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Cycle of confl ict and neglect

Republic of the Philippines

Mindanaos displacement and protection crisis


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Acknowledgements

The material for this report was researched and gathered by Frederik Kok of the Internal Displacement MonitoringCentre (IDMC). Some of the information was gathered during a brief fact-finding mission to Manila and Mindanao inMay 2009. IDMC is grateful to all those who have provided information, including staff of UN and other internationaland national organisations, and in particular the internally displaced people themselves. IDMC would also like toexpress its gratitude to the reviewers for their guidance and assistance. We especially wish to thank the Communityand Family Services International (CFSI) team members for the invaluable support they provided during the missionas well as their input to the report.

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council

Chemin de Balexert, 79CH-1219 Chtelaine (Genve), SwitzerlandPhone : +41 22 799 0700www.internal-displacement.org

Cover photo: A family fleeing on a motorcycle taxi from military sweeping operations in the municpality of DatuPiang, Maguindanao (IDMC, May 2009).

Design: Laris(s)a, laris-s-a.com


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Cycle of confl ict and neglectMindanaos displacement and protection crisis

October 2009


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Map of internal displacement in Mindanao

Map produced by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), October 2009 www.internal-displacement.org

1

2

3

44

CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES

IDPs by province

Provinces Total displaced* Currently displaced**

Maguindanao 264,695 178,648Lanao del N. 148,852 4,933Lanao del S. 116,401 39,250Cotabato 115,082 17,352Basilan 36,346 8,125Saranggani 21,715 0Sultan Kudarat 16,365 1,435Misamis Occ. 11,310 0Sulu 7,555 7,555S. Cotabato 6,685 0

Total 745,006 257,258

* Cumulative figures since August 2008** As of 15 May 2009

Source: Department of Social Welfare and Development(DSWD), 15 May 2009

1. Misamis Occidental2. Misamis Oriental3. South Cotabato4. Saranggani

Number of IDPs1

1. Determining reliable figures on the number of ID Ps remains a serious challenge, due toIDPs high mobility and incomplete collection of data, resulting in some groups of ID Ps notbeing captured in government data.

Note:The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) consists in the following provinces:Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Basilan andTawi-Tawi

> Based on data from government and othersources, the total number of IDPs wasestimated to stand at between 330,000 and400,000 as of the end of August 2009.

> Between 310,000 and 370,000 IDPs are locatedin the ARMM and in particular Maguindanao

province where most IDPs are concentrated.

> It is estimated that up to 950,000 peoplehave been displaced since August 2008

200,000-300,000 IDPs

20,000-40,000 IDPs2,000-12,000 IDPs

provinces where displacement has endedsince August 2008

main armed incidents in displacement-affected areas during 2009

0 100 km

Some of them [people in Mindanao] need a little counselling, most do not. A lot of them are used to it. Its not thefirst time that this has happened () They already know if theres an exchange of gun fire, they should leave theirhomes, then if the shooting ends, then they go back to their homes, thats a way of life in Mindanao

Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), lead governmentagency in charge of IDP protection and assistance, 16 August 2008

Look at us. If you have been here in 2000 and 2003, we are living in the same situation. Nothing really changedexcept for our age. What is sad is our children might be having the same lives in the future () The lives of theMoro people are under the line of poverty. Now, multiply that 10 times and you see the lives of the Moro evacuees.

An internally displaced person from Aleosan, Cotabato province, 31 August 2008


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Table of contents

Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Background: a history of conflict and under-development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Displacement figures as of 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Outstanding humanitarian needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Impoverishment, exploitation and reduced access to education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Threats to the safety of IDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Patterns of return and related problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

National response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

International response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32


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4 Cycle of conflict and neglect | Mindanaos displacement and protection crisis

Executive summary

In August 2008, the suspension of an agreement on theissue of an autonomous Muslim (Moro) homeland be-tween the government of the Philippines and the rebelsof the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led to thecollapse of the peace talks and triggered renewed fight-ing throughout the southern island region of Mindanao.Over a year later, between 330,000 and 400,000 peopleremain displaced, roughly one third of the estimated950,000 people who were forced from their homes bythe fighting. Most internally displaced people (IDPs) areconcentrated in Mindanaos majority-Muslim provinces, inparticular Maguindanao, where displacement significantly

increased as a result of new military operations launchedat the end of April 2009.

The July 2009 ceasefire and the commitment of bothsides to resume peace talks provide some hope for thereturn of IDPs to their homes, their integration in areas ofdisplacement or their resettlement elsewhere. However,military and police operations against renegade MILFcommanders held responsible by the government for theAugust 2008 escalation, and relatively poor prospects ofa final political settlement in the coming months, have lim-ited the scope for optimism in a region that has witnessedrepeated conflict and displacement in the past decades.

In the overcrowded evacuation centres where the major-ity of Mindanaos IDPs have been living, many of them forthe past 12 months, the major protection concerns areabout the inadequacy of water and sanitation provisionsand shelters, the lack of food and the absence of liveli-hood opportunities. The assets and resources of IDPsand host communities alike were largely depleted prior tothe new wave of displacement during 2008 and 2009, andtheir already very difficult situation has further worsened.

Most humanitarian indicators show that the conditions for

the people displaced have further deteriorated as fight-ing and military restrictions have reduced humanitarianaccess and the delivery of aid. In majority-Muslim areas,IDPs not only risk being caught in crossfire but are alsoexposed to abuses by the army which openly considersMuslim IDPs as the enemy reserve force.

The governments response was quick and substantialin the immediate aftermath of the August 2008 fighting.However, as the emergency dragged on and resourcesdried up, efforts deployed by the government failed tomatch the extent of needs and the response appeared

lacking consistency and a long-term strategy. Seeking to

avoid internationalising the conflict at all cost, the gov-ernment has systematically downplayed the severity ofthe displacement crisis and of the extent of humanitarianand protection needs. Its return and rehabilitation plan,launched in early 2009, allowed for some limited returnin provinces where fighting had subsided, such as Lanaodel Norte or Cotabato. In Maguindanao however the planhas largely failed to meet its objective of returning allIDPs to their homes within a few weeks, as most IDPshave been unwilling to return in the face of increasinginsecurity. The closing down of evacuation centres bythe government there resulted in a large number of IDPs

being displaced again, often to locations out of reachof assistance. Despite the ending of hostilities in July2009 most IDPs have remained too afraid to return asthey have little confidence in a ceasefire they know is allbut fragile. Many IDPs have also nothing to return to, asthey have lost their homes and livelihoods or have startedintegrating into the host communities where many havenow lived for more than a year.

Since August 2009 national, regional and local effortshave been underway to develop an early recovery planto support the return and rehabilitation needs of thedisplaced. It is hoped that the greater involvement ofthe international humanitarian community in the devel-opment of the plan, mainly through UNDP as the leadof the recently-activated early recovery cluster, will helpguarantee that it meets international standards relatedto return, resettlement and reintegration.

The assistance which the international community hasprovided to IDPs has complemented and often replacedthe governments response. There have however alsobeen a number of important shortcomings in the hu-manitarian response; it has at times appeared to lackleadership, coordination and an overall coherent strategy.

The absence of a permanent Resident Coordinator (RC)for a year has hampered effective coordination of theoverall humanitarian response by reducing leadershipcapacity and weakening accountability of the clusterleads at the field level.

Application of the cluster coordination approach hasfailed to ensure a timely and effective response in par-ticular in the protection sector, where the UN has notmanaged to agree on the designation of a protection-mandated lead agency. An independent protection clus-ter was established only recently in August 2009, and

there is not yet a comprehensive long-term protection


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5Cycle of conflict and neglect | Mindanaos displacement and protection crisis

strategy. The majority of the international agencies in thePhilippines are development-oriented and have shownlittle eagerness to engage the government on sensitivehuman rights issues.

In the period leading up to the July 2009 ceasefire, in-

ternational agencies faced significant challenges, asincreasing insecurity reduced their access to IDPs, andthe government sought greater control over the man-agement of aid distribution to avoid assistance falling inthe hands of MILF rebels. In the past couple of months,however, significant improvements in security, and com-mitments from both the government and the MILF toresume peace talks, have resulted in improved accessto the affected population and also raised hopes of areturn of the displaced to their homes or their pursuit ofother durable solutions.

