philosophy and exegesis · 2019. 8. 3. · works of simplicius of cilicia (c. 480-c. 540 ce), a...

Philosophy and Exegesisin Simplicius

This page intentionally left blank

PHILOSOPHY AND EXEGESISIN SIMPLICIUS

The Methodology ofa Commentator

Han Baltussen

LON DON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SY DN EY

B L O O M S B U R Y

Bloomsbury AcademicAn imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square 1385 Broadway London New York WC1B 3DP NY 10018 UK USA

www.bloomsbury.com

First published in 2008 by Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.

© Han Baltussen, 2008

Han Baltussen has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identifi ed as Author of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from

the publishers.

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury

or the author.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: HB: 978-0-7156-3500-1 ePUB: 978-1-4725-2146-0 ePDF: 978-1-4725-2145-3

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

www.bloomsbury.com

Contents

Abbreviations viiiPreface ix

Introduction. Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in LateAntiquity 1

0.1 Philosophy in Late Antiquity: eclecticism, syncretismand ‘post-classicism’ 10

0.2 Simplicius of Cilicia: life and works 120.3 Method and outline of this study 14

1. The Scholar and His Books 211.1 The author: philosophical and intellectual context 241.2 Scholarly pursuits: exegetical objectives and practices 311.3 A puzzle about location 481.4 Of books and men: Simplicius’ scholarly method 51

2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of AncientWisdom 54

2.1 What we have thanks to Simplicius 632.2 Two views on unity and plurality: Parmenides and

Empedocles 682.3 A special case: Anaxagoras 782.4 The unity of Greek philosophy 84

3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics 883.1 Succeeding Aristotle, understanding Aristotle 893.2 Teaching Aristotle: Theophrastus and Eudemus 913.3 Simplicius and the early Peripatetics 104

4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander ofAphrodisias 107

4.1 Two commentators, two traditions 1114.2 Alexander the pioneer: exegetical format and style 1144.3 Simplicius’ use of Alexander 1214.4 Disagreeing with Alexander 1294.5 The ghost in the machine and the making of

commentary 132

v

5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration 1365.1 A new Platonism: Plotinus 1405.2 Harmonising strategies: from Porphyry to Proclus 1475.3 Simplicius’ teachers 1585.4 Two outsiders: Galen and Themistius 1665.5 Platonist exegesis from Plotinus to Simplicius 169

6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending PaganTheology 172

6.1 Polemic and philosophy: a very brief history 1736.2 Against the Christian Philoponus: defending Platonism

or paganism? 1766.3 Extensive quotation and disagreement: Alexander

revisited 1886.4 The rhetoric of interpretation 193

Epilogue. Simplicius and Greek Philosophy: The LastPagan Gospel? 196

7.1 The commentator’s craft 1977.2 Simplicius on Simplicius: self-image and

self-presentation 1987.3 Exegesis and philosophy: a complex relationship 2017.4 The methodology of a commentator: a final appraisal 208

Appendix I The ‘Library’ of Simplicius 211Appendix II A. New Evidence on Alexander 216

B. Distribution of Alexander References in in Phys. 217Appendix III Sumphônia in Simplicius 218

Notes 221Bibliography 257Index Locorum 283Index of Names 288Subject Index 290

Contents

vi

ForRICHARD SORABJI

‘philosopher, poet and expounder of mysteries’

Abbreviations

ACA = Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth, 1987- )CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (Berlin: Reimer, 1882-1909)DK = H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds) Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin,

1903 and many reprints)D.L. = Diogenes Laertius, Lives of philosophers (c. 200 CE)Enn. = Plotinus’ Enneads, Loeb edn, trans. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge,

Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966-)FHSG = W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds)

Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought andInfluence, 2 vols (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992)

in Cat. = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categoriesin DA = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima (authorship

disputed)in DC = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s De caeloin Phys. = Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s PhysicsKRS = G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers:

A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd edn (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984)

SVF = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. H. von Arnim, 4 vols (Leipzig:Teubner, 1903-24)

TLG = Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, searchable database on CD-ROM andonline

V.Plot. = Vita Plotini, ‘Life of Plotinus’, biographical sketch by Porphyry inEnneads 1

V.Procl. = Vita Procli, ‘Life of Proclus’, biographical sketch by Marinus

Works of ancient authors (esp. Plato and Aristotle) are as a rule givenaccording to the form used in LSJ = Liddell-Scott-Jones, Greek-EnglishLexicon (Oxford).

viii

Preface

This study offers an general assessment of the nature and purpose of theworks of Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 480-c. 540 CE), a Platonist author of lateantiquity. I came to this body of writings while studying the transmissionof Greek philosophical views. I went looking for a convenient study on thesources, approach and methodology of Simplicius. Alas, such a study didnot exist in English or any other language. With the ever increasingproduction in recent times of monographs and articles on the Platonism ofLate Antiquity and a growing interest in the formal features of these texts,I decided the time was ripe for an accessible book on Simplicius. Thisinvestigation, then, is the response to a genuine desideratum: it aims topresent Simplicius’ methodology in a comprehensive account and in thebest possible light in order to enhance our understanding of his value as ascholar, exegete and philosopher.

To write a scholarly book on an ancient commentator in this day andage may seem unusual and perhaps old-fashioned, but meta-narrative andexegesis are still very much with us.1 Moreover, the commentaries fulfil aspecial role in the continuation of the pagan religious perspective and thusin the perennial debate on what constitutes the best spiritual outlook onlife. Current debates on the role of religion in society have hardlyquietened down and seem to tend in a direction opposite to that ofSimplicius, who as a pagan was forced to come to terms with the dominantrole of the Christian faith. The importance of Simplicius for the history ofearly and classical Greek philosophy and the history of the philosophicalcommentary is widely acknowledged, but only partially studied or under-stood. Many have written on an aspect of his work, either in the context oftranslating parts of his commentaries, or while evaluating the materialshe preserves of Greek philosophers. Yet anyone trying to understand thenature of Simplicius’ reports of Presocratic and Peripatetic thinkers mustobtain a more ‘organic feel’ for the choices and strategies in these remark-able writings. The important exception of a more focused investigation isthe collection of papers edited by I. Hadot (1987). The books on theCategories commentary under her direction (2000-1) have also been valu-able guides for this project. I could not have foreseen when I started workon Simplicius in 1996 and this book in 2002, that during the process ofwriting the study of late Platonism would experience such an upsurge, sothat keeping up with new publications over the past few years has provedquite difficult.

ix

The decision to prioritise work on Simplicius has slowed down anotherproject (my commentary on Theophrastus’ doxographical fragments, forwhich Simplicius is a major source), but it is hoped that this ‘detour’ willnot be seen as a distraction, but rather as a reculer pour mieux sauter,in particular for a better understanding of Simplicius’ interpretivestrategies in handling and incorporating earlier sources. Writing thisbook has been an extended exercise in selecting from an abundance ofmaterials. In it I omit much and pass over more than I would like (orlike to admit), and it is hoped that the book will at least serve as acatalyst for more work on this rich source for advanced students,scholars and historians of philosophy.

This book has a rather long history and even longer antecedents. Workon the sources for the Presocratics (PhD thesis 1988-1993) and involve-ment with a project revising SVF (J. Mansfeld and K.A. Algra, Utrecht1993-96) had prepared me for methodological issues of source criticism,fragments and complicated relations between texts. Next I studied Sim-plicius’ use of early Peripatetics, especially Theophrastus and Eudemus,during a stay at the Centre for Hellenic Studies in Washington DC(1996-97). The project soon gained importance and momentum of its own,while I analysed passages in his commentaries preserving Peripateticmaterials (Baltussen 2002b, 2002c, 2006). Discovering Simplicius’ valuefor many other periods of Greek philosophy opened up a new world ofideas, genres and schools of thought. I cannot claim to have acquired fullexpertise in all the areas I had to venture into – the subject matter of eachchapter could have been a book by itself – but during my time at theAncient Commentators on Aristotle Project in London (1997-2002) I wasin a position to learn much more and faster, profiting from the work ofothers who had more experience in commentary studies and Neoplaton-ism. This period strengthened my resolve to pursue this interesting figureliving in a crucial time for pagan philosophy. Three additional chapterstook shape during my sabbatical in Princeton (IAS 2006). The ancestry ofChapters 2-6 goes back to Baltussen 2002a-b-c, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,2007a (with thanks to Meir Sternberg, editor of Poetics Today, for permis-sion to re-use material), and the introduction to my forthcoming FHSGcommentary.

AcknowledgementsA book cannot be completed without financial support of institutions andencouragement of colleagues and friends. I owe a great debt to RichardSorabji, a major force in ancient commentary studies, and a great sourceof advice and support over the years, during my years at the ACA projectand after. David Konstan also offered his friendly advice and warmencouragement. Bob Sharples was always helpful in answering queries onAlexander (Chapter 4) and other matters. I gratefully acknowledge finan-

Preface

x

cial assistance from the University of Adelaide: my research assistantMeaghan McEvoy (BA, Hons Adelaide, MPhil, DPhil Oxford) expertlyprocessed the data of some 350 Alexander references in Simplicius andprovided helpful notes (Small Research Grant 2003, Faculty of Humani-ties); Ms. Kelly Slape created a useful card index of Greek exegeticalterminology (Student Summer Scholarship for Undergraduates, Facultyof Humanities 2004-5); Benjamin Madden did a great job checking thebibliographical details in all chapters. In addition, two small subsidiescame from the (now defunct) Centre for European Studies and GeneralLinguistics Initiative Fund, enabling me to do much needed library workin the Fisher Research Library at the University of Sydney (2003, 2004),and to attend a workshop on ancient philosophy in Melbourne (November2003). The use of TLG CD-ROM D and E from the University of Irvine hasbeen truly indispensable in pinpointing important words and phrasesacross the Greek corpus, but especially Simplicius’ 3,000 pages of commen-tary. Finally, I was awarded a travel grant for my study leave in 2006(Special Studies Program, Faculty of Humanities). Many colleagues havebeen generous over the years in giving advice or support: Peter Adamson,Dirk Baltzly, Sylvia Berryman, Istvan Bodnár, Tad Brennan, Silvia Fazzo,Dimitri Gutas, Verity Harte, Malcolm Heath, Christoph Helmig, PaulKeyser, David Konstan, Inna Kupreeva, Peter Lautner, Jaap Mansfeld,David Runia, David Sedley, David Sider, Ineke Sluiter, Harold Tarrant,Robert Todd, Robbert Van den Berg. I thank them all sincerely for theirgenerosity. And I thank my colleagues at the University of Adelaide forhumouring me in the pursuit of a specialised and slow-paced scholarlyproject amidst today’s fast and generalist culture of measurable ‘outputs’.

A most welcome opportunity for undisturbed study arose when I wasfortunate to be accepted as Member of the Institute for Advanced Study,Princeton (first term, 2006-7). There an interesting group of scholarsprovided stimulating conversation and food for thought. Helpful sugges-tions on the history of science, Persian history, commentaries, Arabicreception, Renaissance scholarship and more general questions of ancientphilosophy came from other Members, in particular Emma Ganagé, JairusBanaji, Mario Biagioli, Jim Hankins, Chris Hailey, Michael Lackner,Mark Schiefsky, Matthew Stanley, and Philip van der Eijk. Heinrich vonStaden (IAS) proved a great host and offered his time and thoughts in amost constructive and generous manner at our informal ‘commentatorslunches’, seminars and in conversation. This period proved instrumentalfor further study of uncharted areas, starting on two new chapters andpulling the threads together of the work produced in the past five years.The library staff deserve special mention for their exemplary assistance inacquiring obscure titles and searching for hidden treasures in the collec-tions. A brief visit to Toronto (4-5 December 2006) was another helpfuloccasion for presentations in the graduate seminar and the CollaborativeProgram of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. I am especially grateful to

Preface

xi

Rachel Barney, Lloyd Gerson, Danny Goldstick, Brad Inwood and JenniferWhiting, who in discussion asked pertinent questions and made helpfulcomments. Whether or not I have fulfilled the IAS requirement of produc-ing ‘work of significance and originality’, I leave up to the readers to decidefor themselves. If I have, it is in no small measure thanks to thesewonderful resources and people. Suffice it to say that without the supportof this IAS scholarship, the book would not have reached its telos soexpeditiously.

I should thank my editor, Deborah Blake at Duckworth, for a pleasantcooperation and her angelic patience with my belated draft and for guidingit through the editorial process towards a publishable manuscript mostefficiently. I am especially grateful that she found Christian Wildberg(Princeton) willing to read the manuscript for the press; he saved me frommaking some rash inferences and overconfident claims. For this I am inhis debt. It is most gratifying to see my own book added to the distin-guished list of Duckworth publications on the Ancient Commentatorsbeginning with R. Wallis’ Neoplatonism (1971).

Last but not least, I am much indebted to my wife, Angélique, and mychildren, Sanne and Thomas, who cheerfully tolerated my long hours inthe office and (worse) my claim on the computer at home. I hope they willforgive me for dedicating the book to Richard Sorabji, whose immenselearning and generous support did much to give my work in this areadirection and inspiration.

University of Adelaide15 November 2007

Preface

xii

Introduction

Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy inLate Antiquity

Until then I had thought each book spoke of the things, human or divine,that lie outside books. Now I realised that not infrequently books speak ofbooks: it is as if they spoke among themselves. In the light of this reflection,the library seemed all the more disturbing to me. It was then the place oflong, centuries-old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue between oneparchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not to be ruledby a human mind, a treasure of secrets emanated by many minds, survivingthe death of those who had produced them or had been their conveyors.(Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose)

Simplicius of Cilicia in Syria (c. 480-c. 540 CE) was one among a group oflate Platonists who lived and worked in Alexandria and Athens. Theystrongly believed that Plato’s philosophy provided the best means tohaving a good life, leading to its ultimate goal, assimilation to god(Theaetetus 176A). Plato’s thought had by now undergone several trans-formations and reinterpretations – as much a testimony to its flexibilityas to its ambiguities. During the third, fourth and fifth centuries the riseof elaborate and highly sophisticated exegesis among Platonists wouldcome to define the way in which this pagan ‘sect’ chose to preserve anddisseminate their understanding of Plato’s ideas. As Eco’s descriptionintimates, once literacy and learning reach new levels of complexity andinter-textuality, books speak about books, and this elaborate discourse isthe product of a particular stage in intellectual history. The new Platonismwas such an advanced culture of the book, even if it retained strong oralattitudes towards studying Plato. It is often referred to as ‘Neoplatonism’,but in this study I will limit use of this modern term mostly to refer to thephilosophical doctrine, while preferring the label ‘late Platonists’ for thethinkers belonging to the Platonic tradition after Plotinus. Plato’s wisdombecame clarified, supplemented and expanded in their learned notes(hypomnêmata) to the texts which they considered authoritative in mat-ters of both the sublunar region (natural philosophy) and lunar region(theology). In the process they also enlisted other authors in their worksfor the purpose of clarifying and shoring up Plato’s system, most famouslyAristotle, whose views in logic and physics came to be regarded as inharmony with Plato’s. Such learned notes could take different formats, butthe most common type was what we would now call ‘running commentary’.Simplicius is a prime example of this culture of commentary and in this

1

study I aim to show that his voluminous output is more than the preciousrecord of 1,000 years of philosophical discussion or of late Platonist phi-losophy: I want to show how in these works Simplicius symbolises both thepinnacle of scholarly commentary and the demise of pagan rational theo-logy as embodied in the Platonist school.1 My analysis of his methodologywill reveal a connection between his commentaries and the historicalcontext in which he found himself.

Simplicius’ commentaries, though certainly not unique, are exceptionalfor at least four reasons.2 First, his commentaries are very instructiveabout the exegetical and didactic practices of the Neoplatonic school (howexactly remains to be determined); secondly, they are a rewarding re-source on centuries of Greek philosophy from the Presocratics up to hisday. In addition, they present us with a particular stage of the interpreta-tion of Aristotle and Plato, and provide an insight into the transition fromantiquity to the Middle Ages. These are all good reasons to focus on suchan author, particularly if one’s interests lie within the scope of the issueswe are concerned with here: the history of Greek philosophy, the nature ofphilosophical exegesis, and the role of late antiquity in the transmissionof Greek thought. Recent studies have brought out some of these aspects,and new lines of investigation have emerged from interdisciplinary inter-actions which prompt further research.3 It is nonetheless my claim thatSimplicius’ methodology deserves a more comprehensive study, since he isone among several philosophers of late antiquity who have come to be usedto clarify the bridging periods between antiquity and medieval thought.

Until recently several major obstacles have stood in the way of such anenterprise. The corpus is rather inaccessible; with some 3,000 pagesextant, its sheer size makes the task of reading his work daunting. Itslanguage and content are difficult on account of its pedigree and complexheritage. Simplicius also preserves important material from early sourceson astronomy, mathematics and meteorology, and enhances our under-standing of work in ancient physics by Aristotle and others. Those whohave studied the texts recently have focussed more on the philosophicalcontent and less on the methodological (i.e. philological and historical)aspects. And if these technical features were not enough of an obstacle, thecommentaries were not considered to be works contributing to philosophyin their own right.

This study attempts to contribute to the recent surge in scholarship onthe commentators, placing special emphasis on the philological and his-torical features of an author who is often viewed as a mere mediator ofearlier thinkers. The view that the commentaries of late antiquity havecontributions to make on philosophical problems has become more ac-cepted at least among students of late antique philosophy. As a result theyare no longer viewed merely as secondary and derivative pieces of workthat lack the ambition to make original contributions. But much remainsto be done to bring out the value of these commentaries, even though they

Introduction: Simplicius of Cilicia and Philosophy in Late Antiquity

2

are now being translated into English (with explanatory notes), so that amajor resource and aid for understanding these difficult Greek texts isbecoming available.4 This book will contribute to the growing attention onthe complexities of the transmission and reception of philosophicalthought in late antiquity.

The larger picture of Simplicius’ reception confirms the relative neglecthis works have suffered. Until the late nineteenth century he receivedlittle attention for his own contribution to the ancient philosophical de-bate, and modern appreciation has been overshadowed by prejudiceagainst late Platonism as a school of thought (Neoplatonism) or by theview that he was merely a preserver of early Greek philosophy. There waslittle or no interest in his own philosophical ideas, because he appeared tohave none.5 There was also little or no interest in his methodology, becauseit was seen through the lens of medieval scholasticism and considered anuninteresting example of atrophied dogmatism. We need to move beyondsuch prejudice and misguided views to appreciate the importance ofSimplicius as a philosopher and scholar. To do this we must reassess hisworks and the historical record and show that his works can be used formore than one purpose. It is significant that by 1992, in his introductionto the collection Platonism in Late Antiquity (Notre Dame), Stephen Gershcould write (p. 3): ‘Happily, the prejudices which for a long time hamperedthe study of late ancient philosophy now seem on the wane.’

Christian philosophers and commentators on Aristotle of the (so-called)Middle Ages did use his work to understand the meaning of the master’swritings better. Thomas Aquinas (twelfth century CE) used Simplicius’commentary on the Categories for his own work on language, relying onthe Latin translations produced by the prolific William van Moerbeke.6

Some of his commentaries were also known to the Arabs.7 For instance,the mathematician Abu al-Abbas an-Nayrizi (ninth century CE) wrotecommentaries on Euclid making use of (what he thought was) Simplicius’commentary on that author.8 A revival of Platonism occurred when Ficino(1433-1499) translated works of Plato and later Platonists into Latin.9

With the new scientific developments in the sixteenth and seventeenthcenturies, when Aristotle’s cosmology came to be seriously challenged,Simplicius too came under attack, the most famous case resulting from adeliberate misrepresentation. When in February 1632 Galileo publishedhis Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems (Dialogo sopra i duemassimi sistemi del mondo), the work which contains a convincing expo-sition of the Copernican system with an account of Galileo’s discoveriesabout falling bodies, he named one of his main characters Simplicio, whois presented as a diehard but intelligent Aristotelian. In the debateSimplicio is defeated by Salviati, the Copernican, who forces him intoretreat. Simplicio ends up using the Pope’s argument that God’s works areunintelligible to humans – a view met with silence from his interlocutors.10

Galileo himself claimed a link between this character and the late


3

Platonist Simplicius.11 We can understand how his characterisation pre-sents a clear insult to Aristotelians only if we realise that the latePlatonists, and Simplicius in particular, were prone to harmonise Plato’sand Aristotle’s views, which may be why Galileo saw no problem inemphasising his Aristotelianism. Incidentally, the insult to the Churchand the Pope (whose words ended up in Simplicio’s mouth) was alsounmistakable, and the work was confiscated in November of the same yearit was published.12 Clearly Simplicius was the victim of caricature in theconflict between science and the church.

Simplicius has not had a very good press in modern scholarship either.Views range from neglect to clear contempt. In 1928 E.R. Dodds remarkeddryly that ‘the last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently beenless intelligently studied than any other, and in our understanding ofits development there are still some lamentable lacunae’ (p. 129). Doddshad already made an attempt to change this by producing a collectionof translations (1923). The introduction is a fine example of his thor-ough understanding of Plotinian thought, but the publisher (SPCK, orSociety for Promoting Christian Knowledge) reveals how this materialwas classified.

The general judgment on the late Platonists (which is what they calledthemselves) also holds for Simplicius. The most important reason for thisis probably that he has been regarded mainly as a source for otherphilosophers and the upholder of a ‘scholastic’ tradition that misinterpretsAristotle and Plato. The latter judgment, based on commentaries from thefifth and sixth centuries CE, had been given the label ‘Neuplatonismus’(Neoplatonism) by the eighteenth-century encyclopaedists keen to pigeon-hole these works within a wider range of ancient literary writings.13 Ofcourse anything receiving the prefix ‘neo-’ is presumed to be of lesser valuethan whatever it is qualifying.14 This, it seems, is how the nineteenth-century German scholar Hermann Diels saw Simplicius: his presentationof the transmission of early Greek philosophy, in which Simplicius is givena very important role, was concerned mostly with recovering the fragmen-tary remains of Presocratic thought scattered across a vast range ofsources – in particular in Hellenistic textbooks (the so-called placitaliterature) and second- to sixth-century CE commentaries on Aristotle.This approach determined the view of Simplicius as a ‘conduit’ or ‘merecommentator’ for a long time.15 More recently methodological concerns havebeen raised over the selection and presentation of nineteenth-centuryscholarship in this area, with their tendency to cut-and-paste the(presumed) quotations from their context with too little regard for theagendas of the quoting authors. The treatment of these source authors hasundergone a critical change with a number of studies attempting to dealwith these and related problems.16

It is only in very recent times that late Platonism has again caught theattention of the scholarly community for its own sake. Early interpretative


4

studies on Neoplatonism more generally and Plotinus in particular wereby Richard Wallis, Hilary Armstrong, Eric Dodds, L. Westerink, HenriBlumenthal and Stephen Gersh, to name the most important pioneers inEngland. In France Henry Courcelle, Father Saffrey, and for Simpliciusthe studies by Ilsetraut Hadot appeared in the 1970s. Next three thematicmonographs on late antique philosophy by Richard Sorabji (1980, 1983,1988) appeared, and a large-scale translation project into English of theAncient Commentators on Aristotle was instigated (London 1989-, Gen-eral editor: Richard Sorabji).

The translations in particular created wider attention, something theearly pioneering studies could not quite achieve. But ambivalence and(occasional) misuse persisted outside a small group of dedicated scholars.Several causes contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs. The preju-dice against ‘Neoplatonism’ as a philosophical movement caused many tocontinue the misunderstandings and misrepresentations, taking theirviews as oriental mysticism and distortions of classical Greek philosophy.Dodds had already outlined the erroneous perspective of nineteenth-century scholarship in which these thinkers were read as oriental imitatorsof ‘true Greek philosophy’. He called for caution since such hasty conclu-sions were clearly based on suspect assumptions regarding the true natureof Greekness and Greek philosophy, and not grounded in clear textualevidence.17

I suggested earlier that the length of the commentaries can in partbe blamed for the ‘love-hate’ relationship scholars tend to develop whenstudying them. To take one recent example as an illustration for thekind of lingering unease in Simplician studies, James Hankinson hasrecently made an laudable attempt at a slightly more balanced appre-ciation of the commentator, but his phrasing leaves little doubt aboutthe ambivalence one apparently still experiences in dealing with thesecommentaries:

Simplicius’ own discussions are sometimes tedious and unilluminating; butfrom time to time he will cast genuine light on a difficult passage, andintroduce interesting and original ideas of his own. And if he is oftenploddingly pedestrian, he is rarely simply silly.18

I am not disputing that to the modern eye there is something jarring andunattractive about these extensive close readings, which seem to spell outthe Aristotelian train of thought in such great detail that they hardly seemto differentiate or prioritise between important and unimportant pas-sages, or between philosophically interesting or less interesting material.Note, however, that this assessment seems to ignore that these writtencomments to Aristotle’s text (hypomnêmata) may have been intended forneophytes, beginners in Platonism, so to speak, who needed a basic yetdetailed explication of Aristotle’s text.19 In addition, Hankinson’s use of


5

phrases like ‘interesting and original ideas’ and ‘pedestrian’ betray strongmodern predilections in relation to what may be considered philosophi-cally interesting or original. I don’t want to deny modern scholars theirpreferences, but when most teachers (and of course students) are awarethat their introductory courses and lectures are not always very interest-ing and original, why should we criticise the ancient professors on thispoint? Moreover, the works of Simplicius contain enough evidence for usto be more charitable, provided that we apply a non-judgemental approachin trying to appreciate his perspective.

It is with these considerations in mind that I intend to present Sim-plicius in a more positive light. This is motivated not so much by a senseof indignation, but rather by the conviction that Simplicius still is thevictim of certain misunderstandings, in particular regarding the aims andobjectives of his project and the options open to him in his lifetime. I amnot trying to give an unconditional endorsement of Simplicius’ views asinvaluable and his works as mandatory reading. But we will not appreci-ate his works properly unless we come to understand better two of theirdefining characteristics: his scholarly approach and his over-arching ob-jective. The former has received haphazard attention and will be treatedin detail as part of my study of his broader methodology; the latter hasre-emerged as a serious explanation more recently and is connected to thereligious perspective (‘theology’) of late Platonism which should not beoverlooked in his motivation for writing these commentaries (see Chapter6). So in subsequent chapters it is Simplicius the scholar with whom I amprimarily concerned. This is, I believe, a treatment which mirrors in duemeasure the extent to which Simplicius pays explicit attention to certainprinciples of textual exegesis and its eventual pay-off for the philosophicalevaluation of Aristotle’s thought as he envisaged it.

The historical Simplicius of Cilicia, a Platonist of the early sixth centuryCE and heir to an impressive philosophical and spiritual tradition, is notquite the dogmatic diehard Galileo makes him out to be, but someone whoshows strong allegiance to his teachers, while also trying to find his ownway in the discourse on god, the world, and humankind. An importantpassage to which we shall return more than once illustrates his rathersubtle attitude to the commentator’s qualities and tasks (in Cat. 7.23-32;transl. Chase 2003): ‘The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings � should[not] obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is alwaysand everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philo-sopher’s school.’

So when Galileo named one of the characters in the dialogue on cosmo-logy after him (1632), his character is clearly a caricature intended to sendup the Aristotelian ‘tribe’ (the name possibly a pun on the Italian simplicio– ‘simple, naïve’ – although the character is not really a simpleton), thusmisrepresenting the historical figure in his attempt to promote Coperni-can cosmology.20


6

As indicated above, scholars of the eighteenth century perpetuated thestrong classical perspective on ancient writings by creating the label‘Neoplatonist’ in an attempt to categorise these recently recovered com-mentaries of late antiquity.21 The term inherently denigrates thephenomenon it describes as new-fangled, derivative and unoriginal. Thisjudgement did much to relegate the late Platonist writings to the status ofsecond-rate works, thus canonising the view that they are parasitic bynature (as if existing only to comment on another author) and a con-fused type of philosophy, neither Platonic nor Aristotelian. As Gersonhas pointedly remarked, it is ‘an empty term’ but still used as a ‘termof abuse’.22

It was not until 1882 that the first modern edition of Simplicius’commentaries began to be published, inaugurating a massive publishingproject of the Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin to edit all known lateGreek commentaries. This was the first and only modern edition of thePlatonist commentaries on Aristotle, published in the late nineteenth andearly twentieth century under the general editorship of Hermann Diels.Diels’ realisation that some of these long works could actually be useful forother areas (Presocratic philosophy in particular) helped with the produc-tion of some twenty-five fat volumes (c. 15,000 pages) between 1887 and1910. The edition includes commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphys-ics and Ethics by the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE), andPlatonists Simplicius (c. 530 CE), Philoponus (c. 530 CE), Olympiodorus (c.650 CE) and others. But Diels’ objective to mine these texts for preciousfragments (a kind of antiquarianism which has gone out of fashion)already betrays his skewed interest in this corpus.

The edition’s title emphatically announces the works as Greek commen-taries on Aristotle (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca). This labelcontributed further to the identification (or perhaps stigmatisation) ofthese works as derivative in form and a confused type of Platonism indoctrine, since the modern notion of commentary obscured the fact thatthe ancient works have features that are quite different from their latercounterparts. In other words, they were seen as secondary at best, whilemore severe assessments would regard them as parasitic. Such a viewpresumes a heavy-handed preference for the classical (Plato as a thinker‘contaminated’ by, or drowned in, syncretistic scholasticism and in need ofrescuing) and places a rather modern, but misguided, emphasis on origi-nality as the single most important criterion for philosophical discourse.The new interest in archaeological excavation and stripping away layersmay have played a role too. This post-Romantic and one-sided view of thelate Platonists has come under attack more recently. There are sufficientreasons to consider the late commentaries as distinct, creative and some-times even original pieces of writing.23

Hermann Diels’ original plan to recover early Greek philosophy fromthe many sources already studied by his teacher Usener led to a special


7

interest in extracting the invaluable Presocratic passages from Simplicius’Physics commentary.24 Unfortunately, the edition is compromised by hastyexecution and flawed collations of the manuscripts in part dependent onresearches of others.25 Important studies by French scholars have pio-neered the study of Simplicius’ life and works since 1978.26 Since 1989comprehensive translations of his works have begun to appear, and it isexpected that all his commentaries in Greek will be available in Englishbefore long.27

The reasons for a monograph on Simplicius can therefore be summedup as follows. Reassessing the importance of Simplicius will work best byviewing his works as the last and most impressive stage of a long exegeti-cal tradition for the works of Aristotle by Platonists in the Greek language.My argument will aim at a revision of his reputation as an antiquarian or‘channel’ of Greek philosophy by trying to assess his methodology in thecomposition of the extant commentaries, with particular emphasis on hiscommentary on Aristotle’s Physics.

The brief history of the reception of Simplicius’ work given above hasmade it clear, I hope, that he has received a rather uneven treatment asan author. Yet Simplicius has had a presence of sorts in some quarters ofClassical studies. Those who study ancient philosophy will have heard ofhim in the tagline to numerous fragments laid out in Diels’ Fragmente derVorsokratiker (1st edn 1903), a collection of fragments of the so-calledPresocratic philosophers. Thus many scholars in ancient philosophy areaware of him without really knowing much about him.28 This narrow focuson him as the preserver of the ideas of other thinkers is one reason forwriting this book. So a second aim is to counter the somewhat fragmentedunderstanding of his value for late Greek philosophy.

A further, less obvious, reason for this study is that Simplicius holds aquite special place among his commentator colleagues. As indicated at theoutset, his working method, programmatic statements and wealth ofsource material in his works amount to an overall approach which is quitesui generis. One line of argument in this book (in part made implicitly bythe arrangement of chapters) aims to show that Simplicius is in fact worthknowing about as a scholar, and not just because his works are a thesaurusof Greek philosophical ideas and fragments. Studying these works withmore sympathetic eyes (instead of purist classical ones) will greatly assistin appreciating the author’s motives and aims.

My third major reason for writing this book is what I consider the mostoriginal part of the investigation: I intend to provide new insight into thelink between the hermeneutical and philosophical approach in the com-mentaries of Simplicius. I will argue that our understanding of Simplicius’methodology will be greatly enhanced if we study how in various ways hisscholarly approach impacts on his philosophical exegesis. His commentar-ies will be placed in their intellectual context, while several case studieswill shed light on his critical treatment of earlier philosophers and his (at


8

times polemical) use of existing commentaries. The investigation thus notonly clarifies the objectives, presuppositions and impact of his strategies,but also illustrates how Simplicius, as a competent philosopher explicat-ing Aristotelian and Platonic ideas, continues and develops a methodwhich pursues philosophy via clarification of early and classical philo-sophy. He keeps alive the tradition of philosophical exegesis marked by itsdoctrinal complexity and scholarship, which in his case is unusuallyself-conscious, learned and rich in its sources.

An aspect which plays a vital role throughout this enquiry is the role ofauthority and how Simplicius deals with this aspect: the multi-layereddocuments he produced contain a varied mix of primary sources andsecondary voices, in which different types of authority determine theselection, placement and exegesis of the text. Simplicius will be seen tojuggle all these ingredients skilfully. It is the way in which he constructshis exegeses and the outcomes of that strategy which need to be broughtout in a general account of his methodology, revealing also that Simpliciusis not just a collector of ‘fragments’ (as Diels’ Vorsokratiker might lead usto think, perhaps implicitly), nor the author of ‘commentary’ in the modernsense (his ‘written comments’ belong to the genre of hypomnêmata), normerely someone who ‘channels’ information from his predecessor commen-tators (as the introduction to his in Cat. might suggest).

With my central aims in mind, a very important question needs to beraised: what was the purpose of these expansive and detailed clarificationsto Aristotle’s works? If Simplicius was writing after 532, when paganswere no longer allowed to teach in Athens, the generally accepted viewthat these are products of an educational environment is problematic. Inaddition, the nature of the works as more scholarly and overly learned alsoseems to militate against the view that they could be intended for stu-dents, as Praechter already saw. Yet if an actual teaching practice wasnon-existent, he could still have written for an imagined one, perhapsbecause he was assuming or hoping that a future situation might arise inwhich his work could be used.

Depending on how we frame the question, enquiring after the purposeof Simplicius’ works can mean two things: first, his immediate objectivecan be one of explaining Aristotle; secondly, a more over-arching aim canbe at stake, which is part of the broader enterprise of late Platonism, inparticular the use of Aristotle as an introduction to Plato’s thought. Thefirst is more closely connected to an audience, the second to a larger vistaof the philosophical life and its ultimate end. As the heir to a long traditionof sophisticated and scholarly exegetes and as one of the ‘last’ paganphilosophers in an increasingly Christian world, Simplicius took up thebaton for pagan philosophy, and wrought a corpus that could serve severalpurposes. His rather extreme position of harmonising all Greek philo-sophers (sumphônia, sunaidein) is his dominant concern, which we caninterpret as an attempt to counteract the Christian rhetoric of stressing


9

the disagreement among pagan philosophers – a strategy cleverly adaptedfrom the sceptical tradition.29 His work can thus be read as an attempt tocounter the common strategy among Christian authors of exploiting themany disagreements among pagan philosophers to argue that Christian-ity was superior because it was a unified doctrine. It is likely that he basedhis verdict on ‘doxographical’ lists which were influenced by the scepticaltradition in which an emphasis on the disagreement (diaphônia) amongphilosophers was exploited to reach ‘suspension of judgement’ (epochê).30

Working from these considerations I will challenge the still current viewon all four points, based on a new analysis of the historical evidence andof the internal evidence of his approach in the commentaries. I will suggestthat his aim was to supply teachers with the material to explain Aristotle:thus both the didactic motive and the scholarly nature can be explainedsatisfactorily.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter I shall explain how thisstudy will contribute to our understanding of Simplicius’ exegetical andphilosophical methodology by sketching the intellectual context (§0.1),what we know about Simplicius’ life and works (§0.2), and what my ownmethod is, before giving an outline of the book (§0.3).

0.1 Philosophy in late antiquity: eclecticism, syncretismand ‘post-classicism’

Philosophical commentaries by Platonists from late antiquity (250-700 CE)are unusual works: they are long, complex and esoteric. Their claim to bePlatonic in inspiration has had a mixed reception, because early moderninterpreters considered them the product of a process of amalgamationand re-interpretation (what we would now call eclecticism and/or syncre-tism). Such labels are the crutches for academic categorisations, attemptsto deal with schools of thought in the ‘post-classical’ era. The form ofPlatonism Simplicius adhered to takes its character from the re-interpre-tation of Plato and Aristotle, pre-eminently by the philosopher Plotinus, aHellenised Egyptian who started his philosophical career in Alexandria inthe third century CE, and undergoing further revisions up to Proclus in thefifth century. It is characterised by a number of different elements andinfluences, producing a tradition which is uniform in taking Plato’s worksas the major point of reference, yet quite varied in other respects.31 It wouldfor this period be more appropriate to speak of ‘Platonisms’, but forpractical purposes I shall continue to refer to the phenomenon as (late)Platonism. ‘The essence of Plotinus’ system’, Dodds shrewdly observed,‘lies in the new meaning which the whole imposed on the parts; its trueoriginality is not in the materials but in the design � to appreciate thiskind of originality you must read your author in extenso’.32 Plotinus did‘channel’ much of the preceding Greek ideas in a peculiar way, andscholars did not easily accept the new stance emerging from this process


10

of assimilation: if we go looking for Plato and Aristotle in Plotinus and hissuccessors, we end up disappointed. The transformative power of Plotinus’mind would not allow for this kind of purificatory exercise without distort-ing both. Unless ‘Plotinism’ is read as a philosophical system in its ownright, we will be asking the wrong questions and get confusing answers.Simplicius followed in the footsteps of interpreters of Plotinus, who re-served the right to develop and transform his ideas once more, and thecommentaries reflect this doctrinal complexity in all its richness. Thesechanges were brought on by individual tastes as much as external pres-sures: to attract students and find an interest in their community, compet-ing schools of thought, especially Christianity, were major factors in thetwo centuries leading up to Simplicius’ time.

Among classicists one aspect in particular has started to draw theattention recently: the scholarly nature of these commentaries.33 Thewritings can, from hindsight, most easily be understood as the result ofseveral developmental stages and creative moves in the continuous at-tempt to understand Plato’s thought as well as respond to contemporaryneeds and pressures. Philosophy and science were now taught in organ-ised contexts and progress was a matter of interpretation of texts.34 WithPlotinus, Platonism’s focus became emphatically otherworldly, but with-out fully rejecting nature. While the physical world is of secondaryimportance, their analysis of physics is anything but irrelevant. Theirperspective is religious as well as philosophical: a deeper understandingof, and concomitant respect for, the creation was a form of worshipping god(or the One), and an aid to achieving their ultimate goal, the ‘return’ togod. Thus theology becomes identified with metaphysics.35

Late Platonism after Plotinus developed along two distinct lines, whichproceed in parallel: on the one hand there is the increasingly scholarlynature of the doctrine, which complicates retracing influences and sources;on the other hand, there is the notion that true knowledge has becomegradually overlaid with misguided views and thus corrupted. This broughton another revival of Pythagoreanism and Iamblichus’ attempt to show(like Porphyry before him) that Plato and Aristotle derived their ideasfrom Pythagoras. Iamblichus, however, had a very systematic conceptionof the nature of Greek philosophy, more so than most of his predecessors.36

If the idea of harmonising Greek philosophy arose quite early, Iamblichusprovided a convenient new model which ensured a unitarian vision: Plato-nism now became strongly Pythagorean in outlook.37 Clearly, then, by thefifth century late Platonism had a unity based on authority and ancientwisdom, which seemed backward-looking and intent on perpetuating anestablished doctrine.

In explicating Aristotle’s philosophy, later Platonists in fact use com-mentaries as a vehicle for philosophical and scientific thought, andstudying Aristotle prepared students in the Neoplatonist curriculum forthe study of Plato. Although Praechter already signalled that Simplicius


11

would certainly express his personal views on matters,38 this view hasfound favour only in more recent years.39 The same holds for the work onPhiloponus, a contemporary working in Alexandria, who has been shownto be a truly original thinker.40 The ancient ‘commentary’ is in fact not somuch a choice of genre for its own sake, but rather the natural by-productof the ongoing dialogue between teachers and pupils, past and presentwith at the core the presumed or real authority of a pioneering thinker.41

As I will show in Chapter 1, the historical Simplicius is not quite thedogmatic diehard Galileo wants us to believe.42

0.2 Simplicius of Cilicia: life and worksNot much is known about the life of Simplicius of Cilicia, and even hisdates are somewhat tentative. The bare facts are quickly laid out. Givenhis education (see below), a birth date of c. 480 CE is probable. Theterminus post quem for his death is thought to be after 538, when hiscommentary on the De caelo was written (Hadot 1987b). Thus we end upwith c. 540 CE as a likely year for his death, since there is no evidence forhim after this date.

So far as can be gleaned from the surviving corpus and a variety ofreports in Greek, Latin and Arabic sources, Simplicius’ works were manyand varied. He wrote several long commentaries on Aristotle’s works, acommentary on Epictetus’ Manual, and on some scientific works. The firstgroup is immensely important, as these works preserve important mate-rial from early Greek philosophy, Platonic and Peripatetic philosophers,Stoicism, and scientific texts.43 His work enhances our understanding ofwork in ancient physics, astronomy and ethics. Ilsetraut Hadot (1987b; cf.2001, xxxiv-xl) has presented the most detailed account of his works knownto be extant and lost. She has plausibly argued that he wrote his commentar-ies c. 533-40 CE (where is still very much disputed, see §1.3). His extensivecommentaries reveal little about his life and whereabouts, and what littlethere is has been mostly cause for controversy. On the basis of externalsources we can sketch a few important moments of his life and travelsrepresenting the current state of knowledge, but many of the details remainuncertain, including the latest discussions of his stay in Syria after the tripto Persia when teaching in Athens became banned (529 CE).44

A pupil of Ammonius in Alexandria and Damascius in Athens, Sim-plicius was educated in the curriculum of (late) Platonic thought. Thisphilosophical system had by now been established, after the pioneeringwork of Plotinus (210-275 CE), the religious graftings of Pythagoreanthought of Iamblichus (and continued by Syrianus), and further systema-tising reworking of the emerging system of thought by Proclus (d. 485 CE).To be a part of such a tradition meant to be part of an institutionalisedschool of thought in which continuity was important in a direct chain ofteacher-pupil connections.45


12

After Justinian’s edicts which led to closure of the pagan schools in 529CE in Athens, Simplicius and some colleagues joined the head of the school,Damascius, and travelled to Persia (probably in 532).46 This historic event,marking the end of the Platonic Academy in Athens, has become a hotlydebated topic, as it is riddled with difficulties. Of our main sources for theepisode, Malalas mentions the edicts, while the Byzantine historianAgathias gives a very biased account against the Persians. The moderndebate has focused on a thesis put forward by Tardieu (1990), that thephilosophers founded a school in Harran (ancient Carrhae) in Syria, whichsupposedly lasted for three centuries. Although it is likely that thesePlatonists – most of whom were Greek-speaking non-Greeks – reachedHarran after leaving Persia, the thesis about a continuing school there hasnot found favour with many, and has been rejected outright in particularby Arabic scholars (Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998). I shall return to the issuein Chapter 1.3.

The bulk of Simplicius’ known works are the so-called commentaries onAristotle: On the heavens, Physics (written after 538),47 and Categories(written after the Physics commentary).48 In addition there is the commen-tary on the Encheiridion of the Stoic Epictetus (c. 55-c. 135 CE), and hemay have written on Hermogenes’ Technê. I. Hadot has argued that theremight have been a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (see below).49

The later reports add further titles and fragmentary remains to the list ofhis works. Like many other late Platonists Simplicius had an interest inscientific matters, though perhaps the primary motivation for this part oftheir studies was fundamentally theological and philosophical. He pro-vides us with sources on astronomy, mathematics (Eudoxus, Eudemus,Sosigenes), and meteorology (Poseidonios from Geminus’ summary).50

In addition, there are two pieces of evidence, only extant in the Arabicsources, which seem to attribute to Simplicius commentaries (or at leasta commentary) on a medical work.51 One is the Fihrist (vol. 13, 159.9), abio-bibliography by ibn al-Nadim (tenth century CE), which simply listsSimplicius along with several other names as ‘commentators on Hip-pocrates up to the time of Galen’ (sic), without indicating what hecommented on. The more interesting passage is in Abu Bakr al-Razi’sKitab al-Hawi fi al-tibb (Comprehensive book on medicine),52 which namesSimplicius as the author of a commentary on the Hippocratic work Kitabal-Kasr (presumably ‘On Fractures’).53 Hunayn b. Ishaq (808-873 CE) knewof two distinct commentaries on this work by Galen, and the Fihrist states(I, 388.14 Flügel) that Hunayn translated the first book of Galen’s Hip-pocrates commentary.

This remarkable Arabic line of transmission requires some furthercomment. It is unusual that Simplicius should wish to comment on amedical work (especially a practical treatise like the On fractures), and theerroneous chronology in the Fihrist also raises some suspicion. Could thistradition be transmitting a spurious or mistaken attribution? Ullman has


13

suggested that we are dealing here with a different Simplicius, but thiswould be unsatisfactory as an argument from silence.54 Another possibilityis perhaps a confusion over titles or authors: elsewhere Simplicius men-tions Hippocrates of Chios in connection with a mathematical problem (inPhys. 69.22-3). But that must mean that the confusion arose before theArabic authors got hold of this information, given that they present thecomment in a list of medical works. The Arabic titles are unambiguoushere: ‘commentators on Hippocrates’ books, coming after him until Galen’stime: Sinbliqiyus, Santalus, Disqurudus the First’ (transl. E. Gannagé).On the available evidence we cannot confirm or deny whether he wrotesuch a commentary, but it does constitute an anomaly.

Thus we see that Simplicius had a wide-ranging interest in science andphilosophy, a reflection of the broad education he received in Alexandria andAthens. His circumstances after 531 CE may have been a contributing factorfor him to write extensively on philosophical and scientific matters andexplicating the ideas of ancient authorities. His legacy reaches far into latertimes as a worthwhile source for clarification of Aristotle in the Middle Ages,and as a prime defender of the concordia (Greek harmonia, sumphônia) be-tween Aristotelians and Platonists in the Renaissance, to the most importantsource for Presocratic materials since the late nineteenth century.

0.3 Method and outline of this studyThe main parameters of my approach to Simplicius and his works aredetermined by recent scholarship on late antique philosophy, making useof the insights that have been emerging. As the division of chaptersindicates, the organising principle is chronological as well as by thoseauthors which play a significant role in his narrative. There can be nodoubt that I skate over a lot of thin ice and deal only with the mostsignificant aspects of this vast topic. This investigation, then, is both asynthesis and a new treatment of Simplicius the scholar. Here I givepriority to those aspects which have not been discussed comprehensivelyin the scholarly literature.

The approach is new in that, instead of presenting him merely as asource for Greek philosophy, it focuses on the author himself with aparticular interest in the questions how and why is he crafting his com-mentaries. Answering these questions will provide insight into at leastfour important aspects. I aim to bring out:

(1) the underlying assumptions of his working method in order to revealthe important context and his motivation for preserving the invalu-able information contained in these works;

(2) the socio-cultural and intellectual framework of the extant body ofwriting, so we come to see how important it is to assess an author onhis own terms;


14

(3) the wider appeal of this author by taking a mixed approach of philologi-cal, literary and argumentative background to what is traditionallyconsidered a philosophical text – thus illustrating that these textscontain material of interest to classicists, historians, and philosophersalike;

(4) the value of the contextualising approach which emphasises the use ofcontext in a source author for the study of those authors who areimportant as sources for early Greek thought.

A further question, also connected to (2) and the issue of the purpose ofthese works (above, p. 6), is whether they originate in, or were meant for,teaching. The seemingly obvious answer is that they did, given that thebulk of such hypomnêmata arose when a master would expound the settexts in the curriculum. Yet many distinctive features in Simplicius’works, such as their learning, lavishness, style, and authorial voice, differgreatly from other commentaries of this period which are often self-declared notes from lectures (apo phônês, i.e. notes taken by students ‘fromthe voice’ of the teacher).

Obviously, Simplicius’ reputation should neither depend on a seven-teenth-century caricature nor – what is perhaps worse – on the side-effectsof his treatment by eighteenth-century prejudice or nineteenth-centuryscholars, who mined him for his reports and quotations of Presocratic andother philosophers. His works may be more a methodically executedexegesis than a riveting read, but viewed from a vantage point that betterappreciates his aims and objectives we may produce a less harsh judg-ment. No one can deny that they contain a fascinating mixture ofscholarship, exegesis and late Platonist thought. It is my claim that allthree aspects will benefit from a synoptic analysis so that the differentlayers present in the work and the various forces informing Simplicius’approach can be uncovered and thus contribute to an understanding of hisproject, before we attempt to deal with the thinkers he has incorporated.The underlying assumption is that a reported view is often only as good asthe reporter: we are at the mercy of the latter’s selectivity, manipulationeven, in presenting the materials. Simplicius ‘manages information’ in away which can be understood only from his own principles and practice.The challenge here – and this is not an original thought – is to try andmake sure that we become (more) aware of the assumptions, ideological orotherwise, which have determined the method of the source author. Thiswill often be a matter of degree, since it is almost impossible to reconstructan author’s motivations and predilections completely. Yet with Simpliciuswe can go a long way, in part because of the large corpus and contemporarymaterials, in part because we can gain considerable insight on what hethinks his project is.

That said, a few comments must be made on the scope and method ofthis study. The points discussed in the foregoing sections emerge from my


15

focus on Simplicius’ works as the products of a specific agenda. But thetopic is potentially inexhaustible: the commentaries are very long works,and Simplicius belongs to a tradition in which extensive and complexwritings precede his; they had become a fixed ingredient of the philosophi-cal practice. So it will be very important to narrow down the scope of thisinvestigation in several respects. To establish a historical context andsome basic facts about his life will not be a high priority. A considerableamount of work has been done on the meagre facts of his biography, andrecent work on the historical context of the late Roman Empire and theByzantine period as well as the Persian Empire in the fourth to seventhcenturies CE can help to update the accepted narrative. A radically differ-ent account is not to be expected.

The guiding principle of organisation will be twofold: on the one hand Iwill use Simplicius’ own programmatic statements about the aim of hiscommentaries as a working hypothesis to understand what his aim was inwriting such extensive scholarly works and how his methodology contrib-utes to this. On the other hand, I shall arrange the materials according toour modern concern with his role as an important source of ancientphilosophical thought – crucial in the case of some Presocratics, but no lessimportant for many later thinkers such as Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eude-mus, Xenarchus, Boethus in the case of the early Peripatetics, andPlotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, Syrianus, Iamblichus, Ammonius and Phi-loponus in the case of the later Platonists. Any discussion of earlierthinkers will have to start from the Simplician text, so that a roughlychronological arrangement imposes itself. But this approach will be com-bined with a more thematic one, in that the overall argument tries to showhow the presence of earlier thinkers is subordinated to Simplicius’ pro-gramme of showing the harmony among philosophers.

With the objective to study the significance of Simplicius’ commentarystyle on his presentation and interpretation of the material, we need toraise awareness of the ways in which Simplicius is embedding the ideas ofothers into his works. If we can apply appropriate qualifications forfiltering out the ‘information’ he provides, our understanding of the ‘frag-ments’ he transmits should also benefit from such an approach. Ultimatelyone hopes to use Simplicius’ reports as a window onto the views of earlierthinkers whose survival depends fully or substantially on his commentar-ies.55 It will exceed the scope of this study to implement such insights, butfor the Presocratics I will suggest that the boundaries between A and Bfragments is not as clear-cut as the Diels-Kranz selection implies.

It is clear that the ‘colouring’ of Simplicius’ reports requires sensitivereading. In an attempt to defuse bias (whether ancient or modern) ourreassessment concerns both the nature and the constitution of his narra-tive: we should ask how the views incorporated into his exegesis contributeto a new whole. The appropriate image for this process is perhaps that ofweaving: the ‘fabric’ of the commentaries often strikes the reader as varied


16

and multi-coloured in its composition, with different strands skilfullywoven into the overall ‘pattern’, but also with some less fitting additionswhich seem to disrupt the natural progression or train of thought. Nomatter what image we use, the complexity of Simplicius’ activity as ascholar, philosopher and exegete requires careful study for a proper char-acterisation. It is my claim that the relationship between his approach asa scholar and his philosophical exegesis deserves more attention than ithas received, and it is this aspect in particular that I have set out to clarifyin this book. Relevant questions here are: Is the commentator creating anew interpretation or rehearsing existing ones? Is he at the mercy of hissources? Who is he writing for? How does he view his own project?

By emphasising the socio-cultural and intellectual framework of thecorpus, we try to assess how important it is to judge an author on his ownterms. In addition we can show that it is possible to go across establishedboundaries of disciplines, by making clear that in many texts usually studiedonly by philosophers or historians of philosophy and science contain materialof interest to non-philosophers (e.g. classicists, historians of scholarship), andto make a strong case for the contextualising approach which studies thoseauthors who are important as sources for early Greek thought, on the basisof their own motives and background, while clarifying the motives, meansand outcomes of Simplicius’ working method. Additional points of interest,relating to the historical context in which these works were written, the genreof the works, and the transmission of early Greek philosophy will be dealtwith alongside the main argument. The investigation will thus open upconnections with broader issues, in particular the reception of Presocraticphilosophy within the commentary tradition, the nature and purpose of thesecommentaries, and the demise of pagan philosophy.

Simplicius represents an intriguing stage in the development of com-mentaries in antiquity. Although he conforms in general to the exegeticaltradition of writing detailed comments on Aristotle, his methodologyseems to stand out in a significant number of ways. However, the originalcontext in which his commentaries arose can be established only fromgeneral contextual evidence of the time without exact knowledge of hiswhereabouts. This leads to the question what purpose these works served.I will argue that we can get closer to understanding his objective(s) if westudy his scholarly approach in conjunction with his philosophical exege-sis. His outlook and working method are crucial to assess the way in whichhe weaves his philosophical exegesis out of the material he had at hisdisposal. This will not only enable us to put his work in context, but alsoto put the reported material into perspective, from the Presocratics,Theophrastus and Eudemus through to Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200CE), Porphyry (c. 300 CE) and Damascius (c. 500-30 CE).

*


17

In outline the study falls into two parts: Chapters 1-3 detail how Sim-plicius comments on, and makes use of, early and classical Greek philo-sophy, in particular his attempt to forge a unified interpretation of Greekphilosophy as a whole. Here Presocratic, Platonic and Aristotelian ideasbecome part of a comprehensive exegesis of the world by arguing for anessential harmony among all Greek philosophers despite certain disagree-ments among them (in Phys. 29.3-5). It requires him to re-interpretPresocratic thought as a premonition of Platonic thought (as he sees it)and to impose his Neoplatonic views in the light of his own intellectualbackground. These three chapters thus consider how Simplicius is offeringan extended exegesis of early and classical Greek thought with a comprehen-sive purpose in mind. Chapter 1 prepares the way for the analysis byproviding historical context and considerations regarding the practical cir-cumstances of his scholarly pursuits. Chapter 2 starts the analysis with thePresocratics and how they are handled by Simplicius. Chapter 3 looks at theinterpretive moves for understanding Aristotle with the aid of his immediatesuccessors, Theophrastus (c. 380-c. 287 CE) and Eudemus (c. 350-c. 290 CE).This is the last section of Part I and it marks the transitional stage in whichAristotle’s works slowly begin to gain canonical status, so that exegeticalwork done by his successors can be taken as the first attempts to reach a morestable meaning of his overall system by way of textual analysis.

Chapters 4-6 (the second part of the book), on the other hand, look atthe ‘secondary’ sources which assisted Simplicius in this interpretation, bysampling the most important early Peripatetic and Platonist philosophersas well as his predecessors in the commentators genre. Here we learnmuch about the antecedents of his format and style, the major influenceson his working method and his interpretation, and how the philosophicalrunning commentary grew as a genre. Along the way attention will be paidto a number of additional aspects, such as the variety and styles ofexegetical terminology (and their background), his position within thetradition, his appreciation of earlier commentators, and his importance forour knowledge of Greek philosophy. Chapter 4 shows the pervading pres-ence and influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias, an illustration of theprocess of harmonisation and the ease with which a Peripatetic commen-tator could influence Platonist exegesis. Chapter 5 will selectively retracePlatonist exegetical developments and links with Simplicius’ method.Chapter 6 will highlight the importance of rhetoric and polemic in exegeti-cal debates, with particular attention to the acrimonious conflict betweenSimplicius and Philoponus. This debate shows how the issue over thebeginning of the world is paramount in the conflict of religious perspec-tives in the early sixth century. To round off this study the Epilogue aimsto draw together the different strands from both parts and to build apicture of the methodology of our author. The three major aspects underinvestigation, scholarship, exegesis and philosophy, will be shown to beintricately linked.


18

In sum, I hope the reader will come to agree with the view thatSimplicius is one of those rare authors who is of interest to ancientphilosophers, historians and classicists. He is a competent philosopherwho explicates Aristotelian thought and at the same time continues anddevelops an exegetical method which has its roots in the Platonic Academyof the Hellenistic period, but with significant developments under Plotinusand his followers. He thus keeps alive the tradition of exegesis which isremarkable for its complexity in amalgamating different schools ofthought, while he also represents a stage in the history of scholarshipwhich is remarkably self-conscious, learned and rich in its sources. Withroughly 3,000 pages of his commentaries extant, there is still much thatinvites further study and analysis. By studying how his methodologydetermines his exegesis I hope to contribute to adjusting the negativejudgement of him still present in modern scholarship, and to creating anew profile for an author who has been rather neglected and, to someextent, misunderstood.


19

1

The Scholar and His Books

The composition of long and complicated works is not a simple matter inany period, but it is clear that ancient authors had to cope with somespecial practical problems which could make or break such an endeavour.Simplicius’ voluminous commentaries on Aristotle provide us with anopportunity to study a scholar with his books at work. A good startingpoint for our enquiry is to determine what kind of activity Simplicius isinvolved in, in both a mechanical and an ideological sense. The first aspectis central for our purpose of providing a broad account of the methodologyof Simplicius. The term ‘methodology’ is used here in a quite specific way.If we come to Simplicius assuming that we are looking at a philosopher,we are at risk of an oversight that will seriously disadvantage our inves-tigation: Simplicius belongs to a particular philosophical tradition, Plato-nism, which comes to the study of the world with deeply religious motivesas well as certain technical skills of a scholarly nature that accompany thephilosophical activities of the late Platonists.1 It can be argued that thereligious dimension became more important in late antiquity as a resultof the rise of a new spiritual force, Christianity. Platonism would now haveto clarify its message in competition with this new ‘doctrine’. Simpliciusthus stands at the end of a powerful tradition of textual exegesis of pagantheology. A proper understanding of his working method requires us tostudy his approach as a blend of philological, philosophical and theologicalpositions. This chapter starts by looking at Simplicius as a scholar, study-ing his use of texts as they were available to him and the manner in whichthey become incorporated into, and assimilated to, the ambitious writingswe now call his commentaries.

In this study ‘methodology’ will serve as a broad term for the strategiesan author uses to reach his goals. Simplicius’ immediate objective is toclarify Aristotle’s thought, but also to maintain that Aristotle’s ideas arehelpful in understanding Plato’s thought, which should ultimately lead tothe higher experience of the divine truth.2 Philosophical analysis of textsis thus also a religious activity, which is supposed to have an impact onpeople’s individual lives. I will also distinguish methodology from scholar-ship proper, the concrete means to an end: the activity of collecting andevaluating information on its formal aspects, making notes, planning andarranging the layout of the work are important elements of Simplicius’scholarship. Although most studies of Presocratic philosophers will havesome comments on the approach for the particular fragments (and in rare

21

cases the wider context), there is good reason to present a broader analy-sis: the circumstances and practical contingencies of philosophical authorsfrom the early sixth century CE deserve our special attention, and I shallconsider a select set of statements (discussed elsewhere) as a springboardfor further exploration and elaboration.3

The questions that will occupy us in this and subsequent chapters rangefrom practical issues such as manuscripts and access to sources (whichkind, how many), to also more theoretical concerns, such as the nature andmethodological underpinnings of commentary. These issues are both inti-mately linked with the questions why and where Simplicius would havecomposed his long works. The issue of his whereabouts has generatedconsiderable debate and although I do not intend to replicate it, no onedealing with the amount and diversity of Simplicius’ sources can avoidsaying something about it. My argument will summarise the more recentcontributions which tend to respond sceptically to the thesis put forwardby Tardieu (1987).

Another important issue is that of Simplicius’ source referencing. In thescholarly literature Simplicius’ use of quotations, and in particular hisgenerosity in quoting, is mostly taken for granted instead of explained.4

For a long time his works have been used as quarries and understandablythe important question of reliability has dominated the discussion. Schol-ars agree that his longer quotations are reliable (though not free fromerror), but are less clear about the reasons for their presence in the commen-taries. Was this sixth-century Neoplatonist just an antiquarian delighting inwriting long commentaries? Or did he have specific reasons for his elaboratequotes, perhaps as the result of serious reflection upon his own method? Myanswer will affirm the latter option and my thesis is that Simplicius’ worksdo not quite fit the pattern of existing commentaries up to his day (forhistorical and textual reasons): the different formats found in other commen-taries, such as notes taken at lectures (apo phônês), probing question andanswer (aporiai and solution), and problem-based tracts (problêmata orzêtêmata), are quite different from what we find in his works.

These questions can be addressed by focussing on Simplicius the scholarand his use of sources, in particular the ways in which he selects andinterprets other texts in any given context. As Simplicius wrote hiscommentaries at a time when pagan religion and philosophy had beenlosing so much ground to Christianity, we must also be aware of hisfrustration over the role of Platonism: the pagan religio-philosophicaloutlook seemed to be in a desperate state. I will suggest that the extensiveworks he created seem to present a large-scale attempt to turn the tideand also, as I hope to show, to assist others in doing so. In other words, Iargue that the comprehensive and detailed commentaries he provides forthe Aristotelian works constitute the material to assist later generationsto sustain a pagan theology: they are almost the equivalent of an elaboratetextbook, intended for future teachers.5

Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius

22

Much of Simplicius’ material and approach is influenced by othercommentaries available to him. The motives for using such an enormousrange of sources was until quite recently one of the little studied aspectsof his remarkable working method. In talking about the relationshipbetween the scholarly and the philosophical we as modern readers aretrying to appreciate the fascinating mixture of scholarship, exegesis andNeoplatonic philosophy in these works. Ideally all three aspects should beinvolved in a synoptic analysis. But one thing which has always come tothe fore is his emphatic use of quotations. For modern scholars this mayseem an almost obvious thing to do in historical research. But is it for asixth-century Platonist? It clearly wasn’t for his colleagues or many otherancient writers before him. So on that score too certain questions need tobe addressed: How does his scholarship relate to his philosophical exege-sis? What can we say about his use of sources? Why does he insist on usingquotations? How does he quote and process them? What is the relationbetween paraphrase and quotation? These and other questions still awaitanswers. In a first attempt to tackle this problem I give an account ofSimplicius’ attitude(s) towards writing scholarly comments and usingquotations.

In §1.2 I shall first demonstrate that he had considered views aboutquotation, and next that he provides clues as to why he thinks directquotation is important; I shall conclude by speculating about the questionwhy he thought ipsissima verba are important. I suggest his motive is animplicit one which may connect his philological method to his philosophi-cal outlook. This three-step analysis will help to contextualise Simplicius’method and in a way it tells us as much about Simplicius’ procedure as itdoes about our own presuppositions concerning the process of transmis-sion and interpretation of texts.6

His elaborate use of ‘secondary literature’ raises a further point in thiscontext, that of authority versus innovation. Originality is not among themuch-praised objectives in late antique philosophy: whenever the phe-nomenon turns up, it is referred to in rather negative terms. Simpliciuspoints to the influence of his teachers, Ammonius, Syrianus and Damas-cius, claiming that he adds little to the doctrines and argument presented,but merely repeats their great insights. This claim is actually not to betaken at face value, partly because it is a topos, partly because it is amatter of respect and acknowledgement of belonging to a tradition: it doesnot exclude originality. This attitude does, however, require us to be moresensitive to the oblique and subtle ways in which new ideas were intro-duced. At the same time it is clear that Simplicius does not always shyaway from stating that he is making suggestions on his own behalf, but hewill often use turns of phrase that look like hesitation or doubt.7 Anadditional complicating factor is of course the concept of philosophy andits history: working with the assumption that there is a body of workwhich represents a canon, that is, a set of ideas which represents the true

1. The Scholar and His Books

23

account of the universe and everything in it, does not create a lot of roomto manoeuvre, or so it seems. One can easily see that this will create asituation in which innovations will have to be introduced under a differentlabel or description so as to create the impression that it belongs to thediscussion, or what is even better, was there all along.

In short, this chapter aims to prepare the analysis of Simplicius’ meth-odology by paying attention to three interrelated issues: the backgroundof philosophical commentary (§1.1), the significant claims about methodand the practical aspects of his commentary activity (§1.2), and the puzzleabout the location of his writing activities (§1.3). It will be necessary to askwhat his sources were, how they could be available to him, how importantthey are, and how much of them he preserves. This will take us from thediscussion of the sources in his works to his role in their preservation.Some of these questions are about the ‘logistics’ of ancient scholarship,others about the historical circumstances that Simplicius found himself in.Did he have a big library at his disposal? If he was travelling (as we thinkhe was at least from 531 to 533), how did he manage to quote so manybooks (and in what form)? What was his method of organising and usingthese sources? Not only is the range of sources remarkable, but he seemsto have had access to (copies of) ancient works of the earliest stages ofGreek philosophy, the Presocratics. This mapping out of approach andmaterial (including a tree diagram of sources and their interrelations)serves two purposes: (1) to give a convenient overview of the range andkinds of sources used by Simplicius; (2) to illustrate the level of scholarlymethodology present in his works.

1.1 The author: historical and intellectual contextContextualising late antique commentaries is necessary in order to pre-empt a fundamental misunderstanding that the word ‘commentary’ maygenerate, and to allow for this examination to be properly placed withinrecent and current research in this area. As a member of the Platonistmovement of the early sixth century CE, Simplicius belonged to a highlyliterate and tradition-conscious movement, which had taught and studiedphilosophy by elaborate comments on, and explication of, Aristotle’s andPlato’s works for several centuries. His teachers in both Alexandria andAthens were themselves trained in reading texts with close attention todetail – an ancient tradition of interpreters possessing great skills inscholarship. It is a reasonable assumption that the techniques of literarycriticism, which previously had blossomed in Alexandria in the third andsecond centuries BCE, left their mark on the scholars and philosophers ofthe Imperial age, continuing into late antiquity.8 Although standard ac-counts of scholarship tend to follow the pagan strand only, it is becomingmore and more evident that the advances of literary criticism left theirmark on authors engaged in religious and scientific research and exegesis


24

in Alexandria, as the connexions between philosophy and literature ex-hibit striking similarities from Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus(first century BCE?) up to the time of Simplicius.9 Showing how Simpliciuswas a part of this tradition will clarify how much he takes on board andcontributes himself. I start with a brief sketch of the development of thephilosophical commentary and its roots.10

Philosophical exegesis, the practice of interpreting the oral and writtenideas of those from the past and present, started to emerge in the sixthand fifth centuries BCE as part of the polemical discourse among Presocrat-ics and Sophists and reached a more focused and ‘professional’ quality inHellenistic times, when the writing of so-called ‘running’ commentaries onphilosophical texts became part of the philosopher’s task. Early on, text(rhêton) and subtext (dianoia/huponoia) became lexical reflexes of physi-cal phenomena and their deeper meaning: ‘the appearances are a glimpseof the obscure’ is a slogan attributed to several Presocratics, in particularAnaxagoras (B21a DK) and Democritus (B117 DK). Particularly strikingfeatures, to name the most important points in the repertoire of theseearly ‘exegetes’, are the distinguishing of a word’s different meanings, theassumption that a text has a hidden meaning or huponoia (literally‘under-meaning’),11 and a general concern for the plausibility of the text inhow it represents the world. In Alexandria the study of Homer led tohermeneutical techniques in literary and philological circles, and no doubtsome of the interactions among scholars assisted the progression in thetechnical aspects of exegesis, a cumulative process which would bringphilology and philosophy closer together. Although this development canhardly be described as linear, we can trace some of the more importantstages through time up to the late antiquity, the focus of this study.

After the earliest exegetical exploits by Homeridae and the SophistsPlato stands at the crossroads of oral and literate forms of expression.12

Seen within the broader intellectual context his dialogues appear at a timewhen certain exegetical tactics are already well established, but they donot yet belong to a self-conscious, scholarly enterprise with formal rules.It is with Aristotle that we reach the more systematic level that begins toexhibit awareness of the complexities of language and meta-languageinvolved in interpreting texts.

The continuation of textual exegesis is mostly traceable in the Christiantradition and Bible interpretation. Philo, Origen, Clement of Alexandria,Jerome and Eusebius are among the figureheads of this quite variedtradition, all developing in some way the sophistication of exegeticalapproaches. They share with the Greek exegetes an interest in detailedanalysis in the service of a broader attempt to illustrate the coherence andunity of the authoritative text they focus on.13 Clearly, then, the commen-tary tradition – the exegetical engagement with philosophical textsconsidered canonical – had a long history before Simplicius and continuedto thrive after him.


25

To have at least a general understanding of the aim of Simplicius’project of commenting on Aristotle two preliminary points must be made.First, it is not obvious why Simplicius and his colleagues, who regardedthemselves as Platonists (Platônikoi) devoted so much time to explainingAristotle. Starting with Plotinus (c. 210-75 CE) a new ‘curriculum’ forwould-be Platonists was designed; this was developed further by Plotinus’pupil and biographer Porphyry, marking a new stage in the history ofGreek philosophy.14 Again we find ourselves in an educational contextwhere direct teacher-pupil interaction remained crucial, but with a sur-prising twist: instead of upholding a sharp contrast between Plato andAristotle, the Platonists started using Aristotle’s work as the introductionto Plato’s thought, and commentary on both authors became the preferredmode of education. As Sorabji (1990: 5) puts it: ‘Not for the only time in thehistory of philosophy � a perfectly crazy position (harmony) provedphilosophically fruitful.’

Another important development was the strategy for reading Plato’sand Aristotle’s texts.15 Under the guidance of a spiritual master, bookswere read and interpreted (sunanagnôsis).16 It indicates how the Platonistschool activity led to a fixed curriculum with the emphasis on a well-regi-mented approach to these texts. These standard topics which crystallisedout in the later tradition, such as the purpose or subject (skopos), the title(epigraphê), the usefulness (khrêsimos), order (taxis), whether the work isgenuine (gnêsios17), or how to divide the text in smaller parts (tmêmata),have been studied extensively in recent years.18 Steadily expanded andrefined, this list acquired the status of prerequisites for evaluating Aris-totle’s works and would thus structure the reading of these texts.Simplicius uses it consistently in all three commentaries on Aristotle (see§1.2.1). Teacher and student(s) would deal with important issues ofauthenticity and purpose and would lay the basis for detailed page-by-page, sometimes line-by-line, commentary. Such an approach, groundedin generations of discussion, required a scholarly environment and thehabitual use of books. It also reflects the focus on a body of writingsregarded as a fixed set of texts representing an authoritative body ofknowledge used in teaching – that is, a canon.

Developments within the Academy after Plato and his immediate suc-cessors brought a sceptical phase (Arcesilaus to Philo), but by the latesecond century a return to dogmatic readings of the dialogues emergedunder Antiochus (fl. 110 BCE), who adopted a more liberal attitude to thedifferent ‘schools’ and their positions. A new Platonism developed whichcombined Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and (in the fifth century) Pythago-rean elements into a whole new system (see diagram on p. 30).19 Toestablish the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers had to think upnew ideas and the result was an amalgam different from either of the twooriginal philosophies. Gerson clarifies why this was possible: ‘Platonists,for the most part, did not regard Aristotle as an anti-Platonist.’20 It is a


26

remarkable development in this school of thought that since Porphyry, thepupil of Plotinus and editor of the latter’s works, the Neoplatonists areseen to harmonise the views of Aristotle and Plato openly and actively; weknow for instance that Porphyry wrote a work (now lost) entitled On Platoand Aristotle being adherents of the same philosophy (Suda 4.178.24-5 =fr. 240T Smith), though he also wrote on the differences between them).Whatever we think about this, we should accept that Aristotle’s workswere taught as an introduction to Plato and thus had a place in theNeoplatonic curriculum.21

One immediate result of such a strategy is of course that the moreextreme doctrinal differences need smoothing over. And in fact more oftenthan not we find that they will either be explained from superficialdifferences, verbal misunderstandings or explained away.22 But the basicposition which became a deeply felt conviction of most Platonists was that thedifferences between Aristotle and Plato were negligible (because mostlyillusory), and the similarities significant. In other words, Aristotle wasregarded more or less belonging to the Platonist tradition with a few diver-gent views. What we have here, then, is a new perspective which places aparticular emphasis on certain doctrines, and how they were intended, and aframework which de-emphasises doctrinal disagreements.

