philippine koreanist congress - wordpress.com

2nd Philippine Koreanist Congress

1


2

Mapping the Korean Diaspora in the Philippines

3


4

The 2nd Philippine Koreanist Congress “Mapping the Korean Diaspora in the Philippines: 70-year

History and Friendship in Retrospect” Booklet

Published by UP Korea Research Center

Cover Design by Elsie Marie Or

Layout Assistance by Jeanette Garcia

Printed in AC Prints, Maginhawa St., Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines

Copyright © 2019 by the UP KRC

The 2nd Philippine Koreanist Congress was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Korean Studies Promotion Service

(Project Number: AKS-2019-C29).

The views expressed in each paper are those of the authors of the paper. They do not necessarily represent or reflect the

views of the UP KRC or of the University of the Philippines.

On April 27th 2016, the University of the Philippines launched the Korea Research Center

aiming to provide Filipino scholars and researchers with opportunities to widen their

interest in Korean studies. UP KRC provides a venue for Filipino scholars and

professionals to produce meaningful comparative researches and also link Korean

academic institutions and Korean community organizations in the Philippines in order to

promote collaborative partnerships. UP KRC serves as a university-wide hub that will

help promote and develop Korean Studies in the University and the country. It sponsors

interdisciplinary and inter-college research and education activities on Korean studies,

as well as facilitates the training of the next generation of Koreanists in the country.

Address : G/F Asian Institute of Tourism, University of the Philippines, Diliman,

Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, Philippines

Email : [email protected]

Facebook: www.facebook.com/UPKRC


5

PROGRAM TIME PROGRAM SPEAKER ACTIVITY

9:00-10:00 Registration

10:00-10:05 National Anthem

10:05-10:10 Welcome Remarks

Teodoro J. Herbosa, MD, FPCS, FPCEP Executive Vice President, University of the Philippines

10:10-10:15 Congratulatory Remarks

Maruja Asis, Ph.D. Executive Director, Scalabrini Migration Center

10:15-10:20 Opening Remarks

Aldrin Lee, Ph.D. OIC-Director, UP Korea Research Center

10:20-11:20 Keynote speaker

Chulwoo Lee, Ph.D. Professor, Yonsei University

How does diaspora engagement reshape citizenship and nation-statehood?

11:20-11:50 Open Forum

11:50-12:00 Certificate awarding & Photo-ops

12:00-1:00 Lunch Break

1:00-2:00

Session 1 Immersion & Emergence of Korean Community in the Philippines

Prof. Raymund Abejo Department of History, University of the Philippines

Discovering Korea from the Philippine modern history

Bubbles Beverly Asor, Ph.D. Department of Sociology, De La Salle University

The Philippines as a Receiving Society and its Immigration Regimes: An ‘Unlikely Home’ for Korean Communities

Antonio Miranda Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs

Building Cross-cultural Competence for People-to-People Ties: The Landscape of Korean Communities in the Philippines


Certificate awarding & Photo-ops

2:20-3:20

Session 2 Futuristic Partnership after 70-year Ties

Normi Son Kopino Children’s Association Inc.

Korean-Filipino Marriage: Towards an Understanding of Interracial Longevity and Developing Key Policies

Oliver Quintana Political Science Department, Ateneo de Manila University

A Brotherhood Kept Alive: Examining Korean Communities’ Social Involvement in the Philippines and its Potential Role in Institutionalizing National Memory

Danirose Salazar, Ph.D. School of Business, University of the Philippines

Status of Bilateral Trade between the Republic of Korea and the Philippines


Certificate awarding & Photo-ops

3:40-4:50 Session 3 Breakout Workshop

3:40-4:10 Discussion Group discussion

4:10-4:40 Presentation Culminating outcomes

4:40-4:50 Synthesis & Closing Dr. Aldrin Lee, OIC-Director, UP KRC

End of Program


6


7

KEYNOTE LECTURE

How does diaspora engagement reshape

citizenship and nation-statehood?

Chulwoo Lee, Ph.D.

Yonsei University

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the University of the Philippines and its Korea

Research Center for inviting me to this marvelous event. Ms. Kyung Min Bae of the Korea Research

Center has taken care of all procedural matters for my appearance on this podium in a very kind and

meticulous manner, and I greatly appreciate her efforts. The Philippines is like a second home to me,

since my family lived here for seven years until 2014. The Philippines is also a very important country

to me as a migration scholar. It is not only because of the position of the Philippines in the global

migration circuit, but also because the country has a highly renowned migration scholarship, which is

exemplified by the great role played by the Scalabrini Migration Center directed by Dr. Maruja Asis,

who is with us today. I believe this conference will greatly contribute to strengthening the

collaboration between the migration studies circles in the Philippines and Korea, and I feel very

honored to be part of it.

For this event, I have been requested to speak about aspects of diaspora policy in this era of

global migration. Both the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea are known for having

large diasporic populations outside of the country. According to Philippine government statistics, 9.1

million Filipinos were living outside of the Philippines in 2015, when the Philippine population was

recorded to be 100.9 million.1 While the Philippines is reported to be one of the top 10 countries of

origin with the largest diasporas, Koreans claim that their country is as prominent a source country of

emigrants as the Philippines, with the total number of Koreans abroad reaching 7.2 million in 2015.2

The experiences of the two countries merit a serious comparative study, but in my speech I am going

to do something different. I would like to talk about issues which arise from changes taking place in

many parts of the globe and which stimulate our general conceptual understanding of the world in

which we live. In this speech, I would like to bring into light some interesting features of diaspora

engagement policies deployed by various countries and share with you my ideas about how those

changes reshape the notion and institution of citizenship and the international order composed of

nation-states as its fundamental units. I will focus my talk on three politico-legal aspects of diaspora

engagement – (i) the participation of the diaspora in the politics of the state of origin, (ii) the

incorporation of the diaspora into the citizenry of the state of origin by tolerating dual citizenship, and

1 Philippine Statistics Authority / Commission on Filipinos Overseas, “Philippine International Migration Data,”

UN Regional Workshop on Strengthening the Collection and Use of International Migration Data in the Context

of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Bangkok, 31 January – 3 February 2017,

https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/meetings/2017/bangkok--international-migration-

data/Session%203/Session%203%20Philippines.pdf. 2 Jaeoe dongpo jeongeui mit hyeonhwang [Overseas Koreans: Definition and Current State],

http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_21507/contents.do.


8

(iii) the creation of a special diaspora status and preferential treatment of the holders of that status

vis-à-vis other foreigners by reason of their ethnic or national origin.

To begin with, I must speak a little bit about the concept of diaspora. The term diaspora comes

from the Greek word speiro, meaning “to sow,” and dia, meaning “over,”3 and has come to denote

the dispersion of people or a population that has been separated from their homeland as a result of

dispersion. While the term in its original lexicon is applied to populations displaced from their

homeland through some catastrophic processes, such as Jews, Armenians and Palestinians, its usage

has expanded to embrace groups that have various other backgrounds, such as trade, as in the cases

of the Chinese and Indian diasporas. Nowadays, the term is so loosely used that it often encompasses

all groups of emigrants and expatriates. Both Filipinos and Koreans apply the term diaspora to the

“Filipinos overseas” and “overseas Koreans” respectively. Even British expatriates call themselves the

British diaspora.

Many states try to engage with their diasporas. The Philippines has a government agency

named the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (Komisyon sa mga Filipino sa ibayong dagat). Korea also

has an “overseas Koreans policy.” It is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with much of its

work carried out by the Overseas Koreans Foundation (Jaeoe dongpo jaedan). Among the diaspora

engagement policies adopted by many states are various ways of economic incorporation, such as

creating incentives for remittances and investment, and cultural incorporation, such as supporting

language education for younger generation expatriates.

It is often believed that diaspora engagement policies are unique to less-developed emigrant-

sending countries or countries with traumatic historical backgrounds of dispersion. Comparative

studies show that it is not true. Even immigration countries such as New Zealand and the United

Kingdom either have developed engagement programs or are under pressure to develop such

programs.4 In 1999 and 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted reports

and recommendations entitled “Links between Europeans Living Abroad and Their Countries of Origin”

to encourage European countries to strengthen their ties with emigrants and expatriates. 5 The

Parliamentary Assembly updated its position set forth in these reports and recommendations by way

of a report, resolution and recommendation adopted in 2009. These documents bear the title

“Engaging European Diasporas.”6

The Council of Europe’s interest in diaspora issues in Europe has greatly expanded the scope

of comparative diaspora studies. Like many emigrant-sending countries in Asia, Central and South

America, quite a number of European countries have concern for their diasporas in other parts of the

world, North America in particular, and try to develop policies for engaging with those groups. Yet

many European cases involve groups having different backgrounds. In the aftermath of the

disintegration of the communist bloc and socialist federations, many groups of people found

themselves separated from their home country. What Rogers Brubaker terms “accidental diasporas”

came into existence as a result of the redrawing of the political map. Brubaker contrasts the accidental

diaspora with the labor migrant diaspora. Whereas a labor migrant diaspora is formed by “the

3 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p.ix. 4 Alan Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination,” Political Geography, Issue 27

(2008), pp.843-44. 5 Official documents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe are available at http://semantic-

pace.net/?search=KjoqfGNvcnB1c19uYW1lX2VuOiJPZmZpY2lhbCBkb2N1bWVudHMi&lang=en. 6 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Report Doc. 12076 (2009) / Recommendation 1890 (2009) /

Resolution 1696 (2009) on Engaging European Diasporas: The Need for Governmental and Intergovernmental

Responses.


9

movement of people across borders,” an accidental diaspora is constituted by “the movement of

borders across people.”7 Major examples of accidental diaspora are Russians stranded in the Baltic

states and Serbs and Croats in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. They are stranded as minorities

in what became foreign states. They are called “kin-minorities” with ethnonational links with their

“kin-state.”

Indeed, accidental diasporas are not devoid of migration elements. Russians in other former

Soviet Republics, for example, had moved to those countries and settled there before the

disintegration of the Soviet Union. The term diaspora can be applied to such people. There are,

however, minorities left outside of their homeland as a result of the movement of borders with no

movement of people. Magyars, or ethnic Hungarians, in the Transylvanian region of Romania are a

case in point. Those Magyars were separated from their homeland and became citizens of Romania

as a result of the peace settlement after the First World War. It is problematic whether these people

should be called a diaspora. Yet, in this speech, I will not distinguish between diasporas formed

through migration and minorities stranded outside of the home country without migration.

Now let me turn to diaspora engagement policies. As I indicated at the beginning, I am going

to address some of the politico-legal issues that arise from diaspora engagement. Those issues have

much to do with what status the members of the diaspora have.

The members of a diaspora have differing statuses. Some are citizens of the state of origin.

Others are citizens of the state of residence. Of course, there are dual citizens. One of the biggest

political issues arising from engagement with those who retain the citizenship of the state of origin

relates to the political participation of people who reside outside of the country. I understand that the

Philippines implemented an out-of-country voting procedure in 2003 by enacting the Overseas

Absentee Voting Act. Filipinos living abroad participated in national elections for the first time in

2004.8 The Republic of Korea briefly allowed overseas voting in the early 1970s, primarily for troops

stationed in Vietnam, but it was in 2009 that a full-scale out-of-country voting procedure was

introduced, precipitated by a Constitutional Court decision in 2007 which declared that the lack of

such a procedure was not in conformity with the constitution.9 The Philippines is more advanced than

Korea, because it allows postal voting on top of personal voting, whereas Koreans abroad can only

vote by visiting polling stations.

In any case, the Philippines and Korea are in tune with the times. Incorporating diaspora

members into the active citizenry is now regarded as a democratic requirement. The Council of Europe

has adopted it as an important agenda on a number of occasions.10 Article 41 of the Migrant Workers

Convention (International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and

Members of Their Families) stipulates the political rights of migrant workers and their family members.

Since emigrants such as migrant workers contribute greatly to their country as senders of remittances

7 Rogers Brubaker, “Accidental Diasporas and External ‘Homelands’ in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and

Present,” Political Science Series 71 (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 2000). 8 See the webpage of the Overseas Voting Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines,

http://www.dfa-oavs.gov.ph; International IDEA database, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/240/52. 9 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea 2007.6.28. 2004HeonMa644 / 2005HeonMa360 (consolidated);

International IDEA database, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/163/52. 10 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1459 (2005) and Recommendation 1714 (2005) on

Abolition of Restrictions on the Right to Vote; Resolution 1696 (2009) and Recommendation 1890 (2009) on

Engaging European Diasporas; Resolution 1897 (2012) on Ensuring Greater Democracy in Elections; European

Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on Out-of-Country Voting, CDL-

AD(2011)022.

http://www.dfa-oavs.gov.ph/


10

and sources of investments, it would be difficult to restrict their participation in the political affairs of

the homeland. Their rights, however, are not a quid pro quo for their contributions. Their rights are

not contingent upon what they can do for their country, although emigrant contributions make up a

powerful rationale in favor of the introduction of out-of-country voting.

On the other hand, should all members of the diaspora enjoy political rights on equal terms?

Some members of the diaspora have no links with their homeland except holding the passport of the

country. Why should they be given the right to participate in making significant decisions on the future

of the country on a par with resident citizens? For this reason, quite a number of countries, including

Australia, the United Kingdom and Germany, curtail the voting rights of citizens who have been out of

the country (or, as for Germany, out of the European Union) for a certain amount of time. Many

countries limit out-of-country voting to temporary absentees. Ireland, Israel, and Denmark are

examples. The European Court of Human Rights held that the member states were not “under an

obligation to grant nonresidents an unrestricted access to the franchise” and that “the margin of

appreciation enjoyed by the State in this area still remains a wide one.”11

Yet it is equally true that restrictions disappear in parallel with increasing diaspora

connectivity with the country of origin. Canada removed its five-year expiry rule. The Constitution of

the Republic of the Philippines provides for a one-year residence requirement for suffrage, but with

room for absentee voting legislation to make exceptions (Art. 5, Sect. 1 & 2). The Philippines required

permanent residents in foreign countries to execute an affidavit of resumption of residence in the

Philippines, but this requirement was removed by the Overseas Voting Act of 2013. Korea differs from

the Philippines in that it distinguishes between temporary absentees and permanent emigrant voters,

and precludes the latter from constituency elections, but an increasing percentage of Koreans abroad

are registered as temporary absentees despite living and working in the countries where they are.

With the increase of transborder communications and movements, the distinction between

temporary absentees and permanent diaspora will attenuate.

Another sensitive issue involved in the political participation of the diaspora is about dual

citizenship. Popular hostility to dual citizenship is based inter alia on the belief that dual citizens have

split loyalty. Dual citizens have an exit option when the country is in danger. Hence, people ask why

they should enjoy equal political rights. Many countries bar dual citizens from obtaining high public

positions or taking on sensitive responsibilities in intelligence- or security-related fields. Nevertheless,

countries cannot bar citizens from voting only because they are dual citizens, as long as those dual

citizens are willing to, or required to, act as citizens. Restrictions on the electoral rights of dual citizens

follow the rules on the residence requirement if there are any such rules. By enacting the Citizenship

Retention and Reacquisition Act in 2003, the Philippines came to tolerate dual citizenship on a broad

scale. Dual citizens, or “duals” as they are called in the Philippines, were at first denied the exception

to the constitutional residence requirement for suffrage, but, thanks to a Supreme Court decision,

duals living in foreign countries may now exercise their voting rights under the same conditions as

other nonresident citizens.12

While countries such as Korea and India are reluctant to incorporate diaspora members into

the citizenry by tolerating their dual citizenship, an increasing number of countries are using dual

citizenship as a means of expanding its Staatsvolk or citizenry beyond borders. This is one of the

features of the transnationalization of nation-statehood that I have inquired into over the past years.

The 1990s witnessed a widespread trend of legal change in favor of tolerating the dual citizenship of

11 Shindler v. United Kingdom, application no. 19840/09, European Court of Human Rights (7 May 2013). 12 Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. no. 162759, Supreme Court of the Philippines (4 August 2006).


11

diaspora members. Six Latin American countries including Brazil and Mexico changed their laws in that

direction. The Philippines’ legislation of 2003 can be understood in the same context. These changes

reflected the emigrant-sending states’ strategy to support their diasporas for their stable settlement

in the country of residence on the one hand and to incorporate former citizens and their descendants

back into the Staatsvolk on the other. I would tentatively call this pattern the emigrant-integration

constellation of dual citizenship politics.

There has been another pattern since the beginning of the 1990s. This has been most

conspicuous in Eastern Europe since the fall of communism. After the breakup of the socialist

federations, the formerly constituent republics had to find ways to maintain links with their coethnics

or “accidental” diasporas left beyond the newly drawn borders. They have developed external

citizenship regimes with generous attitudes to dual citizenship. The Constitution of the Russian

Republic has a peculiar provision declaring that “a citizen … may have citizenship of a foreign state in

accordance with federal law or an international treaty” (art. 62). In Yugoslavia, both Serbia and Croatia

have used dual citizenship for incorporating Serbs and Croats respectively in other republics, primarily

in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The fall of communism stimulated former communist countries to revive their erstwhile

suppressed ethnonational concern and to develop programs for reaching out to kin-minorities in

neighboring countries. In 1991, Romania enacted a new nationality law allowing “remote”

naturalization, which resulted in the acquisition of Romanian citizenship by a large number of citizens

of Moldova having Romanian origin.13 Bulgaria has also implemented similar citizenship rules. Even

the former prime minister of Macedonia Ljubcho Georgievski was among the people who acquired

Bulgarian citizenship through this route.14 Hungary is looked upon as a paradigm example of using

external citizenship for kin-minority incorporation. By amending its nationality law in 2010, Hungary

turned many citizens of neighboring countries, including Magyars in Transylvania, into Hungarian

citizens.

I would call this pattern the ethnic nation-building constellation. This constellation is more

prone to provoke controversy than the emigrant-integration constellation, while emigrant countries

also are not free from international tension when they strategize dual citizenship. Croatia’s dual

citizenship politics in the early 1990s caused instability in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina by

appropriating its citizens as the kin-state’s citizens, which in turn strengthened Croatia’s exclusionary

nation policy within its territory, where other former constituent nations of Yugoslavia were relegated

to minorities while the constitution enshrined Croats as the titular nation. Furthermore, it had an

impact on the political balance in Croatia in favor of the aggressive nationalist president Franjo

Tudjman’ party (HDZ). Tudjman was not popular in Zagreb, but his party secured a parliamentary

majority, thanks to support from Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 Hungary’s case is a more recent

example of controversy. When Hungary executed its amended nationality law in 2010 and granted

Hungarian citizenship to Magyars in neighboring countries, Slovakia retaliated by amending its

nationality law so that citizens who voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship lose their Slovak citizenship.

13 Constantin Iordachi, “Dual Citizenship and Policies toward Kin minorities in East-Central Europe: A

Comparison between Hungary, Romania and the Republic of Moldova,” in Zoltán Kántor et al. (eds.), The

Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido

University, 2004). 14 Daniel Smilov and Elena Jileva, “The Politics of Bulgarian Citizenship: National Identity, Democracy and Other

Uses,” Rainer Bauböck, Bernhard Perchnig and Wiebke Sievers (eds.), Citizenship Policies in the New Europe,

expanded and updated edition (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), p.230. 15 Katharine Verdery, “Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property: Eastern Europe Since 1989,”

American Ethnologist, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1998), p.296.


12

The Slovak law was challenged in Slovakia’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human

Rights, but the challenges were unsuccessful.16

No attempt of weaponizing external citizenship has been more obtrusive than Russia’s mass

“passportization” of residents in Georgia’s secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Strictly

speaking, this is not a case of ethnic nation-building, because Russia tried to reach out to those people

not on the ground of their ethnic affinity with Russians but by reason of their former USSR citizenship.

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict of Georgia organized by the

European Union observed that the mass conferral of Russian citizenship upon those populations was

neither legally binding nor lawful under international law. 17 This observation against mass

passportization was reiterated by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s

Recommendation on Engaging European Diasporas in more general terms.18 There are, however, few

effective mechanisms to suppress external citizenship being used for transborder nationalist projects.

If the acquisition of citizenship is voluntary and if there is some factual connection between the state

that grants citizenship and the person that acquires it, that citizenship should be respected.19

By this kind of external citizenship strategy, whether it is for ethnic nation-building or emigrant

integration, states expand their personal boundaries beyond borders and thereby create a

transborder nation-state. Now I am going to introduce another pattern of transborder expansion of

membership. It is the creation of a special diaspora status, a status that is given to diaspora members

who are not citizens. Such people can be called “kin-foreigners.”

In 1999, Korea enacted Law on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans, which

is more often called the Overseas Koreans Act. This law created a special category of people called

“co-ethnics of foreign nationality (oeguk gukjeok dongpo).” A “co-ethnic of foreign nationality” is

defined as a former Korean citizen or his or her lineal descendant. Such a person may enter Korea with

an “overseas Korean” (F-4) visa, and may reside and work for income in Korea with much greater

freedom than foreigners of non-Korean origin. While the holder of this status is not allowed to have a

manual labor job in Korea, there is another scheme that is exclusively for co-ethnics from China and

the former Soviet Union who wish to work in less-skilled job sectors. Unlike the “overseas Korean”

status (F-4), this “working visit” status (H-2) does not allow the holder to stay for more than five years.

But the holder has greater freedom in employment and choice of jobs than guest workers of non-

Korean origin admitted through the Employment Permit System.

I had a chance to interview the person in charge of drafting the Overseas Koreans Act in 1999.

That was Mr. Kim Joon Kyu, who was Director of International Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Justice

when drafting the law and who later became Prosecutor-General. Mr. Kim recalls that he and his team

had no model to turn to when they drafted the Overseas Koreans Act. Why no model? Was Korea the

first country to enact that kind of law? In fact, there were already similar laws in some other countries.

In 1995 Turkey enacted the so-called Lex Rona and issued “pink cards” to foreigners of Turkish origin.

With their pink cards, kin-foreigners are entitled to national treatment in landownership, employment

16 Fehér v. Slovakia and Dolník v. Slovakia, application nos. 14972/12 and 30415/12, European Court of Human Rights

(21 May 2013); Lucia Mokrá, “Slovak Constitutional Court: Citizenship Law in the European Context,” Vienna

Journal on International Constitutional Law, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2015), pp.457-62. 17 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (2009), Vol. 1, p.18. 18 Recommendation 1890 (2009) on Engaging European Diasporas, para. 7. 19 See Alexi Gugushivili, Country Report: Georgia, EUDO Citizenship Observatory RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 2012/3

(Fiesole: Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2012), p.8.


13

and other economic rights.20 The pink card is now called the “blue card.”21 In 1997, Slovakia enacted

its Law on Expatriate Slovaks. Foreigners of Slovak ethnic origin were issued expatriate cards, given

visa-free entry, residence and employment, and granted preferential treatment in real estate

ownership and social support.22

It is not strange that the drafters of the Overseas Koreans Act had to work out the text of the

legislation from their brains only, because that kind of legislation was rarely heralded in most parts of

the world until 2001, when Hungary enacted its Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries,

better known as the Hungarian Status Law. The Hungarian Status Law was designed to give

preferential treatment to persons of Hungarian ethnic origin in six neighboring countries including

Romania and Slovakia. As this law provoked furor on the part of Romania and Slovakia, the Venice

Commission of the Council of Europe was invited to conduct an investigation of similar laws in Europe,

and its Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by Their Kin-State (2001) became

the first comparative study of such laws.23 The Venice Commission found nine cases of statute or

administrative regulation, beginning with a 1979 Austrian law providing benefits to German-speaking

people in the Italian province of Bolzano. The other cases came from Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania,

Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Because the Hungarian case was at the center of the debate

surrounding this type of legislation, the word “status law” became a generic term to denote legislation

that provides for a special status for kin-foreigners.

The “status law syndrome” spread to other countries. In 2004, the Ukraine enacted the Law

on the Status of Foreign Ukrainians and, in 2007, Poland passed the Act on the Polish Ethnicity Card.

In 2009, Serbia adopted a statute named the Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region. Some countries

that already had status laws updated or revised their schemes. Hungary amended its Status Law in

2003 and in 2005 Slovakia replaced its 1997 law with the Act on Slovaks Living Abroad. Whereas

Hungary and Slovakia curtained some of the benefits given to the kin-foreigners, some countries

expanded and strengthened their engagement policies. Slovenia has done so with its 2006 Act

Regulating Relations between the Republic of Slovenia and Slovenians Abroad. Greece has

subsequently taken a stream of legislative and administrative measures. Russia amended its Federal

Law on State Policy in Respect of Compatriots Abroad eight times until 2013.24

20 Christian Rumpf, “Citizenship and Multiple Citizenship in Turkish Law,” in David A. Martin and Kay

Hailbronner (eds.), Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals: Evolution and Prospects (The Hague: Kluwer Law

International, 2003), p.369; Ayse S. Caglar, “‘Citizenship Light’: Transnational Ties, Multiple Rules of Membership,

and the ‘Pink Card,” in Jonathan Friedman and Shalini Randeria (eds.), Worlds on the Move: Globalisation, Migration

and Cultural Security (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp.273-91. 21 Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu, Country Report: Turkey, EUDO Citizenship Observatory RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-CR 2012/10

(Fiesole: Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2012), pp.3-7. 22 Law No. 70/1997 on Expatriate Slovaks and Changing and Complementing Some Laws, in Venice Commission

(ed.), The Protection of National Minorities by Their Kin-State (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2002),

pp.397-404. 23 CDL-INF(2001)19, reprinted ibid. 24 Oxana Shevel, “The Post-Communist Diaspora Laws: Beyond ‘Good Civic versus Bad Ethnic’ Nationalism

Dichotomy,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2010), pp.159-87; Agata Górny and Dorota

Pudzianowska, “Same Letter, New Spirit: Nationality Regulations and Their Implementation in Poland,” in

Bauböck et al. (eds.), Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (2009), pp.133-34; Felicita Medved, “From Civic to Ethnic

Community? The Evolution of Slovenian Citizenship,” in Bauböck et al. (eds.), Citizenship Policies in the New Europe

(2009), pp.321-22; Harris Mylonas and Marko Žilovic, “Foreign Policy Priorities and Ethnic Return Migration

Policies: Group-Level Variation in Greece and Serbia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2017),

pp.613-35; Act LVII of 2003 on Amendments of the Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighboring

Countries, reprinted in Kántor et al. (eds.), The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection


14

While status laws flourished in Eastern Europe, similar laws and policies have been adopted

in countries outside of Europe. In the same year that Korea enacted its Overseas Koreans Act, India

introduced its Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) scheme to provide economic benefits to the members of

the Indian diaspora who did not have Indian citizenship. This has been merged into the Overseas

Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme, which was introduced in 2003 and relaunched in 2005. The Overseas

Citizenship of India may sound like an external citizenship, but it is not a full citizenship.25 In Africa,

Ethiopia introduced the status of “foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin” in 2002 and, in South America,

Suriname adopted the Law Establishing the Status of Persons of Surinamese Origin in 2014.26 An

Indonesian scholar I know is calling for the introduction of a similar scheme for Indonesia.27

The Austrian political theorist Rainer Bauböck coined the term “ethnizenship” to capture such

practice of preferential treatment of kin-foreigners. He defines ethnizenship as an “external quasi-

citizenship” given to noncitizens “on the basis of ethnic descent and perceived common ethnicity.”28

I would modify this definition and use the term to denote “a preferential status given by a state to

noncitizens in or from other states by reason of ethnic or national affinity,” considering the fact that

descent is not the only basis of ethnizenship and the benefits attached to ethnizenship are enjoyed

more in the territory of the kin-state than in the host state. Ethnizenship schemes are diverse in nature.

I can’t spend too much time on discerning the similarities and differences between those cases. Let

me just introduce some of the criteria for comparison.