However, both sides are yet to demonstrate their genu-ine commitment to a negotiated political settlement, theessential pre-condition for ending the cycle of conflictand displacement in Mindanao. While the internationalcommunity may now be invited to play a greater role inthe peace and return process, it should also take thisopportunity to encourage the government to do more toensure the effective exercise of national responsibilityand the protection of the rights of the internally displaced.The government should cease to use sovereignty as ashield against interference but rather as a basis of re-sponsibility to assist and protect all citizens.


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Recommendations

To the Governmentof the Republic of the Philippines

Resume peace talks to negotiate a political settlementwhich creates conditions to and allow displaced peopleto find durable solutions.Put an immediate end to all violations of human rightsperpetrated by the AFP and paramilitary groups, includ-ing but not limited to extra-judicial killings, enforceddisappearances, illegal detention and destruction ofhouses and property.Provide all internally displaced people, including

those living in makeshift shelters and unrecognisedcamps, with safe access to food and clean water,basic shelter and housing, and medical services andsanitation.Grant organisations engaged in the provision of as-sistance rapid and unimpeded access to the internallydisplaced.Implement the United Nations Guiding Principles onInternal Displacement as a framework for providingprotection and assistance to IDPs, including throughthe enactment of national legislation.Ensure a clear distinction between armed combatantsand civilians including in particular IDPs. Direct all mili-tary officers to cease making public statements linkinginternally displaced people to the MILF.In the framework of the current return and early recov-ery plan, establish a mechanism to ensure that IDPs areconsulted on the choices they would like to make, andinvolved in the planning and implementation of thesechoices.Encourage and support authorities of the ARMM re-gion to create a regional commission on human rightsto ensure that human rights violations abuses in theARMM are systematically monitored and reported.Invite the UN Secretary Generals Representative on

the human rights of IDPs to visit the Philippines andextend all necessary support to the Representative inthe course of such a mission.

To the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Respect the ceasefire agreement and resume peacetalks so that IDPs can return to their homes.Publicly commit to respect international humanitarianlaw (IHL) and human rights standards, and take meas-ures to ensure that violations and abuses against civil-

ians with the suspected involvement of MILF members

are investigated jointly with the government, and thatthose found responsible are brought to justice.Facilitate unimpeded access to the IDPs of organisa-tions providing humanitarian assistance.

To the UN Resident Coordinator /Humanitarian Coordinator (RC / HC)

Support exercises to profile IDP populations in targetedareas, so that reliable data on their number, age and sexand on their geographic distribution can enable more

effective assistance, and validate figures collected bythe government.Ensure that gaps in the response to the needs of peo-ple displaced by conflict in Mindanao are identifiedand filled, including where appropriate by means ofadvocating with the government.Support the designation of a mandated protectionagency to lead the protection cluster in the Philip-pines, according to the principles of the humanitarianreform programme.

To the UN Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Establish more effective mechanisms to improve coor-dination and information exchange between the gov-ernment and the humanitarian community so as to ad-dress problems of duplication and gaps in humanitarianassistance. Provide ongoing coordination to ensurethat the IASC and government cluster systems worktogether to improve the overall humanitarian response.Support the RC / HC in addressing with the governmentsensitive issues such as the protection of civilians, andthe access and security of humanitarian agency staff.

Raise awareness of the Mindanao conflict and supportshared fundraising efforts to improve the capacity ofhumanitarian agencies to respond to the needs ofinternally displaced people.

To cluster lead agencies

Protection cluster (RC / HC):

Ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place inMindanao to monitor the protection needs of IDPs and

ensure that action is taken on findings.


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Conduct a general protection assessment includingpsycho-social needs of IDPs in all settings to identifyoutstanding problems.Provide capacity building on protection issues to repre-sentatives of the national authorities at all levels, as wellas members of INGOs and NGOs working in Mindanao.

Stop categorising IDPs and other affected groups asmobile and vulnerable populations, as forced displace-ment entails specific protection challenges and impliesparticular responsibilities for national authorities andinternational organisations; if necessary use the termdisplaced and other vulnerable populations instead.

To the child protection sub-cluster (UNICEF):

In close cooperation with the government and internallydisplaced communities, provide displaced children andadolescents with semi-structured educational activities

in a safe and child-friendly space.In close cooperation with the government, support ef-forts to provide protection and assistance to those whohave been separated from their families, and supportfamily tracing and reunification efforts.

Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cluster(UNICEF):

Increase the number of water points and latrines inevacuation centres, relocation sites and host commu-nities to improve access to drinking water and propersanitation. In view of the fact that many IDPs do notintend to return, consider semi-permanent facilitiesinstead of temporary ones.Conduct hygiene promotion activities to increaseawareness of hygiene issues among IDPs.

Early recovery cluster (UNDP):

Support the development of policies to ensure thatIDPs are able to make a free and informed decision onwhether to return home, stay where they are or settleelsewhere in the country, and to discourage the use ofcoercion to induce or prevent return, local settlement

or resettlement elsewhere. When possible, supportgo-and-see visits for IDP representatives in areas ofreturn or resettlement.

Food and nutrition clusters (WFP / UNICEF):

Provide food assistance to all IDPs, including in evacu-ation and host families, as long as their access to foodremains inadequate, their assets remain depleted andalternative livelihoods do not generate sufficient income.Provide emergency nutrition programmes for displacedchildren under two years as they have been found to

suffer disproportionately from acute malnutrition.

To donor governments

Support the government and its international partnersto ensure that the humanitarian and assistance needsof the people displaced by conflict in the Philippinesare adequately met.

Support ongoing efforts conducted under the auspicesof the World Bank as administrator of the MindanaoTrust Fund (MTF) to increase the capacity and confi-dence of local agencies, including conflict-affectedcommunities themselves, to manage their own assist-ance and development projects and help IDPs finddurable solutions to end their displacement.In particular, support efforts to build and expand thecapacity of the Bangsamoro Development Agency(BDA), the implementing body created according tothe implementing guidelines of the 2001 peace agree-ment, and identified by the MILF to determine, lead, and

manage rehabilitation and development projects in theareas affected by the conflict.

To international and national NGOsin Mindanao

Ensure that protection is integrated in all humanitar-ian response initiatives and that protection issues aremonitored, documented and reported on.Actively engage the government and other stakehold-ers on protection issues through common advocacyinitiatives.


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Background: a history of confl ictand under-development

Conflict in Mindanao in the southern Philippines is rootedin under-development, the particularly inequitable distribu-tion of wealth, and the political, economical and culturalmarginalisation of Muslim (or Moro) and indigenous peoplesin what is an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country. TheMoro and indigenous peoples share a widespread belief thatthey have been deprived of their land and resources by agovernment more inclined to defend its economic interestsand those of its clients than to protect their rights.

Between 1903 and 1990, the Muslim population in Mind-anao declined from 77 per cent to 19 per cent, as colonial

and post-colonial governments encouraged an influxof mostly Christian settlers1. As a consequence of thesettlement, many Muslims and indigenous people wereforcibly displaced from their fertile land in coastal andlow-lying locations, to inland and highland areas.

The island group of Mindanao encompasses six admin-istrative regions and 25 provinces, including four whichare not on mainland Mindanao. It is the poorest region inthe Philippines, with the worst development indicators. Itis also the most insecure, and conflict and violence haveregularly plagued the islands. Insecurity in Mindanaois fuelled by two main factors: the presence of a largenumber of armed groups and the easy access to smallarms and ammunition.

An armed separatist group was formed during the 1970s,the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). In 1976, thegovernment and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement,which established some degree of autonomy in 13 prov-inces and nine cities in the southern Philippines, but itsimplementation only stumbled forward. In 1990 the ma-jority-Muslim Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao(ARMM) was formally established after four provincesdecided in a referendum to join the new region; two more

provinces followed 11 years later.

In 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) brokeaway from the MNLF and launched its own armed strug-gle aimed at creating a separate Islamic state in thesouthern Philippines. In 1996 the government and MNLFsigned a new peace accord, allowing the implementationof the Tripoli Agreement, and the MILF signed a ceasefireagreement in 1997. The ceasefires were, however, repeat-edly violated in the following years.

In addition to the MILF and the MNLF, armed groups in

Mindanao include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which is

notorious for its kidnapping activities and mostly activein Western Mindanao, and the communist rebels of theNew Peoples Army (NPA), the oldest insurgency groupin Asia. Other sources of violence include clan wars (orrido), and political and economic rivalries.