The teaching practice of explaining the texts of the main thinkers(especially Plato and Aristotle) remained very much oral through the ages,but with the additional benefit (if that is the right word) of preservingdiscussions and lectures in written form.23 In the case of Simplicius, itconcerns a special kind of approach to texts resulting from the highlysophisticated literate environment to which he belonged. The commentariesare multi-layered documents in which notes from oral presentation becomeoverlaid with revisions and added interpretations. We should therefore nottake the domains orality and literacy as always being mutually exclusive ina strict sense: they are compatible and co-existent phenomena which operateand interact in different ways and at different levels.

The importance of Simplicius’ works for recovering the words of manyancient philosophers is undisputed. His commentaries on Aristotle con-tain massive paraphrase and quotations (see diagram on p. 30). But theanalysis of such habits too often leads to conclusions which are the resultof modern projections about quotation from written sources, including themistaken assumption that accuracy was as important to the ancients as itis to modern scholarship. This is not to say that Simplicius was incapableof quoting accurately, but it should be remembered that the circumstancesin which these authors worked were difficult and decidedly different fromours: questions about availability of sources, the working method for‘processing’ them, and the role of the objectives the author has for hisworks need careful consideration. Since the latter can for now only beestablished on very general grounds, we will have to focus first on thesources and the way in which they are treated.


27

That Simplicius used a great range of sources from practically all majorperiods of Greek philosophy is as impressive a feature as it is complex andpuzzling. It is impressive, because their sheer number as well as diversitymust have created a logistical problem of archiving and managing them.Yet Simplicius succeeds in handling this quite well, as I will show inChapters 2-5. It is, however, also puzzling in the sense that we cannoteasily explain how he could have so many books (scrolls? codices?) avail-able at a time that he is said to be in exile and not allowed to teach inAthens as a result of the Justinian rulings regarding pagan teachings. Theso-called exile of the Platonists from Athens around 531-3 CE is a poorlydocumented and much discussed episode, which has not been definitivelydescribed (see §1.3). For the Presocratics Simplicius has played a crucialrole in recovering important parts of their works, and the statisticssupport this (see §2.1). His references to their ideas illustrate how muchmaterial (whether quotations, titles or other references) can be found inhis commentaries,24 from sources ranging from the Presocratics (sixth/fifthcentury BCE) up to his own time (early sixth century CE).25

Combined with a continuing tendency to make Aristotle’s views agreewith Plato (in Cat. 7.26-30), Simplicius generally manages to presentAristotle’s views as admirably clear and, after appropriate clarification,‘unproblematic’. (He does however express caution regarding the accep-tance of Aristotle’s views and brings a critical perspective to the text.)Nevertheless, there is a persistent and intriguing tendency to speak of theobscure nature (asapheia) of the views of Aristotle (and others). This wayof thinking could in fact use clarity as a criterion against authenticity.Such an esoteric reading of Aristotle could reinforce the cult-like status ofthe Platonist community, in which the view was taking hold that explica-tion of Plato was like an initiation into a deep wisdom – a view clearlystated by Proclus in the late fifth century.26

Having established these features as the most important aspects ofSimplicius’ works, we must now ask: Who was he writing these commen-taries for? This point is linked to the issue of his whereabouts. SincePraechter it has become the generally accepted view that Simplicius’commentaries were designed as scholarly works and for a readership.27 AsI argue, this claim can be shored up more accurately, but it also needs tobe qualified in some respects. For one thing, the term ‘scholarly’ canmislead us into assuming too much and too little: too much regarding thetechnical level of exegesis as presupposed in the modern use of the term,too little in that it is taken for granted that Simplicius had a scholarlymethod, but one that is not really worth studying, perhaps because it isassumed to be less sophisticated than ours. For another, the term ‘reader-ship’ can also mislead. Reading among Platonists was a very structuredactivity, as indicated above, and it mostly took place under the guidanceof a master (above, p. 26) according to a set of strict guidelines. So it willbe important to find out to what extent the commentaries reflect an


28

expectation of this type of reader or whether a quite different audience istargeted.

It will be of considerable importance to get a detailed grasp of thescholarship in the case of Simplicius’ working method at a concrete level.It is clear that he had to have access to an elaborate collection of ‘books’(whether codices or manuscripts or both) as the diagram on p. 30 shows.The diagram does not even include all authors referred to by Simplicius.To illustrate the very great number and range of texts – some of which arenow unique among our sources for ancient Greek philosophy – I providetwo modes of presentation: the diagram maps out the chronological rela-tions, while Appendix I gives a fuller listing of authors and works cited.

In addition, the works suggest a context which could accommodate thedidactic drive present in his comments, even if some kind of teachingactivity was not a real possibility. In general the assumption that ateaching environment is involved holds for the majority of late commen-taries on Aristotle published in the CAG, but not necessarily for allcommentaries: Simplicius seems to be one such exception.28 The importantpoint here is that the historical circumstance almost certainly precludedhim from actual teaching activity, so that we may hypothesise that hiswritings could only be aimed at a potential audience. This suggests thathis motivation and method for writing these commentaries may have comeabout for the same reasons as those of Porphyry, Syrianus and Proclus, yetthe practical circumstances would dictate their distinctly unique featuresas longer, more comprehensive and devoid of an immediate audience.

Although he conforms to the practice of the exegetical tradition ofwriting detailed comments on Aristotle, Simplicius’ working methodsseem to differ from the standard pattern in significant ways. He concurswith recent and current practice in accepting the authorities in exegeticalworks (see Chapter 3), in his use of the so-called isagogic questions, and inproviding detailed clarifications from the new Platonist perspective devel-oped by Plotinus, Porphyry and Ammonius, such as the use of ‘lemmatacommentary’, harmonising philosophical exegesis, and awareness of phi-lological issues (see Chapters 4-5). We should note that, with so manyexegetical works available, he does not consider a new commentary redun-dant.29 But next to these ‘traditional’ elements there are also moreidiosyncratic features, most clearly visible in his scholarship (methodicalreferencing, richness of sources) and the astounding synthesising effort hetries to impose on all his material. Such an awareness of the tradition heis a part of seems motivated by factors other than simply an antiquarianinterest in books and history.

One further striking difference, emphasised in modern scholarship,between Simplicius’ works and other late commentaries is the fact that hisare not apo phônês (‘from the voice of a teacher’), that is, lecture notestaken, and often published, by a student.30 Published lecture notes are oneof the more frequent formats in the surviving evidence of the Alexandrian


29


30

and Athenian Platonists. But care must be taken here in making distinc-tions: on occasion there are mixed signals as to the provenance of hismaterial. It is not impossible that some material is based on lecture notes.The possibility we need to leave open is one based on a distinction betweenthe claim of the author himself that the work as a whole originates inlecture notes and the claim that the work is theirs, but with the use ofadditional exegetical sources, including lecture notes. In this sense hiscommentaries can be partially apo phônês. Some passages suggesting thiswill be discussed in Chapter 5.

1.2 Scholarly pursuits: exegetical objectivesand practices

When it comes to method, philology and philosophy had a lot in commonin antiquity. Although my earlier comments suggested that the practicesof philological and philosophical analysis started quite early – probably inthe sixth century BCE, but most clearly in the Sophistic period31 – the twonotions were not fully defined until quite late: in the first century CE afamous complaint by the Stoic philosopher Seneca (Ep. 108.23: ‘thus whatwas philosophy becomes philology’32) signals awareness of the distinctionand a judgement based on their relative value. When Plotinus in the thirdcentury refers to Longinus as ‘a philologos, not a philosophos’ (V.Plot.14.20), we probably see the advanced viewpoint of a long development inwhich both activities had become distinctive and sufficiently well-known.Presumably the distinction was initially related to the educational activi-ties of teaching basic skills of writing (grammatikos) and reading (philo-logos) where interpretation of epic and poems became more and morerelevant.33 We can trace the literary strands more easily than the philo-sophical ones, but both exhibit a growing sophistication and complexity,in the increase of technical terms, the attention to minute detail at severallevels of the text (grammar, semantics, syntax), and the more ambitiousinterpretive techniques.

Interestingly, Simplicius states quite clearly how important he thoughtthe writing process was in philosophical analysis: he regarded writing asan important tool for interpretation and reflection on a text. His interestin deliberate use of quotation, while also showing his awareness of hisscholarly responsibility for future generations, is stated on a few occasions(see §1.2.3 below). It is of course important that we take these authorialremarks seriously if we want to judge Simplicius by his own standards andintentions.

Even if methodological principles are clearly thought out and stated,their application may leave something to be desired and they do not solveall the problems one encounters in the process of writing extensive com-ments on complicated texts. The cumulative effect of using earliercommentaries introduces an issue that is far more difficult to cope with:


31

that of size. Yet Simplicius and his colleagues had clearly developed waysof coping with the amounts of material as found in their works. Simplicius’working method in the commentary on the Categories is our best (andoften quoted) source for his programmatic statements on how an exegeteought to proceed.34 As we shall see below, he also outlines the qualities ofan exegete, which recall familiar characteristics of the philosopher foundin Plato and Aristotle.35

To sum up, we may conclude that Simplicius’ important and impressivecommentaries stand out from his contemporaries and immediate prede-cessors in several respects:

(1) As already mentioned, most of the Platonist writings are notes takenduring a lecture (or perhaps private tutorial36), the so-called scholiaapo phônês ‘notes taken from the (teacher’s) voice’ – thus representingthe words of the teacher, not the author; Simplicius’ works are schol-arly, written comments (hypomnêmata) in propria voce on a text mostlikely meant for readership. Thus they may be considered as a moreedited type of work representing mostly his own views, not those of ateacher.37

(2) Unlike most Neoplatonists, he has a habit of using explicit namedreferences to his sources.38

(3) A point of interest to modern scholars is that much of the material heprovides is found nowhere else (especially on the Presocratics).

(4) In many cases we are able to distinguish fairly well between contextand quotation, which creates the impression that these are directquotations.39

It is clear then that Simplicius’ commentaries are the scholarly productsof extensive literary activity, distinct from other Platonist commentaries.He not only creates a new narrative of his own, but also maintains acertain independence of judgement on the text. It will be our task tounravel how he positions himself in relation to the accumulation of learnedcomments from the past. This would mean that references to previousattempts at exegesis of the ‘sacred texts’ of Plato and Aristotle wouldcontinue to increase among philosophical exegetes. The practice of com-menting on Aristotle in some form or other started with the Peripatetics(see Chapter 3) and was taken up by the Platonists (see Chapter 5), as isclearly visible in Plotinus’ approach and documented by Porphyry (V.Plot.14), an important testimony to which I shall return.40 It was also Plotinuswho initiated the assimilation of the comments of Alexander of Aph-rodisias into his own exegesis (see Chapter 4). To the modern eye this moveof consulting an Aristotelian for the interpretation of Plato may seemunusual, but the tension (as the modern perspective sees it) between Platoand Aristotle is not felt to the same extent by the later Platonists. Recentstudies (Gerson 2005, Karamanolis 2006) have highlighted the problem-


32

atic nature of viewing Aristotle and Plato as complete opposites, a skewedview of their relationship which was not common in antiquity. A Platonistexegete has a formidable task in juggling different elements to unite theminto one coherent exegesis. That Simplicius felt prepared for the task isclear from the description of the ideal exegete found in his commentary onthe Categories.

1.2.1 The ideal exegete according to SimpliciusThe much-quoted mission statement on the exegete’s tasks in the com-mentary on the Categories is a clear formulation of his intentions, and alsoclarifies well how he wants his readers to view his enterprise. It will allowa selective account of some of the commentators Simplicius draws on forhis own exegetical activity and the ways in which these earlier examplesof exegesis may have influenced his own method. The passage is worthquoting in full (in Cat. 7.23-32):

The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings must not fall wholly short of thelatter’s (i) greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have (ii) experi-ence of everything the Philosopher has written, and must be (iii) aconnoisseur (epistêmôn) of Aristotle’s stylistic habits. (iv) His judgementmust be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal,seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, � should heobstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always andeverywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’sschool. [The good exegete] must, I believe, (v) not convict the philosophers ofdiscordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] saysagainst Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous), and track down(anikhneuein) the harmony which reigns between them on the majority ofpoints. (tr. Chase 2003)

These five ‘principles’ still strike us as sound and balanced: they representa set of guidelines or ‘rules of thumb’ which are clearly the result of a longdevelopment of contemplation on the exegetical process: expertise in thestyle and ideas of Aristotle is to be combined with impartiality(!) and akind of principle of charity, in which the ‘spirit’ (nous) of the text is invokedin contrast to the ‘letter’ (lexis).41 We should, however, not simply take justhis word for it: a clear statement of intent does not free us from the needto further investigate whether Simplicius sticks to his programme: ancientauthors often enough make certain methodological claims without adher-ing to them in the work in which they are made.42 We can use thisstatement as a working model, on the assumption that Simplicius was notjust giving a description of an ideal, but also a self-characterisation. Withfar fewer explicit statements in the commentaries on the Physics and theOn the heavens, and the now accepted chronology of the three commentar-ies placing the commentary on the Categories last, we are faced with the


33

challenge of showing whether these principles had slowly emerged duringthe writing of these works, or whether this profile of the ideal exegete wassomething which Simplicius had in mind all along, but came to formulateexplicitly only when he wrote the commentary which occupied the firstplace in the Neoplatonic curriculum (in Cat. 1.1-2).

Working through the text methodically is another major feature ofSimplicius’ working method. He uses in all three extant commentaries theisagogical topics, preliminary points introducing the reading of a text. Aswe saw, for in Cat. we find discussed aim (skopos, 1.1 and 3.13ff.), title(epigraphê, 4.8-16), usefulness (khrêsimos, 4.17ff.), order (taxis, 5.27-31),whether the work is genuine (gnêsios, 5.32ff.), etc., and their occurrence isequally systematic in the other two commentaries. Are these signs ofteaching practice? Possibly, but one may well wonder whether they arefrom Simplicius’ own student days or from his own teaching.43

In his comments on Aristotle’s Physics 3 (in Phys. 395.20-1) he indicateshow he is alert to textual problems, but also determined not to let theseget in his way:

It should be known that at many places there are different readings in thetext of this book (en pollois khoriois diaphoros hê graphê toutou pheretai toubibliou). But we must move to the discussion of the text passage by passage(epi ta kata meros tês lexeôs). (tr. Urmson 2002)

This is one of several comments in which we can see his methodical agendaexpressed, his thorough knowledge of the text illustrated, and his deter-mination to write a series of ongoing comments on the text, keeping to itsoriginal order. This gradual progression through the text is one goodreason to assume that his commentaries have a didactic motive. Moreover,the comment seems to prove that the division of distinct books was alreadyestablished, even if the larger subdivision of thematic units was stilldisputed, as with the Physics, which was divided by some as ‘five books Onnatural principles, and three On motion’ (in Phys. 6.5-10 Adrastus; cf.801.13-16 ‘Aristotle and the associates of Aristotle’, 1358.8-9), while othersadhere to a four-four division (e.g. Porphyry, see in Phys. 802.8-11).44

Although it is not unusual for the lemmata to be added later, one can easilyfollow the text of Aristotle in the paraphrases of the commentaries, andthe referencing forward and backwards in both texts (i.e. Aristotle’s andSimplicius’) show his astounding control of both argumentative narra-tives. The level of detail in the comments seem partly inspired by Alexan-der of Aphrodisias. As we shall see in Chapter 4, Alexander had paved theway for a meticulous and exhaustive evaluation of the text in almost allits aspects.

Alongside the detailed comments, Simplicius has a thorough commandof the overall plan of the work and its structural coherence. The booksoften begin and end with connecting narratives clarifying the thematic


34

links as well as the purpose of each book and how it relates to the wholework. For instance, he begins book 2 (in Phys. 259.3ff.) with a briefstatement on what went before in book 1 (principles and causes, includinga review of opinions) and ends it with a summary partly based on Alexan-der;45 in the opening lines of book 3 (394.3-5) he gives a summarystatement of book 2 (nature as cause and principle of change), the impor-tance of defining crucial terms, praising Aristotle for his exemplarytreatment (395.14-15, ‘transmits these matters more clearly than thecommentators’), before moving into the present book (and the next),explaining that these are about change, the unlimited (Phys. 3) and place,void and time (Phys. 4), because they are ‘common’ (i.e. generic) aspects ofnature and need to be discussed first. As will become very clear in thisstudy, Simplicius will constantly keep an eye on what previous exegeteshad to say. He may refer to them by name individually or as ‘the commen-tators’ collectively – which clearly indicates the range of sources availableto him (at 414.15-19 he contrasts Aristotle with ‘the commentators’) or saythat he is using one or several particularly rich sources which includeother ‘voices’. The phrase ‘the commentators’ (hoi de exegetai) at 406.28ends up being referenced as ‘Porphyry’s philological interpretation’ (407.4= Test. 152F Smith). Book 4 opens with a full review of books 1-3 (519.3-16), announcing the new topics of place and time, while also indicating howthe approach in Aristotle is a reasonable one as dictated by the materialsand the existing opinions on these. Book 5 opens with a link to book 3 andits discussion of change (801.3-6), suggesting that now (nun, 6) a moreprecise definition of change will be employed for the analysis of metabolêas a more generic term. It ends with rather a long epilogue (920.4-922.19)in which Simplicius wants to give a summary of the main points (takephalaia autou suntomôs). The summary is a very accurate recounting ofthe book’s argument and includes an indication of the kind of problemsAristotle poses and solves.

Book 6 opens with a rather unexpected treatment of how Peripateticsdo their book numbering: this book, Simplicius notes, is rightly given thenumber six (represented by the letter zeta). It may well be that the divisionin two parts (1-5 Physics, 6-8 On motion) discussed earlier (and again here)triggers this: Simplicius goes back to this point and now brings in a letterfrom Eudemus to Theophrastus about a small issue in the text. Althoughit is unlikely that the letter is genuine, Simplicius takes it seriously andits contents are quite informative: Theophrastus deemed book 5 a part ofthe Physics, thus providing justification for the 5/3 division of the work(923.15f.). To this Simplicius adds the evidence from Aristotle himself,quoting comments in which he refers back to earlier parts, such as Physicsbooks 2, 3, 5 (923.17-924.4), ending with the conclusion that this settlesthe question whether 1-5 should be referred to as Physika (924.5-6). Aseparate argument is then devoted to showing clearly (saphôs, 6) that theremaining three books are called On motion. Here he not only appeals to


35

Aristotle’s works (e.g. Cael. A.5 at 924.7), but also to a comment from the(otherwise unknown) biographer of Eudemus, Damas (13-14). In theproem to book 7 Simplicius again mentions the numbering (H, eta) andindicates that he will proceed to discuss the problems and proofs presentedin it, just as ‘the exegetes of Aristotle’ did. He notes that Eudemus skippedthis book (1036.13-15) as it overlaps with the last book. But Simplicius stillinsists that it will be good preparation (1037.4) to study what this book hasto offer (9-10), partly because Alexander and Themistius did consider itscontent.46 At the end of book 7 Simplicius goes through the main pointsagain in a very elaborate summary (1111.29-1116.14). Book 8 opens bystating that this is the last book (number theta).47 Finally, near the end ofthe commentary to book 8 Simplicius gives a very pointed summary of thewhole of the Physics (1359.5-8).48

These comments found at convenient junctures of the work are part ofthe meticulous attention to the organisation of the work (diarthrôsis) andunderline the fact that in Physica is a concerted effort to treat Aristotle’stext from beginning to end. How important is it for us to confirm for anauthor like Simplicius that he is writing a running commentary? Just asit would be too facile to say that his commentaries are obvious candidatesfor use in teaching, so it is too easy to assume that a running commentaryof the sort we have here is the best format, especially if we were to arguethat it was intended for teaching purposes. The references do illustratehow detailed clarification of the text is the main concern of our commen-tator. It seems quite plausible to say that they are also the concerns of ateacher. But such an inference will require further elaboration on themanner of commenting and the assumptions underlying his comments.

Finally, it is also of interest to see how Simplicius views, and on occasionlabels, Aristotle’s method. We have already seen that Simplicius advo-cated an objective attitude to Aristotle. Beginning with the early sectionsof in De caelo, we can observe that the single skopos of each work ispresumed a valid point, in part on the basis of Alexander’s comments,glossed as ‘looking at one thing and making the rest subordinate to it’(3.14-16, cf. 4.26f.). The coherence of Aristotle’s outlook is emphasised byinvoking his own words and lavish cross-referencing to his other works,for example at 3.30-4.4 a quotation is announced and used against someother exegetes.49 The argument that Aristotle uses (scientific) proof is atone time supported by the authority of the astronomer Ptolemaeus(apodeixis, 9.29). Aristotle’s far-reaching agreement with Plato is arguedfor in a detailed discussion on points of doctrine or by claiming mere verbaldifferences that can easily be ‘clarified’ (e.g. 23.2). He may need some helpoccasionally, and here other commentators, especially Alexander, can bebrought in to ‘oblige’ (in DC 24.19-20 against the problems raised byXenarchus).50 Note however that Aristotle may also need help againstAlexander’s attacks (e.g. 44.9). Aristotle’s own words can weigh up againstlengthy exegetical expositions of commentators: ‘why write out (para-


36

graphontas) the long comments of the commentators, when it is possibleto adduce (paragein) his own clear view which reveals all a little after thestart of his On generation and corruption �’ (169.28ff.). Since Simpliciususually speaks in the first person singular when proposing his own objec-tions or interpretations, it is worth asking who is meant when hesometimes speaks of ‘we’; e.g. at in DC 110.24 we find him questionAristotle’s approach to an issue: ‘why does Aristotle not, as we do (hôsperhêmeis), reason that the augmentation happens on account of food’. Thispoint will be dealt with in the context of inquiring after the different voicespresent in the commentary (below, Chapters 4-5).

The early sections of in Physica contain a few more pieces of informationworth adding here. Simplicius’ claims that the skopos of the Physics is easyto discover, if one adheres to Aristotle’s distinctions made regardingphysics. Simplicius begins by offering ‘the whole division of intellectualinquiry’ (1.5-6, tên holên tên kat’ auton tês philosophias dihairesin). Inaddition, Aristotle’s coherent look at the physical world becomes clear inthe first pages in which Simplicius draws connections between the Physicsand other works (DC 2.12, HA 3.8) indicating how the Peripatetics dividedthe natural world into ensouled and soulless things (3.4). Twice in thesefirst pages he expresses disagreement with Alexander on how to interpretthis (2.5, 2.17). In view of Alexander’s role in his commentaries, these aresignificant moments of dissent that bear further scrutiny (see Chapter 4).The actual discussion of the skopos occurs at 3.13ff., and from the initialdescription – things underlying all physical entities – Simplicius goes onto talk about ‘principles’ (arkhai, 3.15); here we see the first comments onhow Aristotle and Plato present views on principles: the vocabulary re-veals the Platonic perspective. Arkhai are causes, both primary (kuriôs,3.16) and secondary (sunaitia, as in Plato Tim. 46D). Aristotle listed fourwhich according to the Platonic scheme divide into main causes (formaland final) and secondary or concurrent causes (formal and material). Platois then said to have added (protithêsi, 3.19) the paradigmatic cause amongthe first group, and the instrumental cause (organikon) among the second.Aristotle’s views are then backed up by two quotations (Phys. 184a14,200b21).

The discussion of the content of the work continues up to 16.7 and liststhe topics of the books, explaining how they are required within theframework of Aristotle’s investigation. Thus we see the programmaticvision take form in the introductory pages, which demonstrate how Sim-plicius proceeds by clearly setting out general outline, specific themes and,what is hardly surprising, a Platonist perspective on the Aristotelianmaterial. If this should raise suspicion in making the modern reader thinkthat such a outlook implies a distortion of the Aristotelian views, weshould remember that these pages also show Simplicius’ consistentlyapplied method of quoting from the texts he studies, in particular when hewants to shore up his interpretation. This also gives us control over the


37

lemmata which are inserted, a feature typical of the hypomnêma (notes orcomments on a text), which in some cases were added much later in thetransmission.51

Our evaluation of Simplicius’ treatment of Aristotle must take this intoaccount, as indeed it must not forget his explicitly stated commitment toobjectivity. We cannot simply declare his linguistic updating of the mate-rial for a contemporary audience wilful manipulation. At the same time,it is of course clear that his interpretive manoeuvres lead to repre-sentations of earlier doctrines which to us are patently coloured by hisPlatonist beliefs. That makes us aware that his idea of ‘objectivity’ is notidentical to ours. What is of interest here is to try and clarify what causesthis mismatch between ancient and modern hermeneutical principles.

1.2.2 Exegetical practices: manuscripts, textual criticism,terminology

After so many centuries of exegetical practice among both pagans andChristians, it is to be expected that the technical level of exegesis in Greekphilosophical commentaries of late antiquity was very high. It included, aswe have seen, a number of fundamental considerations about languageand meaning as well as wider hermeneutical principles for evaluatingclaims made in the text measured against a philosophical doctrine. Exe-gesis also included the assessment of text constitution, variant manu-scripts, conjecture, and a range of technical terms labelling theseprocesses. Already Porphyry (c. 233-c. 310 CE) was a most accomplishedand learned scholar among the Platonists. We may review some of thesebroader categories here to illustrate the skills present in philosophicalanalysis – leaving some of the details for later chapters.

The activity of commenting and the terms for commenting / interpret-ing can range from straightforward ‘explaining’, ‘clarifying’ (such asexêgêsis 457.12-13; cf. exêgêtês, exêgeisthai) to less emphatic exegeticalefforts, as in the case of akouein in the sense of ‘listen’ or ‘read’ (e.g. 538.6linked to Alexander). The term for ‘written comments’ or ‘commentary’ isusually hypomnêma (e.g. in Phys. 60.8, 332.20; in DC 530.16), but for hisown works he also uses scholai (used at 461.15 to refer back to in Phys. 1).Labels for types of writings are also of interest: we also find suggramma(530.15), monobiblion (short treatise, in DC 9.21). Perhaps there is a clueto be found in the way that Simplicius refers to his own works. While hedoes use the more common term hupomnêmata for the works of others (inDC 168.18), he labels his own comments as skholai (in Phys. 393.13,461.15, 1326.39, 1328.11).52 As a term that signals notes of an additionalor complementary nature, this is perhaps in line with his topos of modestythat he is not doing original work in these exegeses.53

The scholarly nature of Simplicius’ method is especially revealed in hisfrequent discussion of manuscript versions and different readings of the


38

text. The quotation given above (p. 34) revealed special awareness of theproblems in the Physics. Significantly he uses information from previouscommentators for such comments most of the time and Alexander ofAphrodisias is again quite prominent. For this reason the terminologyseems more technical and established, but it is important to note that thediscussion of philological problems is not undertaken for its own sake: itis included because variants happen to be there, and his predecessorssometimes already knew of them. The standard term for manuscript isantigraphos (e.g. 414.19, 422.20, 423.14, 427.34 etc.; see Chapter 4), for aparticular reading or textual variant the word graphê is used (see e.g.414.19, 423.21, 436.19) or lexis (436.13). We may also compare in Physica207.7 where a term for ‘passage’ (to khôrion) appears (literally ‘spot’,cognate with ‘place’, khôros, cf. 273.15, 308.12, 329.19, 374.32, 472.8,563.29); it must be a late term of art within a culture of reading, linked toa notion of locating text on the page in written form.

The awareness of variety in a text’s constitution brings with it the needfor decision and, if necessary, correction. Of course one exegete’s correctionis another’s manipulation. The terminology covers all aspects of suchtextual handling. Manipulation of a text can be expressed in several ways,as we find a number of terms referring to some form of intervention: forinstance at in Physica 526.17 we find the unusual term metagraphei,meaning ‘alter the text’.54 Others include ‘impose a reading by force’(biazein, 437.19 on Alexander), ‘cross out, erase’ (diagraphein, 428.2),‘expunge, delete’ (athetein, 44.28, 32), ‘declare a phrase ungrammatical’(akatallêlia, 329.15, 349.27, 429.27, 1244.15). Some of these have a longpedigree, such as athetein, familiar from Alexandrian scholarship;55 somemay originate in earlier philosophical commentators.56 In order to assessthe technical level of his exegesis we may briefly look at (a) manuscripts,(b) textual criticism, and (c) some technical terms, leaving the use andmethod of quotation to the next subsection (§1.2.3). I select passages toillustrate general patterns here, again leaving some details for later.

(a) ManuscriptsAncient books (papyrus scrolls, codices) are a notoriously vulnerable me-dium and could suffer from all kinds of mishaps, such as physical damage,miscopying and re-use (‘recycling’).57 Philosophical texts are of course noexception. Whatever the cause, the counter-measures taken to redresstextual problems could include a number of technical strategies; compar-ing different manuscripts was a more common technique. It goes back tothe Hellenistic period (third century BCE) and is widespread, as is exem-plified by cases in philosophical, literary and medical circles.58

From the first century we find concern with authenticity and properversion of the corpus in the Aristotelian tradition, famously with Androni-cus’ ‘edition’ of Aristotle’s works, which fixed the order and number ofworks. As Gottschalk notes: ‘the main emphasis was no doubt on Aris-


39

totle’s writings, their authenticity, internal structure, the connection be-tween them and their place in the Aristotelian corpus’.59 Here already wefind an indication of the influence of Alexandrian scholarship, as thecatalogues he produced contain incipits, indication of the length of theworks, and an interest in personal documents such as letters which mightthrow light on certain problems.60

Simplicius seems to weave textual issues into his argument quitecasually and sometimes even unexpectedly. References to manuscripts(antigraphoi) or different readings (lexeis, graphê) abound, but are mostfrequent when he builds on other commentators. There is some indicationthat the technique of evaluating textual problems was well-establishedbut, rather than merely traditional, also considered important by him andhis colleagues: both form and content matter in exegesis. The most promi-nent predecessors found in contexts where the text constitution isdiscussed are Alexander, Themistius and Porphyry.61 A few examples mayillustrate the nature and quality of their discussion of such matters(further cases will be treated in later chapters). The choice of theseinteresting cases, especially common in his commentary on Physics book4, will illustrate how well aware these authors were of the importance oftextual criticism.

If not referring to the more general act of ‘reading the primary text’ (e.g.in Phys. 6.31), lexis may refer to the wording of a phrase, sentence orpassage. When this important and recurring issue of wording is broughtup, it is clearly triggered by different versions found in other commenta-tors. For instance, at in Physica 416.27-32 Simplicius emphasises the lexisof Alexander accompanied by a quotation ‘in his own words’ (autei lexei),an important feature to which I shall return. At 436.13ff. Aspasius’reading (lexis) is mentioned, as it is in 936.25 for Alexander (withAspasius). At 416.19 and 25 Alexander knows of one particular reading,but he prefers a different one, i.e. Alexander has two versions of this text.While commenting on change (Phys. 3), Simplicius points out that severaldefinitions are at stake for Aristotle, yet the text as he knows it seemsconfused, so he infers his own reading (in Phys. 450.32-6):

for Aristotle is manifestly accepting it as the third definition of change, evenif the text (lexis) added in the book as from a marginal note (hôs apoparagraphês) seems to be muddled.62

This passage and ibid. 691.3 with its interesting comment on the marginalnote are, so far as I am aware, quite unique.63 They nicely illustratemeticulous observation on the content in conjunction with the textualevidence. The comment on an added note ‘as if from the margin’ addsfurther insight into the experience with textual problems. It also revealshow Simplicius can use philological considerations as an exegetical deviceto create an interpretation that gives him all possible room to manoeuvre.


40

Once we delve deeper into this kind of issue, a whole range of textualproblems can be found to have a place in the exegetical process. Simplicius’deliberations may make him weigh up the alternatives and the authoritiessupporting them. At in Physica 423.12-13, 20-1 a quite subtle argumentdevelops with regard to earlier suggestions on the text:

perhaps Aspasius’ reading is safer; � I do not know why Alexander thinkswhat follows accords better with the latter reading (graphê) than with theother. For I think (oimai) that the internally initiated appears new here inthe examples, which are from the crafts, even if health and disease are insome way natural. (tr. Urmson 2002)

If ‘safer’ is the right way to translate asphalestera, we see Simplicius castdoubt on Alexander’s interpretation (modestly expressed as ‘I do notknow’) and characterise Aspasius’ suggestion as preferable. A similar casenot much further along (427.34) also reveals how quotation and multipleinterpretations can play a role in Simplicius’ deliberations. Alexander hasa different reading here and the discussion focuses on the lack of clarity asa possible reason for confusion, while his view is compared with those ofPorphyry and Themistius (cf. 1051.5). Simplicius seems to want to say thatthe difference is merely verbal and that he does not accept unclarity as ablanket method for rejection: ‘if unclarity were to be struck out, much ofAristotle would be struck out’.64

As I shall discuss Alexander’s role in Chapter 4, a brief comment will dofor now: it is clear that he also has a major role in these discussions oftextual variants. Simplicius is often exploring the suggestions and com-ments of his predecessor, and is not afraid to voice his disagreement,frustration or puzzlement.65 We need not assume that this is becauseAlexander is a Peripatetic and therefore a target: one could point to in Cat.41.22ff. where Simplicius defends Alexander against the ‘much admiredIamblichus’ faulty reading of Alexander, and � even confesses (107.5ff.)that he cannot understand him’.66 In other words, his evaluation of Alex-ander’s exegesis is not generic, but taken on a case-by-case basis, and hedoes not accept everything on authority from a famous and influentialPeripatetic predecessor.

Even this selection of instances clearly shows that a philosophos couldalso be a philologos, perhaps more so in the modern sense of being able todeal with textual issues which require our attention for establishing themeaning of a text. The general framework is not one of established andagreed rules on how to evaluate readings or select one’s authorities.

(b) Textual criticismWith this degree of precise engagement with the text, it is unsurprising tofind the commentators dealing with textual criticism. The cases we find inSimplicius suggest that textual matters can range from word analysis to


41

punctuation. It seems that these often originate with both Alexander andPorphyry (e.g. in Phys. 70.5, 399.19). The verb for punctuating (stizonta,stixanta, in Phys. 399.19, 400.7; cf. Porph. Quaest. hom. Il. 8.323, line 8) isone familiar from the early Alexandrians and later scholia; in most casesit concerns parsing or typographical problems. Syntax may also featureoccasionally, as we see at in Phys. 178.8-11 on Aristotle’s text: ‘twiceAlexander clarified (exêgêsato) the syntax of the wording (tên suntaxin têslexeôs)’.

The concern over authenticity is another major issue and one of thestandard ‘isagogical questions’ posed in reading Plato and Aristotle.67 Onehas to assume that this point could be raised only after some generationshad passed since the school’s founder had written his works, but it is alsohighly plausible that the question of authenticity would arise from debateswith competing schools of thought.68

As to doctrinal fidelity and originality, we must avoid seeing the Platon-ists as a homogeneous group. There was considerable room fordisagreement in all philosophical schools, but what matters is the way inwhich this is expressed. To begin with, the gaps and inconsistencies in the‘system’ would need fixing and this could lead to further interpretiveissues in the form of elaborations and additions. In general the studentsand successors of Plato and Aristotle felt confident that they were working‘within the framework’ of the established dogma, yet with hindsightmodern readers will dismiss such declarations of allegiance as misguidedand self-deluded. What is interesting in all this is the manner in whichthey tried to make their interpretive direction fit the received doctrine. Aswe shall see (Chapter 5), their tactic is to employ all means available tothem. All these features could easily lead to misunderstanding the natureof commentary of this era. The main proviso therefore is to avoid aquasi-modern picture of the commentator and to strive for a well-informedjudgement on his method and motives which is grounded in the text.

1.2.3 The art of quotation69

In the learned literature on Simplicius one basic but important questionhas – so far as I am aware – not been asked: why does Simplicius usequotations in the way he does? As we shall see, he offers quite longquotations, which are given an air of authenticity either by claiming thatthey are ipsissima verba or by paraphrasing in such a way that the changeof style and vocabulary indicates he is using another source. In thisconnection it is worth noting that there are several remarks from which itcan be gleaned that he often gives us long quotations when he needs notdo so. Thus a more specific question also arises: why did he choose to giveaccurate quotations and was he not more selective, e.g. by suppressing thewords of earlier thinkers? It appears that Simplicius had developed clearviews about the use of quotations, both regarding the use of original


42

sources and in the criteria of selection. In this section I present aninterpretation of this aspect of his methodology, which is important for ourassessment of the sources in his commentaries.

There are at least three clear remarks which indicate what Simpliciusthought about the writing of commentaries: they show that he regardedwriting as an important tool for interpretation. First, he states (in Cat.3.4-6) ‘my aim is � to acquire by way of writing � a more accurateunderstanding of what Iamblichus said’. Secondly, an even stronger viewis found in his commentary on Epictetus’ Enchiridion 194.57-60:70 ‘For hewho writes will become both more sensitive to the words and also gradu-ally convinced of their truth’. Even if both statements express his owninvolvement in the learning process by way of a ‘leading of the soul’(psukhagôgia) towards a progressed level of understanding (the emphasisis on the content of the text studied), this process is clearly facilitated bythe use of writing (ek tou graphein akribesteran tôn eirêmenônkatanoêsin).71 The third example is an interesting remark in his commen-tary on Aristotle’s Physics where there is some, though slight, evidencethat Simplicius distinguished between the accuracy of prose and verse;after a discussion of Parmenides’ obscure poem, Melissus’ writing in proseis singled out as allowing a more accurate interpretation because of itsclarity72 (in Phys. 111.15-17):

But since Melissus wrote in an archaic style but not unclearly, let us setdown those archaic sentences themselves so that those who read them maymore accurately judge among the more appropriate interpretations. (tr.Barnes 1987)

These three remarks provide some general idea of his method concerningthe writing of commentaries (cf. n. 10), but they already indicate that thisis an author who reflects on his interpretive procedure and wants hisaudience to know that he does (we are still to decide whether ‘audience’means listeners or readers).

We should therefore move on to evidence for specific motives in quoting.How does Simplicius introduce his quotations and what can we learn fromhis remarks? We find a variety of explicit motives, as is only to be expectedfrom a man with a complex scholarly and philosophical background usingsuch a variety of sources. Yet the majority seem to have one or two featuresin common which are relevant for our purposes. I list a selection of casesconnected to specific thinkers (mostly from his Physics commentary), butwill return to this intriguing point later when discussing individual prede-cessors (below, Chapters 3-5).

In an ad hominem objection against Philoponus with whom he wasengaged in a fierce polemic about several issues (especially the beginningof the universe) he states (in Phys. 1333.33, after a long quote fromPhiloponus): ‘I have quoted so much of his words in order to show what


43

kind of man he is’. Here the polemical context induces him to use anargument from character to make his point, namely that this person isrambling and not worth our attention.73

In a number of cases he tries to adduce evidence to make his argumentmore persuasive. For instance, he may want to show abundance of evi-dence by indicating that there is more material than he is actually goingto quote: ‘and one could find more of that sort of views to quote fromEmpedocles’ physics’ (in Phys. 331.10 after several quotations), or tosubstantiate a paraphrase in order to indicate that his reporting inparaphrase is adequate: ‘to make sure that I do not seem to be makingempty claims (kenas makarias), I shall give a short quotation from Empe-docles’ poem’ (in DC 140.30-2). Once again the emphasis is on directquotation as a useful tool in proving one’s point.

Two further remarks which may have earned him the label of antiquar-ian are worth noting. One is on the Pythagorean Archytas (in Cat.352.22-4): ‘because of the rarity of Pythagorean writings I shall copy outthe whole passage of him on this topic’; another (famous) remark is thaton Parmenides’ poem in which his intention to preserve material fromoblivion is expressed (in Phys. 144.25-8):

at the risk of seeming tedious (gliskhros), I would like to transcribe in thiscommentary (hypomnêmasin) Parmenides’ verses on the one being (they arenot many), both to justify what I have said about the matter and because ofthe rarity (spanin) of Parmenides’ treatise. (tr. Barnes 1987, modified)74

From these examples we can already see that his procedure is inspired bysound considerations of argument, clarity of interpretation and historicalawareness.75 Here he no doubt was inspired by Aristotle himself, goingagainst a recent trend (or so it seems) to use testimonia as a demonstration(in Phys. 1318.10-15):

it is Aristotle’s habit after demonstrations to introduce the testimonies of hispredecessors as agreeing with his demonstrations, in order on the one handto teach and compel his readers through his demonstrations, and on theother to make the belief more certain in his hearers through the testimonies;he does not employ the testimony of predecessors as demonstrations, as isthe habit of more recent writers. (tr. McKirahan 2000)

In other words, testimonies serve to illustrate and reinforce rather thanprove a point at issue. Note how this also implies that he regards quota-tion-plus-interpretation as the correct format for his exegetical strategy.Further study of passages such as these provides an interesting insightinto how he marks out direct quotations with two particular verbs.

Clearly then Simplicius did reflect on his methodology, had specificcriteria for selecting quotations, and was quite particular about the impor-tance of ipsissima verba. We may look at some peculiar features of his


44

method of signposting this narrow set of quotations, while also drawingtogether some work of other scholars. And it is at this point that I proposeto adopt a particular stance on his method: I take his handling of quota-tions as somehow related to the Platonic view on the spoken and writtenword. Two kinds of considerations point us in this direction.

First, as we saw in some interesting examples (more or less implicitlyexpressed), Simplicius clearly regarded quotation as an essential part ofhis exegetical procedure.76 It is also clear when he gives longer quotes thanstrictly necessary, and actually adds excuses for ‘going on a bit’, notablyfor a rather learned audience. Thus at in Phys. 29.3-5 he says:

Perhaps there is nothing wrong in my digressing (mêkunai) somewhat inorder to demonstrate to those with a rather great desire for knowledge, howdespite the apparent disagreement concerning their doctrines on the princi-ples, the ancients are nevertheless in harmonious agreement. (tr. Perry1983)

Simplicius here dismisses those who use certain lists of views as evidencethat they disagreed.77 At in Phys. 80.16-17 he criticises the commentatorAlexander: ‘I am forced to be more elaborate (mêkunai) because of therather unimaginitive (xêroteron) and careless way (aphereponôs) in whichthe quite expert commentator on Aristotle, Alexander, understands theviews’.

Secondly, and more importantly, Simplicius in many cases clearlymarks direct quotations: apart from paraphrasing and introducing quota-tions with verbs of speaking (legei, phêsi), he uses two specific andmarkedly different verbs for signposting his quotations. The first is para-tithesthai (comparable to paragraphein) which may mean ‘to mark as aquote’, ‘to quote’. In a very short but interesting article Christian Wildberghas pointed out that in the commentators this verb is almost always usedto introduce fairly accurate quotation.78 As far as I have been able to verifythis also holds for Simplicius (e.g. in DC 82.10-14, in Phys. 144.25-8 quotedabove). But we can go one step further. A second verb of interest is akouein.Often the two basic meanings of the verb, (1) hearing and (2) under-standing, operate separately, and sometimes they are bound up with eachother. But in a number of cases akouein has a specific meaning: whencombined with the participle in the genitive of a verb of speaking orwriting it merely introduces a quotation. What should we make of this? Isthis a literary fiction? Or were these notes meant to be read and listenedto in the classroom as has been suggested?79 Such considerations would goagainst the common view that Simplicius’ commentaries ‘were composedfor reading and not, like most of the school’s output, for delivery aslectures’.80

There is another way to interpret these occurrences. Dirk Schenkeveld81

has persuasively argued that the prose usage of the verb akouein in


45

combination with a participle in the genitive (e.g. legontos) can be inter-preted as ‘to read what X has said/written’; as Schenkeveld did this on thebasis of examples from the Hellenistic period until the fourth century CE,we should ask whether this also holds for Simplicius. It would seem thathis use of the verb has the same function – I should perhaps add that itmakes no significant difference whether we take it as ‘to listen’ or ‘to read’.What is important is that Simplicius is saying with emphasis that theoriginal words matter in certain cases.82 A couple of examples must standfor a considerable dossier:

because they did not assume these principles of the bodies fully in allrespects, listen to [or: read] what Plato says � (akoue tou Platônos legontos)(in DC 566.4-5)

because Alexander writes ‘or the matter [is] in the things that come to be’,we should also listen to [or: read] his exegesis (toutou exêgêseôs akousteon)(in Phys. 363.16)

These cases (and there are many more83) mark a quotation with akouein.They emphasise the deliberate use of quotation as a means of proving apoint, and very often when he is polemically engaged.

So not only do we find Simplicius using different ways of introducingquotations, and possibly suggesting different levels of accuracy, but healso gives particular pride of place to direct quotation. It would be rash,however, to explain Simplicius’ approach from our point of view as one ofaiming for historical accuracy or as a correct way of acknowledging thework of others – though it is fair to say that what we see here are the firstsigns of such a ‘modern’ approach. Nor would it be helpful to say thatSimplicius was right in quoting as he did, but for the wrong reasons. So Iturn to my last point on this issue and speculate briefly on anotherpossibility, which I present as an hypothesis for further investigation.

The important question why Simplicius thought direct quotation impor-tant has not been answered, even if we have highlighted one aspect of hisquotation habits, which may counter to some extent his reputation as anantiquarian. A further suggestion can be made, which offers a not implau-sible (but possibly controversial) line of investigation for this question: theevidence may perhaps connect this attitude to the view, also held by Plato,Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, that the spoken word and discourse areextremely important in philosophy, and more appropriate than writing tophilosophise and reach an understanding of reality. Some additionalconsiderations can be adduced to clarify this idea.

The well-known and paradoxical Phaedrus passage states a view on theappropriate use of speaking and writing, and the strong qualificationsformulated there on doing philosophy in written form.84 The particularparadox inherent in this passage was well formulated by M.M. MacKenzie:


46

It has long been recognized that this passage is odd. Here is Plato writing abook which repudiates the writing of books. � Socrates says it, but Platowrites it. If he writes to convince, he writes that writing should not convinceus; if what he writes does convince us, it convinces us that it should notconvince us.85

Plato has here created an awkward situation in which he seems to reject(in writing) the use of writing in philosophy. We should take note, how-ever, of the fact that there is an embarrassed silence in the Platonictradition on this passage. The one exception is a very short remark in acommentary from a lecture of Syrianus, Proclus’ teacher, recorded byHermias, On Plato’s Phaedrus 275A-C.86 If we can establish there was achanging attitude towards the role of writing among Platonists up toProclus in the fifth century CE, it would be of interest to see how thismanifests itself. As David Sedley has pointed out, Proclus’ remark onmimêsis (‘re-enactment’) may represent the culmination of a line of think-ing about the role of the proems in Plato’s dialogues. The late Platonistshad two basic positions regarding the proems: they were meant ‘to drawmoral lessons from the dramatic presentation of the characters (Porphyry)or they would teach us about the subject studied in the dialogue (Iam-blichus)’.87 So they took the proems as (implicit) guides for ethical conduct(very much like the Middle Platonists):

Plato uses the actual imitation (mimêsis) of the best men to sketch to us themain outline features of appropriate actions. And these have a much morepowerful effect than things stored away in bare rules. For imitation has itsown special way of shaping the lives of those who read it. (Proclus, On Plato’sTimaeus I 16.6-12 Diehl; tr. Sedley 1997)

The point here is that Plato teaches by example (which is an ‘outline’,hypographê, interpreted as in his Republic 548D2) rather than by pre-scriptive rules: we can read about them but they are not the full andfinished product, since these actions have to be internalised in order to befunctional. In other words, they are first of all meant to change one’sattitude and state of mind, which can only be the result of going througha process rather than just reading them: in short, individuals have (tolearn) to think for themselves by actively engaging in thinking.

Could Simplicius’ emphasis on the original words perhaps be inspiredby the thought that teaching by the living voice (viva voce) was superior towriting,88 as was suggested in a programmatic way by Plato (Phaedrus276-8, cf. Seventh letter 342A-44D)? Such a suggestion would perhapsmake sense of the de facto approach found in the examples discussedabove; we should in addition not forget that it was Ammonius Saccas,89

the Alexandrian teacher of Plotinus, who wrote nothing (V.Plot. 20) andthus presumably practised what Plato preached. And even Plotinushimself is said to have written very little until late in his life, writing


47

up his thoughts in Rome, probably after 260 CE and within a very brieftime span (V.Plot. 5).

Though speculative, this possible motive behind the direct quotationswould fit in with Simplicius’ insistence on using these both as the appro-priate first step in the process of grasping the meaning of their words andas proof that (in his view) he uses these words responsibly. But it alsoleaves us with an interesting paradox: the long quotes in Simplicius maybe a deliberate attempt to ‘recreate’ the living voice through ipsissimaverba, but how then should we explain their occurrence in a writtencommentary? Should we conclude that the oral tradition, for better or forworse, had become enshrined in writing – i.e. in works referred to ashypomnêmata, aides-mémoire or ‘reminders’, notes in the form of a run-ning commentary? Possibly.90 It raises further questions about Simplicius’intended audience and his objectives in writing these commentaries.91

There can be little doubt that the cumulative effect of learning – itselfstimulated by the use of writing – had outgrown the human capacity formemorising. Obviously the (re)presentation of the views of others willproduce a type of orality or ‘oral teaching’ different from the Platonicphilosophy as such, or from the different stages of the writings preservingoral teaching (where revisions could enter into the lecture notes), i.e. itwould have a subsidiary role in the overall framework. But it seems thatthis would be a difference of degree rather than of kind: if doing philosophyis essentially an activity of living souls (Phaedrus 277b-c; Szlezák 1994:40), it remains true that whatever is written down cannot be sufficient forconveying ideas in all their richness of detail, especially when combinedwith the interactive process of continuous feedback in philosophy, whichideally leads to a mental state, that is, a flexible attitude rather than afixed belief.

1.3 A puzzle about locationThe exile of the Platonist philosophers is considered ‘one of the realchestnuts of the period’.92 It is connected with the closing of the Academyas a result of Justinian’s edicts (529-30 CE), which first forbade pagans toteach their ideas and then impounded their property and buildings so thatstaying in Athens became precarious. This decision was regarded as an actof religious intolerance on the part of Justinian.93 It can be seen as theculmination of a long process of growing tensions between the pagan andChristian communities (on which more in Chapter 6). This traditionalinterpretation thus sees the exile as imposed by the Emperor’s laws. Butmore recent suggestions point to another possibility, in which the exilewas self-imposed. This may be just a matter of emphasis, but it does signalthat things are not straightforward.

As the location and travels of Simplicius may have some bearing on thescope and source availability of his scholarly work, I will have to devote


48

some space to this topic. The problem is one of practicality: where didSimplicius go after leaving Athens and how was he able to write these longcommentaries filled with materials from numerous other books while hewas either travelling or living (as was proposed by Tardieu), in a provincialborder town (Harran)? It is of particular interest that the most recentcontributions have not just continued to refute Tardieu’s thesis, but haveusefully extended the historical and geographical perspective. This has not‘solved’ the central question as to where Simplicius wrote these commen-taries, but it has enriched the understanding of the time and place andredirected our attention to other matters, such as the feasibility of hisresuming a teaching role and the (supposed) importance for that role of aninstitutional base. It may be possible to address the question whetherthese exiled philosophers had opportunities for scholarly activity of thekind we see on display in Simplicius’ works, irrespective of location.

So how do we respond to the question: where did Simplicius write hislong works? This is not of mere historical value, but is intrinsically relatedto the ways in which we may or may not envisage the literary compositionof these commentaries: were they intended for educational use? Could theyhave been written without a well-stocked library? I have postponed treat-ment of a few problematic issues in the biographical material, whichcomplicate the picture I have been trying to draw out of Simplicius’ workas a scholar and exegete. They relate to one of the central questions thepresent study tries to elucidate, that is, the purpose of these commentar-ies. Sluiter’s opening remark (2000: 1) ‘The existence of a commentary onany given text is evidence that that text was used in teaching’ may notapply fully to Simplicius, although it is clear from many of his commentsthat his motive is also didactic. The issue can be dealt with only ratherbriefly, since it involves a conspicuous lack of explicit evidence, muchspeculation, and a divided scholarly community.

The first question concerns the location of his writing activity, a secondand related question enquires after the scholarly resources he had avail-able. The features of his works highlighted above, such as the wealth ofauthors, evoke the question whether his works did in fact arise in thecontext of teaching. The use of so many books almost implies he had a goodlibrary to consult. But does the external evidence support this inference?

The main source for the period 529-33 is Agathias’ rather biased ac-count in his History 2.29.1ff. It consists of a fairly straightforward claimthat the Platonists left Athens for Persia after the Justinian edicts ex-cluded pagan philosophers from teaching in 529-31, and then left Persiain c. 533.94 The issue which was dominating the scholarly debate concernsthe difficult question where they went after leaving Persia. The Frenchscholar Tardieu made the (now controversial) suggestion that they wentto and stayed in Harran in North Syria (Roman Carrhae) where in his viewthey founded a Neoplatonic school which was to last into the Islamic period(thirteenth century CE).95 The first point is not easily dismissed, as the


49

whole group consisting of individuals originating in the Near East (Syria)may well have taken the obvious trade route through a mountainouslandscape via Harran. The second point has been refuted.

The trip to Persia will not have happened immediately upon closure ofthe schools in Athens.96 The choice of destination is said to have beenmotivated by the fact that the new king, Kushrow Anorshirvan (Latin:Chosroes), had a reputation for enlightened rule and an interest in philo-sophy.97 But Kushro was not yet on the throne in 529 CE, so one mustassume either that it would take at least one or two years after hisaccession (531 CE) for his reputation as an ‘enlightened ruler’ to spread orthat his reputation for philosophical interests preceded his coming topower. Moreover, enforcement of the Justinian edict cannot have hap-pened from one day to the next, but more importantly, so long as the schoolwas entitled to its grounds and buildings, its members could in factcontinue their work in the privacy of their institution until the additionaledicts announced a total ban on non-Christian teachings, or as one edictexpresses it, ‘those sick with the madness of the impious Greeks’.98

The next problem, how long Simplicius and his companions stayed inPersia and where they went after leaving, has elicited some debate andthe suggestion by Tardieu that they settled in Harran (Carrhae) in Syria,where there presence led to a Neoplatonic school with a long-lastinginfluence into the Arabic era.99 This interpretation has come under attackfrom Arabic scholars (Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998) as well as more recentlyfrom Greek historians (Luna 2001, Lane Fox 2005, Walker 2006), and asa result Tardieu’s thesis of a continuing Harran school has become seri-ously weakened.100 When a treaty was signed between Persia and theByzantine Empire (September 532 CE) it included a clause allowing thepagan philosophers to return home.101 Whether or not they did cannot beascertained beyond doubt, since it is hard to imagine how such an agree-ment would be enforced. As Walker’s illuminating overview of thescholarship shows (Walker 2002), the subject clearly requires an interdis-ciplinary perspective to do justice to the historical situation (particularlythe Persian sources). His book makes clear that the mobility of philoso-phers was considerable, but it cannot be dealt with here beyond a fewcomments. A new analysis by Hällström has tried to place a differentemphasis on Justinian’s motivation, in particular because the traditionalview contains a number of problematic aspects.102 Instead of seeing theedicts as the means to settle a purely religious issue, Hällström regardsthem as targeting educational institutions. In his review of the volume inwhich the paper appeared, Gregory (1995: 549) suggests that Hällström’sconclusion ignores one other option flowing from his analysis, that ‘theAthenian schools were simply not closed at all’. Watts still maintains thatthe school closed, given the particular stipulations of the laws.103 He alsopoints out that there were quite a few more pagan communities in AsiaMinor (e.g. Edessa, Baalbek, Aphrodisias), which could be sustained


50

partly because the Roman state did not succeed in mounting an ‘effectiveempire-wide persecution against paganism’.104 These points at least showthat Harran was not uniquely placed to offer a safe haven for the Platon-ists in the 530s.

A secure solution is hardly possible, as Watts admits, but some finalspeculations may help to see that there are in fact few options.105 Disinte-gration of the group as an educational context at this stage, with thescholarch in his seventies, is not implausible. Simplicius’ works presup-pose access to a very good collection of texts and a major library would bean obvious explanation. Harran apparently possessed libraries, as itslocation made it one of the busiest trade route cities of its day. SinceAlexandria seems less plausible in the light of the embattled position ofthe pagan philosophical schools, it is possible that Simplicius returned toAthens.106 Even if his whereabouts remain unknown, the internal evidence(to be reviewed more fully in Chapters 2-6) seems to suggest at least thefollowing: (1) he had a considerable library at his disposal; (2) he had theleisure to write extensive interpretive works; (3) the ‘political’ situation,and the complexity and massive detail of the commentaries, make itunlikely that his aim was to address students directly.

If Simplicius was still travelling or at least not stationed in one of thelearned centres of the early sixth century (Alexandria, Athens, Aph-rodisias, Damascus), we need to assume he had a well-stocked personallibrary from which he could produce the commentaries we are studying.Such an assumption also creates difficulties from a practical point of view:either he really had all the works he cites (see Appendix I) or he was usingexcerpted material written up in notebooks (personal ‘florilegia’? smallcodices? marginal commentary written in microscript?107), or a combina-tion of the two. I am not convinced that excerpts only could suffice as anexplanation for the specific references and the amount of informationcontained in the commentaries, but there is evidence that can support thisfor some sources.108 Finally, Hankinson has made the interesting sugges-tion that after returning to Athens, Simplicius was in a kind of virtualexile, because he was unable to teach.109 In other words, he could have beenwriting for an imaginary student body. This position will be developedfurther in Chapters 2-6.

1.4 Of books and men: Simplicius’ scholarly method110

It will be helpful to sketch a preliminary picture of Simplicius’ methodo-logy on the basis of the foregoing explorations. Its purpose is to give aprovisional description of the main components of his method, whilehighlighting his philological engagements with texts in the service of hisreligio-philosophical agenda on the basis of his more considered views andhis de facto approach. It can only be a broad description of Simplician‘principles’ of exegesis at this stage, since the following chapters will


51

contribute further points to the analysis of Simplicius’ methodology basedon his applied method. As may have become clear by now, my account aimsat a revision of the reputation of Simplicius: he was neither an antiquariannor a kind of ‘modern commentator’ nor even a faceless imitator of hispredecessors. The remainder of this study is a first step to do him justicein all the aspects of his methodology.

Poised as the interpreter of the text, Simplicius views (and to someextent constructs) the Aristotelian text as a closely knit network of coher-ent arguments and internal ‘reminders’ (e.g. in Phys. 424.14) whichrequire only proper explication to be understood. This strategy aims tolend the work consistency and an almost seamless unity, and is strength-ened by the close reading that he performs on the text – a feature whichsuggests that the commentaries could be aimed at students. Assuming forthe moment that Simplicius falls within, and makes use of, the latePlatonist school practices (though some reservations still hold),111 a gen-eral characterisation of his approach will help to create a certainexpectation of his mode of exegesis.

Simplicius’ programme of comprehensive explication of the text gearedtowards a particular reconstruction of Greek philosophy as a unified andharmonious tradition is composed of several strategies. In broad terms hemakes use of (1) philological moves, as is clear in the textual criticism, theattention to detail, and his ability to use the ambiguities of the text to hisadvantage. Next, we find (2) interpretative moves, as is evident from hisbroader principles (explicit and implicit), the recurrent formalism (re-phrasing arguments as syllogisms), his philosophical assessment ofAristotle and the Presocratics, and the intention to reach ‘harmony’ amongGreek thinkers. Moreover, (3) the appeal to authority (or authorities)illustrates his inclusive approach to his available sources which could beusefully employed in the service of his wider aims and objectives (earlyPeripatetics, earlier commentators, his teachers). Finally, (4) his use ofpolemical argument and invective adds a rhetorical flavour, as is especiallyclear from his attacks on his Christian rival Philoponus.

Most of the time these modes of presentation make up different aspectsof one overarching strategy, so that they cannot always be separated outclearly; often they complement each other, or one may shore up another.But for the sake of clarity it will be a useful to have a provisionaldistinction, because so far only (2) and (4) have received some attention,whereas (1) and (3) have remained undiscussed. Still, this division willenable us to incorporate new observations into this broader framework.Our survey of the scholarly side of Simplicius’ method so far can besummed up as follows.

(a) The analysis in his commentary aims to clarify Aristotle who inPlatonist circles had become regarded as a suitable introduction to Plato;we know that within the school the students started out by readingAristotle first (especially logic, ‘the smaller Mysteries’), then progressed to


52

physics and psychology, and finally metaphysics (‘the Greater Mysteries’).His allegiance is to Plato and his attitude towards Aristotle is anythingbut docile and obedient. We can remind ourselves of his statement onAristotle (in Cat. 7.27-9) where he urged a non-partisan approach to thefounder of the Peripatos.112

(b) For Simplicius as for many Neoplatonists there is a close relationbetween religion and philosophy (pushed further since Iamblichus’ theur-gic approach and Proclus’ overall attitude as illustrated in Marinus’ Lifeof Proclus). Simplicius even regards writing as having therapeutic value(in Cat. 3.4-6, cf. §1.2.3) in the sense of Plato’s Phaedrus, where hedescribes the leading of the soul through intellectual stages. Their inter-pretations reveal how they create, knowingly and unknowingly, room tomanoeuvre. Despite a whole range of logical and hermeneutical conditionsthey have set themselves, their working habits clearly lack the kind ofconstraints that would prevent them from taking such liberties as moderninterpreters have come to avoid: the mingling of religion and science, ofritual and reasoning, of logical argument and partisan polemic have inmodern scholarship been banned, or ‘streamlined’ into separate domains(e.g. disciplines, books, articles, reviews). Clearly the ancient thinkers didnot adhere to such a clear separation of activities. They offer a comprehen-sive treatment of base text, previous interpretations, and counter-attackwhen deemed necessary. Rules of fair play apply only unevenly, in particu-lar when one’s religious affiliation and traditional lifestyle are at stake.There are, it must be said, arguments for and against either approach –but it is crucial that in our assessment of Simplicius’ method we do notproject, unwittingly and unfairly, our own understanding of the rules ofscholarship, reasoning, and the importance of religion onto his practice.

(c) With regard to the incorporation of source material, Simpliciusvariously used paraphrase and quotation (separate and combined); aboutthese two modes (which he shares with Porphyry) he entertained consid-ered views, first, on how to use them, and secondly, on what role they couldplay. His method of quoting certain authors reveals an awareness of theimportance of using those authors’ own words in discussing their views.Phrases such as têi lexei tois rhêmasin (e.g. in Phys. 1325.24) or kata lexin(in DC 499.7; in Phys. 60.27, 140.29, 1125.11) as a lead-up to quotationsindicate that Simplicius is interested in making these distinctions, andwith good reason. This illustrates his interest in deliberate use of quota-tion, based on an acute awareness of his scholarly responsibility for futuregenerations and an heightened sense of scholarly method.


53

2

Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy?Origins of Ancient Wisdom

Early Greek philosophy is still regarded as the foundation and startingpoint of Western thought, representing a new rationalism that emergedfrom the multi-cultural hotbed of the Greek coastal cities of Asia Minor inthe sixth century BCE. Historical accounts of beginnings can be somewhatmisleading in that we cannot look much beyond the surviving evidence,and a major problem with this early period is our dependence on fragmen-tary and often biased evidence. Referred to as ‘Presocratics’, a convenientbut inaccurate label, since publication of Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsok-ratiker in 1903, these natural philosophers have been studied intensivelyfor over a century. The past two decades have seen an increased awarenessthat the cultural and intellectual context of the source authors needs moreattention than a collection of fragments normally allows. Many havealready adopted such an approach in trying to acquire a more ‘organic feel’for the snippets of Presocratic thought and thus no longer rely solely onfragment collections, no matter how useful they are.

My deliberate reference to Catherine Osborne’s book (Rethinking EarlyGreek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics) in this chap-ter’s title pays tribute to such a contextualising style of inquiry. In herbook Osborne made a provocative attempt to evaluate Heraclitus in thework of the Church father Hippolytus, showing how difficult it is to escapethe framework and selection of the source author when studying fragmen-tary texts. My use of her title, which at the time set an agenda for modernscholarship, now describes Simplicius’ approach to early Greek philo-sophy. Simplicius follows a particular agenda in his treatment of thePresocratics, ‘rethinking’ their ideas to make them fit the general picturehe wants to present of Greek philosophy as a whole. But the question markin the title is there to signify that the process is not straightforward:‘rethinking’ contains an ambiguity that we need to spell out, as it compli-cates the interpretation of the Presocratic material. I will not be offeringa new interpretation of the Presocratics, but will rather try to outlineSimplicius’ viewpoint and how it clarifies the problems that arise formodern readers.1 It is hard to deny that there is a certain bias in hisinterpretation, but to apply such a modern notion of historical research isnot always helpful (the British historian John Vincent recently remarkedthat historical accounts might be assessed quite differently if on occasion

54

we were to write ‘commitment’ instead of ‘bias’).2 Here I fully agree withGerson when he states that ‘the Neo-platonists were referring to Plato asthey understood him, not as we do’.3 The same holds for their view of thePresocratics. There is also a redeeming factor in all this, namely Sim-plicius’ use of quotations, which guarantees that the material he preservesplays a crucial part in reconstructing Presocratic thought. But directquotation should not be overly privileged at the expense of other mediatingformats. It may assist in appreciating style, word choice and any literarypeculiarity, but to capture the essence of a philosopher’s views paraphrasewill often be a very acceptable alternative. In fact, an interpretive para-phrase can be more informative than a quotation, so long as it can be seento relate to the ‘original’ words – the proviso being that we will probablynever be sure to what extent and how accurately we can recover originalwords. Clearly we need to evaluate each case on its own merits. Thequestion mark in my chapter title, then, indicates that Simplicius’ ‘re-thinking’ is done from a very unusual angle: ‘rethinking’ needs to beviewed as a kind of transformation, an attempt to read the earliest Greekthinkers as the first holders of the venerable doctrines preserved by thelate Platonists, in other words to present them almost as Platonists avantla lettre. Like Aristotle he uses the age-old strategy of claiming that theirideas are presented in enigmatic form (ainigmatôdôs, in Phys. 36.30), sothat only a proper decoding will reveal their ‘real’ message.4 Here hedisagrees with both Plato and Aristotle.

Simplicius’ role in the transmission of Presocratic philosophy would byitself justify a separate study of his scholarly method.5 His elaboratesource material as reflected in lavish quotations and discussions of earlierphilosophers makes his work a treasure trove for the study of Greekphilosophy across the centuries. His importance in this context has right-fully earned him a place in many fragment collections of Greekphilosophers, but this itself means that his work as a whole has sufferedfragmentation and thus became invisible. Simplicius’ role in providingpertinent information regarding the Presocratics is also exceptional, andon this front considerable progress has been made to assess the quantityand quality of the material he provides.6 But more work is needed tounderstand his methodology properly and consider how this might ad-vance our knowledge of his value for reconstructing the Presocraticmaterial or even some of the intermediary stages by which the informationreached him (e.g. via Theophrastus at in Phys. 9.7). Long chunks of textfrom Empedocles, Parmenides and Anaxagoras are found in his commen-taries, for example, but they are not always treated within the originalcontext and with attention to the agenda and idiosyncrasies of the sourceauthor.

It would seem, therefore, that a more contextualised approach to thequotations in Simplicius can make a contribution to understanding hiscriteria for selecting and quoting. His evidence constitutes the far end of

2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy? Origins of Ancient Wisdom

55

the chronological scale of available sources on Greek philosophy used inHermann Diels’ influential Doxographi Graeci (Berlin 1879). What makesSimplicius special, even if not above reproach, is his exceptional effort touse actual quotations, which illustrates unusual source access and exem-plary reportage. This suggests that he, unlike many doxographicalsources, had direct access to the Presocratics and Theophrastus, andimplies that he has a remarkable methodology in quoting, selecting andusing his sources. The importance of these two characteristics cannoteasily be overstated: despite the considerable chronological distance be-tween Theophrastus and Simplicius, they provide us with an unusual linkbetween two extremes of a textual transmission that straddles almost athousand years. The complexity in the case of the Presocratics necessitatesconsiderable care in interpreting the material. What is even more remark-able is that, despite having certain specific reasons for quoting directlyfrom the earliest philosophers, Simplicius often chooses to quote morethan is strictly necessary.7

Once we acknowledge that Simplicius has a specific agenda in hisdiscussion of the Presocratics, we are better placed to separate out thedifferent factors involved in his approach. His most important aim ininterpreting Aristotle is to gain a comprehensive understanding of hisworks, which in turn may lead to the preparation of our souls in order thatthey may return to the highest level of Being, the One (in Cat. 6.6-18, cf.in Epict. 35, 111.48ff.).8 His second most important aim is to convince hisaudience that this understanding emerges from the unity of Aristotle’sworks and of Greek philosophy in general. In other words, by his moreelaborate inclusion of pre-Aristotelian thinkers he tries to show thatphilosophical thought is the medium for a single venerable and ancientmessage, to be found as much in the Presocratics as in later Greekphilosophers. This perspective will allow us to revisit the short passagespresented in fragment collections and probe their role and value fromSimplicius’ own perspective. We need to ask about the why and how of hisapproach, but the question of his access to source material must also beaddressed (see §2.1.1). As prime examples of special interest to SimpliciusI shall discuss Parmenides and Empedocles, whose broader metaphysicalideas seem to contain particularly useful proposals for showing the appro-priateness (and ancestry?) of the monistic model of true reality that weencounter in Plotinus and the late Platonists. A third example(Anaxagoras) is used to show how exegetical techniques managed toextract a range of meanings from ancient theories to suit the mould of newtheories.

A complicating factor in the case of the Presocratics is that Simpliciusmay have had access both to Theophrastus’ reports on the Presocraticsand to the Presocratics themselves, which could cause contamination ofthe sources. He may have obtained some material via Alexander, but it isfairly certain that he had direct access to Theophrastus. In particular


56

cases he justifies his habit of quoting more than the context requires: thushe clarifies his approach to Parmenides with the by now famous statement(in Phys. 144.25-8) that the work is hard to get hold of:

In order not to seem too pedantic I will here quote the verses of Parmenides� in order to justify my comments on this matter (dia te tôn pistin tôn hyp’emou legomenôn) and because his treatise is becoming quite rare (dia tônspanin) [my italics].

Apart from a sensible strategy of providing supporting evidence, we cansee here the concerns of a scholar who is aware of his responsibilitytowards future generations of readers. Such use of evidence was in factquite a recent phenomenon, as I shall explain below. On other occasionshe may want to provide proof for his interpretation after having providedparaphrases, as with Empedocles (in DC 140.2-3; cf. 528.32-3):

And to make sure that I do not seem to be making idle claims (kenas makariasanaplattein), I shall quote some of Empedocles’ words (tôn Empedokleous epônparathêsomai [there follows a citation of six full lines, 141.1-6].

He has yet other reasons for quoting from Alexander and Philoponus, butwe can deal with these later.9 The examples here well illustrate the specialrole Simplicius has in providing us with information on a range of Greekphilosophers across seven centuries. And his views on direct (literal)quotations seem unparalleled for this period of Late Antiquity.10 A furtherpassage which illustrates this nicely can be found in his commentary onAristotle’s Physics, where he expresses a view on Aristotle’s method (inPhys. 1318.10-15):11

It is Aristotle’s habit to introduce testimonies from his predecessors after hisproofs, as if they were agreeing with these, with a view to, on the one hand,instruct and persuade his readers, but on the other, to render the beliefs ofhis audience more stable with the help of views from others; but he does notuse such testimonies of his predecessors as proofs, unlike more recentauthors.12

Two points emerge from this passage: according to Simplicius quotationsserve to justify and reinforce proofs, not to replace them. In addition, withthis judgement on his near contemporaries he seems to be saying that acombination of quotation and interpretation is the best strategy to use inwritten discussions. Simplicius can thus serve a double purpose in ourquest to reconstruct early Greek thought: by establishing his relation tothe works and method of Theophrastus, (1) he provides a route to therecovery of the reports on the Presocratics, and (2) he emerges also ashaving more direct information on the Presocratics.13

But how can we use him, for example, to disentangle the muddle


57

regarding the different titles, which may refer to one work of Theophras-tus? These titles (one of which is in Simplicius) make it rather difficult toidentify which works of Theophrastus he used. One example must sufficefor present purposes. We can perhaps argue along the same lines as wecan regarding the resemblance between Theophrastus and the doxo-graphical collection in Aëtius’ Placita: if the arrangement and sequence inthe first book of the commentary on the Physics reflects those in Theo-phrastus in any way, it is reasonable to assume that this correspondencecan provide a more reliable insight into the early sources. Usener andDiels have already started this line of argument (Usener 1858, Diels 1879).In Simplicius in Phys. 22-8, we find a discussion of the first principles ofphysics, and Theophrastus is mentioned as a source (in Phys. 20.19; cf. inDC 1.8). Near the end of the discussion, Simplicius remarks (in Phys.28.30-2):

This brief summary of investigations into first principles has been arranged,not in chronological order, but by way of ‘kinship’ (kata sungeneian).