Firstly, some ethnizenship practices are backed up by constitutional provisions. We know that

many constitutions provide for the duty of the state to protect its citizens abroad, and there is nothing

strange about it. What is interesting is that there are quite a number of constitutions containing

provisions concerning noncitizen co-ethnics abroad or diasporas. The Hungarian constitution declares

that “Hungary bears responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders” (art. D). The

Croatian constitution says that “parts of the Croatian nation in other states shall be guaranteed special

concern and protection by the Republic of Croatia” (art. 10). Similar though less obtrusive provisions

are found in the constitutions of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Albania, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia,

Ukraine, Armenia, and Tajikistan. This is not peculiar to Eastern European countries often regarded as

ridden with ethnic nationalism. Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain have provisions on “people of Irish

ancestry,” “emigrant Greeks,” “emigrant children,” and “Latin American countries … which have

special links with Spain” respectively. In Asia, Vietnam and North Korea express special concern for

“overseas Vietnamese” and “Koreans overseas.” Not all these countries have developed ethnizenship

schemes. While Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine have ethnizenship schemes backed up

(2004), pp.517-28; Act on the Slovaks Living Abroad and on Amendments and Additions to Certain Laws,

http://www.uszz.sk/sk/act-on-the-slovaks-living-abroad-and-on-amendments-and-additions-to-certain-laws;

Law on Diaspora and Serbs in the Region, http://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/LAW-on-

diaspora-and-Serbs-in-the-Region.pdf; Federal Law on State Policy of the Russian Federation in Respect of

Compatriots Abroad, https://www.global-regulation.com/translation/russia/2942117/on-state-policy-of-the-

russian-federation-in-respect-of-compatriots-abroad.html. 25 Ngo Chun Luk, Diaspora Status and Citizenship Rights: A Comparative-Legal Analysis of the Quasi-Citizenship Schemes

of China, India and Suriname (Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2018), chap. 4. 26 Bronwen Manby, Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study, 3rd edition (New York: Open Society

Foundations, 2016), p.101; Luk, Diaspora Status and Citizenship Rights, chap. 5. 27 Bilal Dewansyah, “Indonesian Diaspora movement and citizenship law reform: towards ‘semi-dual citizenship’,”

Diaspora Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2019), pp.52-63. 28 Rainer Bauböck, “Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of

External Voting,” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 75 (2007), p.2396.

http://www.uszz.sk/sk/act-on-the-slovaks-living-abroad-and-on-amendments-and-additions-to-certain-laws

http://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/LAW-on-diaspora-and-Serbs-in-the-Region.pdf

http://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/LAW-on-diaspora-and-Serbs-in-the-Region.pdf


15

by their constitutions, a larger number of ethnizenship cases are not coupled with any constitutional

commitment.

Another significant criterion is how to define the ethnizen. Language affiliation, the ethnic

origin and culture, the geographic origin, and past citizenship are major criteria for defining the

beneficiaries. A related criterion is whether the law and policy target all members of the diaspora

wherever they live or ethnonational kin in specific countries in the same region. Schemes can be

distinguished by whether individual rights are given or only collective support is provided. It might be

inadequate to apply the term ethnizenship to schemes which only provide collective support. Among

other criteria are whether the benefits are economic or cultural in nature, whether the law provides

for a special immigration status and, as I mentioned, whether benefits are distributed in the host state

or in the kin-state only.

Ethnizenship or the preferential noncitizen diaspora status apparently challenges the logic of

the Westphalian international order based on the segmentation of the world into territorially bounded

nation-states, where the nation and state are supposed to coincide with each other. Ethnizenship

registers a decoupling of the nation from the state citizenry. When the legitimacy of the Hungarian

Status Law was at issue, an explanatory memorandum for a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly

of the Council of Europe bluntly asserted that public international law was “based on the ‘state’ and

‘citizenship’” and that it left “no room for the concept of ‘nation’.”29

The creation of a national membership separate from state citizenship might generate

discomfort on the part of people who admire international law, but there has not been much

discussion about the normative side of ethnizenship. The Venice Commission’s 2001 Report was

probably the first normative outline about ethnizenship practices spelled out by an international

public body. It examined the practices by reference to four principles, but I would reorganize the

examination into two parts.

The first is whether an ethnizenship scheme violates the sovereignty of another state.

Ethnizenship involves the execution of a law that has effects upon citizens of another state. But that

fact alone does not constitute an infringement of the host state’s sovereignty. According to the Venice

Commission, it is only when the effects of the law take place in the territory of the host state that a

status law or ethnizenship legislation becomes problematic. The kin-state may legitimately do

something on the territory of the host state, such as distributing cultural or educational benefits like

scholarships to support the kin-state’s language education in the host state. But the Venice

Commission report suggests that even this kind of activity is legitimate only when it is based on the

consent of the host state.

Among the status laws, those of Bulgaria, Hungary, Russia, Serbia and Slovenia have effects

that take place in the territory of the host state as well as the kin-state. In the majority of cases,

including Korea, Turkey and India, benefits are given only when the target people come to the kin-

state. In this respect, ethnizenship schemes are mainly designed to support the return migration of

diaspora members.

The second principle is equality. Because ethnizenship involves preferential treatment of a

certain group of foreigners, the question of discrimination arises. János Kis, a Hungarian political

29 Explanatory Memorandum to Resolution 1335 (2003): Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by the Kin-

State: The Case of the Hungarian Law of 19 June 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries

("Magyars"), reprinted in Kántor et al. (eds.), The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection

(2004), pp.574-81.


16

philosopher and the fiercest critic of the Hungarian Status Law, argued that the Status Law was

unconstitutional because it created without mandate a third category between the two categories of

subjects recognized by the constitution, that is, the citizen and every person.30 In Korea, the Overseas

Koreans Act became an object of heated debate in its first few years. Some people criticized it as

discriminatory because it distinguished between different groups of foreigners on the basis of ethnic

origin and gave preference to co-ethnics over the rest. In fact, the Korean ethnizens, that is, “co-

ethnics of foreign nationality,” are defined in terms of past citizenship. They are former citizens and

their direct descendants. Korea’s National Human Rights Commission gave an opinion that, while

different treatment on grounds of ethnic origin would be at variance with the constitutional principle

of equality, preferential treatment based on past citizenship was not unconstitutional.31

In examining the discrimination question, the Venice Commission was more interested in the

nature of the benefit than how the beneficiary is defined. It said that preferential treatment was legal

only in the field of education and culture, and in other fields it was acceptable only in exceptional

circumstances. I must say that the Venice Commission was blind to the widespread preferences in

other fields. Immigration preference is particularly widespread, and the catalogue of ethnizenship

cases gets much bigger if we include all kinds of immigration preference. Then Japan’s preferential

migrant labor policy in favor of nikkeijin from South America becomes a good example of ethnizenship.

The United Kingdom also has a preferential visa named the “UK ancestry visa.”

One of my favorite works on citizenship is Christian Joppke’s book Selecting by Origin. In that

book Joppke observes that the contemporary liberal state is in the crossfire of de-ethnicization and

re-ethnicization and that ethnic migration will continue, but it will do so only within liberal constraints.

Those constraints depend on whether the discrimination is positive or negative, on the rationale and

language of discrimination.32

Advocates of ethnizenship compares that mode of engagement with the external citizenship

or dual citizenship strategy. They ask, “what’s wrong with granting co-ethnics some preferential

treatment, while many countries give them citizenship?” It is true that ethnizenship is a lesser status

than citizenship and that even the most blatant form of ethnizenship is less conflict-prone than

appropriating a certain part of another state’s citizenry into one’s Staatsvolk. In many cases,

ethnizenship is adopted as an alternative to conferring citizenship, to avoid conflict both domestically

and internationally. Yet, while it thus looks benign, it may look anomalous under the hegemonic gaze

of the international legal order, because it disturbs the logic of the nation-state based on the belief

that the nation and the state coincide with each other. Despite a greater danger of pernicious abuse,

the dual citizenship strategy may be more compatible with the logic of the nation-state because it

contributes to making the nation and the state citizenry coincide by closing the gap between the

Staatsnation and the Volksnation.

This anomaly of ethnizenship should not, however, be exaggerated. In the majority of cases,

ethnizenship is practiced without much noise. When Korea was launching the Overseas Koreans Act,

China complained that Korea was trying to meddle with Koreans in China who were Chinese citizens.

In response, Korea excluded ethnic Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union from the scope of

30 János Kis, “The Status Law: Hungary at the Crossroads,” in Kántor et al. (eds.), The Hungarian Status Law: Nation-

Building and/or Minority Protection (2004). 31 National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea, Opinion on Draft Amendments of the Act on the

Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans, 21 December 2001, reprinted in Chung In Seop (ed.),

Jaeoedongpobeop [Overseas Koreans Act] (Seoul: Saramsaenggak, 2002), pp.263-70 32 Christian Joppke, Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State (Cambridge MA: Harvard University

Press, 2005).


17

the law. Although the law was amended and those diaspora groups were brought back into the arms

of the law, China has not complained since. The legality, let alone legitimacy, of ethnizenship is

politically contingent.

I have talked about three political features of diaspora engagement – the increasing

participation of the diaspora in the politics of the state of origin, the conferral of external citizenship

resulting in dual citizenship as a strategy of incorporating the diaspora into the citizenry, and the

creation of ethnizens and preferential treatment of kin-foreigners. All these three features are

manifestations of increasing transnationalism.

The term “transnational” is used in various ways with diverse meanings, but transnationalism

in anthropological and sociological discourse has a distinctive denotation. Trans connotes horizontal

or cross-border movement, in contrast to supranational, which is about a space vertically upper than

the nation-state, and global, which encompasses all levels and all spaces of movement and activity as

well as qualifying a process decentered from state territories. Transnationalism is a descriptive

concept characterizing activities, relations, networks and organizations that span across the

boundaries of two or more states. In that sense, “transnational” comprises “transborder.”

Transnationalism is practiced by migrants, but agents of transnationalism are not confined to

individuals. States also practice transnationalism. Features of state-practiced transnationalism or,

transnationalism from above, are well-captured by accounts of policies and strategies of states that

seek to engage with their diasporas.

The making, existence and expansion of the citizenry outside of the borders and the increasing

transborder political participation of the diaspora mark a transnationalization of the nation-state and

citizenship. While the territorial boundaries remain the same, the personal boundaries of the state

expand. There is a growing mismatch between territoriality and peoplehood, but the personal

boundaries of the nation coincide with the personal boundaries of the state. To that extent, the logic

of the nation-state is unaffected. On the other hand, the development of a special diaspora status or

ethnonational membership different from citizenship illustrates the creation of a transnational

nationhood separate from the state and a decoupling of the nation from the state citizenry. Status

laws have spread since the 1990s and an increasing number of constitutions provide for links between

the state and the noncitizen members of the nation. Some people characterize the latter change as a

movement transcending the nation-state and the emergence of a postmodern form of citizenship.33

Although that change poses challenges to the logic of the nation-state and the international order

composed of nation-states as its fundamental units, that character should not be exaggerated. The

decoupled nation and state are often recoupled through the conferral of external citizenship.

Ethnizenship often proves to be a stepping stone towards external citizenship resulting in dual

citizenship. Further, the transnational nation created or expanded by ethnizenship or a noncitizen

diaspora status seldom challenges the state that has created or expanded it. Transnational nationhood

projects are projects of nation-states.

33 Brigid Fowler, “Fuzzing Citizenship, Nationalising Political Space: A Framework for Interpreting the Hungarian

‘Status Law’ as a New Form of Kin-state Policy in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Kántor et al. (eds.), The Hungarian

Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection (2004).


18


19

SESSION 1

Immersion & Emergence of Korean Community

in the Philippines


20

Discovering Korea from the Philippine

Modern History

Raymund Arthur G. Abejo University of the Philippines Diliman

The Philippines under the Spanish and American colonialism was the background of Korean

interactions with Filipinos in the 19th century until early 20th century. Since the 1890s several Korean

newspapers and magazines published news articles, editorials and essays on the Philippines within

the context of imperialist rivalry of Western powers and Japan. In the 1920s, Korean nationalist

leaders in followed the colonial conditions in the Philippines and the Philippine struggle for

independence. In 1929, An Chang-ho (1876-1938) and Yeo Un-hyeong (1885-1947), prominent Korean

nationalist leaders, visited the Philippines hoping to establish linkages and collaborative activities

between the two colonial peoples of the Philippines and Korea. However, before the 1890s, contacts

between the two people were few and far between. There were not recorded major Korean

settlement during the Spanish and American colonial periods.

This study attempts to explore Korean presence in the Philippines from the 19th century until

the 1920s. The main focus of the study is on the 1920s through the writings of An Chang-ho and Yeo

Un-hyeong as they participate in the Korean struggle for independence while comparing it to the

colonial democracy in the Philippines under the American tutelage. It will be argued in this paper that

the different ideological backgrounds of these two nationalist leaders served as the underlying

interests on the Philippine cause for independence and its resonance to Korean struggle against Japan.

Introduction

On 1 March 1929 it was reported in Samcheonli that Koreans in Manila commemorated the

Samil uprising of 1919 when Korean people gathered outside to protest against the Japanese colonial

rule and declare its independence. An Chang-ho, a leading Korean independence leader was in the

Philippines during the commemoration. Another Korean leader arrived in Manila in June 1929. Yeo

Un-hyeong accompanies the Fudan University soccer team to the Philippines. Both leaders attempted

to confer with Filipino leading politicians and activists during their visits to the country.

What is the significance of these visits in the Philippines? Do these signify linkages in the

independence movements in the Philippines and Korea? This study seeks to examine how Korea

perceived the Philippines through the writings of An Chang-ho and Yeo Un-hyeong.

Notes on Early Philippine-Korean Contacts

I will briefly present a few notes on early Philippine-Korean relations. Popular histories often

cited Taft-Katsura Memorandum of 1905 which noted the secret understanding between the US and

Japan regarding their respective colonies, namely the Philippines for the US and Korea for Japan as

the background of Philippine-Korean relations. Formal diplomatic relations between the South Korean

government and the Philippines was established only in 1949. The Philippines sent troops to South

Korea in active support of the UN-led multinational forces during the Korean War. On the other hand,

due to ideological differences during the Cold War, Philippine diplomatic relations with North Korea

was only established in the late 1990s.


21

However, relatively unexplored historical records would show that Korea and the Philippines

had contacts as early as the Joseon period. In 1614, early Korean converts of Catholicism in Japan

were exiled to Manila together with Takayama Ukon, a Japanese daimyo. Another cultural encounter

between the two countries is Saint Andrew Kim Taegon. Before he was ordained, Kim Taegon studied

theology in the Philippines in the 1830s. Lastly, a sea drifter's record (pyoryugi) written by Jeong

Yakjeon, older brother of Korean Silhak scholar Jeong Yakyong narrates the adventures of Mun

Sundeuk who drifted in 1802 and lived Ilocos (Philippines) for a couple of years before returning to

Korea in 1804. Mun Sundeuk's pyoryugi contained accounts on Philippines customs, houses, clothing,

boat-making traditions and local products.

Two of these encounters illustrate religious connection of Korea with the Philippines which

was a Spanish colony in Southeast Asia. In 1614, four Korean Catholic exiles with the Japanese daimyo

were Pak Marina, and three other Korean males. A Spanish Jesuit wrote an account of the exiles’ travel

from Japan and how they were welcomed in the walled city of Intramuros. A residence was arranged

for them in San Miguel, a suburban area outside the walled city, and was placed under the religious

supervision of the Jesuits. The residence was especially chosen for its proximity to a small parish

church of San Miguel.

Another Korean in the Philippines in late 19th century was Andrew Kim Daegeon. (Kim Taeon),

a Catholic priest who lived and studied in the Philippines under the Dominican order. Born in 1821 to

a Korean aristocratic yangban family, Kim Daegeon was one of the early Korean Catholics. At the age

of 15, he entered a seminary in Macau in preparation for priesthood under the foreign missionaries

based in the Portuguese colony. However, because of the unfolding of Opium War in 1839, the mission

work was put in danger which led the French missionaries and the seminarians including Kim Daegeon

to transfer to the Philippines. The group arrived in Manila on April 19, 1839. On May 3, Kim Daegeon

and the other seminarians moved to Lolomboy, Bulucan to resume their theological studies. On

November 26, Kim left the Philippines and returned to Macau.

Another story of a Korean in the Philippines is about a sea drifter in early 19th century. Mun

Sundeuk, a skate (hong’eo) merchant of Wooi-do, Jeolla province, suffered two misfortunes at sea

that brought him to Ilocos on November 1, 1802. For ten months, Mun Sundeuk stayed in Ilocos and

worked with the Chinese and Ilocanos in the area. An account of Mun’s time in the Philippines

recorded some of his interactions with the people and observations of Ilocano life and customs.

Pyohaesimal, written by a yangban gentry scholar based on his interviews with Mun, contained the

chronicle of misfortunes at sea, discussion of customs, houses, clothing, both technology and flora

and fauna, and lastly a word list of Ilocano words.

On the section of customs, Mun related the practice of kissing the hands of elders and parents

as a sign of respect, ways of eating, clothings, forms of punishments and the game of cock-fighting.

On Ilocano house, he described the differences on the houses of the poor folk and the elite. Windows

are made of glass and there are chairs for people to sit on. He also observed that Ilocos had vibrant

trading activity wherein people from Vietnam, China and the Ryukyus. This account of Mun Sundeuk

offers a significant view on how a Korean perceived the Philippines from their own cultural vantage

point.

Korean Visitors to the Philippines in the 1920s

An Chang-ho

An Chang-ho is one of the noteworthy members of the Independence Club and leading exponent of

the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, China. He visited the Philippines for the purpose of


22

looking for a suitable Korean refugee settlement. First in his agenda was to assess the condition of

the Koreans living clandistinely in the Philippines. Arriving on February 9, 1929, An Chang-ho met

about 50 Koreans in Manila who continued to support the Korean independence movement. It was

said that Koreans enthusiastically received An Chang-ho in Manila. He led the establishment of Daehan

inguk minhoe - Philippine branch and the commemoration of the Samil uprising anniversary on 1

March 1929 (An, 2000, 113).

His second purpose was to confer with the Philippine Immigration Office on the possibility of

granting immigration permits to Koreans in the Philippines. He was told that it would be difficult for

Koreans to migrate to the Philippines because they are Japanese colonial citizens and must carry

Japanese passports. An Chang-ho noted that Chinese farmers and workers are being accorded easier

immigration procedure to the Philippines. This would be the reason why Koreans were surreptitiously

using Chinese passports to enter and stay in the Philippines. Most of the Koreans in Manila lived

among the Chinese in a Chinese suburb Binondo. An Chang-ho also reported that a payment of 50

won for every Korean as guarantee fee is very expensive for ordinary Koreans to enter the Philipppines.

He concluded that the requirements for immigration to the Philippines would be difficult and sought

to have an audience with Filipino politicians, particularly Manuel L. Quezon. In the meantime, while

waiting for an appointment with Mr Quezon, An Chang-ho travelled outside Manila. He went to

Pagsanjan, about 98 kilometers south of Manila and Baguio, about 250 kilometers north of Manila.

He mentioned that Baguio's surroundings and climate would be suitable site for the Korean settlement

(Kim In-deok, 2008, 111-112).

Although no pictures of An Chang-ho's visit have been found yet. There are few pictures of

the places he visited outside the capital city of the Philippines. Most noticeably is the picture with

Filipinos in traditional attire (see Figure 1). In the 1920s to 1930s Korean intellectuals like An Chang-

ho were influenced by the Korean discourse of Orientalism. They embraced and adapted this

discourse in the process of Japanese colonial modernization. A Korean historian, Kang Heejung

pointed out that the Southeast Asian image was "imbibed from the Japanese imperialist's concept"

(Kang, 2014, 36). Kang (2014) argued that this imagination of Southeast Asia as an idyllic tropical

region, teeming with vegetation, natural resources and home of interesting people.

Figure 1


23

A leading Korean newspaper, Chosun ilbo carried a series of feature articles with illustrations

of women from countries in the 1920s. Represented in the series were women from Europe, Asia and

the Pacific. Entitled "Mijiguk yeoseong eul chajeoseo" [In Search of Women in a Strange Land]. On

November 11, 1929, Chosun ilbo featured Philippine women with a picture of a young woman wearing

a traditional attire (Figure 2). Accompanying the picture is a short write-up, to wit:

횐 것만이 고운 것이 아니라 감으스름한 것도 고운 것입니다. 감으스름 한 비율빈

녀엇들의 얼골은 드히눈언 저리에 검은 비치깁고 그검은 비츤 빰과 이마로나을시록

엿터서서 그들의눈동자는 일중 맑아보이는 것입니다. 귀와 목과 팔목에는 금속과

옥괴나무씨 가든 것으로 아름답게 장식하기름 조화하고 또발벗고 춤주기를

조화합니다. 그들 중에 신녀성은 서구부인들과 가티 날카라운 구두에 양복을 입고

모자를 쓰고 다니는 것입니다. 지금의 비률빈녀성은 공촌에 잇는 부인을 에고는

거진 문자를 리해치못하는 자 없고 비율빈 남성들에게 뒤지지 안는 사회 활동을 하고

잇습니다. 이점에서서 동양의 후진국인 어느 나라 보담도 압선 것이 아인 것이

나니겠습니까. 외 사진은 그들의 구식묘녕 소부의 맵시이외다.

Figure 2

The general description of Philippine women on their beauty and status in society carries

dichotomized representations of racialized beauty and modernity. Orientalist in perspective, a

woman from a primitive country with darker complexion is as beautiful as those women with fairer

complexion. Not only beautiful, there are also "modern women" who adopted Western attire and

social customs. Compared with the "modern women" the woman represented in Figure 2 is the

"uncivilized" Philippine woman similar to those indigenous people with An Chang-ho in Figure 1. She

was wearing the traditional attire with ear and neck accessories. The picture and short narrative of

Chosun ilbo projects a Korean subjectivity with is a self-reflection of Korean intellectuals' view of

modernity.

An Chang-ho belongs to Korean intellectuals who perceived the Philippines through the lens

of colonial modernity. As such, the Philippines, its society and peoples were divided between the

modern, educated, Christianized and civilized peoples, on the one hand, and the traditional, non-

Christianized and uncivilized peoples.


24

Years later, An Chang-ho wrote a travel account on the Philippines in Samcheonli March 1933

issue. He expressed positive comments on the Philippine conditions as a colony of the United States.

He wrote on his previous visit to the Philippines in 1929 upon the requests of the Korean residents in

the Philippines. Among the positive conditions of the Philippines, An Chang-ho admired the public

school system that the Americans established in the Philippines and the unusual number of Filipino

officials in the colonial government. For example, he pointed out that prosecutors were mostly

Filipinos. Furthermore, he remembered that Philippine press was free and very active under the

Americans. For An Chang-ho American tutelage resulted to a progressive colonial democracy in the

Philippines. On the other hand, An Chang-ho criticized the unusual control of the Americans in the

economy through the ownership of vast plantations of American landowners (Samcheonli, 1933).

Yeo Un-hyeong

Few months after An Chang-ho left the Philippines Yeo Un-hyeong arrived in Manila in June

1929 as the accompanying coach of the Fudan University soccer team upon the invitation of the

Philippine Athletics Association and the Overseas Chinese Communist Union. Ramon Navas, a Filipino

journalist of The Philippine Free Press, organized a reception dinner in honor of Yeo Un-hyeong. About

30 guests attended that dinner, including personalities such as labor leaders, journalists and religious

leaders. The most prominent guests were Crisanto Evangelista and Domingo Ponce, leading Filipino

leftist leaders. During this dinner, Yeo Un-hyeong urged the Filipinos to continue their fight and be

the first among the colonial peoples in Southeast Asia to gain their independence. Furthermore, the

proposed the establishment of the Nambang minjok yeonbang (Federation of the Peoples of the South

Seas) (Yeo, 1991, 90-92).

Three days following this event, Yeo Un-hyeong was detained when he was about to leave

and his passport confiscated upon the request of the Japanese consul. Many Filipino progressive

leaders denounced his detention and asked the American police authorities for his release. Yeo Un-

hyeong was later released and allowed to leave the Philippines for Shanghai (Yeo, 1991, 90-92).

Yeo Un-hyeong was more critical of the American colonial tutelage in the Philippines

compared to An Chang-ho. Aside from being detained by the authorities, Yeo was not able to travel

outside of Manila. Yeo Un-hyeong's experience was different from An Chang-ho. Yeo Un-hyeong

recounted his particular experience in Manila about poverty its citizens under the American colonial

rule. In a letter to a friend Yeo Un-hyeong wrote about an anectodal friendship with a poor girl he

met in Manila. According to Yeo Un-hyeong's story, this girl dropped out of school and asking for alms

from passers-by. Yeo Un-hyeong befriended the girl, met her mother and went to their shanty house.

Yeo Un-hyeong reflected on the conditions of the poor in Manila and indirectly criticized the American

colonial policies in the Philippines (Yeo, 1991, 90-92).

Preliminary Conclusions

Divided into two parts, this paper presents a brief historical overview of Korean contacts in

the Philippines. In the first part, three early contacts from the 17th century until early 19th century were

mostly brought by religious factors. Being a Spanish colony and a base of mission activities of religious

orders to East Asia, the Philippines served as a refuge for early Korean Catholic converts. Although

not a Catholic convert, Mun Sundeuk’s fascinating stories on Ilocos was based on the contrasting

cultures of Korea and the Philippines. Some of these differences which Mun noticed were religious

articles and buildings.


25

On the other hand, deeper interaction occurred when two Korean nationalists sought the

Philippines and its people for more substantial cooperation towards its nationalist agenda. The

Philippines was imagined as an option for Korean migration although this did not came into fruition.

More Korean read and learned more about the Philippines through Korean publications.

In the 1920s Korean nationalists found resonance in their struggle against Japan among the

struggles of other nations against their colonial masters. Since Korean publication could not print the

Korean nationalist activities of directly to its readers, articles on independence movements from other

countries were published. This included the Philippines especially on the Philippine independence

struggle against Spain in the 1890s and independence missions during American rule.

An Chang-ho and Yeo Un-hyeong had different purposes in their visits to the Philippines. They

met different sets of Filipinos from different political ideologies. An Chang-ho choose to travel outside

Manila and confer with colonial officials and Filipinos politicians. Eventhough he was unsuccessful to

meet Manuel Quezon, he was introduced to Quezon's associates. Yeo Un-hyeong, on the other hand,

was welcomed by progressive labor and leftist leaders of the Philippines. He aimed to foster

camaraderie as colonial subjects.

Generally, Korean intellectuals viewed positively the colonial democracy of the Philippines

under the US. An Chang-ho had this perception. Although the Korean settlement plan did not worked

out, he explored the prospects of this idea and looked for suitable sites outside Manila. He also wrote

positively about the colonial institutions in the country. This positive Korean gaze however, was

directed to the "Westernized" citizens of the Philippines who embraced American education and way

of life. An Chang-ho's gaze reflected an Orientalist view on the non-Christian indigenous peoples of

northern Luzon.

In contrast, Yeo Un-hyeong had a divergent perception of the Philippines. His Korean gaze was

critical of American tutelage and colonial democracy. Due to its leftist ideals, Yeo Un-hyeong

emphasized on collaborative activity between Koreans and Filipinos as colonial nations. He also took

note of the underside of American colonial rule in the country through the persisting poverty of some

Filipinos.

References

• Abejo, R.A. G. “Early Philippine-Korean Contact: Exiled Korean Catholics in the Philippines during the 17th

century.” In Relations between Korean and Southeast Asia in the past, 101-111. Edited by Y.H. Shin and C.

Chulasiriwongs. Bangkok: ASEAN University Network and Korean Associaiton of Southeast Asian Studies,

2005.

• An Chang-ho. Dosan An Chang-ho jeonjip [The Complete Works of Dosan An Chang-ho]. Vol. 6. Seoul:

Dosan An Chang-ho seonsaeng ginyeom saeophoe, 2000.