Continuing conflict and displacementsince 2000

Conflict and human rights violations continued into thenew millennium, in particular fighting between govern-

ment forces and MILF rebels in the majority-Muslim ar-eas of Mindanao. In 2000, nearly a million people fledPresident Estradas all out war against the MILF. Thiswas followed three years later by another major militaryoffensive against the Moro rebels which resulted in thedisplacement of more than 400,000 people. In all, anestimated two million people were displaced by conflictand associated human rights violations in the Philippinesbetween 2000 and 2007 (see Table 1).

Table 1 Conflict-induced displacement inMindanao, 2000-2009

Since 2001, the AFP, supported by the United States, hasalso carried out several large-scale operations against theASG in Sulu and Basilan Provinces, which have resultedin the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

Hundreds of thousands of people are also displacedeach year in the country, including in Mindanao, by natu-ral disasters such as tropical cyclones and floods, aswell as by development projects which have tended todisproportionately affect politically marginalised or disad-vantaged groups such as ethnic minorities2. Regardlessof the causes, the consequences for these uprootedpopulations are often characterised by impoverishmentand social and cultural marginalisation.

As of early October 2009, roughly five million people were

affected by Tropical Storm Ketsana and Typhoon Parma.

0

250000

500000

750000

1000000

2000

NumberofIDPs

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: DSWD & other available sources, September 2009


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Estimates of the number of people displaced stood at 1.6million, and the government welcomed the mobilisationof international support.

In Mindanao, these events and large-scale populationdisplacements which have followed them have severely

disrupted economic, social and political activities as wellas the delivery of social services such as education andhealth care. Of the six regions in Mindanao, ARMM hastended to be most affected by conflict and displace-ment, and has remained particularly under-developed.All five provinces in ARMM are in the bottom ten of thenational human development index (HDI) ranking3. Lifeexpectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income ratesthere are among the lowest in the country. MaguindanaoProvince in ARMM, the MILFs stronghold and long thescene of armed confrontations, has suffered greater lossof life and property as well as a greater level of displace-

ment than any other area of Mindanao.

New conflict and displacementin 2008

Maguindanao Province and Lanao del Sur in ARMM,Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat in Central Mindanao, andLanao del Norte Province in neighbouring North Mind-anao, were severely affected by a new cycle of conflictand displacement which began in August 2008.

In July 2008, the government and the MILF, by now thelargest Muslim rebel group with an armed wing number-ing between 11,000 and 12,000 combatants4, announceda breakthrough in negotiations with a memorandum ofagreement (MoA) on the issue of an autonomous Morohomeland known as the Bangsamoro Judicial Entityreflecting the Moro peoples ancestral domain. Underthe agreement, more than 700 villages in Mindanao wouldvote in 2009 on whether to become part of ARMM. How-ever, the MoA, which would have represented a majorstep towards the finalisation of the long peace process,attracted strong public criticism, and it was suspendedand later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme

Court. In August 2008, MILF combatants responded bylaunching attacks on Christian communities in CotabatoProvince and later in Lanao del Norte Province. Ensu-ing fighting with the Armed Forces of the Philippines(AFP) led to the displacement in the following weeks ofhundreds of thousands of people in several provinces ofMindanao. By the end of the year it was estimated thatmore than 600,000 people had been displaced; at leasthalf of them have since been unable to return.

Low-intensity conflict continued in the first months of2009, causing further displacement on a smaller scale.

Peace talks remained stalled with neither side conced-

ing ground towards a compromise. In April, the govern-ment dropped demands for the surrender of three MILFcommanders held responsible for the 2008 attacks as aprecondition for the resumption of talks, but also intensi-fied military operations in Maguindanao Province to findthem. The escalation in the conflict led to new large-scale

displacements which only ended with a ceasefire agree-ment in July 2009.

In September 2009 the two sides announced a break-through in the discussions by agreeing an internationalcontact group (ICG) to facilitate the resumption of formalpeace talks to be hosted by Malaysia. The ICG wouldinclude representatives of the European Union (EU) andthe Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), andwould also be open to eminent persons and interna-tional NGOs invited to support the peace process throughthe provision of advice, mediation research input and

advocacy5

.

Despite the creation of the ICG, the two sides are yetto agree on how to move forward on the issue of an-cestral domain and mechanisms for the protection ofnon-combatants in armed conflict, including internallydisplaced people (IDPs)6. The timeframe for the currentgovernment appears short: with the 2010 elections nowapproaching fast, much remains to be done to gathersufficient support for a political settlement which many,including the AFP and President Arroyos own constitu-ents in Mindanao, are likely to strongly oppose.


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Displacement fi gures as of 2009

Determining reliable figures on the number of IDPs re-mains a huge challenge, both because the Mindanaodisplacement is characterised by tremendous fluiditywith frequent population movements, and because of theincomplete collection of information, with some groupsof IDPs not captured in government data.7

In May 2009, the government recognised that more than750,000 people had been displaced during the previousnine months8. An additional 150,000 and 200,000 peo-ple are believed to have subsequently been displacedbetween May and July 2009, which would put the total

number of people displaced since August 2008 at upto 950,000.

As of the end of August 2009, based on data from thegovernments National Disaster Coordinating Council(NDCC), an estimated 66,000 families9, or between330,000 and 400,000 people10, remained displaced inMindanao. The overwhelming majority of the displacedwere located in ARMM, where 62,000 families were es-timated displaced, most of them in Maguindanao Prov-ince. A further 3,800 families were reported to be stilldisplaced in Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat Provinces and260 families in Lanao del Norte Province.

These figures only included those registered for govern-ment assistance, either in recognised IDP sites known asevacuation centres or with host families. Various groupsof IDPs were excluded, including those living in informal

camps which the government had not recognised, anestimated 30,000 people who had been instructed bythe government to move out of the camps in early 2009,but who had become displaced again elsewhere as theybelieved it too dangerous to return home. While someof these people had been resettled in relocation sites,often near the evacuation centres, many had dispersedacross the region beyond the reach of any assistanceand protection11. Since April 2009, the International Or-ganisation for Migration (IOM) has worked together withthe government to set up a Humanitarian Response andMonitoring System (HRMS). One of the main purposes

of the database is to better track down mobile IDPs andother affected population and to assess their needs12. Toensure that the needs of IDPs as well as other affectedpopulations such as host communities are included in thedatabase, IOM is using the term Mobile and VulnerablePopulation (MVP) instead of IDPs.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of people have also beendisplaced by conflict between the AFP and the NPA,which remains active throughout the country, and bymilitary operations against criminal groups such as theASG in the island Provinces of Sulu and Basilan in West-ern Mindanao. Fighting there displaced at least 44,000people from August 2008 to May 200913, and has inten-sified in recent months, resulting in an increase in IDPnumbers14. Since January 2009, more than 10,000 peo-ple have been reported displaced by military operationsagainst the NPA, in seven separate incidents15.

Table 2 Families displaced in Mindanao, September 2008 June 2009

Source: IOM, Mindanao Newsletter Issue No. 4, June 2009

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

Families

Maguindanao North CotabatoSultan Kudarat Total

30-Sep 28-Oct 27-Nov12-Sep 29-Dec 27-Jan 20-Feb 20-Mar 18-Apr 15-May 20-Jun

Family Displacement in Mindanao (Source: DSWD, IOM)


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In addition to those displaced since August 2008, hun-dreds of thousands of people in Mindanao who weredisplaced during earlier phases of the conflict betweenthe AFP and the MILF have been unable to find durablesolutions, even though most were able to return to theirareas of origin. Most returnees in Moro areas have faced

the accumulated effects of conflict and displacement,which have continued to block the regions economicdevelopment and further impoverish them. To escapepoverty some have moved to urban areas of the regionsuch as Cotabato City, where tens of thousands of dis-placed households have sought refuge since 200016. Atthe end of 2005, a joint needs assessment led by theWorld Bank estimated the number of IDPs in Mindanaoat 930,00017, most of whom had returned but not founddurable solutions.


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Decades of conflict and neglect in Mindanao, but inparticular in ARMM where most IDPs are located, havecreated conditions in which the basic economic, socialand human rights of the majority of people remain unful-filled. Nearly half of the population in conflict-affectedareas in ARMM are food insecure, and levels of mal-nutrition are significantly higher than in other regionsof the country. Access to clean water and sanitationfacilities, and to social services such as education andhealth care, is generally very limited and particularly soin remote areas18. The most vulnerable 10-20 per centof households are headed by single parents including

widows19

.