If Simplicius claims a principle of kinship here, should we take that tomean that he is changing the arrangement of Theophrastus (against atacit expectation among his readers of a chronological treatment) oradopting it? By itself the passage does not allow us a firm conclusion as towhich option is the better one. The references in the first book of thecommentary would point to Theophrastus’ Physics as a source, but it isstill debated whether that work is the only source at that point in Sim-plicius’ account. At any rate, the reports on the Presocratic opinionsemerge as a parallel line of transmission: these are brief passages perhapstaken from a (richer) collection which Theophrastus used at differenttimes for different purposes. And even though Simplicius was aware of atype of work which contained compilations, he is rather dismissive of themas unreliable.14 So while Simplicius clearly had a vast array of excellentsources at his disposal (see diagram above, §1.1), it is a surprising omis-sion that he never mentions the Theophrastean work we now thinkcontained considerable information on the Presocratics and very probablybore the title Physikai doxai.

Theophrastus’ critical evaluations of earlier philosophers (Presocratics,Platonists) are extant in short passages, his Metaphysics, and the treatiseOn sensation, believed to be part of a larger work (perhaps his Physicalopinions, D.L. 5.48, or his Reply to natural philosophers, D.L. 5.46, whichis possibly the same as the work mentioned in Plutarch Against Colotes 14= F245 FHSG). Such interpretative passages represent important aspectsof his methodology and influence on the (early) history of philosophy. Notonly do they show an increased awareness of the philosophical enterpriseas a continuous discourse by methodical preservation and assessment ofpast achievements, but they also make clear to us, through his criticisms


58

and convenient organisation of materials, the reason for his impact onfollowing ages. Although its dissemination cannot be traced in everydetail, his work in this area contributed to consolidation and preservationof philosophical debates in the Hellenistic schools. Some particularstrands of the reception of his pioneering collections can be seen in theso-called placita literature, a kind of schoolbooks with listings of philo-sophical views under particular headings or themes (doxai in Greek,placita in Latin).15

The most recent strand to have been clarified is the one linked toEpicurus, who in his meteorology and ‘doxographical’ reports relied onTheophrastus’ Physikai doxai.16 The particular thesis Lucretius is arguingagainst in DRN V.1 is that of ‘creation but no destruction’. In other words,he rejects the idea that the world is created but not destroyed – as onewould expect from someone who is a believer in the atomistic model whereonly atoms and void exist (in the true sense of ‘exist’). The crucial question,against whom this argument might be directed, Sedley answers in favourof Plato. Why the target has to be Plato can be argued for on severalgrounds, but the most important reasons are as follows: (1) it cannot bethe Stoics because they believed in a destruction of the world (conflagra-tion), (2) this thesis, which Sedley calls ‘asymmetrical creationism’ (p. 75)was known to be the idiosyncratic view of Plato (Timaeus). In addition, theteleological element, that the world will not be destroyed ‘thanks to thebenevolence of its creator’, is clearly found in Timaeus 32C. A complex webof connections are presented by Sedley between the early Academy(Polemo), Epicurus and Theophrastus to show that the interpretationfound in the latter two are part of an early exegesis of the Timaeus.17 Thecomplexity of this one case may suffice to show how difficult it is to givethis material a proper treatment.

The view that Simplicius has revisited the works of the Presocratics inthe process of commenting on Aristotle was not always accepted. Zellerstill held the view that the material in book 1 of his commentary on thePhysics came mostly from Alexander’s treatment in his (lost) commen-tary.18 This position has been successfully challenged by a number ofpartial studies (e.g. O’Brien 1969, Sider 1981 [20052], Laks 1983, Perry1983), some results of which will be integrated into the argument of thischapter. It is important for our assessment of the Presocratic materials notto jump to conclusions or extrapolate conclusions from one area to others.To generalise in these matters can easily mean to over-generalise: as weshall see, Simplicius’ approach is strongly influenced by his sources – bothoriginal sources and earlier commentators – in various different ways. Theaccount in this chapter focuses primarily on his commentary on thePhysics, because it is still the primary evidence for our assessment ofPresocratic materials in natural philosophy.

Our view of Simplicius’ relation to Theophrastus is still determined bythe view proposed by nineteenth-century scholarship (Usener 1858, Diels


59

1879, Zeller 1886). The most urgent problem concerning the Placita is toestablish what its purpose and function might be in relation to the majorwork Theophrastus is thought to have written about his predecessors.Usener thought he had shown that we can distinguish between Theo-phrastus’ ‘history’ of philosophy and the doxographical collection (Usener1858: 25f.). But Steinmetz (1964: 335ff.) and Mansfeld (1989) have shownthat this interpretation, for the most part based on a specific reading ofbook titles, rests on a misunderstanding. Usener and Diels seem to havebeen convinced that the De sensibus (their preferred title) was part of awork they refer to as Opinions of the natural philosophers. Their argu-ments are not very convincing, but it would take too long to go into thisproblem here, so I will mention only those points which can help us tounderstand the importance of the issue.19

It requires little argument to explain how difficult it can be to deduceanything about the content of a work from a title. The relevant texts –subsumed under the label Physicorum opiniones by Usener and Diels – areof varied provenance and do not allow any firm solution to the problem.20

They can be classified into three groups: they belong to Physics, or to thePhysikai doxai, or they are impossible to attribute to either or both.21

Moreover, the available evidence for the title of the work is inconclusivefor deciding what kind of work could have been the main source forPresocratic material: Calvenus Taurus (F241B FHSG), Alexander (inMetaph. 31.7-8 = F227C FHSG), Plutarch (and Galen’s Commentary onHippocrates’ Nature of man XV.25 Kühn = F231 FHSG) all cite differenttitles: On the physical opinions, Replies to the natural philosophers, Sum-maries of physical opinions, Physics. Presumably what these titles suggest– that a work containing the opinions of the Presocratics was still incirculation among Peripatetic and Platonic authors of the second centuryCE (Taurus, Plutarch, Galen) – can hardly be decisive for Simplicius. Whilethe references give us the impression of a work describing a broadlydefined area of research (physics) on the basis of book titles, it is muchharder to make any definite comments on its content. For now the mostplausible (or least problematic) hypothesis concerning these titles is theone proposing that the genitive plural in peri tôn phusikôn doxôn (foundin Taurus and Galen) should be resolved as phusikai doxai – that is, takenas the title of a work with systematic content dealing with ‘physical’ views(i.e. views related to natural philosophy), which could be used in dialecticalevaluations.22

The role of the Presocratics in the first book of Simplicius’ Physicscommentary is significantly more prominent than one would expect on thebasis of their treatment by Aristotle. This is clear not only from a simplecomparison between the base text and the commentary, but also from theway in which Simplicius talks about their importance in his own overall(re)construction of their philosophical endeavours. Aristotle’s habit ofsurveying earlier views at the start of his investigations is well-known: he


60

was keen to assess existing views in order to establish the questions andproblems to be considered in a particular subject and to determine, byelimination, which considered views were still worth while.23 We may referto this approach as ‘pragmatic dialectics’. By this I mean that Aristotlelooks for direction and parameters in his own investigation on the basis ofthe accumulated insights of previous generations, thus profiting from theobstacles they encountered and the solutions they proposed.24

Simplicius’ attention on the Presocratics seems to have a different focusand motivation. His primary interest in the early Greek thinkers is onewhich he has inherited from Porphyry, Plotinus and of course Aristotle.But given that he is producing commentary on Aristotle, we would expectonly passing comments on their views in the first books, where Aristotlehimself discusses them. So we must ask what brings about the unusualelaborations on the Presocratics, especially Parmenides, Empedocles,Anaxagoras and a few others. He adduces materials from other Aristote-lian works and revisits some of their views in later parts of thecommentary. It is unusual because his contemporaries were less inclinedto do this kind of research (Philoponus being a significant exception). Itcan in fact be argued that he did not have to comment on them at all: sinceAristotle was the crucial author as an introduction to Plato, one wouldexpect the commentary to be predominantly about him. Instead he notonly gives them considerable attention, but also makes an effort to chaseup their original works and present long quotations from these. Are thesemerely the habits of a well-trained scholar? Or is there another reason forhis elaborate source hunting and lavish use of quotations? Is it in fact adeliberate strategy to extend the harmony among Greek philosophers? Ishall suggest an answer to these questions by analysing his discussion ofa selection of Presocratic thinkers. The importance of the Presocratics canbe clarified from the broader perspective of Greek philosophical thoughtas a whole. The striking account he gives of the basic harmony betweenthe early Greek philosophers and Plato, Aristotle and others is unprece-dented and demands our attention. In the process of discussing this issueit is worth indicating how these reports came to be extracted in moderntimes, and how they have been treated by modern scholars.

The question of harmonisation (so dominant in the debate over howAristotle and Plato can be shown not to disagree) will also play animportant role in our analysis of the early thinkers, because of the way inwhich Simplicius seems to impose a comprehensive unity on Greek phi-losophy by assimilating the earliest Greek philosophers into the‘mainstream’ of Platonist historiography of philosophy. The phusikoi arein agreement regarding the need for inquiring after the basic principles ofnature, according to Simplicius (in Phys. 21.14).25 This may strike us as atravesty of reality, but we should not forget that Proclus already pursuedthis aim; that ancient accounts of philosophical views are notoriouslya-historic; or that our view of the evidence is clouded by the limited access


61

we have to it, with the compounding problem that it is Simplicius who isproviding us with a large part of the crucial materials. This does not meanthat I disagree with the commonly held view that Simplicius’ way of‘reading’ the Presocratics as ‘proto-Platonists’ is forced. My point is merelythat, whatever the fundamental objections we have to Simplicius’ ap-proach to early Greek philosophy, Simplicius’ particular perspectivedeserves consideration.

This chapter is thus given further focus: Simplicius’ viewpoint, broughtout in his attempt to synthesise the whole of Greek philosophy as being in‘harmony’ (symphônein, sunaidein). Strong harmony among the paganphilosophers was by now a much-needed commodity to counter the Chris-tians in their claim that Christian doctrine drew its strength from itsunity, combining this claim with an attack on Greek philosophers assuffering from disagreements and thus lack of unity. Considered from thisangle, earlier studies of Simplicius’ treatment of the Presocratics canguide us, in addition to the more recent contextualised interpretations ofphilosophical texts surviving only in fragments.26 We may first glance athis momentous importance for early Greek philosophy before we look atsome significant examples in which his selection criteria disclose hisinterests (2.1). There can be little doubt that the pivotal motive underlyinghis approach is this (to us rather extreme) version of harmonisation withthe aim of bringing the early Greek philosophers into the fold of thePlatonist narrative of intellectual and religious history. This strategy ofreverting to the ‘ancient wisdom’ of Pythagoras and thinkers of his erainvolves a reinterpretation of the Presocratics: by interpreting early Greekphilosophy as he does, Simplicius attempts to make the Presocratics fit aconfiguration of ideas of late Platonism, which is itself an amalgam ofPlotinian, Iamblichan and Proclan revisions (cf. Sorabji 1990: 4f.). He mayhave followed Plotinus, who saw the Presocratics as his ‘precursors’,27 butthere are other influences detectable from, e.g., Alexander, Porphyry andProclus (Iamblichus) to help us understand this perspective, startingwith Parmenides and Empedocles (2.2), and the remarkable thesis ofAnaxagoras (2.3). The argument will prove to be both a vindication ofOsborne’s broader thesis of contextual adaptation – but now based on adifferent author – and an adjustment of it in that Simplicius’ approachgoes much further than Hippolytus’ Christian adaptation. In the proc-ess of assimilating the Presocratics, Simplicius uses certain procedureswhich are of interest for our assessment of the preserved texts, sincethey reveal Simplicius’ method of handling and incorporating sourcesinto the larger narrative of his commentary. What was at stake for himwas nothing less than the survival of the pagan perspective, an objec-tive which was to be achieved by demonstrating the unity of Greekphilosophy as a whole (2.4).


62

2.1 What we have thanks to SimpliciusIt has often been stated, and rightly so, that without Simplicius the studyof Presocratic thought would be speculation for the most part, especiallywhen it comes to the preservation of ipsissima verba. As we have seen(§1.2-4) Simplicius has done future generations of philosophers and schol-ars a huge favour by considering the issue of quotation carefully anddeciding that there are good reasons to supplement paraphrase (a morecommon mode of writing among the Platonist teachers) with elaborate andfrequent citation of the authors under discussion.

However, in the scholarly literature Simplicius’ use of quotations, andin particular his generosity in quoting, is mostly taken for granted ratherthan explained. For a long time his works have been used as quarries andunderstandably the question of reliability has been dominant. Scholarsagree that his longer quotations are reliable, but are less clear about thereasons for their presence in the commentaries. Should we frame thequestion in such a way that we consider this sixth-century Platonist assimply an antiquarian who delighted in writing long commentaries? Ordid he have specific reasons for his elaborate quotations, perhaps as aresult of serious reflection upon his own method?

A reminder of the statistics will make clear how much we owe Simpliciusfor the preservation of Presocratic material: our text of Parmenides owesabout 100 of 154 extant Greek verses to Simplicius’ commentary on Aris-totle’s Physics,28 in the case of Empedocles29 it is around 150 of 450 linessurviving from an estimated total of 3,000 of his cosmological poem; forAnaxagoras twelve ‘verbatim’ fragments of a total of 22 come from Sim-plicius.30 For Diogenes of Apollonia31 we can rely on at least six fragments inhis review and ten for Melissus. His regular appearance in the main sourcesfor Diels-Kranz (an indicator of selection) and their distribution across the Aand B fragments demonstrates our reliance on his works. This is representedin comparative fashion in the table overleaf: I have highlighted Aëtius, anearly source between Simplicius and Theophrastus, and Simplicius, to indi-cate how remarkable his evidence is for an author writing in the early sixthcentury CE.32 In themselves impressive, such numbers are of course only oflimited value to us in assessing why Simplicius quotes from these authors, orhow (or even how reliably). Moreover, Diels’ approach in his collection offragments of Presocratic philosophy (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 5thedn, 1922-) clearly chose to privilege the ‘direct’ quotations (‘B’ fragments)over and above the ‘paraphrases’ (‘A’ fragments), but has been found to beflawed.33 The main reasons for wanting to re-edit DK are three: (1) theseparation of quotations from their contexts diminishes their informationvalue; (2) DK is no longer a comprehensive collection; (3) the presumptionthat ‘B’ fragments are more important undeservedly undercuts the value of‘A’ fragments. That said, it is probably unlikely that anyone will in factre-edit DK, since that would leave the old conceptual framework in place.


63

The important issues of context and closeness to the ‘original’ can onlybe resolved for each individual case when there is independent evidence.It would go too far to do this for all Presocratics in the present context, sothe three short case studies presented below will illustrate the process ofassimilation of Presocratic thought into the Simplician narrative. Itmakes sense to concentrate on Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras,since they are singled out by Simplicius as having done a better job thanother Presocratics by distinguishing physics from metaphysics much likethe much-revered Pythagoreans did (ta phusika apo tôn huper physindiakrinontes, in Phys. 20.29-21.19).34 Parmenides and Empedocles I shalltreat together, because they appear in his discussion largely as a result ofhis interest in their metaphysical monism (2.2). Simplicius’ interest inAnaxagoras is due mainly to the latter’s claims about the importance ofmind (nous) and will thus illustrate how the bold and grand statements ofearly Greek philosophy had a major influence on later thought (2.3).

All three were important figures among the early Greek philosophersbecause of their original contributions: Parmenides and Empedocles aregenerally viewed as the early champions of monism and pluralism, debat-ing the main constituents of matter, the possibility of motion, and thereality of sensory perception.35 Of course we should not forget that we relyheavily on the Aristotelian evidence for this judgement. Ancient accountsbefore Simplicius had already pitted Empedocles and Anaxagoras against

DK Aëtius D.L. Sextus Ps. Plut Simpl. other(A+B) A/B A/B A/B A/B A/B A/BThales 23 7/– 1/– –/– – 1/–Anaximander30

12/2 1/– 1/– – 4/1

Anaximenes 23 8/2 1/– –/– – 2/–Xenophanes 52 10/2 5/– –/5 1/1 1/2Heraclitus 23 9/1 1/12 –/3 –/17 2/-Parmenides 54 11/– 5/– – 3/2 6/9 Thphr. 1Melissus – – – – –/10Anaxagoras 24/– 5/– 1/– 8/2 5/16 Ar. Thphr. Hipp.

Alex. Galen Clem.Diogenes Apoll. /6Empedocles 98 34/2 1/4 1/7 2/37 1 Ar. 17Democritus 170 25/– 4/19 9/10 4/11 7/3 Suidas 3

Clement 2, Arist. 36, Theophr. 10;Aelianus 6


64

one another, as for instance in Aristotle’s On generation and corruption(314a24-b1) and Theophrastus’ De sensu, where they are the main repre-sentatives of the theories explaining perception by like or oppositesrespectively.36 Such labelling or ‘type-casting’ of the early philosophicalpositions as distinct theories of major significance already allowed thePeripatetics to develop explanatory models based on convenient binarydivisions into two major groupings.37 With such precedents of historio-graphic modelling Simplicius might have adopted a similar approach. Aswe saw above, the evidence for Theophrastus’ work on earlier Greekphilosophy (represented in several titles) does not allow to resolve theproblem of his role in Simplicius’ material, but we can explore the issue ofSimplicius’ access to Presocratic material.

2.1.1 The art of quotation once moreThe first question we need to ask is whether Simplicius had direct accessto Presocratic works. If access was direct, not only will it enhance hisreputation as a scholar, it could potentially make us reassess the materialshe preserves, including his paraphrases. The issue is rather tricky. At thisstage of our analysis asking the question allows us to test further ourgeneral characterisation of why and how Simplicius reflected on hisquotation method (§1.2.3) by looking at individual cases. The earlierexamples showed how some notion of a difference between prose andpoetry was clear when he spoke about Melissus (who wrote in prose).There was also a clear emphasis on the need to reproduce the ‘wordsthemselves’ of these earlier authors as a way of reaching greater accuracyand clarity in interpretation (in Phys. 111.15-17). In all cases, in particularwhere polemic and criticism come into it, a careful reading of each casemust precede further inferences regarding his general methodology.

Evidence to substantiate our claim of access (direct or indirect) to theworks of Presocratics is of two types: first, Simplicius provides indirectcomments on the provenance of his materials which strongly suggest thathe had copies of the works in front of him (and not, pace Zeller, justAlexander’s commentary, a verdict perhaps based on Diels’ introductionto the Simplicius edition, CAG vol. 9, p. v, n. 1). This material ranges fromcomments on the location of passages in the original work to elaborateparaphrases and quotations from these works surviving nowhere else –some to be discussed below. For instance, Simplicius indicates whenmaterial is coming from (near) the beginning of a work, as he does withDiogenes of Apollonia or Anaxagoras.38 Second, the amount and nature ofthe ipsissima verba are in themselves a counter-argument for thinking hedid not have access to good copies. The first point (amount) I have de-scribed above, the second (nature) will be discussed in what follows. Overand above these factors there is the comparatively high presence ofPresocratic materials when placed next to some of the other important


65

doxographical sources as shown in the table given above. It specifies onlythe most important sources, yet it clearly shows how the Presocraticthinkers are distributed across the sources, with a clear role for Simpliciusand specific thinkers. I have highlighted the sources towards the outerends of the tradition (Aëtius,39 Simplicius) to give some indication of howthe transmission of material has undergone change over 400 years: onlyAëtius has Thales, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Parmenides (all testimoniesin DK, i.e. ‘A’ fragments); Simplicius on the other hand abounds inreferences to Anaximander (‘A’ fragments), Anaxagoras (‘B’ fragments)and Melissus (‘B’ fragments).

Quotation, then, features in several significant ways: for justification(e.g. to substantiate a paraphrase: in DC 140.32-3, 298.21-2), for clarifica-tion (e.g. when statements containing technical or other obscure termshave been rephrased, 25.26-30), or for evidentiary reasons (e.g. in Phys.331.10). It was also noted earlier that Simplicius objects to using testimo-nia as a demonstration (in Phys. 1318.10-15), a position that carries theimportant implication that he regards quotation-plus-interpretation asthe correct format for his exegetical strategy (as did Porphyry, see below).His more practical motivation, reflected in two well-known references tothe scarcity of certain works (spanin, in Phys. 144.25-8; in Cat. 352.22-4),is significant for the man and his mindset, but should not be over-empha-sised. One is reminded of the method of the Alexandrian church fathers ofthe third and fourth centuries, in particular Origen and Eusebius, whopioneered the use of quotation in their exegetical activities.40 Furtherdetails of Simplicius’ quotation technique can corroborate this line ofinterpretation. Specific verbs underline the conscious distinction hemakes between taking up the words of the authors and other ways ofrepresenting their views (paraphrase, summary, criticism, rephrasing incontemporary language).

The crucial lexical evidence is limited but indispensable: quotations areannounced by paratithesthai or paragraphein, and may be introduced byverbs of stating, saying, remarking, etc. There are strong indications thatin the commentators paratithesthai and paragraphein (literally ‘markinga text with signs’) are almost always used to introduce (fairly) accuratequotations (exceptions exist, see e.g. Themistius in DA 107.30). One of thefamous passages of Empedocles, from his poem (B17 DK41), is also intro-duced with the same verb (paratithesthai) and signals the very interestingimplication that Simplicius does not distinguish between the basic mean-ing of paratithesthai/ paragraphein (in the margin) and ‘quoting’, so thatit is even possible that Simplicius himself marked citations in the text, asin Cat. 64.20-5 may suggest (more examples exist).42

The use of these verbs in this sense was not new, as is clear from earlierexamples. Some cases often retain the meaning of ‘put side by side,compare’, as for instance in the evaluative comment by Plutarch Aristides26.4 ‘although he customarily and properly records such things and sets


66

forth his written sources’, which signals the proper use of documentaryevidence,43 or in his De Stoic. repugn. 1051E to avoid repetition: ‘oftenwritten and said by them so no need to adduce their (own) words’ (toutônpollakhou graphomenôn kai legomenôn par autois ouden edei lexeis para-tithesthai). Other cases can be translated simply as ‘quote’, such as [Plut.]Consolation to Apollonia 115E, or Galen PHP 5.3.31 (saphêneias heneka� paratithesthai kairos), De compos medic. 13.455.11 (parathêsomai têngraphên autois tois hup’ ekeinou gegraphomenois stikhois [quotation fromDamocrates follows]), ibid. 774.9 (kata lexin). As well as these examplesfrom pagan writings we also find the Church fathers making use of theverbs, such as Clement of Alexandria,44 Origen45 and Eusebius.46 The verbparatithesthai has also been found in marginalia of much later periods,one from the late seventh century CE, the other from c. 800 CE, where theverb ‘indicates the normal position of notes in the margin without implyinganything about their origin or complexity’;47 they are the basis for marginalcommentaries on classical texts. Clearly writers such as those living at thestart of or during the Second Sophistic and Alexandrian Church fathersrepresent a strand of ancient philosophical and theological scholarship inwhich the tools of the trade shine through: the bookish nature of theirliterary output is nicely illustrated by the shared use of technical terms inthe context of source evaluation and quotation. Against the background ofthese earlier authors it becomes clear how scholars educated in the greatcentres of learning could come to regard quotation as an essential part oftheir exegetical procedures, although it cannot easily be traced as asystematic component of their methodology before Eusebius.

For Simplicius, who was educated in this Alexandrian tradition, twofurther points can be made.48 To begin with, his use of quotation andparaphrase may have been inspired in particular by Porphyry (c. 232-305CE), whose work he refers to frequently. Porphyry used paraphrase-cum-quotation to great effect in his exegetical comments on the harmonybetween Plato and Aristotle, unprecedented as to the manner and quan-tity of quoting.49 Moreover, a strong argument in favour of seeingSimplicius as an innovator is the fact that his quotations are frequentlylonger than is required in the context. This is clear from his apologies for‘going on a bit’ (mêkunai, in Phys. 36.25, 80.15, 233.3, cf. in DC 11.25)presented as a necessary part of his explication, perhaps because he wantsto avoid trying his audience’s patience.50 But his meticulous signposting ofquotations with special verbs and his occasional comments exhibiting aclear awareness of their value in philosophical discourse based on histori-cal materials, also underline the unusual place his method has in thehistory of late antique scholarship. My earlier suggestion (§1.2.3) that it isconnected to the Platonists’ preference for oral education in philosophising(linked to the notion of the ‘living voice’, viva voce/ apo phônês) providesonly a partial answer to the question why Simplicius thought directquotation is important.


67

Such insights into his quotation method can assist us in determininghow Simplicius arranges and values his materials. He is keen to offer thewords of certain thinkers where possible and appropriate. Moreover, theuse of the future tense parathêsomai, with which he conveniently an-nounces upcoming passages, suggests that he had been pre-arranging hismaterials. It would be of interest to understand more about his planningof the commentary, which is not simply determined by following theAristotelian text. Some comments relevant to this point will be made alongthe way. I shall now turn to the first case study of early Greek thinkers.

2.2 Two views on unity and plurality:Parmenides and Empedocles

As prime examples of monism and pluralism respectively, Parmenides andEmpedocles receive considerable attention from Simplicius. Their propos-als on the reduction of the world (and our impressions of it) to, on the onehand, a contrast between ‘what is’ (ti estin) and ‘what appears’ (Par-menides) and, on the other, four main constituents of matter (called ‘roots’,rhizômata) directed by two additional forces ‘Love’ and ‘Hate’ (Empedo-cles), were ambitious models for explaining the plurality of the world andits origin. The explanatory power of these theories lies as much in theirimaginative rethinking of natural phenomena as it does in its forcefulreduction of the universe to a very limited set of factors. Simplicius was nodoubt led by earlier Platonist interest in the Presocratics, as found inPlotinus, Porphyry and Proclus. He shows particular interest in thoseaspects which are amenable to Plotinian physics and metaphysics. Inthese areas Plato’s Parmenides and Timaeus were taken as the guidingworks, with a strong emphasis on the fundamental unity of the cosmoswhile still accommodating a hierarchy in the levels of being (a ‘topdownmodel’). Plotinus’ monism has been linked to earlier thinkers as a concept,but his version owes most to Parmenides and Numenius.51 His notion of anall-encompassing source of the whole universe, the One, is an efficient aswell as a final cause (e.g. Enn. 3.8.11.40, 5.3.15.28-30). It constitutes amore comprehensive application of monism than the material principlesthe Presocratics came up with as a starting point or principle of thephysical universe (arkhê), yet it resembles Parmenides’ conception ofmetaphysical monism in that its reductionism is comprehensive and total(28B8.5-6 DK). As Rist has pointed out (1965: 338), Plotinus manages tomaintain his metaphysical monism alongside his ethical dualism. The Onecan be described only by way of its powers and impact, since the One isbeyond words, ‘ineffable’ (Enn. 5.3.13.1). His way around this problem isusually to allow for negative statements about the One, that is to say, tostate what it is not.52 It is however quite clear that his monism containselements also found in earlier Greek philosophical doctrines, but they havebeen recast into a new role within a new system. His own acknow-


68

ledgement of this partial dependence does not detract from his originality.In following him Simplicius will have taken up the interpretive directionof Plotinus, Porphyry and Syrianus regarding the relevance of thePresocratic doctrines as well as their important push for the harmonisa-tion of Greek philosophy.

2.2.1 Parmenides (c. 515-450 BCE)Parmenides marks a new and radical approach to thought and nature.This was not just an important step in the progression towards fullerrationalistic analysis, constituting a break with argumentative habits asfound in the earliest explanations of the world. It also set the parametersfor a new discourse on nature and metaphysics for the next two hundredyears. As Burnet put it: ‘Philosophy must now cease to be monistic or ceaseto be corporealist. It could not cease to be corporealist, because theincorporeal was still unknown.’53 The Homeric and Hesiodic accounts,reflecting ‘primitive’ attempts at rationalising the workings of the uni-verse, clearly belong to the oral tribal cultures of the late Bronze Age andearly Archaic period, in which mythological elements abound and logicalconsistency was not a priority. Argumentative patterns are implicit, cos-mogony and cosmology the dominant focus of explanatory discourse, andthe form of delivery is still in narrative structures which show no self-con-scious reflection on whether there could be a more justified or naturallypreferred mode of presentation or explanation.54

As the standard account has it, Parmenides changed the philosophicallandscape by making thought itself an important object of study, and he isregarded by many as the first philosopher in a strong sense, in particularfor his awareness of the need for metaphysical causes and the use ofrigorous deductive reasoning. Although this characterisation of the ‘origin’of philosophy is a view typical of the Aristotelian tradition, it cannot bedenied that Parmenides was hugely influential on later thinkers, mainlybecause of the obstacles he had put in the way of deducing plurality froma single cause. He was acutely aware that the activity of thinking is oftendetermined by presuppositions that go unchallenged and that argumenta-tion is structured by certain rules of engagement. His famous analysis of‘is’ and ‘is not’ (B8-9 DK) as the main factors in our misguided way ofthinking signals his powers of abstract thinking and lies at the heart of hisrevolutionary new approach. His analysis demonstrates how we think weknow the real nature of things, but raise a screen between ourselves andthe world by using language, in particular language that is misleadingunless we acknowledge that the verb form ‘is’ should be taken as apredicational mode of attributing properties, not as an existential modeconveying Being.55 Parmenides was trying to put stricter conditions inplace to allow for the proper understanding of reality.

This (pseudo)logical and metaphysical focus is the first strong case for


69

a monistic stance which radically denies the sensory evidence as a sourcefor knowledge.56 Parmenides’ rigorous deductions lead him to argue thatpure reason is the proper tool, while its powers of deduction help topersuade us that change is impossible.57 Henceforth any thinker wantingto claim that perception does provide a basis for knowledge would have totake issue with this position. Empedocles tried to overcome this by rein-stating the trustworthiness of the senses with his ‘ingenious doctrine ofpores and effluences’;58 the atomists tried to salvage the situation indi-rectly by explaining the distortion of the phenomenal world from itsimperfect link to an underlying reality, an invisible true reality consistingof atoms (which give rise to a range of secondary qualities that vary atperceptual level) and void, a kind of ‘non-being’ which also had existence.Plato and Aristotle came up with more forceful refutations of a logical andmetaphysical nature, both with different purposes in mind. Thus the nextgenerations of Greek thinkers, grappling with the questions of physics andits causes, had to deal with Parmenides’ extreme position in order to finda way forward. Parmenides’ emphasis on logic and a priori knowledgeproduced fruitful obstacles, but obstacles nonetheless.

Simplicius comes to Parmenides from two different directions. Hiscommentary on Aristotle needs to interpret the latter’s doctrine, includinghis view on Parmenides (whom Aristotle considers to belong to metaphys-ics rather than physics: Phys. 184b25-85a1, Metaph. 986b12-17). But healso inherited a positive attitude to Parmenides from his predecessorcommentators: Plotinus (Enn. 5.9.1), Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius allshow a deep interest in the metaphysical principles they took Parmenidesto uphold. However, their dependence is largely indirect in that they reliedheavily on Plato’s Parmenides, and hence on ‘Plato’s Parmenides’ (e.g.Damascius De princ. 1.150.1). So Simplicius’ return to the ‘real’ Par-menides is another sign that his approach is out of the ordinary by histime.59 The intrinsic unity of reality was a prime concern of the latePlatonists, starting with Plotinus. This interest stems from Plato’s preoc-cupation with unity as a preferred metaphysical principle for makingsense of the multiplicity of the sensible world. Parmenides used strictlogical reasoning to persuade his audience of its necessity. He describedthe ultimate ‘singularity’ in extremely positive terms: a sphere, uncreatedand imperishable, single, unshaken and perfect, of one kind (B8.1-4). Hereseemingly endless possibilities are reduced to only one. The terms usedfulfil a priori requirements for something so fundamental ontologically: itcannot be deficient or have any of the qualities we associate with imper-fection, incompleteness and diversity. Since Xenophanes the appropriatepredicates worthy of the divine had found their place in the more secularcontext of rational theology (F17 DK).

Even if Aristotle thought that Parmenides’ views belong to metaphys-ics, he refers to them frequently. Thus we see Simplicius discuss these inhis commentaries on Physics and On the heavens.60 He has gone out of his


70

way to collect the passages he thinks are most relevant, often referring toboth Parmenides and Melissus. A brief review below will make this clear.Length of quotations ranges from one line up to 51 lines (B8). Thus we maysay that the extraordinary preservation of many Parmenidean passagesin Simplicius seems to result from two converging tendencies in hisapproach: (1) the (inherited) interest in monism; (2) the deliberate use ofquotation as a means to illustrate and strengthen his argument. The factthat Parmenides wrote in hexameters helps us to detect his voice in theprose of the commentaries. Diels’ edition of the in Phys. makes thisabundantly clear by separating out the Parmenidean text from Simplicius’prose, even starting a new line each time he gives Parmenides’ words. Thetotal of these passages in Simplicius (approximately 100 lines) stands outagainst other sources that complement them.61 They provide us with asubstantial glimpse of the work and the ideas therein (in Dielsian catego-ries: fragments A7, 10, 14, 28 [life and works]; A34, B1, 2, 6-9, 11-13[doctrine]). Without Simplicius’ excerpts we would know far less aboutParmenides’ Homeric style and imagery, his emphasis on argument andproof, the division between the Way of Truth and that of Seeming, and hisrigorous method of coming to conclusions about the truth. Textual diver-gences could occur: we know of one passage for which Simplicius had adifferent version from the one used by Proclus (412-85 CE).62 It has alsobeen pointed out that the phrasing in B8 has two versions in his text (theworld as mounogenes 30.2 or hologenes 137.15).

In the early parts of his poem (B1 = Sextus Empiricus vii.111ff. +Simplicius in DC 557.20-558.2), we learn about a journey upwards to ‘thegoddess’, going through the ‘gates of Night and Day’, an exchange with thegoddess, the injunctions to judge ‘things that seem to be’, and to apply hisreasoning skills to the ‘proof uttered by me’. Clearly the suggestion is thatthis wisdom is a divinely inspired one and that his account has ‘prophetic’meaning. Such a presentation, reminiscent of the ‘shamanic’ style used bytraditional priests and wise men, was not unusual among the earlyGreek theorists; it shows how ‘philosophy’ was still emerging from thetraditional and tribal communities for whom systematic rational analy-sis of the world had not been central to their concerns. Passages thathave been included among the quotations show how Simplicius givesParmenides a broader airing: in DC 557.25ff. (B1 DK, but most of itfrom Sextus Empiricus) we find some lines from the long proem whichsketches in semi-mythical images the journey the author has taken toreach his new insights. Simplicius introduces the material at in Phys.116.25ff. (= B2) and we learn that he introduces and quotes a section asproof of his proper representation of Parmenides’ words (ei tisepithumei kai autou tou Parmenidou � akousai) on the routes of rightthinking. Then at in Phys. 117.2ff., 144.29ff., 147.28, 179.31 (B6-963) hegives us the actual argument regarding the ‘is’ and ‘is not’ and expoundsthe reasoning for Parmenides’ dichotomy into the two domains of ap-


71

pearance and the truth, including some of Aristotle’s criticism (who de-clared Parmenides’ reasoning fallacious).

Interestingly, the first passage (117.2ff. = B6) is preceded by a referenceto Porphyry’s interpretation (116.6-18) which comes immediately after thediscussion of Aristotle’s treatment of Melissus and Parmenides (lemma186a24ff.). Simplicius indicates that Porphyry uses Parmenides’ words (6)and Aristotle’s (7) and goes on to paraphrase Porphyry’s before he writesout Parmenides’ verses (116.27-117.1, 4-13). Porphyry’s rendering ofthe argument is considered similar to Aristotle’s (19, eoike houtô pôsapomnêmoneuein). In short, the authorities agree – always a verysatisfactory result. Finally, in DC 556.12ff., 559.20ff., in Phys. 39.12-20,39.18 (B11-13 DK) provide further short phrases on the cosmogony.64

Thematically most of these passages clarify the cosmological claims,expand on Aristotle’s discussion, and contextualise Parmenides’ ideaswithin a Platonist outlook.

Simplicius’ various comments contain information not always in Aris-totle, which proves that he had access to additional sources and used them.Some basic facts about the life and affiliations are given in passing:Parmenides was a student of Xenophanes (in Phys. 22.27-9 = 31A7). Theinclusion of in Phys. 115.11ff. as A28 (i.e. among the testimonia) seemsunfortunate. Even if not a ‘fragment’ by Diels’ own implicit definition, itcontains valuable information on sources and doctrine: it discusses thecentral thesis of ‘is’ and ‘is not’ and reports Eudemus’ version (via Alexan-der) of the core statement which seems to have been stylised into asyllogism, as Aristotle (and Alexander) will often do. Eudemus’ role is ofinterest here, because Simplicius puts great store in his views as an earlyPeripatetic, but also because he is one of the earliest exegetes on Aristotleand the Presocratics.65 In this case Simplicius reports his version of theParmenidean statements via Alexander (115.11) and from Eudemus’ ownphysics (115.15), adding the latter because the brief report of Alexander isnot considered clear. A useful statement in paraphrase (in Phys. 39.10ff.= A34, text 2) is a further example of how Diels’ division into testimonia(paraphrase) and fragments (quotation) is difficult to maintain. The para-phrase is corroborated by Plutarch (A34, text 1) and provides valuablecontext for the quoted words: it reports the two domains of opinion andtruth. As I indicated earlier in this chapter, privileging direct quotationover paraphrase at all times leads to the loss of a contextualised view ofthe materials and may as a result give a distorted representation of theevidence.

The distribution of the passages in Simplicius’ text gives us someindication of how he constructs these parts of his commentary. The initialtrigger for elaborating on Parmenides is of course Aristotle’s text andcomments, after which further evaluations are added on the basis of theadditional research he has done with the help of a more extensive sourcefor the Presocratic under discussion. Support for this can be brought in by


72

looking at what he adds over and above Aristotle, and especially where hedeems a quotation useful or appropriate. From in Phys. 21.18 onwardsParmenides is given considerable attention, often named in tandem withMelissus (as in Aristotle), but clearly with greater emphasis on quotationsfrom Parmenides. The following passage gives us crucial information onhow Simplicius approaches these early thinkers (21.16-19):

Those who have done philosophical investigations into arkhai have searchedfor principles of existing things, some in a poorly defined way, not distin-guishing the physical things (ta phusika) from those above nature (huperphusin), others distinguishing <in a defined way>, such as the Pythagoreansand Xenophanes and Melissus and Parmenides and Empedocles andAnaxagoras, escaping the attention of the multitude due to lack of clarity(asapheiai).

This passage reveals three interesting features of his working method: (1)Platonists have special understanding of the ancients which eluded themultitude; (2) he works in the style of Aristotle by using categorisation viadivision (dihaeresis); (3) it hints at the late Platonists’ tactic of claimingthat the old wisdom in the texts of earlier theorists merely needs ‘uncov-ering’ because it has been expressed in an obscure (asapheiai) or riddlingway (anigmatôdê, 7.3).66 According to his immediate predecessors andteachers Iamblichus, Syrianus and Damascius, there was no ‘history of theTruth, only a history of its manifestation and of its unveiling’.67 Thedivision in two groups is also striking, and follows on from Aristotle’scomments that some natural philosophers had not yet reached a properunderstanding of the causes of nature. Then a further division of earlythinkers by the number of causes is presented, which goes over and abovewhat we find in Aristotle (Phys. A.2-4), and it has been plausibly suggestedthat Simplicius builds on Theophrastus’ Physics (mentioned 9.7-8) in orderto reach a ‘more complete dihaeresis’ (22.20) with some additions of hisown.68 Parmenides features among the monists – those who claim theworld can be reduced to one basic cause – and is considered valuable forhis grasp of the dual reality we face: here the old distinction between theperceptual and the conceptual of human cognition is being read inPlotinian terms and transported onto a vertical plane, where truth andreality belong to the upper realm in line with the Platonic scheme. Par-menides is also considered special because of his rigour in argument(116.2-4). Both these characteristics make Parmenides most suitable toelaborate on.

What is also of interest is the discrepancy between what Simpliciusreports and what we know about Parmenides from other sources. Thematerial extant in other sources (B-section DK: Sextus Empiricus, Clem-ent, Plutarch, Galen, Proclus) is often overlapping with it or veryspecialised (e.g. medicine). But we can still see some author-specific


73

interests that explain the choices they have made in selecting and quotingfrom Parmenides: Sextus Empiricus will focus on epistemology (B); Clem-ent’s quotation shows an emphasis on knowledge; Plutarch addresses hiscosmology in his polemic against Colotes, who apparently claimed Par-menides had done away with natural causes (Adv. Col. 1114b = B10).These are obvious points to make, but this pattern suggests that Sim-plicius’ omission of these aspects further underscores his own particularpreferences. It is also noteworthy that it is from Parmenides’ poem thatSimplicius quotes beyond what is required for his immediate purpose.Moreover, Simplicius seems able to keep track of his quotations, as isevident from backward references to earlier passages (e.g. proteron pare-themên, in Phys. 38.29, 437.1). As we saw in §1.2, one reason he gave (notused for any other Presocratic) was the rarity of the work (dia tên spanin,144.26), but another reason given in the same statement reveals a furtherconcern over his methodology: he aims to be persuasive in his presentationof evidence (pistin, ibid.), and quotation is his way of achieving this. Thematerial is clearly selected for the specific purpose of showing how Par-menides can be appropriated within the Platonist doctrine. Theinterpretation reached combines ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources and isbased on an evaluation of all of these. Of the latter group Alexander isprominent for interpretive suggestions, as are Porphyry and Eudemus.Somehow Theophrastus contributes fewer evaluative comments, butwhenever he does, his authority is never questioned. Thus Aristotle’s leadis closely followed, and the Parmenidean passages are aligned with hisinterpretations, either as illustration or for preservation.

2.2.2 Empedocles (c. 493-35 BCE)Empedocles’ legacy to philosophy is considerable and was strongly moti-vated by his desire to eliminate the obstacles Parmenides’ theory hadgenerated, even if he accepted some of the parameters the latter had putin place. His preference for the principle of ‘like is known by like’ made ita powerful notion in theories of human cognition. His four-element theoryhas been very influential in both the philosophical (four causes) andmedical traditions (four humours). Instead of picking just one of the fourbasic ‘stuffs’ in the world as most had done before him, Empedocles’ modelused all four elements as basic ungenerated components of the world,making the process of generation and destruction of physical objects amechanical one, that of combining and separating such basic materials(see Furley 1987, ch. 7 and below, p. 77). Thus he provided the naturalphilosophers with a tool to reinstate change and motion, so radicallydenied by Parmenides and Zeno.69 But his other innovation is also relevanthere: the additional factors Love and Strife suggest that he too realisedthat a theory of matter without a source of motion would make hisuniverse inert, unless one could find a way to explain change and motion


74

as arising from matter itself. Love (or attraction) and Strife (or repulsion)could provide such an explanation, leaving him with six principles (inPhys. 154.6-9, 188.30-1). The result is a very dynamic universe in whichcyclical processes generate organs, limbs, organisms and major cosmictransitions. Thus material and non-material factors contribute to thecreation of a cosmology that can make sense. Like Parmenides, Empedo-cles displays traits of the shaman and miracle-worker, and his claims tothe truth can look rather apodictic and dogmatic. But the religious over-tones of their presentation was probably another attractive aspect of theiroutlook for the late Platonists, whose analysis of the world seamlesslyfuses the rational and the spiritual.70

Simplicius’ discussion of Empedocles’ poem also takes its cue fromAristotle who espoused a theory of four causes, but he adds Theophrastus,Eudemus and Alexander to the mix. Empedocles is presented as closelyconnected to Parmenides (in Phys. 25.19-21)71 and the Pythagoreans (inPhys. 25.21, in DC 140.25-7), but also as having things in common withHeraclitus (in DC 294.32-3, 307.16-17, 367.12). He may be linked to theformer for his belief in reincarnation (B115, 117), and to the latter for hisview that there is change (alloiôsis) in nature, not real destruction(phthora). Simplicius seems to know Empedocles’ work intimately, andrefers to it as ‘his Physics’, even indicating it was in two books (in Phys.381.29 mentions a ‘second book of his physics’). The important fragmentB17, one of the longest among the quotations, has now been partlyconfirmed and recognised as belonging to the early part of the poem on thebasis of the recently discovered papyrus text.72 We can also point (again)to how Simplicius has a strong awareness of his own use of the material,evidenced by forward (20.8) and backwards (358.8) references. Our know-ledge of Empedocles’ writings is incomplete, and the debate over thenumber of his works in natural philosophy still continues. In particularthe work that we have substantial quotations from, the poem On nature,poses some puzzles: it has been suggested that the evidence points to twoseparate works, one on cosmology, the other on a religious topic. The titlesperi phuseôs (‘on nature’) and katharmoi (‘purifications’) could be read insuch a way, but a recent proposal by Richard Janko has made a persuasivecase for taking them as alternative titles, or rather as a title and a moredescriptive indication of content.73 The decisive argument Janko uses ishow the modern distinction between ‘physics’ and religion seems to haveprevented interpreters from considering how these are never separated inearly cosmologies, for which he refers to Heraclitus and the Dervenipapyrus as strong parallels.

There is evidence to think that Simplicius’ interpretation and that of histeachers echo the Platonising interpretation initiated by Porphyry, inwhich the cosmic cycle(s) in Empedocles are read as a non-literal repre-sentation of the emanations of the One.74 As the main causative force inthe universe, the One conveys its motive and formative powers by way of


75

emanation, very much like a spring which is inexhaustible and undimin-ished (cf. Plotinus Enn. 5.1.6). This ‘flowing forth’ of Being is thus viewedas an explanation for all that we think exists, but also for the levels ofBeing (hypostases) ‘between’ the One and us. This reality is not merelyphysical in the traditional sense, but also psychological (or noetic). Con-templation in Plotinus is a creative force, which generates all things;human contemplation of the One will bring us closer to it, indeed can bringabout a return (or reversal) to the One – the ultimate goal of Plotinus andhis followers. Another unusual difference from earlier cosmologies is thatthe ‘beginning’ is not seen as a point in time: the causal relation betweenthe One and the derivative reality humans see is one of dependence ratherthan temporal and originative. It is with these broader principles in mindthat we have to try to understand Simplicius’ reading of the Presocratics.

As Denis O’Brien has shown persuasively, Simplicius’ conclusions arein some cases based on a mistaken interpretation.75 Again the preoccupa-tions of Simplicius – his use of a Neoplatonic lens, so to speak – lead to aspecific focus by way of either over- or under-emphasising particularelements. For instance, on the question whether the universe is at rest ornot, Simplicius assumes that Empedocles posits two periods of rest, prob-ably on the basis of the descriptions and quotations in Aristotle andEudemus. O’Brien has given a detailed analysis to show that the Spherewas at rest, as Aristotle had surmised.76 He also shows how Simpliciusargues against Aristotle that Love is active in the sensible world (O’Brien,151). Aristotle would reject the notion that Empedocles proposed alternat-ing stages of Love and Strife.77 His interpretation of the four cosmic stageswas accepted by Alexander.78 The unified state of the world under the ruleof Love may well have reminded ancient readers of the sphericity ofParmenides’ cosmos. The problem with the opposing pair of cosmic forcesin Empedocles’ view is that there will hardly ever be complete harmony(B27), although the language he uses does suggest that it is as devoid ofhuman deficiencies and as much of a uniform nature as Parmenidesclaimed for his One (B29, 134).79

It is also quite interesting to note how the words of Empedocles are oftengiven qualifying tags when quoted: according to Simplicius’ presentation,he suggests things by his owns words (in DC 293.23 sêmainei), makesclaims (586.10 phêsi, legei passim), clarifies (160.15 dêloi, 19-20.24edêlôsen – presumably his own views), and teaches (in Phys. 31.19 di-daskôn).80 In Aristotle he is often contrasted with Anaxagoras, butSimplicius suggests on occasion that Aristotle preferred Empedocles, forinstance, because he held there was a finite number of elements (in Phys.1254.22-3, compare the quotation above, p. 73). In one respect Simpliciusdiffers significantly from Aristotle here: the pairing up or contrasting ofparticular thinkers in Aristotle is quite dogmatic and limited to a few‘sets’. Empedocles and Anaxagoras are commonly contrasted (on senseperception and matter), but there is also Democritus versus Plato (sense


76

perception), or Parmenides and Melissus versus Empedocles and Democri-tus (number of principles). These oppositions arise within the very strictframework of Aristotelian physics, in which the predecessors are meas-ured by the ‘new standard’ of Aristotelian ideas. Simplicius’ approach ismuch more inclusive and open-minded, so that another range of contrastsand comparisons can be made (Anaxagoras and Democritus both positinfinite causes, in Phys. 458.30; Democritus, Empedocles and Anaxagorasshare an approach in cosmology, houtô gar kai Dêmokritos kosmopoiei kaiEmpedoklês kai Anaxagoras, 1120.20).

The choice of material in Simplicius warrants some further comment.As we saw with Parmenides, Simplicius’ interests are quite specific, yethis quotations are still lavish. This can again be shown by comparing himwith other sources. Sextus’ special interest in epistemology is evident inhis quoted materials (B1, B3). Clement’s focus shares such interests, buthe also reports on matters more easily associated with the religiousperspective on the origin of life and fate of humanity (B38, 124). Plutarchtoo seems to report predominantly on details of a diverse nature in partdetermined by his own immediate discussion, whether it is of astronomy(Roman questions 288b = A60, Platonic questions 1006e = B48), religiouspollution (On exile 607c = B115) or flavours (Table talk 663a = B90). Aëtius’Placita provides us with further minutiae not in Simplicius. We cannotmake too much of this discrepancy (the value of arguments from silence islimited), but it reinforces the very different focus and working manner ofSimplicius in selecting and quoting. The length of Simplicius’ quotationsranges from one line to 34 lines (B17). The expansiveness of the quotationscannot always be explained, as he does not always comment on it, but itmay be another clue to the importance he attaches to them.

It will be worthwhile to review the passages and their context briefly,to see how in this case the ‘original’ text is thought to be important for theoverall account. In the context of Aristotle’s overview of causes (Phys. A.4,lemma 187a21 at in Phys. 153.25ff., B17) we learn about the four ‘roots’ as‘equal in age’, about their continuous alteration, about cosmic processesunder the influence of Love and Strife, and about how under Love every-thing unites (158.1-159.4). The debate about the number of causes thatprecedes this dealt with Anaxagoras and Empedocles, interlacing para-phrases with short quotes (phrases and words, 154.3-157.24). Simplicius’access to these materials may again be based on Theophrastus, but hismention of the Peripatetic at 154.14 does not allow us to determine moreaccurately which comments and quotes Theophrastus provides (or in-spires). One suspects, however, that his presence here could originate in adifferent work from the earlier mention (9.7) where his own Physics is thesource, compared to ‘in his physical enquiry’ here (154.17). We cannotexclude other influences, as Porphyry and Alexander crop up in the samecontext. This discussion of principles was anticipated in the early pages ofthe commentary when introductory comments were made. Some useful


77

contextual comments occur at 25.21-6 (A28) in which the four materialelements are listed and the immaterial causes are singled out as deservingof the name ‘principles’ in a more primary sense (ta de kuriôs arkhas,compare 3.16). The unifying force of Love is spelled out in our presentcontext, as is the divisive power of Strife (159.13-26 = B21; 160.1-11 = B22).This issue is again discussed at 1124.20ff. where Simplicius rejects Alex-ander’s interpretation.

The interpretive strategy seems to be one which aims to provide lavishevidence for the exegesis offered. After a long quotation at 158.1-159.4(B17) and 159.13-26 (B21) on the roles of Love and Strife and the basicgenerative force of the four elements, Simplicius introduces the nextquotation by stating that Empedocles offered a ‘clear proof’ (enargesparadeigma paretheto) – possibly echoing the opening line (159.13) inwhich Empedocles himself claims to offer ‘evidence’ (epimartura). Sim-plicius is here attempting to clarify Empedocles from Empedocles in orderto demonstrate his own interpretation is preferable to Aristotle’s.

Of the total of c. 150 lines that Simplicius provides us with, we find 76concentrated in pages 158-61. Yet Simplicius extracts only a limitedamount of points from these:81 he emphasises the divisive (individuating?)role of Strife, the unifying role of Love, the use of combination (sunkrisis)and separation (diakrisis) for the process of coming-to-be and destruction,and the double nature of the cosmos (160.22). All this is supposed to bequite clear from Empedocles’ own words (the verb for clarifying occurs at160.15,18,24; 161.8). The cosmological emphasis in these passages standsin contrast to a religious interest found in other authors (Hippolytus B115on pollution and atonement) or on sense perception (Plato A92, AristotleB109, Theophrastus A86; Ammonius B134) or zoogony (Proclus B69).Given references to other topics in other works (e.g. [Simpl.] in DA 118.9against Plutarch), it seems reasonable to assume that Simplicius is adher-ing to the particular context of physics, selecting his material fromEmpedocles accordingly.

2.3 A special case: Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BCE)Whereas Parmenides and Empedocles provided ample material, predomi-nantly to do with metaphysical unity and physical plurality, to be re-mod-elled and absorbed into the Neoplatonic construct of a unified universe,Anaxagoras offered a quite different attraction: the notion of an intellec-tual force ruling the universe. Simplicius makes the most of the evidence,and once again he goes beyond what his ‘secondary’ sources (Aristotle,Theophrastus, Eudemus, Alexander) provide.

Simplicius’ interest in Anaxagoras’ idea that ‘mind’ (nous) is an impor-tant force in the universe was not new. Even if nous is not the highestpower in the Neoplatonic cosmos, it still is one of the main metaphysicalentities with a crucial role to play at a cosmic and human level. The idea


78

famously contributed to Socrates’ turning away from natural philosophy.This is at least how we now think Plato’s account in the Phaedo hasdetermined the reception of Anaxagoras (see below). The account is aboutSocrates’ celebrated ‘ethical turn’ (deuteros plous), in which the characterSocrates is presented as expressing great disappointment overAnaxagoras’ (non-)use of his original idea that there is a cosmic mindgoverning the universe. But what exactly is it in this notion that attractsSimplicius and how does he envisage its role in his own account of theuniverse? It will be helpful to establish in brief what Anaxagoras’ role wasin the philosophical landscape of the fifth century before we assess howSimplicius is trying appropriate him.

Our knowledge of Anaxagoras depends heavily on Simplicius.82 Thehistorical and philosophical importance of Anaxagoras (fl. 450-30 BCE) hasbeen clarified well in the past decades, yet there still is considerable debateabout the details of his doctrines.83 Most famously his connexions tohigh-profile contemporaries such as Pericles and Socrates show that natu-ral philosophers were no solitary characters lacking social connections. Itmade him a prominent name in Athens and, as it turned out, an easytarget for persecution. In Apology 26D-E (A35 DK) Plato has Socratesmention him in the context of being accused of making claims similar toAnaxagoras’, namely that the moon and the sun are rocks, ‘heretical’ viewsSocrates is in fact distancing himself from. His views in natural philo-sophy, then, became embroiled in political and religious debates, and exilewas imposed on him in c. 431 BCE.84

We need not doubt that Simplicius had access to a copy of his work, asthe number of quotations seems to indicate.85 The ancient sources seem toconfirm that Anaxagoras wrote one work on nature. In D.L. 1.16 he islisted among ‘those who wrote only one book’ (but it may have beencontained in two rolls). It is generally referred to as a work on naturalphilosophy: ‘first [book] of his physics’ (in Phys. 155.26 = B1), or ‘in hisphysics’ (Plut. De fort. 3, 98F = B21b). The availability of the work isconsistent with other Presocratic authors, where Simplicius’ greater reli-ability in reporting and quoting has been shown to be based on autopsy oforiginal works.86

Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras wants to maintain against Parmenidesthat change and motion are possible. He therefore has to arrange for thepluralist world view to allow the generation of new organisms, whilehaving a limited set of causal principles. His solution is as ingenious as itis controversial: he postulates that ‘all things are in all things’ (in Phys.155.26 = B1.187), that is, he maintains that most physical objects as weknow them come about from beginnings that are potentially everything.88

The use of an Aristotelian term here is justified, for already Plotinus spokein exactly these terms about Anaxagoras’ views (Enn. 2.4.7.2-4): ‘sayingthat it is all things potentially’ (panta energeiai ekhein legôn; cf. in Phys.162.28 têi dunamei). As with the four-element theory (Empedocles) and


79

the atoms (Leucippus-Democritus), this model makes the bold claimthat change is possible, but dependent on invisible entities which by re-arrangement (mechanically or otherwise) make up the items we seearound us. His notion of homoeomerous bodies – bodies where any part isof the same type as the whole, e.g. flesh, bone etc. – leads to an interestingtheory of matter at the perceptible level, which was of considerable inter-est to Aristotle (e.g. GC 1.1, 314a18-19 = A46 DK). It ‘solved’ the problemParmenides created of how something new can arise from something thatdid not yet exist (defined as belonging to ‘non-being’), since this theory ofmatter actually ensures that ‘coming-to-be’ is possible from pre-existingentities, even if coming-to-be is understood in a qualified sense. Things‘separate out’ from the primordial chaos from the inside out in a whirl, butremain contained within the mind. Thus Anaxagoras ends up with a verydualistic world view, something his pupil Archelaus89 must have disliked,as he is known for his compromise in claiming ‘ensouled air’ (pneuma) asthe primary component of the world, thus avoiding Anaxagoras’ dualism.90

Simplicius’ contribution to the body of evidence (twelve quotations) revealhis keen interest in Anaxagoras.91 The bulk of material on mind occurssome way into the first book of the Physics commentary, although onecrucial quotation on the role of nous appears much later (in Phys. 300-1).

The quite revolutionary (but initially unsuccessful) idea Anaxagorasproposed was to postulate a mind (nous) which has the important role ofcreating and maintaining the universe: it ‘kick-started’ (êrxato ho nouskinein, apo tou kinoumenou pantos apekrineto, in Phys. 300.32 = B13.2-3)and governed the cosmic processes (ekratêse, 157.7-9 = B14). Plato andAristotle had each formulated their objections to it, the former voicing thereproach that Anaxagoras did not really make much use of it (Phaedo97B-C), the latter raising the more substantial criticism that it could notdo the work that Anaxagoras wanted it to do (Metaph. A.4, 985a17-20). Onthe latter point Alexander seemed to disagree, at least with regard togeneration (in Phys. 300.27, cf. Alex. in Metaph. 32.16, nous a cause of wellordered production). But in another context Aristotle praises him for theidea that ‘intelligence is unaffected (apathes) <by the material universe>and free from admixture since he regarded it as a principle of movement’(Phys. 8.5, 256b24-6). In his own account, which is working up to theunmoved mover (267b19, 25), Aristotle precedes the late Platonists in hisattempt to see premonitions of his own system in the earlier theorists.Within Anaxagoras’ overall cosmology nous is therefore exceptional, inthat it does not, as most other physical things, have a part of everythingin it, nor does it necessarily have a place in all with its greater inde-pendence (B11-12).

Simplicius’ interpretation of Anaxagoras may have been influenced bythe positive endorsement Plotinus gave him, echoing Aristotle’s appraisal(Enn. 5.1.9.1):


80

Anaxagoras, stating that nous is pure (katharon) and unmixed (amiges) andsingular (haploun), himself also posits the one as first and separable, and heconveys a true and ancient insight.

Reduced to such bare essentials, it is not hard to see how these featuresresemble the Parmenidean requirements for the One. In this particularassessment the significant phrase is ‘also’. Plotinus has just mentionedPlato and Parmenides and looks for similarities in their characterisationof the One. But the manner of placement in Simplicius is determined byAristotle’s narrative. At in Phys. 148-64 (B12, 14; commentary to Phys.A.4) several long quotations provide us with the best material on the roleof mind. Simplicius is here engaged in commenting on Aristotle’s critiqueof Anaxagoras, which he seeks to defuse. At 188a5-18 Aristotle haddiscussed Anaxagoras’ notion of cosmic mind and called it ‘absurd’ (atopos,a9), suggesting that the assumption of having everything in everythingleads to all kinds of illogical results. He also did not, according to Aristotle,understand why the separating out will never be complete.

One or two examples of his ‘rescue mission’ may illustrate Simplicius’strategy. In pages 148-64 he may be basing his comments on some othercommentators. Alexander (151.6), Nikolaos (151.21), and Porphyry(151.24) are mentioned, but Theophrastus also re-appears (149.32,154.14).92 The latter is the starting point for the discussion, when Theo-phrastus is reported as having assimilated (sunôthôn) Anaxagoras andAnaximander in their views (154.15-23); this is illustrated with a quota-tion from Theophrastus’ Physical inquiry. The paraphrase that followscombines details from this quotation and Aristotle’s account at A.4, outlin-ing the system of Anaxagoras and Empedocles (154.23ff.), especially howtheir ideas are shared and different (26, 28). Next Alexander is quoted ona small point of textual interpretation as to whether Anaxagoras wantshis basic matter to contain contraries (155.4-7). Further paraphrases andquotations follow (156ff.), and apart from a comment on how one ought tointerpret Empedocles ‘according to his own character’ (160.25-6), there isno real dissent on Simplicius’ part.

This changes at 161.23, where Simplicius makes a claim about Aris-totle’s approach:

Aristotle, in a bid to emulate Plato’s balanced judgment, wants to adduce theancient and famous men as not saying illogical things, nor to overlook thatthey are judged without defence, but he sets out some reasonings, accordingto which they became grieved as to their views seeming to be inconsistent.(161.23-162.2; lemma A.4, 187a26-31)

By imputing such intentions to Aristotle Simplicius reveals the vantagepoint he is working from. The subsequent argument seeks to illustrate thiswith two points, the first claiming that Aristotle brought Anaxagoras in


81

after the thinkers who posit being as one, because he intends to investigatescientifically (basanizein) those who posit them as infinite. This is clarifiedby another paraphrase in which the opinion that the first principle issingular and unmoved ‘seems rather absurd’ (atopôtera gar � dokei, 4),while the second point represents the view that principles are unlimitedas underdefined and unknowable (cf. Phys. 187b8). Interestingly Sim-plicius now draws comparisons with Parmenides and Melissus after men-tioning Aristotle’s explanation for Anaxagoras’ homoeomeries, that is,‘that all things that come to be have their coming-to-be from being’(162.11). The link with Parmenides is created via this statement, espe-cially the phrase ‘from being’ (ex ontos), alluding to the generally acceptedview in early Greek philosophy that things cannot arise from nothing(11-12, cf. 16, 29): ‘for Parmenides too demonstrated that the true being isungenerated �’, further illustrated with a quotation. Melissus used thesame principle, as another quotation shows.93 It is striking that Aristotledoes not make this link at this point in the argument, even if he does referto the principle invoked. The comments on this lemma end with referenceto, and material from, Alexander (163.10) in combination with a cross-reference to Aristotle’s criticism (GC 314a13f.) regarding the terminologyof the natural processes (diakrisin, sunkrisin). Porphyry also makes anotherappearance (16) commenting on the origin of the terminology (16-18):

Porphyry retraces <the phrase> ‘all things were in all’ to Anaxagoras, but<the phrase> ‘coming-to-be is changing’ to Anaximenes, the terms sunkrisisand diakrisis to Democritus and Empedocles.

The terminological point is perhaps anticipated by Anaxagoras, whochided ‘the Greeks’ for being wrong in their views of genesis and destruc-tion (163.19-20, B17 follows).94 Not only does this episode reveal Sim-plicius’ partisan treatment of some early Greek thinkers – defending themagainst Aristotle when necessary – but also his use of the ‘secondarysources’ to achieve this.

At 164.11ff. another episode of evaluating Aristotle’s objections occurs(lemma 187b7). The terminology indicates that Simplicius sees Aristotleas using a rather formal approach (13, ekthemenou sumperasmata êaxiômata). Aristotle’s procedure is frequently characterised in terms ofsyllogisms, premises and conclusions – an application of the techniques ofscientific reasoning laid out in works the late Platonists considered part ofAristotelian logic (Topics, Prior and Posterior Analytics).95 Here it is saidto consist of two parts: first, he expounded the probable in Anaxagoras’views (to pithanon prôton tês A. doxês, 11), and now he ‘turns to therefutation of him’ (epi tên anairesin trepetai, 12f.). Simplicius refers toAristotle’s comments as antilegein, a term connected to rhetoric andsophistic which signifies dispute and opposition. The first part of thisanalysis (164.14-166.13)96 looks at the claim about what comes out of the


82

‘cosmic origin’ which contains everything (homou panta khrêmata): theseare ‘unlimited in number and smallness’. Interlacing his text with phrasesof both, Simplicius goes on to follow through the points Aristotle is makingagainst Anaxagoras on the unlimited nature of these ‘seeds’ of all thingsand the problem of how we can know anything about them (165.5-7).Porphyry is quoted as stating that the attack is in fact also againstLeucippus, Democritus and Metrodorus, since they too claimed that theelements were unlimited (8-10). Whether or not the next lines are stillPorphyry’s, we can see how Simplicius tends to broaden the scope beyondthe immediate context. The section points to the connection betweenAnaxagoras and the atomists, and expands Aristotle’s ‘compact refutation’(165.22) in a ‘hypothetical’ reconstruction (logos � dunamei toioutos esti).The section ends with another reference to Porphyry’s earlier point wid-ening the argument’s target to all pluralists (166.3), an good indicationthat what precedes does go back to him, while Alexander is said to haveconsidered it as being against Anaxagoras only.

Thus this passage, which must stand for several others, illustrates anumber of interesting aspects of the method of Simplicius in his treatmentof the Presocratics: (1) it shows how quotation and paraphrase serve hispurpose of basing his interpretation on the text; (2) it also shows how hecombines different interpretations from earlier commentators withoutslavishly adopting their views; (3) it shows his independence regardingAristotle’s exegesis of Presocratics, whose words he adduces not just toelucidate Aristotle’s point, but also to extend the discussion and pursue hisown agenda.

In his overall interpretation of the Presocratics it would seem thatSimplicius is applying the basic line of approach announced earlier in hisaccount, in which he disapproved of the selective (!) criticisms of the earlynatural philosophers (above, p. 73). This applies in particular whenever hefeels compelled to counter the suggestion that there is genuine disagree-ment among them (in Phys. 36.24-31):

But we have been forced to elaborate further because of the cavalier reproachof disagreement (diaphônia) among the ancients. Since we shall hear ofAristotle that he is refuting the opinions of the earlier philosophers, andsince before Aristotle Plato has clearly done the same � one has to under-stand that they concerned themselves with things superficially understood(epipolaioteron akrouômenon), and they rejected only the apparently absurdin their arguments, because the ancients had a habit of expressing theirviews in a quite enigmatic way.97

Clearly Simplicius does not simply adopt the earlier criticisms, but findsa way around them. In this particular case we find him use this point as ajustification (or should we say: excuse?) to elaborate a bit more.98 He takesPlato and Aristotle to be arguing against (antilegontes) the Presocratics,


83

when both, according to Simplicius, try to supply what has been left outand to clarify what is said without clarity (37.3, pote to paraleleimenonanaplêrountes, pote to asaphôs eirêmenon) and use several other ap-proaches which makes them think they refute the ancients (loc. cit.).Yet in Simplicius’ eyes Aristotle seems to have had some notion (hu-ponoôn) of the depth of their wisdom (37.1, bathos autou tês sophias),and he therefore decides to go up against his explicit refutations (37.7-8,peirêsometha toutois kai hêmeis ephistanein en tais pros hekaston touAristoteous antilogiais).

It is characteristic of Simplicius’ perspective that, when trying to sal-vage ‘superficial disagreements’ in the objections of Plato and Aristotleagainst the Presocratics, he uses antilegô (e.g. 89.1; 132.20; 147.17, 18;148.12; 164.14 etc.) often combined with a main verb ‘seeming’ (dokein orphainomai). In this way he can construct the debate as one of degrees andaccording to his own rules, allowing him to make a case for the deepermeaning of ancient wisdom, but which is superficially understood. Evenin the case of Alexander he employs this method, claiming that one can seehis protestations as things well said and still hold the view that ‘theancient wisdom remains irrefutable’ (77.11, hê palaia philosophia meneianelenktos). Clearly the origins of ancient wisdom deserve a more positiveairing, he implies, as Plotinus had already suggested (above, p. 62), whilethe harmonising strategy is here extended to all Greek philosophers. Inthis he goes beyond what his teachers had aimed for.

2.4 The unity of Greek philosophyThe main purpose of this chapter was not to offer a new interpretation ofthe Presocratics, because the amount and complexity of the relevantmaterial would require a separate study. My assessment of Simplicius’treatment of the Presocratics has been highly selective and aims atanswering a particular set of questions that illustrate important aspectsof his methodology: to what extent did he have access to their works? Howdoes he use these sources in the commentaries on Physics and On theheavens? Rather than simply sing his praise as a source for early Greekphilosophy, I have opted for a more pragmatic approach to illustrateSimplicius’ method in dealing with three Presocratic theorists in naturalphilosophy. The three case studies, for all their sketchy and tentativefeatures, must stand for a wider set of material and should be seen as afirst step towards further explorations of this material. Without theconstraining perspective of a modern interpreter who merely wants toretrieve the views (‘fragments’) of the Presocratics, we put ourselves in abetter position to appreciate the creative ways in which Simpliciusachieves his goal.

The results present insights into how and why he writes the way he doesabout the Presocratic philosophers. In looking at how he handles the


84

materials, we have been able to put the commentary on Physics into abroader context and thus widen our perspective on the rather mixed rangeof motives. His immediate objective, to comment on the text of Aristotle,can without a doubt serve a pedagogically driven goal, that of clarifyinghis ideas to the budding Platonist. In addition, he is going beyond theAristotelian text and interpretation, first by adducing more material thanin the base text, and secondly by assimilating the early Greek ideas to hisNeoplatonic world view. This may entail going against Aristotle.

The review of how Simplicius chose to assimilate the ancient wisdom(palaia philosophia) into his own commentary is the result of a positionforged among his immediate predecessors. It leads up to a more importantquestion regarding the motivation of Simplicius’ analysis: why does hewant to maintain the (to us absurd) claim that the earliest naturalphilosophers are in broad agreement with Plato and Aristotle? To answerthis question we need to bring in the notion of harmonisation again: withearly beginnings under Antiochus in the fourth Academy, a full scalesyncretism of Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras and the Chaldaean Oraclesdeveloped under Iamblichus, Plutarch of Athens and Syrianus in the fifthcentury CE, followed by Proclus and Damascius.99 My argument (to bedeveloped further in this study) intends to show that Simplicius’ approachconstitutes an extension of this long development: Simplicius’ harmonisa-tion strategy is to bring all Greek philosophers into the fold. It seems tome that in doing so Simplicius aims for the unity of the whole of pagantheologico-philosophical thought in contradistinction to Christianity.

In writing commentaries on Aristotle’s works Simplicius – like many ofhis contemporaries – combined philosophical erudition with considerableskills of scholarship. But he is quite unique in his scholarly sensibility,with a striking appreciation of the value of the text and direct quota-tions.100 This does not mean that he will always report the views of othersin a neutral way, but rather that he was consciously using certain criteria,according to which he made an effort to let the text speak for itself beforehe would express his disagreement or criticism.101 Some of the principlesin this approach were highlighted in quotations. Recent studies haveillustrated what might in fact have been expected, namely, that Simpliciusis perfectly capable of selective quoting if it serves his overall purpose.102

Despite this kind of ‘bias’, his quotations have been shown to be superiorto Aristotle’s (and Theophrastus’). His attitude towards Aristotle does infact go some way towards the kind of objectivity he advocated (in Cat.7.23-32). With a proper understanding of his use of the Presocratic mate-rials within the framework of later Platonism, this should allow us tomake good use of his contextual comments as well as his exegeticalproposals.

Further research will have to determine whether certain assumptionsand preconceptions about texts, sources and the mechanism of transmis-sion must be revised. One view in particular has emerged as untenable:


85

the idea that more recent sources are less important than older ones. Thisposition, first attacked in the study of stemmatology for manuscripts, hasbeen quite an obstacle in reassessing the transmission of ancient philo-sophy, and in particular the doxographical tradition – so crucial for thepreservation of Presocratic materials. The outer limits of the Dielsian‘doxographical universe’ consist of Theophrastus (d. 278 BCE) and Sim-plicius. It was Usener who first suggested that Theophrastus is the singlesource of the philosophical tradition of doxai-collections.103 This positionwas never seriously challenged by Diels, based in part on the correctassumption that Theophrastus made a collection of views in physics. Whenwe consider all the texts relevant to the tradition discussed in the Doxo-graphi Graeci, the hypothesis seems too neat and unrealistic. A reassess-ment of this strand of the tradition will be an obvious spin-off from thepresent study, once we have obtained a better grasp of how Simplicius isoperating.

In addition, we speculated about possible motives for this approach. Bymaking writing an important part of his method, as indicated twice(quoted above, p. 43) Simplicius may have sought to circumvent theparadox involved in the critique of writing found in Plato – if not con-sciously than perhaps intuitively. Despite the lack of explicit evidence forthis suggestion, it seems a helpful hypothesis to make sense of the ques-tion why the late Platonists show no awareness of the tension betweenphilosophising in written and spoken form.104 After all, their oral teachingcontinued in parallel to the scholarly and learned expression of theirteachings. Plato had tried to solve the problem of how to convey andperpetuate his philosophical ideas by writing dialogues – a strategy whichis now thought to make the point through content as well as form.105

Simplicius seems to have extended this strategy even further by mergingthe (Aristotelian) use of testimonies with the exposition of philosophy inwriting, but rather than quoting straight from the philosopher’s mouth, hehad to make do with ‘voices from the past’ taken straight from thephilosopher’s pen.