• Chong Chinsok. Eollon gwa Hanguk hyeondae sa [The Press and Korean Modern History]. Seoul:

Communication Books, 2001.

• Chosun Ilbo. 1929.

• Dongnip sinmun Shanghai. 1921.

• Jeong, Y.J. Yuam chongseo. Jeollanam-do: Sinan munhwawon, 2005.

• Kang Heejung. "Another Form of Orientalism: Koreans' Consciousness of Southeast Asia during the

Japanese Colonial Period." Korea Journal 54, 2 (2014): 36-61.

• Kim In-deok and Kim Do-hyong. 1920 nyeondae ihu: Ilbon, DongnamA jiyok minjok undong [1920s Japan

and Southeast Asia Korean Nationalist Movement]. Cheonan: Independence Hall Institute of Korean

Independence Movement, 2008.


26

• Kim Yong-jick. "Politics of Communications and the Colonial Public Sphere in 1920s Korea. In Colonial Rule

and Social Change in Korea, 1910-1945, edited by Lee Yong Yung, Ha Yong-ch'ul and Clark W. Sorensen,

76-113. Seattle: Center for Korean Studies Publication; University of Washington Press, 2013.

• Samcheonli. 1933.

• Yeo Un-hyeong. Mongyang Yeo Un-hyeong jeonjip. [Complete Works of Yeo Un-hyeong]. vol. 1. Seoul:

Han-ul, 1991.


27

The Philippines as a Receiving Society and its

Immigration Regimes: An ‘Unlikely Home’ for

Korean Communities

Bubbles Beverly Asor, Ph.D.

University of the Philippines Diliman

Introduction

The Philippines has long been regarded as a ‘global model’ for sending society with more than

eight million of its citizens working and/or residing in more than 200 countries and territories (MPI

2006). Researches on Filipino international migration have been exhausted and comprehensive while

policy and popular discourses have normalized international migration as part and parcel of Filipino

psyche and culture. Against this backdrop, it is almost unimaginable for Filipinos to think of the

Philippines as a host society to foreigners and migrants especially from the ‘global north’ (Marilao

2007). Although there have been series of research especially done by Philippine Migration Research

Network (PMRN) on the Philippines as a “home” to foreigners for permanent settlement, refugees,

international students, transients, vacationers (Asis 2001) or to transnational communities (Marilao

and Makil 2007), the Philippines as a host society has not been systematically studied beyond the

empirical profiling of newcomers and the historical sketching of ‘older’ immigrants such as Chinese

and Indians. This paper aims to contribute to the scarce literature on the Philippines as a host society

by focusing on the status of South Korean diasporic communities in the Philippines and the

immigration regimes that govern their migration journey and (non)integration. Based on interviews

with key informants from Philippine government agencies, Korean communities and Korean Embassy

in the Philippines and secondary data analysis, this paper contends that a host society’s immigration

regimes play a crucial role of determining the entry, settlement, (non)integration and exit of foreign-

born people and the challenges that go with each migration phase. To address this, the paper is

structured as follows. First, I present the migrant profile and migration trajectories of Koreans in the

Philippines. I treat Korean migration to the Philippines as a process of ‘geoarbitrage’ by which people

perceive mobility and migration as a means to boost and compound their savings, resources and

financial capital through transnational relocation “across latitudes of the global division of labor”

(Hayes and Perez-Gañan 2017:117). I then discuss the immigration regimes that reconfigure and shape

the differential migration trajectories and differentiated levels of (non)integration of Koreans in the

Philippines. I conclude with the prospects of and some recommendations for partnership between

host and home societies, civic organisations and Korean diasporic communities.

Koreans in the Philippines are interesting to examine because of the diversity of migration

trajectories they pose along an ‘unlikely’ migration corridor, that is, South Korean-Philippine migration

route. In migration studies, most researches are done on the South-North migration, where South is

a developing country and North is a developed and a traditional destination country. Using the

migration flow from South Korea to the Philippines as a case study, this paper contributes to the

appraisal of North-South migration focusing on the process of ‘geoarbitrage’ and the migration

dynamics it entails. This paper outlines not only the diversity in migration trajectories of Koreans in

the Philippines – student migrants, expatriates and their dependents, entrepreneurs, short-term


28

residents as tourists, and frequent visitors but also where they can be located in the Philippines. Due

to the evident divergences in the Korean and Filipino culture, way of life and worldviews and the

bureaucratic hurdles presented by immigration regimes, there is high likelihood that Koreans

encounter difficulties and displacement in various phases – pre-arrival, arrival, settlement, return

migration. Furthermore, Korean integration or (non)integration in the Philippines is greatly shaped

and influenced by the existing immigration regimes in the host society.

‘Korean Wave’ in the Philippines: An Illustration of North-South Migration

“They came without warning, trickling in almost unnoticed until there were too many to

ignore. It seemed, all of a sudden, that South Koreans were practically everywhere in the Philippines

-- in malls, universities, the country's top resorts, and even on local television shows.” This is how an

online magazine, GoodNews Pilipinas, sketched the ‘Korean Wave’ in the Philippines in the mid-2000s.

Although the recent ‘Korean Wave’ is the one which caught popular attention due to the sheer

number and visibility of Koreans in public spaces, there were much earlier noteworthy Korean arrivals

in the Philippines as early as the 8th century. In one of the pioneering works on Koreans in the

Philippines, Kutsumi (2004) claims that prominent Korean maritime figure, Jang Bogo, reached the

Philippines during his control of trade in the Yellow Sea between Silla Dynasty, Tang Dynasty in China

and Heian Dynasty in Japan. Another significant entry of Koreans in the Philippines was that of St.

Andrew Taegon Kim and two other Korean Catholics who flee and took refuge in the country during

the skirmish between the Chinese and Portuguese in Macao where they were studying to become

priests in 1837. The three ‘religious refugees’ (UP-CIFAL 2018) were housed and studied in a

monastery in Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. Other historical accounts that Kutsumi (2004) presented

were the early permanent settlers from Wiju (now a village of Sinuiju, North Korea) who came to the

Philippines via China and Vietnam in 1935. They eventually married Filipino women who were believed

to be poor peddlers on the street to avoid being identified as Korean fighters with the Japanese troops

during the Second World War. One of these permanent settlers, Pak Yun Hwa. who Kuzumi (2004)

identifies as the “first generation” of Koreans in the Philippines established and became the first

president of the Korean Association Philippines Inc. in 1969.

However, these Korean mobilities to the Philippines cannot be regarded as a systematic type

of migration or migration wave. Kuzumi (2004) delineated other more systematic flow of Koreans to

the Philippines as follows. First is marriage migration of Korean women married to Filipino soldiers

who served in the Korean War. In the 1960s, there were around thirty families which moved back to

the Philippines after staying in Korea for five years. Along with this relocation, these ‘international’

families and households started the process of migrant community formation by establishing a school

called Korean Community School which opened in 1970), a women’s organization called Mothers

Association built in 1975, religious networks and the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea which

is composed of war veterans in the Korean War. The third systematic flow of Koreans to the Philippines

was a response to the ‘compressed modernity’ (Chang 1999) that the Korean society underwent in

the 1980s by which labor-intensive industries faced shortage of workers and wage increase and moved

overseas. At the same time, the Philippines was in need of foreign capital and investment which led

to the promotion of export processing zones. The Korean flow of people and capital during this time

resulted in an increase of Korean population which was mostly comprised of managers of small- and

medium- enterprises (SMEs) and their accompanying families.

In 1992, there were only around 128 Alien Employment Permit holders among the Korean

population in the Philippines but the number of Korean visitor arrivals totaled to 26,000. By 1997, the

number of Korean visitors reached 180,000. This figure decreased to 133,068 in 1999 as an aftereffect

of the Asian financial crisis known as “IMF” Crisis in South Korea. By the early 2000s, the Korean Wave


29

to the Philippines was at its peak with the migration trajectories becoming more diverse such as

student migration (either for short-term or long-term study), short-term migration, circular migration,

retirement migration and lifestyle migration. The upsurge in the number of Koreans relocating to the

Philippines was made possible by migration infrastructures or the “systematically linked technologies,

institutions and actors that facilitate and condition mobility” (Xiang and Lindquist 2014: S124) which

took advantage of the Korean aspirations for a better life but at a lower cost and in a less competitive

environment. Travel agencies and English language schools are the foremost types of migration

infrastructures that helped configure the Korean imaginary about the Philippines as an ‘alternative’

destination for tourism, lifestyle migration, learning English, retirement, business and investment at a

lower cost. The aspirational infrastructures (Shrestha 2018) that “shape and direct” the aspiration for

a better life outside Korea at a lower cost facilitated the Korean mobility to the Philippines and is often

built upon the initial perception of the Philippines as a ‘tropical paradise’ with white pristine beaches

and overly hospitable and warm people (Jun, 8 November 2018). The Philippines became an option

for Koreans who began to have ‘cosmopolitan yearnings’ to travel both the traditional and non-

traditional tourist destinations.

Against the backdrop of rapid economic boom with Korea as the 4th largest in Asia and 11th

in the world, Koreans have been experiencing a relatively comfortable life which includes achieving a

sense of adventure for migration and overseas mobilities. At the same time, some Koreans witness

and experience the ‘brutality and complexity’ of rapid industrialisation and ‘compressed modernity’

which pushed them to look at migration both as a means to keep up with the rapid economic

transformations and a ‘escape’ for those who refuse to or could not chase the collective sense and

value of ppali ppali or haste and expeditiousness. In this regard, migration motivations are as complex

as the push and pull factors that drive these Koreans to opt for transnational relocation. In a research

done by the University of the Philippines – Centre Internationale de Formation des Autorites et

Leaders (UP- CIFAL Philipines), migration motivations among Koreans in the Philippines vary which

also determine the typology of migration trajectories. In the early 2000s, Koreans were driven to study

English overseas due to the English language fever against the globalisation backdrop. Meanwhile, the

Philippines which long propelled itself as an ‘English hub’ seized the Korean English craze as an

economic opportunity. In 2003, the Philippine Department of Tourism launched a marketing campaign

called “Philippines as a Second Language Tour Program” which led to the explosion of English language

schools everywhere. It was not the English language schools that proliferated between late 1990s and

mid-2000s. The number of students in Philippine colleges and universities increased from 676 in

academic year 1998-1999 to 1069 in academic year 2002-2003. Korean students steadily comprised

about 10 per cent of the total number of Koreans in the Philippines. Many Korean tourists or short-

term residents often shift into student migrants or circular migrants for the purpose of studying during

winter and summer breaks. Consequently, migrant categorisation and typologising migrant

trajectories are not a straightforward endeavour especially since Korean migrants cannot be

pigeonholed in one category.

Apart from Korean students, the Philippines attract a big number of Korean tourists. From

26,000 tourist arrivals in 1992, there were 288,468 Koreans who came to the Philippines in 2002

(Miralao 2003), and jumped to 498,465 in 2005. By 2006, the Koreans outnumbered the Americans at

572,133 for the first time (UP-CIFAL 2018). From mid-2000s, Koreans have maintained the top spot as

Philippine’s tourist market. In 2012, the number of Korean tourist arrivals reached the one million

mark at 1,031,155 from 925,204 in 2011. There were 1.6 million Korean tourists who visited the

Philippines in 2017. This number slightly dipped to 1, 587,959 in 2018. In the first half of 2019 (January-

May), there were 788,530 Koreans recorded who visited the Philippines as tourists despite the popular

notion that there has been a ‘Chinese invasion’ due to the Philippine government close alliance with


30

the Chinese state. Many of the Korean tourists eventually end up visiting again and/or staying in the

Philippines for a longer period of time. The ‘ease’ of Korean migrants to shift from one migrant

category to another which usually entails settling in, repeated visits, seasonal or circular migration can

be attributed to migrant networks and web of socioeconomic ties that have been established and

maintained across time. Migrant networks and migration infrastructures are crucial in determining

not only the magnitude of Korean migration flow to the Philippines but also the embeddedness of the

Korean population in the host society. Kutsumi (2004) describes this level of integration of Korean

communities in the Philippines through the Korean “social organisations” that existed and thrived as

early as 1969 with the founding of Korean Association Philippine Inc. which is now called the United

Korean Community Association in the Philippines. There were many other “social organisations” which

often emerged as a response to migration-related incidents or policies which I will further discuss in

the subsequent section of this paper. These “social organisations” which are more like civic

associations have served as migrant-serving mediating structures (Asor 2016) or intermediaries that

mediate between the needs and claims of Korean migrants and the Philippine society as a host society

in terms of pastoral care, legal assistance, dealing with local people, housing and long-term settlement.

Given the existing ‘web of alliances’ between and among migrant networks, migration infrastructures,

migrant-serving mediating structures and Korean migrants, there is a suggestion that there is an

uptrend of “longer patterns of migration” such as expatriate migration, family migration, retirement

migration and lifestyle migration (UP-CIFAL Philippines 2018). In 2017, there were 40,866 employment

permits issues to Koreans employed by companies based in the Philippines. There was also a 44 per

cent increase in the number of permanent residents of 1, 176 while 16,962 Koreans were registered

in the Korean Embassy in the Philippines which is a massive 66 per cent swell from previous years. In

total, there were 93,093 Korean migrants residing in the country in 2017.

The influx of Koreans is regarded by many social observers as a “puzzling inward migration to

the Philippines” with many Korean migrants acknowledging the Philippines as a place with “good

future for trade and commerce” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 2002). Miralao (2007:24)

captures this ‘puzzle’ by noting that the Korean arrival in the country was perceived by most Filipinos

as a form of ‘oddity’ because it “goes against the usual migration pattern of people moving from

poorer places and countries and going to richer and more developed ones.”

In migration studies literature, north-south migration such as the flow of Korean migrants to

the Philippines is not an ‘odd’ or ‘puzzling’ migration trend but a reflection of a changing global political

economy in which the “unequal process of global social restructuring due to advanced capitalist

competition, de-territorialisation of production and globalisation of finance” push and motivate

people from developed countries to search for better lifestyle and opportunities in developed

countries. Hayes and Perez-Gañan (2017:117) posit this transnational relocation as a strategy of

‘geoarbitrage’ in which individuals perceive mobility and migration to a developing society as

“increasing the relative value of savings and academic credentials by relocating them across the

latitudes of the global division of labour.” Transnational relocation from the Global North to the Global

South entails a cultural imaginary and utilitarian expectations of migration as individual or family life

project in terms of bettering their lives, seeking opportunities and maintaining a quality of life.

One illustration of ‘geoarbitrage’ in the case of Koreans in the Philippines is retirement

migration whereby Korean retirees perceive the Philippines as a locus of not only maximising but also

compounding their retirement savings. In this way, retirement migration is a ‘new life’ project that

will be beneficial to the retirees and their children who could engage in circular migration with a ‘back-

and-forth’ visa issued by the Philippines. In the developed home society, multiple factors such as

changing family configurations, aging population, elderly living conditions and higher life expectancy


31

push people to take on early retirement. The meaning of retirement has now evolved especially

among individuals from developed country like Korea. To “live leisurely” through early retirement

does not only mean “getting out of the job” but “getting out of social roles and social positions” and

focusing on quality of life. For Koreans though, early retirement does not mean “pure leisure” or

“complete rest” but “investing in a new life” (Kim 2009). Korean retirees perceive Southeast Asia like

the Philippines as the place to invest their retirement fund due to various reasons such as good

environment with panoramic nature, weather, English education for their children, gaining ‘new

identities’ as ‘someone having money’ and regaining ‘another new life’ (i.e. remarriage). The

Philippines, for example, was perceived to be a retirement hub for its close proximity to Korea, ease

of travel and transportation given the numerous flights from several Korean airports to Manila, Cebu,

Clark and Caticlan. The perception, imaginary and utilitarian expectation of migration to developing

country like the Philippines as a form of bettering of bettering life is illustrative not only among Korean

retirees but also among all Korean migrants and Korean residents in the Philippines. This is manifested

in the ‘dwelling choice’ and preferences for places to call ‘home’ away from Korea. Lee and Choi (2012)

identify the following factors – safety, sociality, educational environment, location, and general

environment – as important for Korean living satisfaction in the Philippines. Based on the cities where

there is a large concentration of Korean residents, the location of major international airports with

direct flights to Korea is a crucial factor for the preferred locations of residency and domicile for

retirees. Metro Manila, Pampanga, Cavite, Cebu and Misamis Oriental have the most number of

Korean retirees. Overall, Metro Manila is still the most preferred city for a good number of Korean

residents where 43 per cent of Koreans stay for various reasons such as study, employment,

businesses, migrant networks, etc. Around 14.2 per cent of Koreans reside in the CALABARZON area

such as Cavite, Laguna, Rizal and Batangas for the apparent reason of close proximity to Metro Manila

and the cheaper housing prices and lower cost of living compared to Manila area. With international

airports and modern amenities, Pampanga houses 11.2 per cent of Koreans while 10.8 per cent resides

in Cebu City. Interestingly, Misamis Oriental via access to Cagayan de Oro City as an entry point is a

home to 6.5 per cent of Koreans while the rest are spread out in Baguio City, Aklan, Davao and Iloilo

which are mostly tourist destinations and economic hubs.

Immigration Regimes of the Host Society

There are two paradoxical phenomena in the contemporary globalised world which makes

migration one of the most controversial issues of the 21st century. On one hand is the perceived and

real ability of people to move and migrate especially at the dawn of ease in transportation, innovations

in technology and communication. On the other, nation-states did not wither away as forecasted by

the globalists but are there to stay to ensure that the supposed freedom and ability to move can be

controlled, curtailed and managed. The more people are deemed to freely move, the more the nation-

states create borders and boundaries to demarcate membership and non-memberships, belonging

and exclusion and permanence and temporalities. One of the ‘effective’ ways of establishing

membership and identification of who belongs and who does, who are desirable and undesirable, who

are citizens and strangers is through immigration regimes. These immigration regimes are part and

parcel of assemblages of rules, policies, outcomes, processes and practices that facilitate, regulate,

control and resist mobilities and settlement of people. Boucher and Gest (2017) zero in on migration

policies and their outcomes when implemented but they also include disparate interests,

interpretations and stakes. In this paper, I focus on visa regimes that typologise, categorise and

differentiate migrants and the implications of such migrant categorisation on migration trajectories,

journeys and experiences of individuals. Consequently, the strategy of ‘geoarbitrage’ of individual

migrants and facilitated and nurtured by migrant networks and migration infrastructures may be


32

shaped and reconfigured by existing structural impediments in the form of immigration, visa,

citizenship and integration regimes.

Nation-states have long employed mechanisms and apparatuses to control people’s mobility,

entry, settlement and exit from within and across territories and borders. Travel visas and passports

are classic illustrations of such control over mobile bodies. There may not a brazen and violent

chaining up and shackling involved to curtail people from relocation. However, control comes in the

discursive and political process of differentiating and categorising people based on desirability,

deservingness, and potentialities in terms of possession of merits, resources, financial capacities and

cultural competencies.

The Philippines as an ‘unlikely’ receiving society mainly employ visa categories to control,

regulate and manage foreign population. Following the Immigration Act of 1940 or Commonwealth

Act No. 613, there are two broad categories of foreigners: the nonimigrant (Section 9 Visa) and the

immigrant (Section 13 Visa). Section 9 Visa has the following sub-categories based on the purpose of

entry in the Philippines: pleasure, business and health; transit; seaman on a ship docking in a port of

entry within the Philippines; foreign government officials and their dependents, assistants and

employees; students; and pre-arranged employees and their dependents. Section 13 Visas are issued

to those who are permanent residents primarily based on marriage to a Filipino spouse. There are also

special visas not stipulated in Commonwealth Act No. 613 but were later promulgated by the

Philippine Congress and the Office of the President. These special visas are given to foreign retirees,

investors, and entrepreneurs. By 2017, 6,666 Special Non-Immigrant Visas and 784 Special Immigrant

Visas were issued to Korean retirees, entrepreneurs and investors. Special non-immigrant visas are

granted to foreign-born people who are employed in companies in special economic zones, agencies

that have existing agreements with the Philippine government, individuals who are under exchange

programs and sponsorship of local or international organisations, volunteers who are in sector of

giving assistance during major emergencies and natural catastrophes. Special immigrant visas include

special investor resident’s visa, special visa for employment generation whereby foreign nationals and

their dependents are able to employ at least ten Filipinos in business establishment, special retiree

resident visa and special visa for those employed by multinational corporations and offshore banking

units.

In May 2015, the issuance of Section 13 Visas has been extended to Korean entrepreneurs

who could establish that they have investments and financial capacity. According to my respondents,

to be permanent residents under Section 13 Visa and Special Visa, Korean retirees, investors and

entrepreneurs must be able to establish that they have savings between 35,000 and 50,000 USD.

Extending the issuance of Section 13(a) Visa to Koreans so they can shift to permanent residency status

in the Philippines came about after the approval of granting citizenship to Filipino nationals in South

Korea through naturalisation process. This recent development must have led to the 44 per cent

increase in the number of permanent residents in 2017. However, not many Korean residents in the

Philippines have this amount of money as ‘lifetime savings’ that they can invest and/or use to ‘live

leisurely’. Some of the Section 9 Visa holders who wish to stay in the Philippines for a longer period of

time opt to renew their visas on a monthly basis by paying 2,500 Philippine pesos for renewal fee in

the Bureau of Immigration. Travel agencies often serve as the ‘brokers’ which facilitate the visa

renewal process. Many Korean residents tap the services of these travel agencies to lessen the

bureaucratic hurdles that they encounter in dealing with government agencies. To counter this

practice of ‘serial’ visa renewal, the Bureau of Immigration launched the ‘Trusted Traveler Program’

which allow foreign nationals without entry visa if they have been a temporary visitor at least once in

the last twelve months and have stayed in the country for not more thirty days in each of the visits


33

without violating any criminal and immigration laws. A set of special permits such as Special Study

Permit (SSP) which many Korean students obtain for their short and long term English language study

is another way to respond to bureaucratic hurdles faced during visa application or renewal process.

English language schools work with travel agencies to handle the renewal of SSP. Each SSP costs

around 5000 Philippine pesos. Each renewal and application necessitates corresponding fees and

payments.

In many of the traditional receiving societies, visa regimes aim to categorise people based on

the potential assets and liabilities that they present. For the Philippines as an ‘unlikely’ receiving

society but a ‘home’ to thousands of Korean nationals, visa regimes have become not only as

categorising mechanism to control Korean mobilities, (non)integration, entry and exit but also as

government profit generating scheme especially the process of serial travel visa renewals. For each

renewal of temporary resident visa, the Bureau of Immigration earns 2500 pesos which may not be a

lot of money for many foreigners but it sure is a good profit-generating apparatus. In this business

enterprise that travel visa regimes have produced, migration infrastructures such as travel agencies,

brokers and government agencies are financially benefitting from the process of supposed

documenting, filtering, controlling and managing migrant bodies. Immigration regimes such as policies

surrounding the issuance of travel visas and the outcomes of this implementation shape and

reconfigure the migrant aspirations and migration journeys of Koreans in the Philippines. For instance,

Korean retirees, after relocating and investing their lifetime savings in the Philippines, encounter

‘unexpected’ challenges which make them question and doubt their decision of transnational

relocation and investment in a new life. These challenges include cultural difference between Korean

and Filipino cultures, language barrier, isolation and loneliness especially after realising that

deepening social relationships with Filipino locals is not as straightforward as they expected. Due to

the cultural and linguistic gap between Filipinos and Koreans, most older Korean foreigners face

difficulties in integrating and adapting to the Filipino way of life regardless of the length of their stay

in the Philippines. Meanwhile, younger Korean residents who have more opportunities to establish

social relationships in schools, churches, civic associations and other public spaces may have a higher

level of integration than their older counterparts. Filipinos perceive Koreans positively especially with

more exposure to Korean foodways, Korean fashion, drama and K-Pop. However, Koreans are still

assumed to have the inclination to ‘ghettoise’ and ‘enclave’ among themselves hence the visibility of

Korean spaces, K-towns and gated communities with large concentration of Koreans. Despite the

Korean visibility in the public spaces in terms of Korean restaurants, supermarkets, food and Korean

tourists, Korean residents and local people have little face-to-face interactions that lead to meaningful

engagements and deeper social relationships. I delineate this as Koreans and Filipinos living parallel

lives with Koreans not necessarily in dire need to integrate as there are many infrastructures and

networks that maintain Korean parallel lives in the Philippines.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper has examined the Philippines as a host society to Korean migrants and how their

migration trajectories are shaped by immigration regimes implemented by the Philippine state. I

posited the following assumptions. First, I claimed that the Philippines is an ‘unlikely’ host society

especially due to its longstanding reputation as a ‘model’ sending country and a rich source of

‘servants of globalisation’ (Parrenas 2001). Due to this notion, other forms and patterns of migration

transpiring within the Philippines are overlooked. I am referring to North-South migration that is still

underexplored due to the predominance of migration research on South-North mobility. I further

enriched the North-South migration discussion by linking it to Hayes’ idea of ‘geoarbitrage’ or the

strategy or process of increasing perceived value, academic merits and savings by relocating them


34

from developing society to developed society. By this transnational relocation, Koreans migrants

envision and expect the betterment of life or the maintenance of good quality life at lower costs. I

posited that the Korean migration to the Philippines as an example of North-South migration emerged

from both systematic and sporadic flow of people from Korea to the Philippines as early as 18th

century. However, the systematic wave of Koreans transpired in the 2000s when various migration

trajectories were produced from migration motivations and aspirations that were influenced by

economic and social transformations at the national and global levels. I then discussed the overlapping

and complex migration trajectories that Korean migrants in the Philippines take – student migration,

expatriate migration, retirement migration, lifestyle migration, family migration, circular migration,

and short-term migration through tourism. Koreans are interesting to examine because of the

diversity of migration trajectories they pose along an ‘unlikely’ migration corridor, that is, South

Korean-Philippine migration route. In migration studies, most researches are done on the South-North

migration, where South is a developing country and North is a developed and a traditional destination

country. Using the migration flow from South Korea to the Philippines as a case study, this paper aims

to contribute to the appraisal of North-South migration and the migration dynamics it entails.

Furthermore, the Philippines as a receiving society employs immigration regimes, specifically travel

visa regimes, as the apparatus of control and management of mobile bodies. Korean migrants are

classified based on their utilitarian value in terms of economic merits such as financial capital, savings,

capacity to generate employment for local people and resources to ‘live leisurely’ in the Philippines.

Such hierarchisation of migrant categories led to some form of unmet expectations on the part of

those in the upper echelon. There is an overpromising of the supposed better life that may not be

achieved through the transnational relocation.

As recommendations, the following can be initiated and further examined to deepen the

understanding of the Philippines as a receiving society and North-South migration as illustrated by the

Korean mobilities to the Philippines.

• Launching of Korean migration portal which offers the public an access to data and information regarding the various types of Korean migrants, statistical data pertinent to Korean migration in the Philippines. As part of the Korean migration portal, English materials must go hand in hand with Korean documents to ensure that researchers will have access to substantive and user-friendly information. More documents, secondary sources, primary sources and statistical data will draw more scholarly and policy-based interest and attention.

• Provide more opportunities for interactions and meaningful engagements between Korean residents and local people that go beyond one-time cultural events and popular culture events (i.e. K-Pop concerts, Korean film festivals, etc.) to deepen and broaden understanding about Korean history, culture, economy and ‘ordinary’ Korean way of life

• Korean organizations initiate long-term and sustainable partnership and engagement with local organisations and local communities that go beyond one-time charity events and short-term programs

• More research and projects on Korean migration to the Philippines that can be made by academics, research centers, and students for sustained and long-term systematic interest in Korean-related studies


35

References

• Asis, M. (Ed) (2001) The Philippines as Home: Sojourners and Settlers in the Country.

Manila: Philippine Migration Research Network.

• Asor, B. (2016). No Longer Strangers?: The Role of the Catholic Church as a Migrant-

serving Mediating Structure in the Philippines. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. National

University of Singapore.

