is at most the semblance ofthe alleged direction of a general downward fall, but this, on care-ful examination, turns out to be specious, especially once we becomeaware of the true situation and, thus, can unmask the former self-evidence.

This becomes particularly plain, once we compare such a case asthe above with one of really self-evident necessity, as exemplified by thelaws of contradiction or of sufficient reason. As soon as we have fully35. Cf. the concise discussion of this example by G. F. Stout in Self-evidence andMatter of Fact in Philosophy, vol. IX, pp. 393 f.



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450 PHILOSOPHYNDPHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHpenetrated into the meaning of these laws, we see that there is noalternative to an object's either having or not having a certain property,to its either accepting or repudiating its ascription and that, con-sequently, one of these alternatives cannot possibly apply. Nothing inthis case remains obscure. Everything is plainly presented withoutany dark corners. Whenever we take the trouble to examine the sit-uation thoroughly, such necessity will therefore appear to be genuinelyself-evident.

VI. CONCLUSIONThe primary purpose of these analyses was a phenomenological one.

Regardless of whether self-evidence is ultimately trustworthy or not,our concern was to exhibit the phenomenal characteristics of self-evidence as they occur in our actual cognitive life. If there is anythingto our account, it may be at least maintained that there are differencesamong our self-evidences; they may or may not have epistemologicalsignificance.

I think, however, that beyond that there is good reason to believethat these differences have some bearing on the question of the trust-worthiness of self-evidence in epistemology. Wherever self-evidencesseem to clash, one of them upon careful analysis turns out not to begenuinely self-evident; it represents a case of semblance as a f ore-runner of speciousness. By thorough examination of alleged self-evi-dences we are generally in a position to distinguish between such caseswithout going beyond the phenomena. Thus, self-evidence, if only wetake the trouble to bring it to full presentation, need not cease to be acriterion of truth because of superficial contradictions among theclaimants to it. A careful phenomenology of self-evidence allows usto eliminate the false pretenders and to separate genuine self-evidencefrom the various forms of pseudo-self-evidence.

On the other hand these distinctions make it necessary to observeutmost caution in the application of our criterion. In fact, they oftenrequire us to refrain from asserting the self-evidence of a propositionwhich is not within the range of reasonably safe judgment, and to con-tent ourselves with claiming merely plausibility, which only gives theimpression of truth or falsehood, or with asserting a certain objectiveprobability of such truth or falsehood. It cannot be denied that evenso-called phenomenologists have not always observed this point. Butthe phenomenological method is as little foolproof as any other once itfalls into the hands of uncritical enthusiasts.

Nevertheless, once we do use such critical care in examining con-crete situations, self-evidence will not lose its significance for epistemol-ogy nor for our concrete tasks. Between the Scylla of complete subjec-



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PHENOMENOLOGYOF DIRECT EVIDENCE 45Itivity, which would follow from the uncritical acceptance of all claimsto self-evidence at their face value, and the Charybdis of inaccessibletranscendence,which we would have to face, once we reserve the title ofself-evidence only for those cases where we know that the object isactually, and not only supposedly, self-present, there is a middle coursesafe enough for our practical and theoretical needs.I do not claim that this analysis disposes of all possible objectionsagainst the trustworthiness of self-evidence as a test of truth. The mostradical objection left would be: Suppose there is such a phenomenonas that of genuine self-evidence in the sense of unimpeded accessibilityand apparent self-presence; what guarantee is there that it is supportedby real self-evidence, that what is supposedly accessible and self-present,is actually in our hands? To answer this most sweeping criticism wouldrequire a comprehensive defense of the phenomenological method in itsapplication to epistemological issues, which would have to clarify thewhole relation-between phenomenon of reality and reality itself. Else-where I have tried to discuss this problem; here I can only refer thereader to this earlier discussion.On the basis of this discussion I should maintain: Only subjectivalreality-phenomena, i. e., phenomena belonging to our immediate con-sciousness, have a self-evidence which is absolutely infallible. As toreality-phenomena which go beyond this narrowest circle, it alwaysremains logically possible that their self-evidence, even if it shouldbe full and genuine self-evidence, is eventually misleading. In fact, weobserve here frictions between the anticipations which certain of thesereality-phenomena contain and other reality-phenomena which seem torefute them (e. g., in the case of the celebrated stick with one end inthe water). However, no isolated non-subjectival reality-phenomenonis ever the bearer of full, genuine self-evidence. It can only give partialself-evidence which is necessarily inadequate as long as not all the otheraspects of the phenomenon have been checked. In practically all casesof illusions, whether of the type of the Mueller-Lyer illusion or of amore tenacious kind, the self-evidence involved is never a genuineone as long as not all the anticipatory references of the phenomenonhave been followed up. Wherever self-evidence has been verified in thisway (inasmuch as this can be done at all) there seems no longer anysound reason to reject it. If, in the course of such verification, one self-evidence supplants another whose references could not be confirmed,that does not yet disqualify self-evidence as such. It only means thatone pseudo-self-evidence in its incompleteness has been unmasked asspecious. But it does not mean that a genuine self-evidence has been