In sampling passages concerning those early theorists which clearlyexerted the strongest attraction on the Platonists, we looked at some textsempirically in order to assess what Simplicius’ approach was, and ex-tended existing research on the exegetical use of earlier texts. Specialattention was paid to the way in which quotations are introduced, inparticular the use of special verbs which mark quotations in such a waythat they become privileged as being somehow more ‘direct’ than others.But we also noted the length of quotations as unusual because Simpliciusoften deliberately provides more material than is required for the context.As such these works clearly represent an advanced form of literacy, whichincorporates second-order thoughts on, and differentiates between, exe-getical paraphrase and direct (or approximate) quotation. The differentmotives we examined fit the explanatory model of his ‘extreme’ harmoni-


86

sation best. It was from Plotinus onwards that the process of reinventingthe Platonist stance and assimilating others to reach a unified vision ofreality determined the methods of this particular school of thought. Inspite of the scholarship, highly developed philosophical techniques under-pinning their deeper religious aims, there still was enough room for thekind of syncretism with which they could assimilate a variety of opinionsinto their own doctrinal system without viewing this as problematic. Whatto the modern eye looks like an amalgamation of highly incompatibleelements of religion, philosophy and poetic inspiration, they regarded asinstantiations of a unified metaphysical reality. They saw it as their taskto show how all these were simply different modes of expressing differentfacets of being. It is only a small step to extrapolate from the specificstatement in the discussion of ‘place’ at in Phys. 640.16-17 where such aposition is suggested, namely that one can show that the many aspects of‘place’ have been clarified by many different men,106 to the broader projectwe see emerging in his treatment of the Presocratics. At the time of hiswriting activity Simplicius seems to have added a polemical drive whichmay contribute to this broader strategy, as part of the attempt to savepagan philosophy from the dominating presence of the Christian faith andits highly vocal and ingenious advocates: as Iamblichus before him, thistactic could, at least in their eyes, offer a religious doctrine more venerableand unified than any other religion. As we shall see (Chapters 5-6), hisstrenuous efforts in unifying the tradition and polemicising against theChristian Philoponus suggest that he was aware that he was fighting arearguard action.


87

3

Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics

After Aristotle’s death, philosophical activity within the Peripatos con-sisted to a large degree of a concerted effort to continue the work begun bythe school’s founder. This took the form of clarification, expansion andcorrection. It was a considerable challenge to cover the breadth and depthof Aristotle’s work, and we must remember that continuation of the schoolwas by no means guaranteed.1 The history of the Aristotelian corpus isfraught with difficulties: our evidence for his followers’ engagement withit is fragmentary, and much of it is found in later sources.2 This externalassessment is complemented by a range of modern interpretations regard-ing the internal coherence in the Aristotelian body of ideas: the earlyPeripatetics Theophrastus, Eudemus, Strato, Lyco and Dicaearchus all insome way or other take Aristotle as their starting-point and clarify ordevelop his positions further. But they are also seen to disagree withcertain aspects of his ideas, illustrating that Peripatetic doctrine was nota static and unified body of knowledge, but a dynamic set of proposals tounderstand the world.

This chapter looks at this process of consolidation and continuation inrelation to Simplicius’ use of the works of early Peripatetics in his com-mentaries. By advancing as well as elucidating the works of theirscholarch, his successors were forced to probe the meaning and value ofthe treatises and the theories contained in them. Consistency became oneof the concerns in reviewing a body of work which had grown over theperiod of a long working life. As we shall see, Simplicius took the earlyPeripatetics very seriously in their interpretive efforts, using them asauthorities in building his own exegesis. He frequently quotes them andprefers their views to those of later commentators. The different ways inwhich the use of the successors of Aristotle shapes his own exegesis are ofconsiderable interest for our purposes: first, their value seems to comefrom their closeness to the master, although the justification for attribut-ing this kind of authority to them is not always made explicit; secondly,while Aristotle’s successors were busying themselves clarifying the workand thus (unknowingly) contributing to the establishment of a canon,Simplicius’ use of their interpretations ignores the emerging nature ofsuch a canon and mostly accepts their input as important exegetical aidsto an established corpus.

In keeping with the evidence from the commentaries I shall look mostlyat the second scholarch, Theophrastus of Eresus, and his contemporary

88

and competitor for the post, Eudemus, who after coming second in a bidfor succession returned to Rhodes where he continued to study and teachAristotelian thought. A few words will also be said about Theophrastus’successor, Strato. I start by looking briefly at the motivation and methodof the process of consolidation (§3.1), after which I concentrate on the twoPeripatetics (§3.2-3) and their role in Simplicius’ exegesis. In the finalsection I try to draw some conclusions from these enquiries and attemptto answer the question how these early interpretations determined theshape and nature of the corpus as well as its reception among laterexegetes (§3.4).

3.1 Succeeding Aristotle, understanding AristotleOn the face of it the special interest in Aristotle and his students amonglate Platonists may seem unusual: if the works of Plato are at the core oftheir intellectual pursuits, why study Aristotle? We can explain thisinclusive attitude to a considerable degree on historical and philosophicalgrounds. First, it is rooted in a stance which arose in the so-called FifthAcademy, when a more flexible approach initiated by Antiochus (c. 110BCE) paved the way for a syncretistic way of thinking regarding therelation between Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought.3 This approach wasgrounded in the conviction that Plato should not be read as a sceptic, ashad become the norm under Arcesilaus (c. 316-241 BCE) and Philo ofLarissa (c. 159-84 BCE). Antiochus came to oppose this way of readingPlato’s works and would focus on minimising or de-emphasising the pointsof disagreement between the two thinkers, while concentrating on over-laps and points of agreement. Thus by the time the Anonymous commen-tary on the Theaetetus is written (first century CE?), we can observe anadvanced stage of assimilation and a more liberal use of Aristotelian andStoic ideas and concepts in the comments on Plato’s text.4 This intriguingprocess of borrowing and redefining philosophical concepts and terms is atransformative process, which was started by faithful followers soon afterthe death of famous scholarchs and would continue in different traditionsall the way through antiquity and beyond.

Secondly, Plotinus (c. 210-270 CE) who taught philosophy in Rome andsaw himself as a Platonist, made use of Aristotle’s treatises and conceptualapparatus to discuss Plato’s work in the classroom (V.Plot. 14).5 As hebecame the figurehead for this new way of interpreting Plato, he therebysanctioned the use of Aristotle in the study of Plato (see Chapters 5-6). Hisinterest in the categories of Aristotle inaugurated a new trend in the‘curriculum’ of Platonising philosophers, further developed by his learnedpupil Porphyry, in which this Aristotelian work became the foundation ofPlatonist education.6 This is understandable in that the work can be seenas a fundamental starting-point for understanding the world and/or lan-guage. Logic as a starting point was already proposed by Andronicus when

3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics

89

he set the order of the corpus. In fact the main issue for Plotinus ininterpreting this work was the question whether it described a way ofcarving up the world into ten different kinds or was a method of describingobjects in the world in ten different ways.7

For the Platonists, understanding Aristotle in the Hellenistic and Im-perial era was driven by at least these two factors: there was a concernabout correctly understanding Plato and a willingness to take advantageof Aristotle’s insights, considered of special value on account of his close-ness to the master. Harmonising the views of Plato and Aristotle wasbecoming a major concern, but it also required a special effort and a newstyle of hermeneutics (see §5.2). In addition, a certain pragmatism hadcrept in under pressure of a sustained critique from the sceptical Academyto diminish the conflicts and disagreements among philosophers in orderto show that epistemological problems could be solved. The Sceptics hadcleverly exploited the disagreements among ‘schools’ to argue that thesesignalled the intrinsic impossibility of obtaining positive knowledge. Con-flicting perceptual evidence further underlined this position, presentingpractical proof, so to speak, of the lack of secure evidence for stable andreliable knowledge of the world. At a later stage we shall see this problemreturn when Christian intellectuals use this lack of unity among paganphilosophers to argue for the superiority of a unified doctrine of Christian-ity (see Chapter 6).

In view of his main objective – writing clarifications of the text ofAristotle – Simplicius adopts a sensible strategy from the start: he usesthe close followers of Aristotle as his aids in clarifying Aristotle. That is tosay, he seems to have realised that in order to understand Aristotle, therewould be no better guides than the latter’s contemporaries who witnessedhis lectures, collaborated with him on numerous projects, and had theopportunity to interrogate the founder and first head of the Lyceum. Atone point Simplicius refers to them as ‘having views on and teaching(didaxantes) the same things as Aristotle on time’ (in Phys. 788.34-6). Thismarks an innovation compared to Plotinus, who seems to show littleinterest in the early Peripatetics.8 Platonists after Porphyry were willingto expand the exegetical enterprise by increasing the number of partici-pants in the ongoing debate about the available evidence: thus clarifyingPlato was done by using Aristotle’s comments, who himself can be clarifiedby using his students’ comments, and so on. In Simplicius we see theculmination of this interpretive approach: his commentaries form a multi-layered, intertextual extravaganza geared towards revealing an ancientspiritual wisdom by rational means, in other words, a theology withphilosophical underpinnings mixed with spiritual insights and religiousrituals. Its ultimate aim was to prepare the (fallen) soul for the return tothe divine, the ineffable One (e.g. in Phys. 533.28).

It is doubtful whether the immediate successors of Aristotle undertooktheir philosophical pursuits with such religious zeal, even if the teachings


90

can be said to culminate in theology (his Metaph. 12.10). Their task was toensure that the school and its particular perspective on the world wouldcontinue. Their first priority was to teach Aristotelian ideas. From the listsof his works in D.L. we can easily see how Theophrastus was able to followin Aristotle’s footsteps in most areas, and we are fairly certain that hedeveloped his positions in many of them. Broadly speaking he writes aboutthe inanimate (e.g. winds, stones, fire) and physiology (e.g. sweat, dizzi-ness, fatigue), and from the fragments we see additional activity in thearea of meteorology, biology, epistemology and psychology. As has beenobserved since the earliest modern edition of his extant work (F. Wimmer,Paris 1848), Theophrastus’ work is clearly complementary to Aristotle’s, aview which may even go back to the Roman period with the revival ofinterest in Aristotle’s esoteric writings.9 As a close collaborator for overforty years Theophrastus would have been very much under the influenceof his master. Eudemus worked on physics, religion and geometry and itis in the first subject that we find some critical notes, perhaps because hewas working on Rhodes to which he returned after the succession wasdecided in favour of Theophrastus (Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 13.5 = F5Wehrli). But it took another generation to create the kind of doctrinaldistance that would allow for clearer dissent and disagreement.

3.2 Teaching Aristotle: Theophrastus and EudemusSimplicius’ use of Theophrastus is patchy and difficult to characterise inone general statement. His name is mentioned some 37 times in thePhysics commentary alone, and the occurrences are fairly spread out.10

Most of these passages discuss his views immediately relevant to an issueSimplicius is dealing with. As we saw in Chapter 2, in the commentary onPhysics Theophrastus is first brought in when Simplicius is surveying theviews of the Presocratics.11 The material he provides seems complemen-tary to Aristotle’s and in the past has been construed as coming from a‘history of pre-Aristotelian philosophy’ by Theophrastus, but which maybe from his Physics.12 Other materials concern Theophrastus’ own viewswhich often contain minor divergences or formulate serious problems, e.g.on motion (107.12), change and alteration (566.18), place (583.10, 604.5,612.5, 639.14), and time (700.18, 788.34-789.1, 860.19-861.23).13 The dis-cussion of place is an interesting case, because we see Simplicius and otherPlatonists grapple with Theophrastus’ doubts concerning Aristotle’s con-cept of place, and Simplicius develops a view which goes beyond theTheophrastan material (see below, §3.2.1).14 Often Eudemus is mentionedalongside him, or another Peripatetic (e.g. Strato at in Phys. 788.36), oreven a later commentator (Alexander at 700.19; Damascius and Iam-blichus at 642.18), which confirms Theophrastus’ special status. It alsosuggests a particular arrangement of the source material into thematicclusters grouping authors together.15


91

Whereas it can be demonstrated that Simplicius had access to Eude-mus’ work on physics (see §3.2.2), this is less clear in all cases concerningTheophrastus. Doubt has been raised as to whether Simplicius takes allhis material on early philosophers from Alexander.16 Direct access toTheophrastus is suggested, however, by the different types of titles orwhere specific titles of his works are given.17 But again there are someproblems in determining which works are meant. Some materials cer-tainly could come from an intermediate source, for instance fromAlexander of Aphrodisias (see below), or when Eudemus and Theophras-tus are lumped together to label one particular view (e.g. in Phys. 566.18,583.10, 606.33).

While many details will remain obscure, this chapter will consider therole that Simplicius attributes to Theophrastus and Eudemus in hisexegesis. Their philosophical activities must be viewed as resulting fromteaching Aristotle as well as further developing his ideas in researchactivities. ‘Systematisation’ probably describes their attitude and ap-proach fairly well: they occupied themselves with filling in the gaps,clarifying connexions between works and certain views, resolving incon-sistencies, and extending the different areas which Aristotle hadpioneered and defined.18

Regarding many parts of the Aristotelian corpus we have evidence thatboth Theoprastus and Eudemus formulate disagreements with Aristotle.Yet their expression of disagreement is usually muted or hidden in ques-tioning his statements or raising serious difficulties (aporiai).19

Theophrastus is well-known for his aporetic approach, most palpable inhis short treatise on metaphysics where one specific target is to explorethe limits of Aristotelian teleology.20 It is possible that in some of thesecases their reluctance to voice dissent is in line with the unwritten rule inclassical antiquity not to mention (living) contemporaries when arguingagainst them. It is, however, not easy to establish a chronology for allcases, so this consideration is hardly decisive as to whether Aristotle wasstill alive. A stronger argument is probably that their allegiance to theschool’s founder played an important role. But there are subtle differencesand as time progressed, a more independent attitude towards the Aristo-telian viewpoint became more pronounced.

That said, we must neither preclude nor regard as odd that disagree-ment was possible – an attitude which we shall also find in Simplicius andhis colleagues. Whatever the reason, we see limited dissent in the extantworks and fragments of both of these early Peripatetics. As always, we aredependent on an incomplete body of evidence: even if one does not sub-scribe to the Jaegerian view that Aristotle may have divided up theresearch activities among his students – Theophrastus dealing with the‘history’ of physics and plants, Eudemus with science, Menon with medi-cine – what remains of their extensive research will create just thatimpression. That the writings which are not extant would give us a much


92

richer and broader scope of their interests is beyond doubt.21 In doctrinalmatters, we see them develop their work in tandem with explicatingAristotle’s work. The exegetical tradition began in a way in the firstgeneration, however these successors did not consider themselves as‘mere’ exegetes, but as the heirs of a fluid system of thought and a work inprogress.

3.2.1 Theophrastus (d. 287 BCE)22

The ancient and modern perception of Theophrastus is a variable one, butin general the modern perspective is slanted towards a rather negativeassessment. The perception seems to be that Theophrastus is a second-rate thinker – a verdict based either on the stylistic (de)merits of his worksor on the quality of thought found in the sparsely preserved remains of hisonce considerable output. This is rather unfair, especially in relation to hisscientific and philosophical merit. In ancient times his work was certainlybetter appreciated, although his close association with Aristotle’s worksmay have prevented a propor appreciation because his works sometimesbecame incorporated into the lists and collections of his master.23 HenriBlumenthal once commented that in late antiquity ‘the general consensusof the commentators after Themistius seems to have been that Theophras-tus was a major figure in the history of philosophy whose opinions couldnevertheless be ignored on most matters’.24 Since this judgement is basedexclusively on the commentators on Aristotle’s De anima, it cannot betaken as a balanced assessment of Theophrastus’ role in the exegeticaltradition, but it does capture an important aspect of the Theophrastancorpus: it is like a moon, circling ‘planet Aristotle’. Only in outline can werecapture the breadth of his work on a wide range of subjects, in which hepioneered the classification and taxonomy of plants in his Researches intoplants (HP) and Causes of plants (CP), adjusted physical theories, ex-tended hypothetical syllogisms, and produced a ‘history’ of philosophy inwhich he discussed pre-Aristotelian views critically.25

Theophrastus’ ancient reputation is one of philosophical excellence(D.L. 5.36) and rhetorical elegance (Cicero De fin. V.12-13). His mostsignificant proposals for adjusting Aristotelian positions are found in threeareas: physics, ethics and logic. In physics he dealt with general questionsof method and subject as well as specific topics within the general frame-work of Aristotle’s thought (F142-54 FHSG or his Metaph.). He placedspecial emphasis on the importance of sense perception (F301A FHSG),and with it on the diaphorai and dunameis, the distinctive features andpowers, of natural entities to be discriminated by the senses (F301BFHSG). His discussion of first principles has attracted considerable atten-tion recently, since it shows how he deals with fundamental issues whilealso justifying aspects of Aristotle’s ideas that Aristotle himself merelyassumed as given.26 Among the elements he allocated a special place to fire


93

(On fire 1-227) and heat, giving the role of general agent to the sun (ibid.16), formulating a theory of flow (16-1828). Further, he is also seen to admitmultiple explanations, perhaps a sign that he no longer believed in thepossibility of a definitive assessment of things.29 This is suggested in partby his greater emphasis on the limits of physical enquiry.30 In ethics andlogic there is a similar trend towards systematisation, but also expansionof particular positions.31 Simplicius is less interested in these areas and wetherefore find far less material on topics relevant to these subjects.

Theophrastus’ role in the later tradition has two sides: his discussion oftheories of sense perception (De sensu), which includes analysis andcritique of Plato’s Timaeus 45-7, 61-8, and a different set of commentsrelating to the Timaeus preserved in some twelve fragments, which throwlight on the unexpected place the second head of the Peripatos acquired inthe later Platonist tradition. I have discussed these elsewhere, but wantto revisit them briefly, not only because they say something about theperception of his comments in (late) antiquity, but also because of therenewed interest in the harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle so eloquentlydiscussed by Gerson (2005).

Theophrastus’ role in the Platonist tradition has often been overlooked.To the question ‘when could an interpreter arise?’ Harold Tarrant32 repliedthat it involves distance from the prime author commented upon, and thattherefore the interpretive activity is most significantly done on texts. Theimplicit assumption here seems to be that Plato’s first interpreters areonly to be found within the Platonic tradition of exegesis, though he doesnot subscribe to a possible corollary, that these were all interpreters actingin defence of Plato. Aristotle and Theophrastus are nowhere mentioned,taking ‘interpreters’ (so it seems) to refer only to sympathetic readers,those who consider themselves his followers. If this is the correct way toread Tarrant’s approach, the label ‘interpreter’ (from the Greek exêgêtês)is taken in a fairly limited sense. In the light of recent arguments favour-ing a serious look at the position that Aristotle could be harmonised withPlato, I would prefer it if the Peripatetics were included in this account of‘interpreters’ of Plato. It is well worth asking whether or not we haveuncritically adopted the view of Proclus that Crantor was the ‘first inter-preter’ of Plato (Proclus On the Timaeus I, p. 76, 2.277,8 Diehl). His use ofthe label exêgêtês may be a not fully justified retrojection of the notion ofcommentator as it might have been viewed in Proclus’ time, but it seemshighly plausible that the term is meant to describe an activity of comment-ing on the Timaeus, in this case probably on parts of it, not the wholework.33

One discrepancy between Simplicius and other Platonist commentatorsis relevant here. In an earlier study I demonstrated that Theophrastuswas taken very seriously in the interpretation of the Timaeus.34 FromCalvenus Taurus (second century CE, preserved in Philoponus) and Plu-tarch of Chaeronea (second century CE) to Proclus (fifth century CE),


94

Philoponus and Simplicius (sixth century CE), specific references showthat Theophrastus’ comments on Plato’s Timaeus became incorporatedinto Platonist exegesis. In some cases it means using Theophrastus’ views(a) to corroborate a reading, or (b) to provide an argument from authority,or (c) to refute an objection made by Theophrastus against Plato.35 Weshould accept Bob Sharples’ plausible suggestion that ‘fragments 242, 243as well as 161AB and 159 (esp. ll. 1-8 and 31-2) come from Theophrastus’On heaven’.36 These passages bear witness to Theophrastus’ ongoing andcritical dialogue with Plato’s views, and the inclusion of his critical judge-ment (easily suppressed) is a tribute to him. So, although not all casesimply agreement with Theophrastus, we can safely say that his views weretaken seriously within the Platonist discussions of Plato’s primary workin physics, either for an inclusive interpretation or as a view worthrefuting. For our present purposes this result can now be pushed furtherby pointing out that the later Platonists’ ability to regard Aristotle as aPlatonist (Gerson 2005), clearly also holds for Theophrastus.

Knowledge of the sources or how they were available of course does notsolve the more important problem of how Simplicius chooses to select anduse them. The marked difference in the amount of material taken fromEudemus individually (132 fragments to date37) as compared to Theo-phrastus (36 named occurrences, with far fewer quotations) is statisticallysignificant. In addition, the progression through the books of the Physicsis sequential for both Aristotle and Eudemus (see §3.2.2 below), but forTheophrastus there is no such parallelism.38 For instance, at 860.19,commenting on book 5 of the Physics, Simplicius quotes Theophrastusfrom the ‘first book of his own Physics’, a strong indication that Theophras-tus’ comments are not used in parallel to the Aristotelian text as they arein the case of Eudemus.39 It suggests a more selective and perhaps hap-hazard use of the work of the second scholarch. We can only speculateabout the reasons: does Simplicius consider Theophrastus of lesser impor-tance regarding the physical theory (though crucial on the Presocratics)?Or is this state of affairs the result of indirect access to source materials?Here we may note that the fragments now printed in FHSG (1992)illustrate the difficulty of allocating fragments under specific headings orareas: for instance, the texts on the Timaeus are found in the section‘fragments on physics’ as well as ‘fragments on physical doxography’.40

Though we saw that the material certainly does not come from one workdiscussing the Timaeus, some of these fragments may in fact belong toeither section (or both).

Simplicius’ engagement with Theophrastan material in other areas israther more complex. In Chapter 2 I discussed the relation betweenTheophrastus and Simplicius regarding the preservation of philosophicalviews – often placed under the heading of ‘doxography’. It is clear that mostof the time Theophrastus is providing information (historei ‘reports’, e.g.in Phys. 25.6, in DC 576.14, 602.6,41 641.8 etc). We also see Simplicius refer


95

to a few other works by Theophrastus: On the coming-to-be of the elements(in DC 700.7), On the elements of speech (in Cat. 10.25), On passions (inCat. 235.9),42 a work on dialectic (‘Theophrastus in his own Topics’, in Cat.415.15-16). His Physics is mentioned a number of times (in Phys. 9.7,604.5; book 1: 20.20, 860.19 and 27, 861.23; book 3: 1236.1), which indi-cates that it might have been available to Simplicius.43 In some cases it ispossible that separate titles such as On motion (in Phys. 107.12, 934.30-1,986.5-6 [bk 1], 413.1 [bk 2], 413.5 [bk 3]) or Natural enquiry (ibid. 115.12,149.32) could refer to his Physics or parts thereof.44 Especially in the caseof the Natural investigation (phusikê historia) there are strong suspicionsthat this material is reaching us via Alexander who appears in theimmediate context at 113.28 and 115.11. In those cases where Simplicius’comments suggest he uses written notes (‘Theophrastus writes/wrote’,graphei 154.16; gegraphen 413.5; compare the participle form graphôn166.18) we are naturally tempted to infer that he consulted the original.With the comment at 115.11 ‘as Alexander reports, Theophrastus sets outthe Parmenidean argument in the first book of the Natural investigation’this could cast doubt on the origin of his materials. But it is not impossiblethat this way of referring to a work is Alexander’s way of labellingTheophrastus’ Physics.

I shall end this section by looking at a few examples of doctrinalevaluation, in which Simplicius is seen to appeal to Theophrastus for thediscussion of Aristotle’s text, in addition to reports of Theophrastus’disagreement or new direction. Theophrastus’ appearance in the commen-taries is more often than not a sign of his authoritative views on Aristotle(see also n. 14). He is given several epithets that confirm this: ‘leader ofhis students’ (koruphaios, in Phys. 964.30),45 ‘best among students’ (aris-ton, in Cat. 435.26), and together with Eudemus as ‘companions’ (hetairoi,in Phys. 788.35). Characteristically he will raise problems (aporei, ibid.604.6) or is seen to agree with Aristotle (612.5, 789.1) or even withDamascius and Iamblichus (642.18f.). Here he certainly seems to live upto the reputation already hinted at in D.L. 5.39 in which Aristotle is quotedas having said that Theophrastus ‘interpreted all his meaning with anexcess of cleverness’.46 The verbs used by Simplicius indicate Theophras-tus’ authority quite clearly, as does the extent of the paraphrases andquotations: he ‘is a witness’ to the interpretation offered (marturei), orprovides the same name or label (kalei), or is said to prove the point atissue (apedeixen, in Phys. 21.10). But on a few matters Simplicius noteswith some relish the dissent or novelty of the second head of the Peripatos.Three instances are of particular interest for our purposes. In the first wefind Theophrastus raising questions (aporiai) about Aristotle’s notion ofplace, in the second he does not do the same with regard to time but hissuccessor Strato does, and in the third we see Simplicius trying to demon-strate that Theophrastus’ interpretations square with his own.

(1) At in Phys. 601.1ff. Simplicius is presenting a long overview and


96

discussion of known theories about place (topos), a digression from themain narrative of the commentary.47 His stated motive here is the inter-esting point that Aristotle’s account ‘contains many difficulties’ andevoked ‘many lines of examination to those who came after him’.48 But headds that his account would not be complete unless he will cover the faultyargument of Aristotle on place as well as the other views after him and theobjections that have been brought against him (601.4-7). Theophrastus’aporiai on place are taken from his Physics (604.5, en tois Phusikois aporei)and Simplicius inquires as to whether these are in agreement with thedefinition provided (11-12, ei sumphônos estin ho apodotheis tou topouhorismos). His actual account divides the positions into two camps (thosewho view place as body and those who view it as incorporeal, 14-15) andincludes Plato, Aristotle and the Peripatetics, Damascius, Democritus,Epicurus and Strato. Theophrastus’ aporiai concerning Aristotle raiseissues over a number of aspects, but in particular that of natural place(F146, 149 FHSG).49 While Aristotle held the view that natural place hada power of its own (Phys. 208b11), Theophrastus suggested aporeticallythat the natural movement of the four elements could be explained byviewing the world as an organism re-adjusting its limbs when out of place.This implies a shift from place as an agent of change to the world (the‘organism’). Syrianus, Proclus, Damascius and Simplicius seem to haveadopted this idea of the organism, but considered it to be too much of aninert notion, and attributed to place the power to arrange the four ele-ments into their proper regions. Note that Simplicius’ final proposal is alsoin disagreement with the view of his own teacher Damascius, preferringto take place as a substance (ousia) which is extended, and the upshot isthat ‘his dynamic view of place in fact reverses Theophrastus’ position’.50

He thus creates a compromise of sorts between the views of the first andsecond scholarch of the Peripatos, an outcome that is characteristic of thesyncretistic tendencies in Simplicius and other commentators. Disagree-ment per se is not problematic so long as the point of contention can beexplained or explained away.

(2) The so-called corollary on time (in Phys. 773.8ff.) is the secondexcursus in the commentary on Physics. Here Theophrastus (788.33-789.2) is said to follow Aristotle in almost everything, while Strato is saidto take ‘a different path’ (789.1-2, kainoteron ebadisen hodon). This dis-tinction between the two successors to Aristotle may be a significant one,since the third head of the school is certainly known for his more physical-ist approach. He is nicknamed ho phusikos in D.L. 5.58 and 61, anddescribed as a man who ‘excelled in every branch of learning, and most ofall in that which is styled “physics”, a branch of philosophy more ancientand important than the others’ (D.L. 5.64, tr. Hicks). On place, time andmatter he came to hold quite different views to those of Aristotle andTheophrastus.51 Strato called time ‘the quantitative aspect of motion’ (inCat. 346.14 = F151A.1 FHSG), while Theophrastus defines it as ‘some


97

accidental attribute (of motion)’ (15-16 = F151A.2 FHSG). Yet beforebringing up Strato’s divergent view in the present context Simpliciusclaims Theophrastus and Eudemus hold the same view as Aristotle ontime (F151B FHSG). In his commentary on this fragment Sharples makesthe helpful comment that thanks to Iamblichus’ report (F151A FHSG) wecan say that ‘Theophrastus comes down on the side of holding that timeand motion could be separated, where Aristotle is undecided’.52 Stratoseems to replace Aristotle’s definition, while Theophrastus’ position,which regards time as an accidental property, may well be intended toclarify Aristotle’s definition.53 Thus, one generation on, Strato was able todetach himself from Aristotle’s doctrine on several points. Simplicius, trueto his initial words in the preface to this excursus, makes sure to highlightthis turning away from the scholarch as part of the survey of the ‘manylines of examination by those who came after him’ (601.1-2). As he does notconsider Aristotle’s position infallible (in Cat. 7.27-9, quoted above §1.2.1),he is also not averse to charting the internal discussions in the Peripateticschool. Clearly he did not see these as a threat to the Platonist position orto the harmonising strategy involved in supporting it.

(3) A third passage nicely illustrates how Simplicius may pit thinkersagainst each other in his attempt to turn the argument his way. At in Cat.435.17-436.3 (= F153 FHSG) he brings in Theophrastus into the discussionof movement (Aristotle Cat. 14). Although the perspective here is of coursemore conceptual and linguistic, the discussion has considerable overlapwith the account in the Physics commentary (cf. 427.24-8). The six speciesof movement defined in Aristotle Cat. 15a13-33 are reviewed and analysedwith the help of several earlier exegetes, including Theophrastus.54 Thepuzzle Simplicius considers here is a development from the precedingpages, in which he has raised two specific questions regarding the relationof motion to time.55 First, he asks why permanence (stasis) as a form is notopposed to movement (kinêsis) as a form. Earlier Plotinus and Boethuswere paraphrased on this issue, the former noting that ‘rest is a negationof being moved’ (433.20, cf. Enn. 6.3.27), the latter doubting that ‘the stateof rest opposed to movement in respect of quality is a quality’ (433.28-9).Simplicius’ inquiry aims to determine how the six species of motion relateto the ten categories, and in doing so is clearly pressing the text too hard.He held that there is change in all categories.56 His cross-reference to thecommentary on Physics (23-4, pros men ekeinous tous apologismous epei-rathên ti legein en tais eis ekeinên tên pragmateian skholais) shows theclear connection and chronology of the works.57 But Sharples rightlyquestions the way in which Simplicius uses Theophrastus, since hiscomments seem concerned with the general definition, as is clear from thequotation from his first book of Physics:

It is not difficult to specify the common and universal account of movement,and say that it is a certain incomplete operation of what is potential, qua


98

such, in respect of each genus of the categories, and this is also more or lessapparent from perception. (tr. Gaskin 2000)

Simplicius’ claim that he could demonstrate that Theophrastus ‘the bestamong Aristotle’s students’ agreed with his own suppositions (26-7, ethelô kaiton ariston tôn autou mathêtôn ton Theophraston epideixai tais emais hu-ponoias sumpsêphizomenon) seems to mistake an introductory statement ofa discussion for a preliminary outline.58 Clearly Theophrastus’ authority as‘the best among Aristotle’s students’ is here used to overcome the possiblecriticism Simplicius might incur for disagreeing with Aristotle.

Simplicius’ use of Theophrastus is thus characterised by a respectfulattitude and the assumption that his evaluative comments and aporeticmusings can assist in clarifying Aristotle. His knowledge of Theophrastus’works is limited, as is its actual use in doctrinal discussion. His usefulnessfor the recovery of early Greek philosophy is illustrated by his importantrole in those parts of the commentaries where Presocratic opinions arereviewed. For Simplicius the second head of the Peripatos was an estab-lished voice in the historiographical and philosophical discourse ofPlatonist commentary.

3.2.2 Eudemus of Rhodes (c. 370-300 BCE)The transmission of Eudemus’ work depends almost entirely on the latercommentators, in particular Alexander, Proclus, Philoponus and Sim-plicius. The current edition (Wehrli 1969) is outdated and incomplete, asis illustrated by the omission of a number of references found in Simplicius(Baltussen 2002b). Like Theophrastus, Eudemus has been assigned theambiguous role of clarifying Aristotelian passages considered problematicin the eyes of Simplicius.

In Simplicius’ Physics commentary Eudemus is mentioned more fre-quently than Theophrastus and with considerable respect. The fragmentsshow Eudemus as an exegete and interpreter of Aristotle’s Physics, whosemain concern is to clarify and systematise. It is generally assumed thatthey were lecture notes used by Eudemus to teach Aristotle’s physics inhis own ‘school’ in Rhodes.59 This may also explain why Eudemus’ com-ments seem to possess a dogmatic and systematising tendency. He is seento follow the order of Aristotle’s treatise closely (on which more below), andSimplicius already notes that he passed over book 7.60 From the remarksin Simplicius we can get a fairly good idea of how many books Eudemuswrote, and in what order, since Simplicius provides references for hisquotations to the individual books of Eudemus’ work.61 I have discussedthe references to individual books elsewhere.62 In outline, Eudemus’ workseems to have consisted of four or perhaps five books, in which he dis-cussed subjects dealt with by Aristotle in Physics books 1-6 and 8.63 It isclear that he needed fewer books than did Aristotle, and from this it has


99

been assumed that Eudemus’ Physics was an abbreviated and reworkedversion of Aristotle’s.64 What form the work might have taken is still to beconsidered. But first we may go a little further in examining the nature ofEudemus’ exegesis as reported by Simplicius.

The issue of the completeness of Simplicius’ copy of Eudemus’ work hasbeen raised by scholars because some remarks in Simplicius suggest thathe had a less complete copy than did Alexander.65 The amount and detailof Simplicius’ information (especially the numerous references to theindividual books) certainly make it probable that he possessed a copy ofEudemus’ work. But the situation is complex, since Simplicius is referringto and quoting from Eudemus’ comments alongside those of, e.g., Alexan-der, Porphyry and Themistius, and Alexander also quotes fromEudemus.66 Thus Simplicius several times not only reports Eudemus viaAlexander (e.g. 930.34 = F100; 115.11 = F43),67 but also states that he wasunable to find the words which Alexander quotes from Eudemus (e.g. inPhys. 133.26 = F44 hôs Alexandros phêsi: egô gar ouch hêuron en tôiEudêmeiôi tên lexin tautên).

Three suggestions have been made to explain this: Simplicius had a lesscomplete version than Alexander’s (Schöbe 1931: 72); Alexander’s para-phrase obscured the Eudemian material (Wehrli 1968: 95); Simplicius iscriticising Alexander for extreme brevity (Sider 1981: 26, ‘a not veryoblique criticism of Alexander’s scholarship’). I find the second unlikely,mainly because it is not very different from the third, except for the factthat it makes Simplicius unaware of Alexander’s supposed obscurity. Andsince the third option (Sider’s) seems rather forced, I prefer the first as themost probable. The passages discussed by Sider will not all fit into thisexplanation: even if he is probably right about F37a68 – i.e. that Alexanderis criticised for ‘his condensation of Eudemus’ – this does not mean thatthe phrase exhêuron en tôi Eudêmeiôi tên lexin tautên (F44)69 should betaken as criticism of Alexander instead of a phrase indicating where hefound the statement.70

However, in view of Simplicius’ use of the verb (‘finding’, heurein) it ispreferable to think that Simplicius’ text may have had some gaps (firstoption). One further testimony in favour of this is F122b (1355.28ff., notmentioned by Sider in this context), where use of the verb in a positiveformulation is clearly locative:

Alexander states that Eudemus says that the first mover <is> in the largestcircle through the poles; for that moves fastest. but I found the statement thusin the Eudemian <work>: [quotation follows]

There seems to be no reason to read remarks like this in any other waythan as evidence that Simplicius’ information on Eudemus comes fromboth Eudemus and Alexander. It is moreover likely that Simplicius wouldprobably use another verb for Alexander’s interpretive failure: in several


100

cases in which he rebukes Alexander for not ‘understanding’ the views hediscusses Simplicius uses the verb akouein (e.g. in Phys. 644.25; more onthis passage in Chapter 4). Consequently we cannot exclude the possibilitythat Simplicius’ copy of Eudemus’ work on physics was less complete thanAlexander’s.71

Possibly one of the reasons why Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander andothers before him) found Eudemus’ comments useful is that his approachto Aristotle’s text may have been helpful in understanding it.72 The factthat ‘helpful’ could mean his comments assisted Simplicius in his ownpreferred line of interpretation should not surprise us. When coming toSimplicius the reader knows that he is partie pris in his discussion, so oneshould expect an agenda and an overall attitude to Plato and Aristotlewhich had been forged over a long period of debate and evaluation of theviews of both scholarchs.

In all Eudemus’ remarks an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s words ispresent: like Theophrastus, Eudemus is drawing out implicit or tacitassumptions and reformulating them as explicit stages in his reasoning.Simplicius’ qualifying remarks before quotations from Eudemus seem tosupport such an interpretation: Eudemus is said to follow Aristotle closelyin the main topics of his treatise (in Phys. 924.18 = F98, paraxeôn; 1036.13= F109, parakolouthein). Or he proceeds by shortening paraphrase(1206.27, paraphrazôn � suntomôn = F113; cf. 74.18 = F35). Summariescan occur without necessarily losing clarity (in DC 497.24 = F149 W., sun-tomôs kai saphôs historêsen) and he may also approach a problem in anexpansive way (in Phys. 48.6-7 = F34, philokalôs tên problêma) and be praisedfor his clarity (48.26-27 = F34, lexin saphôs ektithêmenên).73 Finally, he mayset out a problem in an ‘unfailing fashion’ (in Phys. 1355.28 = F122b,asphalôs). Such is the range of judgements by which Simplicius indicates hispraise for Eudemus, despite some potential tensions between these labels.

The aspect emphasised here, Eudemus’ clarity, is not unambiguous.Does ‘clarity’ here mean ‘expressed more clearly’ or ‘fitting the Platonistagenda better’? If we take it as ‘expressed more clearly’, it could mean aform of ‘spelling out’ the message or the problem, as the case may be (cf.48.26-7 = F34), which would fit other comments in which Simplicius refersto the ‘overall meaning’ of a passage (holê ennoia vs. kata lexin/ katameros at, e.g., 129.16, 150.25, 210.28, 216.10, 888.16). Even when we makeallowance for the subjective nature of some of these assessments, Sim-plicius’ elaborate use of Eudemus is in itself an argument in favour of thelatter’s value. Eudemus’ comments apparently make him a good guide forlater students of Aristotle’s Physics. Simplicius is clearly also thinking ofthe relationship between teacher and pupil, which in the Platonic traditionis a crucial link for the transmission of the truth (viva voce, see §5.2). Onestatement which supports this is found at in Phys. 68.32-3 (not in Wehrli):‘regarding Hippocrates of Chios one does better to permit to Eudemus thathe knows, given that he is closer in time and a pupil of Aristotle’.74


101

But the nature of these notes also seems to indicate that the ‘title’ taphusika, when used by Simplicius in connection with Eudemus, refers toa work of a different character from Aristotle’s Physics. From Simplicius’descriptions one is inclined to think of these lecture-notes as a shorterversion of Aristotle’s Physics with some evaluative comments added, sincethey are both shorter in terms of the general line of argument (note forinstance kephalaiôs at in Phys. 1036.13 and the number of books), andlonger in terms of clarification (philokalôs, saphôs, asphalôs).75 Scholarsare rightly hesitant to infer that Eudemus had written some sort of‘commentary’, and although it may largely depend on definition, it seemswise to think of it as interpretive paraphrase with added considerationsand arguments.76 We can at least conclude that he seems quite inde-pendent towards the treatise (more so than Theophrastus, apparently),creating a reworked version of some of Aristotle’s ideas on physics whilekeeping to the main lay-out and structure of that work.

The reason that we may hesitate to translate Eudemus’ ta phusika asPhysics is that the features discussed above suggest that we should avoidthinking of a full-blown treatise.77 As there is a very thin line between areworked paraphrase and a shortened version with added remarks or‘notes’ this may seem a rather academic point. Yet to characterise the workas ‘notes on (Aristotle’s) Physics’ might imply that Aristotle’s text wasconsidered to be canonical.78 Sharples (2002) has shown that there areseveral possible ways of interpreting Eudemus’ work as well as the differ-ences between Eudemus’ and Theophrastus’ approaches to Aristotle’sPhysics. From Eudemus’ remarks it is clear that he may be trying toreformulate Aristotle’s work – possibly in an attempt to clarify the denseprose – whereas Theophrastus is commenting in a more aporetic fashion,perhaps because he was using the works of Aristotle in teaching wherequestions provide a good didactic tool and starting point for furtherresearch.79 It is important to remember that Theophrastus’ developmentof Aristotle does not always mean that he is challenging him.80

We have no way of checking what the original ‘title’ of Eudemus’phusika was (if there was one), but it is plausible that Simplicius labelledit ta phusika by analogy with other Peripatetic works. It is well-knownthat, despite Aristotle’s variable use of the adjective phusikos, Simpliciusmostly uses physikê akroasis for the Physics.81 It may in addition bepointed out that the common practice of printing ancient ‘titles’ as moderntitles (with capital initial) is misleading: ta phusika may, it seems, haveseveral different shades of meaning, all of them sharing the basic idea of(writings on) physical matters. It may seem a trivial point, but all too oftena wrong label introduces a number of questionable connotations, whichmay then lead to questionable assumptions.82

The foregoing discussion of the Eudemian material as it is found inSimplicius is meant to set the scene for a better understanding of howSimplicius makes use of it. Eudemus seems to have stuck fairly closely to


102

Aristotle’s views on nature, but as with his contemporaries he may findhimself formulating new proposals in the process of systematising Aris-totle’s thoughts.83 Eudemus is also responsible for the preservation ofscientific views, many of which must have originated in his Geometricinvestigation (geometrikê historia). Simplicius’ interest extends into suchareas, as science and mathematics were an important part of the Neopla-tonic curriculum. The role of Eudemus can be summed up on the basis ofour investigation into the contextual comments and his frequent appear-ance in the commentaries for particular topics, using some resultspublished elsewhere (Baltussen 2002b, 2006a).

Many short references, which should be added to the surviving frag-ments for the sake of completeness, produce no new insights of majorimport.84 This is not surprising, because the material is limited and takenfrom the same source as most of the known texts. They can neverthelessbe taken as further evidence that Simplicius is reading Eudemus’ notesclosely alongside Aristotle’s text, as the brevity of such references suggeststhat Simplicius is on the look-out for useful comments and adding themwhenever they occur (e.g. in Phys. 118.5-20). Moreover, some of the closingstatements, which follow (and fall outside) the actual quotations, do teachus more about Simplicius’ method of demarcating (or ‘bracketing’) hisquotations and draw attention to certain features of Eudemus’ approach(in Phys. 48.26-9, 63.19-20, 74.29-30, 725.19-24).85 We also find detailswhich further clarify aspects of Eudemus’ role in the exegetical tradition.For instance, at in Phys. 11.16-17 we see Simplicius formulate objectionsagainst both Eudemus and Alexander, an unusual move since he normallyprefers the former to the latter and in general disagrees with Alexanderonly in a limited number of cases (roughly a quarter: see Chapter 4). Intwo cases (in Phys. 48.26-9, 717.14-20) Eudemus’ value in clarifying aproblem is noted. These insights arise from including more of the contextof the source text, thus using a broader approach towards the study offragments.

A set of longer passages omitted in Wehrli (T8-12 in Baltussen 2002b)yield five further ‘quotations’, or at least passages supposedly reportingEudemus’ words (signalled by verbs such as paratithesthai, graphein,legein). They give us additional glimpses of his working method.86 Furtherquotations in other authors (Themistius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus) addto our knowledge of the engagement with and transmission of Aristotle’stext among Simplicius’ immediate successors and also signal the furtherabsence of Arabic sources in Wehrli: Themistius and Philoponus confirma text we have from Simplicius (F79-80 W.), with an additional quotation.Above all, most additions offer quite valuable insights relevant for thetransmission, interpretation and editing of the Eudemean fragments.

Thus stronger support can be offered for the view (hinted at by Wehrli1969: 88) that it was the value of the Eudemean material as an exegeticalaid for Simplicius that ensured the survival of so much material. Sim-


103

plicius almost treats him as a ‘colleague’ who also aims at clarifyingAristotle’s difficult prose. The higher ratio of references to Eudemus (some132) as compared to references to Theophrastus (37) might be an indica-tion of just that: Eudemus’ clarifications of Aristotle’s thought in physicsseem more useful – a convenient explanation for why they found their wayinto later exegetical writings.87 My suggestion (2002b: 148), that Sim-plicius perhaps thought of Eudemus’ comments as a useful cure forAristotle’s unclarity, would explain the emphasis placed on clear exposi-tion (witness the frequent use of saphôs), perhaps to counteract Aristotle’s– supposedly intended – unclarity (asapheia, in Cat. 7.1-22).88 Specificreference to the mode of expression in Eudemus also indicates that hemakes confident and reliable contributions: he is a ‘witness’ (marturein,martura legôn) who skips parts of Aristotle’s work, recounts or clarifies(48.26-8, tou Eudemou lexin saphôs ektithemenon; 118.3-20, mnêmoneuse,edêlôse; 433.13-18 exetheto), understands (121.9, sunidôn), and statesthings in writing (717.15, gegraphotos; 121.9, graphei). Thus we find thata renewed study of the evidence with more emphasis on context, evenduplicate passages, can improve our understanding of Simplicius’ ap-proach. All in all, Simplicius considered Eudemus a reliable sourceoffering an authoritative contribution to the explication of Aristotle’s text.The underlying principle of attributing greater value to an author contem-porary with Aristotle is one which makes sense to the modern eye, butmust probably be explained by the view, common among late Platonists,that personal contact between teachers and students was the best way tointeract in philosophy. With an educational context in mind, we canunderstand why Simplicius wanted to use Eudemus’ comments consis-tently throughout his own commentary. It is plausible to infer thatEudemus rewrote the Aristotelian text into a leaner form with an overallnarrative which brought out both the structure and the meaning of theoriginal more clearly.

3.3 Simplicius and the early PeripateticsIf Theophrastus and Eudemus offered the late Platonists an opportunityto explore and exploit the earliest interpretive engagements with theAristotelian corpus, this can be explained to a large extent by the dynamicsof canon-formation, or at least the beginnings of such a process in the earlyPeripatos. Simplicius declared Theophrastus ‘the best among Aristotle’sstudents’ and regarded Eudemus as a useful aid to shed light on difficultpassages. Such laudatory epithets were not used for any other earlyPeripatetics and signal his admiration and trust in them as reliablesources for interpreting their master’s thoughts. They had contributed defacto to the formation of a canon (in the sense of an emerging consensusabout his works) in that Aristotle can be understood best either from hisown works or from those who had had the privilige of sunousia – the


104

Platonist term for intensive teacher-student interaction.89 Either way thepresumption of consistency and coherence of the Peripatetic viewpointimposes itself: Simplicius does not seem to be concerned about the newdirections in the Lyceum. Gottschalk’s comments on the importance ofAndronicus (first century BCE) for the final step in establishing a canon areof particular relevance here:

Andronicus performed his task well. He not only established the form andcanon of Aristotle’s writings which, with comparatively slight modifications,we still use today, but initiated a way of doing philosophy which was topredominate among Aristotelians to the end of antiquity and to spread toadherents of other schools. Their work was firmly centred on the Aristotelianwritings. Much of it consisted of straight exegesis and even where theydisagreed with Aristotle’s doctrine or were dealing with different problemsfrom his, they often chose to present their views as an interpretation ordevelopment of his ideas. Philosophical debate could take the form of anargument over the authenticity or meaning of a text.90

The existence of a substantial body of work is in itself neither a reason nora guarantee that it will achieve the status of a canon, that is, of anauthoritative and definitive expression of a truth or truths. Canonisationof a philosophical corpus requires both authority and a conviction amongfaithful followers that there is, in principle, little to add to the form andmeaning of the writings. Such a conviction can hardly be attributed toTheophrastus, Eudemus and other early members of Aristotle’s school.From the start critical evaluation was part of the internal debates, butthese are not always easily recognised or reconstructed, because express-ing disagreement with the scholarch was regulated by tacit rules abouthow this could be done. In the case of Theophrastus it has been pointed outthat he is rather indirect in disagreeing with Aristotle: his view on theso-called fifth element implies a divergent view, but it has to be extractedfrom the subtle treatment he gives.91 On other issues too he preferred topioneer new areas with a particular emphasis on the inanimate parts ofthe universe (apsucha: his tracts on stones, winds, fire, metals etc). Evenwhen he focused on a fairly new area such as plants and set out to chart itcomprehensively he is seen to model his approach on Aristotle’s studies onanimals – sensibly, a sympathetic reader might say, or slavishly, as a morecritical observer might maintain.

The standard account of the Peripatetic school after Theophrastusdescribes it as undergoing a change of focus, from the abstract andmetaphysical concerns of the founder to more concrete and physical inter-ests of his successors. Although this developmental picture is grounded inancient representations, going back to Diogenes Laertius (e.g. D.L. 5.58,61, Stratôn ho phusikos), things are more complicated than can be acknow-leged in brief surveys of the subject. On the one hand, we must accept thatAristotle’s writings represent a great achievement, though one that was


105

far from complete. On the other, we must also take into account thatindividual choices were made by his followers, pursuing particular inter-ests of their own. However, most of the time their proposals remainedwithin the main parameters of Aristotle’s system, a geocentric universeruled by specific physical and metaphysical causes. Their work can be seenas continuing to philosophise in the Aristotelian manner, while the notionof canon as established doctrine is probably the result of a shift in the firstcentury BCE.92

Simplicius’ keen interest in these early exegeses can be credited to hisdesire to make the most of all the available evidence, which he must havesought out and studied carefully. In our account of his sources we haveseen that with regard to the Presocratics and the Peripatetics his libraryis already quite extensive: the works of Parmenides, Empedocles,Anaxagoras and other Presocratics, a range of works by Theophrastus andEudemus and other Peripatetics were probably in his possession.93 Stratoplays an important role in the discussion of place, diverging considerablyfrom Aristotle.

In their relation to the Aristotelian corpus, the earlier interpreters wereengaged in developing an existing body of thought cooperatively, whileSimplicius, coming to Aristotle from a completely different angle, aimedmore at finding sufficient evidence to support and/or demonstrate hisparticular viewpoint. The early Peripatetics are to some extent consideredas colleagues, offering ‘privileged information’ for the immediate explica-tion of Aristotle’s text. In the light of the Neoplatonic aim of preparingoneself for the Platonic ‘Greater Mysteries’, Aristotle’s ‘Smaller Mysteries’were well served by his close collaborators, who in one sense were also hisfirst exegetes. Simplicius does not cover up, nor does he show any specialconcern for, the internal disagreements in the Peripatetic school, butrather tries to exploit their exegetical comments. Although not stated, thisapproach suggests that he follows a line of thinking we encountered inconnexion with the Presocratics (and will see again among late Platonists),by which such disagreements could be considered as superficial and easilyclarified or defused. Simplicius also shows little awareness of the phe-nomenon I referred to as the emergence of a canon (p. 88), but employs (orprojects) the notion of an established canon to evaluate the earliest clari-fications of Aristotle’s prose. It seems that for him ‘clarification’ stood for‘extracting the meaning which is already present in the text’. The earlyPeripatetics thus fulfilled the roles of well-informed interpretive sourcesclose to Aristotle and those of ‘colleagues’ contributing to the educationalobjective of spreading the Platonist message.94


106

4

Ghost in the Machine? The Role ofAlexander of Aphrodisias

[it is] profitable for those who choose to understand and explain Aristotle’sthought by way of Alexander’s commentaries, to examine what he said. (inDC 297.8-10, tr. Hankinson 2006)

Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE) has a more dominant presence inSimplicius’ commentaries than any other commentator on Aristotle. Thefrequency with which he is quoted, referred to and criticised exceeds thatof all others, while there is some evidence that he is also behind a numberof comments where his name is not given. The evidence for this is substan-tial and clearly collecting and elucidating the ‘fragments’ of Alexanderfrom Simplicius would be a book project in itself (see n. 1). In this chapterI open a line of investigation which explores this influence in its differentguises, both explicit and implicit. The two broader questions steering myexploration are the following: (1) why is Simplicius relying so heavily onAlexander? and (2) how is it that a died-in-the-wool Peripatetic philosopherand commentator has such an important role in a Platonist commentary?I call this an ‘exploration’ because the subject is too big to claim compre-hensiveness either in scope or depth, and recent and ongoing work makesdefinitive statements premature.1 My conclusions in this chapter, al-though based on a full review of the Alexander occurrences for in Phys. andin DC, remain provisional and tentative to the extent that a more completeassessment of the Alexander fragments must await until a more compre-hensive analysis has been completed.2

In focusing on Alexander we turn our attention from the discussion ofearly and classical Greek philosophers (Chapters 2-3) to Simplicius’ pre-decessors who lectured on Plato and Aristotle and as a result producedextensive comments laid down in lecture notes and commentaries (Chap-ters 4-6). This division between the two parts of the present study is basedon a distinction not unlike that made in modern scholarship between‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources. Anachronistic as these terms maysound, they help to bring out more sharply how we can determine theprimary function of an author mentioned in Simplicius’ works. The worksof the Presocratics and Aristotle fulfil the role of texts commented on(‘target texts’), while the commentaries from Alexander onwards are moreformal in their exegesis and thus constitute a kind of ‘auxiliary’ texts(Chapters 4-6). Aristotle’s immediate successors (§3.2) lie somewhere inbetween these two categories – transitional authors, so to speak, who are

107

themselves engaged in explaining Aristotle (one could call their workstexts with an ‘auxiliary role’). To the modern eye (and probably in theirown minds) Theophrastus and Eudemus were not writing commentariesin the formal sense of the word: their engagement with the works ofAristotle is as cooperative as it is complementary.3 Yet they can be seen toestablish, slowly but surely, a meaning in the texts of their teacher whichwill eventually assist in clarifying the supposed connections betweenworks and their functions within a larger system of thought. The effectwas that, by way of exegetical evaluation and by filling in the blanks andgaps, they helped create a canon in the sense of an authoritative corpus,even if this was not their primary concern.

The need for a detailed study of the role of Alexander of Aphrodisias inSimplicius’ working method (and especially in his Physics commentary) isobvious: not only does he represent an element which on the surface seemsalien to the Platonist commentary tradition (Aristotelianism), but hisimportance extends beyond the Greek tradition into Arabic philosophy aswell. As this is a huge topic it requires careful and selective reading of theavailable materials. Here I offer a first attempt at tackling this topic,though I do not assume that it will constitute the last word. I am of coursenot the first to advocate the importance of Alexander for Aristotle, sincestudies by Robert Sharples and recent translations (in the ACA series)have been praised for clarifying that relationship, among other things. Inthis connection Gerson has rightly pointed out that Alexander was usefulfor his patient clarifications in reading the text in sequence and very muchon its own terms; we know that he also tried to read the Metaphysics as acoherent work.4 Alexander was already part of the very scholarly traditionin which by his own admission doing philosophy meant using lots of books.5

Presumably referring to book rolls, Alexander makes this point in hisCommentary on Aristotle’s Topics 27.12-14 when explaining the dialecticalprocedure set out in Aristotle’s major mission statement of dialectic (Top.101a26-36):

This kind of speech was customary among the older philosophers, who setup most of their classes in this way – not with reference to books, since at thetime there were not yet any books of this kind. After a thesis has beenposited, they trained their aptitude at finding argumentative attacks byproducing attack arguments about this thesis, establishing and refuting theposition through what is approved.6

Simplicius’ use of such ‘secondary’ sources already well illustrates his skilland innovation in clarifying Aristotle. The weaving of many differentvoices into the fabric of his commentaries may be compared with thewriting of a symphony, a skilful orchestration of different components.Simplicius would have liked this image in view of his aim to show thereexists considerable agreement (symphônia in Greek) between Plato and


108

Aristotle. To support his argument he variously uses paraphrase andquotation, two devices which we saw he used for specific reasons (atypicalfor the Neoplatonic school, though present to some extent in Porphyry andProclus), in particular based on the view that accurate citation can be moreuseful than paraphrase (discussed in §§1.2 and 2.1).

Among the many references to his commentator-predecessors, Sim-plicius mentions Alexander almost 1,200 times, of which c. 700 occur inthe 1,300-page commentary on the Physics.7 That amounts to an averageappearance of once every other page! This makes him by far the mostquoted source in Simplicius. A detailed study of Alexander’s role in thePhysics commentary should therefore look in particular at (a) how thehigh frequency of his comments in the making of this commentary affectsthe nature of it, and also at (b) the way in which Alexander is quoted, whenhe is being praised or scolded. So far as I am aware, one of the experts onSimplicius’ works has remained unchallenged in stating that regardingthe Presocratics Simplicius’ ‘citations far exceed the need to illustrateAristotle’s text and Simplicius did not borrow such quotations from Alex-ander of Aphrodisias or from any other earlier commentator’.8 I will show,among other things, that viewed from a broader vantage point the quota-tions from Alexander himself also exceed that need and thus in a numberof cases can be compared in this respect with those of the Presocratics,provided one specifies ‘need’ in a certain way.

It is also significant for our understanding of the commentary traditionto become aware of Alexander the Peripatetic commentator within thePlatonic tradition. This phenomenon can be traced back to Plotinus (217-275 CE) who used him as an integral part in the exegesis of Plato andAristotle along with Severus, Numenius, Aspasius, Adrastus and othersas noted in Porphyry, Vita Plotini 14.14. The passage is intriguing becauseof the detailed description of Plotinus’ approach: he is said to have reactedto commentaries being read to him (14.11-12 aneginôsketo autôi ta hypom-nêmata), after which he would swiftly absorb its meaning and respondsuccinctly. In doing so Porphyry claims considerable originality for him,although his teacher Ammonius is also given a role in this process: his‘insight’ (noun 14.16) is used in the process of exegesis. Rist (1967: 171)has speculated that Plotinus followed him in expounding philosophy ‘outof a natural flair for his subject-matter’, dealing with the problems not thetextual issues. He often used question and answer (e.g. his lost commen-tary on the Categories), a technique not liked by all auditors: in thisconnection one wonders about the meaning of the phrase used with regardto a certain Thaumasius when he requested that Plotinus, instead of usingquestion and answer, speak eis ta biblia (13.14). Armstrong has translated‘in the manner of a set treatise’ (Loeb), but is a more literal translation‘to(wards) books’, to be understood as ‘put into books’? The combination of‘speaking’ and ‘books’ is somewhat unusual, and ‘speaking to books’ mightprompt us to think of commentary. If that is what Thaumasius meant, the

4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role of Alexander of Aphrodisias

109

contrast presumably is one between question and answer, debate andmonologue.

Whatever the meaning, Plotinus is described as a meticulous and sharpinterpreter of philosophical thought. It is generally accepted that Plotinus’decision to make Aristotle again important in his study of Plato washugely influential upon the Platonist tradition. Thus the process of (re)as-similation or, as is the more common term, harmonisation, i.e. to provesumphônia between Plato and Aristotle, required additional ‘input’ fromthe Aristotelian tradition, a role to which Alexander was very well suited.We have seen that Simplicius stated that the search for harmony is one ofthe tasks of the ideal commentator (above, §1.2.1). But Plotinus was farmore critical of Aristotle than, for instance, Porphyry. The work of someof Alexander’s antecedents, from the period after Eudemus (third centuryBCE, see Chapter 3) to Alexander’s time (early third century CE), cannot becovered here for practical reasons: not only is the material in questionhighly fragmentary and complex (some Aristotelians, the so-called MiddlePlatonists), but there are now at least two book-long discussions of themain figures covering many aspects of Platonist exegesis from Antiochusto Porphyry. I will briefly highlight some important contributions fromthis period in Chapter 5.9

In attempting to enquire into the reasons for the dominant position ofAlexander, we enter, so to speak, into an ‘archaeology’ of exegesis in thePlatonist tradition, with an important role for Plotinus’ style of comment-ing on Aristotle, as is hinted at by D’Ancona when she lists recent work onthe influence of Alexander on Plotinus.10 But we need to do more than hintin this case: the analysis needs to bring out in more detail how thecommentary format was given shape in the period between Plotinus andSimplicius. In addition, the analysis will selectively present the resultsbased on a broad examination of the Alexander passages.11 The exactnature of his method is worth investigating, without projecting our mod-ern understanding of scholarly working methods. This case study will thusprove useful in showing how, with a more empirical analysis, we can gainfurther insight into which sources Simplicius used directly and indirectlyand how he used them. The first point requires asking pertinent questionsabout his scholarly strategy, the second brings in the issue of how hishermeneutical procedures relate to his philosophical activity.

In outline this chapter proceeds as follows. First, a brief general sectionlooks at the place of both protagonists within the commentators tradition(§4.1). Their methods and motives differ considerably, not only becausethey are three centuries apart, but also because (strictly speaking) theybelong to different traditions, Alexander to the Aristotelian, Simplicius tothe Platonist school (with various contributions by Iamblichus, Syrianus,Proclus and Damascius). For those studying classical philosophy this maybe surprising, but syncretistic movements in ancient philosophy hadalready started in the Hellenistic period12 and with the rise of Neoplaton-


110

ism in the third century CE, Plotinus initiated a perspective by which Platoand Aristotle were fused into a fruitful synergy.13 Next some remarks onSimplicius’ methodology will be helpful to set up the analysis of theAlexander passages in the commentary on the Physics (§4.2). Simpliciusis of interest for his scholarly outlook and expresses some very interestingviews on how to proceed when writing philosophical prose. The point Ishall try to bring out above all is that he is tacitly assuming that Alexandercan be used for the exegesis of Aristotle within the new framework of latePlatonism. The evidence from the Physics commentary lends itself best tosurveying and analysing the different ways in which Alexander featureswithin the exegetical framework, in particular the types of usage and theirfrequency, while taking some additional aspects on board, such as theirrelation to the importance of the argument at issue, the exegetical termi-nology and the groupings of quoted sources, and where disagreement isexpressed (§§4.3-4).14 The final section draws some preliminary conclu-sions, and outlines further tasks and prospects of the wider project (§4.5).

4.1 Two commentators, two traditionsThe importance of Alexander of Aphrodisias in formal exegesis is clearfrom the fact that he is labelled ‘the commentator’ in later times.15 Hispresence is of far-reaching importance, because it brings into relief Sim-plicius’ dependence on him and forces us to determine his own contribu-tions to the exegesis of Aristotle. The Simplician commentaries also giveus many quotations from Alexander’s commentaries: in the Commentaryon Physics this is presumably his equivalent work on the Physics, whichdoes not survive in Greek independently.16 Recent work has recoveredsome new fragments of it from an independent source in addition to thepassages in Simplicius, indicating that Simplicius’ reporting is not alwaysimpartial.17 But this should not surprise us: it has long been known thatancient authors did not abide by scholarly and argumentative rules inconsidered natural or necessary today: the contrast between lavish quota-tions on the one hand, and manipulative techniques in using them on theother, is a common feature of ancient writing, but it does not go down wellwith modern scholars.18 Yet if the manipulation of texts causes surprise, itis most likely a sign of our wrong assumptions regarding ancient practices.Nevertheless, Simplicius is still one of the most impressive scholars inantiquity even by modern standards.19

Alexander of Aphrodisias, known as ‘the commentator’ (in Phys. 700.9),is referred to by Simplicius as ‘most knowledgeable of Aristotle’s exegetes’(in Phys. 80.15) or ‘the most careful of Aristotle’s partisans’ (in DC 378.20-1).20 His commentaries are of exceptional quality in clarifying Aristotle’sphilosophical views and in providing a consistent picture of the scholarch’sphilosophy. He wrote exegeses on many of Aristotle’s works in differentformats. Not all are continuous commentaries: he also composed so-called


111

dialectical discussions (problêmata) and shorter essays.21 His survivingworks show him as a patient and meticulous thinker and commentator,firmly placed within the Aristotelian tradition. This is not to say that heunconditionally agreed with everything Aristotle wrote. On certain issueshe is known to have diverged from Aristotelian orthodoxy, for instance onthe immortality of the soul.22 But for our purposes it is more important tohold on to the general consensus that his outlook in his exegetical activi-ties was that of an Aristotelian. Although the two authors approachAristotle from very different angles, the dynamic between the two is afruitful one, which allows us to chart the progress in the history ofinterpretation of Aristotle, but also in the history of exegesis in general.

Simplicius must have had a convenient method for locating the rightpassage at the right time in the many authors he cites. The arrangementof certain authors in each other’s vicinity (‘clusters’) are most likely theresult of a particular way of note-taking keyed to themes or topics, or theymust have been present in another source (Porphyry? Proclus?). This isone aspect to which I shall return. In addition, Simplicius’ use of technicalterms will give us further clues as to how he may have constructed hiscommentaries in practical terms. The survey of his works given above(Chapter 1) confirmed the unusual wealth of Simplicius’ library. Signifi-cantly it also seems to have included copies of several works by Alexander.So far as we can see, the works of Alexander known to Simplicius werecommentaries discussing Aristotle’s Physics, On the soul, and On theheavens (in Phys. 1292.2-3), and also Alexander’s own treatise De mixtu(in Phys. 530.15), a polemic against Zenobius the Epicurean (in Phys.489.21), and perhaps a commentary on On generation and corruption.23

Simplicius may have had access to such works while in Athens, eitherbefore or after he wrote the commentaries (see §1.3).

By continuing the practice of explicating Plato with the help of Aris-totle, Simplicius stands firmly within the Athenian Platonist school.24 It issignificant that, apart from the commentary on Epictetus, his survivingworks all deal with Aristotle. It is again the school’s syncretism which isrelevant here. In aiming for the harmonisation of the views of Plato andAristotle, the peculiar view that Aristotle’s works are a good introductionto Plato became standard.25 This position was not new (see n. 10), but itreceived its most explicit advocate in Porphyry, while the Plotinian systemunderwent its most thorough synthesis under Proclus (d. 485 CE). As wesaw, Simplicius goes even further in this respect by claiming that thePresocratics are basically in harmony with Plato, despite certain super-ficial differences (in Phys. 28.32-4; 29.3-5, above, p. 83). I have suggestedthat this claim is in part motivated by his aim to defuse the potentiallydamaging conflicts found in ‘certain overviews’ (anagraphais), which ac-cording to him overemphasise disagreements (28.34-29.5, 29.14). This wasa well-known strategy among some Christian authors who attempted toexploit these disagreements, following the sceptics’ ploy of listing major


112

epistemological problems to show how unceasing disagreement about suchissues proved the impossibility of knowledge (Sextus Empiricus).26

In the case of Alexander, Simplicius seems to be taking his material ashe moves through the text of Aristotle, often using Alexander’s commentsas a starting point for a new topic. This suggests that he takes Alexanderas his main guide – as we shall see, this is the most plausible workinghypothesis. Alexander’s dominant role can thus in part be explained by theparallelism of base text (Aristotle) and commentary (Alexander). Alexan-der’s first occurrence in the Physics commentary is rather casual andsignals an apparent exception to Simplicius’ good scholarly methods: hedoes not introduce Alexander properly in recognition of his contribution tothe discourse. I do not mean by name and place of birth, as he does withmany of the Presocratics, e.g. Xenophanes of Colophon (7.3-4) orAnaxagoras of Klazomenai, because this has been plausibly attributed toSimplicius’ source for this material, Theophrastus.27 Yet he does not namehim in a list of sources available to him, as he did in his commentary onAristotle’s Categories when outlining the task of a commentator (7.23-32Kalbfleisch, quoted above, §1.2.1). Yet Alexander, the commentator andthe most quoted author in his works by far, gets no special mention orintroduction at all. The first occurrence of his name is a simple ‘Alexander’(in Phys. 2.5), and it is not until the eighteenth occurrence that a furtherlabel, relating to the place of provenance, is found (‘of Aphrodisias’, 19.5,cf. 44.11, in DC 176.33-4, 297.8). In fact, in in Phys. Simplicius does notrefer to Alexander’s works in any concrete form until 332.20, where hespeaks of ‘the written comments of Alexander’ (ta tou Alexandrou hypo-mnêmata; cf. 430.3, 530.16; in modern translations usually rendered‘commentaries’).

What are we to make of this? Some have suggested that the Categoriescommentary is the most accomplished and complete because it was thestarting point of all teaching in the (Neo)platonic school, and so teachersand students would have spent the most time on it28 – hence the elaborateintroduction and the methodological refinement in both stating and exe-cuting the overall strategy. By contrast, it is suggested, the Physicscommentary represented a later stage in the curriculum. Because itsintended place was after that on the Categories,29 Simplicius may not havefelt the need for special introductions, or he may not have been able tofinalise it.30 Given Alexander’s prominence as an exegete, it seems odd thathe does not get official ‘credit’ for his role in the commentary. I take thisreticence to be a sign of Simplicius’ tacit assumption that Alexander’s rolein a commentary needs no further justification. As we have seen, it isbecause of the harmonising (or syncretistic) strategy of the Platonists thatSimplicius can incorporate the views of the Aristotelian Alexander at all(more on this point in Chapter 5). At the same time, since Alexanderbelongs to his own tradition (Aristotelianism), the act of incorporating himinto a Platonist narrative is bound to create tensions, and it is here that


113

even Simplicius will admit to disagreement with his illustrious guide.Strictly speaking, Alexander is not part of the harmonisation process assuch, but does contribute to the process as an external voice.

Since the extent of his disagreements has not yet been studied properly,I shall touch on this aspect in the next two sections (but see also §6.3).From this analysis we can confirm that Alexander’s importance issimply assumed by Simplicius, even if he remains more critical andindependent than it would seem on the surface. In addition, Alexander’spresence in the text is more complicated than might be expected. Butfirst it will be important to assess Simplicius’ technical approach inorder to illustrate how the formal commentary experienced its decisivestage under Alexander.

4.2 Alexander the pioneer: exegeticalformat and style

As indicated in the previous chapters, the exegetical tools Simplicius hadat his disposal were the result of a long tradition of textual interpretation(going back to the grammarians)31 and of the specific Neoplatonic way ofreading Aristotle, especially through Plotinian, Iamblichan or Procleaneyes. This practice produced an interesting range of terms which map outthe different activities and intentions of the commentator. Some of thesetools will become especially clear from the exegesis of Alexander passages.Broadly speaking, we can distinguish verbs of clarifying and explaining,nouns indicating comments or commentary, expressions of agreement,disagreement, dissent, error, and philological moves. The order of treat-ment reflects roughly the logical order of exegesis: Simplicius will be seento establish the type of work, consider textual variants, make his initialexegetical moves, and may then resort to various forms of meta-commen-tary. The last refers to comments that connect specific remarks to a globalargument of the doctrine, or to the other commentaries in a comparativespirit. Measuring Alexander’s importance and influence is best done viaan empirical examination of the frequency and nature of quotations wefind in Simplicius’ commentaries.

We can start by considering his role in the development of philosophicalcommentary. While formal commentary started some time before Alexan-der, Cristina D’Ancona has rightly emphasised that Alexander’s choice ofthe lemmata style of running commentary decisively determined thesubsequent tradition. With Plotinus his works start to play a role in thephilosophical discussions of the educational context,32 and in other pas-sages traces of his influence have been detected.33 In other words,Alexander’s commentaries, though not the earliest surviving Aristotelianworks of this nature, no doubt became influential for all the reasons wemight expect: they were detailed, sensible discussions of the text and notoverly partisan or obsequious in their interpretation.34 Although it is


114

nowhere stated in so many words, Simplicius may have been especiallyappreciative of this attitude; he himself admonished the would-be com-mentator to be objective in his approach to Aristotle (in Cat. 7.26-9). Still,the commentaries on De anima did often accuse Alexander of interpretingAristotle ‘un-Platonically’, which they considered a perversion.35 Thesecommentators on the De anima were especially keen to distinguish ‘theboundary between higher, rational, and lower, irrational soul’. Alexan-der’s claims about the unity of body and soul and the nature of the intellectare critical and thus not always helpful in pursuing the Plotinian agenda.36

The format of selecting short passages (lemmata) and commenting onthem in the original order of the base text was a prominent feature, bywhich Alexander (and before him, Aspasius)37 effectively established therunning commentary within the Aristotelian exegetical tradition, al-though he does not always follow the base text line by line or page by page,often sampling them selectively.38 At the same time Alexander manages tomaintain a clear view of the overall purpose of a work he discusses, whichmakes his commentaries not just a loosely connected (and incoherent) setof notes on individual passages. It is very likely that these commentariesare linked to his role as a teacher of Peripatetic philosophy in Athens. Hisworks are thus partly pragmatic and partly ideological: pragmatic in thatthis approach allows for a discussion of segments of text which aremanageable and thematically cohesive, ideological because he is commit-ted to the Aristotelian cause.39 It is possible that his position as publicteacher in Aristotelian philosophy in Athens (created by the EmperorMarcus Aurelius around 176 CE), to which Alexander was appointed atsome time between 198 and 209 CE, gave his work additional authority. Inshort, Alexander had much to offer a student of Aristotle’s works: consult-ing his commentaries meant making use of a rewarding aid to a criticalyet fair exploration of Aristotelian doctrines.