• Kutsumi, K. (2007) Koreans in the Philippines: A Study of the Formation of their Social

Organization. In Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines. Manila:

Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN) and Philippine Social Science Council

(PSSC). Pp. 57-73.

• Makil. L. (2007) South Koreans in Dumaguete: A Preliminary Study. In Exploring

Transnational Communities in the Philippines. Manila: Philippine Migration Research

Network (PMRN) and Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC). Pp. 40-57.

• Miralao, V. and Makil, L. (2007) Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines.

Manila: Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN) and Philippine Social Science

Council (PSSC).

• Miralao, V. (2007) Understanding the Korean Diaspora to the Philippines. In Exploring

Transnational Communities in the Philippines. Manila: Philippine Migration Research

Network (PMRN) and Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC). Pp. 24-39.

• Parreñas, R. (2001) Servants of Globalization: Migration and Domestic Work, Stanford,

CA: Stanford University Press

• Weiqiang Lin, Johan Lindquist, Biao Xiang, Brenda S. A. Yeoh (2017) Migration

infrastructures and the production of migrant mobilities, Mobilities, 12 (2): 167.

• Xiang, Biao and Lindquist, Johan (2014) Migration Infrastructure. International Migration

Review, 48: S122-S148.


36

Building Cross-Cultural Competence for

People-to-People Ties: The Landscape of Korean

Communities in the Philippines

Antonio Emmanuel R. Miranda

Foreign Service Institute

Department of Foreign Affairs

An interpersonal perspective of Philippines-South Korea relations

The growing presence of Korean communities in the Philippines has been acknowledged as a

reliable indicator of the evolving relationship between the two countries. As of 2017, 93,093 Korean

nationals are living in the country for various reasons apart from tourism, including business,

employment, retirement, and education, among others.1 The proliferation and organization of these

communities is inextricable from the push and pull factors of Korean migration into the Philippines.

From a historical perspective, the volume of Korean migrants and their purpose of stay have fluctuated

in accordance with South Korea’s wartime past, rapid socioeconomic development, and subsequent

stagnation. The foundations of such people-to-people exchanges coincided with the establishment of

diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Philippines in 1949 and the aftermath of

the Korean War, during which soldiers from the Philippine Expeditionary Forces of Korea (PEFTOK)

married Korean spouses and returned to the country to raise families. This was followed by the

relocation of Korean industries in the country during the 1980s that was driven by the

complementarity of the Philippines’s foreign capital policy under the Marcos regime and the volatile

conditions of Korean economy prior to its democratization.2

Korean communities have distinguished themselves among other transnational groups in the

Philippines by establishing a network of organizations and associations that promote specific

advocacies and programs representing their interests and concerns. Initially, these organizations were

primarily directed to address the needs of Korean residents in preserving their way of life within a

foreign environment. Notably, entities such as the Korean Community School, Korean Women’s

Association in the Philippines, and Korean Union Church of Manila were established from the 1960s

to the 1970s to create a conducive environment for raising children of Korean-Filipino families.3

Buoyed by the permeation of the Korean Wave (hallyu) in the 21st century, numerous Korean

organizations have crafted programs to introduce Korean culture in the Philippines and cultivate

amicable relationships with local sectors. Apart from cultural exchanges, they have partnered with

government and private sectors in pursuing common objectives that would improve Philippine

conditions, particularly public safety, health, and community development. Regardless, Korean

1 UP CIFAL Philippines, “Korean Migration to the Philippines – Data Snapshot,” September 18, 2018. 2 Kanako Kutsumi, “Koreans in the Philippines: A Study of the Formation of their Social Organization,” in Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines, ed. Virginia A. Miralao and Lorna P. Makil (Manila: Philippine Migration Research Network and Philippine Social Science Council, 2007), pp. 61-63. 3 Ibid.


37

communities remain steadfast in their common goal of maintaining the national identity of their

compatriots while facing the challenges of living outside their homeland.4

In response to this significant trend, the South Korean and Philippine governments have

gradually recognized the crucial role of Korean communities in fostering mutual understanding and

greater cooperation between their societies. In June 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte and President

Moon Jae-in met in Seoul to designate 2019 as the “Year of Mutual Exchanges” between the countries,

in which they will commit to intensify tourism, cultural cooperation, and other people-to-people

exchanges while ensuing the safety and interests of their citizens and multicultural families. Such

efforts also signify the Philippines’s interest in becoming a partner of President Moon’s “New Southern

Policy” of engagement and economic cooperation with ASEAN countries and India. 5 As the two

countries celebrate the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties, both houses of the Philippine Congress

have concurred in pursuing this policy direction with House Resolution No. 188 and Senate Resolution

No. 128 that collectively prioritize the strengthening of bilateral relations with South Korea.

Notwithstanding the merits of political capital among leaders in enhancing goodwill between states,

such rhetoric requires further substantiation by identifying salient aspects that would positively affect

Korean residents in the Philippines and their interactions with their Filipino neighbors. Hence,

concrete policies on people-to-people ties must be aligned with the advocacies and pressing concerns

of Korean communities that can be translated into tangible milestones on diplomatic relations.

This policy paper aims to comprehend the emergence of Korean communities in the

Philippines and their engagements with their local contexts. In particular, it will investigate the

implications of their presence in building stronger people-to-people ties between Korean and

Philippine societies, their prevalent approaches in interacting with Philippine stakeholders, and its

opportunities and challenges. These inquiries will be addressed through a conceptual framework on

cross-cultural competence, an analytical tool devised to create effective strategies in improving

intercultural communication among individuals and professionals from diverse cultural backgrounds.

This will be supported with a comprehensive overview of relevant Philippine policy frameworks

catered to the needs of Korean residents.

The study will feature a descriptive landscape of Korean communities in the country and their

notable advocacies and programs based on informant interviews with leaders of Korean organizations

and relevant government agencies, and other primary and secondary sources. These findings will be

analyzed by identifying strategies for cross-cultural competence prevalent among Korean

communities, and the political-security, economic, and sociocultural factors of the Philippine context

that may either enhance or constrain the progress of Korean communities in advancing partnerships.

The study will conclude with policy recommendations in facilitating deeper understanding and

collaboration between Koreans and Filipinos, and bridging cultural gaps.

Operationalizing cross-cultural competence

Scholars in intercultural communication developed the notion of “cross-cultural competence”

in response to the needs of numerous professions that require frequent interactions within diverse

environments and multicultural contexts. It can be operationalized as a set of behavioral and cognitive

4 Kutsumi, “Koreans in the Philippines,” pp. 70-71. 5 Presidential Communications Office, “Joint Statement of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and Republic of Korea

President Moon Jae-in,” June 4, 2018.


38

skills and abilities to efficiently adapt with and engage in foreign cultures. Among the several

competencies that have been observed and identified, the basic tenets of cross-cultural competence

can be summarized in a three-factor model pioneered by Dr. Mitchell Hammer that describes three

dimensions for intercultural effectiveness, namely intercultural stress management, effective

communication, and interpersonal relationships. Collectively, these dimensions emphasize the skills

required in establishing rapport and empathy with groups from different cultures, while managing

anxieties and difficulties entailed in adjusting to foreign customs. 6

Recent contributions in literature on cross-cultural competence have expanded the range of

interpersonal skills and its validity in various cultural settings. Among them, the notion of “culture-

general” competence has been introduced to empower individuals with the capacity to adapt and

interact in any culture.7 Such approach can be demonstrated in four competency domains: diplomatic

mindset, cultural reasoning, intercultural interaction, and cultural learning. In contrast with Hammer’s

model, culture-general competencies provides a nuanced perspective of intercultural communication

that considers an individual’s motivations and sensitivity towards one’s own cultural biases. For

instance, intercultural communication is proven to be driven not only by personal interests to learn

new cultures, but also the need to accomplish work objectives and other practical tasks.8 In addition,

these competencies can be measured with clear behavioral indicators in interacting with new cultures,

including self-presentation, perspective-taking, cultural knowledge, and language proficiency.9

Table 1: Culture-general competencies and their domains.

Competency domain Competency

Diplomatic mindset Maintains a mission orientation

Manages attitudes toward culture

Understands self in cultural context

Cultural reasoning Copes with cultural surprises

Takes perspective of others in intercultural interactions

Develops cultural explanations of behavior

Intercultural interaction Engages in disciplined self-presentation

Plans intercultural communications

Acts with limited cultural knowledge

Cultural learning Is self-directed in learning about cultures

Develops reliable information sources

Reflects and seeks feedback on intercultural encounters

6 Mitchell R. Hammer, “Behavioral Dimensions of Intercultural Effectiveness: A Replication and Extension,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 11 (1987): 71. 7 Louise J. Rasmussen and Winston R. Sieck, “Culture-general competence: Evidence from a cognitive field study of professionals who work in many cultures,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations (2015): 1. 8 Ibid, 12. 9 Ibid, 13.


39

Source: Louise J. Rasmussen and Winston R. Sieck, “Culture-general competence: Evidence from a cognitive field

study of professionals who work in many cultures,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations (2015): 13.

Discourse on cross-cultural competence continues to gain traction with the growing demand

for skills and practices on intercultural communication that are relevant in navigating the

transboundary trends of globalization. Innovations in scholarship are driven by the field’s overarching

goal of demonstrating the universality of such competencies that would nurture harmony among

different societies. Hence, it has developed into an invaluable asset in all levels of people-to-people

engagements that have been intensified by technological advancements and the dissolution of

borders, including but not limited to diplomatic, corporate, and education fields.10 Regardless, cross-

cultural competence has been challenged for its highly descriptive and subjective approach. Most

research has identified competencies based on anecdotal data from sojourners in low-conflict areas

within relatively short timeframes, which may differ in accordance with variances in individual

personalities.11 With this, the salient aspects of cross-cultural competence can be improved through

its incorporation in policy discussions on people-to-people ties that are shaped by long-term

transnational forces such as migration. Such movements take into consideration external factors that

may influence the collective ability of migrant communities to assimilate or interact within foreign

cultures, such as history, power relations, and socioeconomic status.

Policy frameworks on Korean communities in the Philippines

The Philippines has consistently projected an accommodating outlook on the entry and

coexistence of Korean migrants. As a result of their growing size, the welfare of Korean communities

has become the lynchpin of policy discussions between Philippine and South Korean diplomats and

high-ranking officials. In the 7th ROK-Philippines Policy Consultation in November 2018 in Manila, the

two governments reaffirmed their commitment to advance cooperative ties through a greater

emphasis on people-to-people exchanges. In sustaining such interactions, the policy consultations

underscored the mutual protection of the safety, rights, and interests of Korean nationals in the

Philippines and Overseas Filipinos in South Korea as an indispensable precondition.12 From this, policy

responses have expanded to various issue areas affecting Korean communities, namely public safety,

business, retirement, education, and multicultural families.

Public safety concerns remain a persisting complication among Korean nationals, given the

elevated crime situation in the Philippines. Among other Southeast Asian countries with large

concentrations of Korean residents, the Philippines has one of the highest number of crimes involving

Korean victims, with over 3,190 cases from 2009 to 2014.13 Notably, it has also gained prominence as

an entry point for Korean criminals, peaking to 124 cases in 2013 or 8.65 percent of crimes committed

by Koreans in 142 countries. This is attributed to the numerous limitations of Philippine law

enforcement agencies in investigating and preventing crimes, including porous internal borders,

sparse manpower and police equipment, ease of acquiring firearms, delays in judicial process, and

corruption.14 This trend is aggravated by the case of Jee Ick Joo, a Korean businessman residing in

10 Hammer, “Behavioral Dimensions,” 65-66. 11 Rasmussen and Sieck, “Culture-general competence,” 14. 12 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Outcome of 7th ROK-Philippines Policy Consultation,” November 6, 2018,

www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=320182 (accessed July 16, 2019).

13 UP CIFAL Philippines, “Korean Migration to the Philippines.” 14 Ki Heun Kim, “The Korean Desk in the Philippines – Facilitating collaboration in international criminal justice,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 41, no. 1 (2018): 163-164.


40

Angeles City, Pampanga who was kidnapped and killed within the headquarters of the Philippine

National Police (PNP) in October 2016.

While repeatedly calling on Philippine authorities to properly ensure the security of Korean

nationals and deliver justice on perpetrators, the Korean Embassy and the ROK National Police Agency

(KNPA) have embarked on cooperative measures to improve local investigative capabilities, such as

information sharing, dispatch of investigative experts, and capacity-building. Among such tangible

efforts, the PNP and the KNPA formally established a Korean Desk in 2012, in which a Korean police

officer is designated as a liaison that actively participates with local authorities in investigating crimes

and extraditing Korean criminals. By establishing a good working relationship with the Philippine

police, the Korean Desk is regarded as an effective mechanism of police cooperation that has positively

contributed to the reduction of crimes by Korean offenders.15

The steady flow of Korean investments and professionals in the Philippines is demonstrative

of its competitive business climate that entices Koreans to explore opportunities outside their

stagnating economy. With a total FDI flow of 217 million USD in 2017, Korean investments are

concentrated on upgrading the Philippines’s manufacturing and construction sectors.16 Maximizing

such favorable economic conditions, existing legal frameworks have marketed the country as a viable

destination for foreign businesses and employment. Most regulations are currently designed to

circumvent restrictions on foreign ownership of assets and preferential use of Filipino labor set by the

1987 Philippine Constitution. In particular, the Investors’ Lease Act of 1993 (Republic Act No. 7652)

allows foreign investors to contract long-term agreements in leasing private lands for a maximum of

fifty years. In conjunction, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issues alien employment

permits (AEPs) for foreigners seeking gainful employment in Philippine-based establishments.17 Apart

from metropolitan areas such as Manila and Cebu, the distribution of Koreans within the country are

widely dispersed based on accommodating local ordinances that improve the ease of doing business.

For instance, special economic zones such as Subic Bay and Clark are popular locations for Korean

establishments due to its harmonized rules and regulations on visas and work permits.18

The developing trend of Korean retirees living in the Philippines indicates the remarkable shift

in the demographic and socioeconomic status of Korean communities in the country. As of May 2018,

the Philippines has welcomed 11,753 Korean retirees, which is attributed to the government’s

successful campaign to become a “retirement haven.”19 Such opportunities for retirement migration

became lucrative as public perceptions Korean society favored the financial empowerment of its

elderly population in light of its looming demographic crisis. In an attempt to assert independence

from their families, Korean senior citizens seek to retire in the Philippines to experience affluence as

“new seniors”, which is characterized by a sustainable and consumption-oriented lifestyle that

signifies the fruits of South Korea’s economic development.20

Spearheaded by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA), a major policy development that

maximizes the benefits of this trend is the issuance of special resident retiree visas (SRRVs) granted

under the Philippine Retirement Park System of 1985 (Executive Order No. 1037). Foreigners and

15 Ibid, 167-169. 16 ASEAN-Korea Centre, “Resources: Statistics,” 2017, https://www.aseankorea.org/eng/Resources/figures.asp (accessed July 16, 2019). 17 Patrick Carlos De Leon, “Why have Koreans Migrated to Angeles City, Philippines?” Journal of Management and Development Studies 7 (2018): 42-43. 18 Ibid, 42-43. 19 UP CIFAL Philippines, “Korean Migration to the Philippines.” 20 Dohye Kim, “’I am a Half-Retiree, But Soon to be Pure’: Korean Retiree Migration to the Philippines,” PhD diss. (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2015), p. 2.

https://www.aseankorea.org/eng/Resources/figures.asp


41

former Filipino citizens above the age of 35 can avail the privileges stipulated under the visa, including

multiple entry and exit, permanent residence, employment, and private investment.21 The number of

SRRVs issued exponentially increased due to the reduced costs for visa application and cash deposits,

with over 8,000 SRRVs granted to Koreans in 2014 alone.22

The influx of Korean students in the country is sustained by the quality of its English language

training (ELT) institutions and its strong demand among middle-class migrant families. Out of 21,433

Korean students residing in ASEAN countries in 2017, 9,903 or 46 percent study in the Philippines,

making it the top destination for English education in the region.23 The country’s rise in the global ELT

industry is amplified by two factors that institutionalized its prominence. First, its affordability and

proximity to South Korea is a significant pull factor for Korean families to reside in the country with

their children. Typically, students are enrolled in ELT centers or boarding schools within two to three

months to acquire basic English proficiency prior to studying in Western countries on a long-term basis.

These facilities are popular among Korean communities due to their competitive budget, intensive

curriculum, and positive feedback on Filipino English teachers. 24 Second, the Philippines heavily

invested on its competitive edge in ELT through extensive marketing campaigns and policy

accommodations for teachers and foreign students. In particular, Executive Order No. 188 of 1994

provided the framework for the entry of foreign students in the country along with the creation of an

inter-agency committee that will monitor their concerns.25 Building on this legal foundation, the

country is actively pursuing its education tourism policy under the leadership of the Department of

Tourism (DOT). With an annual budget of USD 3.2 million for tourism campaigns, the DOT launched

its English as a Second Language program in 2003 that dovetails the promotion of ELT among Korean,

Chinese, and Japanese students with package tours to the country’s top tourist destinations.26

However, current policy frameworks may not be sufficient to sustain the demand in the

Korean market due to local conditions that impede students from maximizing their stay in the country.

Primarily, unfavorable security concerns discourage prospective students from travelling to the

Philippines. Notably, the number of Korean students experienced a sharp decline from 31,316

students in 2013 to 7,285 in 2015, which is correlated with the fluctuations in crime rates involving

Korean victims.27 In addition, Korean students have been observed to demonstrate moderate levels

of language anxiety due to their exposure to the Philippines’s bilingual education system, which may

limit their capacity to acquire better proficiency.28

Policy discussions on the reality of Korean-Filipino families remain relatively undeveloped due

to difficulties in identifying such groups and providing a comprehensive assessment of their situation.

With their descendants popularly labeled as “Kopino” children, these families face varying levels of

marginalization in both Korean and Philippine societies. In spite of South Korea’s aspirations to evolve

into a multicultural society, Kopinos continue to experience discrimination because of their mixed

heritage, which is informed by Korean society’s strong self-image as a homogeneous society. This is

21 De Leon, “Why have Koreans Migrated,” 43. 22 Kim, “I am a Half-Retiree,” pp. 3-4. 23 ASEAN-Korea Centre, “Resources: Statistics.” 24 In Chull Jang, “Legitimating the Philippines as a language learning space: Transnational Korean youth’s experiences and evaluations,” Journal of Sociolinguistics (2018): 13-15. 25 De Leon, “Why have Koreans Migrated,” 43. 26 Eulsub Song, “Migration of South Koreans to the Philippines: Its History, Challenges and Impact,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 6, no. 2 (2018): 767. 27 UP CIFAL Philippines, “Korean Migration to the Philippines.” 28 Jasmine Sabrina J. Rombaoa, “Foreign Language Anxiety of Korean Students in Regular Schools in the Philippines,” in The Fifth Philippine Korean Studies Symposium Conference Proceedings, ed. Aldrin P. Lee and Kyungmin Bae (Quezon City: UP Department of Linguistics, 2017), pp. 183-184.


42

translated into unfavorable socioeconomic prospects among Kopinos as they grow older, such as

lower Korean language proficiency, higher school drop out rates, and unemployment. 29 In the

Philippines, Kopino children are stereotyped as poor illegitimate children of Korean men with Filipina

partners; this perception is erroneously perpetuated by mass media and non-government

organizations claiming to support their welfare.30

Remarkably, the Philippine government’s policy response to the plight of Kopino families pales

in comparison with that of South Korea. In particular, Kopinos are entitled to attend free Korean

language classes in South Korea, which would capacitate them with the necessary skills in adjusting to

Korean society.31 Meanwhile, Philippine policies on multicultural families are indirectly governed by

the Family Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 209), which provides a fundamental framework on

marriage and the rights and obligations of families within a Filipino context. For marriages between a

Filipino and foreigner, they are required to secure a marriage license like any other couple, provided

that the foreigner proves one’s legal capacity to enter into marriage.32 In managing the separation of

families, either spouse may resort to legal remedies in claiming conjugal properties and custody of

children during severe cases such as abuse, infidelity, and fraud.33 Through a landmark amendment of

the Family Code, Filipino spouses are allowed to remarry under Philippine law if their foreign spouse

files for divorce abroad.34 However, such provisions are not entirely applicable to the situation of

Kopino families, which is complicated by cultural differences and financial difficulties. In most cases,

Filipina wives who were abandoned by their Korean husbands file lawsuits under Korean courts in

order to receive compensation in raising their Kopino children, but at the cost of rescinding the

children’s legal ties with their fathers and their claim to Korean citizenship.35

The emerging landscape of Korean communities in the Philippines

Korean communities have established its foothold in the Philippines as the number of

organizations and associations increased. Their contributions to the welfare of Koreans in the country

are guided by their respective advocacies that coincide with the multifaceted drivers of Korean

migration. Gradually interacting beyond their primary clientele, they expanded and diversified its

programs and services that aim to promote harmony between Korean residents and Filipino neighbors.

At present, there are 29 active Korean organizations identified in this study that represent and

act on the interests of Korean communities in the Philippines. These organizations are currently

engaged in the following sectors: politics, business and trade, senior citizens, women and children,

education, religion, and community development. The location and description of Korean

communities are proximate with the geographical distribution and profile of Korean residents

throughout the country. Majority of these organizations maintain offices in Metro Manila, which

currently holds the largest number of Korean establishments and employees. 36 In addition, the

diversity of their related sectors correspond to the major activities of Korean residents in the city,

29 Normi Garcia-Son, “Shifting the Focus on the Kopino Phenomenon: Contexts, Misconceptions, and Spatial Reform,” AIKS Korean Studies Conference Proceedings, ed. Sarah Domingo Lipura (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2015), pp. 73-75. 30 Ibid, pp. 76-80. 31 Ibid, 73-75. 32 Executive Order No. 209, s. 1987, “The Family Code of the Philippines,” Art. 9. 33 Ibid, Art. 50. 34 Ibid, Art. 26. 35 Garcia-Son, “Shifting the Focus,” pp. 58-60. 36 UP CIFAL Philippines, “Korean Migration to the Philippines.”


43

which revolve on business, education, tourism, and religion.37 Outside the capital, seven regional

Korean associations are scattered in major cities of the country’s three main islands with large

concentrations of Korean residents. For instance, the Korean Community Central Luzon, Inc. monitors

the concerns of residents and businesses in Angeles City and Clark, Pampanga, and manages the

impact of their presence on the local neighborhood.38

Table 2: List of Korean organizations in the Philippines and their respective sectors.

Sector Organization

Multisectoral United Korean Community Association in the Philippines

Regional Korean Community Association Central Luzon, Inc.

Subic Korean Association

Korean Community in Southern Manila

Baguio Korean Association

Boracay Korean Association

Cebu Korean Association, Inc.

Davao Korean Association

Politics

National Unification Advisory Council

Southeast-Asia Northern Chapter

Korea Freedom Federation in the Philippines

Business and trade Overseas Korean Trade Association

Korean Chamber of Commerce Philippines

United Korean Businessmen Association

Korean Investors & Traders Association

Korean Investors Association in Cavite

Senior citizens Korean Veterans Association

Korean Senior Citizens Association in the Philippines

Women and children Korean Women’s Association in the Philippines

Korean Women’s International Network

Kopino Children Association, Inc.

Education Korean International School Philippines

37 United Korean Community Association in the Philippines (UKCA), “Living in Harmony: Koreans in the Philippine Islands, 2017” 38 De Leon, “Why have Koreans Migrated,” 48.


44

Korean Sports Association in the Philippines

Korean School Association of the Philippines

Korean Students Association of the Philippines

Religion Korean Union Church of Manila

Korean Church Association in the Philippines

The Korea Missions Association Philippines

Community development Center for Asian Mission for the Poor Asia (CAMP Asia)

The United Korean Community Association in the Philippines (UKCA) is regarded as the largest

organization representing the entirety of the Korean migrant community in the country due to its scale

and organizational structure. Originally known as the Korean Association Philippines, Inc. when it was

established in 1969, the board of directors of the UKCA consists of the heads of 21 Korean

organizations, making it an umbrella association that encompasses all sectors. 39 Its mandate is

centered on sustaining the national identity and cohesion of all Korean residents in the country and

promoting their interests and welfare in cooperation with Philippine partners. Notably, its vision

envisages the organization’s role to establish a comprehensive network among Korean communities,

disseminate information on pertinent matters affecting Koreans, and ensure their security while

residing in the Philippines.40

The proliferation of business associations is inextricable from South Korea’s increasing

economic engagement with the Philippines that flourished since the 1980s. Collectively, these

organizations strive to consolidate the concerns of Korean entrepreneurs and cultivate mutual gains

of economic cooperation between the two countries. Among them, the Korean Chamber of

Commerce Philippines (KCCP) was established in 1994 to lead efforts in bridging Korean and Filipino

proprietors and business groups. They primarily facilitate trade missions to South Korea and other

recreational activities to build beneficial networks among businesses.41 Similarly, these organizations

enhance the mandate of Korean government agencies in the Philippines to manage bilateral economic

ties. In particular, the Manila office of the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)

doubles as the Commercial Section of the Korean Embassy that is directly responsible for promoting

the steady flow of Korean investments through facilitating amicable ties between Korean and Filipino

business sectors. In doing so, they regularly conduct business-matching events and collaboration

projects that allow prospective Korean companies to meet Filipino distributors and explore fruitful

partnerships.42

Other notable Korean organizations have been instrumental for institutionalizing the numerous

drivers of Korean migration into the country. Among them, the stability and growth of Korean-Filipino

families is prioritized to demonstrate the viability of the Philippines as a settlement location. The

Korean Women’s Association in the Philippines is actively involved in empowering Korean women in

Philippine society and developing creative avenues for cultural exchange. Formerly known as the

Mothers Association established in 1974 to represent the concerns of Korean wives of Filipino

39 Hyun Joo Lee (UKCA), “Living in Harmony” 40 Ibid. 41 Hoik Lee, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019. 42 Roshal Ammiel P. Balinton, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019.


45

husbands, the Korea Women’s Association renewed its mandate to include the promotion of cultural

exchanges between the youth of the countries. With classical music as their main platform in achieving

their objectives, the association is currently organizing the FILKOR Youth Orchestra in 2019, which will

recruit young Filipino and Korean classical musicians and deepen their friendships through their

common passion for music.43 Furthermore, the entry of Korean missionaries is evidenced by the

growth of Korean Christian churches in the Philippines that allow Korean residents to express their

faith.44 This is exemplified by Korean Union Church of Manila, which was founded in 1974 not only to

satisfy the spiritual needs of Korean residents, but also extend its religious mission to the Filipino

public. Attended by approximately 300 to 400 Korean members, the church holds jurisdiction over

four local Christian churches presided by Filipino pastors located in nearby lower-class barangays.45

In the 21st century, Korean communities have established their respective roles in addressing

the concerns of marginalized sectors of both Korean and Filipino communities. Responding to the

plight of Kopino families, the Kopino Children Association, Inc. (KCAI) was founded by Bum Sik Son and

Normi Garcia-Son in 2005 to offer protection and academic support to disadvantaged Kopino youth,

and support their mothers in building self-sufficient livelihoods through trainings and financial

assistance for starting retail businesses.46 As part of its goal of bridging Korean and Philippine societies

through the recognition and welfare of Kopino families, KCAI has been steadfast in challenging

misperceptions on these communities by documenting their struggles. For instance, it highly

discourages Korean law firms and related establishments from pressuring Kopino families to pursue

litigation as they only gain profit from their marginalized position and deny the legal agency of Kopino

children.47

In relation, the trend of Korean volunteer migration in the Philippines demonstrates the

expansion of welfare activities of Korean communities beyond their own social network. With the

goal to proactively contributing to community development, these organizations deploy social

workers in marginalized Filipino communities to improve their conditions through volunteer programs,

infrastructure projects, training, and cultural exchanges.48 Remarkably, the Center for Asian Mission

for the Poor Asia (CAMP Asia), Inc. has been involved in the development of two barangays in

Towerville, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, which is home to 13,000 urban poor households that were

relocated due to calamities and redevelopment projects. CAMP Asia’s engagement with the

community began in 2010, when its volunteers conducted community surveys to assess the conditions

and needs of the residents.49 Their numerous activities are guided by its sustainable approaches to

poverty eradication that necessitates the empowerment and leadership of local residents themselves.