In this context, the ongoing displacement situation, ofa scale and duration not seen in nearly ten years, hasfurther compounded the plight of people displaced andleft them significantly worse off than the rest of thepopulation. They have lost their livelihoods and the useof their homes, and prolonged stays in overcrowdedevacuation centres or with host families have left themfacing extreme hardship and almost entirely dependenton external assistance to meet their most basic needs.

Over 60 per cent20 of the people included in the gov-ernments IDP count were at the end of August 2009

living in evacuation centres set up in public buildingssuch as schools, churches or mosques, or in makeshif tshelters or tents on public or private patches of land.As of the end of June 2009, a total of 171 evacua-tion centres were officially recognised, most of themin Maguindanao Province (see Table 3). Some IDPswere moved in early 2009 into relocation sites whereconditions are often no better. The remainder of thedisplaced are house-based, in other words living withfriends or relatives.

Many of those who have not been counted by the gov-

ernment live in temporary makeshift settlements alongroads and on unoccupied land. These unrecognisedIDPs have often faced the greatest difficulties as theyhave not been registered to receive assistance, have noaccess to clean water and sanitation or health facilities,and tend to live in the poorest housing conditions.

Widespread food insecuritylimits IDPs capacity to cope

Most IDPs were farmers who depended on crop pro-duction and trade to meet their food needs and thoseof their families. They mainly produced crops includ-

Outstanding humanitarian needs

Table 3 Number of recognised evacuation centres, September 2008 June 2009

Source: IOM, Mindanao Newsletter No. 4, June 2009

5049

92

72

85 93 82 82

104

117

21 1822 21

17

2835

23 2632

2 2 5 5 510

2 68 8

7369

119

98

107

131119

111

138

157

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

12-Sep 30-Sep 28-Oct 27-Nov 29-Dec 27-Jan 20-Feb 20-Mar 18-Apr 15-May 20-Jun

Month

Numberof

Camps

Maguindanao North Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Total


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ing rice, corn, cassava and banana, typically to sellrather than for family consumption. Between 30 and40 per cent owned livestock such as water buffaloesto plough rice paddies or pull wagons, and chicken orgoats whose meat or milk provided additional income21.Other sources of livelihood include fishing, in particu-

lar in the area of the Liguasan Marsh, a freshwaterwetland lying across the provinces of Maguindanao,Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato and the site of manyarmed encounters between the AFP and MILF rebelssince August 2008.

It is estimated that in times of peace one in four house-holds in Mindanao is severely food insecure. A 2007World Food Programme (WFP) report showed that mostfarmers in Mindanao did not own the land they wereworking on, and had to return up to 90 per cent of theirharvest to the landowner or to those who financed their

work. What was left was usually sold, and farmers spentup to 70 per cent of their income on food. The reportestimated that they bought 20 per cent of their food oncredit, increasing household debt levels22.

Food production is often limited due to poor agriculturalpractices, lack of fertilizers and also recurrent floods. InJuly 2008, a month before the conflict resumed, TyphoonFrank hit the country, destroying some 300,000 homesand displacing tens of thousands of people. It had hada particularly devastating impact in Mindanao, includ-ing on many people who were subsequently forced toseek shelter from the conflict in evacuation centres andhost communities. There the majority quickly becamedependent on food aid provided by the governmentand international agencies such as the World FoodProgramme (WFP)23.

Displacement caused by the conflict from August 2008led to a disruption of the production cycle for farmers,and also took away the sources of employment andincome for other vulnerable groups, and so made ex-ternal assistance essential for their survival too. Evenmore vulnerable than tenant farmers were those whohad no land to cultivate, who had to rely on daily labour

or other less reliable sources of income such as localcrafts, firewood collection or petty trade.

According to a joint emergency nutrition and food secu-rity assessment conducted in Central Mindanao in early2009, more than 80 per cent of IDPs were food food-insecure five months after having been displaced, mainlybecause they had been cut off from their land, but alsobecause of their extreme poverty, with most householdsdeep in debt24. While 62 per cent of the displaced hadpreviously relied on crop production, this percentage fellto 16 per cent after displacement. Only very few IDPs

managed to keep any livestock.

IDPs have had to purchase the main part of their foodrequirements, although almost all (at least of those recog-

nised by the government) have received food distributedby the governments Department of Social Welfare andDevelopment (DSWD), and agencies includingWFP, the In-ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and ActionContre la Faim (ACF). Each household normally receivesaround 40 kilogrammes of rice per month, regardless of itssize. For an average family of six this would be sufficientfor 17 to 18 days. House-based IDPs registered with thegovernment only receive 25 kilogrammes. As a result oftheir displacement, an overwhelming 80 per cent of IDPsare now forced to purchase their food on credit. Two-thirdsof IDPs have also reported having to spend more, for whichthey have had to borrow even more frequently. Given theexisting debt levels of IDP households, this is seen asunsustainable, and the joint assessment recommended adoubling of the size of the food rations25.

Food insecurity was also compounded by the irregularityof food supplies. Since April 2009, the growing insecurityand military restrictions in Maguindanao Province havecaused repeated delays in the delivery of assistance,causing hunger levels to increase. To make mattersworse for IDPs, in June 2009, the government statedthat it would encourage aid agencies to reduce their foodrations in order to reduce the risk of it being resold or

falling into the hands of rebel combatants of the MILF26.

In addition to borrowing food and money, mostly fromrelatives and friends, IDPs have also resorted to twoother coping strategies: 87 per cent reported eating lesspreferred food and 75 per cent reported limiting the sizesof their meals. This has reduced the diversity of theirdiet, increasing the risk of malnutrition. IDPs have alsoreportedly used aid food to pay back their creditors sothey can continue borrowing to purchase other essentialitems, including food items that are not included in thefood distributed to them, with most probably losing out

through these exchanges.

Displaced women in Makir Evacuation Centre, Datu Odin Sinsuat,Maguindanao, waiting for coupons that will enable them to claim food atthe next distribution round (Photo: IDMC May 2009).


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High levels of malnutritionamong IDP children

The joint assessment showed high rates of malnutritionamong IDP children under five. Assessments conductedin previous years had already shown that displaced and

non-displaced children alike in Mindanao were morevulnerable to malnutrition than those in other regions,but the 2009 assessment also indicated that malnutri-tion was significantly more frequent among displacedchildren in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Lanao delNorte provinces27.

The prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM)among young displaced children was found to be tenper cent, and of severe acute malnutrition 2.2 per cent.While not reaching the emergency threshold of 15 percent, GAM rates were still a serious cause of concern

and a strong warning that any further deterioration ofthe underlying causes of malnutrition inadequacy ofhealth care, water and sanitation and infant feeding risks bringing rates to emergency levels. The lack ofclean water and unhygienic practices, more than thelack of food, was responsible for acute malnutrition;72 per cent of acutely malnourished children had beenill in the previous two weeks. This indicated an urgentneed for intervention on health and WASH. Acute mal-nutrition was most prevalent among children between6 and 24 months old, with rates of 22 per cent found.Emergency nutrition programmes were therefore tospecifically target this age group. Meanwhile high lev-els of chronic malnutrition or stunting were seen asindicative of a serious public health problem amongIDPs; 47 per cent of internally displaced children wereaffected, compared to the national prevalence of 26per cent28 .

Inadequate conditions in evacuationcentres and relocation sites

In evacuation centres and relocation sites, access toclean water and sanitation facilities is very limited and

shelters are generally inadequate. These factors havecombined with inadequate nutrition to threaten the healthof people living there.

Poor sanitation and limited access to drinking water

Most IDPs in evacuation centres do not have adequateaccess to water for personal or domestic use, or accessto proper sanitation. In many cases, several hundred peo-ple have to share one water source or a single latrine. AWASH assessment conducted in evacuation centres, re-location sites and house-based settings in Maguindanao

and Cotabato in July 2009 found that almost 42,000

individuals had to share 61 water points and 165 latrines,representing one water point for 680 people and onelatrine for 252 people29 .

In addition to the insufficiency of water sources, manypeople have used the water pumps installed by humani-

tarian agencies for domestic purposes, and have in-stead dug traditional unprotected open wells to get theirdrinking water. Measures are urgently needed to enablehouseholds to treat their own water, and to protect theexisting open wells and other water sources.