Moreover, Alexander’s independence with regard to Aristotle’s views,feeling free to criticise him, or at least to question him and disagree onvarious issues, could be exploited, since some issues concern fundamentalpoints of doctrine.40 Such behaviour within the Aristotelian school startedquite early and should not surprise us: in Greek philosophical schools asense of allegiance would never cramp a student’s capacity for criticalscrutiny, an attitude which was acceptable so long as it was presented asa cooperative gesture. What mattered was the way in which one expresseddissent: we saw Theophrastus formulate doubts and questions (aporiai),presumably because he was close to Aristotle, while Eudemus and laterstudents, whether as a result of geographical or chronological separation,were more explicit about the problems in his work and distanced them-selves from the master on a number of issues.41 Alexander’s careful(non-confrontational) explication of Aristotle probably facilitated his usein the Platonist school, and his close allegiance to Aristotle allowed him tobe regarded as amenable to the Platonists’ views in the same way that


115

Aristotle was. The commentaries are as much determined by his alle-giance to Aristotle’s thought as they are by the debates current in his day.

The format of lemmata commentary may in itself seem an obvious toolfor exegesis, but it is the way in which it is given shape that counts: theselection of a particular section or ‘slice’ of the text reveals the commenta-tor’s skill or ability to divide a text up meaningfully and sensibly. It is tobe noted that the predilections of ancient commentators for what can beconsidered ‘thematically cohesive’ do not coincide with modern prefer-ences. One reason for this is that phrases can be singled out for commentwhen they are considered difficult or obscure. The discursive style anddetailed explications of the text illustrate an awareness of the dense prosein Aristotle’s treatises as well as the need for elucidation of the thoughtsenclosed in them. Style is also a point worth looking into in so far as wewant to determine who the intended audience might be. As the officialpublic teacher in Aristotelian philosophy in Athens Alexander would beplying his trade as a ‘professor’ of philosophy. Do these works fit thatprofile? If teaching was his primary activity, it must be considered themajor driver behind his writings. Given the polemic against Stoics andSceptics, it would seem reasonable to see them too as a platform forsettling important questions in current debate and defending Aristoteliandoctrine. For instance, there are some observations on the Stoics inQuaestiones F1-2 (Sharples 1994: 89-94) where Alexander’s comments onthe so-called sorites (a logical problem on what constitutes a ‘heap’) and onthe incorporeality of the soul are found. With regard to the first, Alexandernotes that it is a sophism; as to the second, he states that ‘there is moredisagreement in respect of these matters between the Stoics and Platothan between Aristotle [and Plato]’ (op. cit. 93). He does clarify thatAristotle and Plato agree on the incorporeality of the soul but not on itsimmortality. In Quaestio 3.12 an argument relating to the questionwhether reality is limited or not occurs. It uses the imaginary action ofstretching one’s hand out beyond the limits of the world; the presence ofvoid outside the world was a feature of Stoic and Epicurean doctrine.

To further illustrate the importance of Alexander in the multi-refer-enced universe that is Simplicius’ work, we may briefly compare theoverall use of sources and their distribution across the work. The sourcesclearly marked in Simplicius’ commentaries were reproduced, with someadditions and corrections, in a diagram (above, p. 30). This not onlyillustrates what a well-stocked library he had at his disposal, but alsoallows us to gain some statistically significant information about thearrangement and presentation of his sources. Here I want to call attentionto his preferences and the distribution of commentators mentioned.

That Alexander seems to be his preferred starting-point for discussingAristotle is especially apparent from the first lines of the Commentary onAristotle’s On the heavens (in DC). The introduction of this commentary isa complex mixture of source discussion and arguments from authority,


116

both in Alexander’s reported comments and in the way these becomeincorporated into Simplicius’ account. The opening comment (1.1-2: ‘Alex-ander says that the subject (skopos) of Aristotle’s treatise On the heavensis the world’) sets the agenda for the initial pages, in which Simplicius firstallows Alexander to state his view more fully (in DC 1.1-13 with areference to Theophrastus as a supporting ‘witness’), and next elaborateson the proposed overall interpretation of this treatise by further clarifyingthe proposal (‘conjecture’, hypothesis, as he calls it), giving reasons for hisview. He clearly follows the broader agenda of the ‘preliminary questions’in reading Aristotle when he details the skopos (discussed and criticisedat 3.11-4.5, reiterated at 201.26-8), the order of reading (taxis, 5.36-7) andthe division of the works (divisio, 6.8-28). Only then are more recentcommentators brought in, allowing him to deal with the divergent viewson the skopos of the work. Iamblichus (c. 245-325 CE) proposes the ‘heav-enly and divine body’ (universe) as the ‘subject’, Syrianus (d. 437 CE) the‘heaven proper, i.e. the eternal, revolving body � not accepting Alexan-der’s claim that its subject is the world’.

Thus this opening section represents a typical example of Simplicianexegesis, in which a chain of commentators on Aristotle going all the wayback to Theophrastus (in this case, via Alexander) is used to set the sceneand define the topic. It often strikes modern scholars as odd that Sim-plicius does not always choose one particular view. In this case he looksfor a compromise, ending a critical discussion of Alexander’s position withthe conclusion that both the universe (Iamblichus) and the four elements(Alexander) are the theme of the work (in DC 4.26-30). After he has listedthe views he does formulate criticisms on the individual positions (‘againstthe others’, in DC 4.5; cf. Alexander 45.5). The decision, if that is the rightword, comes at 5.35-6, when he evinces the view that ‘this would be thesubject of the present treatise, being named after its most important part,which is that on which the rest depend’. On the position (‘chronology’) ofthe work he approvingly cites the general consensus of the exegeticaltradition: ‘Both Aristotle and his exegetes reasonably determine its posi-tion in the order of reading as being after the treatise on Physics’ (in DC5.36-7).

Why does Simplicius start with Alexander here? If he was merely aftera chronological survey, one would expect him to start with Theophrastus,unless he did not have access to his On heaven (peri ouranou). He doesmake it a point to report Alexander’s mention of Theophrastus, whichconfirms his interest in the second scholarch. He also signals the disagree-ment between Alexander and others, and sets them against each other (as,e.g., at 4.22-5), all of which would suggest his knowledge of Theophrastusis indirect. But as we have already seen in Chapter 3, Simplicius had someknowledge of Theophrastus’ relevant works as it transpires from thefragmentary remains (fragments 165B-D, 169, 171, 176 FHSG), locatingOn heaven as the third book of his Physics (in Phys. 1236.1-2 = F176


117

FHSG). Eudemus and Theophrastus are both regulars in Simplicius’quotation pattern and not infrequently appear together with Alexander(e.g. at 700.19 on Plato). Independent access to Eudemus and Alexandercan hardly be doubted. Would Alexander’s commentary be the only com-prehensive running commentary among Simplicius’ samples? As in thecase of the Metaphysics, partial commentaries by the later Platonists werewritten.42 The core commentaries were on Cat. and Metaph., so it ispossible that Phys. and Cael. were not given equal attention. A furtherfactor could be more recent commentaries which show an interest inAlexander’s method, such as Syrianus’ adoption of lemmata commentaryor Ammonius’ use of Alexander in interpreting important concepts (seebelow).

After Alexander Porphyry is a good second among the preferredexegetes in Simplicius, even if his name occurs only some 126 times. As wehave already seen (pp. 41-2), he often is mentioned in the vicinity ofAlexander, Eudemus and Themistius: at 728.10-14 manuscript versionsare discussed by ‘Porphyry and Themistius and Alexander’ (the latter isquoted). Themistius and Alexander also appear as equally valuable con-tributors to the discussion at in DC 62.12-13, 176.32; in Phys. 169.24, 400.1(includes Porphyry), 414.17, 684.2 (Themistius rejected: touto de aduna-ton), 854.20, 864.15 (Porphyry added), 918.13 (with Porphyry, on a textualmatter), 950.4 (with Aspasius, on a textual matter), 1130.3-6 (Philoponusadducing both in his silly attempt to impress the naïve), 1253.7 (both thinkthere is a necessary eternal motion). Note, however, that at 70.32 Them-istius’ agreement (sunaidei) with the exegesis is mentioned and that at inPhys. 986.30 Themistius’ non-acceptance of Alexander’s interpretation isnoted:

The clever Themistius does not accept from Alexander [the statement] thateven in things that seem to change all at once, as in the case of freezing milkand a darkening body, one part changes earlier, and another later. For hesays [192.8-9] that perception proves that there occur some all-at-oncechanges and transformations of bodies. But we may reply that evidence fromperception in these things is not safe. (tr. Konstan 1989)

Simplicius here cautiously offers a critical comment on the issue of instan-taneous change, adding further comments on Alexander and anotherquotation from Themistius (969.14-24 = Them. in Phys. 192.12-22) inwhich he argued that ‘things that possess no parts’ cannot undergo thisparticular kind of change.

Porphyry’s role in all this is not easily defined: his position in suchclusters varies, and he is often singled out for criticism. Disagreementsbetween them may also crop up. At in Phys. 407.4-6 Simplicius disagreeswith Porphyry about moving a phrase after ‘the commentators’ (adding aquotation of ten lines). More will be said on Porphyry and Plotinus in the


118

next chapter, but for now it is to be noted that they seem to occur moreprominently in cases in which the material is clearly of fundamentalimportance to Neoplatonic philosophy. Ammonius also features in suchcontexts, as for instance in the discussion regarding first ‘principles’(arkhai) at in Phys. A.7:

With regard to the second point [lines 5-6] our teacher Ammonius said:43 ‘weare looking for the true being (hypostasis) of substances, in which also theother categories have being’, [a point] which Alexander also calls attentionto (epestêse) giving an interpretation: ‘at the same time it is impossible forthere to be more primary oppositions, for substance as one genus is identical’such as being is primarily in substance, in second instance it sends out fromit also being for other things in accordance with those as from the one and tothe one, [192.20] so the oppositions of other genera will also acquire beingfrom [the opposition] in substance.44

Alexander is here quoted via Ammonius, who is keen to incorporate someof his comments into his own commentary. Clearly Alexander’s interpre-tation is taken on board as a useful perspective on the issue. He continues:

First, it will fit to speak of form and privation in the case of the oppositionaccording to substance, with a second description in the case of the changesin other categories; for those too there is form on the one hand, privation onthe other. One would not say ‘in every individual category’ (cf. 189a32) withregard to the genus which is instantly divided into species. For the oppositionon this basis would not be primary, even if that genus is primary. The firstopposition must need be primary to the other oppositions.

Alexander’s suggestion here emphasises the importance of form and pri-vation as polar opposites that define the scope and subdivision of a genus,in particular with reference to the genus of being (ousia). The secondpassage shows how Alexander’s position is paraphrased approvingly, cul-minating in the claim of there being a first opposition over and above allother oppositions.

With regard to the distribution of sources it is of some interest to explorethe significance of the groupings of authors. The practicalities of ancientscholarship have been studied for some individual authors.45 Preparatorynotes and how they end up in the final product may differ from case to case,but it would seem that we have some opportunity to recapture this aspectof the working method by looking at when certain sources occur andwhether their closeness to others could be significant. The sources in thePhysics commentary are famously varied in provenance and background.Does Simplicius use separate individual works for his sources, or are somedependent on or derived from others? In other words, did he consult all theworks cited, or did he also have indirect access using compilations orreports in intermediaries? For instance, in the commentary on the De


119

anima, he combines Plutarch and Alexander on several occasions.46 Hereit is likely, as Blumenthal has pointed out, that he used the commentariesof both, since we know that several commentators (Philoponus,Stephanus) still had access to Alexander’s commentary on De anima.Blumenthal goes on to claim that ‘the Neoplatonist commentators con-fronted Alexander on matters where differences could hardly fail toarise’.47

At this stage we should remind ourselves of a point made earlier aboutthe lack of an official ‘mission statement’ on sources in the Physics com-mentary: nowhere does Simplicius state explicitly what the provenance isor what the main approach will be. As stated in the introductory pages,this is in stark contrast to the commentary on the Categories, whereSimplicius opens his account with a statement of the purpose and methodof the work (in Cat. 2.23-32, above §1.2.1). It is assumed that the Catego-ries commentary is of a later date, and Hoffmann rightfully poses (butleaves unanswered) the question whether this ‘programmatic’ profile ofthe ideal commentator was in Simplicius’ mind all along, or spelled outonly for this particular work.48 The argument could in fact go both ways:the Categories commentary became the first in a planned curriculum ofthe Platonists.49 So even if it is probably not the first to have been written,once it was written, it would be a suitable place to include such a program-matic statement. On the other hand, if written earlier, the commentsabout the ideal commentator would be taken as understood and thusredundant in later parts of the ‘syllabus’.

A second point to be noted was made recently by Silvia Fazzo.50 Com-mentaries which are part of such a self-conscious tradition tend to havemany layers which may accrue onto a stock of basic comments. Thisprocess of accrual will not go on indefinitely, since overlaps with, andrejections of, previous positions may lead to obliteration of early commen-taries (partial or whole). Significantly, in Simplicius the genre does notseem to have reached its ‘saturation point’ yet: Simplicius seems deter-mined to give a comprehensive synthesis of all significant views, with anequally laudable attempt to give many of them a hearing.

In sum, we have seen how Alexander is at the forefront of Simplicius’mind when constructing his exegesis: he appears at the outset of in Phys.and in DC as an important and distinct voice, setting the agenda for thediscussion, though not necessarily determining its outcome. His proposalsget serious attention but are evaluated against later commentators, andcan thus be criticised and even rejected. This method of offering differentperspectives on the base text would seem fitting for an educational contextor purpose. The extant works of Alexander allow us some insight into hisusefulness for someone looking for convenient and helpful insights, par-ticularly if such insights could be used in an educational programme orsyllabus. Alexander was part of the Platonist exegetical discourse fromPlotinus onwards and is found in several commentators after him up to


120

Simplicius, who in turn seems to continue this pattern without question-ing it. His impartiality, lemmata format and elaborate attention to detailmade him a very suitable author to be exploited for Simplicius’ purposes.It is becoming more and more likely that an educational objective wasincluded among these. Alexander can therefore certainly be considered apioneer in these aspects of commentary.

4.3 Simplicius’ use of AlexanderThis section offers a typology of usages to illustrate some of the charac-teristics of the influence of Alexander. My account so far suggests thatAlexander’s influence is considerable, in particular when it comes to theformat and doctrinal evaluation of the Aristotelian doctrines. Syrianushad taken up this approach in his commentaries, so Simplicius’ attitudecan possibly be seen as conforming to the newly established conventionwithin the Platonist school. Yet such conformism may not sufficientlyexplain his interest in Alexander. We need not over-emphasise the choiceof the lemmata format, one among several in the Platonist school, whichcan hardly look very different once chosen. The majority of his referencesto Alexander concern points where Simplicius shows agreement with him.Alexander’s commentaries were probably the most detailed and authori-tative discussions of Aristotle to be found before Plotinus. Even Plotinusmust have seen that when he decided to make use of him in his teaching.So in considering the question how pervasive Alexander’s influence is –perhaps as a kind of prototype for Simplicius’ commentaries – it is my primaryobjective here to establish what Simplicius’ main reasons might be forincorporating Alexander’s comments on such a grand scale. With his nameappearing on practically every other page and quotations from him abound-ing, one would expect this to inform us about his importance in the eyes ofSimplicius. But can we be more precise in determining what exactly bringsSimplicius to consult Alexander all the way through his commentaries?

The broader characteristics of Alexander’s commentaries sketchedabove (§4.2) would easily assist anyone seeking accurate and comprehen-sive clarification of Aristotle’s compact and complicated theories. So hisworks provide sufficient reason for use in learned and didactic dis-courses.51 One possible implication is that none of the interveningcommentators up to Simplicius were as helpful as Alexander in as manyways as he was. It thus becomes of interest to consider how Simpliciuspositions Alexander in comparison to other authors. On occasion hemakes a broader distinction between Alexander on the one hand andthe other commentators on the other. He also appeals to Alexander ashe defends the reading of a definition ‘against some’ (in Phys. 437.11),especially when Alexander clearly agrees with his own position (ibid.31). It is striking that Eudemus and Porphyry often appear in thevicinity of Alexander quotations.


121

So let us turn to Simplicius’ use of quotations attributed to Alexander.Quotation as a frequent and deliberate tool, if handled appropriately, mustbe based on a clear understanding of the quoted text as an independentand distinct entity. Simplicius will distinguish clearly between the text ofthe source under discussion (e.g. lexis) and the exegetical notes. Forinstance, in the case of Alexander he is very aware of the author’s ownpreoccupations and how these affect his interpretations. At in Phys.77.9-10, in an uncharacteristically general statement, Simplicius statesreproachfully ‘that Alexander’s own preoccupations caused him to opposethose who said being is one’.52 One senses a degree of disappointment, butalso a great understanding of the way in which authors come to see thingsthe way they do. On other occasions Simplicius is half-apologetic about hiscritical comments against Alexander (see quoted text below, p. 126).

Frequency and style of quotation are not the only useful criteria to usein tackling this issue. To sharpen up the assessment we should alsoconsider context, viewpoint and manner of expression. Context concernsSimplicius’ comments in relation to the nature and/or importance of theargument at issue, while his viewpoint adds a further dimension, inparticular whether agreement or disagreement is expressed. Manner ofexpression refers to exegetical terminology and its significance. Combinedwith knowledge of the clustering of sources (above) these points willcontribute to our understanding of the ways in which the selection andplacement of his predecessors’ comments shape his own commentary. Thisapproach can illustrate how this type of analysis can have a philosophicalpay-off, because together these points retrace the structural features ofcomposition as well as the doctrinal positioning of our commentator.

So far I have outlined the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the approach and we shallsee some examples presently. But first I would like to revisit the questionregarding the purpose of such manoeuvres: is Simplicius’ work a purelyscholarly product written in isolation and real or ‘virtual’ exile or is it apedagogical document produced to be used in teaching? The first option(the work was written in isolation) would have to make sense of thehistorical events which indicate that Simplicius, after leaving Athens in531-2 CE and the Persian court not long after that, started writing hiscommentaries around or after 533 CE in a location not known to us.53 Thesecond option (educational context) would rest on an argument fromanalogy (of some sort54) in which it is assumed that these commentaries,just as most other Neoplatonic writings, originate in the school curricu-lum. I have already suggested elsewhere that this does not seem to holdunconditionally for Simplicius.55 Since the first option (isolated scholarlywork) has little chance to progress further unless new evidence emergesor yet another interpretation of the available evidence, I will explore thesecond option by trying to establish how Simplicius’ methodology regard-ing the evidence for Alexander might contribute to our assessment of thevexed question in what kind of context the work might have arisen.


122

The Alexander passages offer a clear opportunity to tackle the question,because their high number makes them a statistically significant body ofevidence; moreover, the majority represents direct quotations. The differ-ent ways in which quotations are presented and qualified is also ofinterest. As with Eudemus, Simplicius is fond of adverbial tags to qualifya statement he quotes (saphôs, kalôs), and makes a point of emphasisinghe is giving the exact words of his source. He may also qualify the mode ofexposition, as for instance at in Phys. 234.25-9 when he adds comments onthe destruction of composites in nature, but maintains that form does notget destroyed, since it is a principle deemed indestructible (25), concludingat 29: ‘this seems to have been said by Alexander in the manner of naturalscience (physikôs)’.

As Alexander appears in places where one does not always expect him,one may well ask what brings Simplicius to insert a reference to, orquotation of, Alexander. The possible answers seem limited here: (1) as anargument from authority: Alexander is brought in to support the view atissue; (2) to give a helpful clarification; (3) to express disagreement: to berefuted (e.g. in Phys. 211.20ff.). Apart from such purposeful usages anadditional consideration can be brought in to explain certain incidentaloccurrences mostly as in (2) above: the Alexander material could have beenpresent in the source Simplicius draws on. We know that Alexander wasused widely by earlier Platonists: Plotinus, Porphyry and Ammonius wereamong the earliest ‘commentators’ to adopt Alexander’s comments andstyle of lemmatic commentary.56 Syrianus continued this tradition, andO’Meara has persuasively shown that Syrianus relied quite heavily onAlexander in his comments on the Metaphysics, so much so that his owncommentary did not cover the whole of Aristotle’s work but was composedas a complementary piece: ‘for a Platonist, a complete new commentary onAristotle’s Metaphysics is not needed: for parts of the work Alexander’scommentary suffices’.57 This further underlines Alexander’s influence, butdoes not offer a solution for Simplicius, whose approach can hardly becalled ‘complementary’. Should we therefore assume, by analogy, thatAlexander’s commentary on the Physics was not considered sufficient? Itseems unlikely, but to provide a more secure answer to such a question wewill need to have another look at some passages to get a more empiricalgrasp of Simplicius’ use of Alexander.

In what follows I give a selective presentation of preliminary resultsbased on a comprehensive examination of the passages mentioningAlexander arranged by types. There is a risk of over-simplification, butthat holds for any typology. Intended as a practical solution to come togrips with a huge body of evidence, appropriate selection of repre-sentative types can still offer a solid basis for a qualitative assessment.I shall discuss four types of usage, each illustrated by some exampleswhich I consider representative.58


123

(1) Alexander provides a helpful exegesis of Aristotle.

This type of usage entails agreement and shows Simplicius looking forenlightenment from his predecessor-colleague in understanding or clari-fying Aristotle’s arguments. There may be some rhetoric involved, in thatlater commentators will not always claim a clarification as their own, butoften the consultation of an authority (see also next point) is genuine andwill lead to further discussion of possibilities and textual details. We sawa similar use in the case of Eudemus’ clarifications (§3.2.2), and it is ofparticular interest to note that Eudemus and Alexander actually occurclose together a considerable number of times, with Alexander making useof and building on Eudemus’ interpretations (more on this point below).Clearly Simplicius held both in high esteem, the former as a first clear caseof full-blown exegesis, the latter as a contemporary (hence privileged)source for Aristotle’s ideas.

One or two passages may illustrate the typical case. At in Phys. 434.36-7 the position of Aristotle is shored up with Alexander’s comments, whichare brought in unreservedly: ‘Now he [= Aristotle] wishes to provide clearexamples of things reciprocally changed in initiating it and at the sametime, as Alexander says, to separate off the divine body from beingreciprocally changed and affected.’ Alexander seems to extend the clarifi-cation here by giving ‘clear evidence’ (tekmêria enargê) and a quotationfollows introduced with parathesthai (on which see above §1.2.3). Suchbrief interjections (‘as Alexander says’) are frequent and often signalagreement. Note that Eudemus, who is called ‘lover of truth’ a number oftimes (e.g. 1024.6), is often preferred to Alexander (see §3.2).

Many more examples of this use of Alexander could be provided, inwhich he helps to clarify the point (e.g. 416.27-31; 437.10; 440.34 includesexamples etc.), gives support for a specific interpretation (e.g. 434.36;443.18f.; 467.1; 472.36 homologei; 937.25ff.), or is the jumping-off point fora comment (e.g. 396.20; 457.13 etc.). On occasion rejection also occurs (e.g.449.4ff.) and Alexander may be used in the summing up of an argument(e.g. 469.10). Alexander is also represented as solving puzzles (lusin têsaporias, lusai phêsi), quite often those which he himself has raised (tithêsi:e.g. in Phys. 71.5, 83.19, 84.22 etc.; in DC 22.18, 41.7, 51.5, 274.23, 342.20etc.). But it would be pointless to list all cases here (but see Appendix II.Band §6.3): clearly Alexander is made to serve several purposes, whichshows his versatility as a meticulous commentator and that of Simplicius.Some significant cases of disagreement will be revisited below.

(2) Alexander is brought in to back up Simplicius’ argument and/or tocounter the view(s) of others.

This type, again based on agreement, resembles an argument from author-ity, in that Alexander’s view is invoked explicitly for confirmation and/or


124

is placed in opposition to that of ‘others’.59 One can find the use of the verbakouein, ‘listen to’, in such cases, indicating how Simplicius encourages hisaudience/readers to take note of Alexander’s comments (e.g. in DC 168.17,272.21). The verb does not warrant the inference that the commentarieswere in fact used in teaching, because frequently akouein can be taken tomean ‘read’ under certain circumstances, as noted in §1.2.3. A goodexample of using a position for ‘backing up’ one’s own view is, e.g., in Phys.530.16-23. A case of countering views of others with the help of Alexander’sposition is found at 521.10 where he brings an objection against a hypo-thetical reasoning of some ‘ancient thinkers’ (tôn palaiôn) who take as acommon assumption what is only assumed by corporealists. An excep-tional case, somewhere in between the previous two examples, can befound at 1358.39-40 against Philoponus. Here Simplicius defends Alexan-der against an attack by ‘the Grammarian’ (his label for Philoponus, line39), impugning him with misunderstanding Alexander:60

the Grammarian [i.e. Philoponus] should have noticed that Alexander didnot here investigate how the finite fixed sphere is eternal, but how, beingfinite, it possesses an infinite power of causing motion. (in Phys. 1358.39-40,tr. McKirahan 2000)

In this case his archrival Philoponus (c. 490-570 CE) is criticised formisinterpreting Alexander. As so often, Simplicius’ argument leans onAlexander’s view to counter the view(s) of others.61 This point, based onagreement, can be classed as an argument from authority. The commentagainst Philoponus is part of a broader polemic, a well-worn part ofexegesis (to which I shall return in Chapter 6). Here the strategy is todeclare the opponent an inferior exegete. As always a correct under-standing of a text is the basis for offering further clarifications.

(3) Alexander’s view is criticised and/or rejected, but quoted anyway.

At the start of this chapter I indicated that Simplicius is seen to providequotations in a considerable number of cases, where disagreement withAlexander is expressed.62 I have already mentioned that the critical assess-ment of those who can still be seen as his main authorities on Aristotle isnot unexpected. Urmson has summed up the attitude quite nicely: ‘Despitemodern opinion, the later Neoplatonists were critical of and quietly irrev-erent towards their authorities’.63 This observation raises the questionwhy he would take the trouble to quote a view extensively when he is aboutto reject it? After all, it had been a long-established practice in philosophi-cal debate to be economical with the truth: a good reason for suppressingevidence is that it would allow a critic to present a convincing refutationof an opponent. Simplicius has been accused of such an approach regard-ing Alexander on the basis of recently found marginalia, and in this case


125

that verdict seems justified.64 The findings here, however, can qualify thatassessment, or curb its generalising force. According to modern standardsthe quoting of views to be dismissed has merit. Better still is the evidencethat Simplicius himself adhered to rules of ‘fair play’ in the scholarlycommunity: when he stated that he would quote extensively from Phi-loponus, he did so to ensure that readers would not judge him to be makingthings up (in Phys. 1333.33; similar comment on Empedocles in DC141.1-6).

In addition, it seems plausible to put this attitude down to respect forAlexander’s views: if he is disagreeing in roughly a quarter of the cases inwhich he mentions him (i.e. he agrees more often than not), and if we takeinto account how much Alexander’s presence dominates the discussions inthe commentaries, that seems to be a reasonable inference. If so, we candeduce that Simplicius does not seem to have a ‘principle of economy’, thatis, a rule which might have induced him to keep references to views hedisagrees with very brief, hence to be dismissive only. Instead he seems toprefer to elaborate on such passages, indicating what is wrong withAlexander’s view. It is at these moments that he presents such ‘redundant’quotations. One good example of this type is found at in Phys. 449.6ff.65 Thequotation from Alexander runs for several lines and Simplicius squarelycontradicts it (449.11-12: ‘I, however, believe it to be �’ using the emphaticnomizô, not the habitual oimai). What is the issue here? Alexander isdiscussing change and its actualisation from the example of teaching andlearning, considered by some to be the same thing (447.11-13). Against thishe is reported to have brought some objections, pointing out absurditiesresulting from that view. Simplicius runs through this discussion andAlexander’s individual points, but ends by disagreeing with Alexander,after first quoting the latter’s final point (449.5-17):

Alexander however explains this also in the same way as the previous ones.He says: ‘for if the activity of both is one in regard to substrate it does notfollow at once that teaching and learning is the same; for one thing, the actof learning comes about as one through both of them, but in fact teaching isnot the same as learning’. I, however, believe it is to be said with referenceto agency and affection, both this and ‘different in account’. But what doeshe mean by saying that teaching and learning are even one in substrate? Itis because the act of learning becomes one through both. For the act ofteaching also comes about. In general all of the causes of one thing are notone in substrate, since if so then so are father and mother; but those thingsare one in substrate because the extension is one and the same from [sic] theagent in the affected. (tr. Urmson 2002)

While Alexander argues on the basis of the substrate’s relation to itsdependent instantiations, Simplicius seems to focus on a different aspect(agency and affection) and the general viewpoint on the relationshipbetween causes and substrate. The point they differ on, then, relates to the


126

way in which different causes of actualisation lead to one result and theimplication such a perspective has for the nature of the process of change.66

The manner of expressing criticism is of particular interest here. Sim-plicius’ respectful tone and muted language suggests that he is not keento attack Alexander openly, but is carefully positioning himself by way ofexpressing surprise (thaumaston), disbelief, and seemingly tentative al-ternatives (the use of mêpote ‘maybe’ is a marker for his own view). Inthose cases in which he does confront Alexander more directly, disagree-ment is strong and leaves little room for manoeuvre. This aspect of hiscritique, as well as several unusually long quotations from Alexander, willbe revisited in §6.3, where I consider the role of polemic in the exegeticalstrategies of the commentaries. It constitutes a significant contrast to thecritique of Philoponus.

(4) Alexander is quoted/mentioned in connection with a variant in themanuscript tradition.67

Although discussion of textual variants can happen within any of the threecategories mentioned above, I have added this as a distinct class ofpassages because it provides us with detailed information on the philologi-cal method of the commentators and thus deserves separate treatment.Philological moves are of course not a primary objective of his works, butSimplicius does discuss such issues on many occasions. This may includepunctuation (399.9 Porphyry rejecting Alexander’s; 399.19; 400.1), movingwords (407.27), grammar (400.1), bracketing of words (e.g. 459.4-5 etc.)and taking variant manuscripts into account – in particular those markedby the keyword ‘copies’ (antigraphoi).68 An intriguing case of a grammati-cal argument is found at in Phys. 526.16 where active and passive verbforms are discussed and Alexander is accused of changing the meaning(metagraphei episkelesteron ‘changes <the meaning> awkwardly’).

When Simplicius is evaluating manuscript variants Alexander’s namecrops up frequently.69 A few of these comments on variant readings give usan interesting glimpse of the scholarly habits of the commentators. Dis-cussion of several opinions on a textual problem can involve comparativeanalysis (hermêneia 400.1 with quotation, cf. 399.19) and a decision tofollow Alexander against Porphyry and Themistius (on the issues outlinedin §1.2.2: manuscripts, punctuation, grammar, word analysis). Such casesraise questions about how these different authorities were used: certainclusters of names suggest that Simplicius was using thematic note-takingwhich allowed him to quote these commentators on specific issues: at 422.22,25 a quotation introduces a dispute on manuscripts between Aspasius andThemistius on the one hand, and Alexander and Porphyry on the other; at728.5 we find ‘Porphyry and Themistius’. This suggests that Simpliciusevaluates their views on a case-by-case basis without prejudice as to whoseauthority might decide the issue without further analysis.


127

At one point Simplicius talks about a marginal note which he suspectsmay have migrated into the text (in Phys. 450.32-3):

for Aristotle is manifestly accepting it as the third definition of change, evenif the text (lexis) added in the book as from a marginal note (hôs apoparagraphês) seems to be muddled.70

Clearly the philosopher Simplicius is perfectly capable of the kind oftechnical textual analysis in the service of interpretation that had beencommon among grammarians and philosophers alike, illustrating thecontinuous importance of scholarship.71 He follows Alexander and othersin this, if often only for the practical reason that his pursuit of comprehen-sive coverage creates these potential conflicts between the versions avail-able to him. Thus he regularly reports different readings in Alexander,Porphyry and Themistius ‘and the rest’ (e.g. in Phys. 414.15-18).72 Accord-ing to Simplicius Alexander is often the better informed scholar in theevidence and explanation he offers (436.19 graphên, exêgeitai) or for givinga clearer reading (lexin, saphestera). This judgment is also found at 443.10,where Alexander’s reading (anagignôskein) is considered clearer and at748.21 where he interprets (akouei) the reading (graphê) better thanothers. On lexical and stylistic issues he may use word analysis, but theredoes not seem to be a consistent pattern, although attention for the lexisis mentioned regularly.

In the context of quotation Simplicius quite often proffers externalevidence from other texts, Plato’s being the most obvious (e.g. Parmenidesat 420.13; Sophistes at 430.12). Within the set order for reading the worksunder the guidance of a master (sunanagnôsis) in Platonist curriculum, ahierarchy of the Platonic dialogues arose which clarified their relevancefor particular issues. The Parmenides is certainly among the much ad-mired dialogues, as was Sophistes.

The high frequency of Alexander’s views (in most cases clearly namedreferences) is the kind of information that can be exploited for differentpurposes. A combination of these aspects can be most usefully analysed inthose sections in which Simplicius is seen to disagree rather strongly withthe Peripatetic commentator. If we highlight the ratio of the number oftimes Simplicius disagrees with Alexander in relation to the referencesand quotations in which agreement is stated or implied, the followingpreliminary statistics can be presented, which are based on roughly halfof the references by Simplicius to Alexander in the commentary on Physics(c. 350 occurrences from books 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8.6-10). A survey of thesereferences (including mention of the name only) reveals that in 104passages Simplicius expresses disagreement (c. 30%), while in 51 of themhe gives direct quotations (c. 15%).73 There are some telling statistics here,showing that Simplicius is engaged in an extended dialogue with Alexan-der and constantly assessing on which points he agrees or disagrees. A


128

further significant outcome is produced when we chart these statisticsagainst two other criteria, i.e. diffusion of references across the work andauthor groupings. I take up this issue now, returning to some longerquotations in §6.3.

4.4 Disagreeing with AlexanderDisagreement is a real litmus test for passages of significance: wheneverSimplicius disagrees, it underlines his independence of mind and willing-ness to challenge authority. It may also indicate his more personal engage-ment with the issue discussed. As indicated in the typology presentedabove, once Simplicius gets stuck into interpreting the views of others, hefeels free to express agreement or disagreement. Even within the multitudeof ‘voices’ of the commentator tradition in his works, he makes his ownheard consistently, though his formulations of them might be mistaken forrather diffident comments. Obvious moments of personal comment arethose in which he introduces the first person singular to bring in objections(pros touton rhêteon oimai) or reinforce an observation, in expressionssuch as ‘(as) I believe’ ((hôs) oimai, in DC 11.2, 23.16, 39.20 etc.; in Phys.2.16), ‘it seems to me’ ([e]moi dokei, e.g. in Phys. 110.23, 126.3).74 These areoften not very strong expressions of dissent, as they can look like some-what hesitant suggestions of an alternative, but the cumulative effect ofthese moments of reflection provides considerable evidence of resolve toassess the available material critically.

Simplicius’ use of ‘maybe’ (mêpote) when introducing a comment seemsless straightforward. It is not until one collects these examples moresystematically that one realises, again, that the cumulative force of theevidence undercuts the superficial reading of ‘maybe’ as a sign of doubt ordiffidence: it is in fact a persistent signal for subtle subversion. Upon closerinvestigation disagreement occurs far more often than one might suspect.Some cases consider minute details of spelling, grammar or glosses.Others concern details of doctrine, in which Alexander is accused ofmisreading Aristotle. Not all cases are part of Simplicius’ strategy toharmonise Aristotle with Plato (indicated when relevant). I have alsofound a range of other expressions which, although not all of a technicalnature, do show how he carefully evaluates and makes tentative sugges-tions in case he thinks there is room for improvement. The followingexamples will illustrate Simplicius’ interest in, and even respect for,Alexander, which can in itself be inferred from the frequent references tohis views and the serious engagement with them. An even clearer testi-mony is his comment at in DC 301.19-21 (tr. Hankinson 2004) after a longexposition on the destructibility of the world (see below and §6.3), in whichAlexander is discussed extensively and Simplicius evaluates him approv-ingly, but also critically. He ends by saying:


129

I have said these things against Alexander for, while I respect the man andwish him well, I think that honouring the truth the more is dear to him too.Aristotle, as I said, in setting out to refute the apparent sense of argumentsif it conflicts with the truth �

Here he not only makes a deft allusion to the famous comment Aristotlemade about his relation to Plato and the truth (EN 1096a14-17),75 but alsorefers to the method of exegesis that he uses regarding the apparentmeaning of arguments, implying that the real meaning can be made clearafter appropriate interpretive reading. It is a perfect illustration of themethod and attitude of Simplicius in dealing with Alexander. Note, how-ever, that his claim that Alexander is misinterpreting Aristotle, and thatAristotle interprets Plato in the same way as Simplicius himself is quitemisleading.

A range of small issues illustrates the level of detail Simplicius gets intoin his treatment of Alexander’s views. While he often expresses modest orpartial disagreement (e.g. at 446.13 with a quotation), stronger disagree-ment is not impossible. For instance, at 697.17-23 Alexander is said toknow another reading of the text, but Simplicius disagrees with it, attack-ing his poor sense of judgment. As we saw above and in Chapter 2, he mayon occasion disagree with Alexander on a variant reading (734.12, graphê),the wording of which is reported (rhêsis, pheretai) from other sources.Extensive referencing to three positions on one page, including a quota-tion, shows Alexander in agreement with the view that an example ofmathematical objects is not a distinctive feature (526.16 homologei). Re-jection of Alexander’s views is sometimes implied by the verb paraiteomai‘decline, refuse, deprecate’.76

Two longer passages may illustrate in more detail how Simpliciustreats Alexander’s text. At in DC 297.1-301.25 a quotation and discussionof a long Alexander passage (297.10-98.19, some 40 lines) occurs, in whichSimplicius also provides an interesting justification for the length of thequotation:

I have quoted all of this from Alexander so that those who encounter (toisenteuxomenois) both it and what I am about to say [may arrive] at a judgment(eis epikrisin). So, since the bulk of what he said is directed towards [showingthat] Plato said the world was generated not in the sense of its having itsbeing in becoming, but rather in the sense of its having come to be from atemporal beginning, it suffices, I think, to quote a single passage from Plato,parts of which Alexander himself also quoted. (298.20-6; tr. Hankinson2006)77

What is striking here is, first, that Simplicius seems to say that he wantsto offer the reader an opportunity to make up his own mind by offering textand comment as if this were a way of presenting evidence and assessmentin a balanced and ‘objective’ way. But there is more: he acknowledges that


130

Alexander is making use of Plato’s text and proceeds to adduce it himselfin order to correct Alexander’s interpretation. Over the next two pages heelaborates on the issue of the creation of the world and how Plato intendedit to be understood, while questioning Alexander’s view. At 299.4ff. hequeries some of Alexander’s suggestions, in particular accusing him of notmaking the proper distinction between being and coming to be (299.13-14),trying to move away from the temporal beginning that Alexander sees inPlato’s account (299.15-16). But note that Simplicius remains respectfuland, rather than squarely contradicting Alexander, continues to detail theparticular points that he does not agree with, offering his own view as thepreferred one.78

A passage of similar tone can be found at in DC 377.20-34 in whichSimplicius takes Alexander to task for his interpretation of Plato. Heretoo Simplicius makes sure to clarify his long quotation, justifying hisapproach as one which distinguishes between superficial and carefulreading (25-32):

Contesting Plato frivolously in a way, he tries not only, as Aristotle alsodoes, to refute the surface only import (to phainomenon monon) of whatPlato says, taking simpler <people> into consideration, but he also at-tacks the ideas of the divine Plato and tries to draw consequences fromwhat Plato says, frequently not even attending to the surface import.Consequently I, setting out the truth, which is dear to god and to Aris-totle, will here try to do a careful investigation, putting forward thethings which Alexander says are the opinions of Plato about the motionof the soul. I do this because of those who deal with his words in a moresuperficial way and dare to take from them in a way which is hostile tothe views of Plato, which is the same as to say hostile to the views ofAristotle and to divine truth. (tr. Mueller 2004)

Here Alexander is pitted against the two heroes of late Platonism, Platoand Aristotle, by the suggestion that Alexander’s interpretation is mis-guided because it is superficial. Yet this distinction between surface anddeeper meaning leads to the remarkable result that Simplicius criticisesAlexander for not accepting the deeper meaning, implying that Aristotledoes so without mentioning Plato in this context.

Thus Alexander’s position is undeniably one of major importance andinfluence in a range of aspects relevant to our study of Simplicius’ meth-odology. While the general order of progression depends clearly onAristotle’s text, Alexander’s comments seem to guide the exegesis of thattext. He can therefore be called the backbone of the exegetical narrative inSimplicius, at least for the in Phys. and in DC. This does not mean, as hasbeen argued above, that Alexander’s individual interpretations were sim-ply accepted and taken over: Simplicius exhibits a critical attitude,tempered by a sense of respect.


131

4.5 The ghost in the machine and themaking of commentary

What can we say, on the basis of this selective survey of passages,regarding the role of Alexander in Simplicius? We have seen that the useof Alexander in the exegesis of Aristotle was not really Simplicius’ idea.From Plotinus onwards he appears frequently in the works of late Platon-ists: Porphyry, Syrianus, Proclus and others rely on him for guidance anddebate. This explains at least in part how his format of a running commen-tary by lemmata came to be adopted by most later commentators. How-ever, such precedents do not explain why Alexander is such a dominantforce in Simplicius’ commentaries, which is why this point needed furtherclarification, especially the two problems highlighted: why does he keepquoting material he disagrees with and why does he phrase his criticismin such a respectful way?

As to the earlier commentary tradition there can be no doubt thatAlexander is hugely influential in a number of ways. Simplicius hasconstant recourse to the Alexander commentary, quotes him frequently forhelp (in clarifying Aristotle), or support (in shoring up his own position orcountering that of others), thus making it clear that Alexander is a goodbasis to start from and elaborate upon. But we also saw that he expressesdisagreement in a fair number of cases: these range from strong disagree-ment (rejection) to offering alternatives and improvements on interpretivepositions as well as textual problems.79 The balancing act of following anauthority and staying master of one’s own judgment is well played out inthis case. We must conclude that Alexander’s importance is due to thisestablished position, but also to the view that if Aristotle can be taken inas a preparation for Plato, his ‘most reliable and faithful exegete’ can too.That Simplicius regarded this connection as an uncontroversial lineage ismost clearly expressed in his comment on the question whether it is betterfor the souls of gods to be apart from bodies (in DC 378.20-2): ‘These werenot only Plato’s views, but also those of that most genuine of the disciplesof Plato, Aristotle, and of that most careful of Aristotle’s partisans, Alex-ander.’ The text here in fact suggests that what they agree on is the claimthat the souls of gods will never be apart from their eternal bodies (in thecase of Aristotle and Alexander, this will apply to the sphere-souls).80

Alexander’s overall perspective on Aristotle as presenting a coherentphilosophical system will have been much to the taste of Simplicius, as toowas probably Alexander’s quite objective stance, exemplified in his criti-cisms of Aristotle on some central positions (soul, heaven, intellect). Theseand other traits are good reasons to believe that Simplicius regardedAlexander as coming quite close to the ideal commentator he had outlinedin his commentary on the Categories. At the same time Simplicius’ respect-ful approach in both agreeing and disagreeing with Alexander is the resultof the established position of the Peripatetic commentator: he could not be


132

ignored and any criticism against him required properly presented andvalid arguments. It goes without saying that ‘properly presented’ and‘valid’ were not neutral standards, but had to meet Neoplatonic criteria.

These points raise the question how Simplicius saw his own contribu-tion to the exegesis of the Physics, since that commentary has absorbedand assimilated an abundance of earlier commentators (in particularEudemus, Alexander, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Porphyry and Damascius),whether positively in suggesting a line of interpretation or negatively inevoking criticism and rejection of particular positions. Moreover, in thePhysics commentary he has not presented us with the ‘topos of modesty’as he did in the Categories commentary.81 In the latter he insists onpositioning himself explicitly vis-à-vis the existing commentaries, statingthat Iamblichus is his ‘source of inspiration’ and that he offers only ‘a smallnumber of additions of his own’.82 He also claims that Iamblichus followedPorphyry’s commentary very closely (2.11), which dealt with ‘all tradi-tional aporiai raised up to his date, notably those of Lucius andNicostratus’.

In other words, Simplicius places himself very explicitly within thistradition, suggesting that his commentary is a mere synthesis of all hislearned predecessor-commentators from the second to the fifth century CEwith little input on his part. This stance has proved to be a conceit whichcannot be taken at face value. Yet it illustrates neatly that on the surfacethere was no ambition for innovation and originality, or to put it moreaccurately, Simplicius had no interest in presenting himself as offering anynew ideas – thus continuing the mode of presentation already taken byPlotinus in his Enneads (5.1.8). As a result his works are multi-layereddocuments with certain methodological and philosophical tensions.

We should also reflect on the nature of commentary as a response to anauthority.83 Noting down one’s thoughts in response to an authoritativetreatise may seem ‘parasitic’ to us, but it was a justified and well-estab-lished way of philosophising in the late Platonic school. The idea that onecan contribute to the understanding of a philosophical work by building onauthoritative explications of others seems unproblematic to Simpliciusand his colleagues. We are dealing with an unusual philosophical andcultural attitude, in which originality is not the focus: even Plotinus wasadamant that he was not creating anything new – although, as Porphyrywas aware (and we can observe), his contribution is actually very originalin many ways. The approach to Aristotle and Plato was to clarify, exploreand interpret their work.84 But they regarded the commentary as a legiti-mate way of bringing out what Plato actually thought.

Yet Simplicius’ elaborate running commentaries are different in at leastthree ways: the detailed and exhaustive treatment of the text, the gener-ous attitude to earlier exegetes (Platonists and others), and a ‘catholic’interpretation of Greek philosophy. The first point may be related to hisdecision to take Alexander as his main guide, as we have seen in this


133

chapter, but, as I shall argue in the following chapters, he also seems to beon a mission to leave future generations with a complete set of tools to readthe Aristotelian corpus in the correct light. The second point fits both thePlatonist tradition of commentary and the Aristotelian methodology ofconducting philosophical investigations: Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syri-anus had already espoused the view that the truth had been discovered inancient times, there was therefore no need for originality, but for theproper skills to unearth it from the authoritative writings available (Chap-ter 5); Aristotle had advocated the view that scientific progress is a jointventure so that help was at hand from earlier views if properly analysed(Chapter 3 and Baltussen 2000). The third point is possibly the mostdifficult one, but I suggest that it must be related to the desperatesituation Simplicius found himself in as one of the remaining Platonistswho were barred from teaching and thus put in a position that came tosymbolise the status of pagan theology and philosophy – isolated andthreatened with extinction – and the main weakness of the doctrinalstance of Greek philosophy, disagreement.

A word must be said on the potential pay-off of the overall analysispresented here: apart from insight into the importance and magnitude ofAlexander’s role in the later commentators tradition, I hope to have shownthat his influence is pervasive in the format, focus and direction of Sim-plicius’ commentaries on Physics and on On the heavens. Although manyof Alexander’s comments are a positive influence, in that they form thebasis for Simplicius’ elaborations and comments, a considerable percent-age of his interpretations were questioned or rejected by Simplicius. Thispattern puts into sharper focus how Simplicius is carefully workingthrough issues and establishing his own interpretation of the texts. Goingup against an authority established over three centuries was not an easything to do, which is most likely the reason why Simplicius expresseshimself so cautiously. Philosophically his objections make sense from theperspective of keeping Aristotle consistent and in harmony with Plato. Wehave also seen that Alexander used a wide range of tools in workingthrough the Aristotelian text, showing the way in textual analysis at everylevel. Whether it concerned punctuation, grammar, textual variants orphilosophical doctrine, all are accepted parts of the exegetical method.

These preliminary results on Alexander and his role in the Simpliciancommentaries, based on a broad set of criteria and parameters as well asthe first results of a rather large sample of evidence, leave considerableroom for further inquiry. Alexander’s role will in fact require a much fullerinvestigation, and can also be usefully studied for his role in other writers,in particular Philoponus. What is clear is that Alexander’s work was seenas authoritative and that Simplicius has made every effort to extend hiswork by incorporating much of Alexander’s helpful exegesis into his own,but also to challenge him on those points which stand in the way ofharmonising Plato and Aristotle. He is tacitly assuming that Alexander


134

the Peripatetic can be used for the exegesis of Aristotle within the newframework of late Platonism – another sign that his review of Greekphilosophy is intended to be comprehensive. In short, Alexander appearsto be both his benchmark in commentary composition and his beacon innavigating the Aristotelian text. To call Alexander a ghostwriter would bean exaggeration, but his dominant role in Simplicius’ works appositelyhonours him in his role as a pioneer and prototype of philosophicalcommentary.


135

5

Platonist Commentators:Sources and Inspiration

It occurred to me, indeed, both to pose this puzzle in this way and to solve it,since I have found it in none of the commentators � (in Phys. 946.24-6, tr.Konstan 1989)

Simplicius’ Platonist predecessors working in the commentary traditionwere of considerable importance in forging the Platonist exegetical strate-gies to explicate doctrine. Their modes of exegesis varied in response tonew circumstances while also imposing personal preferences regardingthe focus, tools and direction of their interpretation of Plato’s and Aris-totle’s philosophical thought. The opening lines of Simplicius’ Categoriescommentary reveal the extent of work on Aristotle up to his own day:

Many authors have set forth many speculations on Aristotle’s book ofCategories. This is not only because it is the prologue to the whole ofphilosophy (since it is the beginning of the study of logic, and logic, in turn,is rightly taken up prior to the whole of philosophy), but also because theCategories is, in a sense, about the first principles (arkhai), as we shall see,in our discussion of the goal (skopos). (tr. Chase 2003)

Simplicius goes on to give a broad characterisation of the different com-mentators he knows about, indicating their actual style and individualfocus (on lexis, concepts, or problems) in their comments on this work. Thisuseful typology especially highlights Porphyry (2.6-8) and Iamblichus(2.9ff., 3.2) for their valuable contributions in solving problems. In so faras these earlier exegetes play a significant role in Simplicius’ workingmethod they are worth discussing for our present purpose. Our review ofhis treatment of the Presocratics (Chapter 2) as ‘Platonists’ avant la lettre,of the early Peripatetics as important figures paving the way for commen-tary (Chapter 3), and of the pioneering role of the Peripatetic commentatorAlexander as determining the format and technique of the genre (Chapter4), were the stepping stones to a proper understanding of the full-blowncommentary style that developed after Plotinus. Here we need a narrowperspective which arises mostly from practical considerations: to presenta full background story for the Platonic tradition here would be quiteimpossible, apart from the risk of duplicating a number of very recentstudies.1

Taking the period after Plotinus (250-500 CE) as the decisive stage of

136

this ‘exegetical tradition’ for Simplicius I shall approach this issue fromtwo very specific angles. First, I will consider the presence of otherPlatonist commentators and their role in Simplicius’ argument (‘sources’).The focus will be on the question to what extent Simplicius relies onprevious commentaries in his broad approach, but also how the presenceof an earlier commentator colours individual passages. From my readingsof his works it has become clear that very often interpretive issues come‘under the influence’ of other sources he consults. We saw already in thecase of Alexander how his comments determined much of the agenda anddirection of the exegesis, over and above the sequential order of theAristotelian text. With regard to the Platonist predecessors Simplicius’evaluative comments range from acceptance to partial criticism to rejec-tion. In other words, ‘sources’ of this chapter’s title is here used in amethodological sense: they offer ways of exploring the similarities inexegetical strategy and in presentation of argument. The second aspect(‘inspiration’) intends to reflect the doctrinal side of the account. Here Ishall pay attention to Simplicius’ usage of existing accounts and argu-ments and how these become incorporated into his own.

With a topic of such scope I shall have to rely on the judgment of otherseven more than in previous chapters. So in discussing the commentatorsthat Simplicius draws on for his own exegetical activity we can learn moreabout how these earlier examples of exegesis may have influenced his ownworking method. The outcome to the question whether and to what extentSimplicius is at the mercy of his ‘secondary sources’ will assist in drawingup a detailed picture of his exegetical methodology. I am inclined to thinkthat Simplicius is not really at the mercy of his predecessors, but rathermaking good use of available material for the particular agendas hepursues. What will also emerge is that the Middle Platonists had alreadycome up with the majority of exegetical techniques to interpret Plato’s andAristotle’s works, but that the period after Plotinus inaugurated a newphase, in which the overall format of commentary became more fixed,more formal and doctrinally more complex.

Recent scholarship on the Categories commentary can guide us in thisexploration of ‘influences’, since that commentary is the most explicitabout how earlier work is taken up and integrated into the fabric ofSimplicius’ own writing. Although this procedure may not strike us asunusual, it was quite ambitious, leading to an accumulation of materialwhich could stretch anyone’s logistical skills to their limit (see n. 40). YetSimplicius did not shy away from this daunting task, since it served hispurpose of mounting a massive defence of the pagan outlook.

As hinted at above, Simplicius’ introduction to his own commentary onthe Categories – one of eight surviving – reveals the ‘impressive andcomplex history of the commentary tradition’.2 Within a few pages Sim-plicius provides the reader with a history of the exegesis of this work anda justification for his own approach in this work: he clearly wants to make

5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration

137

good use of the existing interpretations and claims to offer little that isnew. It thus well illustrates a typical feature of the Platonist tradition, thecareful study of transmitted commentaries based on important teacher-pupil interactions. The Categories commentary is a thorough and scholarlydiscussion, which shows the richness of the tradition since Porphyry –most likely a major source for the views rehearsed in Simplicius. Althoughwe can see that the argumentative agenda makes his works much morethan summaries, one would be forgiven to think that Simplicius is present-ing something resembling a summa in the medieval sense, that is, acomprehensive account of a subject with a strong focus on the ideas andarguments.3 He was carefully assembling the scholarship on this text andevaluating its usefulness through meticulous scrutiny. This is a credit tohis overall methodology and a constant reminder of his innovative ap-proach in crafting his commentaries.

Simplicius’ claim that he reproduces the views of others rather thancontributing himself might lead the reader to believe that his work isnothing more than doctrinal traditionalism or, worse, scholastic antiquari-anism: Simplicius’ comment might be taken as one of modesty arising fromthe realisation that the existing tradition is being canonised and faithfullyreproduced. This impersonal trait in Platonism, that is, the tendency todiscuss the issues in a traditional and ‘objective’ way without revealingmuch of one’s personal ideas (or feelings) was already present early in thetradition. As Dillon has pointed out in connection with second-centuryPlatonism, ‘it was not the fashion among Platonists of this period � tocompose personal testaments; there is no Platonist equivalent of theMeditations of Marcus Aurelius’.4 There are, however, many individualcontributions to the discussion by Simplicius, as we saw in the case ofAlexander. Traditionalism did not exclude critical judgment: the conceit oflimited originality and of acting mostly as a ‘mere’ conduit for earlier views(in Cat. 2.30-3.4, 11-16) is not borne out by the commentaries’ narrative.

Considered the best introduction to philosophy, the Categories becamethe standard beginning of the curriculum. Simplicius’ introduction (in Cat.3.4-11) outlines his approach in a clear and purposeful way, presenting hisown contribution as quite modest:

My goal (skopos) in making this copy was, in the first place, to obtain,through the act of writing, as accurate a comprehension (katanoêsis) aspossible of what had been said. At the same time, I wished to reduce thisman’s [= Iamblichus] lofty spirit, inaccessible to the common people, until itwas more clear and commensurate [with the common understanding].Thirdly, I also wanted to reduce somewhat the vast multitude of variegatedwritings; not, as the most philosophical Syrianus did, to an absolute mini-mum, but as far as was compatible while leaving out nothing necessary. (tr.Chase 2003)


138

The last point shows that his account is a compressed representation ofthe learned literature, while making the effort to preserve those commentsthat would be helpful in exegesis. As a result of this concern with thepreservation and transmission of valuable insights, his commentaries areinfused with other voices, and in order to establish how this affects thedirection and nature of the argument, the dynamics of adaptation have tobe brought out more clearly. The second and first points show his ambitionto simplify ‘lofty’ thought after he has clarified the ideas to himself. Thatis why it is crucial to appreciate that his work is a scholarly project,because such an appreciation can assist in establishing where Simplicius’voice can be separated out – a key issue for understanding his motivationin his tireless efforts to clarify Aristotle.5 We should note, however, thathis intended audience is not specified here.

On scientific issues Simplicius thinks that advances are being made(e.g. in Phys. 625.2, 795.33-5).6 He himself significantly alters the cosmo-logical account of Aristotle with full use of post-Aristotelian reactionsinside and outside the Peripatos. The rotation of the sphere of fire is called‘supernatural’. Starting from criticisms by the Peripatetic Xenarchus anda suggestion by Origen (a third-century Platonising Christian) he makesthe fifth element influence the motion of fire, while Aristotle consideredfire to rotate according to the natural inclination of the fifth element.7 Healso refers to an objection, found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, that theirrotation on transparent spheres could not explain the occasional closenessof some planets. Like his teacher Ammonius, he made Aristotle’s thinking-god into a creator-god (Plato Timaeus). He famously polemicises againstAlexander and Philoponus about the eternity of the world (see §§4.3 and6.2). His most original contributions are on time and place, some of whichwill be discussed later.

To narrow down our focus we can deal only with those thinkers who canbe seen to make important contributions to the exegetical method in thePlatonist school, with an occasional look at earlier evidence. I will startwith a summary sketch of the general background of the transformationof Plato and Aristotle8 with a view to the exegetical activities initiated byPlotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus, and the important subsequent stagesof enrichment and systematisation of that ‘Platonico-Peripatetic’ practiceby Ammonius and Proclus respectively (§5.1). We must also look at theremarkable links between teachers and pupils in their exegetical activi-ties. As will emerge from the discussion, we are dealing here with atradition of teachers and their pupils from Plotinus all the way down toProclus: the significance of this ‘chain’, presented as almost continuous,lies not only in the fact that teaching would remain strongly oral andtraditional (the latter not to be confused with ‘unoriginal’), but also thatthe methodology can be seen to develop gradually and to a certain extentconsistently. While each individual philosopher may add to the exegeticalprocedures, the curriculum based on direct personal contact (viva voce)9


139

creates a particularly coherent line of transmission of both form andcontent. It also has the advantage of engaging with the typically Platonicview that philosophy proper only works orally. At the same time decisionsabout which earlier voices to allow into the debate, which particular movesand techniques of exegesis to adopt, will determine much of the resultinginterpretation(s) of Plato and Aristotle. The chapter ends with two shortsections which add further contrast to the Platonist perspective: the oneconsiders a few authors present in the commentaries, but who are outsidethe ‘golden chain’ of Platonist thinkers for the sake of comparison andcontrast (§5.4). The final section (§5.5) summarises the Simplician formsof exegesis in the light of our investigations, ending with some reflectionson Simplicius’ position in this tradition of educational explication of texts.

5.1 A new Platonism: PlotinusAlthough the four major ‘schools’ of Greek philosophy (Platonists, Aris-totelians, Stoics, to a lesser degree Epicureans) had an almost continuouspresence in Greece up to 200 CE, from Plotinus onwards the Platonisttradition was to dominate the philosophical scene for some 400 years. Thissuccess was partly due to the well-organised curriculum, developed byteachers from the third century onwards.10 Like any other school ofthought, Platonic philosophy was a dynamic and serious undertaking: itdeveloped in interaction with, and opposition to, rival positions, a processwhich led to cross-fertilisation of ideas and terminology. Christianitywould also play a role in its success, assimilating Platonic ideas almost byosmosis. A distinctive feature of the post-Hellenistic philosophical dis-course is the use of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic terminology acrossdifferent schools of thought, much of which had become common currency– a result of the continuous debates on fundamental issues such as theorigin of the universe, the nature of language and logic, and the best wayto live one’s life.11 The issue of how these schools differed would becomemore acute, but for the Platonists the solution usually was to considerAristotle and Stoics as being basically compatible with (even indebted to)Platonic views or presenting them in distorted form, while they them-selves considered it legitimate to adapt views for the reconstruction ofPlato’s philosophy.12

The changes leading up to a new Platonism had already begun underAntiochus (d. 69/8 BCE), who favoured a return to Plato’s dogmatic posi-tions, rejecting the Carneadean attitude which viewed the aporeticdialogues as possessing a sceptical attitude regarding epistemologicalquestions. He already advocated the use of Aristotle and Stoic views tobuild on.13 Despite this more dogmatic turn Platonism remained a ratherdiffuse movement with at the core the study of Plato’s dialogues, but withadd-on features from other domains. With Plotinus Aristotle’s influencebecame more noticeable and far-reaching: while Antiochus and others


140

paved the way for a harmonisation of Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus contin-ued to engage with Aristotle’s work and when he passed on the torch toPorphyry, the latter ensured that the importance of Aristotle becameenshrined in the school’s curriculum. From now on the Categories and theOn interpretation would be the starting-point for aspiring Platonists.14

Thus what seems an upside-down approach historically can in fact makesense didactically and to some extent even philosophically: Aristotle’smethod of using clearly defined terms and strategies to do philosophyformed a very good springboard for the more intuitive and inspired per-spective of the preferred works of Plato. In the perceptive words of Dodds:

His originality showed itself, not in the discovery of new philosophicalmethod, or in the affirmation of a new attitude towards life, but in theconstructive power which, starting from certain scattered hints in Plato, themost unsystematic of creators, and certain loose ends in Aristotle, the mostinconclusive of systematisers, and utilising whatever seemed valuable inStoicism and the later Academy, evolved a scheme of Reality at once morecomprehensive and more closely knit than anything which had yet beenattempted.15

This very pointed characterisation sums up the challenge anyone had (andhas) when attempting to interpret Plato and Aristotle. Their original andpioneering ideas were imaginative but not fully systematised in all parts,sketchy and thus incomplete in others; they could therefore benefit frommore structure, added clarity and elaborations. Dodds rightly highlightsPlotinus’ skill in offering a fundamentally coherent and comprehensiveinterpretation which by its very nature is creative and new. The routetowards the ‘higher mysteries’ was now determined by a didactic andinclusive principle of commenting on the elements of doctrine which weretransparent at the surface (i.e. working from clearly stated principles) inorder to rise up to the more convoluted and almost mystical insights of thePlatonic masterpieces. This religious goal, achieved through a form ofspiritual meditation, was facilitated by the rational framework of philo-sophical reasoning. Proclus eventually declared this tradition as one ofteacher-pupil initiation into the secrets of Plato’s wisdom via the‘dionysiac frenzy’ which his works induce (Theol. Plat. i 1).16

The emergence of a subtle and searching exegetical reading practice inphilosophical teaching can be observed in Plotinus, although the extantevidence leaves us guessing about what went before (see below). Hisworking manner was rather intuitive, incorporating comments from ear-lier thinkers (but he was not prone to mention his sources) into hisassociative and highly discursive meanderings we can now read in theEnneads.17 The significant role of Alexander in his discussions has alreadybeen illustrated (Chapter 4). It was his habit to use a passage in acommentator or the Stoics to kick-start the discussion.18


141

A succession of teacher-pupil transmission started with Porphyry and,although not continuous all the way through, intensified from Iamblichusto Proclus, as each new teacher added a personal touch to the Platonistdoctrine and method. In the fifth century CE this (supposedly unbroken)succession became known as the ‘golden chain’.19 The ‘continuity’ alsoallowed for shifts of focus, thanks to the developing hermeneutics and theneed for continual adaptation to the pressures of the political and socialenvironment.

When Simplicius began writing his commentaries, he emerged from aneducation in which elucidation of texts would build on earlier comments.Simplicius is indeed very much a ‘scholar at work’ when we look at hisprocedures, even if our modern understanding of scholarly working meth-ods cannot be fully mapped onto him and his colleagues. But then thePlatonists themselves regarded the engagement with Plato as a matter ofexegesis: for instance, when appointed as the school head Isidore’s task isdescribed in terms of exegesis (diadochos � tês platônikês exegêseôs).20 Amore empirical analysis should give us better insight into the questionwhich sources Simplicius used directly and which indirectly. It should alsogive us a more informed sense of their influence, though the wealth ofmaterial will still force us to be selective. However much such an under-standing is limited, it will allow us to develop a considered view ofSimplicius’ methodology through his ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources.

As argued in Chapter 1, formal commentary did not arise until the lateHellenistic period and it almost always grew to fuller form in the contextof teaching activity.21 In addition, the elaborate scholarly commentary wasgiven a particular direction with the works of Peripatetic scholars from thesecond century CE, such as Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, whodetermined the format of commentary in lemmata style (see Chapter 4). Afurther examination of some commentator colleagues of Simplicius willtherefore give us insight into two additional aspects of his methodology:the traditional nature of the arguments and some developments in methodand doctrine. Considering the shifts and transformative interpretationsthat occur in the period from Plotinus to Proclus, it would probably bebetter to speak of ‘Platonisms’ as different instantiations of the Platonic‘doctrine’. Their relation to each other is determined by the canon(s) thatthey respond to, thus resembling Aristotle’s notion of the pros hen relation,family resemblance on account of their relation to the same object.

One phenomenon which has often baffled modern scholars is the vari-ations in quotation of Plato’s texts, usually explained by the claim thatancient authors quoted from memory. However, for many authors thenumber of quotations and the range of sources quoted from memorymilitates against this solution. For the Platonic tradition John Whittakerhas offered a far more persuasive argument that a rather counter-intuitiveexplanation must be accepted: in an illuminating paper, entitled ‘The Artof Misquotation’, he argues that in the Platonist commentators’ tradition


142

text manipulation (as we would say) was quite normal, but that they usedthis technique for pedagogical purposes, for instance to subvert the audi-ence’s expectation about a passage and thus keep them alert.22 Whittakerhighlights several types of variation (e.g. addition, subtraction, new wordorder) and argues that most are to be explained as the result not of faultymemory but of deliberate variation.23 Such an approach is only possible ifwe assume that the base text (in this case Plato) is sufficiently well-knownto the audience for the strategy to be successful. There is little doubt thatthis was in fact the case among Platonists.

This liberal use of texts can be traced back to an intriguing and littlenoticed passage in Porphyry’s (lost) collection of Oracles, in which we findthe following exegetical ‘ground-rule’ stated (Eusebius Praeparatio Evan-gelica 4.7.1 des Places = 303F Smith, p. 352):

I swear by the gods that I have neither [i] added (protetheika) nor [ii]subtracted (apheilon) anything from the sentiments (noêmata) used, exceptthat I have [iii] corrected (diorthôsa) an occasional erroneous reading (lexinhêmartêmenên), [iv] altered (metabeblêka) the text in the interest of clarity(pros to saphesteron), [v] completed (aneplêrôsa) a line in which the metreappeared defective, or even on occasion [vi] deleted (diegrapsa) what seemedirrelevant to the present purpose, and that I have [vii] preserved the spirit(nous) of the words. (translation mine, partly based on Whittaker’s para-phrase)

The Greek terms used by Porphyry show how the language for textualanalysis is technical and subtle: addition, subtraction, metre and rele-vance are the specific points referred to. As Whittaker rightly emphasises,it is striking that ‘Porphyry does not deny that he has altered the wordingof the Oracles but only that he has not changed their noêmata’ (1989: 69).This clear distinction between form and meaning is by now establishedand fully exploited and we see how the motive of clarification (see iv)justifies alteration. Moreover, there is a more than fleeting resemblanceto the Pauline contrast between letter and spirit (2 Corinthians 3:6; cf.Romans 2:29 and 7:5-6) – a contrast still present in Simplicius’ missionstatement of the commentary on the Categories.24 He also notes that thereis an inconsistency in the points listed, since there is in fact alteration ofthe text (point vi) despite the claim he has not subtracted anything (pointii). Clearly the former is not seen as being a violation of the latter.Porphyry offers a striking justification for rephrasing the text of theOracles, implying that changing the wording will not affect the meaning.Such an elastic conception of the interpretive process seems over-gener-ous, but it does provide the kind of welcome margin for manoeuvring in acontext where assimilation of other doctrines is a significant part of theexegetical effort. That Porphyry had made himself vulnerable to anotherreproach, namely that he was being irreverent towards Apollo, is clear


143

from the comments of Theodoret (c. 393-460 CE) who accused him ofattributing to Apollo ‘incorrect usage, lack of clarity, and halting metre’.25

Note, however, that ‘Porphyry’s editorial procedure’ is not really criticisedfor its liberal approach to the text.

Compared to Plotinus, Porphyry was much more scholarly and system-atic about working out the details of interpretive issues. Plotinus is notinterested in scholarship per se, as his much-quoted judgement of Long-inus makes clear. His comment ‘Longinus is a philologist, not aphilosopher’ (V.Plot. 14.20) assumes a fairly clear distinction between thetwo types, and confirms the more positive label of ‘most judicious’ (kri-tikôtatos) he received from others.26 Clearly Plotinus found himselfsurrounded by learned men eager to engage with texts; his priority,however, was not one of general text appreciation (literary criticism), butof philosophical analysis which could include exegesis. It implies a differ-ent emphasis with important consequences: he was not interested incorrecting his works, which he started writing down on the request of hispupils.

Some of the scholarly techniques from before Plotinus are worth review-ing here to give Simplicius’ method proper background. We have someintriguing reports on some of the Platonists of the post-Hellenistic period(the so-called Middle Platonists), who use creative interpretation (somemight say ‘manipulation’) of text as a convenient element in their report-age and exegesis. Allegory was another popular tool to extract meaningfrom texts already from the earliest Homer exegetes in the sixth centuryBCE (Chapter 1) continuing with the Stoics and finding a niche in the latePlatonist curriculum.27 Selective quotation, word analysis and semanticstretching were also used, consciously or unconsciously.

The evidence from the period between Antiochus and Plotinus (oftenreferred to as Middle Platonism) is mostly fragmentary and hence limited,but we can nonetheless glean some interesting information from thatevidence regarding exegetical activities. In all periods comments onPlato’s works occur and the emphasis on an ethical interpretation isparamount, framed by a combination of ‘Plato’s metaphysics, Stoic-Aca-demic ethics and Peripatetic-Stoic logic for which Middle Platonism iswell-known’.28 Four brief instances can illustrate some of the tendenciesand approaches in the hermeneutical activities of this period: Eudorus ofAlexandria (c. 50 BCE), the so-called Anonymous Commentary on theTheaetetus (50 BC/CE?), Plutarch of Chaeroneia (c. 100 CE), and Harpocra-tion of Argos (c. 150 CE).

Eudorus of Alexandria (c. 50 BCE), who seems to have been a strongadvocate of harmonising Plato and Aristotle, is referred to by Simpliciusas ‘the Academic’ (ho Akadêmikos, in Cat. 187.10).29 His position is dog-matic (like Antiochus, whom he may have tried to outdo),30 but in adifferent way, with Stoic and Pythagorean elements added (in ethics andphysics respectively). In physics he adhered to a monism ‘more extreme


144

than that favoured in later Middle Platonism’ and he wanted to limit ousiato the material substance; in this connection his work on Aristotle’sCategories (we know that he probably wrote a commentary) is relevant,since by rearranging their order he made them irrelevant to true being andthe intelligible world.31 Given such elaborate analyses on the basis ofPlatonic, Aristotelian and Stoic ideas, it comes as no surprise that he alsodealt with textual issues: there is evidence that suggests he forged apassage in Aristotle Metaphysics.32 The conclusion of Moraux after discuss-ing this passage is that Eudorus’ intervention was not ideological, as hadlong been thought, but purely textual or philological, thus rehabilitatingthe reading of the vulgate tradition.33

The Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus found on papyrus holdsa special place in the history of exegesis.34 Its uniqueness lies in its date asmuch as in its survival as a specimen of commentary. Experts have datedit to the first century BCE or CE, which makes it the earliest ‘running’commentary on a Platonic work we possess, and Eudorus of Alexandriahas been named as a possible candidate for authorship.35 Whoever theauthor, he clearly belongs to the Middle Platonist period, since he showsall the signs of amalgamating into the interpretation of whole Platonicdialogues Stoic and Peripatetic terminology and concepts which werecommon after Antiochus of Ascalon.36 He discusses aspects that latercommentators will use routinely in fixed sequence: the introductory pas-sages of the dialogue for its relevance as context to the main theme, thatis, the skopos (or prothesis), i.e. the subject or aim of the dialogue, occur atcol. 2.11ff.; the issue of authenticity at col. 3.29-37 (part of the proem); thequestion of genre at col. 3.37-8; and an analysis of character (dramatispersonae) at col. 3.40ff. Thus the methodology of Anonymous foreshadowssome of the topics standardly treated in later commentaries. Althoughthey have often been credited to Proclus, they are clearly traceable inwritings from much earlier periods.37

Plutarch of Chaeroneia (c. 100 CE) was a learned and voluminous writerand a strong advocate of Platonic doctrines.38 This is not the place to givea complete picture of Plutarch’s exegetical approach, but he was clearly asophisticated and experienced reader of the classical authors, and hadmastered issues of interpretation and philosophical polemic. He succeedsin maintaining an interest in Aristotle, while he also prefers the scepticalstance in epistemology. His involvement with exegesis, which can be seenfrom his discussions of Plato’s Timaeus and other philosophers, occursmostly within ‘monographic’ treatments of a particular idea or school(monobiblion): Epicurus is under attack in his That it is impossible to livea pleasant life in accordance with Epicurus’ view (Non posse suaviter �),the Stoics are assailed for their inconsistent arguments in On Stoiccontradictions (De Stoicorum repugnantiis). Or he discusses problems inthe tradition of zêtêmata, problêmata, aporiai as in Platonic problems(Quaestiones Platonicae), On the creation of the soul in the Timaeus,


145

Dinner discussions (Quaestionum convivialium libri), Natural problems(Quaestiones naturales).39 His Platonist exegeses include many criticalcomments on Aristotle. His knowledge of the corpus is extensive and histreatment shows him criticising some views but, as has been arguedrecently, without rejecting Aristotle fully. A good example of his widereading and polemical skill can be found in his attack on Colotes, in whichhe tries to counter the Epicurean’s attack on all other philosophers. AtAdv. Col. 114F-115C he reproaches Colotes of using poor methods, oflacking proper knowledge of the ancient authors, and, as a result, ofmisinterpreting Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the Forms.40 These com-ments indicate how Plutarch expects a serious scholar to take the booksunder discussion in hand and study them attentively. Another famouspolemic he mounted is that against the Stoics, in which he tries to showthat their doctrines are full of contradictions. His scholarly attitude is alsoillustrated by his importance for our knowledge of the Presocratics.