This is demonstrated by CAMP Asia’s establishment of interlinked social enterprises in Towerville that

induce job creation and education, such as sewing centers, bakeries, and organic farms.50

In engaging with their local environment, Korean organizations have employed common

approaches that harmonize their respective advocacies with the necessity to build friendly relations

43 Hyun Joo Lee, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019. 44 Virginia A. Miralao, “Understanding the Korean Diaspora to the Philippines,” in Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines, ed. Virginia A. Miralao and Lorna P. Makil (Manila: Philippine Migration Research Network and Philippine Social Science Council, 2007), p. 33. 45 Ma. Belen Ebrada-Rosal, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019. 46 Bum Sik Son and Normi Garcia-Son, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019. 47 Garcia-Son, “Shifting the Focus,” pp. 81-85. 48 Kutsumi, “Koreans in the Philippines,” pp. 64-67. 49 CAMP Asia, “Sustainable Community – Camp Annual Report 2016,” 2016, pp. 10-11. 50 Ibid.


46

with Philippine society. Collectively, three trends can be observed among Korean organizations,

namely language and cultural education, social welfare programs, and institutionalized partnerships.

First, Korean communities implement policies programs that improve the language and

cultural proficiency of both Koreans and Filipinos to facilitate effective communication. Building this

technical skill is an essential for Korean organizations in managing their daily operations, since they

interact with Korean and Filipino members on a daily basis. In the Korean Union Church, its Korean

pastors are required to demonstrate English proficiency and rudimentary knowledge on Tagalog, while

their Korea worship services are equipped with audio translators to aid Filipino spouses of Korean

church members.51 This is also observed among the volunteers of CAMP Asia, wherein they maintain

close communication between Korean and Filipino staff through team building, sharing activities, and

regular updates.52

In conjunction, language and cultural programs are popular avenues for Korean organizations

to reintroduce Korean culture to Korean residents. Carrying the responsibility to preserve the integrity

of their identity and traditions, Korean communities have become an integral part of the upbringing

of new generations of multicultural families. Notably, KCAI conducts short-term cultural exchanges

and weekend Korean language classes for Kopino children with the support of Korean students and

volunteer tutors from the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman. This is complemented with

tutorial classes and financial scholarships for disadvantaged students from elementary to college.53

The Korean Union Church also provides Korean language training for Filipino spouses of Korean

members and their dependents.54 In addition, cultural programs aim to reach Filipino audiences who

have developed a new appreciation for Korean culture. Such initiatives are spearheaded by the UKCA

through the annual Philippines-Korea Cultural Exchange Festival, which is renowned for its talent

competition portion that invites Koreans and Filipino to perform each other’s songs and dances.55 In

connection, the Korean Women’s Association conducts classical musical concerts, speech contests,

bazaars, and food festivals that are accessible to the public.56

Second, social welfare programs testify the long-term commitment of Korean communities to

improve their local environment. Their concern for the well being of Korean residents extends to

marginalized Filipino neighbors through numerous outreach and capacity-building programs geared

towards community development. The activities of CAMP Asia in Towerville are an exemplary of such

approach, in which it empowers local communities with the proper capital and expertise to become

self-sufficient. Apart from social enterprises, it established public facilities that deliver basic services

that were previously inaccessible to residents, such as community health clinics, libraries, and day care

centers.57 This is complemented with leadership programs that pass on CAMP Asia’s expertise on

poverty eradication and sustainable development to community leaders and volunteers.58

Korean organizations extend all forms of assistance to disadvantaged communities regardless

of their primary function. For instance, the Korean Union Church concretizes their religious vocation

through outreach programs that address the practical needs of their congregation and nearby

barangays, such as bible study sessions, feeding programs, and medical and dental missions. In

particular, the church is prominent for conducting mass weddings every two years for long-term

51 Ma. Belen Ebrada-Rosal, e-mail interview with author. 52 Buyoung Cho, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019. 53 Bum Sik Son and Normi Garcia-Son, e-mail interview with author. 54 Ma. Belen Ebrada-Rosal, e-mail interview with author. 55 Jae Heung Byun, e-mail interview with author, July 16, 2019. 56 Hyun Joo Lee, e-mail interview with author. 57 CAMP Asia, “Sustainable Community,” pp. 21-28. 58 Ibid, pp. 36-37.


47

Filipino couples.59 In a similar fashion, KCCP engages with communities in remote areas throughout

the country, which is made possible through the donations of its member businesses. In June 2019,

they provided support to the B’laan tribe in South Cotabato with school supplies and equipment, and

tree planting activities.60 In cases of calamities such as natural disasters, the UKCA regularly helps

collect and distribute relief goods for affected families.61

Third, Korean communities strengthen their networks through building formal partnerships

with Philippine institutions and fellow Korean organizations. Such joint endeavors are crucial in

consolidating objectives and amplifying their overall impact on Korean and Philippine societies. As

Korean organizations have cooperated with both public and private sectors for numerous ends, the

welfare of Korean residents and multicultural families remains a priority issue. In ensuring the security

of Korean nationals, the UKCA created a Korean Safety Countermeasure Committee in 2014, which

aims to resolve criminal cases against Korean victims through close communication with relevant

government agencies. Apart from seminars on safety education and emergency hotlines, it

collaborated with the Korean Embassy and the PNP in establishing a new Korean Desk in Angeles City

in 2017; the parties intend to create additional desks in Quezon City and Cavite.62 Addressing the

political and legal challenges of Kopino children, KCAI maintains informal linkages with the Korean

Embassy in providing accurate updates on their situation, facilitating reunions with their Korean

fathers, and verifying their eligibility for Korean citizenship and mandatory military service in South

Korea.63 In promoting their economic interests in the Philippines, KOTRA regularly organizes job fairs

for Korean residents seeking employment in local companies.64

Korean organizations pursue cooperative efforts for it is an efficient avenue to delineate tasks

and responsibilities with institutional partners. For instance, the UKCA has signed memoranda of

agreement (MOA) with local hospitals to provide medical assistance for Korean residents. 65

Meanwhile, CAMP Asia has signed numerous memoranda of understanding (MOU) with local

government units, national agencies, religious associations, and schools in pursuing its community

development objectives. With over 27 local partners, it received recognition from the National

Housing Authority (NHA) in 2015 for its contributions to the development of San Jose Del Monte.66 In

the business sector, KCCP maintains its scholarship program for Filipino students in local schools

through its partnership with the Philippine KOICA Fellows Association (PHILKOFA), in which the latter

is responsible for nominating deserving scholars throughout the country. Furthermore, KOTRA

mediates in social welfare programs through corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects between

private Korean companies and Philippine partners. Ranging from housing projects and feeding

programs to tutorials, the target sectors are determined by the competencies and profile of the

Korean entity.67 In order to widen the reach of its charity programs, the Korean Union Church has

partnered with Filipino religious entities that share their spiritual mission, namely the Philippine

Council for Evangelical Churches and the Presbyterian Theological School.68

59 Ma. Belen Ebrada-Rosal, e-mail interview with author. 60 Hoik Lee, e-mail interview with author. 61 Jae Heung Byun, e-mail interview with author. 62 UKCA, “Living in Harmony.” 63 Bum Sik Son and Normi Garcia-Son, e-mail interview with author. 64 Interview with Ms. Balinton. 65 UKCA, “Living in Harmony.” 66 CAMP Asia, pp. 34-35. 67 Roshal Ammiel P. Balinton, e-mail interview with author. 68 Ma. Belen Ebrada-Rosal, e-mail interview with author.


48

Building cross-cultural competence between the Philippines and South Korea

Strategies of Korean communities for cross-cultural competence

The approaches of Korean communities in engaging with their Filipino neighbors share broad

commonalities, since they collectively improve their intercultural communication skills and practices

in the process. In delivering the positive impact of their advocacies to Filipino communities, Korean

organizations have coordinated their engagements and programs in line with strategies that

ultimately enhance cross-cultural competence. Remarkably, these strategies involve culture branding,

long-term immersions, and goal setting.

Primarily, Korean communities are able to engage with Filipino communities by projecting a

unified branding of Korean culture in the Philippines. As a starting point of intercultural

communication, Koreans are relatively at ease in sharing their culture with their neighbors as they

follow a consolidated narrative of the compelling aspects of their history and traditions. Recalling the

cross-general competencies that build intercultural relationships, maintaining a specific branding of

Korean culture can be perceived as a functional strategy for cultivating disciplined self-presentation

and planned communications, which is crucial in managing one’s behavior towards a desired

perception by others. 69 Korean organizations develop these competencies through their

institutionalized language education programs and cultural exchange events targeting Korean

residents, which deliberately aim to reproduce a positive image of their heritage that would be warmly

received and consumed by Filipino neighbors.

Culture branding empowers Korean communities to become authentic sources of Korean

culture for fellow nationals who have limited contact to their homeland. By providing legitimate

sources of their way of life, they are able to support Korean residents in preserving their national

identity while adapting within their host environment. This strategy is cognizant of the current profile

of Korean migration in the country that differs from other time periods in Korean history. Compared

to older generations of Korean migrants who were mostly farmers from lower socioeconomic

backgrounds, the current flow of Korean migration largely consists of educated middle class families

seeking long-term residence in countries with better opportunities for social mobility and education

for their dependents.70 In the Philippines, Korean entrepreneurs and retirees with relatively greater

purchasing power are able to maintain their business culture and lifestyles through the support of

Korean business associations and organizations. With the established presence of their culture,

Korean communities are less likely to experience extreme forms of marginalization in the country that

may be attributed to their position as an ethnic minority. Equipped with their strong work ethic and

entrepreneurial mindset, Korean residents are able to deter social discrimination by engaging in

productive activities that do not negatively alter the political and economic landscape of the

Philippines, such as the academe or self-employment.71

In learning and adapting to the culture of their local contexts, Korean communities closely

interact with Filipino neighbors through long-term immersions. Contrary to a tourist’s perspective that

is limited to static observations of a foreign culture, Korean organizations allot time and resources in

becoming exposed and deeply involved in the affairs of Filipino communities by listening to first-hand

accounts of their situation, understanding their worldviews, and complementing their needs. This

strategy hones their competencies on cultural learning that requires individuals to seek reliable

69 Rasmussen and Sieck, “Culture-general competence,” 13. 70 In-Jin Yoon, “Migrant and the Korean Diaspora: A Comparative Description of Five Cases,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, no. 3 (2012): 430-432. 71 Ibid, 432-434.


49

sources of information on new cultures to gain deeper understanding. 72 Given the geographic

dispersion of Korean associations and the multitude of their social welfare programs in marginalized

communities all over the Philippines, they are able to appreciate the country’s ethnolinguistic diversity

at a close range and invest on their holistic development.

For Korean communities, regular immersions with Filipino communities enable them to

mutually share their expertise and perspectives on issues of common interest. This strategy requires

not only technical skills such as language proficiency, but also cultural knowledge and perspective

taking in approaching people from different cultural backgrounds. With their strong sense of identity,

Korean communities become more aware of the partiality of their worldviews and opinions informed

by their cultural backgrounds, which differ from their Filipino partners. As they are careful not to

impose their way of life on others, they also learn to respect cultural differences and maximize

similarities. From a wider perspective, numerous points of commonalities between South Korea and

Philippines are good starting points for meaningful intercultural interactions and cooperation,

particularly their shared colonial and wartime history, struggles in economic crises, and commitment

to democracy. 73 The case of Korean missionaries in the Philippines is an exceptional instance of the

level of respect between the two countries, in spite of the Philippines’s dominantly Roman Catholic

population. Notably, the reception of their religious and charitable works is enhanced by the

complementarity of moral virtues between Koreans and Filipinos, and their common exposure to

Protestant missionaries in their history.

Lastly, Korean communities sustain the momentum for interacting with their local contexts

since they collectively demonstrate a goal setting strategy in their operations. In particular, they

established their identity and presence in the Philippines by setting practical outcomes for their daily

activities and cooperative endeavors. Recalling the culture-general competencies nurturing a

diplomatic mindset, a goal setting strategy drives Korean communities to adopt mission-oriented and

self-aware attitudes, which are essential in deliberating and implementing achievable work objectives.

This is manifested in the declared mandates and advocacies of Korean organizations that inform the

nature of their activities with local communities and partners. The effectiveness of these programs

can be inferred in specific indicators measuring their impact on the country’s economy and

marginalized sectors, such as higher volume of investments, business partnerships, improved access

to education and healthcare, reduced unemployment, and stable housing.

In relation, a goal setting strategy drives Korean communities to sustain good working

relationships with Filipino partners who resonate well their objectives. In doing so, Koreans have

become more willing to develop working knowledge on Filipino language and culture in order to

communicate effectively. This has resulted in a sophisticated network between Korean and Philippine

institutions that are bonded by the common goal of advancing greater friendship between their

societies. These connections have proven to be instrumental in protecting the interests of Korean

residents in the country. By lobbying government agencies, Korean organizations were able to deliver

policy concessions in response to several crises affecting Korean residents, such as immigration,

employment, business, and ELT.74 At present, this trend is gradually replicated in the protection of

Korean nationals from crimes and the recognition of disadvantaged Kopino families, in which both

public and private sectors have committed to respond to their needs with proper legal and financial

assistance.

72 Rasmussen and Sieck, “Culture-general competence,” 13-14. 73 Song, “Migration of South Koreans to the Philippines,” 768. 74 Kutsumi, “Koreans in the Philippines,” pp. 64-67.


50

Opportunities and challenges in building cross-cultural competence

The process of gaining cross-cultural competence does not occur in a vacuum, but is

manipulated by external conditions that influence the community’s cognitive and behavioral

disposition towards people from different cultural backgrounds. Hence, the opportunities and

challenges in building cross-cultural competence among Korean communities hinges on the

Philippines’s political, economic, and sociocultural contexts that either facilitate or limit their ability

to absorb and practice such skills. On one hand, the celebration of milestones in political and economic

cooperation between the Philippines and South Korea provides sufficient momentum and capital to

advance genuine people-to-people ties. On the other hand, their ability to learn from the contexts is

limited by technical and structural gaps that are rooted from disparities in their economic and cultural

resources.

The opportunities of Korean communities in deepening people-to-people relations with their

local context is inherently linked with the milestones of diplomatic ties between the Philippines and

South Korea. At the political level, the celebration of 70 years of bilateral relations between the

Philippines and South is a golden opportunity for Korean communities to assert its relevance as a non-

state actor in the trajectory of diplomatic ties. Through amplified policy discussions on people-to-

people ties, Korean associations can augment their newfound political capital through consistent

communication with Philippine and Korean state actors so as to garner support for their activities in

building friendly relations with the local context. Specifically, their strategies for cross-cultural

competence would gain traction through political recognition and assistance in their numerous social

welfare programs for marginalized Filipino communities. Here, the development of interpersonal and

intercultural knowledge between Filipinos and Koreans would lead to the creation of a new social

structure that ensures the viability of Korean migration into the country. This path would empower

both societies to foster peace and harmony through sharing their cultures and principles.75

Moreover, the Philippine economic climate continues to motivate Korean communities to

develop cross-cultural competencies that help institutionalize the economic drivers of Korean

diaspora into the country. Korean organizations are able to capitalize on these opportunities by

expanding their networks with institutional partners, and lobbying for policy concessions that

promote economic cooperation between their countries. As lucrative investment opportunities in the

country continue to attract Korean companies to relocate their operations, their prolonged stay in the

country necessitates the need to develop skills for effective communication with Filipinos. In doing so,

Korean residents are able to deepen intercultural relationships while improving their work

performance.76 Since most Korean organizations and establishments require frequent interactions

between Korean and Filipinos partners and colleagues, they can enhance the quality of their

interactions through language training programs and proficiency requirements.

The present strategies of Korean communities in enhancing cross-cultural competence can

also intensified with cultural capital gained from a heightened interest in South Korean society and

culture. Facilitated by the strong appeal of the Korean Wave in Philippine society and the proliferation

of Korean establishments, Filipinos are more willing to engage in meaningful interactions and

friendships with Korean communities due to their familiarity and personal interest in the various forms

of Korean popular culture, such as food, music, dramas, and cosmetics. As part of developing cross-

cultural competence, the ability to establish interpersonal relationships is indispensable in adjusting

75 Song, “Migration of South Koreans to the Philippines,” 764. 76 Hammer, “Behavioral Dimensions,” 84-85.


51

or acculturating into a foreign environment.77 Hence, the increased value of Korean culture in the

Philippines is a boon for Korean organizations that invested on the institutionalization of its cultural

exchange programs, since they have a feasible market to propagate its cultural resources and foster

amicable ties with Filipinos.

However, Korean communities continue to confront challenges in engaging with their

Philippine context due to wide technical and structural gaps between their societies. Primarily,

language and cultural barriers remain persistent impediments in intercultural communication

between Korean and Filipino communities. Korean organizations have collectively identified this

hindrance in executing their mandates and implementing programs that aim to nurture partnerships

with local sectors. In particular, their social welfare programs frequently encounter complications in

assisting and collaborating with marginalized communities due to their limited proficiency in a

common language. This challenge also has implications for regular transactions between Koreans and

Filipinos that may limit the progress of fruitful partnerships. As observed by business associations and

government agencies, Filipino and Korean entrepreneurs experience difficulties in expressing their

thoughts and opinions with each other due to the diverging nuances of their business language and

etiquette. This may result in additional costs of doing business that may deter them from pursuing

cooperation, such as hiring interpreters.78 In the long term, communication problems may pose

difficulties for Korean communities in adapting to their local environment and accomplishing their

objectives, which may lead to culture shock and stress. An important component of cross-cultural

competence, stress management enables individuals to deal with psychological stress induced by their

exposure and adjustment to new cultures.79

More importantly, underlying power relations between the Philippines and South Korea

constrain the ability of Korean communities to strengthen people-to-people ties with their local

environment on an equal basis. Overshadowed by the disparity of their economies and the

Philippines’s current dependence on Korean aid, this hierarchical relationship is reproduced at the

interpersonal level through the common approaches of Korean organizations in interacting their

Filipino neighbors. Although marginalized Filipino communities have recognized the generosity of

these organizations through their social welfare programs, scholarships, and employment

opportunities, such strategies dependent on private donations establish a donor-recipient

relationship between Korean and Philippine societies that replicates the nature of development

cooperation between their countries. This “dole-out” arrangement inadvertently perpetuates popular

perceptions of South Korea as a superior country, while the Philippines is largely misrepresented due

to its elevated poverty incidence.80 As a result, such unexamined prejudices impede Koreans and

Filipinos to genuinely learn more about their cultures with mutual respect and empathy.

Policy recommendations

With a nuanced understanding of the landscape and context of Korean communities in the

Philippines, state actors can craft appropriate responses that ensure their involvement in the

deepening of bilateral relations and appreciate their contributions in sharing their culture with

Philippine society. In doing so, prospective policy responses can be sequentially developed in short-

term, medium-term, and long-term stages that compound the impacts of existing mechanisms for

77 Ibid. 78 Roshal Ammiel P. Balinton, e-mail interview with author. 79 Hammer, “Behavioral Dimensions,” 84-85. 80 Bum Sik Son and Normi Garcia-Son, e-mail interview with author.


52

people-to-people exchanges towards greater heights. Cumulatively, these policy recommendations

would collectively reinforce the Philippines’s new reality as a multicultural society that has welcomed

foreign cultures and can continue to nurture their concerns.

In the short term, the Philippines and South Korea can intensify and recalibrate existing

avenues for academic and cultural exchanges between their societies by underscoring reciprocity as

its guiding principle. Acknowledging that intercultural communication is a two-way process, these

opportunities should be geared towards cultivating cross-cultural competence between Koreans and

Filipinos that can serve as the foundations of future collaboration. This can be executed by

consolidating a comprehensive language education campaign that accommodates the proficiency

needs of both Koreans and Filipinos to foster intercultural relationships, covering Korean, English, and

Filipino. Compared with the Philippines’s ongoing ELT campaign that is primarily marketed to Korean

students, this reciprocal approach to language education can be achieved by actively supporting

Korean communities that have developed their respective programs on language and culture

programs, and linking them with notable Korean and Philippine academic institutions that are

equipped to receive international students.

While Korean and Filipino youth is a strategic market for these collaborative endeavors,

cultural exchanges should not be limited to students; instead, opportunities for cultural learning must

be open to Korean and Filipino professionals and civil servants from different age brackets and

disciplines to encourage them in developing mutual respect towards their diverse backgrounds and

instill the spirit of cooperation. For instance, language training can be provided to Philippine law

enforcement personnel assigned in areas with large concentrations of Korean communities, which

would facilitate amicable working relationships and allay persistent fears among Korean residents for

their safety. The Philippine and South Korean government have made significant steps towards this

direction. In October 2016, the Korean Consulate in Cebu, the PNP Regional Office in Central Visayas,

and the King Sejong Institute signed an MOU on a Korean language and culture program catering to

police officers, which would allow them to overcome language barriers and enrich their engagement

with Korean communities within their jurisdiction.81

In order to sustain the political capital accumulated from the recent milestones in diplomatic

relations, it is beneficial for Philippine and South Korean policymakers to envision a medium-term

roadmap for bilateral relations for the next decade that particularly focuses on the welfare and

empowerment of their societies. Transcending from the economic fruits of their strategic partnership,

indicators of bilateral ties should reflect the conditions of Korean communities in the country and the

quality of their interpersonal relationship with Filipino neighbors. Hence, the Philippines’s policy

options in augmenting diplomatic ties with South Korea should not be limited to tourism-oriented

approaches, but rather advance capacity-building efforts in building a welcoming society in which the

cross-cultural competence of Korean communities can flourish. This can be initiated with

institutionalized partnerships between Korean organizations and local and national agencies for

healthcare and community development, support for policy research, and involvement of Korean

community leaders in high-level policy consultations.

Future policy discussions may explore opportunities to establish and harmonize legal

mechanisms that ensure the sustainable welfare of both Korean communities in the Philippines, and

81 Consulate of the Republic of Korea in Cebu, “Signing on MOU to support Korean language program for police

officers,” October 28, 2016, overseas.mofa.go.kr/ph-cebu-

en/brd/m_2276/view.do?seq=744694&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_se

q=. (accessed July 16, 2019).


53

Filipinos in South Korea. In particular, the two governments can discuss the viability of a mutual

recognition agreement (MRA) in order to harmonize regulatory standards and increase employment

opportunities of Filipinos and Koreans living abroad. In connection, the consolidation of professional

norms and practices would improve the intercultural communication skill of Korean and Filipino

workers. Considering the dynamic demographic of Korean residents, the countries can also prioritize

negotiations for a social security agreement to ensure their financial independence while alleviating

their burdens. Furthermore, Philippine lawmakers can embark on legal consultations with their Korean

counterparts to discuss the harmonization of their legislature addressing the plight of multicultural

families, which would allow both governments to sanction all forms of discrimination and reassure

them with the necessary assistance.

Lastly, the Philippines is in the position to commence long-term steps in realizing a

comprehensive multiculturalism policy that formally recognizes the contributions of Korean

communities to the country’s national development and evolving ties with South Korea.

Notwithstanding the multitude of the county’s indigenous ethnolinguistic groups, the Philippines

would fulfill its mutual interests with strategic partners if it acknowledges the diversity of transnational

communities that have become deeply embedded within its social fabric. In the case of Korean

communities that have grown in size and influence over the past decades, such endeavor requires

inter-agency cooperation in integrating responses for their prevalent concerns, such as public safety,

education, employment, and cultural resources, among others. As a starting point, the Philippine

government can coordinate with the Korean Embassy and Korean association in consolidating

pertinent and updated information on Korean residents, including aggregate statistics and

demographic profiles, total number of Korean companies and establishments, and sectoral

competencies of Korean associations.

By embracing multiculturalism, the Philippines would able to address its policy woes

attributed to the general lack of awareness on the existence of Korean communities and their

advocacies. At present, public policies are preoccupied with managing the country’s overpopulation

issue without considering the quality of movements of foreign residents facilitated by globalization.82

In order to deepen discourse on Korean migration beyond its popular culture, it is imperative to invest

on research and cultural learning opportunities that allow Koreans and Filipinos to mutually cultivate

cross-cultural competence. This would fulfill the necessary preconditions for innovative policy

accommodations that would protect and preserve their language, customs, and religion of Korean

residents, while maintaining a harmonious and fruitful relationship with Philippine society.

Conclusion

In general, Korean communities in the Philippines have transformed in accordance with the

ebb and flow of Korean diaspora since the 20th century. During this process, they have gradually

expanded their perspective and focus beyond their own kind by adopting indispensable interpersonal

and cultural skills that empower them to build harmonious relationships with their local environment.

Their evolution is attributed to their newfound role in enhancing people-to-people ties between the

countries through the cultivation of cross-cultural competence among Korean residents. The growth

and maturity of Korean organizations and associations is facilitated by the Philippines’s enabling policy

framework that recognizes the benefits of maximizing the drivers of Korean migration. Subsequently,

82 Miralao, “Understanding the Korean Diaspora to the Philippines,” p. 28.


54

these drivers are institutionalized by Korean communities through the diversification of their

advocacies and target sectors that facilitate cordial ties between Koreans and Filipinos.

Collectively, intercultural communication between Korean and Filipino societies is structured

within common strategies that demonstrate their progress in developing cross-cultural competence.

Apart from a goal-oriented mindset and strong sense of cultural identity that amplify their self-

awareness, Koreans have become more open to immerse with marginalized Filipino communities,

which allows them to listen to their own experiences and insights and collaborate in community

development efforts. While these strategies can be augmented with the current political, economic,

and sociocultural opportunities for collaboration in the Philippines, the long-term impacts of such

intercultural endeavors can be dampened by underlying language barriers and structural relations that

question the sincerity of people-to-people ties. Regardless, it is imperative to involve Korean

communities in discourses that will determine the course of diplomatic relations between the

Philippines and South Korea. Transcending from traditional indicators of bilateral ties, the authenticity

of friendships between Korean and Filipino societies can be ascertained with established practices of

mutual respect and sensitivity towards for their well being.

Notes and Acknowledgements

The author would like to express his sincerest gratitude to the following leaders and

representatives of Korean communities who shared their time and insights for this publication: Mr.

Jae Heung Byun, Mr. Hoik Lee, Ms. Hyun Joo Lee, Mr. Bum Sik Son, Ms. Normi Garcia-Son, Ms. Ma.

Belen Ebrada-Rosal, Ms. Buyoung Cho, and Ms. Roshal Balinton. The author would also like to thank

Ms. Kyungmin Bae and Mr. Marco Angulo for sharing their networks with Korean communities in the

Philippines.

The views expressed in this publication are of the author alone and do not reflect the official

position of the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Government of

the Philippines.

References

• ASEAN-Korea Centre. “Resources: Statistics.” 2017. Accessed July 16, 2019,

• https://www.aseankorea.org/eng/Resources/figures.asp.

• CAMP Asia. “Sustainable Community – Camp Annual Report 2016.” 2016.

• Consulate of the Republic of Korea in Cebu. “Signing on MOU to support Korean language program for

police officers.” October 28, 2016. Accessed July 16, 2019, overseas.mofa.go.kr/ph-cebu-

en/brd/m_2276/view.do?seq=744694&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_

itm_seq=.

• De Leon, Patrick Carlos. “Why have Koreans Migrated to Angeles City, Philippines?” Journal of Management

and Development Studies 7 (2018): 40-51.