According to the assessment, a lack of water, latrinesand basic materials such as soap has combined with theabsence of hygiene promotion to undermine personalhygiene levels. One out of four existing latrines cannot beused because it needs to be emptied. As a result, mostIDPs are forced to defecate in the open. Most of the fewhygiene promotion activities started have been discon-tinued. In Talayan evacuation centre, Maguindanao, IDPswere reported to sometimes fetch their drinking water

from a muddy stream which also serves as a latrine andto clean farm animals. The majority of the children whodied in the camp had reportedly suffered from diarrhoealinked to the poor quality of water30 .

Water and sanitation conditions were found to be evenworse in relocation sites and in the evacuation centresset up since April 2009. The proper monitoring and ad-dressing of the water needs of IDPs was complicatedby weak camp management structures and insufficientrepair and maintenance of facilities by Local GovernmentUnits (LGUs) struggling with dwindling resources. Overall,

the situation in Maguindanao and Cotabato was seen as

A woman using a traditional unprotected well, in Makir Evacuation Centre,

Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao. The water is not potable but in theabsence of a safe water source it is used for cooking and as drinking water.(Photo: IDMC, May 2009).


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deteriorating and the assessment highlighted an urgentneed to further assess and improve the situation31 .

Despite the lack of water points and inadequate sanita-tion, major disease outbreaks have so far been avoided,and IDPs have been far more concerned with the irregu-

larity of food supplies, the lack of income-generatingactivities and the need to improve their shelters, as fewenvisage a quick return.

Highly congested camps with insufficient andinadequate shelters

Shelters are often insufficient in number and of inad-equate quality; IDPs who are not in evacuation centresin converted public buildings are either living in tents ormakeshift huts made of branches and tarpaulin which arenot strong enough to provide lasting protection against

the sun or the rain. During the rainy season from June toNovember 2008, many evacuation centres were floodedand residents often forced to move again. In 2009 thereis a widespread urgent need to replace worn-out sheltermaterials, in particular in the old evacuation centres.

After the government launched its return plan in early2009, and some IDPs were moved to relocation and tran-sition sites, congestion became less severe in some ofthe old evacuation centres. However, on average, fromthree to five families have still had to share one singleroom. In Tamar evacuation centre in Talayan, Maguindan-ao, the shortage of shelters meant that some IDPs werereportedly forced some to sleep in a sitting position32. InDGPC evacuation centre in Datu Piang in Maguindanao,over 100 families were in May 2009 forced to live underschool buildings (built on stilts) due to lack of space andshelters33. Almost completely deprived of any natural lightand ventilation, they had no protection against floodswhen the nearby river overflowed.

The tarpaulin bunkhouses which government agencieshave built in the relocation sites are often even moreuncomfortable, as up to four families are forced to sharearound ten square metres; they lack ventilation as well

as space and privacy. The limited water and sanitationfacilities and the absence of electricity also increaserisks to personal security and integrity, particularly forwomen and girls.

Health problems in evacuation centres

Unhygienic living conditions and practises and poor nu-trition are major causes of health problems, with diar-rhoea and pneumonia reported as the leading causes ofdeath34.The most common primary symptoms reportedwere fever, followed by repeated coughs and colds, and

diarrhoea35

.

A total of 380 deaths linked to the conflict were officiallyrecorded from August 2008 to July 200936. 268 cases, ormore than two-thirds of the officially-recognised deaths,

were of IDPs who died from causes related to illnesswhile staying in camps. 84 per cent of deaths in campswere in ARMM. The real scale of death in displacementis still higher, however, as casualties among IDPs seekingrefuge outside recognised camps are generally excludedfrom these statistics. According to records which the Mu-nicipal Disaster and Coordinating Council in Datu Piang(Maguindanao) shared with IDMC in May 2009, over 100IDPs died in this municipality alone between August 2008and May 2009. These findings reflect the greater scaleof displacement in ARMM and also that conditions thereare probably worse than elsewhere in Mindanao.

Medicine is often unavailable or unaffordable for thedisplaced and local health systems lack the capacity torespond over a sustained period. An inter-agency assess-ment conducted in September 2008, only a few weeksafter the start of the renewed conflict, already showedinitial signs of fatigue among direct health service pro-viders, even though the capacity of local health systemsin the four provinces surveyed was sustained through anumber of measures including the deployment of medi-cal personnel to IDP camps, the presence of local healthvolunteers and the provision of extra medical supplies.Obstacles to the provision of medical services included

the high mobility of IDPs, security restrictions which lim-ited the mobility of health workers and the absence ofany cultural- and gender-sensitive health, nutrition andWASH material37.

Conditions for IDPs in hostcommunities

Roughly four out of ten IDPs are house-based, withmost of them living with relatives. They are less visiblethan people in evacuation centres or in relocation sites,

and also suffer from the assumption by aid agencies that

A makeshift latrine in Lumpong Evacuation Centre, Datu Odin Sinsuat,Maguindanao (Photo: IDMC, May 2009).


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they have less urgent needs. While it is true that thoseaccommodated by relatives were generally better off inthe early phase of their displacement as they could relyalmost immediately on some level of family or communitysupport, their apparent advantage disappeared over timeas IDPs in camps started getting more assistance while

they continued to rely on their hosts dwindling capacityto support them.

Assessments of the water and sanitation situation in hostcommunities revealed conditions that were not muchbetter and even sometimes worse than in evacuationcamps or relocation sites. However, as with IDPs living incamps or relocation sites, those accommodated by rela-tives appeared more concerned about accessing foodor income-generating opportunities than improving theiraccess to water and sanitation38. Food assistance wasextended to house-based IDPs later than to camp-based

IDPs, and also in smaller rations and not to all of them;house-based IDPs have also had to share food aid andother relief items with host families, whose situation hasbecome equally precarious. IDPs are also competing withthe host population to access scarce job opportunities,sometimes causing tensions between the displaced andtheir hosts.

Host communities have faced a reduction in food se-curity, and in access to drinking water, sanitation facili-

ties, land and shelter. Three-quarters of host householdssurveyed in early 2009 reported that access to food hadbecome a problem.While a majority of respondents whoshared their homes considered their shelter as adequateprior to the arrival of the displaced, only 16 per cent hadthe same opinion five months later39. Access to cleanwater was already very difficult before the influx of IDPs,with few reliable water sources existing and many hostareas prone to flooding.

As with previous episodes of displacement in the region,what started as a temporary hosting solution has often

become permanent, as people have found a livelihood

A house occupied by IDPs in Cotabato City, Maguindanao. Most housesin the community are in poor condition and in desperate need of repairs.(Photo: IDMC, May 2009)

in the host communities, children have enrolled in schooland families have created new social networks40. Con-flict and displacement in Mindanao is known to havesignificantly contributed to rural-urban migration in thepast decades. Impoverished by the loss of property andlivelihoods, these urban IDPs have often ended up min-

gling with other migrants fleeing poverty in search ofnew opportunities in the cities. Recognising this fact,a number of projects have been implemented in recentyears, namely in Cotabato City, to help displaced commu-nities address their main rehabilitation needs and securenew livelihoods41. These efforts remain however limitedand most urban IDPs remain unidentified and unassisted.


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The lack of jobs or income-generating activities is oftencited as one of the main problems facing IDPs in Mind-anao. Already living below the poverty threshold, mostdisplaced households suffered the loss of their liveli-hoods and further impoverishment as a result of theirdisplacement. Away from their farm lands or traditionallivelihoods, most have resorted to daily labour, petty tradeand fishing, activities which have generated far less in-come and have not significantly improved their accessto food or other basic necessities42.

The scarcity of employment or income-generating op-portunities in the camps has made IDPs and in particulardisplaced women and children an easy target for traf-fickers43 . Displaced children often lack the protectionprovided by the community and schools, and a numberof displaced girls and boys have been reportedly luredinto exploitative and unsafe situations as domestic orfactory workers or in prostitution networks44.