Finally, the work of Harpocration of Argos, a pupil of Atticus,41 survivesin scraps of his comments on Plato in later commentators. The limitedevidence (all with name attached) suggests that his method had all thetrappings of the style and methods of later surviving commentaries, suchas determining the aim of a passage, and solving aporiai whether inher-ited or newly devised.42 We also find the clarification of historical andterminological points, and the intention of giving an ethical interpretation– consistent with other cases such as the Anonymous Commentary onTheaeteteus and Alcinous’ Handbook of Platonism (second century CE).Typical of the later commentators, lacking in Middle Platonists, is theelaborate use of metaphysical and symbolic elaborations and proems.43 Hewas credited with a commentary (hupomnêma) on Plato in 24 books(Suidas s.v.). Dillon’s discussion and reconstruction of the work fromsixteen fragments gives us a good indication of this process of assimilation.These examples show what were considered important issues worth tak-ing on with a clear division between literal and analogical types ofargument. But critical evaluation and occasional correction could alsooccur. Olympiodorus (sixth century CE) will criticise Harpocration forsuggesting that he is one among many who are ‘acknowledged’ for particu-lar suggestions, and their mention is in a way a tribute to their work.Aeneas of Gaza (Theophr. 12.1ff. = Dillon fr. 7 [1990: 136]) will mentionHarpocration together with Plotinus, Boethus (Peripatetic) and Numenius(second century CE). The last, in particular, has been shown to be veryinfluential on Plotinus.44

The fragmentary survival of Harpocration’s work also reflects a typicalfeature of the learned commentary tradition: as a rule previous commentswill be absorbed into the new treatises, thus often eclipsing the originalworks.45 The use of such techniques may seem unsurprising, until werealise that philology and philosophy tended to be considered quite sepa-rate activities (see p. 148 below [Plotinus]). Here we see that in practice


146

such a disjunction did not exist, mainly because the commitment to reacha certain interpretation of the texts, consisting – as they do – of wordsstrung together into rational arguments, would lead the exegete to look forany tool that was useful for that end. Philology supported philosophy, andphilosophy religion.

There are several other important contributions which would deserve alonger treatment here, but that would exceed the scope of this investiga-tion. Mention should be made, though, of Calvenus Taurus (c. 150 CE) whoread Aristotle in his classes (Gellius Noct. Att. XIX.646) in a format whichgave detailed comments on consecutive passages, while he distinguishedbetween general discussion and discussion of separate passages, a sensibleapproach which in later commentaries developed into a fixed division,labelled theôria and lexis.47

In sum, the Middle Platonist period allows us to retrieve a practice ofhermeneutics which includes a number of important components such assemantic and lexicographical analysis, philosophical evaluations of pre-vious comments, aporiai and solutions, and different ways in which thedoctrinal inclination to harmonise Plato and Aristotle are implemented:the claim that the one is foreshadowing the other; maximising any over-laps; declaring disagreements illusory; defusing criticism. The eclecticway in which Aristotle could be criticised or praised indicates that mostPlatonists made up their own minds to a considerable degree about howto clarify his Platonist leanings. The next stage would add even greaterphilosophical complexity to this practice, beginning with Plotinus andPorphyry.

5.2 Harmonising strategies: fromPorphyry to Proclus

Although he was to become the figurehead of a new school of thought,Plotinus was a late convert to philosophy under Ammonius Saccas inAlexandria in the mid third century CE. We find the school practice ofPlotinus’ circle usefully described in the biographical sketch penned byPorphyry (V.Plot. 1-14).This forms the best starting point for finding outhow scholarship and philosophy were working in tandem to inaugurate a‘culture of commentary’.48 Of course Plotinus is not a commentator in astrong sense, since his ruminations on Plato and Aristotle show us how hedeveloped an original philosophical system in a dynamic interaction withthese classical thinkers: his work exhibits an emerging combination ofphilosophical evaluation and the philological manipulation necessary tomake the interpretation work. But he was not a scholar or a highlymethodical thinker. A typical passages is Enneads 4.8.3:

The work of the more rational Soul is thought, but not thought alone: howelse should Soul be distinct from Intelligence? The Soul ceased to make part


147

of the Divine Intelligence when beside intuitive thought she got anothercharacter, by virtue of which she assumed her proper substance. She has herown work as have all things that possess reality. (tr. Dodds 1923)

Contemplative, searching, and emphatic, his thought makes one suspectthat there are many more assumptions informing his comments. More-over, his thought is marked by its aporetic nature, resulting from hisdiscursive method, his ‘thinking out loud’ so to speak, and a resistance todogmatism. Within his circle scholarship and philosophy also becameconsidered as distinct and sometimes competing forces. Yet the fusing ofscholarship and philosophy progressed steadily as a necessary conse-quence of the accumulation of comments and elucidation by scholarchs aspart of the ongoing disagreements on the texts and their meaning.

This built-in fluidity in his thought has made interpreting his doctrinesmore difficult, but experts agree that his works exhibit a unity of thoughtthat reflects a mature thinker – an assessment which fits the chronologyof his writing activity from the age of about 40 (V.Plot. 4). Plotinus is alsoan example of east meeting west: although his coyness about his originskeep us in the dark about the details, his early studies in Alexandriaindicate he was probably Egyptian49 and we know that he admired theunusual views of Numenius, which included a belief in ‘ecstatic’ contem-plation, a state of union with the Absolute, which Plotinus is said to havereached four times in his life.50 The influence of his teacher AmmoniusSaccas is pervasive and palpable in all his works, as he acknowledges atregular intervals. If he insists that all he is doing is bringing out what isa very old doctrine (Enn. 5.1.8), he introduces a topos of modesty thatendures in the ensuing tradition, brought in with reference to acceptedauthorities.51 In this respect Simplicius also follows in his footsteps, al-though he had far more reason to be impressed by the number ofauthorities which had given their views on texts that were consideredspecial and sacred.

Far from wanting to exaggerate what is sometimes called the ‘Eastern’influence, it deserves our attention that many late Platonists originatefrom countries located in the eastern Mediterranean (Cilicia, Lycia, Syria,Egypt). It can help explain (at least in part) the peculiar combination ofmysticism and rationalism in Plotinus and others, and the interest in‘magic’, theurgy and rituals. Some of these aspects take their cue fromPlato’s comments in various passages. Fowden’s seminal study on thepagan holy man has not had the impact it should have had in philosophicalcircles, simply because modern philosophers feel justified in separatingphilosophy (as they see it) from ‘religion’. The modern view of Plotinus andlate Platonism has long over-emphasised the rational philosophical ap-proach at the expense of the religious and spiritual side: there are goodreasons to think that the philosophical armament is auxiliary and part ofthe more important preparation for the ultimate goal, a return to the


148

divine. Only recently have some scholars returned to the view that theirdoctrine is as much religious as it is philosophical (e.g. Fowden 1982,Sorabji 1983: ch. 11, Hoffmann 1987b, Athanassiadi 1993).

The problem here is twofold: first, there is no appropriate terminologyto discuss the pagan religious stance without prejudice, because most ofthe words we would want to use retain their Judeo-Christian connotationsand represent the current dominant perspective informed by that tradi-tion. One sign of this is the negative connotations still attached to the term‘pagan’ as opposed to Christian. Thus the word ‘religion’ seems not quiteapposite, in that it may impose expectations of, for example, a uniquerevelation absent from Platonism. The term ‘philosophy’ also has itsdownside, because it tends to exclude anything remotely non-rational inthe traditional Western sense of the word, whether religious or any other‘mystical’ experiences. ‘Theology’ only goes some way to mediate betweenthese extremes, but it too has acquired a particular sense of rational andsystematic thinking about religion. Clearly these labels will remain unsat-isfactory. To take Platonism seriously, we would need a term betweenphilosophy and religion to convey pagan rational spirituality as well asintuitive (non-rational) understanding of the world, but without evokingnegative reactions towards elements that became included such astheurgy and Pythagoreanism. We can compare the distinction of Christianversus pagan (as religion versus superstition) to that of languages versusdialects: in the latter case what is considered a ‘proper’ language is morecorrectly (but perhaps cynically) called ‘a dialect with an army and a navy’– expressing the reality of how the paradigm of language is a result ofpolitical power rather than a natural state of affairs.52 In much the sameway, a religion might be referred to as ‘a superstition with an army’, as isperhaps clear from the fact that ‘Christian’ will be spelled with a capitalC, while ‘pagan’ remains lower case. In other words, the establishment willdetermine how to apply the labels: the religious view that is dominant hasthe right to marginalise any other system of religious beliefs – as is shownin the case of other terms which attempt to label religious groups consid-ered to be outside the mainstream (sect, caste, superstition etc.).

Secondly, late Platonism (Plotinism?) was one of the many alternativesavailable to non-Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries, and given theincreasing pressures the pagans were under, we can see Platonism beingforced to compete with the Christian religion in how it comes up withadditions to the Plotinian core.53 If we de-emphasise or marginalise thereligious strands in late Platonism – which is strongly linked to its overallmotivation and aim – we risk turning them into secular (analytical)philosophers, whose philosophical nous would make them seem interestedonly in analysing the world through language and logic. Our elaborateevidence for such analysis (commentaries on the Categories) should notmake us forget the religious motivation of their efforts. I shall return tothis matter in the next chapter.


149

What can we say about the role of Plotinus in Simplicius? Contrary towhat might be expected, Plotinus is not an all-dominating figure, but oneamong many commentators with a rather understated presence. Plotinuscan in principle be expected to loom large in this tradition, as he legiti-mised the assimilation of Aristotle, but apart from his criticisms ofAristotle, this process of assimiliation comes in the form of allusion,paraphrase, ideas embedded in later commentators and near-quotationswithout source acknowledgment. As Porphyry noted, Aristotle’s views arehidden in Plotinus’ writings (V.Plot. 14.5-8). He is considered to belong tothe ‘more recent’ thinkers Simplicius makes use of, as his comment en toisneôterois Plôtinos phainetai prôtos � (in Phys. 790.30) indicates – withcharacteristic vagueness in his chronological determinations. On occasionreferred to as ‘the great Plotinus’ (ho megas Plôtinos, in Cat. 108.22,275.10, in DC 20.12) or the ‘most divine Plotinus’ (theiotatos, in Cat. 73.27),Simplicius brings in comments and objections from Plotinus on a range ofissues which often correspond to passages in his Enneads. Some 106named references spread across the extant commentaries place himamong the top five of quoted authorities.54 Does Simplicius quote himdirectly and with approval?

The occurrences in the Commentary on the Physics are of specialinterest for our purpose. While named references point us to certainoccurrences easily, others have their limitations when no name is given.55

For the former Simplicius seems to have limited direct reference to a smallset of topics, for instance prime matter having no features such as shapeor magnitude (229.12, perhaps cf. Enn. 1.8; 2.4), potentiality (398.32; Enn.2.5), motion as genus (403.10, 432.17; perhaps cf. Enn. 6). After these earlyoccurrences his name does not resurface until 706.26 with an increasedfrequency at 790-2 on motion of the cosmos, before another two passagesmention him regarding perception and alteration (1072.8, 1079.12; Enn.1.1). A quite scattered presence, one might say. But this is not all we canfind: quotations of Plotinus abound in which he uses a range of passagesfrom Platonic dialogues and Aristotelian works: at 432.20f. Plotinus isquoting from Tim. 57Eff. (announced in 431.5-6); at 433.14 and 733.4 wefind an account dealing with Aristotle, followed by a quote; the same goesfor 1165.20, 1132.26f. (quote follows). Simplicius is also familiar withPlotinus’ habit of raising problems (aporiai), as is clear from his commentat in Phys. 769.6 (êporêkenai).

These passages show under what circumstances Plotinus is consideredrelevant to the topics under discussion. There is little to suggest a particu-lar pattern here and Simplicius is very likely proffering these views on thebasis of his readings in Porphyry, Iamblichus and Damascius. However, itis perfectly possible that he had direct access to the Enneads, as may besuggested, for example, by in Phys. 790.34-5 where we are urged to ‘listento [i.e. read] the intelligible words of Plotinus’ (akousai noêrôn rhêmatôn).If the amount of materials seems limited, such a claim can be supported


150

by the nameless echo which occurs at in Phys. 1.7 (see below). It isnoteworthy that he does not refer to the work by its Porphyrian title(Enneads) as we now do, but uses the titles of individual tracts, such asOn the kosmos (in DC 12.12), On the kinds of being (in Cat. 2.3), the firstbook of On being (in Cat. 127.12). In addition, Plotinus regularly appearsin the vicinity of other thinkers: Andronikos (in Cat. 270.2), Alexander,Ptolemaeus and Xenarchus (in DC 20.21), Ptolemaeus and Proclus (in DC37.33), Porphyry (in Cat. 2.3), Porphyry and Iamblichus (in Cat. 2.27),Iamblichus (in Cat. 191.10). One suspects therefore that Simplicius isusing notes in which views on specific themes are collected with names ofthose who have expressed a view on the matter, perhaps of the kind wefind in ‘doxographical’ collections.

A long extract from the Enneads seems the basis for a passage in Phys.1.7-8, in which the use of close paraphrase and near-quotation shows howSimplicius brings in Plotinian material from the Enneads in a discussionof the primary causes or principles (arkhai). It is an unusually longquotation-cum-paraphrase and, what is more, uses interpretive commentswhich by their frequent technical terminology betray an additional influ-ence (i.e. another author). This additional influence may perhaps beexplained from Simplicius’ use of another work or possibly notes taken ata lecture given by one of his teachers. If so, we would have to assume theinput of Iamblichus, Syrianus or Damascius. Full discussion is not possi-ble here, but a few more comments will help to put the passage andPlotinus’ role in it in context. The likely source for the Plotinian passages,indicated by Diels in his apparatus, are Enneads 2.1 On the heavens and4.8 On the descent of the soul into bodies, but others qualify as well.56 Thefirst discusses the life span, nature and characteristics of the universewith obvious reference to Plato’s Timaeus. The second looks at the soul’spresence in human bodies and the implications of such a descent. Thuspsychology and cosmology are here combined in an analysis of Aristotle’sstatements on matter and how we can know it (the lemma to which this isadded is Phys. 191a7 ‘the underlying matter can be known by analogy’).What is unusual here is that Simplicius’ analysis moved seamlessly fromhis paraphrase of Aristotle into the Neoplatonic analysis, typically con-taining a range of paraphrastic descriptions couched in rather technicalvocabulary. We already saw that Plotinus’ On the heavens occurred earlyon in the commentary on Aristotle’s On the heavens (12.12), but there thetitle was provided and only a very brief quotation given. A few moreoccurrences can be found in the same commentary and many more in thecommentary on Physics.57 It is most likely that the nature of the topic (firstprinciples) necessitated the presence of the fundamental discussion by thefounder of the new Platonism.

Plotinus’ student and successor Porphyry (c. 232/4-c. 305 CE) was one ofthe most learned Platonists of his day, perhaps second only to Longinus,described by Eunapius as a ‘living library and walking museion’ (Lives of


151

the philosophers and sophists IV.1.3, 6.13-15). A formidable scholar, hewas responsible for refining the interpretation of core Platonist texts. Hewas probably the first Platonist to write a commentary on Aristotle.58 Thelate Platonist David (proem to his Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagogê = 6TSmith) reports that the Delphic oracle called him ‘learned’ (polumathês)as distinct from his pupil Iamblichus who is called ‘divinely inspired’(enthous).59 It is very regrettable that so little of his works survives.60 InEunapius (fl. 390 CE) Porphyry is credited with offering a ‘medicine’(pharmakon) against the obscurity (asapheia) with which poets and philo-sophers tend to cover up their thoughts, thus bringing them into the light(eis phôs).61 The ancient tradition of claiming to ‘uncover’ meaning in thepoets continued all the way through Hellenistic and early Christianperiods. Also, a special place was given to the notion of ‘obscurity’ or‘unclarity’ (asapheia), e.g. in Cat. 7.6-8 (presented as intentional), in DC232.23, 349.21, in Phys. 8.19 (with the justification ‘to ward off superficialstudents’), 21.19 (attributed to Anaxagoras), 427.35, 429.27 (criticised),etc. It has been shown that this is an important topos in the exegeticaltoolbox of the commentators and part of the preparatory (or ‘isagogical’)questions in the Neoplatonic classroom reading practice: the deliberateuse of obscurity is considered a ploy on Aristotle’s part.62 They attribute toAristotle’s works an intentional ‘obscurity’, which is there to safeguardknowledge for the initiated, and they deny that this kind of unclarityshould lead to the rejection of those parts of his work. The latter notion isnicely expressed at in Phys. 428.2-3 when Simplicius remarks: ‘if we wereto cross out the unclear parts, much in Aristotle would be erased’, implyingthat this is the wrong way to approach the philosopher.

Porphyry wrote several commentaries on Aristotle’s logic, a significantillustration of his commitment to the importance of that part of the corpusfor Platonists.63 In addition to his own works (few of which survive com-plete) and the ‘biography’ of Plotinus, he took on the difficult task of editingthe writings of Plotinus in re-arranged order so as to give the corpus athematic organisation, even if it meant breaking up their original chrono-logy. The idea of preserving and organising the writings of Plotinus,effectively establishing a canon for Platonists, is presented as a requestfrom Plotinus himself (V.Plot. 24). Whatever the reason may have been, itwas a crucial step towards the creation of a set of writings that could nowbe used as reference works for further study and debate.

Porphyry’s appearances in Simplicius illustrate his influence in twoareas: he preserves much of the earlier tradition by learned accumulationof comments, some of which may go back to his Philosophical history, butthey also show that debate continued. The so-called ‘golden chain’ ofteachers and pupils followed on from these two pioneers of the newPlatonism. In addition, he determined much of the curriculum and themanner in which the discrepancies between Aristotle and Plato should behandled.


152

The fate of Aristotle’s role in the Platonist tradition was by no meanssealed when Porphyry wrote his Introduction (Eisagôgê) which deter-mined that the De interpretatione and Categories should the first works tobe read in the curriculum. During the succession of school heads thematter remained a point of debate. The main protagonists to be looked atin this short section are part of the ‘golden chain’ of Platonists: Plutarchof Athens, Iamblichus (fl. 245), Syrianus (fl. 431), Proclus (d. 485), Am-monius (fl. 490) and Damascius (fl. 520).64 The scholarchs had a distinctinfluence on school practices and in their reading of Aristotle and Platodetermined much of the different strands developing across the post-Plotinian era of the school. Thus the individual strengths and weaknessesof the scholarchs were crucial in the survival of the philosophical schoolsin late antiquity.65 The charisma and leadership of one person oftendetermined how each school – a term that easily overstates its nature –operated.

Iamblichus (c. 265 CE) continued the Platonist approach after 305 CE onthe death of his teacher Porphyry. An influential figure in the history ofPlatonist philosophy, he is known for favouring two things in particular:Pythagoreanism and theurgy. He may have been Syrian, but his doctrineis clearly Greek and very much based on rational foundations. His view ofPlato as a Pythagorean became very influential, inducing him to attackPorphyry on several occasions as putting forward un-Platonic ideas.66

When Finamore and Dillon comment: ‘his championing of theurgy (whichis really only magic with a philosophical underpinning) � introduced anew element into Platonism, which was to continue even up to the Renais-sance’, this reveals how modern sensibilities react negatively to thecombination of spirituality and logic: ‘really only magic’ clearly aims todebunk the seriousness behind this particular form of religious outlook.67

The neologism ‘theurgy’, a compound of theos ‘god’ and ergein ‘make, do’expresses an attempt to influence the gods and was connected to theso-called Chaldaean Oracles, ‘a divine revelation in Greek hexameterverse of a cosmological and soteriological system and of a set of moral andritual rules and instructions’.68

We can also see Iamblichus using formal exegesis in his teaching,building for example on Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories as wellas writing several other commentaries.69 He was important not only forgiving the curriculum a better-defined and firmer footing, but also fordetermining the exegetical methods of reading and interpreting the worksof Plato and Aristotle. Thus he introduced the (not unproblematic) notionthat each Platonic dialogue could be given one single unifying purpose(skopos).70 As one of the seven or eight topics which will become thestandard list of ‘isagogical issues’ discussed by most late commentaries71

this approach had a good and a bad side: it imposed a criterion on theevaluation of a work’s objective which could be very restrictive and evenmisleading, yet at the same time it would streamline the interpretive


153

process and encourage the exegete(s) to think in terms of overall consis-tency.72 Simplicius treats the topic as a matter of fact in all majorcommentaries on Aristotle, either reporting the range of views when thereis a dispute (in Cat 1.7, 8.15, 9.5-11.1; in DC 1.1-3) or simply presentingthe purpose as ‘easy to grasp’ (in Phys. 1.1-3 ton skopon � mathein estirhaidiôs; cf. 3.13ff.). Iamblichus’ influence is especially detectable in thecommentary format as it develops further the Porphyrian approach ofrunning commentary with lemmata, the format Alexander started usingconsistently.73

Iamblichus’ influence on Platonist philosophy also runs deep. The newdirection he chose by bringing in Pythagoras as the exemplary philosopherwas far-reaching, and Pythagoreanism once again became an importantcomponent of Platonism.74 He wrote a ten-volume encyclopaedic work onPythagoras, of which four books have survived under individual titles, andconsidered some of the exegetical principles he used as Pythagorean.75 Hethus extended the view that Plato’s works contained ancient wisdom andcontributed to the creation of a new dogma, which helped provide aresponse to the need for a ‘holy book’ in order to create a pagan identity.76

It has been suggested that this amalgamation was partly motivated by hiscompetitiveness with Plotinus and possibly Christianity: by choosingPythagoras he was able to oust the pioneer of the new Platonist perspec-tive with a figure more venerable than Plato, Socrates or, for that matter,Jesus.77 Whether or not this is part of a competitive streak in Iamblichus,he was often critical of Porphyry’s positions (Finamore-Dillon, 4-5) thusdistancing himself from the successor of Plotinus (and by implication fromthe school’s founder as well).

Simplicius refers to Iamblichus some 180 times in the in Cat. alone,against seven times for in DC and thirteen times for in Phys. In most caseshe shows great respect, as is evident from the epithet theios (‘the divineIamblichus’) and more often than not a direct quotation is part of thereferencing.78 From these important passages Iamblichus’ interest ap-pears to lie with the Categories as a foundational text, although we mustbeware of exaggerating the weight of the evidence, which depends onSimplicius’ selection: the limited number of references to in Tim. does initself not inform us about the importance Iamblichus himself attached tothat work.

For the commentary on the Physics (which runs to 1,300 pages) Sim-plicius draws mostly on the Timaeus commentary of Iamblichus, givingreferences with great accuracy (e.g. in Phys. 639.23 ‘second chapter of thefifth book of his commentary on the Timaeus’), making direct access bySimplicius or his source very likely. Iamblichus’ name appears predomi-nantly at in Phys. 650-700 and 760-95, that is, those later sections of thecommentary on Aristotle’s book 4, in which Simplicius elaborates onAristotle’s theory of space and time (Corollaries), alongside the views ofhis teacher Damascius and several other Platonists on the question


154

whether the universe has a beginning, the nature of time and the ‘now’(this discussion is part of the so-called Corollary on time). He disagrees onseveral points with his teacher, as we shall see (§5.3). It appears, then,that his voice is most appropriate, at least according to Simplicius, whendealing with the metaphysical questions such as space and time, meaningand reference.

The epithet theios seems to acknowledge Iamblichus’ theological orien-tation, further illustrated by the interesting comments Urmson has madeto his translation of Simplicius’ Corollaries. He notes that ‘divine’, whileusually reserved for Plato (Proclus in Tim. 3.9,22; Simpl. in DC 377.27)and the great metaphysicians among late Platonists (as here for Iam-blichus, cf. 564.11), is also used for Pythagoras, in particular to denote hisimportance as the predecessor of Plato ‘in the Golden Chain of higher truth(Iamblichus Vita Pyth. (Klein) 29.162,3-4; Syrianus in Metaph. 81.31)’.79

Urmson (Coroll. 107 n.) also points out that Aristotle receives the epithetdaimonios, a term alluding to the daimôn of Socrates (Apology 40A; cf.Enn. 3.4). Other epithets for his predecessor exegetes can further illus-trate their function, as they seem to signify an interesting hierarchy of themembers of the ‘golden chain’. Urmson’s footnote was triggered by theunusual attribution of the epithet theios to Aristotle, a unique occurrencesuggesting that Simplicius is elevating him for this one instance. Epithetsrange from hêmeteros hêgemôn and ho philosophos to kritikôtatos, philoso-phôtatos, megas, daimonios, theios. They do represent a certain hierarchy,but it is not certain that they are all Simplicius’ creations. Their usagesuggests a mixture of standardised characterisation and honest respect.

The presence of Proclus (d. 485) in Simplicius’ works should not surpriseus and yet he is not such a clear voice in the corpus as one would expectfrom his rigorous treatment of late Platonist thought, in particular if weremember that Damascius, Simplicius’ teacher, is described as expound-ing Proclus’ work in his teaching.80 He was taught by Syrianus (Marinus,V.Procl. 1), but it has been pointed out that his work exhibits the influenceof Iamblichus in particular doctrines (listed in Dodds 1963: xxi) as well asmore general (‘structural’) points, such as the triads and multiplication ofentities in the universe (ibid. xxii). Proclus was ‘chosen by Syrianus as “theheir capable of inheriting his vast learning”’.81 Dodds also speaks of thesalvation that Syrianus brought according to Proclus and rightly stressesthe relevance of Proclus’ motives for writing such a work as the Elementsof theology (p. xviii). Well into the commentary on On the heavens Sim-plicius feels compelled to indicate that Proclus ‘lived a little before mytime’ (in DC 640.24, oligon pro emou gegonôs), referring to his place ofbirth, Lycia, four times (in DC 640.24; in Phys. 601.15, 611.11, 795.4). Itwould seem that Simplicius is mostly using the commentary on theRepublic and Timaeus.

Proclus was a systematiser; his ambition was to embrace the sum ofPlatonist thought on the universe with a clear spiritual objective in mind:


155

to offer a convincing and comprehensive form of salvation. Recent scholar-ship has shown that the hymns that he wrote (traditionally seen as ‘mere’expressions of religious fervour) can in fact be considered as philosophi-cally meaningful contributions.82 The influence of Proclus is acknowledgedby Simplicius when he discusses Iamblichus’ notion of time and adds‘those after Proclus up until our time (eis hêmôn) almost all follow Proclusnot only on this point, but on all other issues’ (in Phys. 795.11-13).83 He setout the principles of late Platonism in two major works, using mathemat-ics as a structuring device in one of them. Such an elaborate scheme of ahighly intellectual nature may seem unpromising for the common man,but it was not unprecedented. Plato had set an example with his Timaeus,synthesising much of the preceding tradition in natural philosophy. In thefifth century CE Nemesius of Emesa (Syria) had done a very similar thing,but adding Aristotelian and medical insights, and giving the whole enter-prise a Christian gloss.84

Proclus’ commentaries are important specimens in this tradition ofteaching Plato and Aristotle by explication of their work by a teacher, andit has been noticed that his works to a certain extent reflect oral discus-sions. Proclus’ format is not original, despite contributions on his part, inparticular the use of a demarcation of passages read (praxeis) and a cleardivision between general exegesis (theôria) and specific exegesis (lexis).85

His commentary on the Timaeus is a monumental work, which has ab-sorbed much of the foregoing tradition.86 But he was operating in anincreasingly hostile environment, in which Christianity, now the officialreligion of empire, began to encroach on pagan territory and create formaland informal practices which would marginalise pagan ideas and rituals.At one point he went into exile for a year as a result of tensions in Athensand spent time in Lydia studying religious customs there (Marinus Life ofProclus 15). His staunch defence of paganism brought risks when heexpressed ‘direct criticism’ of Christian doctrine.87 For Proclus theChaldaean Oracles were in fact more important than Plato. Simpliciusdoes not quote from Proclus often, but his influence can be detected indifferent passages, sometimes indirectly.88 Proclus’ dealings with thePresocratics have already been mentioned (Chapter 2). His ‘history’ ofGreek philosophy follows Hierocles’ historical reconstruction – probablythe first real history of philosophy per se.89 The concern in both is toestablish the importance of Platonic thought, and to show that all religiouswisdom leads up to and follows from it. His general focus was one ofharmonising many religious doctrines.90

Since his extant works are mostly on Plato, he may not have been ofdirect use for Simplicius’ exegesis of Aristotle. Still, references are notinfrequent and Simplicius respectfully refers to Proclus as ‘the philo-sopher from Lycia and the teacher of my teachers’ (in Phys. 611.11-12, cf.795.4-5). The majority of cases where he mentions Proclus in in DCindicate he is adducing him for the methodical refutation of objections to


156

and attacks on Plato’s thought by Aristotle and others. It is likely that heuses Proclus’ book which ‘solved the objections’ (in DC 640.24-5, biblion �tas enstaseis dialuon; in most cases the term enstasis ‘objection’ occurs, oran equivalent, e.g. epikheirêma). For in Phys. he is mentioned only in theCorollaries, the excursus in which Neoplatonic views on time and place aretrotted out (above, p. 97). Between 611.11 and 614.8 Proclus’ views onplace are set out after Aristotle’s, and his theory is said to have beenexpounded ‘with great originality’ (12, kainoprepê); as the closing com-ment reveals (614.8, tauta kai toiauta peri topou phêsi ho Proklos),Simplicius has presented a comprehensive account. This passage is thechief source for this theory and, as Urmson argues quite plausibly, may bebased on Proclus’ account in his commentary on Plato’s Republic (2.198-202 Kroll) where he provides an even more detailed account of theproperties of place.91 Simplicius goes on to quote from Proclus’ text (25ff.),justifying the use of ‘his own words’ by saying (25-6) he ‘expounded hisopinion clearly and expertly’ (saphôs autên kai sunêirêmenôs exetheto).92

Proclus defends the interval as place after arguing against the views thatit was either matter or form and against Aristotle’s view since it producesabsurdities. Simplicius goes on to evaluate critically what Proclus said,raising objections to the position of ‘incorporeal interval’ (615.13ff.), sug-gesting that immateriality can still produce an impression, thus makingit visible (616.26-8).

It appears, then, that Proclus is not given such a prominent placebecause he has the best theory, but, first, one that raises difficulties concern-ing Aristotle’s theory, and secondly, one that offers counter-suggestions thatare shared by many existing ‘hypotheses’ (616.31), yet can still not be saidto be the best theory available (616.26-32). Novelty may also be a reasonfor inclusion, since the innovative nature of Proclus’ theory is emphasisedhere as well as in the case of Damascius (624.3-4). Proclus features againin the concluding paragraphs of the excursus on place, receiving somepraise for having established that there are ‘things superior to, and witha more divine body, than this universe’, taking that to be the whole placeof the universe (643.36-644.2). But most thinkers reviewed have, accord-ing to Simplicius, seen ‘some true conception of place and did not miss itsgeneral character’. Thus he generously allows all to contribute. In the endit is Damascius who is held up as having produced the best analysis (seebelow, §5.3).

Such then is the continuum of teachers and their pupils, who in turnbecome teachers themselves. This ‘golden chain’ consisted of highly indi-vidual thinkers who all contributed to the exegetical and philosophicaldevelopment of late Platonism (Athanassiadi 1993). It is characterised byweighty scholarship, in which Porphyry, as the most learned of them all,acquired the role of ‘model and source book’ on the Categories for succeed-ing generations.93 Yet due to his immense learning Porphyry’s was a hardact to follow. The assessment of the systematiser Proclus would seem to


157

signal that Platonism was not merely about scholarship and learnedcommentary, but something altogether more important: the spirituality ofdivine knowledge as perceived in the Chaldaean Oracles, Plato’s works,and other writings assumed to belong to the Pythagorean tradition (ps.Archytas). Although the late Platonists were not always in agreementabout the correct interpretation of Plato’s words, they did attempt to readhim in a cooperative spirit – one that was both collaborative and tolerantof diverse interpretations. The unity of the Platonist ‘school’ is a ratherdiffuse and fluid one which could not always be defined clearly to theoutside world. While emerging exegetical strategies contributed to thisconcerted effort to produce a coherent reading of Plato within the school,external pressures had been solidifying the view that emphasis on thecoherence and unity of Platonist ideas was important. After Porphyry,assimilating Aristotle became a more prominent part of this strategy.Simplicius absorbed aspects of method and doctrine into his own commen-taries, yet nowhere is there one dominant voice that he followsunconditionally: he incorporates selectively and judiciously. He does how-ever present his own voice most strongly when discussing the views of histeachers.

5.3 Simplicius’ teachersThree figures in particular deserve our special attention for their moreimmediate influence on Simplicius: his teachers Syrianus, Damascius andAmmonius. As we have seen (§§2.1 and 3.1) there was a venerable tradi-tion from Antiochus onwards of interpreting Aristotle in such a way thatmuch common ground was detected (or claimed) between him and Plato.This important issue of harmonising Plato and Aristotle can be illustratedfurther in order to clarify how Simplicius continues this tradition. As Ihope to show, he also makes his own contribution to it.

Himself a pupil of Plutarch of Athens (d. 432 CE), Syrianus is animportant figure in the early fifth century CE, succeeding his teacher in431/2 as head of school until his death in 437. He wrote several works,three of which survive. Proclus (d. 485 CE) is probably the most influentialpupil in terms of exegesis, leaving behind a massive commentary on theTimaeus.94 Syrianus had a considerable influence on the commentary stylein the fifth and sixth centuries CE.95 As already mentioned, he also adoptedAlexander’s method of providing a lemma (literally a ‘snatch’ of text) forcommenting, and this format became the norm, in preference to severalother forms of presentation.96 Interestingly, as in earlier periods, the textcommented upon is often said to use ‘intentional unclarity’ (aspheia): whileOrpheus and the poets were said to provide messages in riddles, Aristotleis now said to be deliberately unclear so as to fend off the uninitiated(Ammonius On Aristotle’s Categories 7.10-11 Busse). This argument for


158

the self-legitimisation of the commentator’s task could only lead to expan-sive supplementation as the main tool for clarification.97

From the important prologue of his commentary on Metaphysics 13-14a general impression of Syrianus’ view on Aristotle can be gained: we findrespect for and acceptance of his teachings in logic, ethics and physics(80.5-7), and he calls Aristotle a ‘benefactor (euergetês) of mankind’ (80.10-16).98 Syrianus makes an attempt to reconcile Aristotle’s views with thephilosophy of Pythagoras (81.9-11; 25-31) and comments on those partsthat deviate from Platonic-Pythagorean views: they are a ‘rectification ofAristotle’s Metaphysics where it diverges from Platonism and Pythagore-anism’.99 Aristotle’s deviations (10.37) are read as bringing disharmony (todiaphônon), because he tried to ‘combine philosophic insight with thereceived opinion of “the many”’ (60.27-30). Thus we see Syrianus ‘massag-ing’ the material to fit a particular view of the philosophical tradition,emphasising the derivative nature of Aristotle’s views from ancientsources, with a strong emphasis on the harmonising approach.

Yet Syrianus was a great admirer of Aristotle, while also following hisown teacher in many respects (at in Cat. 34.14 Simplicius reports he isfollowing the text of Iamblichus). Syrianus presents philosophy as a formof revelation and gives Socrates the role of a saviour.100 In his commentson the Phaedrus (notes authored by Hermeias) ‘Socrates is referred to asa “saviour” who seeks to bring back souls who have fallen from the divinecompany of the gods’.101 So the beneficial ‘madness’ claimed by Socrates inthe Phaedrus becomes linked to the inspired knowledge philosopherspossess (cf. above p. 141 [Proclus]). Thus the Pythagorean inspiration isclear, as is the theological focus of Syrianus’ thought. In this, then, he isclose to Iamblichus, continuing the pagans’ attempt to offer an alternativeto the Christian salvation of humankind.

References to Syrianus are sporadic in Simplicius and borrowings arenot always well signposted (a typical case is in Phys. 213.24ff. which I shalldiscuss below). Most quotations are marked by his name, which occursabout twenty times (3 in DC, 10 in Cat. and 9 in Phys.); the majority ofthese references involve both paraphrase and quotations. Simplicius isshowing great respect towards Syrianus, as is clear from epithets such as‘the philosopher’ (in Cat. 23.13, 164.4, in Phys. 635.12), ‘most philosophi-cal’ (philosophôtatos, in Cat. 3.9), ‘the great Syrianus’ (ho megas, in DC 2.6and 397.29, in Phys. 192.29, 213.24, 241.22, 618.26), ‘most judicial’ (kri-tikôtatos, in Cat. 199.17). Some of these look rather perfunctory orconventional: why call him a philosopher, which seems all too obvious?Why use a traditional epithet if these are school books? It is of coursepossible that the term is used because Syrianus was no longer alive. Therespect suggested by such labels is borne out by most passages, sinceSimplicius is not expressing any strong disagreement in contexts wherehe mentions Syrianus. It raises the question which of Syrianus’ works area source for the paraphrases and quotations. Syrianus could have been


159

available to Simplicius directly and indirectly, e.g. via his pupil Proclus.Very few statements are given as possible quotation (in Cat. 72.10, 164.6-12, 199.17ff., 231.11-12, in Phys. 635.12), which does suggest direct accessas less likely. Whatever the source, there are some distinct appearancesin the text which we should briefly review to get a sense of Syrianus’ rolein Simplicius.

Simplicius reports that Syrianus and his followers did not follow Alex-ander’s proposal for the purpose (skopos) of On the heavens (in DC 2.8-9).This already indicates how different authorities can disagree and be seento do so when they become included in Simplicius’ review of the debate sineira et studio. Syrianus’ views on the universe are selectively noted, e.g. onthe immortality of the universe where Simplicius subjects the Aristotelianargument to a review and offers Syrianus’ suggestion, that immortality isthe activity of the god, because it has ‘reverted towards intellect’ and longsfor immortality by seeing it (in DC 397.29-30), as an alternative view. ButSimplicius may also cautiously propose minor adjustments to the viewstated, as when he talks about the elements and their properties (in DC711.26-7, note mêpote 26f.). In the in Cat. smaller issues are mentioned,all for support of individual points (72.6; 72.10 with quotation; 164.4-5;199.17, etc.). For the in Phys. some passages signal strong agreement withthe master, although he does not appear until late in the commentary onthe first book (192.29) on the issue of first principles, and an objectionagainst his (Neoplatonist) reading at 193.16-19. In this case the termino-logy clearly betrays the late technical rephrasing of Platonic doctrine in anew framework:

In this context it should in addition be said against (pros) the words of themost philosophical Syrianus,102 that if he takes excess and defect (tên hyper-okhên kai elleipsin kuriôs akouei) in the specific sense, the appropriateantithesis would belong to quantity only; for in the other categories it alsoexists by way of quantity.

During a discussion of the main opposition of principles, in particular formand lack of form (‘privation’), Ammonius, Alexander, Porphyry and Syri-anus’ ideas are scrutinised and the latter’s notion of opposition (quoted192.29-31) is questioned in relation to the categories. A few lines later theobjection against Syrianus is extended to Alexander as well (193.4). Theagenda for this discussion had been laid out at 191.13-17, bringing forwardfour points which are all dealt with in the subsequent pages on the basisof the authors mentioned – which suggests that their points have in factset the agenda. Finally, we have seen that the value of Alexander was sogreat in Syrianus’ mind that he would not write a full commentary on theMetaphysics, because a good one was available already.103

The ‘nameless voices’ mentioned above deserve some further attention.There is at times a striking number of terminological and stylistic vari-


160

ations which strongly suggests that different authorial voices are presentin part of his in Phys. In book 1 for example Simplicius is expected torepresent much of the preceding tradition and so he mentions certainnames, but the terminological evidence as well as the stylistic differencesfrom one section to the next indicate that there is even more intrusion thanone might have thought (and of course the situation is not as clear as within Cat.). As we saw in Chapter 4, some TLG searching confirms Alexan-der’s influence, but in book 1 we have intrusions without his name beingmentioned. In addition Plotinus, Iamblichus (name at 192.14) and Syri-anus (name at 192.29) seem to loom behind certain passages.

A passage where Syrianus’ own words probably underlie much of whatlooks like paraphrase is at 213.25ff., an implicit use not indicated in Diels’apparatus to the text.104 The reasons for taking the passage as a (near)quo-tation, despite the lack of clear markers in the usual verbs for introducingquotations (discussed in §2.1.3) are manifold. The most significant reasonis the quite marked changes in vocabulary and style, signalling that thisis a very close paraphrase (hence: near-quotation) of Syrianus’ words (Ihave tried to indicate this by giving some of the terms used in roundbrackets):

And the great Syrianus also seems to accept such an (213.25) interpretation(exêgêsis): Perhaps there is this division of the things that come to be in asubstantial way. The shape is the form and substance of the statue, but notits quality. For the form becomes different but not by way of alteration, if astatue came to be from a sphere. If, however, he had received the other forms,how did alteration in the strict sense, being a change in terms of quality andwith a substrate remaining unaltered (atreptos), include the substrate’sradical shift (katatropên) there, which is according to substance? How was itreasonable that after getting rid of the other types of generation he gets backto them again? If he did just that, for what reason did he not accept(parelaben) all in the list, which he had mentioned earlier? Also he men-tioned the [category of] relative, the [category of] when and [category of]where. And yet the exegete agrees that this division is also (213.35) uninter-mittent (aparaleipton).

Although this passage looks like a near-quotation, I have not used quota-tion marks because it is not clear where the quotation finishes. The lexicalelements do however strongly point to Syrianus as the source for thispassage.105

In some ways Simplicius’ style also contains signs of oral presentation(see, e.g., 214.13, 216.10), which could mean that Simplicius is usinglecture notes going back to any of the aforementioned Platonists (unlesswe assume they are his own notes taken at lectures as a student). Thiswould be an easier explanation than to conclude that his language some-times has an oral appearance, again raising the question whether this isconnected to his time as a student or his own role as a teacher. Most


161

scholars assume that he never taught again after 529 CE. Should we inferthat his expansive but straightforward paraphrases of Aristotle are justone mode of expression, and the Neoplatonist interpretation of the text(with a high rate of technical terms) another, both genuinely his? Thesignals of personal views (oimai, moi dokei, e.g. in Phys. 207.19, 22, 26)may suggest this. Verb forms in the first person plural are also found, forinstance at in Phys. 184.29 there is an unexpected use of mathoimen ‘wemay learn’ (the only other cases are 413.25 and 470.1). A similar but morefrequent phrase is mathêsometha, ‘we shall learn’.106 Are these signs of oralteaching? Or is it a so-called plural of modesty (pluralis modestatis) inaddressing an (imagined) audience of students? Their casual insertion intothe narrative does not allow for a clear answer, while their overall fre-quency is not high enough to make it a significant sample (see n. 106).Presumably this means that we can use it equally well as possible evidencefor actual teaching as for imagined (or prospective) teaching.

The terminological traces that allow us to detect such ‘intrusions’ mustbe the immediate result of the method of composition and use of sourcesavailable to Simplicius.107 As identifiable cases seem more terminologicalthan stylistic, they can be taken as signals of influence in a strong sense:in these cases the density of technical terms rises dramatically and morequestions are included, marking a significant change in presentation ofthe argument. This can be caused by oral presentation or lecture notes –not surprising since there is good evidence that many commentaries arosein the classroom, where posing questions or puzzles aand inviting alterna-tive explanations of passages are part of everyday practice. Yet all alongmy argument has been that Simplicius’ works do not quite fit this pattern(for historical and textual reasons): the formats commonly found in othercommentaries, such as apo phônês style, question and answer, aporia andsolution, and problêmata, are on the whole quite different from what wefind here.

It may be asked, then, whether Simplicius, in constructing his commen-taries, is (also) using lecture notes he took down himself from his time asa student, or someone else’s. And we cannot exclude that such lecturenotes were reworked and adopted into commentary proper, as has beenshown for Proclus.108 The tools to look into such a vast issue are of limiteduse. The results from electronic text searches make Plotinian influencelikely, but probably via Damascius who often goes unmentioned. Forinstance, very rare words crop up for which lexical resources (LSJ, TLG)bring up only Simplicius and Damascius as potential sources.

Often the commentators will note two readings of a passage and try tomake sense of both, to the consternation of modern textual critics, whowant them to choose the ‘better’ reading and dismiss the worse.109 As a partof their teaching, the Platonists are taking advantage of alternativereadings to help educate the students on how to interpret Aristotle, and sothey explain both versions. Unlike this general feature of Platonist com-


162

mentaries, Simplicius’ reports of close contemporaries seem different.Although as before he does not accept their views mechanically, hishabitual doubts are less pronounced in some matters.

A second influence was Ammonius (d. 517 CE), a pupil of Proclus, whotaught in Alexandria and ended up a controversial figure as a result of thedifficult situation in that crowded and religiously divided city. The accu-sation of Damascius (Philosophical history F118B) that he was implicatedin the betrayal of some pagans, while he himself was allowed to continueteaching, landed him with the reputation of having struck a deal with thebishop in Alexandria.110 Simplicius consistently refers to Ammonius as ‘mymentor’ (ho emên kathêgemôn, perhaps ‘spiritual leader’) and confirmspersonal contact with him (in DC 462.20, emou parontos). Simplicius maywell be reporting from lectures, since most of the statements by Ammoniusare introduced by verb forms in the past tense. He was influenced by himon matters of cosmology, in particular the thesis that Aristotle’s God wasan efficient cause.111 In this connection Simplicius refers to a (lost) work byAmmonius, ‘a whole book � offering many proofs that Aristotle considersgod also the efficient cause in the whole universe’ (in Phys. 1363.8 biblionholon � pollas pisteis parekhomenon etc.). He admits that he has takenover some of Ammonius’ points, but refers the reader to the book itself fora fuller treatment (teleioteran didaskalian, 1363.11-12). It is intriguinghow he assumes the availability of this work (exesti labein, ibid.) which hasnot survived.

In contrast to Alexander’s very frequent and explicit appearance, wefind a more shadowy presence in the commentary in the figure of Sim-plicius’ teacher and colleague Damascius. Damascius’ role is not alwaysacknowledged by Simplicius, except for the sections dealing with time andplace (the so-called corollarium de loco and corollarium de tempore).112 Inthese two Corollaries of the Physics commentary, Simplicius addresses theideas of Damascius more explicitly. Interestingly, his position is a mixtureof acceptance and mild criticism. On place, a two-dimensional surface forAristotle, Simplicius follows the criticism of Theophrastus who wants adynamic instead of static concept, and with Damascius he gives place thepower to arrange the parts of the world which is viewed as an ‘organism’with ‘members’ (place is defined as ‘good ordering’ at 644.10-11, and ‘ameasure of position’ at 645.4-6). Iamblichus already had postulated thatplace holds things together, giving each thing a unique place which moveswith it. Simplicius and Damascius hold that the power to arrange mem-bers of an organism is assigned to place (e.g. 636.8-13, 637.25-30).113 Thushe accepts the dynamic understanding of place as advocated by Iam-blichus, Syrianus and Damascius, but disagrees with the notion that placeis the measure of positioning and size for things (e.g. in Phys. 625.28; 627.2and 14-15).114

Sorabji has argued persuasively that Simplicius goes beyond the Theo-phrastan interpretation, which was taken up by Iamblichus and


163

Damascius.115 In the first excursus Simplicius disagrees with Damascius’idea that measure – a kind of mould (tupos) ‘into which the organismshould fit’ – gives things size and arrangement. Each thing has a uniqueplace (idios topos) which moves along with it (629.8-12). A second excursusto book 4, on time, responds to Aristotle’s plain rejection of the paradoxeson whether time exists at all (according to Aristotle its parts do not, so timeitself cannot), and whether an instance can cease to exist. The latePlatonists posit higher and lower time, the former being ‘above change’ asIamblichus maintained: the higher kind is immune to paradox, while thelower kind is a stretch of time between two instants. Simplicius reportsDamascius’ solution, but merely agrees that time exists as somethingwhich continuously comes into being, divisible in thought only. In thediscussion on the continuum (Phys. 6) he adds his own solution that timeis infinite (without beginning or end), if viewed as a cycle. Simplicius endsup moving away from Theophrastus’ position regarding the control of anorganism’s parts (left to form, not place as Damascius would have it).

In a more oblique way Damascius’ presence is found in other parts ofthe commentaries, and although more work is needed, some tentativecomments can be made. A close reading of the text will reveal terminologi-cal variations which strongly suggest the presence of different authorialvoices in, for instance, the second half of in Phys. book 1, as we already sawin our brief discussion of Syrianus.116 Of course Simplicius can be expectedto represent much of the preceding tradition and he mentions certainnames, but the terminological evidence as well as the stylistic differencesfrom one section to the next suggest that there is even more intrusion thanone would suspect at first (and of course the situation is not as clear aswith the commentary on the Categories). Alexander’s presence could ofcourse easily be confirmed by searching the corpus electronically for hisname (TLG CD-ROM E) even when his name is not mentioned, but inaddition Plotinus, Iamblichus (name at 192.14) and Syrianus (name at192.29) seem behind certain passages. One passage where I have strongsuspicion Alexander is in play (partly unacknowledged) is in Phys.196.10ff.

A major difficulty here is that this section of in Phys. (1.5-9, pp. 179-258Diels) is almost virgin territory: little work has been done on this part,mainly because the first book attracted the attention of those hunting forPresocratic fragments, which limited the immediate interest to the first170 pages or so. Checking previous ACA volumes by index has only limitedeffect, as such oblique or subtle influences on the writing style andinterpretation of Simplicius by Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus havenot been recorded.117

It is thus not easy to establish whether we should simply assume thatSimplicius’ expansive but straightforward paraphrases of Aristotle arejust one mode of expression, and the ‘Neoplatonist’ interpretation of thetext another, both genuinely his. Signals of personal views such as oimai,


164

moi dokei would suggest this (e.g. 207.19, 22, 26 etc.).118 As we sawabove, the style in certain parts also indicates oral presentation (p. 162)which could mean that Simplicius is using lecture notes going back toany of the aforementioned Platonists; this would be an easier explana-tion than to conclude that Simplicius sometimes uses oral language,since most scholars agree that he never taught again after 529 CE, atleast not publicly.

One example can round off this argument about ‘anonymous’ intrusionswith rather tentative results. At 197.12-15, in a long analysis of theprinciples of physics, we find the unusual intrusion of technical termswhich strongly suggest the involvement of Damascius in framing thenarrative for this material:

And Empedocles at least, although he had assumed two in the oppositionsfor the elements of hot and cold, dry and wet, united them (sunekoruphôse)to the one [opposition] of two, that of Strife and Love, just as that of necessityto the monad. But the latter [operates] as one, yet Strife and Love as two,and not only as efficient [causes], but also as elemental [causes] such as[197.15] dissolution and aggregation: for it is of equal power to these.

It is again the lexical evidence (underlined) that arouses suspicion here.For instance, the compound verb sunekoruphôse is late (cf. 206.25; apek-oruphôse 126.3) and could, given the context, be a calque on the nounkoruphê in Empedocles F24.3 (= Plutarch On the obsolescence of oracles418C) and F157.4 (= D.L. 8.65). However, Simplicius may also be takinghis cue from Damascius, who uses the verb at Problems and solutions onthe principles 54 and Theological arithmetic 16, himself in turn perhapsworking from Iamblichus, Theological arithmetic 20.7 where the topic isthree-dimensionality.119 Simplicius reports this some pages further alongin the commentary (209.33-210.5):

While going over the first difference with reference to the object he says thatwhat survives [in change] is the substrate, but [210.1] what departs from itsnature is the privation, finding this the main difference and clearly thecausal factor (aitian). For the substrate, because it is not the opposite to theform, remains while moving towards it. But the privation which is oppositeand incompatible (asunaktos) with it [i.e. eidos], changes completely whenthe form comes upon it. Next he adduces [210.5] the difference according tolanguage, [�]

The term translated ‘incompatible’ (asunaktos) occurs only here and at1174.29 (asunakta) in his polemic against Philoponus (does it originatewith Iamblichus? Damascius?). These cases illustrate how the layers andcomponents in Simplicius’ commentaries still require further study: evenif he is seen to give sources and quotations for most named references,there are many cases in which he does not, a state of affairs which could


165

have many explanations (lack of revision, sign of inconsistency, interpola-tions, manuscript corruption). This multi-layered nature of his exegesiscannot always be disentangled or unpacked into its constitutive elements.Yet our heightened awareness of the possible complexities and layers willkeep us from simplified inferences about the origin of the different voicespresent in the text.

5.4 Two outsiders: Galen and ThemistiusWhile the Platonist predecessors exerted a considerable (yet selective)influence on presentation, argument and style of exegesis in Simplicius’commentaries, other authors from outside the Plotinian tradition alsocontributed. Strictly speaking, these are of course outsiders (i.e. not partof the so-called ‘golden chain’), yet Simplicius has reasons to bring theminto the discourse. It is worth asking what purpose this could serve, ifindeed it is of his own doing. For instance, Simplicius at one pointintroduces some objections (to be discussed shortly), which he presents asan interaction between the physician and Platonist Galen (129-c. 219 CE)and the rhetorician and philosopher Themistius (317-387 CE): the formerwas a Platonising physician pre-dating Plotinus and using advancedexegetical strategies to merge Platonic natural philosophy with Hip-pocrates’ medical theories; the latter was a fourth-century Aristotelianwho wrote interpretive paraphrases of Aristotle’s works.120 Both werequite independent thinkers and commentators, and their role in Sim-plicius is worth looking into, if only to illustrate how widely he cast his netto find useful resources in his exegetical activity. In the case of Themistiuswe know that he wrote ‘creative paraphrases’ on Aristotle’s On the soul,Physics, On the heavens.121 After detailing some significant passages I shalltry to assess their role and importance in Simplicius’ commentaries.

The first appearance of Themistius for in DC comes at 62.12 where heand Alexander are mentioned in a discussion of the natural motion of theelements in the universe. It is clear from further references in the ensuingpages (62-72) that Simplicius refers to Themistius’ work in his polemicagainst Philoponus who adduced him for support. In most cases referencesare brief and his suggestions seem presented as an alternative, e.g. at63.19 after the added requirement Simplicius discussed just before (11-18). At 72.10 he gives his epithet as euphrades, ‘eloquent’. It is of interestto note that Simplicius is aware of his Aristotelian leanings (70.10, sum-phônôs tôi Aristotelei), but highlights a case where Themistius prefersPlato’s view, notably on whether Plato defined ‘up’ and ‘down’ in absoluteterms (in DC 69.9-10). In other passages too Philoponus’ use of Themistiusfor supporting his own arguments is rejected as frivolous and causingThemistius to contradict Aristotle (kakoskholôs Themistion pros ton Aris-totelên sunekrouse, in DC 131.21), and Simplicius is able to build onThemistius’ own words (autos phêsi �, 22-4) to counter this misuse of the


166

Paraphraseis. In the next lines Simplicius defends Themistius’ view byendorsing the implicit reference to the Physics as known to Themistius(eidôs, 25).122 Similar appearances at 176.30-177.9 and 188.6,26,30 confirmthis strategy of mounting a defence for Themistius (based on his ownwords) against his improper use by Philoponus. Clearly, then, in thiscommentary the occurrence of Themistius is triggered by his role inPhiloponus’ commentary, while we can see at the same time that Sim-plicius claims direct access to Themistius’ work in the process of refutingPhiloponus.

The situation is different for in Phys. The first appearance of Themis-tius comes at 42.12 (again with his epithet euphrades ‘eloquent’), a rathersudden mention concerning the lemma to Phys. 184b18, in which thosewho claim more than one primary cause in nature (the ‘pluralists’) arediscussed, and in particular Democritus. Themistius’ paraphrase (para-phrazôn) is here given as an explication of the division of types in Aristotle,presumably because he elaborates on it (principles are ‘either <being>moved, he says, or unmoved and either limited in number or againinfinite’, 42.12-13). This is followed by a reference to Eudemus (42.13-17 =F33b W., with a link back to 22.15) and Alexander (18ff.).123 Charac-teristically, there is no decision as to whose comments are to be preferred.His next appearance is at 44.1, again among a multitude of commentators,who ‘all agree that Aristotle was of the view that Democritus posited thatthe elements � are of the same genus’ (43.28-9). Here Themistius is placedalongside Porphyry as proposing a different wording; both also seem toconcur on where book five ends (they apparently had the same version),while Alexander had additional text in some manuscripts (in Phys. 918.13-15). Frequent coupling with Alexander also occurs, mostly showing themin agreement (in DC 62.11-12, 176.32, in Phys. 169.24, 400.1-2, 414.17-18[textual issue]124, 864.15, 950.4 [textual issue], 1253.7 [textual issue]) or ascomplementary voices (in Phys. 70.32-3), but only rarely as disagreeing (inPhys. 684.2-3: change is of like into like; 854.20 [text variant]; 968.30).

Thus Simplicius’ inclusion of Themistius is confirmation of the latter’sadded value, despite what the later term used to characterise his works(paraphrasis) might at first suggest: Themistius’ interpretive ‘para-phrases’ do contribute to the exegetical tradition, following his ownwell-stated justification that simply repeating what had been said beforewould be futile (in APost. 1.2-12).125 Whether or not Simplicius was awareof his considered views on how best to clarify Aristotle, he shows a keeninterest in his views and had direct and indirect access to his works.

For Galen the evidence is perhaps best described as patchy and some-what disappointing. Simplicius refers to him as ‘the highly learned Galen’(in Phys. 1039.13, ho philologôtatos Galênos), a description we wouldsubscribe to, especially in the light of recent scholarship that has eluci-dated Galen’s skills as a philologos and philosophos over and above hiscontributions to medicine.126 If we add in Phys. 708.27 where he is called


167

‘the amazing Galen’ (ho thaumasios Galênos) and 718.14 where he is ‘themost learned Galen’ (ho polumathestatos Galênos), one would think thatSimplicius is showing great respect on the grounds that he has readGalen’s work and was suitably impressed. However, Simplicius’ descrip-tion does not seem to be based on direct and broad familiarity with Galen’sworks: the epithet is an anomaly (a hapax legomenon in Simplicius’commentaries) and the passages he occurs in are limited in number, withone title and few quotations of significance.127 Galen’s pioneering work asa commentator (on Hippocrates) and his use of certain well-known topoiin commentary can thus be excluded as a direct influence on Simplicius,and one suspects that the labels used here are taken over from someoneelse.128

One reference discussing intervals and quoting from Galen talkingabout the clepsydra (573.19-23) ends in a rejection of his suggestion thatone is to ‘suppose � that no other body flows in’ to take the place of thewater flowing out. Simplicius chides him for this question-begging pro-posal when the purpose of the inquiry is to see ‘whether there can be aseparate interval’ (24-5). There is no mention of a source in this context,but we know that Galen wrote on the clepsydra in connection with hisresearch into relevance of the pulse for medical diagnosis (On the use ofthe pulse, On the differences of the pulse). Another passage which givesmore than a brief mention is found at 718.14-719.22, where in the discus-sion of time Galen’s objection on the issue of ‘before’ and ‘after’ is given(‘saying that time revealed itself’), to which a comment by Themistius isadded, which proposes to eliminate this objection by two arguments. Onereply is that ‘before and after in change are not respectively before andafter in account of time but rather create the before and after in time’(19-21); the second is Aristotle’s point relating time to the categories,namely that ‘before and after is first in place, then in position, then inmagnitude’. Next an extraordinary (hypothetical) riposte on Galen’s partis given:

In reply to that Galen would say that the before and after in change followingon that in the magnitude over which the change takes place is chiefly inposition; for the before and after in magnitude was of that kind. (tr. Urmson1992)129

Themistius has a second point to bring in, arguing that time is notself-revealing: he accuses Galen of rejecting the position on precisely thegrounds that should have compelled him to accept it. Since Galen consid-ers time as ‘nothing other than the before and after in change’ (719.5-6),he should not protest against calling before and after just that merelybecause ‘before and after signify nothing beyond the temporal’ (4-5). Theissue Themistius raises seems to be that before the creation of time onecannot speak of ‘before’ and ‘after’.


168

We are left in the dark as to what Simplicius’ source is and the passagemay have been clearer in its original (fuller) version. But while thealtercation between Galen and Themistius looks rather compressed, Sim-plicius gives enough of this discussion to show that his interest lies withpossible objections and their solutions. As a strategy of fortifying Aris-totle’s theory (or what he takes this to be), this makes perfect sense, sinceit will anticipate possible attacks by dealing with objections (‘weak spots’)beforehand. In the light of these findings we can understand why Galen’sappearances in Simplicius’ commentaries are rather marginal and unpre-dictable, while Themistius’ role seems confined to the polemic againstPhiloponus and comments on textual issues. In this case Simplicius seemsunaware of their ambitions and achievements in writing commentary.

5.5 Platonist exegesis from Plotinus to SimpliciusHow will the preceding survey of earlier commentators help us in ourunderstanding of Simplicius? We have seen that Simplicius has managedto incorporate a cornucopia of sources into his detailed commentaries.Incredible as this may seem, this enormous structure of ideas and argu-ments serves a higher purpose, the preparation of the human soul toascend to god by acquiring comprehensive knowledge of the universe byway of studying the ‘sacred’ books of Platonist thought. Commentary onAristotle will lead to the next stage of reading Plato, who as ‘the prophetof the Creator’ (in DC 106.6 prophêteuein, cf. Julian Letter 61c, 423c)reveals his thoughts and deeds. Comprehensive knowledge for Simpliciusseems to imply the use of all relevant sources available and as far back aspossible. Harmonisation will be a necessary corollary of this position.

The issue of harmonisation is a long-standing one among the Platonists,giving those involved a range of arguments and approaches to deal withperceived difficulties. The tendency to harmonise grew in importancewithin a ‘framework of consensus’ regarding the corpus of books givenspecial significance.130 Recent studies on the Platonic tradition have ex-plored this controversial aspect, to illustrate the details of this traditionin Middle Platonism (Karamanolis 2006) or to show that Aristotle was stillconsidered a Platonist among late Platonists (Gerson 2005a,b). It is crucialto be clear what harmonisation means: it must not be taken to mean thatthey agreed on everything, but rather that they have a lot in common and– upon closer inspection and with the proper exegetical tools and/orapproach – much more than traditionally has been acknowledged.131 AfterAntiochus and Plutarch of Chaeroneia it was above all Porphyry whoattempted to show the role Aristotle could play in the study of Plato, andit has been argued convincingly that this initiated a continuous effort tofind ways of harmonising Plato and Aristotle.132

In the period from Plotinus to Proclus exegesis could be expressed indifferent ways, and harmonisation was not always the focus. Plotinus had


169

criticised Aristotle on many points in the process of elucidating or defend-ing Plato: he disagreed with him about the nature of the soul, thedefinition of the categories, the use of substance (ousia) for both the pureForm and the enmattered form and this inconsistent notion of eudaimo-nia.133 We find him attacking Aristotle (and Stoic) views without a clearstatement of the relationship between Aristotle and Plato, although heseems implicitly to assume that they share many views. Porphyry wrote awork entitled How Plato and Aristotle are in agreement (Hadot 1974). Withregard to the notion of harmonisation Simplicius often makes use ofmusical metaphor to express this idea of agreement as a kind of attune-ment (e.g. sumphônia ‘harmony’, sunaidein ‘sing in tune’, i.e. ‘agree’).Proclus had used a similar metaphor when he used the phrase ‘[a] choirwho sing the truth of the divine principles’ (Platonic Theology 1.1).

My analysis in this chapter leaves much unexplored regarding the roleof the predecessor exegetes in Simplicius. What emerges is a quite variablepicture of their influence on terminology, format and doctrinal perspec-tive. Each of these aspects deserves further study. Clearly Simplicius’basic position, which is to give quite a comprehensive account of availableinterpretations, makes a description of his method in this respect acomplex and expansive topic. Now that the core task of Platonists was toexplicate a particular set of texts, the commentary had become the reposi-tory of the views of many generations, thus accumulating many layers ofinterpretation and engaging texts in a dialogue. Hankinson’s commentsabout this ‘centuries-old tradition of Platonist hermeneutics’ are veryapposite:

It is startling, as well as stimulating and refreshing, to see Aristotle throughsuch an unfamiliar lens; and it may help serve as a valuable correction to thetendency to suppose that the Aristotle of the modern analytically-trainedhistorian is the only intellectually respectable one.134

The relationship between Simplicius and his predecessors in philosophicalcommentary can thus be described as one which enriches our perspectiveon, and knowledge of, possible approaches to Aristotle. The first stepstaken in this study to map out the different strands and influences willeventually sharpen our understanding of his originality in his exegeticalactivity. The late phase of Athenian Platonism reveals certain fascinatingshifts in emphasis doctrinally and will require more interdisciplinarystudy, in particular on the importance of its responses to the Christiancontext, as we are about to find out (Chapter 6). The immediate target ofshowing how Aristotle’s system was to be understood in the light ofPlatonic thought served the further purpose of strengthening the Platonistpoint of view, which itself was a means to an end. In this Plotinus,Ammonius, and Proclus had shown the way. Simplicius reveals sufficientfamiliarity with their works and arguments for him to have been influ-


170

enced in the main direction of Neoplatonic thinking. The climax of hiscommentary on Physics shows quite clearly the strong appeal to Am-monius in showing how Aristotle (supposedly) considered god both a finaland an efficient cause, a position that exhibits the Platonist colouring ofthe Peripatetic view. On more specific issues Syrianus and Damascius arebrought into play, but both are assessed critically, despite the honorificepithets and other seemingly hagiographical labels.

The lofty tone (prayer) with which Simplicius ends places the emphasison the ultimate purpose of Aristotle’s philosophical system (metaphysics),showing how eventually all that has gone before contributes to the grandscheme of a theological nature: the return to, and unification with, theOne. Rational theology in the guise of philosophical analysis would pre-pare the soul, assisted by authoritative interpretations of the visibleinstantiations of the One, i.e. the universe and everything in it. Becausethe understanding of the universe requires interpretation, which in Pla-tonist terms more often than not means ‘uncovering, revealing’, manyminds are consulted and many voices allowed into the debate. How thisprocess of assimilation and clarification cannot always unfold harmoni-ously will be explored in the next and final chapter.


171

6

Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius:Defending Pagan Theology

� in practice a religion is just a fossilized philosophy – a philosophy with thequestioning spirit suppressed. (S. Blackburn, Plato’s Republic: a Biography2006: 1)

The role of polemic in Simplicius is an important element within thebroader rhetorical context of the purpose of his commentaries. As has beenwell illustrated by Hoffmann, his philosophical discourse becomes espe-cially aggressive on an issue of immense importance to him. Polemic isthus a useful but underrated aspect to assess an author’s involvement inthe problems treated. There are two sides to this notion: polemic can beused as a rhetorical device to attack an opponent’s views, but it can alsobe used to gauge whether or not the presumed understanding of theopponent’s views emerges from an interpretive effort. In the first case thecritique tends to be external to the issue, in the second it can be usefullyemployed to understand what the interpretive basis is for his critique. Inthis chapter I shall argue that Simplicius follows a venerable tradition inthe use of polemic within philosophical discourse, but also that the motivefor the intensity of his polemic needs to be viewed within a specificallyrhetorical context to do with his defence of paganism. I will briefly clarifyboth points.

The earliest exegetical activities in ancient Greece were in part shapedby the competitive and oral nature of philosophical discourse among thePresocratics and Sophists in the sixth and early fifth centuries BCE.1 Forthe Platonists in late antiquity the role of polemic is of course no longerone of emerging philosophical perspectives and terminology as it wasoriginally, yet it is one that can drive and support the overall project of thecommentator when he is trying to make his case against rival interpreta-tions in the strongest way possible. In interpreting texts critique andpolemic are to be considered not only as a means for refuting opponents,but also for strengthening, directly or indirectly, one’s own position. As wewill see, polemic served an even more important role in Simplicius’ strat-egy of promoting Aristotle and Plato as preferred pagan theorists.

The heated arguments we find at times in Simplicius’ commentaries area useful measure of his commitment to the questions under scrutiny. Theyshow how these long works are far more than scholarly schoolbooks. Whenthe temperature rises, his engagement is more deeply felt, and this Isuggest gives us a glimpse of his fighting spirit when it comes to issues of

172

fundamental importance to him.2 As will become clear, Simplicius has alot riding on his spirited defence of Aristotle, since the stakes have becomevery high for pagan philosophers to present their views on many impor-tant issues, in competition with Christian views. The Athenian school hadbeen forced to cease its teaching activities in 529-30 CE, which meant theend of the long tradition of institutional Platonic philosophy. This was amajor blow for pagan philosophy with lasting consequences.3 The cele-brated debate with the Alexandrian Christian Platonist Philoponus, inparticular the question whether or not the world had been created, standsat the heart of the conflict, the more so because Platonist philosophy andChristian doctrine become merged in his opponent’s exposition. For thiscentral case of our present enquiry I am not so much focussing on theinteresting philosophical details (as do Hankinson, Hoffmann, Sorabji,Wildberg and Mueller),4 but rather on the religious nature of the motiva-tion for this debate. I shall argue that the polemical drive behind thearguments has a very specific influence on them. Other ‘skirmishes’ canbe adduced, but few are as well documented as the one aimed at Phi-loponus. I will start by briefly giving some background to clarify how I seethe role of polemic in philosophical discourse (§6.1) before I discuss theattacks on ‘the Grammarian’, as Simplicius likes to call Philoponus (§6.2).I return to Alexander briefly in a further section to illustrate somepassages in which Simplicius seems to dissent while still giving fullquotations – an unusual state of affairs which requires clarification (§6.3).The conclusion will underline the importance of the polemical mode ofargumentation in Simplicius’ commentaries which culminated in his vig-orous defence of Aristotelian theology. I will conclude that Simplicius’summa of Greek philosophy is the result of his religious zeal in a symboli-cal battle over the spiritual hegemony of the ancient world as he knew it.5

6.1 Polemic and philosophy:a very brief history

The use of polemic by philosophers goes back a long way, but it is notalways acknowledged that there is an important link between interpreta-tion and criticism. To present a critique of someone’s view presupposessome act of interpretation. Disagreement more often than not relies on thepresumption of knowing better. It is therefore hardly surprising thatphilosophical interpretation involves polemic. In fact, the main reputationphilosophers had in antiquity is that they never agreed on anything.6 Toillustrate the persistence of this role of polemic in the rise of interpretivestrategies I shall briefly review the evidence which reveals the extent andimportance of polemical confrontations from the earliest beginnings ofphilosophical enquiry.

When Greek natural philosophers set out to clarify the world, theirapproach was radically different from Homer’s mythical accounts. Refut-

6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius: Defending Pagan Theology

173

ing opponents meant proposing alternative causes or material constitu-ents to explain the natural world. Fragmentary texts show imaginativeindividuals proposing bold explanations of the world by postulating cer-tain primary stuffs as the origin of everything (Thales: water;Anaximenes: air; Heraclitus: fire). Before long a competitive spirit beganto encourage philosophers to probe the linguistic expression of their rivals’positions, thus also exploring an interpretive and argumentative route intrying to assess whose explanation was superior.7

Such interaction signals the new role of polemic in the interpretation ofboth the world and the word. For instance, Xenophanes (c. 540 BCE)famously criticised the Homeric gods (F14-16 DK) on the good groundsthat an anthropomorphic depiction saddled them with human featuresunbefitting divine beings (jealousy, greed, etc.). No doubt Xenophanes’awareness of his audience and of the value of persuasive rhetoric alsoplays a role here, since his polemic may aim at both refutation andpersuasion. Different approaches to interpretation can be identifiedamong the Presocratics, ranging from more systematic explanations ofearlier philosophers to highly polemical refutations. As mentioned, Empe-docles (c. 500 BCE) was clearly trying to take up the challenge ofParmenides’ arguments against the possibility of motion, but he went farbeyond a polemical refutation by giving his own comprehensive and sys-tematic explanation of the physical world and its genesis. Theagenes’allegorising interpretation of Homer was in part a defence against themoralising criticism levelled at the poet by Xenophanes.8 Heraclituswanted to counter the misguided idea among his predecessors that ‘know-ing a lot of things’ (polymathia F40 DK) would amount to understandingor intelligence (noos). He draws an interesting contrast between theamount of information (polymathia, a quantitative notion) and the rightkind of interpretation (noos, a qualitative notion). Such critical assess-ments clearly illustrate the competitive nature of philosophical debate andpresuppose a shared sense of purpose: to give an explanatory account ofthe world, but (unlike Hesiod or Homer) a rational one.