36. The Reality-Phenomenonand Reality in Philosophical Essays in Memory ofEdmund Husserl,HarvardUniversity Press, 1940, pp. 84 ff.



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452 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICALESEARCHexploded. Thus, the distinction between genuine and pseudo-self-evi-dence seems to be sufficient to meet the theoretical difficulties. I am,however, quite prepared to admit that this does not constitute anyabsolute guarantee with regard to the world of non-subjectival reality-phenomena.

The dwelling on phenomena such as speciousness and semblance aspseudo-phenomena of self-evidence may appear like telling an old andtrite story. In order to see them we do not seem to need take recourseto any special method. But phenomenology does not claim to tell onlycompletely new stories. It does not want to invent or to construct butto find. Nor does it claim to make sensational new discoveries. Its mainoffice is to keep phenomena in sight which all too easily drift out of thelight of our attention. In so doing it implies that to see the phenomenain their full and irreducible variety is an indispensable preparation fora full discussion of philosophical problems. Only such a descriptivepreparation can prevent dogmatic oversimplifications and disastrousgeneralizations, regardless of whether they come from the speculativeor from the negativistic wing of philosophy. To skip this stage runscounter to the ideal of philosophy as a universal and, at the same time,as a rigorous science, which was Husserl's deepest concern.

APPENDIX: A DISCUSSION OF PROFESSOR BLANSHARD S OBJECTIONSTO SELF-EVIDENCES A TESTOF TRUTH

A complete vindication of self-evidence would have to include athorough discussion of objections such as have been recently advancedby Professor Blanshard in his critical survey of the possible tests oftruth. His criticisms intend to prepare the ground for the theory ofcoherence as the ultimate criterion for, and, in fact, even as the natureof, truth. However, independently of this wider scope of his arguments,his criticisms deserve to be examined on their intrinsic merits, althoughthis might not do full justice to his systematic position. For the latteris ultimately based in his theory of internal relations, according to whicheverything, including truth, is ultimately determined in its nature byeverything else. It would far exceed the scope of this discussion todiscuss the cogency and the limitations of this doctrine in connectionwith Professor Blanshard's general conception of thought and its func-tions. At this place there is no other possibility of defense but toexamine his specific arguments against the sufficiency of self-evidencewithout reference to the wider context.

Professor Blanshard does not put much reliance upon the usualobjections to self-evidence which are based on the apparent change in

37. The Nature of Thought, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1939, vol. II, ChapterXXIV.



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PHENOMENOLOGYOF DIRECT EVIDENCE 453self-evidence from age to age and from person to person. As he himselfformulates it very concisely: The fact is that there is no sort of incon-sistency in accepting both self-evidence and divergent opinions about it,for the reason that this divergence may spring from a great many otherthings besides the lack of self-evidence. It may spring from a differencein native intelligence, for example, or from a differing understandingof the proposition, or, as so commonly in morals, from a differingapprehension of the values entailed (ibid., p. 239). His argumenthinges upon an attack on what he calls the twin citadels of the doc-trine of self-evidence, i. e., on the most abstract and simple propositions,that are taken as most indubitably certain (p. 240) and whose self-evidence is really in dispute between minds of apparently equal ability(p. 239), namely, mathematical axioms and logical laws. His argument,therefore, does not consider the whole range of self-evidences referringto individual experiences as exemplified by Descartes' ego cogito, allof which Russell lists as truths of perception. 38 Nevertheless itwould be a most serious breach in the bulwark of self-evidence, ifgeneral self-evidence, as it is usually ascribed to mathematical axioms,would have to be abandoned.

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