While the education of all children in conflict areas is af-fected by the violence and its consequences, displacedchildren have tended to be more affected as the dis-ruption of their education has often been long-lastingor repeated. Displaced children have dropped out ofschool entirely45, for example due to the lack of securityand uncertainty on the length of their displacement, thedestruction of school buildings, the distance to schoolsfrom evacuation centres, the loss of the documents theyneed to enrol, and the prohibitive cost for their families.According to an estimate by the Provincial Planning andDevelopment Office of Maguindanao Province, more

than 18,000 displaced children had seen their school-

ing interrupted as a consequence of their displacementbetween 2008 and August 200946. The same month, theARMM Department of Education estimated that 4,000IDP children were at risk of dropping out47.

In Datu Piang in Maguindanao, where there were up to30,000 IDPs in mid-May 2009, the majority of displacedchildren had been displaced for nearly ten months byJune 2009. While school authorities had made effortsto help displaced children pursue their education by al-lowing them to use classrooms in the afternoon whilelocal children used them in the morning, many displaced

parents had still been unable to afford school supplies orthe children had had to work to complement the familyincome48.

Coconut pulp left to dry in the sun in DGPC Elementary School in Datu

Piang, which was converted into an evacuation centre. Turned into oil andsold, this is one of the few sources of income for the displaced. (Photo:IDMC, May 2009).

Impoverishment, exploitationand reduced access to education


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Threats to the safety of IDPs

Both sets of combatants in the Mindanao conflict haveperpetrated human rights abuses and violations of in-ternational humanitarian law against civilians since theresumption of conflict in August 200849. MILF rebels havebeen accused of unlawful killings, hostage taking, lootingof businesses and burning of houses of mainly Christiancivilians in both Cotabato and Lanao del Norte Provinc-es50. The AFP have reportedly perpetrated indiscriminateattacks against civilians, including aerial bombing andshelling, but also looting of property and crops as wellas burning of houses accompanied by forced evictions51.

The conflict has also been fuelled by paramilitary groupsand other civilian militias which have been promoted andarmed by local politicians and the government52. Two ofthe main irregular auxiliary forces of the AFP, the CivilianArmed Forces Geographical Units and the Civil Volun-teer Organizations, have in the past been responsiblefor human rights against civilians. The Illonggo LandGrabbers Association (ILAGA), a Christian paramilitarygroup founded in the 1970s and re-activated followingthe August 2008 conflict, has reportedly attacked Morocivilians in retaliation for MILF attacks in Cotabato andLanao del Norte Provinces.53

Civilians living near areas of fighting, mostly in the ARMMregion, have been at risk of shelling and aerial bombard-ment, even after their displacement. In September 2008,all six members of a family, including four children, werekilled in Maguindanao by a bomb allegedly dropped bythe AFP while they were fleeing the fighting on a boat54.Even evacuation centres are not safe, and in recentmonths there have been a number of cases of shelling

in or near IDP camps, with the AFP and the MILF usuallyblaming on each other55. On 15 June 2009, an IDP campin Maguindanao was hit by a mortar shell which killedone person and wounded three others56. As a result, IDPsare often again displaced to camps further away fromthe areas of fighting.

AFP often fails to distinguish betweencivilian and rebel combatants

Human rights violations against civilians and IDPs in par-

ticular have reportedly increased in Maguindanao sinceApril 2009, when a new AFP operation resulted in anincreased military presence, an escalation in the fightingand a reduction in the access of humanitarians. Duringcounter-insurgency operations by the AFP, people havebeen allegedly harassed, abducted, tortured and some-times killed57, with soldiers often accused of disregardingthe distinction between civilians and rebel combatants58.In areas known as MILF rebel strongholds, in particular inMaguindanao and Lanao del Norte Provinces, the AFPhas come to openly consider IDPs as the enemy reserveforce 59. This failure to distinguish between combat-ants and civilian non-combatants, a basic and essentialprinciple of international humanitarian law, is a worryingdevelopment which is likely to lead to further violenceagainst the displaced population.

The looting and burning of hundreds of civilian homessince August 2008, attributed mainly to the AFP butalso to the MILF, is another violation of the principle ofdistinction which prescribes a clear separation betweenmilitary and civilian objects. In early May 2009, peopledisplaced in Talayan, Maguindanao filed a complaint withthe Commission on Human Rights in Region XII for de-structive arson against soldiers they accused of burning

150 houses in their community. They reported being toldby the soldiers to leave their homes without any apparentsecurity reason, and finding all the houses burnt downupon their return60. IDPs fleeing their homes in BarangayReina Regente in Datu Piang, Maguindanao, reported atthe end of May 2009 that at least 100 houses had beenburnt down by armed men they identified as belongingto local paramilitary groups61.

The AFP has imposed restrictions on the delivery ofhumanitarian assistance62, purportedly to protect hu-manitarian workers from attacks by rebel forces; however

these restrictions and the resulting delays have not only

Re-displaced families in Makir Evacuation Centre. After seeking shelter ina camp close to their homes in Datu Piang where they didnt feel safe, theydecided to flee further from the combat zone to Datu Odin Sinsuat. (Photo:

IDMC, May 2009).


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increased food insecurity among displaced people, theyhave also heightened security risks they face, as someIDPs have been forced to return to their homes or seekalternative food supplies near their camps. Away fromthe camps they have been caught in the crossfire andalso often detained, by the AFP as a suspected member

of armed rebels groups, or by rebel groups on suspicionof collaborating with security forces. On 7 May 2009,three IDPs went missing, reportedly abducted by secu-rity forces; they had been travelling to a village near thetown of Datu Saudi after learning that the ICRC woulddistribute food there. The body of one was found the nextday floating in the Rio Grande river63.

The insecurity and military-imposed restrictions whichhave limited access to some areas, and the lack of in-dependent human rights monitors, make it difficult toascertain the full extent of human rights violations com-

mitted since August 2008. The lack of investigations bythe police or the AFP into allegations of violations com-mitted by their members, and the fear of reprisals, meanthat most cases remain unreported and perpetrators canact with impunity.

A sustained pattern of violationsagainst enemies of the state

The human rights violations committed in the contextof the current Mindanao armed conflict do conform toa sustained pattern of violations committed by the AFPor paramilitary groups during previous phases of theconflict or in their fight against other insurgent groups.Past counter-insurgency operations against the ASG andthe NPA have been accompanied by regular reports ofhuman rights violations against civilians, and IDPs sus-pected of being members of the groups or supportingthem.

The majority of the victims of human rights violations inthe past years in the Philippines belong to leftist or-ganisations such as peasant or fishermen associations,political parties, student or religious groups. These legal

and peaceful organisations are often labelled by theAFP as allies of the NPA, or enemies of the State64,and become legal targets and its members subject toneutralisation by the AFP. According to a 2006 UNICEFassessment, a textual analysis of AFP documents onmilitary strategy and tactics indicate that the distinctionbetween combatants and civilian noncombatants is notjust blurred but explicitly disregarded.65.

In his report to the Human Right Council in 2008 fol-lowing a mission to the Philippines the previous year,the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary

or arbitrary executions described the AFP as being in a

state of denial concerning the numerous extrajudicial ex-ecutions in which its soldiers are implicated66. In March2009, both Amnesty International and the European Par-liament urged the government to investigate and endextra-judicial killings and other human rights violationsfor which there was ample evidence of the government

security and armed forces involvement such as tortureand cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, enforceddisappearances or illegal arrests67.


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Patterns of return and related problems

The governments efforts to enable IDPs to return totheir homes have appeared more a list of activities thana comprehensive return and rehabilitation strategy.They have not generally reflected the reality of thedisplacement situation, and have primarily been drivenby a concern to close the camps to ensure a quick andvisible return of the displaced despite obvious andsignificant obstacles, the main one being the militaryoperations driven by the government itself. Follow-ing the July 2009 ceasefire, new efforts have beenunderway to try to develop a coherent early recoveryplan to support return and rehabilitation, and the UN ,

through UNDP as the lead of the recently-activatedearly recovery cluster, has been invited to advise thegovernment on the process.

2008-2009: Continued fightingprevents return

Of the estimated 750,000 people displaced in thenine months since August 2008, it is estimated thattwo-thirds managed to return to their homes in thefollowing weeks or months. Most of the returns tookplace in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Cota-bato, and to a lesser extent in Lanao del Sur andMaguindanao where sporadic skirmishes betweengovernment forces and MILF rebels continued to pre-vent returns while creating new displacement. Manyof those who returned found their homes destroyedor damaged and their property and livestock looted68 .For the majority, assistance provided by the govern-ment or local authorities has been insufficient tocompensate for their loss.