• Garcia-Son, Normi. “Shifting the Focus on the Kopino Phenomenon: Contexts, Misconceptions, and Spatial

Reform.” In AIKS Korean Studies Conference Proceedings, edited by Sarah Domingo Lipura, pp. 49-98.

Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2015.

• Hammer, Mitchell R. “Behavioral Dimensions of Intercultural Effectiveness: A Replication and Extension.”

International Journal of Intercultural Relations 11 (1987): 65-88.

• Kim, Dohye. “’I am a Half-Retiree, But Soon to be Pure’: Korean Retiree Migration to the Philippines.” PhD

diss., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 2015.


55

• Kim, Ki Heun. “The Korean Desk in the Philippines – Facilitating collaboration in international criminal

justice,. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 41, no. 1 (2018): 159-174.

• Kutsumi, Kanako. “Koreans in the Philippines: A Study of the Formation of their Social Organization.” In

Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines, edited by Virginia A. Miralao and Lorna P. Makil,

pp. 58-73. Manila: Philippine Migration Research Network and Philippine Social Science Council, 2007.

• Jang, In Chull. “Legitimating the Philippines as a language learning space: Transnational Korean youth’s

experiences and evaluations.” Journal of Sociolinguistics (2018): 1-17.

• Miralao, Virginia A. “Understanding the Korean Diaspora to the Philippines.” In Exploring Transnational

Communities in the Philippines, edited by Virginia A. Miralao and Lorna P. Makil, pp. 24-39. Manila:

Philippine Migration Research Network and Philippine Social Science Council, 2007.

• Presidential Communications Office. “Joint Statement of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and Republic of

Korea President Moon Jae-in.” June 4, 2018.

• Rasmussen, Louise J. and Sieck, Winston R. “Culture-general competence: Evidence from a cognitive field

study of professionals who work in many cultures.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations (2015):

1-16.

• ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Outcome of 7th ROK-Philippines Policy Consultation.” November 6, 2018.

Accessed July 16, 2019, www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=320182.

• Rombaoa, Jasmine Sabrina J. “Foreign Language Anxiety of Korean Students in Regular Schools in the

Philippines.” In The Fifth Philippine Korean Studies Symposium Conference Proceedings, edited by Aldrin P.

Lee and Kyungmin Bae, pp. 178-191. Quezon City: UP Department of Linguistics, 2017.

• Song, Eulsub. “Migration of South Koreans to the Philippines: Its History, Challenges and Impact.”

International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 6, no. 2 (2018): 764-769.

• UP CIFAL Philippines. “Korean Migration to the Philippines – Data Snapshot.” September 18, 2018.

• Yoon, In-Jin. “Migrant and the Korean Diaspora: A Comparative Description of Five Cases.” Journal of Ethnic

and Migration Studies 38, no. 3 (2012): 413-435.


56


57

SESSION 2

Futuristic Partnership after 70-years Ties


58

Korean-Filipino Marriage: Towards an Understanding of

Interracial Longevity and Developing Key Policies

Normi Garcia-Son

Kopino Children’s Association Inc.

Abstract

The study aims to contribute to an understanding of Korean-Filipino (Korfil) marriage by

examining the factors that impact their longevity within the context of migration and cross-cultural

interaction. The study employed the qualitative approach in conducting in-depth interviews with five

Korfil couples residing in the Philippines and who have been married for twenty years or more. Study

findings show that a satisfying and enduring Korfil marriage involves the following factors: later first

marriage; high level of independence; similar values and goals; courtship; commitment; love, trust and

respect; similar religious beliefs; high level of education and bilingual proficiency; middle-class

household income and a joint bank account; high level of cultural sensitivity and high level of

adaptability. Finally, the study provides key policy recommendations with the view of strengthening a

multicultural and beneficial setting for Korfil couples and their family.

Keywords: interracial, intercultural, binational, multicultural, Korean-Filipino, marriage longevity

I. INTRODUCTION

What factors contribute to a long and satisfying marriage between a Korean and a Filipino?

What social policies in support of intermarried Korean-Filipino couples can be recommended within

the context of migration? I aim to contribute to an understanding of these two questions, and I do so

from the position of being a Filipino who is happily married to a Korean for 26 years and counting.

Despite the growing instances of interracial marriage between citizens of Korea and of the

Philippines, the phenomena is remarkably understudied. Indeed, research is necessary in order to gain

insights into the various ways of approaching, understanding and supporting Korean-Filipino (Korfil)

marriages.

Assisted by my Korean husband, I conducted in-depth interviews with five Korfil couples

residing in the Philippines and who have been married for 20 years or more. As this study pulls in the

focus on long-term Korfil marriages, it is important to state at the offset that there is no single unique

variable that can account for the longevity or sustainability of marriage -- alas, of any human relation.

However, as I hope to show in this study, several recurring factors that have emerged from the

interviews can provide windows to understanding lasting Korfil marriages.

To set the stage for the interview outcome, I will first provide a socio-historical sketch of

interracial marriage globally as well as regionally. Then, existing research on interracial marriage will

be utilized to enrich the discussion of the interviews. Finally, this study will provide policy


59

recommendations with the view of strengthening a multicultural and beneficial setting for Korfil

couples.

II. INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE IN KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES

Interracial marriage1 is a global phenomenon generated and conditioned by international

migration. At least two million people would cross international borders on a daily basis and more

than 190 million people live outside their country of birth or citizenship (Omelaniuk, 2005). A visible

sign of globalization, interracial marriage bears on the political, economic and cultural landscape of

South Korea and Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines.

South Korea saw 15.6 million foreigner arrivals in 2018. Out of 15.6 million, 2.3 million

foreigners reside in Korea including 60,139 Filipino students, workers and marriage migrants.2 While

the rate of increase of interracial marriages in South Korea has slowed down after the requirements

for a marriage migrant visa (F-6) application was revised and implemented in 20143, the number of

interracial marriages in South Korea has continued to rise.

Large scale international marriage immigration from developing countries to South Korea

began only in the early 1990s, but it has increased rapidly (Kim, Yang, and Torneo, 2014). In 2018,

marriage migrants including foreign husbands and wives married to Koreans living in South Korea

numbered 159,206. The majority of all interracial marriages in Korea are between South Korean

citizens and Southeast and East Asia citizens with Chinese ethnic Koreans being the single-biggest

source followed by Vietnam. Korfil couples were numbered at 11,836 and ranked fourth in the tally

(see Table 1).4

Rank Nationality Total Husbands Wives

1 China 58,706 12,710 45,996

2 Vietnam 42,460 2,182 40,278

3 Japan 13,738 1,231 12,507

4 Philippines 11,836 419 11,417

5 Cambodia 4,496 217 4,279

6 Thailand 4,411 96 4,315

1 In this study, interracial marriage is used interchangeably with cross-national marriages, binational marriages,

transnational marriages, multicultural marriages and international marriages to refer to the phenomenon of cross-

border marriages between individuals of different nationalities and race.

2 Korea Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice. Immigration and Foreign Policy Statistics Monthly Report (in Korean), December 2018. Accessed at http://www.moj.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?rs=/viewer/result/ bbs/160&fn=temp_1548720809280100 3 The requirements for a marriage migrant visa (F-6) application was revised in 2013 and implemented from April

1, 2014. The new requirements include: Income requirement of W17,439,168 up to W37,923,264, housing in

Korea, and Korean language proficiency requirement for the foreign spouse (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic

of Korea/ http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us) 4 Korea Immigration Servic, Ministry of Justice, South Korea. 2019 Update. Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice, South Korea. Accessed online at http://www.immigration.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?rs=/viewer/result/bbs/228&fn=1546653289371101 on August 11, 2019.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thailand

http://www.moj.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?rs=/viewer/result/

http://www.immigration.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?rs=/viewer/result/bbs/228&fn=1546653289371101


60

7 United States 3,658 2,683 975

8 Mongolia 2,438 147 2,291

9 Uzbekistan 2,425 114 2,311

10 Russia 1,494 109 1,385

11 Canada 1,320 1,102 218

12 Taiwan 1,213 94 1119

13 Nepal 901 172 729

- Others 10,110 5,539 4,571

Total 159,206 26,815 132,391

Table 1: Marriage migrants married to Koreans as of 2018

(Source: KIS 2018)

Table 2: Korfil Marriages 1989-2017

(Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas)

While Philippine law does not allow divorce inside the country, the divorce rate with foreign spouses

in South Korea drastically increased from 1,567 in 2004 to 8,300 in 2009 (see Table 3).

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2017

Total 380 547 1,567 2,382 3,933 5,707 7,962 8,300 2823

China 180 274 835 1,425 2,538 3,654 5,398 5,562 1,652

Vietnam 7 28 147 289 610 895 1,078 1,292 594

Philippines 28 43 108 140 165 213 268 285 152

Japan 78 89 114 116 147 157 205 227 51

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongolia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uzbekistan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nepal


61

Mongolia 10 6 83 116 147 157 205 227 61

Uzbekistan 3 16 67 75 105 112 160 174 26

Cambodia 0 0 4 6 19 99 178 109 64

Others 74 91 209 215 217 404 462 475 223

Table 3: Divorces with foreign wives by nationality, 2002-2009, 2017

(Source: Statistics Korea)

The divorce rate in South Korea continues to trend upwards, but divorces with foreign spouses

slowed down in 2017 with a total of 2,823 reported cases or 3% of the total divorces in South Korea.

31.2% of the total divorces have an average duration of 20 years or more of marriage, followed by a

duration of less than 5 years at 22.4%. In 2017, Korfil divorces totaled 152 cases (which represents

20% of the 746 newlywed Korfil couples in the same year), a significant decrease from 285 divorce

cases in 2009.5

2009 - 2017

By Nationality/ Region By Sex Total

Spouse of Korean

National (F-2-1)

Spouse of Korean

National (F-5-2)

Spouse of Korean

National (F-6-1)

Child Raising (F-

6-2) Divorce (F-6-3)

Grand-Total Total 155,457 2,996 29,938 116,996 2,704 2,823

Male 25,230 186 4,047 20,484 232 281

Female 130,227 2,810 25,891 96,512 2,472 2,542

Korean-Chinese Male 7,157 71 1,010 5,915 76 85

Female 14,364 357 3,057 10,337 96 517

China Male 4,959 59 819 3,934 63 84

Female 31,164 452 10,815 18,697 234 966

Vietnam Male 1,762 12 27 1,704 13 6

Female 40,443 1,347 1,355 35,736 1,417 588

Thailand Male 83 0 3 80 0 0

Female 3,588 30 611 2,861 41 45

Philippines Male 368 5 34 321 5 3

Female 11,415 205 601 10,189 271 149

Japan Male 1,223 3 436 781 2 1

Female 12,177 28 6,536 5,535 28 50

Table 4: Status of Marriage Migrant by Nationality/Region, 2009-2017

(Source: KOSIS, Ministry of Justice, South Korea)

5 Statistics Korea. Marriage and Divorce Statistics in 2017, accessed online at http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/11/index.board on August 10, 2019.

http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/11/index.board


62

In the Philippines, 746 out of the 20,723 interracial marriages registered in 2017 were

between a Filipino and Korean national, according to data from the Commission on Filipino Overseas

(CFO).6. Between 1989 to 2017, CFO registered a total of 18,115 KorFil couples (see Table 2). 7 A

sharp increase in Korfil marriages occurred between 2009-2014 from only 4 in 1989 to 1,754

occurring only in 2012.

Table 5: Korfil Marriages 1989-2017

(Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas)

Romance, economic motivation, and religion are significant influences in Korfil marriages.

According to Kim (2016), most Korfil marriages have been mediated through organized mass weddings

of the Moon Sun Myung’s Unification Church since the late 1990s; the establishment of commercial

marriage agencies in the 2000s; mutual acquaintances; and through dating Korean men visiting the

Philippines for study, business, or work. According to Chung (2001), 2,745 Korfil couples are included

in the 9,800 couples married under Moon’s group and living in South Korea.

To date, we can calculate that there are 837 Korfil couples who have been married for 20 years

or more. These are the couples who got married between 1987 to 1997. The five Korfil couples who

took part in this study have been married between 1987 up to now.

The recent trends in divorce and marriage of Korfil couples may not necessarily reflect the

actual statistics as some observers have concluded. Although Korfil couples are splitting up less as

statistics say, there could be more divorces occurring but could not be fitted into the figures for

divorced Korfil couples anymore because the Filipino spouses could have already been naturalized

Korean citizens, a different category. Now, what characterizes these Korfil couples who survived their

marriage and what factors contributed to their successful and satisfying marriage?

III. FIVE KORFIL MARRIAGES AND THE FACTORS OF THEIR LONGEVITY

This study identifies a wide range of factors that impact an enduring marital relationship and

analyzes how these factors play a role in the success and longevity of Korfil couples’ marriage.

The Korfil couples in this study have been married for at least 20 years or more. Face-to-face

interviews took place over the course of two weeks in July 2019, with another week allotted for follow-

up calls. Two sets of guide questionnaires were prepared, one in English and one in Korean. The

6Commission on Filipinos Overseas. Number of Filipino Spouses and Other Partners of Foreign Nationals by Major Country: 1989-2017, accessed online at https://cfo.gov.ph/downloads/statistics/statistical-profile-of-spouses-and-other-partners-of-foreign-nationals.html on August 10, 2019.

7 CFO’s total tally was 18,155, however, when the totals year by year are added, the correct figure should be 18,115.

https://cfo.gov.ph/downloads/statistics/statistical-profile-of-spouses-and-other-partners-of-foreign-nationals.html

https://cfo.gov.ph/downloads/statistics/statistical-profile-of-spouses-and-other-partners-of-foreign-nationals.html


63

questionnaires sought to assess a range of factors, from demographic aspects such as educational

attainment and income, to subjective judgments concerning happiness and marriage expectations. As

presented below, the discussion of the interview outcome is sectioned according to each factor

assessed in the questionnaire.

The Vulnerability-Stress-Adaptation Model for Marriages (VSA) is the framework used for the

interviews. The VSA model offers the closest and most effective form of analysis for this study. The

limitations of the VSA in relation to this study will be discussed in the conclusion.

Figure 1. The Vulnerability-Stress-Adaptation Model for Marriages (The VSA Model)

(Reprinted from Karney & Bradbury, 1995)

Age and First Marriage

Later first marriage is a recurring factor in this study. The Korean spouses have never been

married before and were between 26 to 42 years old when they married their Filipino spouse who

were between 23 to 34 years old at the time of marriage. The Korean spouses, on average, are 6.6

years older than their Filipino spouses (see Table 1).

KorFil Couple

Age

Age Gap

Year Married

Education

Korean male spouse

Filipino female spouse

Korean male spouse


1 35 34 1 1987-1997

postgraduate postgraduate

2 26 23 3 High School graduate

College graduate

3 30 27 3 College level postgraduate

4 42 27 15 College graduate College graduate

5 31 20 11 postgraduate College level

Table 6 – Demographic Information, part 1

The couples in this study saw themselves as “matured” and as an “adult” who were of age to

settle down. Four Korean spouses who dominated most of the in-depth interview time revealed that


64

prior to their marriage, they were already looking for their life partners. They stated that they came

to the Philippines intentionally to find their future wife after having traveled to many countries. When

a Korean spouse was asked if his readiness for marriage was sufficient, he replied that “At the age of

45…very stable and ready”.

Another Korean spouse responded:

At the age of 26, still young, I prepared only the money for house rent at that time. But I was

confident that I was prepared to be a family man.”

I was of age at that time but I didn’t have money, could not speak English well, somehow I

thought it was a reckless marriage on my part. Even so, there was a willingness to make it

work between us.

Except for one, all female spouses had a stable job and were considered established in their careers

when they married. Lehrer (2005) affirms that women who tend to marry later or delay their entry to

marriage are more stable as an outcome of “greater maturity” than those who marry in their teens.

She explains that greater maturity is a stabilizing effect and counteracts the “poor match effect” that

can emerge during later ages and beyond late twenties.

Hymowitz et al. (2013) argue that the benefits of a delayed marriage include women enjoying

an annual income premium and less chances of divorce as compared to younger couples. Considering

other factors after the variable of socioeconomic status has been controlled, Hymowitz et al. (2013)

and Lehrer (2005) argue that women who tend to marry later enjoy higher combined household

incomes, and this benefit is due to focusing on career first and establishing a work-life balance before

marriage and childbirth.

College-level Education, Middle Class Household Income

Reflecting on their marital experience, the Korean spouses articulated another recurring

theme from the interviews, namely college education and middle-class household income. According

to three Korean spouses, their marriage will endure the test of time because their educational

attainment and socio-economic standing are similar or close to their wife and their wife’s extended

family. Brines & Joyner (1999) affirm that the closer the income of the partners are to each another,

the less likely they are to break up.

The Korfil couples in this study, except for one, have the advantage of having college-level

education and were either gainfully employed or self-employed at the time of marriage. The couples

have a secure economic standing and have attained after more than 20 years of marriage a combined

annual gross income of between USD 30,000 to USD 70,000, an amount that matches the income of

the middle class in South Korea.8 The couples are able to maintain and secure their family’s economic

welfare, thereby eliminating financial stress, a factor that almost led one Korfil couple to divorce.

8 As of 2015, almost half (46%) of the Korean population who earn at least $30,000 annually are considered middle class, according to Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research projections (http://wwdw.gbaforwomen.org/docs/GOLDMAN-SACHS-Power-of-the-Purse.pdf). Accessed on July 30, 2019.


65

KorFil Couple

# of Children

Occupation at First Meeting Current Occupation

Korean male spouse


Korean male spouse


1 2 Consultant Executive Self-employed Executive

2 3 Employed Employed Self-employed Self-employed

3 2 Self-employed Self-employed Self-employed Self-employed

4 3 Self-employed Employed Self-employed Self-employed

5 3 Self-employed Student Self-employed Self-employed

Table 7 – Demographic Information, part 2

Having a Joint Bank Account

All Korfil couples in this study have kept their money in a joint bank account. Couples tend to

have a positive and satisfying relationship when their bank accounts are merged (Addo & Sassler,

2010). Having a joint bank account positively impacts the relationship of couples because it promotes

transparency and serves as proof of commitment and trust of each other.

Treas (1993) suggests that people who have previously been married or who maintain

separate bank accounts look at their relationship as less permanent. What is more, they are also

more protective of their finances and assets, and are less likely to have a joint bank account. This is

also affirmed by Addo & Sassler (2010) in their study on low-income couples. Garbinsky & Gladstone

et al. (2018) found that couples who have joint bank accounts are the most content, happier,

satisfied, and are likely to have a lasting relationship, an experience that does not persist among

couples that dated for less than a year despite having joined their bank accounts.

Courtship

The findings of this study support the view that courtship or pre-engagement for at least one

year can lead to a lasting marriage. The couples’ responses highlight the importance of having a

considerable amount of time to get to know each other during courtship and dating in preparation

for marriage.

Characteristics are challenging to define because each individual is unique and different. In

any relationship, whether interracial or intraracial, spouses bring to their marriage a set of

characteristic traits that they have inherited and developed since birth. Their childhood environments

significantly influence their traits, belief systems and values during the most sensitive period of their

formative years. It will be hard to change an adult’s temperament and personality traits. However,

theorists have underscored how personality can develop toward higher levels of psychological

maturity (Caspi et al, 2005; Lucas & Donnellan, 2011). Self-transcendence is the highest predictor of

overall personality change (Josefsson et al., 2013).


66

In this study, personality traits and the capacity to transcend cultural barriers are qualified in

terms of agreeableness, tolerance, openness, acceptance of other people (and their culture) and

willingness to compromise.

Commitment

Marriage is a lifetime commitment that ideally should minimize the distance and soften the

boundary between two people of different race and culture. Verhofstadt et. al. (2007) explain that

personal characteristics, intimacy, and commitment to one’s spouse contribute to marriage stability.

Couples with strong commitment encounter less marital problems (Johnson, 1982). Couples who

nurture a greater sense of obligation to each other are likely to keep their marriage intact and stable.

For this study, Korfil couples were asked to describe their understanding of commitment and

how they experience it in their marital life.

On commitment to spouse and family

[A] promise doesn’t need a contract. Commitment requires a contract. Meaning to say, I

signed some papers (marriage contract) – [that’s] commitment. I don’t need to marry her if I

just love her. I loved many people before but I didn’t have to marry them.

For another spouse, commitment means yielding to her husband during the initial stage of their

marriage:

I follow whatever he likes although at this stage I argue from time to time with him unlike

before.

On commitment to children and gender roles

Like a candle or light of my family; I will be the guide of the children.

I taught my eldest son Korean language. I wanted all of them to learn Korean language. I

regretted not teaching them Korean. I didn’t have time to teach. It’s my biggest regret.

On commitment to providing for the family

We both provide for the family. I think the responsibility should be the same for both.

High Level of Independence

The Korfil couples provided an impression of their high level of independence before marriage. In one

case, a Korean spouse’s family protested and initially rejected his decision to intermarry, but he still

proceeded with the marriage while recognizing the protestations of his Korean parents and siblings.

He said:

My parents’ consent was not necessary because I was of age, although my mother came to

meet my in-laws later. In fact, I didn’t consider them in my decision about marrying. I told

my parents about our wedding six months later. They were shocked when they heard about

my decision because I am the eldest grandson of the Head of our family If I marry a foreigner,

I cannot continue the tradition of the family to be homogenous… untainted (pure blooded).


67

Another Korean spouse said, “I didn’t care about what they think. I was an adult already,” while

another responded, “At my age, I am very capable.”

These Korean spouses would have returned to Korea had they listened to their parents. They were

able to decide on marrying interracially thanks to their strong will, emotional strength, and

independence. Their high-level of independence allowed them to withstand family pressure and the

fear of disharmony in interracial marriage.

I have a very strong perspective in life particularly regarding the privacy of my family. I have

mostly avoided my in-laws to avoid collision. I have never envisioned nor prepared myself to

live with my in laws. This is one big reason why we are here in the Philippines. I can’t live with

my in-laws. So avoiding them was my solution.

Love, Trust, Respect

As attested by the Korfil couples, love, trust and respect are key factors to a lasting marriage.

Responding to the question, “What do you feel is the key to your enduring marriage?”, a

spouse replied and described love the following way:

One kind of love, affection to each other. If we don’t love each other. Maybe we break up.

[For us, Koreans], the word ‘saranghye’ (love) is very difficult to say. I can easily tell [my wife]

“I need you” and it’s easy to say “I love you” in English.

It is love that brought us together in marriage. But love is not enough. Our love must be

tempered with respect and trust. So I think it’s not about which one has the greatest impact

on our marriage. Love, respect and trust should all be there in a happy and stable marriage.

Another Korean spouse had this to say of love in interracial marriage:

I loved [my wife] from the start.

If you meet some Filipino, and love her, don’t plan to bring her to Korea. How can [you say

you] love her if you take her to Korea to live and suffer there?

The couples also affirmed that importance of trust in love. As Filipino spouse said:

I loved [my wife] from the start.

If you meet some Filipino, and love her, don’t plan to bring her to Korea. How can [you say

you] love her if you take her to Korea to live and suffer there?

The couples also affirmed that importance of trust in love. As a Filipino spouse said:

If you’re jealous, it’s not real love if there is no trust. We stayed long in our marriage because

of trust. I think trust is first, and love is second. My husband was my first in everything.

Although he had several women before, I trusted him.

One spouse conveyed that love can be expressed discreetly: “You can feel love – you don’t have to

show it.”


68

I am not showy. We just feel it. He’s also not showy. We do it through jokes.

No need to show. Together we feel we love each other.

For a Filipino spouse, as for this study, trust must encompass financial trust in a marriage. For this

respondent, trust includes allowing the spouse to manage the finances, to inform him everything

first, especially if it involves a big amount.

He trusted me in everything. I managed the finances. I was a wise spender and budgeter. I

don’t spend without telling him. I tell him everything first especially if it’s big amount. He does

the same to me. He consults me first.

The couple who married under the Unification Church of Moon Sung Myung valued trust and

respect before love. For them marrying their spouse, who is “heaven-sent”, is not a choice but a role

that must be fulfilled. Love at the time of “blessing” (marriage) may not yet exist, but it can evolve

over time. Although they represent just one case, the couple from this union worked hard to maintain

a “God-centered marriage and family”.

Although marriages under the Unification Church “sparked more controversy and animosity

than harmony in Philippine-Korean relations” (Miralao, 2007), the marital experience of this Korfil

couple proved to be satisfying and enduring. According to Henneberger (2012), divorce in the

Unification Church only stands at 5 to 10%. Unlike marriages done through commercial matchmaking

agents, the couples from the Unification Church continue to receive counseling and support from

church members, which are essential in maintaining a healthy and strong union.

In my 26 years of marriage as a Korfil spouse, I have met and personally know Korfil couples

from the Unification Church both in Korea and the Philippines. To this day, the marriage of these

couples remain strong and resilient.

Never did we fight before. I will shut my mouth and agreed. I felt my husband respected me

because he asks my opinion and listens from my suggestions from time to time. From time to

time, he allowed me to send money to my family. Later, he took my brothers to work in Korea

so that I didn't need to send money.

Similar Values and Goals

Having similar values, especially concerning raising children and maintaining a family, are essential to

a lasting interracial marriage. Both parties should be able to discuss and agree on their goals as a family

early on. Responding to the question “What kind of marriage do you envision with your spouse in the

next 20 years?”, a spouse said:

We always talked about it. While our children are studying, we will spend for whatever they

need to finish their studies. When children have their own family, we build a house next to the

beach and retire there. They must consider us. Our retirement is the time we spend name for

ourselves.

Keep doing what we are still doing now, continue to earn money, and invest in our children’s

future businesses.


69

Interestingly, the Korfil couples claimed that they share family and work responsibilities, however their

responses show otherwise. The older Korean spouses kept their traditional patriarchal role as provider

and head of the family by entrusting and leaving the housekeeping and childrearing role to the Filipino

spouse. Some couples embraced a combination of traditional/patriarchal and non-traditional

practices. In this case, both spouses shared the responsibility for housekeeping and work even while

the Korean spouse occasionally assumed the more dominant role in the family particularly in business-

related matters.

Vital to a satisfying marital relationship is a shared understanding of individual roles, and the

Korfil couples have expressed non-conflicting expectations of each other’s roles in their marriage and

family life. Except for one case, the control and disbursement of household finances was left to the

care of the female spouse. In this financial partnership, couples have different preferences in

managing finances.

Of course my wife manages food and household budget. I manage the business

finances.

It is common for couples to experience some distress in their marital life. However, according

to studies (Bottazzi et al., 2017; Tili & Barker, 2015; Gaines & Agnew, 2003), the relationship of

interracial and interethnic couples, such as those of Korfil’s, are “less durable” and run the higher risk

of failure due to their exposure to multifaceted dynamics brought about by racial and cultural

differences. Furthermore, the relationship of an interracial couple is more difficult to maintain than

that of an intraracial couple because the former is confronted with more stress, dysfunction and

conflict that may lead to the dissolution of marriage.

In the example of one Korfil couple in this study, financial losses caused by the negligence of

one spouse and in-laws interference proved to be an extremely disrupting stress and tested the

strength of their marital relationship. Despite being married for more than 20 years and regardless of

their good coping skills, this Korfil couple emphasize that extreme financial difficulties can shake and

break a marriage. The Korfil couple was able to overcome the financial challenge and persevere their

marriage because of their strong commitment to their children and to each other.

In most cases in this study, the Korfil couples had a shared understanding of how Korean in-

laws and family traditions can be a challenge to some Filipino wives. Korean in-laws and family

traditions create an indefinite barrier and distance when the Korean spouse is dissuaded from residing

in the Philippines. By deciding to reside in the Philippines, the Korfil couples were able to live

separately from their Korean in-laws, thus avoiding potentially devastating marital conflict. Having the

Philippines as their home ground allowed the Filipino spouses to feel more relaxed because they

avoided being subjected to pressure from their in-laws.

Mental Shift, Global Perspective, Agreeableness and Tolerance

This study found that mental shift, increased openness, agreeableness, and having a global

perspective are favorable to the marriage of Korfil couples.