It is in the fifth century BCE that clear evidence for a second-orderdiscourse (in the sense of a text talking about another text) is found inphilosophical circles. This is a period in which different strands fromrhetoric, religion and philosophical discourse contribute to this new formof ‘commenting on’ other people’s views as a self-conscious and self-con-tained activity: a written text was viewed as objectivised thought, lendinga more fixed character to words and thoughts which had been fluid andexpressed in various ways when transmitted orally (Yunis 2003). To tracethis new trend we need only look at the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle asthe clearest cases of the new frontier (see also next section). Word gamesand more meticulous analyses, assisted by writing, raised awareness ofthe processes of thought and argumentation, leading on to linguisticstability and semantic differentiation. For example, terms for types of


174

writing proliferate, and soon distinctions between comments (hypo-mnêmata) and preparatory notes (hypomnêmatikon) helped describe thecompositional stages of interpretive works.9 In a relatively short period of100 years (480-380 BCE) this trend helped to crystallise certain existingtechniques in rhetoric and emerging philosophical argumentation intowhat was to become philosophical commentary: it involved the methodicalevaluative scrutiny of existing philosophical views with the purpose ofpushing forward the search for the truth.10 Thus polemic progressed andwas absorbed into systematic dialectic. By the time Plato and Aristotleforged their theories of the natural world or morality or metaphysicalprinciples, they would reject many views of their predecessors. Polemicscontinued to play a significant role in philosophy after Plato.

Of course, polemic and refutation are often biased forms of interpretation,but they will nonetheless be based on an interpretive act (or the presumptionof such an act), going some way to sharpen the mind and method of those whoengage in it.11 Therefore these different early forays into exegesis, no matterhow embryonic in character, led to a considerable rise in works with aninterpretive objective aimed at refutation and response.12

From the post-classical era onwards commentary became a more well-defined activity which cannot be considered merely parasitic uponphilosophy; it is an essential part of doing philosophy. It is an exercise inunderstanding the works of the school’s founder with the further aim ofunderstanding the world. Authority plays a major role here, and manycommentaries simply present their activity as a natural extension of theschool founders, with Plato and Aristotle as the prime examples of worthyauthorities.13 Over time, ‘authorities’ multiply in exegesis. But the furtherwe move away from the source, the less likely it is that the original textwill be openly challenged.

With the rise of longer exegetical works in philosophy, interpretiveactivity continues to include deciding on the meaning of a philosophicaltext in the light of doctrinal positions and their supporting arguments. Butwhile known techniques continue, there is an increase in the self-conscioususe of polemic to establish one’s own position. Ideally such choices aremade in a dispassionate way, judging the arguments and relevant infor-mation on their own merit. In reality the critical assessment of argumentsmore often than not include a critique of particular views of individuals.Refuting them is one step in the right direction in the process of developingone’s own views. This is especially relevant when it concerns contempo-rary views: their critical evaluation often forms part of a heated debate,not necessarily immediate and personal, but certainly linked to real-lifeconfrontations. Plotinus already had to polemicise against contemporar-ies, in particular the Gnostics:

But we have addressed what we have said so far to our own intimate pupils(gnôrimous), not to the Gnostics (for we could make no progress towards


175

convincing them) so that they may not be troubled by these latter, who donot bring forward proofs (apodeixeis) – how could they? – but make arbitrary,arrogant assertions. Another style of writing would be appropriate to repelthose who have the insolence to pull to pieces (diasurein) what godlike menof antiquity have said nobly and in accordance with truth. (Enn. 2.9.10.12-14tr. Armstrong 1966).

His awareness of different styles in expressing and defending one’s viewsis clear, as is the rather ‘lively’ manner of debate. Broadly speaking, themajor philosophical issues in the debate between Platonists and Chris-tians come under three headings: first, ‘the elevation of faith above rea-son’; second, ‘three points found unassailable by the amateur Platonistphilosopher Synesius of Cyrene’, namely the eternity of the world, thepre-existence of the soul and the resurrection of the body; and third, ‘theproblems of Incarnation � and of miracles’.14 It is the eternity of the worldthat Simplicius and Philoponus chose as their battleground, on the heelsof Proclus who had tried to prove once and for all that the universe wasindestructible.

6.2 Against the Christian Philoponus: defendingPlatonism or paganism?

It seems to have been the custom in antiquity to avoid mentioning contem-poraries in writing, although there are exceptions. Identifying the anony-mous opponents is not always easy, but in the case of Simplicius’ attackon the ‘Grammarian’ we are well-placed to discuss the details. The conflictbetween Simplicius and Philoponus has already attracted considerableattention in the scholarly literature, so my aim is to further the discussionby concentrating on the intensity of the debate in the light of my earliercomments on polemic. In addition, I will place particular emphasis on thereligious nature of this specific conflict as a symptom of a much broaderissue: the intellectual victory of Christianity over institutional pagantheology. Philoponus set out to attack Aristotle in his work De aeternitatemundi contra Aristotelem, and his ingenious method of turning the argu-ment against the pagans in his defence of Christianity’s position that theworld was created caused Simplicius a lot of trouble.15 Simplicius had toensure that he could neutralise or refute the arguments Philoponus hadformulated, and he used every means available. The theological issue wasto be decided by way of philosophical and rhetorical weapons. I am skatingover a lot of thin ice in the early part of this section, because the subject ofpagan-Christian interactions is vast and complex. Here I am merelyattempting to set the scene for the debate with Philoponus, although myemphasis does not represent a generally accepted view.16 The clash be-tween Christian and pagan intellectuals was not new, but the early sixthcentury shows a new urgency. Simplicius’ massive commentaries suggest


176

that he took up the challenge to defend pagan theology, and his historicalawareness of some of the previous struggles and crises must have drivenhim to write these elaborate comments as the only means available to him.To illustrate this urgency as he might have experienced it I will mentionsome significant moments in the rivalry between the two.

Interactions between Christianity and paganism started soon afterChristian communities formed in the late first century CE.17 The earliestcontact we hear about was between individual Christians and Romanauthorities: Nero’s scapegoat strategy after the fire in Rome (64 CE) gaveChristians an unwelcome negative exposure to the wider Roman public,and Pliny’s correspondence with the Emperor Trajan is one famous exam-ple, Paul’s trial in Rome another, of the way in which the new religiousfervour of a Jewish splinter group found little understanding for their‘stubborn superstition’.18 As Christian communities grew (exemplified forinstance in Paul’s letters to Rome, Corinth and Ephesus), the ‘dialogue’became more doctrinal and intellectual. Alexandria contributed much tothis development, simply because the intellectual pagan community wasboth an example for a learned spiritual outlook and a competitor for anaudience. Before long the emphasis was on exegesis of sacred texts (Sep-tuagint, the gospels).

The new scholarly approach gave the Christian intellectuals a morecompetitive edge: here too polemic became an important tool to downgradepagans and talk up the new faith. The martyrs were their ultimate‘weapon’. A well-known case of someone converting because he was soimpressed with the Christians’ willingness to die for unfounded beliefs isJustin Martyr (100-165 CE). The interest in Greek philosophical thoughtalso grew, partly because their education was Hellenic, and partly becauseGreek thought was admired for its strengths in rhetoric and reasoning.19

But the Platonic heritage was being claimed as poorly representing Chris-tian doctrine, and a competitive streak soon entered the debate over thedoctrines of Platonism.

It would seem therefore that tracking the progression of exegeticalstrategies in the early centuries CE also charts the ongoing religiousstruggle between pagans and Christians, at least on the intellectual sideof the debate: not only did the pagan schools of thought need to be mindfulof the spectrum of theological alternatives, but they also had to make sureto clarify the value of their own position, increasingly so after Christianityhad been endorsed by the state. Plotinus wrote his sharp polemic aimedat the Gnostics (Enn. 2.9, Against the Gnostics – a title added by Porphyry,cf. V.Plot. 16), probably to avoid being confused with them on account ofsome similarities in doctrine; Porphyry’s long work against the Christianswas burnt and hence almost completely lost (except for some fragmentsand responses in the church fathers),20 and several others in the Platonisttradition sought the ideological confrontation on paper as well as in reallife. The notion of the ‘golden chain’, a continuous succession of Platonist


177

thinkers, looks rather similar to the important issue in Christianity of theapostolic succession since the Church’s foundation by Jesus. Eunapius’Lives of the philosophers and sophists, full of scathing remarks against theChristians, was intended to compete with the lives of saints (see esp. Lives471-2); and as we will see, the issue of the divine nature and timelessnessof Christ looks remarkably similar to the question of the eternity of theworld discussed by Proclus and at the core of the polemic between Sim-plicius and Philoponus; as mentioned in the previous chapter, Syrianus’image of Socrates took on soteriological features, depicting him as asaviour of humankind which had ‘fallen from grace’.

The closure of the Platonist school in 529 CE thus needs to be seen asthe culmination of a long process of growing tensions between the paganand Christian communities, ever since Constantine had exempted theChristian faith from execution (313 CE) – a decision which would eventu-ally result in Christianity being endorsed officially by the state at theCouncil of Nicaea, producing the Nicene Creed (325 CE). In less than ahundred years the winds had changed and pagans came under threat:while Porphyry had argued c. 300 CE that ‘Christianity is an illegal way oflife (zôn paranomôs)’, Theodosius issued a law in 392 CE which madepagan cults illegal.21 During its first two hundred years a growing numberof intellectuals among Christians made a considerable difference in howthe sect became a more serious force to be reckoned with. Learned menraised in the Hellenic educational system such as Clement of Alexandria,who died c. 215 CE, and Origen, started the scholarly defence of thisdoctrine which until then had been expressed in simple and crude lan-guage; as a movement open to all it had been vilified by its critics as asuperstition for the ignorant. The second and third centuries illustrate thedivisions among Christians, which made Jerome and Eusebius even morekeen to unify the church. Celsus in his Alêthês logos (‘True Word’) hadlaunched a fierce attack on the Christians, as transpires from the counter-arguments in Origen. Celsus exploited the comparative method brilliantlyto argue that all their claims had been taken from Greek philosophers,reversing the claim of Clement and others that the Greeks had stolen theirinsights from them.22 Origen and his students had developed the allegori-cal method as a tool for interpretation – a tactic that allows considerableroom for manoeuvre in exegesis. Although not new, allegory was now putto use in the battle for dominance in religious matters. Unfortunately, thepersecution of pagans has not yet been properly investigated, as Athanas-siadi has recently pointed out, so my comments will be rather tentativeand sketchy.23

By the time Justinian closed the Academy, antagonism had been grow-ing for a considerable time and the pagan camp was losing ground fast. Anumber of Platonists had had a brush with Christian groups and authori-ties on several occasions. These ‘conflicts’ indicate how difficult it becameto maintain a pagan stance in an increasingly Christian world; conflicts


178

raged inside and outside both camps, caused by sectarianism, prejudiceand ignorance, because it proved harder and harder to differentiate thesects and ‘philosophies’ that were around.24 Plotinus, reluctant to userevelatory texts, preferred philosophical analysis: but, as mentioned ear-lier, he had to ward off accusations of being a Gnostic (Enn. 2.9).25

Porphyry’s attack on the Christians (Against the Christians) was a learnedrefutation of their beliefs based on detailed knowledge of the Bible, whichis why the Christians considered it the most dangerous of all and tried todestroy it by burning as many copies as they could find.26 In Alexandriatensions rose to dangerous levels, with Christians, pagans and Jews livingat close quarters and in continuous tension, and with the church appropri-ating pagan temples, the pagans created counter-strikes (e.g. bybarricading the Serapeium c. 391/2 CE). After aligning herself with aChristian faction against the bishop Cyril and falling victim to a rumourcampaign, the Platonist Hypatia was killed in the street near the Cae-sarion, a former temple of the emperor cult, by a mob of religious zealots(March 415 CE).27 At the same time it must not be forgotten that otherreports speak of pagans turning on their own when they considered theirviews or acts ‘heretical’.28

Clearly Alexandria was an unruly place and religion was one area inwhich partisans became easily over-excited about these matters.29 TheAlexandrian Platonists were under much pressure in these circumstancesand the competitive spirit shines through in some added features of theirdoctrines. Celsus, a Platonist, had fuelled the conflict with his anti-Chris-tian treatise, which we know indirectly from the response by Origen(185-254 CE). The tensions must have been more widespread: in AthensIamblichus did not shy away from viewing Pythagoras as more venerablethan Jesus and Syrianus cast Socrates in the role of a saviour of souls,openly competing with the Christian saviour and re-defining the paganholy man as someone with superhuman powers.30 Before him Porphyryhad already caused unrest and, much like Celsus, had poured scorn on theuneducated ‘ramblings’ of Christians, revealing the inconsistencies andtrivialities in their teachings. Porphyry’s attack was so devastating be-cause he knew the Gospels and Old Testament very well and because heused all his acumen and dialectical skills to show up the logical weak-nesses in their doctrines.31

In the 480s Ammonius came to Alexandria to find the school ‘a collaps-ing and illegal professional institution’.32 He survived a conflict withAlexandrian authorities over a strange incident: when a student of Horap-polo’s elite school bought a baby and presented it as ‘divinely grantedoffspring’, he was found out, causing a conflict in which a detractorappearing at the school condemned his blasphemy.33 Proclus had sufferedtemporary exile for a whole year when his political activities causedtensions with the Christian authorities.34 Damascius, the last head of theschool (or what was left of it) had revived the school, but lacked the


179

flexibility and local contacts to save the school from disrespect and even-tual exile in 531 CE.35

All these cases send a strong signal regarding the ongoing animositybetween the ‘state religion’ and the traditional pagan religion, the dwin-dling influence of pagan philosophical sects and the growing isolationPlatonists found themselves in, whether in Rome, Athens or Alexandria.Brown and Fowden have rightly emphasised the importance of the paganholy man. But in a forceful description of the way in which pagan leader-ship failed in the late fifth and early sixth centuries, he makes clear thatthe isolation of the Academy came about because of the learned nature ofthe late Platonist outlook. At the end of his first section Fowden sums upthe crucial reason for their diminishing appeal:

This pervasive spiritual and intellectual traditionalism, together with theassociation that the pagan mind instinctively made between holiness andknowledge of God, ensured that familiarity with the divine world was ineffect limited to those capable of standing on the shoulders of the giants ofthe past – in other words, to the learned. This observation is bound to be thestarting-point for any attempt to write the social history of the holy paganman; for this sense of attachment to Greco-Roman cultural and religioustraditions predetermined his human milieu and even his attitudes of mind.36

The demise of the pagan spiritual outlook as a legally viable stance seemedunavoidable and it is therefore not surprising that Simplicius and hiscolleagues found themselves with their backs against the wall. As Doddshas remarked in his usual perceptive manner: ‘In the fourth centurypaganism appears as a kind of living corpse, which begins to collapse fromthe moment when the supporting hand of the State is withdrawn from it.’37

Different sensibilities and issues were at stake, but it is clear that we aredealing here with a conflict over religious issues, a theological debatewhich despite its academic and high-minded nature cannot be regarded asmere philosophical discourse nor dismissed as theoretical musings be-tween intellectuals, but should rather be viewed as a matter of convictionand life choice. It has often been thought that the conflict was one betweenmonotheism and polytheism, but it is perhaps better to say it concerned aconflict between logismos (reasoning) versus pistis (blind faith).38 The factthat a group of men seeking wisdom (one way to interpret philosophos)used logic and argumentative tactics does not justify playing down theiractual objective to offer a vision on life, the mind and the universe,ultimately framed by the firm belief that everything is subordinated togod(s).

Thus the competitive aspect became a dominant factor in the develop-ment of pagan and Christian modes of self-representation and interaction.We can once more take Dodds’ judgement as our guiding principle whenhe characterises this discourse as follows:


180

While Origen and his successors were endeavouring to supplement authorityby reason, pagan philosophy tended increasingly to replace reason byauthority [�] after Plotinus Neoplatonism became less a philosophy than areligion, whose followers were occupied like their Christian counterparts inexpounding and reconciling sacred texts. For them too pistis became a basicrequirement.39

This debate clearly gained in momentum and animosity during the thirdto fifth centuries and the description reveals how this particular discoursegenerated a curious ‘inverse cross-over’ between the two parties. Thisreinforces the importance of the religious and spiritual sentiment at theheart of the Platonists’ intellectual endeavours: it should not be relegatedto the realm of spiritual mysticism given the religious and intellectualclimate of those early centuries of the common era. Nor should their useof logic mislead us into thinking that they were nothing more than‘philosophers’, let alone philosophers in the modern (analytical) sense ofthe word.

The Platonist school in Athens became very much like a circle of‘charmed men and women’, an embattled sect which saw it as its task todefend the pagan theological outlook by philosophical and rhetoricalmeans. The weight of their massive output and lasting influence easilymisleads us into thinking they attracted great numbers, but the evidencepoints in the opposite direction: for all its expansive and wide-ranginglearning late Platonism was a very small affair, as we see, for instance, inSynesius’ letter (Epist. 136), in which he complained about the lost gloryof intellectual life in Athens by c. 400 CE, a passage well worth quoting:40

Athens has no longer anything sublime except the country’s famous names!Just as in the case of a victim burnt in the sacrificial fire, there remainsnothing but the skin to help us to reconstruct a creature that was once alive– so ever since philosophy left these precincts, there is nothing for the touristto admit except the Academy, the Lyceum, and – by Zeus! – the DecoratedPorch which has given its name to the philosophy of Chrysippus. (tr. A.Fitzgerald 1926)

From the stray remarks in the biographical material and the fifth-centurycommentaries we learn that a combative spirit became part of the Platon-ists’ outlook, and it would seem that to be polemical and on the defencewas the most common driver for their writing activity; Syrianus’ aside inhis commentary on the Metaphysics is a case in point, when he states: ‘onecould call us fighters, since we defend the best and most beautiful ofphilosophies from the charges brought against us’ (in Metaph. 81.8-10).41

We should also not forget to what extent the Platonists competed inlifestyle with the Christians: asceticism and continence were very impor-tant as was the notion of orthodoxy. For the latter we know of a case at thetime of Proclus (late fifth century) in which a philosopher called Domninus


181

was struck off the list of diadochi for introducing his own ideas into theclarification of Plato. He fell subject to damnatio memoriae, the expungingof his name from all records; comments by later heads, such as Damascius,were ‘harsh and scornful’.42 Clearly there were heretics on both sides of thefence.

Against this background Simplicius’ rather angry treatment of hiscontemporary Philoponus (c. 490-565 CE) becomes even more under-standable. It will prove to be an extreme example of his polemical style andstrategy, but more importantly, it can also be read as a symbolic momentin what is probably his last-ditch attempt to make a stand on behalf of thepagan intellectual world view. No doubt this description gives his subjec-tive view of the situation rather than a truthful account of the actualdemise of pagan philosophical religion (hence my use of the word ‘sym-bolic’). Compared to the other critical evaluations he wrote, this case is notreally representative of the general style of polemic in Simplicius, but it isespecially informative for the importance of the religious motivation forhis philosophical exegesis.

Hoffmann’s excellent pilot study has led the way in understandingSimplicius’ polemical procedure better, but it does not seem to explainfully the intensity of the invective. We can add to the existing explanationssome comments on the fierceness of the polemic: many aspects of the wayin which Simplicius goes up against Philoponus are unusually aggressiveand ad hominem. Yet the reasons for the invective are actually notabsolutely clear, unless perhaps we take some contextual factors intoaccount. Mindful of the pagan-Christian relationship sketched above, Iwant to suggest that we can use the religious nature of the debate toapproach this issue, since it has been unjustly neglected due to theemphasis on the philosophical aspects of the commentaries. The latterview seems to be the result typical of a ‘history of the victors’ (Christi-anity) as well as the appropriation by modern philosophers of theseformidable thinkers as rationalists with a few negligible flaws (e.g.magic, mysticism).43

The role of prayer may illustrate how important the religious aspect oflate Platonism is. It is striking (though hardly surprising) that Simpliciususes prayer at specific points in his commentary; for instance, the com-mentary on Physics opens by emphasising how the accurate knowledge ofnature produces a form of awe about the creation (5.18-20, akribous katanoêseôs eis thauma) and a ‘sympathy, insight and hope with regard to god’(pros ton theon sumpatheian kai pistin kai elpis asphaleis) and his com-mentary on On the heavens mentions a work ‘on prayer’ by Aristotle(485.21 = F49 Ross), in which he claims that Aristotle knew of a transcen-dent intellect. The commentary as a whole has been dubbed ‘a paean to theCreator or Demiurge’.44 The passage at the start of the commentary onPhysics just mentioned can be read as saying that the study of nature is aform of worship (5.15-20), whereas in the climax of his argument of in


182

Phys. 8 he refers to Aristotle as singing the praises of ‘the prime mover asmind, eternity and god’ (the verb used is humnei). Here ‘physics’ slipsseamlessly into a religious mode of reverence and worship. Plotinus hadalready expressed some thoughts on prayers (Enn. 4.4), and Proclus, who alsoheld prayer meetings and wrote hymns to the gods, including Asclepius, Isisand others, wrote a short work on the subject (Marinus V.Procl. 19).45 Theneed for an internal spirituality is also clear from the criticism by Simplicius’teacher aimed at contemporaries: Damascius chided those who think them-selves good philosophers when they know rhetoric and syllogisms, but haveinternalised very little of the correct spiritual attitude.46

The precedent for this attitude is of course Plato, who in the Timaeushas the protagonist state the need for a prayer before beginning theirenterprise of describing the universe (27C) or who in the Phaedrus hasSocrates utter a prayer to Pan and ‘other deities’ (279BC).47 This may looklike a rather mechanical or fortuitous act of reverence, but the latePlatonists developed this behaviour into a core component of their theo-logy, one that was clearly different from the popular attitudes to prayer.Iamblichus is probably the best example to illustrate the complexitiesinvolved:48 he developed a strategy by which there are three types of prayerwhich relate to three stages of meditation in the process of unification withgod. What is remarkable is that prayer becomes like transcendentalmeditation in which the praying subject has increasingly less control overthe process, but must await ‘contact’ from above. Still, a precondition isone’s preparedness by way of correct sacrificial procedures, making thisversion of prayer more ‘theurgic’ than conventional prayer.49

Proclus may serve as another brief example, though the list of examplescould be extended. Proclus provides a helpful hint at what by his time wasconsidered the goal of such prayers: in the fragments of his Chaldaeanphilosophy he speaks of an ascent which aims at ‘participation in the fruitsof divinity and self-illuminating fulfilment, which is the vision of God’.50

Clearly such activities were considered important and they help remindus of how limited our knowledge of school practices is. While we canobserve that those studying late Platonism in recent years have acknow-ledged its importance, it will still be good to spell out how (to varyBlackburn’s comment with which I opened the chapter) this religiousphilosophy ‘with its questioning spirit not suppressed’ plays a role inSimplicius’ works, because it was very important for the overarchingobjective of Platonist philosophy.

So what is Simplicius’ strategy in his attacks on Philoponus? At leastfour connected aspects deserve our attention: in the debate over the natureand creation of the world (1) Simplicius regards Philoponus the Christianas a traitor to his school, but also (2) shows his annoyance becausePhiloponus goes against Aristotle whose views on the cosmos have greatauthority, his works having the status of sacred books (comparable to theBible’s status among Christians); further (3) Simplicius must be regarding


183

Philoponus as an influential author whose training has given him accessto the Platonist writings so that Simplicius’ agitated tone reveals hisexasperation over the fact that Philoponus might actually clinch the powerstruggle between pagans and Christians on a philosophical level; finally(4) Simplicius’ use of rhetorical and argumentative tools assist in charac-terising the debate. In other words, it will help to view the debate againsta background of the animosity between pagan and Christian philosopherswho are competing for the same audience. It is here that the analysis alsohelps to clarify how this debate is a symptom of the demise of paganphilosophy.

We have to be clear about what the real issue is. The specific questionSimplicius and Philoponus concentrate on is the eternity of the world. InAristotelian terms this position rests on arguments concerning both thebeginning and the end of the universe.51 It became a major bone ofcontention in the religious debate for centuries. Is this a matter forphilosophy or religion? As it happens, for both: Greek cosmological aetio-logies in general deal with theological issues of fundamental importance,and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover (Phys. 8) is a prime example of naturalphilosophy merging with metaphysics and theology. The religious debatethat is being played out here concerns issues of primary causes, newdevelopments in Platonism (including the issue of harmonisation) andquestions concerning the real differences between pagan and Christiandoctrine. We should also not forget that real fears of the world coming toan end, part of the prophetic religions of the time, gave such a debateadded significance. Yet not all Christians rejected Aristotle’s view, as forinstance in the case of Synesius of Cyrene (c. 370-c. 414 CE), who after hisconversion could maintain that the eternity of the world (Aristotle) was‘not incompatible with the notion of a divine Creator and Providence’.52

The issue of allegiance and conversion was not new and could occur inboth directions. Social, political and religious dimensions could contributeto people’s motivation, but conversion was still considered an act ofdesertion (as the technical term automolô indicates).53 Philoponus is gen-erally thought to have converted rather suddenly from a Platonist to aChristian (a thesis now disputed, on which more below), and he is one ofmany examples of men in Alexandria who remain Platonists after declar-ing themselves Christian. It seems plausible that Simplicius enters intothe bitter rhetorical mode we find in his commentaries because he re-garded Philoponus the Christian as a traitor to the pagan cause onreligious and philosophical grounds (in DC, in Phys.). This style of attackmay have been informed by numerous earlier cases of polemic and vitriol.One may think of Porphyry’s Against the Christians (c. 300 CE), whichapart from being condemned to the fire twice, elicited fierce and immedi-ate responses in Methodius of Olympus (d. 311 CE), Eusebius (275-339 CE)and Apollinaris of Laodicea in Syria (d. 390 CE).54

The attack on Philoponus is aggressive. He is accused of talking non-


184

sense (in DC 30.26-34, cf. 58.14f., 190.15-22), or called a ‘raving swine’ (inDC 156.25). But we should note that despite this aggressive tone, Sim-plicius is not content simply to vilify Philoponus. As we have seen manytimes before, he emphasises the need for proper quotations and refutationof the arguments. He states repeatedly that he feels compelled to quotePhiloponus’ words verbatim:

Since I suppose some <readers> will not believe that any would-be authorcould be so illiterate as to be ignorant of these matters, I am forced again tocite what he has said � (F54 tr. Wildberg 1987, my italics)

Philoponus’ conversion was highlighted by Verrycken, but it has receivedrenewed attention more recently with an emphasis on the religious dimen-sion of his circumstances. MacCoull has made the point that some ofVerrycken’s arguments aiming to show that Philoponus experienced asudden change are part of the theological debate among Arrianists. Heraccount is thus quite different from that of Verrycken, who sees Phi-loponus as undergoing a conversion, a change of mind from Platonism toChristianity.55 MacCoull, however, argues that this so-called conversion ofPhiloponus is ignoring his deeper commitment to religious matters veryearly on, and should be explained as one stage in a natural progression ofhis religious development. The polemic with Simplicius serves an over-arching objective to defend a particular position within the debate of histime, that of the Monophysite nature of Christ. The debate over the natureand creation of the world as (un)created and (un)perishable is perhaps adistant parallel or echo to the Arianist conflict over the nature andcreation of Christ.

Philoponus’ works show that he was keen to argue against the Platon-ists following Proclus’ 18 arguments on the eternity of the world as well asagainst the Nestorians, a Christian group which he considered ignorantand wrong-headed, hence open to the charge of heresy.56 His main purposewas to align pagan philosophical arguments with Christian doctrine. Theissue of the eternity of the world was in fact ‘one of Christianity’s mostphilosophically embarrassing pieces of dogma’.57 By contrast, it was acentral part of Platonist philosophy since Plotinus, who clarified how tointerpret the creation myth in the Timaeus ‘allegorically’ (Enn. 3.5.9 seesthe work as compatible with the eternity of the world). It was therefore nowonder that this particular issue would generate such a passionate debatebetween the protagonists of both camps.

Despite the ad hominem attacks Simplicius also makes an effort tooppose the arguments as well as bring forward additional viewpoints. Heinforms us that Ammonius had already argued that Aristotle saw God asa creative cause, not just a final one – a possible sign of the later compro-mise between the Platonist view and that of the Christians.58 Simplicius’new points are of interest in that they show his attempt to use his


185

opponents’ view against themselves: for instance, at in DC 370.3-5 hepoints out that even the ‘godless’ (atheoi) place the divine in the heavens.Of course the attempt to reconcile Plato, and in particular the four pureelements in heaven, with Aristotle’s fifth element is one of the tensions tobe resolved in this debate.59 The other points made above seem in no needof elaboration: his anger seems to build on the assumption that Philo-ponus’ work could be damaging and underlines the importance heattributes to this conflict.

Simplicius’ rhetorical and argumentative tools consist of a range ofdevices to demonstrate, as already stated, that Philoponus is a despicableperson and a bad philosopher. Central to his attack against Philoponus arerhetorical terms and imagery which have been clarified in more detail byPhilippe Hoffmann.60 In it he distinguishes several categories, of which Ishall briefly review some aspects before I assess their value for my ownargument.

First, the use of invective is lavish and direct: Philoponus is called‘narrow-minded, a user of empty words, insolent, shameless, immature,emotional, ignorant, dishonest’. To go to such lengths makes one suspectthat there is an audience for such smears to be heard and appreciated andthat Simplicius is taking this debate very seriously. Secondly, the consis-tent use of indirect address (‘that man’, ‘the Grammarian’) adds effectivelyto the negative ‘smear campaign’ which attracts attention to the object ofscorn without mentioning his name, on occasion extended by wordplay. Ithas been suggested, quite plausibly, that the term grammatikos, a lowlyposition in social terms, was adopted deliberately by Philoponus as ‘nomde gueux’ (my term), both to signal humility as a Christian and to hint athis task as instructor of basic ideas.61 Moreover, it is not certain thatSimplicius is harbouring a personal grudge: he may just be thinking of hisaudience and how to educate them.

We may also contrast the characteristics attributed to Philoponus withthe required attributes of the ideal commentator (quoted above §1.2.1).This can help us understand that the personal attack aims to show thatPhiloponus has a range of moral and intellectual shortcomings: ‘Phi-loponus crows in vain against the divine bird of Zeus’ (in DC 42.18);‘Philoponus is a greenhorn, a novice (nearos) � talking newfangled non-sense (nea phluaria, 201.7)’; ‘Philoponus’ ignorance is boundless,unacquainted with Aristotle and exegetical tradition’; ‘Philoponus is irra-tional, a late learner (opsimatheis), not a lover of learning (philomatheis)’;‘he drowns in the flood of eristic chatter and logorrhoea’; ‘the Grammarianis after vainglory (kenodoxia), blasphemous, boastful’ and so on.62

Secondly, the use of literary and mythological allusions shows how aconsidered literary style is applied: their effectiveness lies in the range ofthings alluded to, including Plato’s works, which always proved to be agood way of enriching the attack. As to imagery, Hoffmann has highlightedthree interesting cases: first, there is a reference to ‘Gardens of Adonis’,


186

which Plato (Phdr. 276B-D) referred to as paidia ‘play things’ – suggestingthey are infertile little gardens doomed to die. This makes the doctrine ofPhiloponus look rather ephemeral and not serious: Christianity will notsurvive, while pagan views are unshakable. Next, there is the story ofHerostratus which symbolises vainglory (kenodoxia), a quality despised byPlato, suggesting he deserves a ban on his name. And finally there is amention of the Augean Stables, one of Hercules’ labours, which adds adistinct mud-slinging quality to the literary mode of attack (tr. Hoffmann1987b, 69):

since this individual who gives himself the title of Grammarian clearly seeksonce again to persuade his peers to think of the world as destructible and ascreated at a certain moment in time; since he flies up against those who showthat the heavens are uncreated and indestructible; since he releases a greatmud-bath of arguments against the claim of Aristotle – come let us call themighty Hercules to our aid, and let us get down to cleansing the filth whichis contained in the arguments of our adversary. (in DC 119.7-13)

I do not know how, when my intention was to clarify Aristotle’s On theheavens, I have tumbled into the Augean Stables. (in DC 135.31-136.1)

since this Grammarian has amassed a bed of dung, let us call Alpheus alongwith Heracles and purify, so far as we can, the souls which have admittedthis filth. (in Phys. 1129.29-1130.3)

It is clear that this polemic against Philoponus is dominated by strongdislike of his positions and that Simplicius believes his ideas have adeleterious effect on people’s minds. But why the rudeness? The broaderhistorical context has to be brought in, since the participants in thisparticular polemic represent the two major camps of theological debate atthe time: pagans and Christians. A salient detail here is of course thatPhiloponus is both a Christian and Platonist. His inside knowledge of latePlatonism would give him an advantage in attacking their ideas.

The general view of Christianity among late Platonists was also drivenin part by social and intellectual snobbery: Christianity was for the vulgarmob; Christians are not Greeks, but foreigners; they are ‘atheists’ (atheoi,cf. in DC 370.30) and ‘evil vultures’.63 Clearly the high-minded disdain ismixed with plain prejudice, but the exaggeration can also be explainedfrom a rhetorical perspective. Once the decision to attack is made and thetarget identified, all means are allowed, especially when the stakes arehigh. The assumption has to be that the audience plays a significant partin all this, either because they are ‘stakeholders’, that is, actual or poten-tial participants of either religious side, or because they are somehowinstrumental in how these religious positions are perceived. The situationalso makes clear that even if Simplicius was in Athens, he was well awareof the works of Philoponus, written in Alexandria. Since the commentaries


187

have been dated to 517-20 CE, it is likely that he got hold of copies whilestill in Alexandria. This does not answer the question how he got hold ofPhiloponus’ polemical works, which have been dated to the late 520s andearly 530s.64 We may still assume that a didactic element plays into thepolemical approach. The overall impression one gets from these elementsis that for Simplicius much depended on the refutation of this opponent.65

So we can agree with Hoffmann that the polemic against Philoponushas a religious motivation, but we must also point to its fierceness, whichcomes from the importance of the issues for Simplicius arising from theparticular context: his efforts to preserve and defend the Platonist per-spective may in his view have stood for the whole of pagan rationaltheology in contrast to and competition with Christian doctrines. Herecognised that Philoponus was not ‘constructing a systematic, positivetheory of creation ex nihilo, but a systematic, negative critique of Aris-totle’s arguments’.66 The political pressure applied to the AthenianPlatonist community in 529-32 CE in the guise of an educational policy,and the brief trip to Persia of the seven hopefuls must have contributed tohis feeling of frustration and despair over the chances that Platonismwould survive. A return to Athens where there still was a ban for pagansto teach would not have helped either: he would have been an isolatedfigure with a lot of time on his hands, enough to write long commentarieson his cherished authors.67

6.3 Extensive quotation and disagreement:Alexander revisited

When we studied the frequent occurrence of Alexander in SimpliciusChapter 4, we found that there were frequent expressions of dissent. Theserepresented cases in which disagreement was not always very strong (orat least not strongly expressed), and in numerical terms the majority ofcases showed Simplicius in agreement with Alexander. In this section Ireturn to Alexander to discuss a few interesting episodes in which thedisagreement is more engaged. My criteria for inclusion here are particu-larly long quotations (10 lines or more) and comments in which somedisagreement is voiced or suspected. The length of the quotations can betaken as a significant indicator of Simplicius’ special interest in thepassage under scrutiny. The phenomenon is also further proof of hisconsidered use of quotation, as length is correlated to the evidentiary valueof the text and the force of his argument. This has not yet been looked atand we now know that this unusual treatment is mostly true for Alexan-der. As announced in Chapter 4, this will challenge the view that Alexan-der was not subject to unexpectedly long quotation as in the case of thePresocratics.68

A further reason to discuss Alexander in connection with Philoponus isthe link between them as suggested by Simplicius’ language. Among the


188

Alexander references there are some which can easily be read as puns onPhiloponus’ name (philoponos, ‘lover of toil’). This type of allusion couldevoke in an informed reader a connection between Alexander and Philo-ponus which we may label a ‘good cop, bad cop’ approach. The ‘ironic pun’is achieved, as Hankinson has already suggested,69 by the well-timed useof the adverb philoponôs, for instance at in DC 316.3-5:

thus Alexander painstakingly (philoponôs) expounded and opposed the senseof ‘generated’ to those of ‘ungenerated’. But perhaps the first sense of‘generated’, which is the most genuine, is also opposed to the third sense of‘ungenerated’ �

For this example the allusion works very well on account of the topic atissue: as we saw Philoponus was taken on for his attack on Proclus’arguments in favour of the eternity of the world; by characterising Alex-ander’s manner of analysing the meaning of the word ‘generated’ and itsopposite as philoponôs, the allusion could be picked up by the attentivereader with the added benefit of being especially effective because hisanalysis includes the genuine sense of ‘generated’. This indicates thatSimplicius agrees with Alexander, who is thus implicitly presented as thetrue philoponos. Two further instances indicate that this is not a system-atic punning on his arch-enemy’s name, but they can nonetheless be readas praise for Alexander and further oblique criticism of Philoponus. Thefirst of these (in Phys. 129.32) concerns a compliment of Alexander’scollecting of syllogisms related to ‘place’ (topos), the second (ibid. 291.21)mentions Alexander’s painstaking quotations of Geminus taken from anepitome of Posidonius’ Meteorology.70

While the adverbial tag is a clear sign of respect for Alexander, the quitelong quotations from Alexander may by themselves be taken as an implicitsign of this attitude. To illustrate the use of long quotations, showingSimplicius’ keen interest in, and privileging of, Alexander’s work, I shallselect for further discussion a few significant passages from in Phys. (3)and in DC (2), in which Alexander is criticised. This part of Simplicius’approach has not received the attention it deserves: the long quotationsfrom other commentators are as a rule brought in to support or confirm aposition, yet in these cases he also attacks his most reliable and trustedguide for the Aristotelian corpus.71

The first passage, in Phys. 403.14-22, introduces Alexander at a pointin the comments on Phys. 3 in which Aristotle deals with the definition ofchange and finitude of the universe.72 Change, Aristotle is taken to say,takes place in things and cannot be separated from the things changed.This close link to things introduces a reflection on the process of abstrac-tion and how in physics this cannot be applied to the full. In addition, thediscussion of change is linked to the categories, to which there is nocommon genus, that is, they do not all share a property that would allow


189

them to be classified together. Aristotle is also compared to Plotinus inregarding change as not a genus, perhaps, Simplicius speculates, becausehe saw that some people would count it ‘among the categories’ (403.9-10).A quotation is then given in which Alexander makes plausible the pointthat ‘some things in the same genus can be equivocally named’, an issueraised by Simplicius. Alexander’s argument is rather witty, as he uses asexample two instantiations of a man by the name of Alexander, saying

perhaps nothing prevents some things that are in the same genus beingequivocally named. Surely the Alexanders that are in the category of sub-stance, both the picture and the man, are still named the same equivocally.

He goes on to give other examples to make the same basic point, one onrelation (‘being equal’), the other on place. It would seem, then, thatAlexander here serves to reinforce the argument with minor adjustmentsin discussing the same case made at in Cat. 331.23ff. when he discussedincidental and intentional homonymy.73

A second passage at in Phys. 511.30-512.9 introduces Alexander at apoint where Simplicius has been talking about geometric proofs andprefacing his account by approving the generally accepted importance ofgeometry (510.18-20). The broader context is a discussion of the unlimited,and the issue whether the postulates of geometers really prove that ‘thereis an unlimited magnitude inexhaustible in increase’. Simplicius is keento disprove the possibility of an unlimited magnitude and may haveconsulted Proclus on this matter.74 He then reports Alexander’s reflectionon the first theorem of Euclid’s Elements. Alexander is said to have askedhow this theorem was not refuted ‘if it is not possible to extend a straightline or to draw a circle also beyond the universe’. It is a case in whichAlexander raises a question and then answers it. It is the second part, theresponse (512.2-9), which is quoted by Simplicius (tr. Urmson 2002):

Since that is unlimited of which, taken as a quantity, there is alwayssomething to take beyond, as has been proved, it is clear that mathemati-cians assume that the lines that they assume to be unlimited are such thatthey can be increased. For those lines are unlimited beyond which there issomething. But one cannot increase the diameter of the universe. So theysuppose them as less than the diameter, which they assume to be limited,since those to which they can add and which they can extend are unlimited.

The first theorem of Euclid almost seems a mathematical version of theproblem of infinitude in that it implies the finite nature of a line,75 and thequotation shows how their treatment, in particular the use of certainassumptions, is set against allowing the actual unlimited. The passageaims to clarify that there are two modes of reasoning; in this shortargument conceptual thinking and mathematical objects are contrastedwith actual objects/space. The conclusion is that ‘he who abolished unlim-


190

ited place and place in general in no way impedes graphic proofs’. Mathe-matics, it turns out, serves as a model of abstraction and is used to put inrelief how one can reason about the unlimited (hypothetically). The criticalstance is less prominent here, in that Simplicius presents Aristotle ashaving put the reasoning of Alexander on its head (512.10-36).

A third and final example from in Phys. gives us what must be one ofthe longest quotations to be found in the commentaries, an almost continu-ous quotation of 47 lines at 770.22-771.23.76 This excerpt is part of theconcluding section discussing time in Phys. 4. It contains a discussion ofnumbers and sets of substances: Aristotle tries to explain how sets suchas ten dogs and ten sheep are the ‘same’ in number, but not in substance.Simplicius is here especially keen to spell out why Aristotle took up thistopic a second time, saying ‘not because he was given to excess verbiage,but because he is trying to articulate more exactly about it, as being opento many objections’ (770.14-15). Earlier he had made another comment onAristotle’s style of exposition, which shows perhaps how difficult this topicwas considered to be: ‘Aristotle was accustomed to help those who wereseeking a knowledge of the truth but not grasping it accurately by givinga reasonable explanation of their misunderstanding’ (769.22-4). Alexan-der’s words are brought in after a brief gloss on the lemma (224a2-17).

A few points in Alexander’s long account may be highlighted to clarifyhis role in this final section on ‘time’, just before Simplicius launches intohis Neoplatonic excursus on ‘time’. Alexander first sets out Aristotle’s aim:‘he is teaching us by this how we should judge which things falling undersomething identical are different from each other’. The examples thatfollow are geometrical figures as well as dogs, sheep, and numbers (as inAristotle), but also ‘Plato’ and ‘Socrates’ (771.8-10) as examples of humansand their differentiae (not in Aristotle), showing how Alexander spells outin great detail how these can help to understand the main claim at thestart. He then goes on to expand this for time and place, arguing that ‘thepresent time is also the same everywhere’ reminding his audience that ‘thedifferences in time are only being past and future’ (771.19-20). The wholepassage is a very useful example of Alexander’s style of exposition andcommentary – showing at the same time how Simplicius came to rely somuch on him. Simplicius does not express strong disagreement here, butis keen to add to the exposition by clarifying further aspects of identity anddifference, with a special interest in the example of humans (Plato andSocrates, 25-31).

To round off our discussion of long quotations we may look at one moreexample, now from the commentary on On the heavens. At in DC 297.10-301.25 (mentioned above, p. 130) we gain further insight into themotivation for quoting from Alexander. The section is dealing with Phys.279b17-21 in which Aristotle considers the issue of the eternity of theworld and Plato’s statement on it. Just before this lemma he made areference to a view of some contemporaries as different from what the


191

ancients said about the destruction of the universe (295.26-7). The quota-tion shows Alexander expound an argument partly on the basis of hisdiscussion of Plato’s Timaeus. Since Simplicius had introduced the episodeby saying that Alexander understands the Platonic doctrine not in thesame way as did Aristotle, and since Simplicius counts himself amongthose who want to use Alexander in explaining Aristotle, he undertakes adetailed examination of his words and makes every effort to find a way tomake Alexander’s dissent from Aristotle bearable. After the very longquotation (in DC 297.10-298.19) he meticulously redefines Alexander’sinterpretation in order to make it less problematic. His reason for quotingso much, given right after the quotation, is ‘so that those who encounterboth it and what I am about to say [may arrive] at a judgment’. This isquite surprising, as if he were saying that the reader can make his or herown assessment, especially given that what follows is beyond doubt push-ing for the option that the world is not generated.

His approach is to quote a text from Plato to show how Alexander hasmisinterpreted the former. His tone is lively, includes a second-personaddress (298.31) and runs through the words and meaning of Plato’s textwith great care. He also keeps asking about Alexander’s exegesis, workingthrough individual points and offering counter-arguments. First he re-proaches him for not distinguishing properly between being and coming tobe (299.9-22), since Alexander infers a temporal beginning for the uni-verse. On this point Simplicius seems to get somewhat upset, as he refersto Alexander by the dismissive ‘this man’ (houtos anêr, 299.14), a phrasemore commonly used for Philoponus. Next he elaborates on what Platomeant when he spoke of a beginning, namely, the productive cause(299.24-5). Several other issues are taken up, regarding the destructibilityof the universe (300.1ff.), which Simplicius counters with refined com-ments, saying that Plato reserved generation and destruction to thesensible world, but being (in the unqualified sense) to the intelligible worldabove. He ends by quoting more from Alexander’s exegesis of the predicate‘is’ as problematic in its applicability to the world, while Simpliciusdefends this by saying that Plato’s use of ‘is’ with reference to the (sensible)world is based on common usage, i.e. non-technical. Simplicius’ half-apolo-getic tone after the quotation, in which he tries to explain himself in hiscriticism of Alexander, shows once more the kind of respect he pays to thePeripatetic commentator, but also reveals the expectation he has thatothers would be surprised at criticism against him. His clever allusion toa well-known expression by saying ‘honouring the truth the more is dearto him too’ (301.19-2177) is intended to defuse such a reaction from anaudience with such a response. In sum, even though he thought Alexanderdifficult at times (in DC 54.13) or misguided (112.24ff.) or to be making useof the wrong manuscripts (697.17), overall Simplicius considered him thereliable guide and interpreter he thought him to be all along. Disagree-ment is expressed in muted form and head-on confrontation is rare.


192

We may conclude by observing, first, that the respect paid to Alexanderis considerable. This is confirmed by the pervasive presence of his com-ments, but even more so by the treatment he receives, even when adiscordant note is struck occasionally. On the latter point it is alsoimportant to note that Simplicius is not as rude to Alexander as he is toPhiloponus. This may have several reasons, in particular the Peripateticallegiance Alexander can be expected to exhibit when it comes to clarifyingAristotle. But we saw that his stance was not obsequious or unreasonablypartial, while he also expressed significant criticisms or voices disagree-ment with Aristotle. Simplicius does not seem keen to capitalise on suchdisagreements within the Peripatetic camp, but rather to use him forstrengthening the broader structure of late Platonist doctrine. That hestill could not avoid finding some fault with the ‘most knowledgeable ofAristotle’s exegetes’ (in Phys. 80.15) and ‘the most careful of Aristotle’spartisans’ (in DC 378.20-1) is only to be expected in the course of such atour de force, which his undertaking undoubtedly was, of harmonisingPlato and Aristotle and the whole of Greek philosophical thought as it hadcome down to him.

6.4 The rhetoric of interpretationIt may have come as no surprise that the philosophical discourse of lateantiquity had strong rhetorical elements. Rhetoric remained a crucialcomponent of the educational system and would often be taught alongsidephilosophy, astronomy and other subjects.78 But it was not the purpose ofthis chapter to argue the view that rhetoric was an unexpected influenceon philosophical debates. Rather I have tried to show that Simpliciusmakes good use of rhetorical strategies, as any author with a missionwould, and what is more significant, that the agitated episodes in thecommentary, reinforced by polemic, invective and even slander, are impor-tant indicators for his level of commitment to the issue under considera-tion. Philoponus was not only a shrewd and well-informed philosopherwhose arguments could do some serious damage, he was also a traitor tothe Neoplatonist cause. It is this rhetorical context that deserves to beemphasised. Polemic may be a less formal aspect of rhetorical style, but itis clearly part of Simplicius’ attempt to persuade the readers of thecorrectness of his point of view and the weakness of that of his opponent.

This led to two further insights: by reconsidering the debate withPhiloponus as a clash of intellectual cultures, that of Christian and pagantheologies, hence concerned with a religious issue, I have explored whatwas at stake for both authors. Secondly, it brought home more than beforehow we should not regard these commentaries as philosophical discus-sions or mere scholastic schoolbooks without any value for real-life issues(no matter how dry or intellectualised they are at times). Let me take eachof these points separately.


193

The increasingly religious nature of late Platonism, already highlightedby scholars such as Dodds (1923) and Saffrey (1984), was sketched inChapter 5 and §6.3 in an attempt to show how the competing sects ofPlatonism and Christianity seemed to converge in their agendas, butfiercely disagreed on how to implement them. Both were otherworldly inorientation, both had rational arguments to expound and justify theirpositions, both had remarkable spiritual leaders to show the way.79 Inresponse to political and social turmoil their attention would be di-rected to particular issues, but once the political establishment came tosupport the ‘new’ religion, the old ways of pagan practices came underpressure. The argument from tradition and seniority became one of thedecisive points over which they locked horns in the fourth and fifthcenturies: Iamblichus’ return to Pythagoreanism was strongly moti-vated by this attempt to make a claim for the oldest and most venerableorigin of their ideas, thus hoping to trump competing ‘philosophies’.This label could be applied to groups and ideas engaged in spiritual andintellectual pursuits, whereas we might prefer to separate them outinto religion and philosophy.80

It is significant that a central concept used in both camps, pistis(‘belief’), could serve a religious as well as philosophical purpose: inChristianity pistis was one’s firm expression of faith for which they pridedthemselves on needing no rational arguments; in the pagan philosophicaltradition, and especially Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology, pistiswas an inferior level of cognition, ‘unfounded belief’, and therefore in needof scrutiny and rational justification.81 Christians would continue to at-tract the rebuke that they were ignorant (Galen), irrational (Porphyry), orenemies of science (Celsus), but from the third century onwards theyhad strengthened their faith by presenting a reasoned case.82 For Sim-plicius too this is relevant, as Rist (1967) has shown, since Plotinus didin fact attribute some value to pistis in one sense, but rejected thecommon and traditional sense of ‘irrational belief’.83 His view on pistisseems influenced by Epicurean ideas, making it a conviction based onsensory evidence (Rist, 236f.). Simplicius’ reflections on this point fol-low Plotinus’ and Proclus’ lead, when he opens the commentary onPhysics and claims that the study of nature will lead to union with god,and a sense of pistis and hope (Rist, 240). No doubt Rist is right tomaintain that here pistis represents a reputable notion which seems along way away from Plato.

Moreover, at in DC 55.1-12 a more theoretical discussion (‘clearlyNeoplatonic’, according to Rist, l.c.) of the notion of pistis provides furtherevidence for an interesting shift in the terminology. Of the two kindsmentioned here one is distinct from demonstration (apodeixis), while theother arises ‘after demonstration and apodeictic syllogism which is secure,irrefutable, and closely allied to the truth’ (55.2-6). In this context Sim-plicius also brings in sympatheia, another concept Plotinus spoke of, one


194

that stands for our connection with the universe and hence the explana-tory factor for the possibility of understanding the world.

Simplicius is thus seen to represent an advanced stage in the develop-ment of the concept of pistis which became more important in theirreligious pursuits than before. The growing tensions between reasoningand belief is nicely expressed by a third-century writer (anonymous) whostates:

[Every student ought to pursue] that uncomplicated love for philosophywhich lies solely in knowing God through continual contemplation and holypiety. For many confuse philosophy by the complexity of their reasoning �by combining it with various incomprehensible intellectual disciplinesthrough their over-subtle reasoning.84

These sentiments could describe both groups, except that the Platonistsdid in fact seek to prepare the ‘knowing of God through continual contem-plation and holy piety’ by purely rational means using ‘incomprehensibleintellectual disciplines’ and ‘over-subtle reasoning’.

If we take Simplicius at his word that ‘the study of physics � arousesus to marvel and magnify the maker of the cosmos’,85 his commentaries onPhysics and On the heavens are indeed also a form of worship in which hisingenuity and respect for the established tradition contribute to thegeneral effort of clarifying the interpreters of nature (and the interpretersof the interpreters). In trying to defend the Platonist point of view incontradistinction to the Christian outlook he uses polemic to persuade andrefute, the comprehensive exegesis to clarify and proselytise. His commen-taries thus became one very elaborate protreptic and guide to Aristotle’sworks.86


195

Epilogue

Simplicius and Greek Philosophy:The Last Pagan Gospel?

Simplicius’ methodology, as we have studied it in this investigation, hasemerged as an impressive programme of exegetical activities to eluci-date Aristotle’s works, to show the harmony between Plato and Aris-totle, and to prove the unity of the Greek philosophical tradition whichculminates in late Platonism. What impresses above all is his commandof an enormous corpus of philosophical writings and the scholarlynature of his exegesis, with a striking emphasis on the importance ofthe text, which is almost invariably offered to the reader to ‘speak foritself’. This strategy may not always be successful by modern stand-ards, but it is unusual for its time and the reason for the survival of somuch material in ancient philosophy. It means Simplicius has beenjudged on his intentions rather than the results he offers in what hetakes Aristotle to be saying.

The quotation from Umberto Eco at the beginning of the Introductionto this book characterised the mysterious library in his famous novel as aplace that contained the intellectual sediment of many centuries, thelayers upon layers of meaning and intertextuality, a living entity inde-pendent of any mind. Simplicius’ works are very much like this library:they contain the knowledge of centuries of philosophical argument andexegesis, presented in a way that reveals how the discourse continues,despite the weight of the impressive authorities that came before. Nosummary can do justice to the body of work we have been studying andmuch could not even be covered. But I hope that my analysis of a carefullyselected sample and significant statements from Simplicius’ work canconvey the immense skill of his exegetical activity and the dramaticcircumstances in which this took place. Against the background of thesetwo aspects the most salient points to be extracted from my analysisconcern his position in the commentary tradition and his achievement, athorough blend of philosophy and exegesis in the service of the Platonistideal, inspired by Plato Theaetetus 176A, the virtuous life leading to unionwith god. That such a spiritual journey has its foundation in the meticu-lous study of texts about nature and the universe and the use ofphilosophical analysis does nothing to diminish the central importance ofhis religious inspiration.

196

7.1 The commentator’s craftIn a letter to Arthur Greeves (9 January 1930) C.S. Lewis described thepleasure of reading a commentary on Chaucer as follows:

What a glory-hole is the commentary of an old author. One minute you arepuzzling out a quotation from a French medieval romance: the next, you arebeing carried back to Plato: then a scrap of medieval law: then somethingabout geomancy: and manuscripts, and the signs of the Zodiac, and a modernproverb ‘reported to Mr Snooks to be common in Derbyshire’, and theprecession of the equinoxes, and an Arabian optician (born at Balk in 1030),five smoking room stories, the origins of the doctrine of immaculate concep-tion, and why St Cecilia is the patroness of organists. So one is swept fromEast to West, and from century to century, equally immersed in each oddityas it comes up.1

This is clearly the view of a scholar who delights in the learned detail andunexpected outcomes of clarifying one text by means of another text. Thepassage also illustrates that such scholarly commentary for its own sakeis a rather mixed bag of disparate notes, where the immediate dependenceon another text is the only binding factor. The passage exemplifies themodern scholarly commentary in its most typical form: learned in outlook,but more often than not focused on specific problems and therefore lackinga coherent agenda.2 According to Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (1913s.v.) the term ‘glory-hole’ signifies ‘an opening in the wall of a glassfurnace, exposing the brilliant white light of the interior’, used by aglassmaker when reheating glass. Such a description evokes the intrigu-ing metaphor, so popular among Platonists, of the glimpse of an extra-ordinary reality of unsurpassed brightness, almost like a revelation andillumination. But this would perhaps be the only connection with thecommentaries we are studying.

Simplicius is part of a tradition in which commentary is in fact almostthe opposite of its modern ‘cousin’, as I have argued in the precedingchapters. Platonist commentaries are a mode of philosophising with anagenda, a cohesive perspective imposed on a philosophical system whichin a variety of ways is in need of clarification. That the mechanics of theprocess (a drawn-out and methodical elucidation of certain texts) and itsmotivation (preservation and dissemination of a special kind of wisdom)seem odd to us as modern readers, says much about how we choose tounderstand religion. The modern categories ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’prove insufficient to describe adequately what is involved here. The barri-ers between these domains are less strict in antiquity, because althoughphilosophia and theologia refer in principle to the pursuit of wisdom andstudy of the divine, they were not seen to delineate clearly defined territo-ries but rather different perspectives which could overlap, interact and becomplementary. Plotinus used the phrase ‘at once poet, philosopher and

Epilogue: Simplicius and Greek Philosophy

197

expounder of sacred mysteries’ (V.Plot. 15: ton poiêtên kai ton philosophonkai ton hierophantên) in praise of Porphyry when he had read a poemwhich ‘was expressed in the mysterious and veiled language of inspiration’(ibid.). So are we dealing with religious philosophy or philosophical relig-ion? Natural philosophy (‘science’) and religion have been complementaryand competing entities throughout human intellectual history.3 We needto reconfigure our language and sensibilities in order to get away from theJudeo-Christian perspective created by centuries of scholarship. It has ledto marginalisation of any other strategy to deal with the supernatural ordivine as superstitions or magic, thus complicating our understanding ofthe pagan point(s) of view. Philosophical reasoning was certainly impor-tant but we can see that it is a means to an end.

There was another component to the Neoplatonist stance that is, as wesaw, not easily described, because modern terminology tends to imposealien associations. Philosophy had absorbed much of the new attitudesarising in the third to fifth centuries, which included ascetism and a newform of piety that would include prayer and meditation. At times the latePlatonists come across as a secretive sect.4 As Most rightly points out,‘most of those who write commentaries are members of the culturalinstitutions which are legitimated, at least in part, by their privilegedaccess to the authoritative texts which they protect, divulge, and conceal’.5

The intellectualist approach depended heavily on the importance placedon the philosophical tradition and the attention paid to the study, trans-mission and preservation of texts. This impulse of higher learning mayhave originated with the Alexandrians and resurfaced with the SecondSophistic, the broader movement of studying the rhetoric and literature ofClassical Athens, but no doubt the Christian insistence on the central roleof the gospels as the core repository of wisdom and divine inspiration alsoplayed a role. The doctrinal beliefs would drive the commitment of paganand Christian intellectuals, and it was the competitive edge that wouldmake them go to great lengths to shore up and make unassailable theirphilosophical system by using constructive argument and aggressive criti-cisms, anticipatory points against possible objections and many othercreative moves of a legitimate and less legitimate nature.

7.2 Simplicius on Simplicius: self-image andself-presentation

Self-characterisation is a poor substitute for analysis, but it seems usefulto try to offer not so much a psychological profile as an exploration of a fewstatements not considered so far, in which Simplicius either characterisesthe wider context within which he operated or further clarifies his projectof writing commentary. His own view ought to be included to enhance ourunderstanding of these works in our search for his motives or perhaps evenfor his intended audience. It has been shown that Simplicius deliberately


198

maintains a ‘low profile’, at least on the surface, yet expresses his viewson a regular basis in a style which may be mistaken for diffidence or anincapacity to deal with the issues at hand. That such a reading of hisremarks would be mistaken can easily be shown by referring to the highlyfrequent interjection oimai ‘I believe’ (c. 160 times)6 and a host of explicitexpressions of dissent with a great number of his predecessors, fromAristotle, Alexander and Porphyry down to Damascius. These are signifi-cant statistics, despite the customary restraint of Platonists in theirwritings when it comes to expressing personal views.7 It is not easy toassess the weight of these personal comments, since they often concerndetails or semi-aporetic considerations (some were mentioned in Chapters4-5). But as I said earlier, his seeming diffidence is misleading since hedoes express his doubts and disagreements regularly.

Just as Simplicius would say that Plato and Aristotle should be inter-preted ‘from themselves’, he himself deserves to be studied on his ownterms. Unsurprisingly, we also find some helpful comments in the twoparts of his in Phys. in which he is speaking in his own voice moreemphatically, the so-called ‘corollaries on place and time’. As we saw inChapter 3 (§3.2.1), Simplicius launches into a more elaborate discussionand analysis of place propria voce after discussing Aristotle’s views in book4 of his Physics. Here Simplicius again proffers the trope of modestycombined with a remarkable reflection on his task as a commentator(601.5-13):

There have been other opinions about place since Aristotle, an examinationof which he would have handed down to us if they had arisen before him. Sohe would approve of them also being examined. [�] If I were able myself tocontribute to the articulation of our thoughts about place I think thatAristotle would countenance my daring, since he has provided the basishimself. So if I shall seem to exceed the office of a commentator, let thosewho notice it blame the difficulty and complexity of the problem. (tr. Urmson1992)

Strongly reminiscent of the passage in which he outlined the task of thecommentator (in Cat. 7.23-32), this passage reveals the self-consciouspositioning of the author: he clearly feels the need to justify his excursusas contributing to the wider understanding of the topic at hand and itsrelevance for Aristotle’s analysis. There is also a clear reminder of Aris-totle’s own method which provided endoxographical overviews of existingopinions in many of his treatises based on the dialectical techniquesexpounded in his Topics.8 The trope of modesty is here linked to the‘articulation of our thoughts about place’ and the presumption that Aris-totle would have accepted his attempts, because they would take theirstarting-point in the scholarch’s account. The last sentence seems tosuggest that there was a rather strict understanding of the task of the


199

commentator (exêgêtês), but Simplicius’ justification deflects any criticismby claiming that the topic’s complexity must be blamed for his expansiveanalysis.

A second passage relevant for our present purpose is found in hiscorollary on time (in Phys. 773.8ff.). Here he introduces his excursus onthe account of Aristotle’s views with some very interesting remarks (lines9-19):

I have gone through what he has said from the beginning to the end, showinghow it all fits together so far as possible. But since our academic training hasnot the sole aim of learning Aristotle’s opinion concerning the nature of time,but rather of understanding what time is – by which I think that we shallalso get a closer grasp of Aristotle’s thoughts on time – let us examine(dieukrinêsômen) that briefly. After that, let us review (episkepsômetha) theopinions of those who have philosophised about time. But since Aristotle atthe beginning of his discussion mounted severe attacks (drimeôs epik-heirêsantos) on the reality of time and did not defeat these attacks (taepikheirêmata mê lusantos) it would be useful towards our goal to overcome(dialusai) them as far as possible. For otherwise our discussion of time wouldremain incomplete. (tr. Urmson 1992)

The passage is illuminating with regard to Simplicius’ method of dealingwith Aristotle’s text, claiming that it had received a thorough examination‘from beginning to end’ to demonstrate its coherence, but also emphasisingthat his agenda is a more general one, to learn about time per se. Thepassage ends in a similar fashion to the introductory remarks for theexcursus on place, which also involved a ‘criterion of completeness’.

What else can we learn from this passage? The aim of understandingtime per se is revealing of the philosophical agenda in (this part of) thecommentary and seems to require at least three things: first, a review ofexisting theories on time, which was implied in the previous passage as afixed feature of his method. Second, the problems that can be mountedagainst the reality of time must be defused to make the account complete(though no comment is made on the fact that Aristotle did not resolve allproblems). Third, Simplicius claims that the understanding of time per sewill enhance our understanding of Aristotle’s views on time, showing howthe general account of time can illuminate a specific account of time.

One further passage of self-characterisation can be adduced. It confirmshis strong commitment to set out Aristotle’s ‘searching accuracy of expla-nation’ of the text and its truthfulness (in DC 566.17-20):9

In what follows I shall set out Aristotle’s investigative precision of suchaccounts intending to the best of my ability and for each argument to showthat the true meanings are not damaged by them.

These passages show us that Simplicius makes a concerted effort (note


200

kata to dunaton prothumoumenos) to live up to his own programmaticstatement about the tasks of a commentator (see §1.2.1). There he stipu-lates that one should aim at a comprehensive and lucid treatment withoutbeing unduly partial to the Aristotelian doctrine. The passages dis-cussed above also leave little doubt about the didactic element presentin the commentaries. Simplicius keeps presenting Aristotle as ateacher, as someone who wants to teach us. This transpires especiallyfrom those passages in which he introduces or recapitulates Aristotle’swords with phrases such as ‘Aristotle teaches us �’ (in DC 1.20, 2.25,6.30 ‘the prooemium teaches us the skopos and the order of the treatise’,etc.) or his works ‘teach us’ (in Phys. 3.5 didaskousi, cf. 15 didaxai;31.19 didaskôn etc).10

In view of the points I have put forward concerning the unusuallyelaborate and learned nature of these commentaries, his attitude towardsthe exegetical ‘tradition’, and the rather uncertain state of evidence re-garding Simplicius’ whereabouts in the years 533-40 CE, and also given thehistorical circumstances and religious debates he found himself in, itwould seem appropriate to propose that his hupomnêmata were intendedfor the instruction of a potential rather than real audience, with theproviso that the works seem more suitable for teachers who could guidestudents rather than for individual use by students themselves.

7.3 Exegesis and philosophy:a complex relationship

The rather ambitious aim of this study was to explore how in Simplicius’works his exegetical strategies served his philosophical outlook. If exege-sis was the major focus, this was mainly the result of its ubiquitouspresence, but more importantly, caused by the fact that exegesis and doingphilosophy are so inextricably entangled in his commentaries. The rela-tion between exegesis and philosophy was described by Pierre Hadot in anarticle entitled ‘Philosophy, Exegesis and Creative Mistakes’ which sug-gested that the Neoplatonist manner of interpretation of Plato and Aris-totle can be viewed as creative, even if (or because, in today’s view) it isoften mistaken.11 I have also tried to show that Simplicius has a verywell-defined purpose in mind while writing his commentaries, which,however, he does not spell out. Despite his elaborate (some might sayroundabout) way of explicating Aristotle’s ideas, the commentaries canserve the purpose of reinforcing the Platonist message of the importanceof Aristotle for the study of Plato which in turn is meant to lead to thedeeper philosophical insight. Two questions were particularly importantfor this enterprise of coming to grips with his methodology: first, whatdrove him to write such gargantuan works? and secondly, how much ofthese commentaries reflects his own contribution?

The first question was brought into connection with his training and the


201

circumstances he lived in and aimed at showing that his elucidations ofAristotle both do and do not fit the mould of late Platonism as a product ofa school environment. They fit in so far as they are founded on a specificset of doctrinal presuppositions coming out of the late Platonist tradition,stretching from Plotinus to Proclus. They do not fit in so far as they differin their origin (not student lecture notes), their nature (elaborate anddetailed source referencing), and their scale (unprecedented comprehen-siveness). An answer to the second question must be based on a review ofthe specific insights gained in this study. They have arisen from analysingsome essential features of Simplicius’ working method and placing hismethodology in its cultural and social context. The conclusions of eachchapter may be summed up first.

As we saw in Chapter 1, even with so many exegetical works available,Simplicius does not consider a new commentary on the Categories, Physicsor On the heavens redundant. This is a reason to think that Simplicius feltthe need for his works, and it suggests that he was not engaged in thenormal teaching activity we know about for his immediate predecessorsand contemporaries. When mentioning this point I also referred to thecases of Syrianus and Marinus: the former composed a partial commen-tary, the latter was advised against writing yet another commentary. Suchconsiderations make more sense in an active educational environment,where other commentaries are available and teachers advise their stu-dents. So we can take this consideration as strengthening the idea thatSimplicius was not actively involved in teaching, but that his commentar-ies were still intended for educational purposes. As we saw he may wellhave been drawing upon his own student notes as well as on the work hehad been doing as a teacher before he had to leave Athens. But thisapproach alerts us to the fact that certain traces of oral teaching in thetext can have several different origins and explanations.

In Chapters 2-5 I illustrated the exegetical activities of Simplicius inthe light of his attempt to construct a summa philosophiae paganae. Someof the main points may be reviewed here. Simplicius’ treatment of somePresocratic views (Chapter 2) was discussed with reference to the debateon the contextualised nature of fragments. This issue will always be animportant component in modern scholarship. But while modern scholarshave been concerned about the reliability of his reports, the objective herehas been to look more closely at how Simplicius operates when introducingand evaluating Presocratic ideas. By selecting the early theorists mosteasily linked to some of the core ideas of Neoplatonism, I have tried toillustrate how his interest in early Greek philosophy was driven by amixture of motives: the fact that Aristotle incorporated them into hispreliminary discussions of a particular area, which assisted in setting itsparameters and key concepts; the established doctrine that ancient learn-ing needed to be uncovered; the need for offering a competitive‘philosophy’, that is, a spiritual outlook backed up by rational argument in


202

order to withstand the marginalisation of pagan thought that resultedfrom the rise of Christianity. In his most far-reaching attempt to includethe Presocratics into a harmonising account of Greek philosophy as awhole, Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras had to be defendedagainst Aristotle’s and Plato’s criticisms, and it is here that we seeSimplicius’ skills in trying to iron out ‘superficial disagreements’.

We also saw that the successors of Aristotle have a significant role inSimplicius’ commentaries (Chapter 3). Their attitude towards Aristotle’sworks is regarded as one of collaborative expansion and elucidation. Theissue that became important for them was the unity of Peripateticthought. In addition they had to find a way to resolve the tensions betweenphilosophical creativity and the process of canonisation. These aspects ofsupplementation are characteristic of what sociologists of science call thestage of the ‘minders’, the second stage in a three-tiered model whichdistinguishes pioneering thinkers, care-takers and followers, sometimessummed up in the gnomic phrase: ‘finders, minders and grinders’. Such‘care-takers’ of an important intellectual legacy find themselves contem-porary with a ‘finder’, an intellectual pioneer, whose work is so dominantand overwhelming that it seems to forestall any new and original contri-butions. This is, however, an exaggeration: it would be misleading to thinkthat Theophrastus and Eudemus were unable to make real and originalcontributions. Establishing what their contribution is can sometimes bedifficult, because they will always be judged in relation to the work of theirmaster; in addition, they are not aiming to compete or overthrow his work,so that in their own mind there is no need to differentiate their ideas fromhis in an emphatic way. What the model helps to do in a convenient(though superficial) way is to sort out to what extent the roles andcontributions of these thinkers are determined by their historical andintellectual environment. Yet the borderlines between the three categorieswere shown to be less rigid than the terms might suggest.

The important role played by Alexander of Aphrodisias was discussedin Chapter 4. His presence was found to be the result of a deliberate choiceby Simplicius. The analysis could only give a highly selective account ofthe pervasive influence of Alexander on choice of topics, structure andexegetical style. While it was also clear that he had been given a place inthe Platonist exegetical tradition before Simplicius, the approach to, anduse of, Alexander by Simplicius is far more intense and elaborate andplaces a particular emphasis on the use of quotations. Thus the good useof evidence went hand in hand with the harmonising strategy. On manyoccasions we could see the extensive quoting and praise as the signs ofimmense respect for Alexander. At the same time we found out thatAlexander’s views were not always taken for granted or accepted uncondi-tionally: criticism, doubts and objections are all part of the treatment,mostly on points which resisted harmonisation between Platonic andPeripatetic views.


203

In Chapter 5 I have tried to sketch how the different voices in thecommentary tradition are given a place in Simplicius’ comprehensiveoverview. The Platonists after Plotinus had begun to see themselves aspart of a so-called ‘golden chain’, that is, as part of a special group guardingand preserving Plato’s thought. Each one of this rather varied group ofthinkers equally engaged in interpreting Plato, but in ways that consti-tuted shifts in emphasis as well as proposals for additions to the core ofsacred texts which seem to us rather removed from the original works ofPlato. This illustrated the fluid nature of the Platonist doctrines, whilealso showing how exegetical techniques were capable of interpreting themeaning of texts in many directions; to a degree that would seriouslystretch the possible and intended meanings of those writings. A briefdiscussion of some other ‘commentators’ outside the golden chain addedcontrast and illustrated Simplicius’ keen eye for useful material to bolsterthe position by arguments that took care of criticisms of Aristotle. Therange of manoeuvres within the golden chain also testifies to the fact thattheir real objectives were mostly due to external motivations, certainfundamental presuppositions about what the text ought to mean. Thesemust be sought in the role of authority (a ‘canon’) and the belief in theimportance of Plato’s message as read by Plotinus.