In January 2009, with more than 300,000 people stilldisplaced and most of them clearly unable to return to

their homes due to continued insecurity and signifi-cant destruction there, the government launched thePHP500 million ($10 million) Early Recovery and Reha-bilitation Plan, aimed at enabling most IDP to return inthe following weeks. Local authorities were instructedto close as many camps as possible while the govern-ment initiated early recovery and rehabilitation activi-ties69. In the face of warnings by aid agencies about theprematurity of the plan and the impossibility of returnfor most IDPs, the government was obliged to clarifythat nobody would be forced to leave the camps andthat IDPs were only encouraged to do so where their

return was possible70

.

While the majority of the displaced managed to returnin provinces where conflict had already subsided, suchas Cotabato or Lanao del Norte, many were afraid toreturn in areas where fighting continued, in particularin Maguindanao Province, where the largest number ofpeople remain displaced.

The presence of the AFP or paramilitary groups in ar-eas of return has also discouraged many from goingback home, in particular in Moro areas but also in someChristian areas. Muslim IDPs from Aleosan municipalityin Cotabato who sought shelter at evacuation centres

in Datu Piang expressed their fear of returning to theirhomes due to the presence of ILAGA paramilitariesthere71.

Many IDPs had nothing to return to, as their homes andmeans of livelihoods have been destroyed during thefighting; according to government records, at least 3,800houses were damaged or destroyed by the fighting be-tween August 2008 and May 2009, nearly 70 per cent ofthem in the ARMM region72. As of July 2009, the govern-ment had managed to repair less than one third of alldestroyed or damaged houses73.

Limited returns in the wake of July2009 ceasefire

The July 2009 ceasefire resulted in a significant im-provement of the security situation, mainly by putting anend to large-scale military operations and subsequentdisplacements. It has also allowed for a limited numberof returns. By the end of August, spontaneous returnshad been reported in Maguindanao province, mainly inKabuntalan and Talayan municipalities where close to5,000 families had reportedly returned, and some 3,500

families in Lanao del Sur Province and 2,000 families inSultan Kudarat Province had reportedly started planningtheir return74.

However, many IDPs were reportedly still too afraid toreturn as of September, in particular in MaguindanaoProvince, and it also appeared that some of the returnssince July had not been voluntary, as IDPs were notconsulted or involved in decisions, but instead just toldto leave the camps and go back to their homes75. Noinformation is provided to them on conditions in areasof return, where few reconstruction and rehabilitation

activities have reportedly started.


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National response

The government response to the Mindanao displacementcrisis can be described as significant in terms of thedelivery of essential humanitarian assistance, in par-ticular during the first months of the emergency, butalso inconsistent and insufficient as the displacementsituation evolved. Despite making real efforts to assistpeople affected by the conflict, the government has so farfailed to provide a comprehensive response to the spe-cific problems which IDPs face. Most efforts have goneinto providing emergency humanitarian assistance, butnot enough to ensure that the returns which have takenplace are sustainable both in terms of security and liveli-

hood opportunities, or that alternative durable solutionssuch as local integration or resettlement elsewhere areoffered when return is not an option.

The government remains by far the main agent of dis-placement through military and security operationsagainst rebels and criminal groups and their suspectedsympathisers.

Causing recurrent waves of displacement to the sameareas and communities year after year, repeated AFPoperations have not only prevented early recoveryprojects from being implemented, but they have alsoundermined previous return and rehabilitation effortsand left stability and security a distant dream for mostIDPs and returnees.

While the government has generally acknowledged theinternal displacement situation, its scale and impact havebeen insufficiently documented and often played down.Protection issues, in particular those linked to military

actions, have tended to be left neglected, and no steps

Rows of bunkhouses built by the governments Department for Social Wel-fare and Development in the DGPC Evacuation Centre, Datu Piang (Photo:IDMC, May 2009.

have been taken so far to develop a national IDP policyor action plan covering all phases of displacement.

Local non-governmental organisations, volunteers andother representatives from civil society, including IDPthemselves, have played a critical role in assisting theinternally displaced and in advocating for their rights inMindanao, and elsewhere in the country. Some of themain local humanitarian actors are organised throughthe Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN),a coordination and assistance delivering entity revivedsince August 2008. Strong advocates for peace and

IDP protection and rights have included the MindanaoPeople Caucus, a network of more than 50 grassrootsorganisations as well as the Bantay Ceasefire, a networkof volunteers who aim to prevent conflict by conductinginvestigative missions of armed incidents and establish-ing early warning networks in the field.

The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), the devel-opment arm of the MILF, has since 2006 been involvedin community-driven reconstruction and developmentactivities mainly in conflict-affected areas. Since August2008, it has also responded to the humanitarian needsof communities affected by the conflict, including thedisplaced. Eight years after its creation, the BDA con-tinues to lack capacity and resources and still needs tobe fully recognised by the government as a legitimatedevelopment and assistance partner.

Coordination challenges

The governments Department of Social Welfare andDevelopment (DSWD) remains the lead agency on IDPprotection and assistance. The overall humanitarian re-sponse follows established plans: the National Disaster

Coordinating Council (NDCC) coordinates the nationalresponse and regional, provincial and finally municipalcoordinating councils manage the response at each levelin conjunction with the LGUs. The NDCC is headed bythe Secretary of National Defense. While these institu-tional arrangements do not present any problems whenresponding to the natural disasters regularly affectingthe country, in situations of armed conflict the fact thatthe head of the main national assistance coordinatingbody is technically a party to the conflict can presentobvious problems and concerns as to the neutrality andeffectiveness of the response in areas considered by the

government as loyal to insurgent groups.


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The government has taken steps to clarify responsibilitiesand improve coordination between the different agen-cies involved in the assistance efforts, by establishingin October 2008 the NDCC Task Force on HumanitarianAssistance for IDPs in Mindanao under the chairmanshipof the DSWD, and more recently the ambitious Health,

Education, Livelihood, Progress Task Force for CentralMindanao (HELP-CM)76. Coordination is still howeverlargely driven from Manila, and coordination both be-tween government agencies and between them andhumanitarian agencies has been inadequate, with UNagencies only linking with the government through clus-ter mechanisms late in their response. Coordination be-tween the government and local authorities of the ARMMhas also reportedly been difficult. Poor communicationand lack of information sharing between local bodies andthe government has reportedly resulted in both gaps andduplication in assistance.

Between August 2008 and July 2009, the governmentreportedly spent a total of $10 million (almost PHP500million) to assist IDPs in camps or with host families aswell as those who have returned.77 The bulk of the moneywas spent on emergency relief assistance, and less thanone fifth on early recovery and rehabilitation projects. TheEarly Recovery and Rehabilitation Plan, intended to signala move from emergency relief to early recovery and solvethe IDP crisis within a few weeks, largely failed to meetits objectives. In July 2009, six months after its launch,the government was unable to implement most of theprojects due to insecurity, and was faced with an evengreater number of IDPs to assist and a budget largelyfocused on early recovery and rehabilitation projects.

Government suspicion of Moro IDPs

The government has largely played down the severity ofthe displacement crisis and the scale of the humanitar-ian emergency, primarily to avoid attracting internationalattention to the conflict, and partly because of prevalent

stereotypes of Mindanao and its Muslim and indigenous

Relocation site in Datu Piang. A shortage of tarpaulin was reportedly slow-ing down the completion of the site. (Photo: IDMC, May 2009).

populations. In September 2008, at the height of thedisplacement crisis, with half a million people displaced,the government insisted the situation was largely undercontrol and there was no humanitarian crisis or need toappeal for international assistance, despite reports to thecontrary by UN agencies and NGOs working there78. Ten

months later, in July 2009, with up to half a million peoplestill displaced and dwindling resources to assist them, thegovernment insisted that the situation still did not amountto a humanitarian crisis79. The government has appearedto view the conflict and displacement in Mindanao aspart of a natural state of affairs in that region, with thehead of the Social and Welfare Department describingthe Moro people as used to it80.