70

International travel and cultural immersion have allowed most Korfil couples in this study to have a

mental shift and global perspective. Additionally, the willingness to compromise and change their

citizenship is distinctive of the Korfil couples’ enduring marriage.

I have acquired Filipino citizenship already. I gave up my Korean citizenship long long ago to

give way to my children’s future. The existing prevailing law requires that my children who

hold dual citizenship must give up their Korean citizenship if they take the Philippine board

exam for doctors and lawyers. I had to give up my Korean citizenship as well.

I have once considered changing my citizenship from Korean to Filipino to ease trouble in doing

business but my wife stopped me for the sake of the kids.

According to one spouse, dealing with cultural differences does not necessarily mean changing one’s

culture. It is rather that one must have the willingness to adjust and compromise.

Give up something, take something. When you marry, you either reject half your background

or set it aside.

I never said anything negative about him to my parents or siblings. I always considered his

feelings and his happiness. I honored and respected his love of farming by letting him explore

his skills. He let me practice my profession and enjoy my career. I am trying to reciprocate

that be committing my retirement years with him in the farm.

The truth be told: I always initiated the talk [whenever we had a fight].

High Level of Cultural Sensitivity, High Level of Adaptability, Openness

The issue of racial or cultural differences was not discussed at length in the interviews. In fact,

the couples agreed on many issues to such a degree that three Filipino spouses gave the same

response to the same question asked of their Korean spouse.

By experiencing and accepting the realities of cultural difference, the Korfil couples were able

to turn a challenge into something positive for their relationship. Instead of maintaining a defensive

attitude towards preserving their culture, the couples in this study showed a high level of cultural

sensitivity. Being sensitive to the needs of one’s spouse in a marriage is a form of self-transcendence.

I am used to eating noodles and rice in Korea but settled for just rice in the Philippines for the

last 26 years. I give my nieces and nephews money at Christmas or New Year’s Day. I used my

hand to eat when I’m with in laws in the countryside.

Interracial marriages have a good chance of lasting when spouses are accepting and appreciative of

cultural difference and highly adaptive. According to Ju, et al.’s (2006) study, female spouses from

Southeast Asia are the “most adaptive” among five groups of foreign wives. Furthermore, wives

from Southeast Asia were tracked to have the highest reported rate of citizenship and employment

and the lowest rate of divorce-separation.

The Korfil couples in this study have developed their own approaches to acculturation. In one

case, for example, a Korean spouse has learned to enjoy cooking despite the expectation of his culture

that cooking for one’s husband is a wife’s job. Interestingly, all Korean spouses but one expressed that


71

they love to cook and were willing to cook for their family, while most of the Filipino wives were not

inclined to cook. Here are some of the responses of the Korean spouses:

More and more as I get older, I want to eat kimchi jjigae9 (kimchi soup). When you become 70

[you] will still eat kimchi chigue… Don’t ask your wife to forget to eat sinigang10.

I expected my wife to cook for me. [Luckily] my wife loves to cook. Sometimes I cook. I wake

up early and at 5 am I start to cook.

Areas of cultural difference include religion, childrearing, financial attitude and strategies,

acculturation, and gender-based traditions. Living together for a longer period of time allows a

married couple to be more open to different levels of adjustment. Cultural acceptance can be likened

to a form of rebirth. A new adjustment mechanism must be activated each time a significant event

takes place in a couples’ life. Each spouse must exert an effort to adjust to their differences in order

to maintain harmony in their relationship.

If I hadn’t adjusted, maybe we have divorced. I tell my husband from time to time, ‘if I was

not the one you married, maybe your married life would have not lasted like we did’.

Proficiency in Bilingual Communication

Cultural adjustment requires effective communication. A high level of communication

proficiency is essential in the acculturation process and affects the relationship quality of intermarried

couples. In Korea, 53% of Filipino spouses in Korfil marriages are proficient in both English and Korean

(Seol, 2006).

An interesting narration on how a Filipino woman migrated to marry a Korean farmer who

ends up using her knowledge of English to navigate power differences in Korean society. Cognitive

dissonance occurred for the people she interacted with because on an economic standpoint, the

couple was not as well off. However, her knowledge of English and the premium placed in such skill in

Korean society made her an outlier (Shin 2016).

At the time of the interview, the Korfil couples possessed a functional level of English

proficiency, which partially explains their easiness in communicating openly and effectively with each

other and in interacting within their social circles. The Korean spouses’ ability to communicate in

English and understand commonly-used Filipino words reduced the likelihood of being isolated and

misunderstood in the Philippines.

Communication during the early years of the Korfil couples’ marriage was challenging, but

they have become more proficient and comfortable communicating with each other. A Korean spouse

confessed that during the first two years the difficulty of language communication “goes down to the

endless abyss.” He had the eagerness to communicate despite his greater fear of being misunderstood.

Religious Practice and Social Network

9 ‘Kimchi jjigae’ or Kimchi stew is a well-loved Korean spicy to-go stew made with kimchi, pork belly and tofu. 10 ‘Sinigang’ is a Filipino stew known for its sour broth. There are several types of ‘sinigang’.


72

Religious influence is usually associated with marriage stability since religion and family

institutions emphasize similar values and depend on each other for reinforcing socialization. Call &

Heaton (1997) show how denominational affiliation is also as important in terms of religious influence

on marriage as family traditions, life-style choices, or social expediency rather than personal beliefs

are reinforced through it. Other scholars suggest that more than denominational affiliation,

participation in religious activities plays a greater role in marital stability (Call &Heaton, 1997).

Call and Heaton (1997) argue that those with no religious affiliation and couples with mixed-

faith are more likely to have their marriage dissolved. However, it must be considered that this study

has multiple variables controlled such as if the couples have been married longer, if they have not

been previously divorced, if they grew up in intact families, if they had a birth in the interval, and if

the wife had not married at a young age, in which case, these marriages prove to be more stable

Sharing the same religious orientation and practices tend to contribute towards strengthening

a Korfil marriage and their family life. Below are the Korfil couples’ responses to the question, “Do you

practice a religion as a whole family?”:

Yes – as a Catholic – he converted to Legion of Mary

I have never attended a Catholic church before; I attended a protestant group; even attended

a church in BCDA with children; going to church I think helped the family to be solid and it’s

good for the children

We go to Catholic church as a family. I wanted to go to a Korean church but nobody

understood… I had to sacrifice for my family.

I practice Catholicism [in the Philippines]. In Korea, I attended the Unification Church.

Bryant and Conger (1999) discuss the positive correlation between network support and

marital success. Relationship-specific support showed the strongest association with marital success.

Three factors affected the couple’s view of success through support, and these are: network support,

personal support, and affective implementation. With Bryant and Conger’s (1999) study, they posit

that the most effective factor was network support and the only one that is a significant predictor.

The first few years of marriage, couples have to merge their social worlds. There is a consolidation of

networks once one part of the pair comes to like the other’s and his benefits the relationship through

an expansion of networks. The authors also note that couples usually meet through friends, and in the

early years of marriage, mutual friendship and support through these networks eases the process for

new couples. Consequently, isolated couples tend to develop codependency and may depend more

on each other out of necessity such as those in small, isolated, rural towns (Bryant and Conger’s, 1999).

In responding to the question “Are you an active member of a multicultural group in the

Philippines?”, the Korfil couples responded:

No. But I have Korean friends in the Philippines.

We are active members of a Korean Filipino church here.


73

IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

The findings of this study highlight the various factors that impact the longevity of interracial

marriage in the case of five Korfil couples. As have been discussed, the factors in the satisfying and

enduring marriage of the five Korfil couples are the following: later first marriage, high level of

independence, similar values and goals, courtship, commitment, love, trust and respect, similar

religious beliefs, high level of education, bilingual proficiency; middle-class household income and a

joint bank account; high level of cultural sensitivity and high level of adaptability; tolerance and having

a global perspective.

While not able to speak for all interracial marriages and relationships, the findings of this study

show that a satisfying and enduring marriage is essential to the well-being of the Korfil couples and

their family life. The findings reinforce several standing theories on long-lasting interracial marriage

(Field & Weishaus, 1984; Fenell, 1993; Kaslow, Hanson, & Lundblad, 1994) which affirm the

significance of non-cohabitation, higher income, positive support from family and social networks,

commonality in belief systems, willingness to adapt, and respecting each other’s personality and

culture.

The VSA model as used in this study can be refined to provide assessment and analysis of data

and responses outside a series of linear relationships as shown in the diagram (see Figure 1).

Integrating the results with the VSA model, one can only suggest that interracial couples must always

seek to familiarize themselves with each other’s vulnerabilities and control the internal and external

stressors that can affect the adaptive process of each person because doing so will enable these

marriages to avoid marital conflict - thus increasing marital quality and stability.

As this study is only able to study the cases of five Korfil couples, further studies on Korfil

marriages can seek to gather more data by increasing the sample size. Interview can also be conducted

for married Korfil couples residing in Korea and other countries to assess variations in interracial

marriages.

This study suggests that understanding and supporting Korfil couples can play a crucial role in

the realization of South Korea’s “Grand Plan”, which aims for the “social integration of foreign wives

and an attainment of a multicultural society”.11 Korfil couples in a satisfying and enduring marriage

can contribute in the makings of a community that is open, diverse, and dynamic.

This study carries important policy implications that may significantly contribute towards

meaningful integration of marriage migrants. Two decades ago, while Korea was experiencing rapid

socio-cultural change through the Korean wave or “Hallyu” and the arrival of marriage migrants, the

Philippines was becoming a melting pot with the influx of Korean students as well as American and

Japanese migrants. Koreans adapted easily to the foreigner-friendly Philippines.

11 The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family is the major coordinating department in implementing the ‘Grand

Plan’ of April 26, 2006 which includes seven policies: 1) Regulation of international marriage agencies and

protection of foreign wives before entry to Korea; 2) Support for victims of domestic violence; 3) Support and

orientation for newly arrived foreign wives; 4) Support for Children of international marriages in schools; 5) Providing

social welfare to foreign wives; 6) Raising social awareness of multicultural issues; and 7) Making a comprehensive

project


74

But despite the creation of measures and programs under the banner of multiculturalism in

Korea and the Philippines, marriage migrants and their families continue to face discrimination,

stereotyping, and challenges. Establishing new policies and refining existing ones must have the

objective of encouraging citizens and marriage migrants to coexist harmoniously. Interracial marriage

can only positively flourish if it is supported by beneficial integrative policies and measures.

Below are key policy recommendations of this study:

1. Establish a multicultural school in the Philippines where Korfil families from Korea can be

immersed in Filipino culture and gain proficiency in Filipino and English. A multicultural school can

help biracial children avoid the pressure and stress of attending “cram-schools” (hagwon) in order

to keep up with Korea’s competitive school environments. This multicultural school can also host

other multicultural families in Korea as well as Korean families with children who are open to

acculturation.

2. Re-establish and strengthen a Korean-Filipino family association to serve the interests of Korfil

couples and their family. Interracial couples face numerous adversities and have different lived

experiences inside and outside of their homes. A Korfil family association can help foster

meaningful connections and community life, and it can serve as a safe, empowering haven in

which Korfil families can gain understanding, draw inspiration, seek support, and campaign for

advocacies.

2.1. The Korean government, through the Korean embassy, could be supportive

partner of a Korfil family association to help strengthen the union of Korfil couples residing

in the Philippines.

2.2 The Korfil family association can be accredited and approved by the Korean

government to help in the orientation and interview of Korean spouses and marriage

migrants applying for a Korean visa.

3. The Commission on Filipino Overseas’ role should be expanded from mainly providing orientation

to marriage migrants. Registering the names of marriage migrants is not enough, and it is

recommended that the CFO provide continual assistance by linking the multicultural families to

support networks of Korfil marriage migrants in Korea and the Philippines among others.

4. Because financial stability has a significant influence on marital satisfaction, social networks and

non-government entities can develop an action-oriented financial education program to provide

Korfil couples and their families with knowledge in financial management.

Interracial marriage is at once a private and social matter considering the migrant and citizenship

issues at stake. Of the laws and policies concerning Korfil couples, the most relevant that needs

revision in South Korea is the Revised Evaluation Criteria for F-6 Visa Application (Revised F-6). This


75

law largely affects brides from developing countries. Korfil couples who intermarried before the

revised F-6 was passed in 2014 had easier time obtaining marriage migrant visa to South Korea. With

the passage and implementation of this law, the government is being criticized for violating the

constitutional right of its citizens to marry the partner of their choice. The said policy is viewed as

discriminatory and unfair because it has made it harder for Koreans to marry citizens of developing

countries.12 Women from developing countries are expected to contribute to Korea’s “reproductive

crisis” (Kim and Kilkey, 2017) while it is easier and quicker for women from developed countries to

intermarry with a Korean citizen. It would be better for Korean laws to support rather than restrict the

interracial marriage of its citizens. Delaying the issuance of marriage visa or blocking the entry of

marriage migrants to Korea for failing to pass the basic Korean language test or failing to prove

financial capability to support a new family is unfavorable towards Korfil couples and devastating for

Filipino female spouses who have more to lose. A less stressful beginning makes for a good and happy

married life.

V. WORKS CITED

⚫ Addo FR, Sassler S. Financial Arrangements and Relationship Quality in Low-Income Couples. Fam Relat.

2010;59(4):408–423.

⚫ Bottazzi, Laura and Manasse, Paolo and See, Sarah Grace, Better Wed Over the Mixen Than Over the

Moor? Break-Ups of Inter-Ethnic Marriages in Italy (2017). Working Paper.

⚫ Brines, J. & Joyner, K. (1999). The Ties That Bind Principles of Cohesion in Cohabitation and Marriage.

American Sociological Review, 64 (3): 333-355.

⚫ Bryant, C. & Conger, R. (1999), Marital Success and Domains of Social Support in Long-Term Relationships:

Does the Influence of Network Members Ever End? Journal of Marriage and Family, 61 (2): 437-450.

⚫ Call, V. & Heaton, T. (1997). Religious Influence on Marital Stability. Journal for the Scientific Study of

Religion, 36(3): 382-392.

⚫ Caspi, A., Roberts, B. W., & Shiner, R. L. (2005). Personality Development: Stability and Change. Annual

Review Of Psychology, 56, 453–484.

⚫ Fenell, D.L. (1993). Characteristics Of Long-Term Marriages. Journal Of Mental Health Counseling, 15, 446-

460.

⚫ Field, D., & Weishaus, S. (1984). Marriage Over Half A Century: A Longitudinal Study. The Gerontologist,

24, 269-273.

⚫ Gaines, S. R. & Agnew, C. R. (2003). Relationship maintenance in intercultural couples: An

interdependence analysis. In D.J. Canary & M. Dainton (Eds.), Maintaining Relationships Through

Communication: Relational, Contextual, and Cultural Variations (pp. 231-276). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence

Eribaum.

⚫ N. Garbinsky, Emily & Gladstone, Joe. (2018). The Consumption Consequences of Couples Pooling

Finances. Journal of Consumer Psychology. 10.1002/jcpy.1083.

⚫ Henneberger, Melinda. A look at life after mass marriage; For 2,075 couples (Give or Take 200), 10 years

together, thanks to Sun Myung Moon, December 22, 1992. Accessed online at

12 Note that “if a visa application is disapproved after the marriage, there can be disadvantages such as the marriage migrant being unable to enter Korea. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea/ http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us

http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/us


76

https://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/22/nyregion/look-life-after-mass-marriage-for-2075-couples-give-

take-200-10-years-together.html on August 11, 2019.

⚫ Hymowitz, K. et. al. (2013). Knot Yet: The benefits and Costs of Delayed Marriage in America. The National

Marriage Project, pp 3-33.

⚫ Josefsson, Kim & Jokela, Markus & Cloninger, Robert & Hintsanen, Mirka & Salo, Johanna & Hintsa, Taina

& Pulkki-Råback, Laura & Keltikangas-Järvinen, Liisa. (2013). Maturity And Change In Personality:

Developmental Trends Of Temperament And Character In Adulthood. Development And Psychopathology.

25. 713-27.

⚫ Ju Lee, Yean & Seol, Dong-Hoon & Cho, Sung-Nam. (2006). International Marriages In South Korea: The

Significance Of Nationality And Ethnicity. Journal of Population Research. 23. 165-182.

⚫ Karney, B. R., & Bradbury, T. N. (1995). The Longitudinal Course Of Marital Quality And Stability: A Review

Of Theory, Methods, And Research. Psychological Bulletin, 118(1), 3-34.

⚫ Kaslow, F.W., Hansson, K., & Lundblad, A.M. (1994). Long-term marriages in Sweden and some

comparisons with similar couples in the United States. Contemporary Family Therapy, 16, 521-537.

⚫ Kim, G. and Kilkey, M. orcid.org/0000-0002-0842-7290 (2017) Marriage Migration Policy in South Korea:

Social Investment beyond the Nation State. International Migration, p. 12.

⚫ Lucas, R. E., & Donnellan, M. B. (2011). Personality Development Across The Life Span: Longitudinal

Analyses With A National Sample From Germany. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 847–

861.

⚫ Kim Hyun Mee (2016) Marriage As A Pilgrimage To The Fatherland: The Case Of Japanese Women In The

Unification Church, Asian Journal of Women's Studies, 22:1, 16-34

⚫ Kim, J., Yang, S. B., & Torneo, A. (2014). Marriage Immigration and Multicultural Families: Public Policies

and Their Implications for the Philippines and South Korea. Asian Politics & Policy, 6(1): 97-119.

⚫ Lehrer, E. (2006). Age At Marriage And Marital Instability: Revisiting The Becker-Landes-Michael

Hypothesis. J. Popul. Econ. pp. 463-484.

⚫ Miralao, V. (2007). Understanding the Korean Diaspora in the Philippines, in Miralao, V.A; Makil, L.P.,

Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines, Philippine Social Science Council, pp. 40-57.

⚫ Omelaniuk, I. (2005). Gender, Poverty Reduction and Migration. World Bank, accessed online at http://

siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ Gender.pdf on August 14, 2019.

⚫ Schoebi, Dominik & R Karney, Benjamin & Bradbury, Thomas. (2011). Stability and Change in the First 10

Years of Marriage: Does Commitment Confer Benefits Beyond the Effects of Satisfaction?. Journal of

personality and social psychology. 102. 729-42.

⚫ Seol, Dong-Hoon. (2006). Women Marriage Immigrants in Korea: Immigration Process and Adaptation.

Asia-Pacific Forum. 33.

⚫ Shin, J. (2016). Language choices and symbolic power in intercultural communication: A case study of a

multilingual, immigrant Filipino woman in South Korea. Applied Linguistics Review, pp. 1-22.

⚫ Tili, T. & Barker, G. (2015). Communication in Intercultural Marriages: Managing Cultural Differences and

Conflicts. Southern Communication Journal, 80(3): 189-210.

⚫ Treas, Judith (1993). Money in the Bank: Transaction Costs and the Economic Organization of Marriage,

American Sociological Review 58.

⚫ Verhofstadt, L.L., Buysse, A., Devoldre, I. and De Corte, K., 2007. The Influence of Personal Characteristics

and Relationship Properties on Marital Support. Psychologica Belgica, 47(3), pp.195–217.


77

A Brotherhood Kept Alive: Examining Korean

Communities’ Social Involvement in the Philippines and

its Potential Role in Institutionalizing National Memory (The Case of the PEFTOK War Veterans in the Philippines)

Oliver John C. Quintana

Ateneo de Manila University

I. Introduction

In a time where there is a global resurgence of nationalism and national pride, there is a great

need to replenish our country’s wellspring of memory as a nation. Recently, there is a recurring

interest in history and Philippine heroes, especially with the release of semi-autobiographical movies

in Philippine mainstream cinema featuring national heroes such as Heneral Luna, Goyo, and life during

the tumultuous ‘70s and ‘80s, as portrayed in the film Liway. In many universities, protest theater

productions such as Dekada ’70, Desaparesidos and The Kundiman Party are being staged for the

public’s consumption.

Moreover, the controversial burial of former dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Libingan ng

mga Bayani has rekindled questions about the importance of national memory and the burning

question of what and who a hero is within the national narrative. This, in turn, begs the question: Are

Filipinos honoring the right heroes?

Indeed, the politics of heritage preservation and promotion has become a pressing issue in

many socio-political circles. And the government’s lack of effort in institutionalizing national memory

and consciousness. For instance, more than 30 years after the 1987 EDSA Revolution, we still do not

have a museum to commemorate the events during one of the darkest periods in Philippine history,

the Marcos dictatorship.

Recently, we have seen a growing interest in hallyu among young Filipinos – especially

teenagers. This makes it an opportune time to introduce this unfamiliar episode in Philippine and

Korean history.

II. The Korean War

It is an unknown fact for many Filipinos that, when the Korean War broke out on June 25,

1950, the Philippines was the first Asian country and the third UN member state to send contingent

forces to South Korea.

It is important to take note that Filipino General Carlos Romulo, was the president of the UN

General Assembly when the Korean War broke out in 1950. and he staunchly advocated the

international defense of South Korea. Under the leadership of then President Elpidio Quirino, the

Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK) was formed. It was composed of five battalion

combat teams or BCTs: 10th (The Fighting Tenth), 20th (The Leaders), 19th (The Bloodhounds), 14th (The

Avengers), and 2nd (The Black Lions), the 10th BCT being the first one to be deployed.


78

According to the book written by Brig. Gen. Victorino Azada:

“The press coverage of the 10th was so extensive that Filipinos knew that the oldest

soldier in the battalion was 54 years old while the youngest was just 18. Daily

newspapers such as the The Manila Times, The Evening News and The Philippine

Herald have assigned correspondents to cover the battalion’s exploits in Korea. At

9:00 AM on 2 September [1950], 60,000 Filipinos converged at the Rizal Memorial

Stadium in Manila to watch the 10th BCT parade prior to its departure for Korea on

September 16.”

“’Today, we begin to write a wonderful page in our history,” said President Quirino.

“Many of you have fought on our own soil to secure our freedom. You now go forth

to a foreign land to fight for the preservation of that freedom.”

Right then and there, it was clear: the send-off was a national event, a powerful gesture from a country

which was still recovering from the destruction brought about by the horrors of the Second World

War.

A total of five Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) were deployed over a span of five years (from

19 September 1950 to 13 May 1955), with the first contingent arriving in Busan on September 19,

1950. Enduring the rough terrain, harsh weather conditions and homesickness, 7,420 Filipino soldiers

fought bravely on foreign soil.

III. The Challenge of Institutionalizing Memory

One cannot deny how important events such as the participation of the Philippines in the

Korean War are slowly being forgotten, slipping outside of the boundaries of national memory. This

slow, painful process of heritage deterioration is continually being felt up to this very day. For instance,

how does the present, young generation participate in reflecting about a history that seems to

disconnect them from the national narrative that is taught in school?

When Benedict Anderson refers to the nation as being an “imagined political community,” he

inevitably opens up a whole range of questions about how unfamiliar (if not, forgotten) episodes in

Philippine history are able to enter into the stream of national consciousness and identify with rest of

the polity. In the case of Filipino veterans who took part in the Korean War, the struggle to remain

relevant in this age of globalization becomes alarmingly crucial.

As the last few remaining veterans face the sunset of their lives, the challenge of passing on

their stories and immortalizing their heroic contribution to Korea’s freedom and independence

become more and more difficult. Given this situation, it becomes crucial then to ask: How is this

important piece of ‘Philippine history’ reproduced in the everyday lives of Filipinos? How is heritage

preserved and its lessons passed on to the future generations? What are the challenges of

institutionalizing memory in Philippine society? Who can be our partners in pushing forth this

advocacy?


79

First published in 1983, the second chapter of Anderson’s groundbreaking book, Imagined

Communities, opens with the writer’s observation of how the tomb of the unknown soldier, whether

it contains “identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls” are “saturated with ghostly national

imaginings.” He points out how, “we are all aware of the contingency and ineluctability of our

particular genetic heritage, our gender, our life- era, our physical capabilities, our mother-tongue, and

so forth.”

Of course, Anderson’s main thesis focused on the birth of the idea of a nation – but what is

quite interesting is how he mentions in the footnote some lines from Douglas MacArthur’s speech

when he addressed the US Military Academy in 1962. It reads: “My estimate of [the American man-

at-arms] was formed on the battlefield many, many years ago, and has never changed. I regarded him

then, as I regard him now, as one of the world's noblest figures; not only as one of the finest military

characters, but also as one of the most stainless... He belongs to history as furnishing one of the

greatest examples of successful patriotism. He belongs to posterity as the instructor of future

generations in the principles of liberty and freedom. He belongs to the present, to us, by his virtues

and his achievements.”

He then proceeds by proposing how it may be actually, “useful to begin a consideration of the

cultural roots of nationalism with death” and how the dawn of religious thought required “a secular

transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning.” I believe these assertions are

quite significant in the sense that they situate the creation of a nationalist imagining from a necessity

to cultivate memory and past experiences to form one, strong coherent nation.

Moving on further, when Ernest Gellner emphasized the significance of partaking in a shared

culture in defining a nation, he also inadvertently recognized how systems of ideas, signs, and ways of

behaving contribute to the nation’s very subsistence. Similarly, in his introduction to The Invention of

Tradition, Eric Hobsbawm emphasized how invented traditions function (1) to establish or symbolize

social cohesion or the membership of groups, (2) to legitimize institutions, status or relations of

authority, and (3) to socialize and inculcate beliefs, value systems and conventions of behavior.

Defined as a “set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a

ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition,

which automatically implies continuity with the past,” ‘invented traditions’ have undoubtedly become

valuable and indispensible components in fostering the transition of the nation from being an

‘imagined community’ to an active political machinery of the state.

However, even Hobsbawm acknowledges this tendency of “invented traditions” to be actual

sites of struggle because they “use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion.”

In fact, he gives the example of how the writing of history books exemplifies this claim. Using the

example of James Connolly’s Labour in Irish History, he points out how:

The element of invention is particularly clear here, since the history which became

part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of nation, state or movement is not

what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected,

written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those whose function it is to

do so.

Finally, in her book Uses of Heritage, Laurajane Smith explores how the idea of heritage is “not

so much as a ‘thing’, but as a cultural and social process, which engages with acts of remembering that

work to create ways to understand and engage with the present.” Moving away from the usual idea

of heritage as tangible pieces of history – such as old buildings, artefacts, and places of interest – she


80

points out how the passing on and the receiving of memories helps us to “make sense of and

understand not only who we ‘are’, but also who we want to be.”

Using these ideas as starting points, I would like to proceed in examining the challenges of

institutionalizing memory and preserving heritage through contemporary reproductions of the

“Korean War” in Philippine society – specifically through the involvement of the Korean government,

and eventually, of local Korean communities and organizations based in the country.

IV. Images of the Korean War in the Philippines

Since the early 1950s, there have been several ways that the Filipinos’ participation in the Korean War

have been presented:

• National Hero and Former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. volunteered as a war correspondent at the

age of 17. His image is seen at the back of the old 500-peso bill. Beside his picture is one of his

articles entitled “First Cavalry Knifes Through 38th Parallel.”

• The Marikorea Monument is the Philippines' first structure honoring the 7,000 Filipino soldiers who

helped defend South Korea in the Korean War. It was build in 2005. Measuring about 26 feet tall,

the monument is crowned by an eternal flame atop a granite pylon. It is located in Evolution Park,

Marikina City. The word “Marikorea” was coined from the words Marikina and Korea. Before being

deployed to Korea, all five PEFTOK BCTs trained extensively for mountain combat in Marikina,

whose rolling hills and rugged terrain resembled that of Korea. Castro said the Marikorea

Monument filled a decades-old yearning by Korean War veterans for a monument to call their own.

• There is a second monument (Korea Memorial Pylon) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani (Heroes’

Cemetery) in Taguig City.