The government has appeared at times unable to priori-tise its responsibility to assist and protect all civilians, andits attitude towards IDPs from Muslim-populated areas

has seemed at times to be driven more by distrust andsuspicion than by concern for their well-being. Shortlyafter the August 2008 upsurge in fighting Oxfam, clearlyreferring to Moro civilians, noted that humanitarian as-sistance is being withheld from some people because oftheir religious belief81. In past years, there have some-times been reports of discrimination in the provision ofaid during displacement, with IDP camps housing civiliansconsidered loyal to paramilitary and government forcesreportedly receiving greater assistance from govern-ment aid agencies while (mainly Moro) IDPs in schoolsor makeshift shelters considered as pro-MILF foundit more difficult to be recognised as beneficiaries andreceive assistance82.

During 2009, government measures to better control thedistribution of humanitarian supplies and stop them fall-ing into the hands of MILF combatants have presentedproblems to IDPs: they have included the reduction of thesize of food rations, and the general distribution of FamilyAccess Cards (FACs)83, which has raised concerns aboutpossible use of the personal information collected onIDPs for security purposes84.

Institutional reforms to strengthenhuman rights protection

The government has found itself under increased inter-national scrutiny following the visits in recent years of anumber of independent human rights experts and or-ganisations. They have reported on widespread violationscommitted by the AFP, and pointed to the inadequateinstitutional arrangements which have failed to protectthe victims, in particular those identified as enemies ofthe state. The Human Security Act (HSA) of 2007, an

anti-terrorist law broadening the definition of terrorism


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preliminary investigations on complaints filed by IDPsfrom Maguindanao against military officials they accusedof destructive arson and misconduct. This was reportedas the first time IDPs had filed complaints against theAFP during a conflict91.

Lumpung Evacuation Centre in Datu Odin Sinsuat (Photo: IDMC, May2009).

and increasing law enforcement agencies power, hasbeen criticised for threatening fundamental freedomsand violating a number of international human rightslaws.85

In the past couple of years, the government has made

some efforts to strengthen human rights protectionmechanisms or to adopt laws that criminalise reportedlywidespread practices and behaviours such as extra-judicial killings, torture and enforced disappearances.These have however remained limited in the absenceof concerted political will. Laws and mechanisms whichexist and which should contribute to better protectioncontinue to be poorly implemented.

Ongoing efforts to develop national legislation basedon the UN Guiding Principles have remained stalled fora number of years. Following the 2005 National Multi-

Stakeholders Forum on IDPs, the Internal DisplacementBill was presented to the Philippines Congress in 2006,and filed before the Senate in August 2007. The Billcomprehensively addressed the needs and rights of IDPsin the different phases of displacement. As of September2009, the Bill had passed the House of Representatives(the lower chamber of Congress), but was still pendingat the Senate.

One of the Bills proposals is to make the Commissionon Human Rights (CHR) the institutional focal point onIDP issues. While explicitly committed to monitor andreport on human rights violations in the context of forceddisplacement and to promote the protection of the humanrights of IDPs86, the CHR does not yet have a presencein ARMM or a clear strategy in relation to the Mindanaosituation87. It is also reportedly lacking proper resourcesto fulfil its mandate 88.

In April 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions reported to the HumanRights Council that one year after its visit to the Philip-pines in February 2007, the number of unlawful killingshad appeared to have significantly decreased. However,forced disappearances, illegal detentions and torture

remained a major problem89. There are no domestic lawsprohibiting torture or forced disappearances. In August2009, the Philippine lawmakers adopted a final draft ofa bill making torture illegal. The final version needs tobe ratified before it is submitted to the President forfinal approval.90

Little or no progress has been reported on reforming orimproving existing programmes that would contributeto a greater respect of human rights. The impunity ofofficials continues to be encouraged by the lack of aneffective witness protection programme. In September

2009, the Ombudsman for Mindanao started conducting


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International response

The international communitys response has been vitalto the IDPs in Mindanao. Many of them have relied onthe humanitarian assistance provided by UN agenciesand international NGOs to complement and fill the gapsin government assistance.

Since May 2009, in the context of growing insecurity andaccess restrictions, international agencies have some-times struggled to reach the affected population, andhave also found themselves under increasing pressurefrom the government to show that they are not indirectlysupporting rebels of the MILF through the delivery of

food and medical assistance to the displaced. To thisend, they have been asked to better coordinate their as-sistance with government cluster leads and comply withtheir distribution and reporting procedures92. Problemsreported in the monitoring of IDP numbers have led tosignificant discrepancies between official governmentfigures and international agency figures have reportedlycaused disagreements on the quantity of aid needed93.Although they have been working within the same clustercoordination framework, the government and its inter-national partners have interpreted and implemented thesystem differently, resulting in some degree of confusion.

Lack of leadershipon protection issues

Overall, the humanitarian response of the UN was ham-pered until August 2009 by the absence of a perma-nent Resident Coordinator (RC) since August 2008.The RC is responsible for the strategic and operationalcoordination of the response efforts of the UN and itshumanitarian partners , and also for advocating with allparties for the application of humanitarian principlesand access to affected populations including internally

displaced people.

This lack of leadership has been particularly felt in theprotection cluster. Coordination arrangements requirea cluster protection lead to be identified from amongthe three UN agencies with a core protection mandate(UNHCR, OHCHR, UNICEF)94; however the UN has failedto designate one as lead agency to coordinate the in-ternational response, forcing the two successive RCsad interim to formally take on the role despite the clearlimits to their capacity to focus on the role. While issuesof resources and capacity have played a role in the fail-

ure to clarify protection responsibilities, the government

has made no secret that it saw no need for strongerinternational involvement on issues related to humanrights protection. The majority of the international agen-cies present in the Philippines are development-oriented,work closely with government departments and mostprefer not to engage the government on sensitive humanrights issues95.

The protection gap was identified early on, but has re-mained largely unfilled since August 2008. No independ-ent national protection cluster was established for morethan a year. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)

members have been able to discuss protection issuesindependently from the government in the MonitoringWorking Group (MWG) established in February 2009 inMindanao and led by the International Organization forMigration (IOM). However, its effectiveness has beenhampered by lack of resources and support as well as byinadequate terms of reference which focused on moni-toring in areas of return. In August 2009, the MWG wasreplaced by a Protection Working Group (PWG) withwider responsibilities96 and its leadership was formallyattributed to IOM under the supervision of the protectionofficer at the RCs office.

Despite these important shortcomings, there have beena number of positive developments in the past monthsthat are likely to improve and strengthen the overallinternational response and in particular on protectionissues. These have included the deployment by theGlobal Protection Cluster Working Group of a seniorprotection officer in Manila tasked with developing along-term protection strategy, and the deployment inMindanao of a humanitarian affairs officer by OCHA,mainly to facilitate coordination between UN agencies,international and national organisations and local andnational government bodies.

A year after the start of the emergency an IASC pro-tection cluster was finally established in Manila. Also,in early September 2009, after a vacancy of more thana year, a new RC took up position in Manila. FollowingTropical Storm Ketsana, which hit the northern Philip-pines on 26 September 2009 and affected more than2 million people, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinatorproposed that the RC also assume the role of Humani-tarian Coordinator (HC). It is hoped that this will helpto ensure a systematic response to different crises indifferent areas, whether they are caused by natural

disaster or by conflict.


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No international funding appealdespite considerable humanitarianand rehabilitation needs

In the past years, most donor assistance for the Phil-

ippines has been directed towards Mindanao. While anumber of initiatives have sought to directly address therelief and rehabilitation needs of IDPs, they are usuallyconsidered as one vulnerable group within a larger targetpopulation in Mindanaos conflict-affected areas. In linewith the prevailing view that under-development is one ofthe main roots of the conflict, most of the resources andefforts are concentrated in long-term initiatives aimedat improving governance, developing infrastructure andstimulating economic growth97. Designed for times ofpeace, the implementation of many of these projects hasbeen prevented by regular rounds of fighting.

Since August 2008, the government has opposed anyinternational donor appeal, preferring contributions tobe channelled through non-emergency programmes orinstruments such as the Central Emergency ResponseFund (CERF), which has provided $7.2 million sinceAugust 2008 to UN agencies working in Mindanao98 .The European Commission has been by far the largesthumanitarian donor with over $22 million contributedsince August 2008 to assist the conflict-affected peoplein Mindanao99. The other main donors include Japan,the United States, Germany, Italy and Canada. Therehas been a near-total absence of support to protection-related activities since August 2008, with contributionsfocusing mainly on emergency humanitarian assistance.As of September 2009, many agencies were still report-ing significant funding problems.

Conclusion:closing the protection gap

While both the go

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