• According to Former PVAI President, BGen Bienvenido Castro, these two monuments filled a

decades-old yearning by Korean War veterans for a monument to call their own.

• The Philippine Embassy in Korea commemorates the sacrifices of Filipino soldiers every September

at the Philippine Monument in Goyang City. Two forgotten memorials which were erected in the

1960s (one by the War Allies Association) to honor their courage and bravery during the Battle of

Yultong, were accidentally discovered in 2008.

• On August 4, 2000, Presidential Proclamation 535 was signed declaring September 7 as “Korean

War Veterans Memorial Day.”

• The is immortalized in several feature films and documenteries:

o 10th Battalion sa 38th Parallel (1951), Korea was directed by Gerardo de Leon

o Korea (1952) was directed by Lamberto V. Avellana with screenplay by Benigno Aquino, Jr.

o Batalyon Pilipino sa Korea (1954) was directed by Carlos Vander Tolosa.

o Lagablab sa Silangan (Sunset Over Korea) (1956) was directed by Constancio T. Villamar.

o The Forgotten War (2009) tells about Filipinos who fought the battle of Yultong Bridge by Carlo

Cruz (53 years after)

• However, there still a clear absence or not a mention of the Philippines’ role in the Korean War in

local textbooks and history lessons.


81

V. The PEFTOK Veterans Association, Inc. (PVAI)

Historical beginnings

• Conceived in 1955 by top officers of the five expeditionary forces

• 23 July 1959: officially registered with Securities and Exchange Commission

• A initial total membership of 7,500 war veterans

• From 1955 to 1970, PVAI had few notable activities because a large majority of the members

were still in active service and assigned to distant places

Aims and objectives

• The aims and objectives of PVAI are four-fold, namely:

o uplift through self-reliance the economic well-being of all PEFTOK Veterans, their widows,

orphans and dependents;

o preserve and maintain the scholarship program for the sons and daughters of PEFTOK

Veterans and the ABULOYAN (burial assistance) for the Veterans;

o to further improve the already existing close relationship between the Filipino and Korean

Veterans and the Korean Community in the Philippines; and

o in general, to do such acts and deeds and to undertake such activities not otherwise

prohibited by law for the accomplishment of the aims and objectives for which the PVAI has

been organized.

A struggle for a home

• With the cooperation of then Commanding General of the Army, Maj. General Zagala, the

association was able to establish a home for PEFTOK

o a lot in Fort Bonifacio was chosen and acquired by PVAI for the PEFTOK Veterans Center

o AFP Chief of Staff General Espino gave the permit to put up a national headquarters on 26

September 1972 (interestingly, 5 days after Marcos’ proclamation of Martial Law)

o a Php 1-million PEFTOK Veterans Complex was inaugurated on 25 June 1975 inaugurated;

Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile attended as guest speaker

o unfortunately, the building was included in the government sale of a portion of the Fort

Bonifacio military reservation to Ayala Land Investments for property development

o for many years, the veterans had no home they can be proud of and call their own; remained

homeless, stayed in a small building inside the Camp Aguinaldo

• Inauguration of the PEFTOK – Korean War Memorial Hall

o 29 March 2012: President Benigno S. Aquino III led the unveiling of a dedication marker

together with former President Fidel V. Ramos who is a Korean War veteran himself, Korean

Ambassador to the Philippines Hye Min Lee, Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, Korean

Minister Park Sung Choon of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, and United

Korean Community Association in the Philippines President Lee Won Joo

o the place “serves as an enduring symbol of the great and extraordinary friendship between

the Philippines and Korea for more than sixty years and is a reminder of a shining moment

in both countries’ history, as well as the special bonds that have tied the fate of the two

countries”


82

VI. Remembering PEFTOK

Programs and annual commemorations

• Scholarship program

o Korean government funded a Scholarship Program for the dependents of the Filipino

Korean War Veterans

o May 1986: through Korean Foreign Minister Lee Won Kyung, the government of the

Republic of Korea donated an initial amount of US$ 100,000.00 to PVAI to subsidize

the scholarship of the descendants of veterans.

o A scholarship committee was formed to evaluate the performance of grantees at the

end of each academic year. Special cash awards are given during presentation

ceremonies held during the annual celebration of the Korean War Anniversary on June

25.

• ‘Revisit Korea’ Program

o Started in 1975, when the Korean Veterans Association (MPVA) and the Korea

National Tourism Corporation invited PEFTOK Veterans back to Korea to express

gratitude and build their pride by allowing them to witness how Korea enjoys peace

and prosperity thanks to their noble sacrifices and dedication.

o The trip includes a visit to the Seoul National Cemetery, the War Memorial,

Panmunjom (the site of armistice negotiations) and battle sites relevant to each

participating nation, wreath-laying and remembrance ceremonies. Official receptions

and awards banquets are also held.

• Commemorations

o Battle of Yultong Day – first celebrated on 22 April 1980. Consists of wreath laying

ceremony at the PEFTOK Memorial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

o Korean War Veterans of the Philippines Memorial Day – first celebrated on 07 September

2000

Problems

• Now that there are only a few veterans who are still alive, how will PVAI move forward as an organization?

• As descendants take over its leadership, how will PVAI continue its mandate of immortalizing the legacy of Filipino heroism in the Korean War?

• In the cusp of an impending Korean unification, how should Filipino Korean War veterans be remembered?

• What can be the role of local Korean communities and organizatios in preserving the veterans organization, and in the long run – in institutionalizing national memory?

A new era for PVAI

• The organization is now moving forward and changing its course.

• Earlier this year, PVAI moved its offices in the same building as the Korean War Memorial Hall.

• Changes in the composition of the Board of Directors – a quick look at the 15-member board would reveal that descendants are now taking over the positions once held by their fathers. 9 out of the 15 members are descendants.


83

• When I interviewed the current Vice President, Mr. Roy Amparo – he said that the organization has overlooked the need to provide some sort of transitory provisions. Our veterans are one by one passing on, and the organization has no choice but to be left with nothing but memories that are passed down.

• There is a growing need to spread awareness about the Korean War: a good starting point would be the museum and the holding of campus tours together where veterans can speak about their experiences during the war.

• Another possible option is to collaborate and touch base with local Korean communities and organizations to support the programs and initiatives of PEFTOK.

VII. Korean Communities’ Social Involvement in PEKTOK

VIII. Conclusion

• These recurring limited depictions of the Korean War in Philippine history– prove that there is still much to be done in order to immortalize its memory within a broader community of belonging.

• First, there is a clear need to reconfigure and restate the objectives of the organization to fully serve as a platform to celebrate and commemorate the heroic sacrifices of Filipinos in the Korean War.

• The task of the Korean government and PVAI now is not just to provide financial support, but also educate a nation about the heroism of Filipino war veterans in Korea. Second, we need to document the stories and interview the last few remaining veterans in order to preserve the institutional memory of the organization. Descendants play an important role in spearheading this movement. Third, education is still the best entry point and platform in preserving the memory of this important event in Philippine history. Most important of all, local Korean communities and organizations in the country play an indispensable role both in reaffirming the deep brotherly ties between Filipinos and Koreans, and in contributing to the survival of the veterans organization.


84

Status of Bilateral Trade between

the Republic of Korea and the Philippines

Dani Rose C. Salazar, Ph.D. University of the Philippines Diliman

1. Introduction

According to the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, the bilateral relations between the

Philippines and the Republic of Korea (ROK) started in 1949.1 The Philippines was the fifth country to

recognize the ROK. As of 2019, the two countries had maintained 70 years of friendly ties. During

these times, the friendship between the two countries was strengthened when the Philippines sent

soldiers to aid ROK during the Korean war.

Trades between the two parties were well documented. The Korean International Trade

Association (www.kita.org) reported intercountry trade between South Korea the Philippines as far

back to 1965. The reports included the yearly value of import and export trades between the two

nations as well as disaggregation of those values into commodity categories.

This study aimed to examine the status of the bilateral trade relationship between South Korea

and the Philippines. Part of the intention of this analysis is to report the kinds of products that the

two countries exchanged. Primarily, data from UN Comtrade and KITA were analyzed to understand

the trade between these two countries. Based on these, potentials for future trades were identified.

This paper was organized as follows: Section 2 described the overall trade structure of each

country. Section 3 investigated the trade between South Korea and the Philippines. Section 4

contained the conclusions of the study.

2. International trade structure

Philippines

Similar to other developing countries, the Philippines consistently posted negative trade balances.

In 2017, the country’s imports were about 1.5 times the value of its exports. However, the country’s

exports grew at a slightly faster rate than its imports. Trade, as a percentage of GDP, was 71.83%.2

China, Japan, the United States and South Korea were the Philippines’ most important trading partners.

1 https://seoulpe.dfa.gov.ph/116-phl-korean-relations/263-philippine-korean-relations 2 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2017

http://www.kita.org/

https://seoulpe.dfa.gov.ph/116-phl-korean-relations/263-philippine-korean-relations

https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2017


85

Figure 1: The Philippines’ Balance of Trade (Y- Axis in USD Billions)

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank

In 2017, the Philippines exported roughly USD 68.7 Billion to various countries. The Philippines

exported 2,883 products.3 The lion share of the country’s export at 62.9% were classified as capital

goods (Figure 2). The remainder at 17.6%, 12.8% and 6.8% were consumer goods, intermediate goods

and raw materials, respectively.4

Figure 2: Composition of Philippines’ Exports Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank

Philippine exports grew at an average rate of 5.9% from 1996 to 2017 (Figure 3). The growth of

exports in capital goods product outpaced the other product category at 7%. The sale of consumer

3 World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)

https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2017#section2 4 Ibid.

63%17%

13%7%

Capital goods Consumer goods Intermediate goods Raw materials

-

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17

Import Export

https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2017#section2


86

goods to the world, while increasing, was at a slow rate of only 3%. The other product categories, raw

materials and intermediate goods rose faster than the average at 6.9% and 6.5%., respectively.

Figure 3: Growth Rate of Philippines’ Exports (Y Axis are in USD Millions)


As reported by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) of the World Bank, the Philippines had

209 export partners. The country’s 2017 Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) Market Concentration Index was

0.11.5 A country gets closer to a perfectly diversified export portfolio as the index approaches zero.

The Philippines’ low HH Market Concentration Index indicated that the country’s exports were

diversified over its trading partners. Hence, the Philippines had low dependency on any particular

trading partner.6

Japan was the Philippines’ most important export market since 2010 when it overtook the US as

the Philippines’ number one market. In 2017, 16% of the Philippines’ export went to Japan. The other

top export partners of the Philippines are the United States, Hong Kong SAR, and China. South Korea

jumped three places to rank 5th among the Philippines’ top export partners in 2017.

Country Export Value Export Share

Japan 10.9 15.8%

United States 9.7 14.1%

Hong Kong SAR 9.0 13.1%

China 8.0 11.7%

South Korea 4.3 6.3%

Table 1: The Philippines’ top export markets (In USD Billions)

5 Ibid. 6 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/TradeIndicatorsHelp/TradeOutcomes_Help.htm

-

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

80.00

Capital goods Consumer goods Intermediate goods

Raw materials All Products

http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/TradeIndicatorsHelp/TradeOutcomes_Help.htm


87


On the other hand, the Philippines’ imports from the world were valued at USD 101.9 Billion in

2017. 4,350 products were imported from various countries. Capital goods were the largest share of

imports at 40.9%. Consumer goods drew a larger share of the imports at 26.9%. Intermediate goods

and raw materials were 20.7% and 11.5%, respectively (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Composition of Philippines’ Imports


Philippine imports grew at an average rate of 5.3% from 1996 to 2017 (Figure 5). While the other

product categories posted lower than average growth rates, consumer goods entering the Philippines

rose at an annual compounded rate of 8.8%. This was consistent with the country’s rising disposable

income and the country’s consumption economy.

41%

27%

21%

11%



88

Figure 5: Growth Rate of Philippines’ Imports (Y Axis are in USD Billions) Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank

The Philippines had 193 import partners in 2017.7 China overtook Japan and the United States as

the Philippines’ most important import partner. 18% of the Philippines’ imports were purchased from

China (Table 2). South Korea, with increasing sales to the Philippines, moved up to be the country’s

third most important import partner by 2017.

Country Import Value Import Share

China 18,478 18.1%

Japan 11,798 11.6%

South Korea 8,820 8.7%

United States 8,017 8.2%

Thailand 7,065 6.9%

Table 2: The Philippines’ top import market (In USD Thousands)


Republic of Korea

The economic success of South Korea was hailed as one of the East Asian miracle.8 The country was a

net importer from 1965 to 1979, most of the 1980s and early half of the 1990s (Figure 6). In 1997,

7 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2017 8 Birdsall, Nancy M.; Campos, Jose Edgardo L.; Kim, Chang-Shik; Corden, W. Max; MacDonald, Lawrence [editor];

Pack, Howard; Page, John; Sabor, Richard; Stiglitz, Joseph E.. 1993. The East Asian miracle : economic growth and public policy : Main report (English). A World Bank policy research report. New York, New York : Oxford University Press. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/Main-report

-

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

20

13

20

14

20

15

20

16

20

17



https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2017


89

trade balance of USD 30 Million was reported. In 2017, South Korea posted its largest trade balance

at USD 95 Million.

Figure 6: South Korea Balance of Trade (Y-Axis in USD Billions)

Source: Korean International Trade Association (www.kita.org)

In 2017, South Korea posted exports of USD 573.7 Billion. 4,284 products were exported. At 55%

of export volume, capital goods composed majority of the country’s sales to the world (Figure 7).

Exports of intermediate and consumer goods were roughly at equal standing at 22% - 23% of export

volume. A small portion of the country’s export to the world were classified as raw materials.

Figure 7: Composition of South Korea’s Exports Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank

South Korea’s sales to various countries grew at an annual rate of 7.33% (Figure 8). The growth

in the export of capital goods exceeded the average at 8.8%. Intermediate and consumer goods grew

at 6%. The sale of raw materials lagged behind the other categories at growth rate of only 2.9%.

-

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Export Import

55%

22%

23%0%

Capital goods

Consumer goods

Intermediate goods

Raw materials


90

Figure 8: Growth Rate of South Korea’s Exports (Y-Axis in USD Billions)


South Korea had 223 export partners. China was South Korea’s biggest export market (Table 3).

The volume of export with China, at USD 142 Billion was more than double the country’s export to

the US, its second largest trading partner. At export volume of USD 10.6 Billion, the Philippines was

South Korea’s 11th biggest export partner.

Country Export Value Export Share

China 142.1 24.8%


Vietnam 47.8 8.3%

Hongkong SAR 39.1 6.8%

Japan 26.8 4.7%

Table 3: South Korea’s top export markets (In USD Billions)


In 2017, South Korea posted imports of USD 478.5 Billion. A total of 4,487 products were imported

from the country’s partners. South Korea’s import structure was very different from that of its export

(Figure 8). In contrast to the low export share of raw materials, it was observed that a significant share

of goods coming into the country were classified as raw materials. At 24% of import value, the share

of raw materials was evidence that South Korea sourced the inputs to its manufacturing process from

outside its border and export the intermediate and final goods to the world.

-

100.00

200.00

300.00

400.00

500.00

600.00

700.00

20

17

20

16

20

15

20

14

20

13

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

08

20

07

20

06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

01

20

00

19

99

19

98

19

97

19

96




91

Figure 8: Composition of South Korea’s Exports Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank

From 1996 to 2017, South Korea’s imports grew at 5.7% (Figure 9). This was largely driven by the

8.1% annual compounded growth rate of the importation of consumer goods. Also, purchases of raw

materials grew above annual average at 6.6%. Imports of products classified as intermediate and

capital goods lagged at growth rates of 3.9% and 5.0%, respectively.

Figure 9: Growth Rate of South Korea’s Imports (Y-Axis in USD Billions) Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions, World Bank

South Korea had 226 import partners.9 China was the biggest seller to South Korea at 20.5% of

import volume (Table 2). Japan, the United States, Germany and Saudi Arabia were the other

9 https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KOR/Year/2017

34%

23%

19%

24%


-

100.00

200.00

300.00

400.00

500.00

600.002

01

7

20

16

20

15

20

14

20

13

20

12

20

11

20

10

20

09

20

08

20

07

20

06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

01

20

00

19

99

19

98

19

97

19

96



https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/KOR/Year/2017


92

important import partners of South Korea. At only USD 3.7 Billion, the Philippines was ranked 21st

among the largest import partners of South Korea.

Country Import Value Import Share

China 97.9 20.5%

Japan 55.1 11.5%


Germany 19.7 4.1%

Saudi Arabia 19.6 4.1%

Table 2: South Korea’s top import market (In USD Thousands)


3. Trade between the Philippines and South Korea

The bilateral trade between the Philippines and South Korea mirrored the two countries changing

economic development (Figure 10). From 1965 to 1981, the value of South Korea’s imports from the

Philippines is larger than the value of their exports. However, a reversal in this relationship was

observed beginning 1982. At 2017, South Korea export to the Philippines was valued at USD 10.6

Billion while imports stand at USD 3.7 Billion.

Figure 10: Trade between South Korea and the Philippines (Y-Axis in USD Billions)

Source: Korea International Trade Association (www.kita.org)

South Korea and the Philippines were important trade partners. This can be a result of geographic

proximity, cultural comparability and product complements. From the point of the Philippines, South

Korea was consistently one of the top ten markets in both imports and exports. From the perspective

of South Korea, the Philippines climbed up as an important export market from number 29 in 1984 to

-

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

20

18

20

16

20

14

20

12

20

10

20

08

20

06

20

04

20

02

20

00

19

98

19

96

19

94

19

92

19

90

19

88

19

86

19

84

19

82

19

80

19

78

19

76

19

74

19

72

19

70

19

68

19

66

SK to Ph

Ph to SK


93

number 8 in 2018. The share of the Philippines in South Korea’s import portfolio, was low and ranked

at the lower 30s to number 29 in 2018.

A. South Korea to Philippines

According to the UN Comtrade reports, 56% of trades from South Korea to the Philippines in 2018

are composed of products under SITC commodity code 77 – electrical machinery, apparatus and

appliances (Table 3). Other top product trades are petroleum products, road vehicles, special

industrial machinery and iron and steel.

Commodity Code Commodity

USD (in Billions)

77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof. 6.0

33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 2.2

78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 0.4

72 Machinery specialized for particular industries 0.4

67 Iron and steel 0.3

68 Non-ferrous metals 0.3

74 General industrial machinery and equipment, n.e.s., and machine parts, n.e.s. 0.2

65 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products 0.2

59 Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 0.2

57 Plastics in non-primary forms 0.1 Table 3: Top 10 Product Categories, South Korea to the Philippines, 2018 Source: UN Comtrade (All 2-digit SITC Rev. 3 commodities)

Table 4 exhibited the product categories traded from South Korea to the Philippines with the ten

highest growth rates from 2000 – 2018. Out of the top 10 gainers, five product categories are under

food and beverages (Table 4). SITC Commodity Code 9 – Miscellaneous Edible Products and SITC

Commodity Code 11 – Beverages both grew at 22% level. SITC Commodity Code 4 – Cereals and Cereal

Preparation, SITC Commodity Code 7 – Coffee, Tea and Cocoa and Spices and SITC Commodity Code 9

– Vegetables and Fruits posted 19%, 18% and 17% growth over the same period, respectively. This

explained the increasing presence of Korean food and beverage products, such as ramyeon, chips, ice

cream, chocopies, banana milk and soju, in national chains of supermarkets and convenience stores

in the Philippines.


Growth Rate (2000 – 2018)

79 Other transport equipment 29%

9 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 23%

11 Beverages 22%

27 Crude fertilizers, other than those of division 56, and crude minerals 21%

88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks 20%

4 Cereals and cereal preparations 19%

7 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 18%

33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 18%


94

5 Vegetables and fruit 17%

24 Cork and wood 17% Table 4: Top 10 Fastest Growing Product Categories, South Korea to the Philippines, 2018 Source: Author’s computation of compounded annual growth rate using UN Comtrade data (All 2-digit SITC Rev. 3 commodities)

Another significant observation was the decreasing trend in the sale of fabric and textiles from

South Korea. Over the 18-year period, SITC Commodity Code 65 – Textile Yarn and Fabric and SITC

Commodity Code 26 – Textile Fibres were moving at a decreasing rate of 1% and 2%, respectively.

Interestingly, South Korea’s exports of clothing and accessories grew at 11% over the same period.

This showed the movement of South Korean exports to the Philippines as regards fabrics and clothing

were moving from raw materials to finished goods.

SITC commodity code 55 – Essential Oils and Perfume also grew at a fast rate of 13% per annum.

This was fueled by the increasing presence of South Korean brands of cosmetics and skin care products

in the Philippine such as Laneige, Etude House, Innisfree, Face Shop, and Nature Republic. Also, major

retailers took advantage of the demand for these products through increase in their house brands of

Korean-made skin care and cosmetic products.

B. Philippines to South Korea

UN Comtrade reported 37% of the trades from Philippines to South Korea in 2018 are composed

of products under SITC commodity code 77 – electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances (Table

3). Other top product trades were office machines, vegetables and fruit, petroleum product and

scientific equipment. These may be partly attributable to outward flows of products manufactured in

various export processing zones in the Philippines.


2018 (In USD Billions)

77 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof 0.97

75 Office machines and automatic data-processing machines 0.28

5 Vegetables and fruit 0.28

33 Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 0.15

87 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. 0.11

68 Non-ferrous metals 0.09

79 Other transport equipment 0.09

12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 0.08

84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0.07

28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 0.07 Table 5: Top 10 Product Categories, the Philippines to South Korea, 2018 Source: UN Comtrade data (All 2-digit SITC Rev. 3 commodities)

Two of the fastest growing exports of the Philippines to South Korea were raw materials related

to manufacturing cigarettes (Table 5). SITC Commodity Code 12 – Tobacco was the fastest growing

export category of the Philippines to South Korea at a growth rate of 78%. USD 81.4 Million export

volume was recorded in 2018. Specifically, the increase in export volume was attributable to


95

manufactured tobacco, extracts and essences. The 45% growth in SITC Commodity Code 64 - Paper

and Paperboard were largely attributable to exports of cigarette paper cut to size.


Growth (2000 – 2018)

12 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 78%

79 Other transport equipment 45%

23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 29%

64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard 28%

84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 23%

78 Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 21%

88 Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks 18%

43

Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed; waxes of animal or vegetable origin; inedible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils, n.e.s. 18%

4 Cereals and cereal preparations 16%

83 Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 15% Table 6: Fastest Growing Product Categories, the Philippines to South Korea, 2018 Source: Author’s computation of compounded annual growth rate using UN Comtrade data (All 2-digit SITC Rev. 3 commodities)

The second fastest growing exports, at 45% growth, was SITC Commodity Code 79 – Other

Transportation Equipment, more specifically parts of aeroplanes and helicopters, and other ships and

boats for the transport of goods. SITC Commodity Code 84 – Clothing and Accessories, with a growth

rate of 23%, were largely composed of jackets, suits and knitware.

4. Conclusion

The trades from the Philippines to South Korea were largely composed of goods produced in

various export processing zones in the Philippines. Producers of these goods may also be Korean

companies that relocated their manufacturing facilities in the Philippines to take advantage of

inexpensive labor. These included clothes, electrical machineries, office machines, and scientific

instruments. Also, a significant portion of the Korean purchases in the Philippines were agricultural

produce like vegetables and fruits.

The portfolio of the South Korean exports to the Philippines show that the big value items were

capital and intermediate goods used in Philippine industries. However, finished goods for Filipino

consumers posted the largest historical growth over the 18-year period. There is a large potential for

increasing trades on these sectors for South Korea as Philippines’ 2019 population is estimated at 108

Million.

Prior to 1982, South Korea bought more from the Philippines than it had sold. Subsequently,

South Korea dominated this bilateral trade relationship with larger exports than imports. The bilateral

trades between South Korea and the Philippines were clearly reflections of the economic development

of the two countries over the years.


96

PAPER PRESENTERS

Bionotes

CHULWOO LEE, PH.D. is Professor of Law at Yonsei Law School and a former Director of the Institute of Legal Studies, Yonsei University. He studied at Seoul National University (LL.B. and LL.M.), Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M.), and the London School of Economics and Political Science (Ph.D.). He held full-time faculty positions at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and Sungkyunkwan University, and taught at the University of Washington School of Law as Garvey Schubert Barer Visiting Professor of Asian Law (2011). His areas of academic interest include citizenship and nationhood, law and social theory, and social history of law. He has conducted research on diaspora engagement

policies and the theorization of the relationship between sovereignty and citizenship. Dr. Lee was President of the Korea International Migration Studies Association (2013-2015) and is an advisor to the Korea Immigration Service, Ministry of Justice, Government of the Republic of Korea. E-mail: [email protected]

BUBBLES BEVERLY ASOR, PH.D. finished her PhD in Sociology in National University in

Singapore. Her research interests include migrant organizations, mediating structures,

religion – migration nexus, Filipino migration, and South Koreans in the Philippines. E-mail:

[email protected]

RAYMUND ARTHUR G. ABEJO is an Assistant Professor at the Department of History, UP

Diliman where he teaches courses on Philippine history, Asian history and Korean history and

society. He obtained his undergraduate in History and master’s in Asian Studies from the

University of the Philippines. Currently, he is a Ph.D. candidate in Korean History at the

Academy of Korean Studies, South Korea. E-mail: [email protected]

ANTONIO MIRANDA is a researcher at the Center for International Relations and Strategic

Studies (CIRSS) of the Foreign Service Institute. He currently manages the Japan and Korea

desks, and his research interests focus on Northeast Asian regional security, Japanese

politics and governance, and peace and security in the Korean Peninsula. Mr. Miranda

graduated from the Ateneo de Manila University with a Bachelor’s degree in Diplomacy and

International Relations with specialization in East and Southeast Asian Studies. He is

currently taking his Master’s degree in International Studies at UP Diliman. E-mail:

[email protected]


97

NORMI SON received her B.A. from Philippine College of Commerce, a Teaching Certificate

from Philippine Normal University, and a Master’s Degree in Education from the University

of the Philippines. Being the primary trainer of trainers of Montessori Institute of America,

she is a U.S. Certified Montessori Trainer, Instructor and Consultant of six Montessori

teacher education programs in the Philippines, China, and Vietnam. She and her husband

are founding volunteers and sponsors of Kopino Children Association Inc.

(www.kopino.org, FB/kopino.org), a welfare organization that caters to disadvantaged and

orphaned Korean-Filipino children in the Philippines since 2005. E-mail: [email protected]

OLIVER JOHN C. QUINTANA is an instructor at the Department of Political Science, Ateneo

de Manila University teaching Philippine politics and governance, Comparative Politics in

Asia, and Korea- ASEAN Relations. He graduated with an MA in International and Area

Studies, with specialization in Indian and ASEAN socio-cultural studies, from the Hankuk

University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, Korea. His research interests include Southeast

Asian politics and society, international relations, nationalism, and modern Korean history.

He is the grandson of Ret. Col. Melecio S. Quintana (+), Korean war veteran and member

of the 14th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) of the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK). E-mail:

[email protected]

DANIROSE C. SALAZAR, PH.D. is an associate professor of the Department of Accounting

and Finance at the UP Cesar E.A. Virata School of Business. She taught Fundamentals of

Accounting Theory and Practice, Intermediate Accounting, Advanced Accounting,

Accounting Information Systems, Financial Derivatives and Public Accounting Practice

(Audit). She is also the current Chair of the Department of Accounting and Finance of the

School. She lectured for the UP Institute of Small Scale Industries (ISSI), Development

Center for Finance and Land Bank. She received her BS Business Administration and Accountancy magna cum

laude and MS Finance degrees from the University of the Philippines Diliman. She earned her PhD in Business

Administration at Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul, South Korea where she was an ASEAN fellow of the

Korea Foundation. E-mail: [email protected]

http://www.kopino.org/

http://kopino.org/


98


99

philippine koreanist congress - wordpress.com

Documents