Finally, in Chapter 6 the aspect of competing religious perspectives wasbrought to the fore in an attempt to clarify the extraordinary effort ofSimplicius’ commentary activities. By sketching the background of therelationship between pagan and Christian intellectuals I have placed anemphasis on the religious nature of their interactions, an approach thathas recently been gaining ground. The effort of Simplicius to present theGreek philosophical tradition as unified can be clarified from his decisionto adopt this attitude acquired in his Alexandrian training and the invol-untary defensive tactic of going up against the Christian outlook.

This summary has highlighted the main results from earlier chaptersand it remains to look at some implications and broader insights emergingfrom them. It is rather unfortunate that we have no information aboutwhere Simplicius wrote his works, but this has proved not to be essentialfor obtaining a better understanding of his working method. It does,however, remain relevant for our second question, and therefore a plaus-ible working hypothesis has been used to strengthen earlier suggestionsthat he returned to Athens and wrote his long commentaries in relativepeace and quiet.12

The potentially oppressive force of tradition and authority is palpablein these commentaries and may in itself lead to the sense of awe andmodesty so often expressed by Simplicius.13 Whether this is something hefelt forced to do on account of his immediate environment cannot beestablished. But the social pressures of paying tribute to the great think-ers and predecessors of the past are clearly a factor. His identity as acommentator is closely connected to the school’s profile as a ‘school of


204

thought’ bent on showing the importance of Plato’s ideas. The unity ofthe school depended first and foremost on the way in which acrossseveral centuries all these thinkers took the Platonic works as theirstarting-point: no matter how many innovative and often alien ele-ments they added, this relationship to the agreed canon forged amuch-needed continuity in the Platonist tradition. This attitude al-lowed for a central core of basic assumptions and doctrines, while at thesame time allowing considerable margin for reinterpretations, assimi-lation and transformations of this and other materials. Viewed in thislight, late Platonists stand to Plato in a kind of pros hen relation, theAristotelian notion of ‘family resemblance’ by which we group togetherseveral concepts connected to one central concept, such as health,healthy and medicine.14

From a broader perspective my analysis of Simplicius’ methodologymakes at least two significant contributions. First, I have made use ofmuch previous scholarship in order to produce a much-needed synthesis ofthe modern scholarship on the commentary tradition with a particularfocus on Simplicius. As such this study presents an account of the currentstate of research of an almost Simplician type, incorporating the scholarlydiscussion of the last fifty years. Secondly, I have contributed to clarifyingthree important aspects, each of which enhance our understanding of hisapproach and motivation. (1) To begin with the question of why one wouldwant to write such massive works, I have suggested that circumstance andideology drive the enterprise. Simplicius fits the general trend of Platonistphilosophers to comment on the core texts of their preferred philosophicalviewpoint, Plato and Aristotle. But the prevailing attitude in recentdecades has been to subject them to (analytical) philosophical investiga-tions. I have argued that the religious dimension of this commentaryactivity must not be lost sight of. (2) In addition, in order to explain thecomprehensiveness of his exegetical programme – comprehensive regard-ing both the number of commentaries and the degree of detail included –I have suggested that his didactic drive may be viewed as an attempt toprovide a resource for teachers. This notion was put forward as a mostplausible working hypothesis, because it takes care of both the comprehen-siveness and the didactic aspect of the commentaries.15 To call hiscommentaries a form of protreptic (end of Chapter 6, p. 195) is just anotherway of expressing that idea.

(3) Finally, as a result the specific question as to whether these worksoriginated in the classroom was answered negatively. Here I have sug-gested that we need to distinguish between the ways in which exegeticalnotes can relate to classroom activities. There is clearly no doubt that themany commentaries taken down by students are of a different kind whencompared to the Simplician works (their learning, elaborateness, style,authorial voice). In addition, it is also clear (and uncontroversial) that theimmense learning and detail in Simplicius’ commentaries, unlike other


205

hypomnêmata, are not self-declared notes from lectures, the so-calledstudent notes apo phônês taken ‘from the voice’ of the teacher as in somany extant commentaries. Yet Simplicius’ explications of Aristotle are socomprehensive in scope and attention for detail that we cannot escape theconclusion that these works were suitable for a teaching environment,especially for teachers. These considerations brought me to think of theseworks as intended for educational use, but not arising from concreteteaching activity. This would in fact take care of A.C. Lloyd’s concern(1967: 448) that his ‘surviving commentaries � are both more learned andmore polemic than would have been suitable for students’ (see also Chap-ter 1, text to n. 80).

This shift in emphasis helps to understand the attention to detail atevery level in the commentaries, so much so, that many of his commentshave sometimes been labelled trivial. But his tendency to explain ‘everylittle detail’ also suggests that they were not only a resource for teachers,but also for students; after all, the traditional approach among Platonistshad been for a teacher and student to read the works together (sunousia,sunanagnôsis). His commentaries might even be trying to provide a com-plete course for students, in that they could be used for self-study. In otherwords, I am suggesting that the Simplician commentaries form a naturaltextbook of late Platonism, in which the primary text and ‘secondaryreadings’ are all included in the body of the text. The curriculum pre-scribed the study of Aristotle before Plato (and the Chaldaean Oracles),and for the study of Aristotle the particular order of study had beenestablished by Porphyry, Iamblichus and Syrianus.16 The idea that hisworks, in their comprehensive and lavish coverage of centuries of scholar-ship, are like a library rather neatly reinforces the notion he produced a‘stand-alone textbook’.

The commentator’s craft is admittedly also quite technical and includesphilological observations, grammatical detail and refined argumentation.But that should not blind us to the more important global aim suchtechnicalities and minutiae serve: the lavish learning and exegetical vari-ety are the result of the historical process of accumulation and scholarship,driven by sensible motives; they acknowledge the cooperative nature ofphilosophical discourse and the usefulness of different viewpoints anddisagreement – already a component of Aristotle’s own methodology.17 Atthe same time Platonist exegesis was keen to forge a unity out of thisdiversity that could stand up to scrutiny. Ultimately the over-arching aimand message will emerge and remain visible, if we are receptive to thespecific nature of their thought. With Plotinus, Platonism’s focus becamedistinctly otherworldly, but without fully rejecting the study of nature.While the physical world is of secondary importance, their analysis ofphysics is anything but irrelevant. This is because their perspective isreligious as well as philosophical: a deeper understanding of, and concomi-tant respect for, the creation was a form of worshipping God, and an aid


206

to achieving their ultimate goal, the ‘return’ to God. Simplicius’ use ofprayers at certain points in the books is one indication of this underlyingobjective. Several other statements underline this attitude of associatingthe inquiry into nature with reverence for god, for instance when heevaluates Alexander’s comments on Plato, he states:

Consequently I, setting out the truth, which is dear to god and to Aristotle,will here try to do a careful investigation, putting forward the things whichAlexander says are the opinions of Plato about the motion of the soul � (inDC 377.29-31)18

Thirdly, I have in connection with the foregoing points developed thenotion (suggested by others before me) that Simplicius’ emphatic attemptat harmonising the whole of Greek pagan philosophy is mainly motivatedby his conviction that he must make a stand against Christianity as thenow dominant religious outlook. Not only was Christianity in a wayresponsible for the ban on pagan teachings in Athens (Justinian’s edicts of529-31 CE), but in its strident polemic it had seized upon a shrewd tactic,namely to declare its own position superior as a result of its unified vision,whilst scoffing at the Greek philosophers for their never-ending disagree-ments (already exploited by the Sceptics) among themselves as a clear signof the inferiority of their views.19 Simplicius was not the first to suggest aharmonising strategy, but he certainly pushed it further than anyone elsehad. Porphyry and Proclus had already made attempts at unifying Greekphilosophy:

Since Porphyry (third century AD) the Neoplatonists sought to unify thediversity of Greek thought, and particularly its two leading, but antagonis-tic, authorities, Plato and Aristotle. This ‘harmonisation’ was not a symptomof feeble thinking. It was the critical evaluation of existing philosophies. Inanalytical fashion only the ones that were deemed coherent were accepted,the rest were rejected or modified radically.20

Simplicius’ working methods, then, seem a mixture of traditional elements(lemma commentary, philosophical exegesis, philological awareness) andidiosyncratic features (e.g. scholarship in an almost modern sense, rich-ness of sources, awareness of tradition he is working in, comprehensiveharmonisation). Yet his use of the existing literature did not make himunconditionally depend on it: his independence of thought shows up in thedetail and the effort to reach clarity about the fundamental postulates ofPlatonic and Aristotelian thought. Although he never chose to challengemajor authorities openly and forcefully, he showed in more ways than onethat he could compose his own grand synthesis (summa), into which thegreat pagan choir of voices could be absorbed.


207

7.4 The methodology of a commentator:a final appraisal

A final appraisal of Simplicius’ methodology will most usefully focusnarrowly on those features of his commentaries that do not fit well-rehearsed characterisations in generalised descriptions of the tradition:his choice of subject, his use of quotation and his reliability.21 The finalparagraph will highlight the purpose these elements served.

Commenting on Aristotle fits the Platonist curriculum of consideringAristotle as a suitable introduction to Plato, reading Aristotle first, espe-cially logic (‘the smaller Mysteries’), progressing to physics andpsychology, and finally metaphysics (‘Greater Mysteries’). For Simplicius,as for many late Platonists, the relation between religion and philosophyhad remained a close one after Iamblichus had introduced new forms ofcommunication with the divine (theurgy). I have suggested that this tacticcan best be viewed in connection with the competitive nature of thereligious debates in the Empire since Christianity began to gain ground.Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius had cultivated this interest by theologi-cal focus, but combined it with metaphysical and mathematicalconsiderations. Such mixed approaches defy categorisation in modernterms: religion and philosophy simply cannot be separated out helpfully inthe way later centuries have pretended they could.

With regard to the incorporation of source material Simplicius hasshown himself to be in control of an incredible range of sources from insideand outside the Neoplatonist tradition. We noted the particular approachin his method of quoting authors, which reveals some awareness of theimportance of using someone’s very own words in discussing their view.Phrases such as têi lexei tois rhêmasin (e.g. in Phys. 1325.24) or kata lexin(in DC 213.2, 499.7, 597.13) as a lead-up to quotations abound and indicatethat Simplicius is interested in making these distinctions and for a reason.He will variously use paraphrase and quotation, at appropriate moments,as mutually supportive modes about which (in a manner uncommon in theNeoplatonic school) he expresses firm views, first on how to use them, andsecondly on what role they can play. It has often been overlooked that hisuse of Neoplatonic school practices does not imply that he himself waswriting for an actual school environment. His programme of comprehen-sive explication of the text geared towards a particular reconstruction ofGreek philosophy as a unified and harmonious tradition is composed ofseveral strategies, including philological moves, interpretative moves, theappeal to authority, and polemical arguments. These are geared towardsthe immediate aim of clarifying Aristotle, and a more distant aim, externalto the text, of celebrating the virtuous life and the divine creation. One wayto describe his commentary activity would be to say that his philologicalengagements with texts stood in the service of his philosophical theology.

As to the question of reliability, it is obvious that Simplicius is not


208

straightforwardly aiming at level-headed objectivity or impartial report-ing.22 He is a man on a mission, and he uses whatever means are availableto ‘clarify’ Aristotle in a way that springs from late Platonic thought. Thismay involve manipulations of text and content which to the modern eyeare unacceptable: selective quotation, rephrasing, and even misrepresen-tation. And it is here that the seeming ‘modernity’ of Simplicius’ methodis flawed: in the absence of anything like a formal notion of copyright anda firm agreement in the scholarly community to abide by certain rules (ofciting, referring, and acknowledging sources23), he and his peers do nothave a very formally worked out method of scholarship (although it goes along way) and they are also still under the spell of rhetorical tactics wheresuch considerations of fair play hardly come up. In addition, there is atendency to let beliefs dominate the reading of others, whether this is doneconsciously or not. In this respect the commentary is again unlike themodern equivalent, since it is more a genuine philosophical discussionthan a scholarly line-by-line (philological) elucidation. There is even someevidence that Simplicius regards writing as having therapeutic value inthe sense of Plato’s Phaedrus where he describes the leading of the soulthrough intellectual stages. When all is considered it is fair to say that hecame quite close to becoming the ideal commentator he had outlined at thestart of his commentary on the Categories.

The assessment of Simplicius’ working methods, then, seems to havesuffered from the presence of traditional and common elements, whichstood in the way of appreciating more idiosyncratic features. This studyhas attempted to reassess what makes Simplicius’ method special, and itis hoped that this can help to inaugurate a revision of the reputation ofSimplicius, who was not merely an antiquarian, nor a kind of ‘moderncommentator’, nor even a faceless imitator of his predecessors. ClearlyGalileo’s Simplicio is far removed from his supposed historical predeces-sor. Even if the geocentric world picture has been superseded, Simpliciusdeserves a better press for his responsible scholarship, source criticism,historical sensibility, and exegetical sophistication. And as we have seen,all these were pressed into service to achieve something that had not beentried before, a summa philosophiae paganae, perhaps to create the lastpagan ‘gospel’ against the ever-growing presence, and impending victory,of Christianity.


209

Appendix I

The ‘Library’ of Simplicius

This Appendix aims to provide a very general impression of the booksSimplicius may have had at his disposal while writing his commentaries.It lists (primarily philosophical) works and authors as mentioned in hiscommentaries and is arranged by author. It makes no assessment as towhether Simplicius really had direct access to all of these writings norwhat the significance might be of the absence of certain works known tous. It also contains authors for whom no work is mentioned (though titlescan sometimes be provided from other sources) and works for which noauthors are mentioned (under Anonymous or Auctor Incertus). The sourcesfor these entries were the text of the commentaries, TLG-E, and Diels’indices to CAG 7-10.

AdrastusOn the order of the treatises of Aristotle, in Cat. 16.1, 18.16, in Phys.

4.11, 6.5Alexander of Aphrodisias

Against the Epicurean Zenobius, in Phys. 489.22Commentary on On the heavens, in Phys. 1219.2Commentary on Physics, in Phys. 430.3, 530.16De mixtu, in Phys. 530.15On the soul, in Phys. 1292.2-3On the heavens, in Phys. 1292.2-3

Ammonius[no title] ‘that Aristotle considers god the efficient cause’, in Phys.

1363.8 biblion holonAnaxagoras

Physics, in Phys. 34.29, 55.26, 163.20Anaximander

[no title] (on cosmology and physics) 6.35, 22.12, etc.Anaximenes

[no title] (on cosmology and physics) 22.12 (apeiron), 24.28 (air), etc.

Andronicus of Rhodes[no title] (on the text and order of Aristotle’s works), in Phys. 440.14,

450.16, 924.20, 923.9

211

AnonymousChaldaean Oracles, in Phys. 613.4, 614.6, 616.1, 616.35, 617.5Orphic hymns, in Phys. 641.32, 643.30

Antiphon[no title] (on nature), in Phys. 273.36[no title] (on the squaring of the circle), in Phys. 54.13ff.

(ps.)ArchytasOn the all, in Cat. 2.15, in Phys. 785.15On general terms (peri tôn katholou logôn), in Cat. 17.26

AristophanesClouds, in Phys. 707.23

Aristotle, works other than commented on (cf. Diels Index IV, CAG 9,1458-61)

History of animals, in DC 3.8; in Phys. 3.8Metaphysics, in DC 116.29, 134.2 (eta), 269.31, 270.5,18 (lambda),

288.24, 422.17,24, 497.9 (lambda), 505.28 (lambda), 617.7, 665.5; inPhys. 8.30, 12.27 (A.1), 48.3, 148.19, 182,31, 219.29 (eta), 234.2,241.18 (theta), 257.26, 258.18,23, 269.7, 308.37, 364.30, 365.7,1271.24, 1361.34

On coming-to-be and passing-away, in Phys. 600.36On Democritus, in DC 294.33-295.24On memory and sleep, in DC 3.7On the good, in Phys. 151.10, 453.28On the soul, in DC 91.5, 279.17, 380.18, 381.5, 442.10 (B); in Phys.

262.19, 263.6, 268.26, 269.3, 286.4, 523.2, 540.9, 660.28, 924.16,965.26, 1060.22, 1219.10, 1248.31

On the progression of animals, in DC 3.6-7On philosophy, in DC 289.2-3 [F16 Ross]On prayer, in DC 485.21On sense perception and the senses, in DC 454.14, 608.3, 611.29, in

Phys. 753.11, 1059.7Physical problems, in DC 505.24Physics, passimPosterior Analytics, in DC 59.29Topics, in Phys. 642.6

Aristoxenus[no title] (on music) in Phys. 815.27, 1023.27, 1213.33

AthenodorusAgainst Aristotle’s Categories, in Cat. 62.25

Auctor IncertusOn indivisible lines, in DC 566.25-26 (ho tines eis Theophraston

anapherousin)Chrysippus

[no title] ‘the Chrysippean book’, in Cat. 403.6On privative terms (cf. D.L. 7.190), 396.20


212

DamasciusOn number, place and time, in Phys. 774.30On time, in Phys. 775.34, 800.20

DexippusCommentary on Categories, in Cat. 21.5

Diogenes of ApolloniaMeteorology, in Phys. 151.27On the nature of man, in Phys. 151.27Physics, in Phys. 25.7, 151.25

EmpedoclesPhysics, 32.1, 157.25, 300.20, 381.29

Epicurus[no title] (on primary and secondary qualities) in Cat. 216.21, 431.24

EuclidElements 62.27, 65.19, etc (18 occurrences)

Eudemus of RhodesAstronomical investigation (en tôi deuterôi tês astrologikês historias),

in DC 488.20Geometric investigation, 60.22,31Physics, 10.3, 12.23, etc. [see ch. 3 nn. 61-2]

EudoxusOn speeds, in DC 494.9

GalenOn klepsydras, in Phys. 573.19On demonstration bk. 8, in Phys. 708.28Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato, in Phys. 325.24

GeminusEpitome of Posidonius’ Meteorology, in Phys. 291.22, 292.30

HermodorusOn Plato, 247.33, 256.32

HesiodTheogonia, in Phys. 527.17

IamblichusCommentary on Categories, 60.7, 92.20,22, 786.11, 787.4,10,27Commentary on Timaeus, 639.24, 702.20, 793.24, 794.22, 795.2

MelissusOn nature or On being, in Phys. 70.17, 71.10

Nicolas of DamascusOn the gods, in Phys. 23.14, 25.1, 151.20On the philosophy of Aristotle, in DC 398.36ff.On the universe, in DC 3.29

ParmenidesParmenideion suggramma, in Phys. 144.28

PlatoOn the good (via Alexander), in Phys. 161.6-19

Appendix I

213

PlotinusEnneads bks 1-6, in Cat. passim (cf. Kalbfleisch 564)[no title] (Enn. 1.1.1.12-13), in Phys. 1072.8-9[no title] (Enn. 1.1.9.15), in Phys. 1079.12-13On the universe (Enn. 2.1), in DC 12.12On potentiality and actuality (Enn. 2.5), in Phys. 398.32-3On the descent of the soul into bodies (Enn. 2.8), in Phys.[no title] (Enn. 3.7.8), in Phys. 706.26

PlutarchLife of Alexander, in Phys. 8.29

PorphyryAgainst Gedalius, in Cat. 33.11Eisagôgê, in Cat. 54.26 etc.Commentary on Categories, in Cat. 2.6[no title] (commentary on Aristotle’s Physics), 9.11, 11.6, 11.23, etc.Commentary on Plato’s Philebus, in Phys. 453.30-454.19Commentary on Plato’s Republic, in Phys. 615.35On matter bk 2, in Phys. 231.6Synopsis of physics, in Phys. 918.13

PosidoniusMeteorology, in Phys. 291.22, 292.30

ProclusLetter to Aristocles, in Phys. 615.13[no title] (investigation into the objections by Aristotle against the

Timaeus), in DC 640.24-6 (for the title and details see Proclus inTim. II 279.2-17)

[no title] (commentary on Plato’s Timaeus), in Phys. 601.15-20[no title] (commentary on Plato’s Republic), in Phys. 613.1peri topou [On place], in Phys. 611.11-614.71

PtolemyOn dimensions, in DC 20.11On the elements, in DC 20.11Optics, in DC 9.22

Sosigenes[no title] (planetary theories), in DC 492.31-510.36

StratoOn before and after (monobiblion), in Cat. 418.26On time (?) (cf. D.L. 5.59), in Phys. 788.35-790.25, 800.17

SyrianusCommentary on Plato’s Laws, in Phys. 618.28

ThemistiusParaphrase [of Aristotle’s On the heavens], in DC 68.8 (bk 4), 176.33,

188.30Paraphrase [of Aristotle’s Physics], in Phys. 70.32, 1132.26Paraphrase [of Aristotle’s On the soul], in DA 151.14


214

TheophrastusEpitome? [Simplicius] In DA, 136.29Investigation <into Nature?>’, in Phys. 149.32, 115.12 (first bk),

154.15-16On Anaxagoras, in Phys. 166.17f.On motion, in Phys. 107.12, 413.1,5, 986.5, 964.30On nature, in Phys. 25.7On the coming-to-be of the elements, in DC 700.6On the elements of speech, in Cat. 10.25On the heaven, in DC 1.8 Physics, in DC 564.24, 435.27-8; in Phys. 9.7, 20.20, 604.5-6, 639.14,

860.19; in DA 286.31 Prior analytics, in DC 554.3Topics, in Cat. 415.15

XenarchusAgainst the fifth substance, in DC 20.12

XenocratesLife of Plato, in DC 12.22-3; in Phys. 1165.35

Zeno[no title] book (biblion), in Phys. 99.8,18

Note1. Diels’ app. crit. suggests de primo loco (?), but this title is not extant; peri

topou is found in Proclus in Remp. II 199.22-3, the Scholion to in Remp. II 199.6(in Remp. II 380.30); cf. Urmson 1992: 32 n. 24. I owe these references to DrChristoph Helmig, Leuven University.

Appendix I

215

Appendix II

A. New evidence on AlexanderTwo recent discoveries have brought us exciting new evidence regardingAlexander’s life and work.

(1) A recently discovered inscription provides new information on Alex-ander’s life. Angelos Chianotis first published a three-page preview,‘Epigraphic Evidence for the Philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias’, BICS47 (2004) 79-81. The abstract found on the ICS website (accessed 17October 2004) announces the new find from the city of Aphrodisias in AsiaMinor in 2001, which presents some important biographical informationon Alexander. The actual article, published in AJA 108.3 (2004) 377-416,pays special attention to the inscription mentioning Alexander on pp.388-9. Sharples has presented an analysis in BICS 2005.

(2) The Archimedes palimpsest, rediscovered in the 1990s and contain-ing a unique text by this brilliant Greek mathematician, very recently alsorevealed two other unique texts, one from the orator Hyperides, the otherfrom a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. Dr Marwan Rashed (CNRS,Paris) and Prof. Robert W. Sharples (University College London) believethat the fragmentary passages most likely belong to the commentary byAlexander, thought lost (RWS email 27 April 2007). We knew of itsexistence from Simplicius in Cat. 1.16 and Olympiodorus in APr. 12.1,13.31ff. (Sharples 1987: 1185).

Sources: personal communication from R.W. Sharples (email); Sharples1987, 2005; Chianotis 2001, 2003; BBC Science online athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6591221.stm

216

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6591221.stm

B. Distribution of Alexander references in in Phys.The graph maps the distribution of Alexander (named occurrences) across the in Phys., thus showinghis overall presence as well as the density of references in certain books. See also Chapter 4.

217

Appendix III

Symphônia in SimpliciusThis appendix lists all occurrences of the term symphônia (source TLG-E)to show how its use serves several claims of ‘harmony’ among philosophers(a few cases have sumphônia in the non-personal sense of agreement, e.g.in reasoning between premises). Note how in two out of three commentar-ies there is a very early mention of the term, signalling its importance (1and 17). The emphatic attention to harmony in the discussion of the firstprinciples is clear from the cluster of references at in Phys. 179-204 (seealso Chapter 2, pp. 61 and 75). In two cases its opposite, diaphônia, occursin the vicinity to enhance contrast (8 [same line] and 10 [one line earlier];cf. 14 [290.25]).1

Commentary on Physics(1) 20.12: the first occurrence claims that Aristotle sees ‘harmony’

(agreement) on the matter of principles of physics as opposites amongearliest natural philosophers.

(2) 179.29: reconfirms the agreement on the first principles amongalmost all natural philosophers, while admitting they may disagreeon other things.

(3) 182.10: recapitulates the reasoning of Aristotle, referring back to theagreement as based on individual points and introduces anotherargument in favour of agreement ‘by deductive reasoning’.

(4) 188.13,16: continues the argument of 182.10 by repeating the earlierpoint, but now showing that Aristotle also manages to demonstratethat differences noted by others can be reconciled.

(5) 204.27: the final mention in this long episode of the discussionconcerning principles (179-206), summarising the argument that hasdemonstrated agreement from deductive reasoning and from ‘otherphilosophers’ on the view that there must be ‘three elemental physi-cal principles’.

(6) 314.29: technical discussion of genus and species in connection withmaterial cause. ‘Agreement’ here refers to the shared propertyamong all items within a genus.

(7) 341.27: states that the ‘harmony of all (things/philosophers?) is con-firmed’ in connection with the discussion of fate (tukhê)

(8) 404.21: A case of clever word-positioning in Simplicius’ repre-sentation of the view of Proclus, who wanted to claim a singular

218

disagreement between Plato and Aristotle on change. His phrasing,which juxtaposes sumphônia and diaphônia, aims to ‘demonstrateagreement in the apparent disagreement if at all possible’.

(9) 617.27: [different usage] Proclus has shown ‘agreement of such anhypothesis with the postulates about place’.2

(10) 1121.1: harmony claimed by Aristotle between all natural philo-sophers regarding the existence of motion (251b15f.) on the basis ofthe disagreement (diaphônia) regarding the eternal motion as thosewho claim many worlds say as opposed to those who claim one worldand may allow for the absence of motion.

(11) 1166.11: after giving Aristotle’s comment that the natural philo-sophers have not strayed in everything from the truth (apoplanêthen-tas apo tês alêtheias) he is said ‘to agree now and in other cases withthe other philosophers’ according to himself.

(12) 1363.31: in a summary of the whole Physics Simplicius here reiter-ates the claim that Aristotle proves from ‘the practically unanimousagreement of the natural philosophers that motion always exists andneither has been generated without existing before nor will perish’(tr. McKirahan).

Commentary on On the heavens(13) 143.16: a rhetorical question with regard to the eternity of the world

and on Plato and Aristotle as not in harmony (diaphônein) but canbe shown to agree (tên heautôn sumphônian) (not in Hankinson 2004or Wildberg 1987a).

(14) 287.5: discusses Plato’s reason ‘for there being one world, the one whichAristotle welcomes, was that it was composed of all the natural bodythere is’ (3-5). Simplicius next wants to show ‘the harmony betweenAristotle and his teacher in these matters, which extends even as far asterminology’, and to do so he ‘will set these words down for comparison’(5-7), with a quotation from Tim. 32C-33A (tr. Hankinson).

(15) 297.3: introduction to one of the very long quotations from Alexander,who ‘does not understand Plato’s doctrines as Aristotle understoodthem, nor does he accept that their views are in agreement’ (tr.Hankinson). Simplicius claims that Alexander has treated Platounfairly and goes on to quote 40 lines from Alexander after which hetries to refute him. (On the Alexander quotation see above, §4.4).

(16) 466.13, 15: concerns the Pythagorean view that the stars makesounds (refuted by Aristotle) and create (musical) ‘harmonies’.

Commentary on the Categories(17) 2.21: introductory section mapping out the ‘many speculations on

Aristotle’s book’ (1.1) and claiming in this passage that ‘Iamblichus

Appendix III

219

had adduced the considerations of Archytas � and demonstratedtheir accord with the doctrines of Aristotle’. The work Iamblichusbelieved to be by Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher and mathema-tician from the fourth century BCE, was entitled Concerning the tencategories and has been shown to be spurious, probably dating toafter Andronicus (first century BCE). It contained an attempt toappropriate the Aristotelian categories as an invention of Pythagorasand Archytas.

(18) 7.31: part of the famous passage on the ideal exegete (see §1.2.1) inwhich Simplicius states that ‘the good exegete must not convict thephilosophers of discordance by looking only at the letter (lexis) ofwhat Aristotle says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit(nous) and track down the harmony which reigns between them onthe majority of points’. A fine expression of a principle of charity thatwill allow Simplicius to counter narrow literalism and maximise theharmony between Aristotle and Plato.

(19) 243.32: discusses a challenge by some to Aristotle on ‘the order of thespecies of Quality’ (243.29, tr. Fleet 2002). Simplicius counters thechallenge by pointing to Aristotle’s self-consistency (agreement withhimself, pros heauton sumphônian) with reference to Phys. 265a22.

Notes1. The term diaphônia occurs only 12 times in the commentaries, but the

contrast is clearer here than in these passages. See in DC 159.8, 202.20, 290.25,555.32, 603.11, 640.28; in Phys. 36.20, 36.25, 404.21, 821.21, 1121.2, 1145.6.

2. For Proclus see in DC 7.37, 640.23, 643.13, 645.15, 648.1,19, 649.28, 650.5,656.6, 658.24, 660.4, 663.3, 663.27, 665.16, 666.9, 667.22, 668.20; in Phys. 601.15,611.11, 614.8, 643.18, 643.37, 795.4.


220

NotesPreface

1. In particular on the internet, as the recent book by Steven Johnson onpopular culture brought home to me. About the internet he writes (2006: 274): ‘Themeta-commentary sites have endowed these armchair experts with venues wheretheir expertise can flourish in public.’ Cf. McCarty 2002.

Introduction1. But not the end of Platonist teaching full stop, for in Alexandria there was

continuing activity at least up to the 560s, see e.g. Westerink 1990, Wildberg 1999.2. A similar statement in Chase 2003: 1-2. But this view has been a growing

consensus for some years now, cf. Hadot 1987a, Tarán 1987 (who mentions two ofthe four points, 246-7), De Haas 2001b, Baltussen 2002b.

3. See Baltussen 2002c (orality), Lameer 1997, Gutas 1998 (both on the trans-mission of Greek philosophy into Arabic; relevant for Simplicius’ whereabouts), DeHaas 2001a, Hankinson 2002, Lane Fox 2005. For a more general account ofPlatonism(s) in Islamic philosophy, see D’Ancona 2007, Walker 1994 with furtherliterature.

4. The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series (ACA), published by Duck-worth, London, including introductions and notes.

5. Dodds 1928 already reviewed the reasons for neglect of the Neoplatonists, asthey became known. Cf. Gersh (1978: 10): ‘so it is understandable but not com-mendable that Damascius and Simplicius are often passed over by historians ofphilosophy as though they were of very little significance’, and quoting the exampleof the Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (1967) inwhich Damascius (not Simplicius!) is dismissed as having added ‘nothing ofparticular interest’ (op. cit. n. 23). Cf. Walker 2002: 57 with n. 68.

6. Bossier et al. 2004. But the first Latin translation has been traced toGrosseteste (Bossier 1987: 289).

7. E.g. on the Categories, Hadot 1987b: 36; Chase 2003: 3 with n. 17. See alsopp. 13-14. In conversation Christian Wildberg has made the valuable point that itmust be significant for the reception of his works that Simplicius was known to theArabs and Byzantine scholars, while he is altogether absent from the Syriansources.

8. See now Abu al-Abbas an-Nayrizis Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?)Simplicius Kommen-tar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I (ed.Rüdiger Arnzen, Köln 2002).

9. See e.g. Golitsis 2007, Saffrey 1992: 49-50, Wallis 1971: 170-2, Allen 1984,Kristeller 1943.

10. The requirement emerging from his negotiations with the Pope leading upto the publication was that he should end with this point (Finocchiaro 1997: 41-3).In addition, by publishing his Dialogo he went against the injunction stated inCardinal Bellarmine’s report of the 1615-16 Inquisition proceedings that he should

221

abandon his ‘geokinetic thesis’ and not discuss it ‘either orally or in writing’ (ibid.,43).

11. The list of books from his personal library (Favaro 1886: 241ff.) has nomention of Simplicius’ works, only of Ammonius Hermeias (no. 45, commentary inthe De interpretatione), Aristotle (nos 46-9), Bonanici De motu and Averroes (no.51) and Plato (no. 77). But as he is the proponent of the Aristotelian geocentricsystem it is an obvious inference.

12. Finocchiaro 1989: 291; cf. id. 1997: 46.13. Brucker 1742 bd. II: 217 ‘secta Platonica reformata’ and ‘eclectica’ (after

Hager 1983: 98n.).14. See further Hager 1983 on the origin and meaning of the term.15. Cf. Walker 2002: 57.16. E.g. Cherniss 1934, id. 1944, O’Brien 1969 (see Chapter 2), Laks 1981,

Osborne 1987a, Mansfeld 1986, 1990b, 1996 etc.17. Dodds 1928: 129-31.18. Hankinson 2002a: 9.19. Here we touch on a problem which relates to the historical context, or to be

more precise, the immediate environment in which these works were created.There is as yet no definitive answer from external evidence to this problem, so thatit is my hope that the internal analysis may assist us in getting closer to a solution(see §1.3 and Chapter 7).

20. ‘Simplicio’, see §0.3.21. Derived from Neuplatonismus (Hager 1983) and probably coined by Thomas

Taylor, who was the first to translate Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus into English(1758-1835).

22. Gerson 1996: 1. Cf. Vallance (1999: 223) who highlights that Galen’s andProclus’ commentaries were unusually independent in thought, labelling them‘non-submissive’, that is, ‘a model of commentary � in which the commented textis forced into second place’.

23. See Sorabji 1987; id., 1990. This seemingly radical shift had to overcomeingrained views on the importance of the ‘classical’ period. Renewed interest inHellenistic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s helped to break the dominantfascination with the classical period (at the exclusion of all others) in modernclassical scholarship. We should not forget that it was only in the twentiethcentury that English literature became a subject of academic study at Cambridge.

24. It is significant that the first volume of the Commentaria in AristotelemGraeca sponsored by the Berlin ‘Akademie der Wissenschaften’ is Simplicius’Physics commentary (vol. 9, Berlin 1882; the second volume, no. 10, appearedthirteen years later, Berlin 1895). For a severe critique of his edition see Tarán1987, who points to many flaws and is preparing a new text for in Phys. The roleof the Presocratics in the commentaries will be discussed in Chapter 2. Cf. Most1999b.

25. Christian Brandis had given Diels his notes from autopsy of the manuscripts(DG 114-18, cf. 104 n. 1, 109 n. 2). The scholarly world is awaiting the new editionof the Physics commentary announced by L. Táran (previous note, cf. his review ofMoraux 1973 in Gnomon 1981).

26. Esp. I. Hadot 1978, 1983, 1987a, 2001, 2002; Hoffmann 1987b, 2000.27. See Baltussen forthcoming-1.28. For some important exceptions see Kahn 1961, O’Brien 1969, Sider 2005

(1981) and Chapter 2.29. See e.g. Mansfeld 1990, Karamanolis 2006: 252 (n. 39) and next note.

Notes to pages 3-10

222

30. See Mansfeld 1989, 1990 for the role of such lists in the wider philosophicaltransmission of doxai. Further comments in Chapter 1 (esp. n. 75), Chapter 2 (esp.n. 12) and §6.2.

31. See Gerson 2005a.32. Dodds 1970 (1965): 129. Endorsed by Gatti 1996.33. See e.g. Mansfeld 1994; Sluiter 1990, 1999, 2000.34. Wildberg 1999: 115.35. As Lang 2005: 156 points out, Plotinus speaks of ‘respect’ for the cosmos

(eusebês, Enn. 3.2.7.42-3), Proclus of ‘showing respect’ (eusebein, Eternity of theworld 144.12, 146.8). Drawing on these passages she adds: ‘if one pays respect togod, then one must do the same for the cosmos; conversely, to dishonor the cosmosis to dishonor god.’

36. On the idea of corruption see O’Meara 1989: 102; on Pythagoras as thesource of later ideas in Plato and Aristotle ibid., 104. Earlier interest in Pythagorasoccurred in the first century CE.

37. More on Iamblichus in Chapter 5. The position on ‘ancient wisdom’ as a corecomponent is already present in Plutarch (c. 100 CE), see Boys-Stones 2001.

38. Praechter 1927: 205.54-64; cf. Chapter 1 n. 27.39. See now Sorabji 2004.40. Wildberg 1987; id. 1990: 124; cf. Sorabj 1987.41. Cf. Dillon 1987: 878 on Iamblichus vis-à-vis Plotinus: ‘a sequence of scholas-

tic elaborations arose by a sort of natural process’.42. See in Cat. 7.23-32, discussed in §1.2.1. Cf. Sedley 1997.43. Similar assessment in Tarán 1987: 246-7, who calls the commentary on the

Physics ‘the best extant ancient commentary and its intrinsic high quality makesit the best commentary on the Physics even today’.

44. A vexed question reopened in Lane Fox 2005b (cf. the comments on his paperin Classical Review 2006-1), Watts 2004, 2005, Walker 2006. See §1.3.

45. The link between continuity and institutional presence is explored by Watts(2005: 288), who goes on to argue (to my mind persuasively) that for the latePlatonists after Proclus continuity seems dependent on a teacher, not a location.See also §§1.2-3.

46. See Lane Fox 2005b: 231-5 and Watts 2005: 286. Walker 2006: 183 has ‘ca.532’.

47. See e.g. Praechter 1927: 204; Sorabji 1990: 18; Hadot 1990b: 278ff.48. Cf. e.g. Lautner 1997: 4.49. Hadot 1987a: 225-45; this is, however, rejected by Rashed 2004.50. For Eudemus see Wehrli 1969 and Fortenbaugh and Bodnár 2002. For

Eudoxus see Gregory 2003a.51. I am grateful to Dr Peter Adamson (King’s College London) and esp. Dr

Emma Gannagé (St. Joseph University, Beyruth) for their help with the Arabicmaterials discussed in this section.

52. According to L.E. Goodman, Encyclopaedia of Islam VIII, 474-7, he was‘known in the West as Rhazes, al-Razi (864-930 CE) and the most authoritativephysician of medieval times before Ibn Sina (Avicenna). His al-Hawi (Comprehen-sive book) represents his notebooks in 25 volumes and is probably the mostextensive work ever written by a physician. It includes Greek, Syrian, and earlyArabic medical knowledge in their entirety. It was translated into Latin under theauspices of Charles I of Anjou by the Sicilian Jewish physician, Faraj ibn Salim(Farragut) in 1279 and was repeatedly printed from 1488 onwards. Al-Hawi wasknown as Continens in its Latin translation.’

Notes to pages 10-13

223

53. Ullmann lists it under Peri agmôn (1970: 31, no. 12). The Hippocratic workis also known in Arabic as Kitab al-Jabr (‘On Setting [Bones]’).

54. ‘Kommentar eines sonst unbekannten Simplikios’ (1970: 31). Cf. Badawi1968: 111.

55. I am here thinking of, for example, Theophrastus, Eudemus of Rhodes, thePresocratics, and others. The evidence for distortion of later material has alreadybeen described by Rashed (1997) on the basis of marginal glosses which present uswith precious materials from Alexander’s lost commentary, and which reveal somediscrepancies (or manipulation?) between Simplicius’ citations of the same mate-rial. See further Chapter 1 n. 60, Chapter 4 and also De Haas 2001a.

1. The Scholar and his Books1. First emphasised by Dodds 1923 (see quotation §0.1); more emphatically put

forward by Hoffmann 1987a (reiterated 2006: 599), endorsed by Wildberg 1990:117; cf. Sorabji 1990: 5-15.

2. Plato is considered the ‘expounder of truth’ (in DC 131.1).3. The hypothetical nature of the sketch presented here will be subject to

continuous evaluation in the process. In addition, it will provide the reader with aframework, which can help build up a certain expectation of how Simpliciusproceeds.

4. Clearly noted in Táran 1987: 247 and n. 2. Exceptions to some extent areO’Brien 1969; Sider 1981; Perry 1983.

5. While it was clear to me that the commentaries are didactic, their size andcomplexity seem to militate against seeing them as targeting only students. WhenI put this question to the audience at a seminar in Toronto (5 December 2006), theidea of a focus on teachers was tentatively mooted by Danny Goldstick. I amgrateful for his suggestion, which I have adopted as a most plausible workinghypothesis, because it does take care of both the comprehensiveness and thedidactic aspect of the commentaries – as I intend to illustrate in subsequentchapters.

6. On methods of scholarship see e.g. Blumenthal 1996: ch. 3; Sluiter 1999passim.

7. One of his favourite terms is mêpote ‘perhaps’, when formulating an alterna-tive view. See §§4.1 and 5.2.

8. See Sandys I,105-64; Pfeiffer 1968: chs III-VI; on late antiquity see Slater1982, Lamberz 1987, Mansfeld 1994, Sluiter 1999, D’Ancona 2002, Fazzo 2004,Hoffmann 2006.

9. See Grafton and Williams 2006 on Origen (Chapter 2) and Eusebius (Chapter3); Von Staden (forthcoming) on the Hellenistic medical commentaries, and Chap-ter 5.

10. I will here summarise and at times rephrase Baltussen 2007a, which formsthe blueprint for a future book on the history of ancient philosophical commentary.

11. Richardson 1975: 66-7.12. Some detect the signs of transition already among the Presocratics (e.g.

Havelock 1982; Robb 1983). For important critical notes on the Presocratic role inthe growth of literacy, see Ferrari 1984.

13. I lack the space and expertise to cover Judaeo-Christian biblical as well aslater Arabic commentary activities here (for some comments see Chapter 6), butplan to return to the subject in the framework of another book on the history anddevelopment of the ancient philosophical commentary (see above, n. 10).


224

14. Sorabji 1990: 5-10. This section is based on Baltussen 2007a, part 4.1.15. Hadot 1987a; cf. Chase 2003: 93 who notes precedents in Alexander and

Porphyry. I have argued elsewhere (Baltussen 2004) that the notion of a skopos isalready to be found in Plato Protagoras 341E1-2, where the interpretation of apoem by Socrates includes two hermeneutical principles in embryonic form, (i) theimportance of consistency (what became known in later times as the ‘Homer fromHomer’ principle; for which see Schäublin 1977), and (ii) the assumption that onecan attribute an overall purpose to a poem rather than simply interpreting singlewords, phrases or passages. Cf. Mansfeld 1994, Sluiter 2000, and below, Chapter4 n. 20 and text thereto.

16. This technical term for the reading of a text with a master in e.g. Elias OnAristotle’s Categories 107.24-6; cf. Sorabji 1990: 5 n. 28, Mansfeld 1994: Chapter 1.

17. See e.g. Müller 1969, Moraux 1974, Mansfeld 1994.18. E.g. Hadot 1987, Mansfeld 1994, Blumenthal 1996, Barnes 1997, Post 1998,

Hadot 2002b: 167-76.19. The use of this tree model is of course not new. It is standard in manuscript

studies, but also in other contexts (see especially J. Mansfeld 1998). Its value forthe analysis of the relationships between authors or works is limited and mainlymeant to give a convenient graphic representation of chronology and the interre-lations (in the first instance based on content resemblance).

20. Gerson 2005a: 270. He also rightly emphasises that ‘to be in harmony �must be sharply distinguished from the view, held by no one in antiquity, that thephilosophy of Aristotle was identical with the philosophy of Plato’ (271).

21. See Chapters 5-6.22. E.g. in Phys. 13336.35ff. See Sorabji (1990: 5): ‘Syrianus had Proclus study

Aristotle as the “Lesser Mysteries” serving to introduce the “Greater Mysteries” ofPlato.’ Cf. Simplicius in Cat. 7.23-32 where he claims the task of a commentator isto show the general agreement between the two philosophers (discussed §1.2.1).The Academy had come a long way since Antiochus (c. 130 BCE) advocated thisdirection, see Dillon 1996: 57-8, Gerson 2005b: 3-10, and §5.2.

23. On the school practice see Dillon 2005. All texts referred to and translatedare in the standard edition of Aristotelian commentators, the Commentaria inAristotelem Graeca (CAG, 1882-1907) published by the Berlin Academy under thedirection of Hermann Diels.

24. See Appendix I.25. A slightly longer list of authors in Simplicius in Tarán 1987: 247.26. See p. 158.27. RE III A.1 (1927) 205.54-64 s.v. ‘Simplikios (10)’. This view is usually

repeated without change, see e.g. Hadot 1987a, introduction, Blumenthal 1987: 95n. 18. See also next note.

28. Sluiter 1999 maintains that the existence of commentary always meansthere was teaching activity. I agree, but for our purposes it will be helpful to specifyin each case whether the work has traces of actual teaching context or whether (asI believe may hold for Simplicius) the motivation to write is more a matter of habitand with a view to possible teaching activity. I shall return to this question in§1.2.3 and §7.2.

29. As had happened in the recent past, e.g. in the case of Marinus, who receivedthe advice from Proclus that the new commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics wasunnecessary; he burnt it. O’Meara (1989: 120) points out that Syrianus consideredhis complementary to Alexander’s: he pays particular attention to the anti-Pla-tonic books, with an emphasis on theology and metaphysics of Pythagoras/Plato.


225

30. E.g. Porphyry published Plotinus’ lectures, Proclus those of Syrianus,Philoponus those of Ammonius. The seminal article on apo phônês lectures is M.Richard 1950. The expectation in late antiquity that students would publish thethoughts of their teachers seems present in Eunapius’ comments on Alupius (Livesof philosophers and sophists 460).

31. See Baltussen 2007a.32. Itaque quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est.33. E.g. Marrou 1982: 160-9.34. When referring to an ‘exegete’ no doubt in this context Simplicius under-

stood this to mean ‘a Platonist exegete writing on Aristotle with the particular aimof clarifying his thought as minor mysteries in preparation of the Greater Myster-ies of Plato’.

35. See e.g. Rep. V, Tht. 144A, Aristotle EN 6.1, 6.8, 6.12-13. Cf. Anon. in Tht.cols IV-V, IX-XI.

36. The latter holds, as Richard Sorabji kindly reminded me, of Proclus beingtaught by Syrianus (cf. previous note) at the latter’s house, see Marinus V.Procl.chs 12-13.

37. On acroamatic, hypomnematic writings see I. Hadot and Ph. Hoffmann1990: 22, 65, 67-75. The two cannot be kept separate in every case, because thelecture notes could be reworked into a commentary, see Lamberz 1987: 1-20 andthe Oxford Classical Dictionary 3rd edn 1996 s.v. ‘scholion’. Simplicius refers tohis own work occasionally as scholia, see below, n. 45.

38. See Blumenthal (1981: 213): ‘The later Neoplatonists are, to varying ex-tents, prone to reproduce material from their predecessors, without acknowledgingits provenance.’

39. Two qualifications are necessary here: (1) we cannot infer that ‘direct’implies ‘accurate’. In addition, Simplicius and Alexander report that they hadaccess to different manuscripts with different versions of the text, and on manyoccasions they discuss the merits of the variant readings. We should not forget thatSimplicius would not have at his disposal the modern editorial techniques toseparate out quotation from the main narrative (either in his sources or in his ownwork), although Christian Wildberg has made an interesting case for the early useof quotation marks (see below, n. 78). (2) There are of course many problems inseparating out quotation from context in the case of prose writers, see e.g. De Haas1998: 171-89.

40. For the early Platonist exegetical tradition I am indebted to Blumenthal1996, Dillon 1996, Sedley 1997, and to Karamanolis 2006 on the appropriation ofAristotle in the Middle Platonic tradition from Antiochus (c. 100 BCE) to Porphyry(c. 300 CE). For the question of harmonisation among late Platonists see Gerson2005a,b, and §5.3. For Aristotelians I rely on M. Frede 1999b and Sharplesforthcoming-1, -2 (see also Chapter 3).

41. The contrast between letter and spirit is of course famously that of Paul inhis letter to the Corinthians (see now F.L. Jong 2004). Its history is outlined inGrant 1957. Presumably Simplicius became familiar with it during his Alexan-drian training – see §0.2 and §1.1.

42. Aristotle is a famous example. The frequency with which this happens hasoften puzzled modern scholars; Quandt 1983 offers a plausible interpretation,showing how Aristotle may be advocating principles in one work which he appliesin another.

43. For skopos in the Physics commentary see 8.32, 83.29, 220.14, 221.6, 302.23,303.30, 310.35, 314.16, 317.33, 318.23, 357.13, 367.25, 372.26, 578.20, 867.22,


226

907.19, 914.13, 1022.14, 1024.18, 1117.14, 1135.34, 1146.19, 1182, 30, 1241.31,1327,12,23, 1329.13 (from TLG-E). See also Luna 2001a: Introduction, who revealsan interesting divergence in the arrangement of topoi for both Simplicius andPhiloponus when compared to other commentators.

44. Simplicius expresses surprise over this (thaumazô � pôs en têi sunopsei toupemptôi toutou bibliou), but it is unclear to me that his comment ‘Porphyry �although he wisely reports on the division of the eight books, namely that all callthe <first> five Physics, the <next> three On motion, himself still says that the fourbooks from the fifth to the eighth coming after constitute the treatise on motionand is entitled idiosyncratically On motion’ really means that it was Porphyry’sidea to give this title to that section of the manuscript. See also McKirahan 2000:n. 558 ad loc.

45. I note that he ends by referring to his comments as ‘skholai to Aristotle’ssecond book of Physics’ (393.12-13), not hupomnêmata. See also below, n. 53 andtext thereto.

46. The issue of the authenticity of Physics 7 is also discussed in modernscholarship: see Manuwald 1971, Wardy 1990.

47. Presumably the emphasis on the numbering for books 6-8 is connected tothe division discussed earlier (5-3 or 4-4), and makes sense if we still want to seethe physics as one coherent treatise (pragmateia, 1117.2).

48. Noted by Gerson 2005b: 112.49. Other examples: in DC 20.15 (other book of the same work), 41.17, 116.28,

122.10, 199.31, 200.18 (all refer to Phys. 8), 111.30 (refers to Cat.), 121.20, 129.30,199.3 (all refer to Phys. 1), 271.7 (refers to Metaph.).

50. On Xenarchus see Hankinson 2002-3.51. Lamberz 1987: 7-11. Cf. Bossier 1992.52. It is the end of book 2. He uses the term also for Porphyry (in DC 503.34, in

Cat 2.12, 435.24). Cf. next note.53. Cognate forms are skholikos (in Cat. 3.15), skholazô (in Phys. 25.2, 51.11 of

Presocratics), skholê (in Cat. 65.7, in Phys. 271.27). Lamberz 1987: 5 (with n. 18)notes that since Galen skholion is attested in the sense of ‘explanatory note to apassage’.

54. Cf. Moraux 1969: 494-5 and n.55. See Pfeiffer 1970: 124-90; 213-85.56. On the question which of these may originate with Alexander of Aph-

rodisias, see Chapter 4.57. A famous example is the recently edited Empedocles papyrus (P. Strasb. gr.

inv. 1665-1666) which was recycled to support a funerary crown (see Martin andPrimavesi 1999, and §2.2).

58. Philosophical: Epicureans read and re-read their master‘s foundationaltexts and dealt with textual difficulties, as is clear from, e.g., the discussion ofcruces in P. Herc. 1012 (Sedley 1998: 78); literary: the Alexandrian scholarsAristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus in their Homer exegesis (Sandys1903: ch. VIII, 125-35); medical: von Staden’s pioneering work on conjectures foreditions (ekdosis), commentaries, and glossaries mentions commentators from theHellenistic period such as Zeuxis the Empiricist, Bacchius of Tanagra, Andreas ofCarystus and Xenocritus of Cos (paper presented at Columbia University, NewYork, 8 December 2006).

59. Gottschalk 1990: 59 with n. 21. For the early scholarship on Plato we havethe Anonymous Commentary on Theaetetus (see § 5.1) and the important evidencein D.L. 3.65-7.


227

60. Gottschalk notes (1990: 59 nn. 20-1): ‘we know hardly anything of histreatment or the internal arrangement of his work � [with reference to Düringand Moraux]. We can still see, however, that he employed the techniques ofAlexandrian scholarship. His catalogues included incipits and information aboutlength, in lines, of the works he listed, and letters and personal writings werelisted at the end. No doubt he compared different manuscripts, although positiveevidence is rare.’ Simplicius also mentions an apocryphal letter of Eudemus toTheophrastus on a textual problem (in Phys. 923.10-16).

61. Gottschalk (above, n. 59) in his n. 21 points out that Dexippus’ discussion ofCat. 1a1 at in Cat. 21.18ff. should not be read as his own contribution, but asPorphyry’s on comparing manuscripts, as can be seen from Simplicius’ commen-tary ad loc. Similarly, the variant at Phys. 202a14 in Simplicius in Phys. 404.14presented as from Andronicus ‘may be due to conjecture or carelessness’. He alsonotes that those mentioned in Brandis (1833: 273) are not on textual criticism.

62. Urmson 2000: n. 177 points to parallels at in Cat. 88.25-7; 228.1-3.63. TLG-E search (online) produces only two further results: Basilica, Scholia

in Basilicorum I-IX (9-13 CE) and Constantinus VII Porphyrogenitus (10 CE).64. On asapheia see esp. Mansfeld 1994: 16, 25-6. Cf. Whittaker 1971 and in

Phys. 734.12, 936.22, 1017.20, 1054.29, 1056.15, 1078.5-6, 1086.22, 1093.13,22,27etc.

65. See e.g. in Phys. 428.17-18: he fails to understand Alexander’s position;429.25-430.3: Alexander deemed confused (cf. 332.20); 448.21 Alexander com-ments on a phrase.

66. Chase 2003: 12 n. 48.67. Mansfeld 1994 with earlier literature.68. On concerns over authenticity see Sorabji 2004,3 [2.d]; Mansfeld 1994:

14-15, 37, 40; Moraux 1974: 265-88; Müller 1969: 120-6.69. This section is a revised version of part of Baltussen 2002b.70. Edition of I. Hadot, 1996.71. I am grateful to Frans de Haas for discussion of these passages, which

helped to improve my wording, though he may not fully agree with my interpreta-tion.

72. It is perhaps a moot point whether Simplicius intends to distinguishbetween literary modes rather than individual styles, which happen to be eitherin verse or prose, but the internal opposition with regards to Melissus between‘archaic, yet not unclear’ implies that he does at least differentiate between clarityof style and thought.

73. For the polemical strategy of Simplicius against Philoponus, see §6.2.74. In the case of Parmenides there is a problem as to the transmitted version

of some of his verse lines: see §2.2.1 with Whittaker 1971.75. On the relative decline of education and literacy in late antiquity see Harris

1989: ch. 8.76. Cf. Perry 1983: 128, 264-5, 267. Recently Sedley has noted a similar

approach in the anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus (first century BCEor CE). He concludes (1997: 129): ‘He wants to vindicate Plato’s authority � It isdone by devoting the closest possible attention, page by page, to the ipsissimaverba of Plato’s text.’

77. He mentions anagraphais historikais (in Phys. 28.33-4). See below, Chapter2 n. 12 and Chapter 6.

78. A possible exception is Themistius, in DA 107.30 Heinze; compare forinstance the famous Empedocles passages from his poem (31B17 DK) which is


228

introduced with the same verb (in Phys. 161.14); see also Wildberg 1993: 187-99,esp. 193-4 with notes; at 193 n. 20 Wildberg translates ‘ganz genau zitieren’ (whichis not the same as verbatim) and points out the very interesting implication thatSimplicius does not distinguish between the basic meaning of para-tithes-thai/para-graphein, ‘mark a text on the side with signs’ (in the margin) and ‘quote,cite’, so that it is possible that Simplicius himself marked citations (adducing inCat. 64.20-5). For more examples see Baltussen 2002b, 2006a.

79. See e.g. Barnes 1991: 6.80. Wallis 1971: 138-9. Cf. Lloyd 1967, 448: ‘His surviving commentaries � are

both more learned and more polemic than would have been suitable for students.’81. Questioned by Usener 1994: 164 n. 39 (I owe this reference to R. Sharples).

Schenkeveld 1992 gives a thorough overview of Greek prose texts up to the fourthcentury CE. Earlier but less extensive analyses in Schroeder and Todd (1990: 25-9)with reference to previous comments on the issue (I owe this reference to R.Sorabji). More recent contributions have tried to narrow down further the meaningof the verb in certain occurrences, casting doubt on whether akouein can mean‘read’, but as Sharples and Opsomer (2000: 254 and n.) admit, cases of akoueinlegontos as a rule refer to views taken from texts.

82. One proviso regarding the ‘original words’ always holds: accuracy is a mootpoint here. We should think of ‘original words’ as the words Simplicius thought tobe the original words, or as he presented them as the original words. That he wascapable of misrepresenting views has been shown in recent publications (Rashed1997).

83. A full dossier would be too long: see e.g. in Phys. 363.15-6, 644.25-6 (in theexcursus on ‘place’); in DC 454.24,29-30, 168.15-18; 169.2-3.

84. For an interesting interpretation of this aspect of Plato’s position see Th.Szlezák 1999: chs 12-16, whom I follow in the main points.

85. MacKenzie 1982: 65.86. I use the edition of P. Couvreur 1901. A similar omission is in the discussion

of this work in Simplicius, who only refers to part of the passage in passing, see inDC 25.34-6 with Hoffmann 1987b: 66-7.

87. Sorabji 2004,3: 2.b(ii), p. 51.88. Essential reading on this topic is Richard 1950.89. Not to be confused with his namesake Ammonius, son of Hermeias, who

wrote a number of monobibloi and some commentaries, and of whom we have apophônês writings by Philoponus with some additional comments by the latter (seeWesterink, 1990: 326-7).

90. At Phaedrus 275A writing is labelled a ‘cure for memory’, hypomnêseôspharmakon. Presumably Plato is implying that writing might replace (the powerof) memory, taking this as a negative development. One wonders whether hisworks could have the additional function of self-advertisement, as Tarrant hassuggested for the works of the earlier Greek thinkers (1996: 135). Tarrant’spunchline is particularly interesting: ‘One’s oral teaching was what one wantedthe reader to hear, one’s written teaching little more than a provocative preview.’

91. See Harris 1989: 294-5.92. Gregory 1995: 548.93. See Cameron 1969: 7.94. Chosroes came to power on 18 August 531 (Cameron 1969-70: 110). Cf.

Cameron 1981, Foulkes 1978. Walker 2002: 59-60 is inclined to take Kushrow’sinterest in philosophy seriously on the basis of sources other than Agathias. Watts2006: 128-38 interprets the first edict (Codex Just. 1.11.9) as a ban on all activities


229

to do with divination suggested by Malalas’ listing of philosophy, astronomy andcasting of dice (131-2), and the second (ibid. 1.11.10) as a clear ban on paganactivities (138f.). Cf. Cameron 1969: 10.

95. See Tardieu 1987, 1989; accepted by Hadot 1987a.96. See Walker 2006: 183-4.97. Agathias Histories 2.28.1 Keydell. Walker 2006: 184 warns that Agathias’

‘cultural chauvinism’ is unjustified and not to be followed (cf. Cameron 1970:114-17; id. 1969-70: 176 on Procopius who ‘shared the hostility’ towards thePersian king); the short stay of the Platonists is not an indication of ‘the super-ficiality of Sasanian philhellenism’ (n. 73 with additional literature). Grignaschi1966: 16-45 provides independent evidence for Kushro’s interests on the basis ofhis autobiographical account, in which, however, there is precious little about thevisit of the Greek philosophers. (I owe this reference to Prof. Jairus Banaji,Jawaharlal University, New Dehli.)

98. The story has been told and retold and from different perspectives. SeeChase 2003: 2-3 with further literature on Simplicius; Combès in his introductionto Damascius On principles (1986: xviii-xxvi). Definitive blows to the Harran stayin Luna 2001c, summarised and extended with Arabic materials by Watts 2005:290-8.

99. Tardieu 1987, 1990.100. Lane Fox’s critique (2005b: 231-44) is particularly devastating, as it refutes

the thesis of the Harran school point by point. Lameer 1997 and Gutas 1998 haveusefully evaluated the Arabic evidence, which also produces a negative conclusion.See also Walker 2002: 57-60 with lavish sources.

101. It is the so-called ‘Eternal Peace treaty’ (Agathias 2.31.3-4), revoked in 540CE (Procopius Wars 2.3-4).

102. Hallström 1994: 144-7.103. Watts 2005: 299-300 with notes.104. Watts 2005: 302-3.105. What follows is in part based on Watts 2005: 305ff.106. Cameron 1969; Sider 2006; cf. Blumenthal 1996. Doubtful, Hankinson

2003: 12.107. The use of microscript is suggested by Hoffmann 2006: 616.108. All this, by the way, is still based on the Hadot chronology of his works;

Watts (2005: 286) considers Cameron’s view that the in Epict. might be from529-31, given the views on how philosophers are being maltreated (on the histori-cal connection cf. O’Meara 2004: 89-90, 94ff.).

109. Hankinson (2002a: 12 n. 3): ‘cut off from an organized school and fromformal teaching may without hyperbole be described as a form of exile’. ForSimplicius’ ideas on the role of philosophers in the city see O’Meara 2004.

110. This section builds on and expands my previous discussions of Simplicius’method (Baltussen 2002c, id. 2003) and has in addition benefited in particularfrom the valuable insights of Hoffmann 1987a, 1987b, 2000, 2006, De Haas 2001a,Chase 2003. I note that Rappe in her book Reading Neoplatonism (2000), althoughshe contributes much to our understanding of exegetical strategies in Neoplaton-ism, hardly ever mentions Simplicius (see her Index s.v.).

111. For a qualifier that his use of Neoplatonic school practice does not implyhe himself was in fact writing for a school environment himself, see n. 28.

112. Cf. Sedley 1997: 110, who usefully exploits this sentiment of caution in hisstudy of Plato’s authority in the Platonist tradition.


230

2. Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy?Origins of Ancient Wisdom

1. A new project at the University of Cambridge aims to revisit the Presocraticmaterial from in Phys. book 1. A full translation of book 1 is forthcoming from theLondon ACA Project.

2. Vincent 2003: 77, where he also notes that ‘our culture has a bias againstbias’.

3. Gerson 1995: 261.4. On the presumption of a text’s hidden meaning claimed by allegorists and

Sophists see Plato Protagoras 316D-E, 317A, with Baltussen 2004, 2007a andabove, p. 25. The point was also made in Mansfeld 1994: 25f., 149f.; Sedley 1997;Wildberg 1990: 116. Cf. in Phys. 453.30, 454.18 (Porphyry).

5. Among existing studies O’Brien 1969 is the best example of a thoroughdiscussion of Simplician material. See also n. 64 below.

6. See references in §2.2.7. E.g. in DC 142.25, 565.26f., in Phys. 48.27, 1137.26. He may even explicitly

avoid such lengthy quotes (in DC 121.22). For the range of different reasons, seebelow and Chapter 4.

8. See Brittain and Brennan 2002: 7-9. Cf. Hoffmann 2006, Gerson 1997.9. For Alexander see Chapter 4, for Philoponus see §6.2.10. The attitude towards direct quotation as a conscious choice also requires

further research: authors such as Plutarch (see W.C. Helmbold and O’Neil) andEusebius (see Gustafsson 1961) come to mind as important earlier cases in whoseworks quotations play a special role; see also n. 44.

11. Passage already discussed in Baltussen 2002a and above, p. 44.12. ‘Predecessors’ translates proterôn, a conjecture by Diels for neôterôn of the

manuscripts.13. ‘more direct’ does of course not necessarily mean ‘more accurate’. On

quotation-cum-paraphrase, see also n. 49 and §6.2.14. He mentions anagraphais historikais (in Phys. 28.33-4) in the same context.

These ‘lists’ may belong to the doxographical tradition, which (in a sense) startedwith Theophrastus (see Baltussen 2000: 234-45), then became stock in trade of thesceptical tradition (Sextus Empiricus), and inspired Christian authors (e.g. Clem-ent of Alexandria, Eusebius) to prove the permanent disagreement (diaphônia)among Greek (pagan) philosophers. See also Chapter 6.

15. See Mansfeld 1990, Mansfeld and Runia 1997.16. See Mansfeld 1994, Sedley 1998: ch. 6. There is also reason to believe that

Cicero preserved some useful pieces of information in his doxography in Lucullus(see F240 FHSG and Mansfeld 1989). In addition, a persuasive case has been madefor an early version of a placita-collection known to Chrysippus and his audience(Mansfeld 1990). Later authors who may have had (indirect) access to some worksrelevant to physiology are Galen (cf. Sharples 1985) and perhaps Sextus Em-piricus.

17. For a fuller exposition of Sedley’s illuminating argument see Baltussen2003.

18. Zeller 1963: 819n. Burnet simply states that Simplicius ‘of course had thelibrary of the Academy at his command’ (1975: 171). Hadot 1978: 26-7 is notconvinced.

19. A more elaborate treatment is in preparation (Baltussen forthcoming-3).20. Usener 1858: 25-7; Diels 1879: 102ff.


231

21. This section is based on Baltussen 2005, §3.22. Mansfeld 1989: 148-9 with n. 49 (his p. 157).23. On these (en)doxographical preludes see esp. Cherniss 1935; Mansfeld 1989,

1994; Baltussen 2000 with further literature.24. See Baltussen 2000: ch. 2 for a fuller account.25. He is especially emphatic about the ‘agreement’ on the issue of first

principles, as is shown by the use of harmonia at 182.10, 188.13, 188.16, 204.27.For all occurrences of sumphônia see Appendix III.

26. Although going back to Cherniss’ studies of Aristotle (1934, 1944), thegreater emphasis on the importance of the intellectual and subjective context offragments really took off in the second half of the twentieth century, see e.g. Laks1981, Osborne 1987a, Mansfeld 1990, 1997, Baltussen 2000, 2005.

27. Enn. 4.8.1, 5.1.8, 5.1.9 (Sorabji 1990: 4-5 with n. 22).28. On Parmenides see Perry 1983: 6. For Empedocles we suspect that his

poems contained 3,000 lines. Cf. O’Brien 1969: 150. He suggests on the basis of theSuda 2,000 lines for the poem on physics, the rest on the Purifications (Katharmoi)– but doubt has been cast on this by Osborne 1987b. See below, n. 71.

29. See now the exciting new publication of the Strasbourg papyrus by A.Martin and O. Primavesi, L’Empédocle de Strasbourg (Berlin, 1999) in whichfurther implications regarding the total length of Empedocles’ poem are formu-lated.

30. Perry 1983; Tarán 1987: 246-66; Sider 2005 (1981).31. Laks 1981. Simplicius had the work of Diogenes to hand (in Phys. 25.7 to eis

eme elthon autou suggramma Peri Phuseôs epigegrammenon).32. Table was first published in Baltussen 2005, based on autopsy and Runia

1989.33. See Laks 1998; Mansfeld 1999b.34. Cf. text quoted below, p. 73. Another reason for selectiveness is the existing

detailed treatment of the sources for Anaximander (Kahn 1960, repr. 1994) andDiogenes of Apollonia (Laks 1981).

35. Cf. Aristotle Phys. 184b15-17; Metaph. 986b9-87a2.36. Aristotle GC 314a7-b11; Theophrastus DS 1-2; cf. 12-24 and 36-9.37. Mansfeld 1989, 1996; Baltussen 1992.38. Compare his remarks regarding Eudemus (§3.2) and Sider 2005: 52.39. See Mansfeld and Runia 1997, Baltussen 2005.40. See Mansfeld 1994: 56; Grafton and Williams 2006, chs 2-3.41. in Phys. 161.14; Martin and Primavesi 1999: 112 n. 5 translate ‘cité’.

Wildberg (1993: 193f.) translates ‘ganz genau zitieren’ – even though he does notwant that to mean verbatim (see his n. 20).

42. See e.g. Simpl. in DC 135.15, 637.12, 644.5; in Phys. 161.15 [less relevant225.22, 1173.32]; also in Phys. 83.28, 97.9, 175.33, 725.23, and 432.20f. [announcedin 431.5-6]; 433.14, 733.4 (subject is Aristotle, and a quote follows); 1165.20,1132.26f. (quote follows); 1333.33 (after a long quote from Philoponus).

43. kaiper eiôthôs epieikôs graphein ta toiauta kai parathesthai tous historoun-tas (quoted and translated in Higbie 1999: 47).

44. E.g. Strom. 2.18.79.4 (marturias paratithesthai), 4.8.66.4 (paratithesthaigraphên), 5.14.139.2 (muria epi muriois epirrei moi paratithesthai), 7.14.84.2(polla men kai alla ek graphês marturia epeisi paratithesthai).

45. E.g. Philocalia 21.6.6 (verb).46. E.g. Hist. Eccl. 4.18.4.47. Wilson 1984: 108.


232

48. Cf. Chapter 1 n. 44.49. Karamanolis 2006: 257, 265. At 266 Karamanolis highlights the use of

quotation for illustrating a point, in particular when comparing authors. More-over, he makes the valuable point that this approach was already pioneered byOrigen and Eusebius in comparing Christian and pagan views (ibid. n. 73).

50. Cf. makrêgorein as in [Plut.] Consolation to Apollonius 115E muria d’epimuriois an tis ekhoi toiauta pros taúton kephalaia, all’ ouk anagkaion makrêgoreinand Alexander in Metaph. 816.35.

51. Rist 1965. Cf. Dodds 1928: 132ff., Whittaker 1971.52. The influence of Parmenides’ argumentative approach is clear. See esp.

Schroeder 1996.53. As quoted by Rist 1965: 329.54. The contrast between these two groups also occurs in Simplicius, albeit on

another aspect (in DC 598.2-3).55. See e.g. Curd 1998: 4-5. Cf. Sanders 2002.56. Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1984: 257 (‘a form of monism’); Curd 1998: 65-6

(‘predicational monism’).57. For the general account of Parmenides I rely on Burnet 41975, Gallop 1984,

Curd 1998, Shields 2003.58. Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1984: 310. Cf. 31B2-3 (Sextus Emp. 7.122-4);

31A86, A92 DK.59. Damascius calls him ‘the great Parmenides’, De princip. 1.24.14-15; 1.214.3.

See also Damascius De princip. 1.95.25, cf. Dodds 1928, Rist 1962: 398 (summary),Dodds 1960, id. 1963 and Chapter 5 below.

60. In DC 556-62 has a particularly high frequency of his views. At 7.23-4 evenpoints to the connection with in Phys. On Parmenides’ position in the division ofnatural philosophers see Kerferd 1991.

61. Sources range from Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus to Philodemus,Aëtius, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Strabo in Greek, andTertullian, Censorinus and Lactantius in Latin.

62. See Whittaker 1971: 16-32 (with earlier literature).63. This part has been quoted by many other authors, as DK show in their notes

to the entry: Plato (Soph., Tht.), Aristotle (Metaph., Phys.), Clement (Strom.),Eudemus (ap. Simplicius 143.4), and Simplicius.

64. If we retrace our steps in the fragments as arranged by Diels (DK), butrearrange them according to the Simplician text, a rather disorganised sequenceemerges from it: the sequence in DC 557.25-58.2; in Phys. 30.6-10, 16-19, 22-31.2;in Phys. 117.2ff.; in Phys. 143.4,6 [= Plato Soph. 244E]; in Phys. 147.13f. (homouto pan; repeated often, see Sider 2005: 69); in Phys. 147.28; in Phys. 179.31ff.relates to B1.28-32, B8.53-9, B6, B8.42, B8.43-5, B8.52, B8.42. This does notnecessarily mean that the reconstructed sequence in Diels is wrong, but if it isright, it signals the peculiar manner of Simplicius’ referring to Parmenides. I notethat KRS give the wrong reference to in Phys. for their no. 297: what they print atthe bottom of p. 250 is 143.3 + 145.23-6 (not 144.29).

65. Eudemus comes into Simplicius’ observations on Presocratics on severalother occasions (Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Empedocles), based on his work in thehistory of science. Sider (2005: 46) acknowledges that Eudemus consulted the textof Anaxagoras thus going ‘beyond Aristotle’. O’Brien 1969: 151 also thinks Eude-mus had a copy of the poem. See also §3.2.

66. See above, p. 55.67. Hoffmann 2006: 599. See also Chapter 5 below.


233

68. Mansfeld 1989; cf. McDiarmid 1953, Wiesner 1991. A more syntheticaccount will be given in Baltussen forthcoming-3.

69. Basic collection of passages with translations in KRS 280-321. Generalinterpretations in O’Brien 1969, Wright 1995, Inwood 2002, Trepanier 2004. Goodsummary outline in Campbell 2006.

70. On Empedocles’ shamanic and mystical aspects see Kingsley 1995.71. He is called ‘an emulator and associate of Parmenides’ (zêlôtês kai plêsiastês

tou Parmenidous) which seems slightly odd: an attempt to characterise theircompetitive relationship from hindsight? According to Frohn 1980: 123 Alexanderdoes not seem to have added new material.

72. A marginal note marks line 300 in P. Strasb. gr. inv. 1665-1666, found in1991, published in 1999 by A. Martin and O. Primavesi.

73. For a summary of the debate on titles and the new proposal see Janko 2005.74. See Kohlschitter 1990, who also shows how this reading is taken up by the

Arabic historian Sahrastani (1076-1153 CE). Cf. Syrianus in Metaph. 13-14,171.11-15 where he claims that Plato and Parmenides agree.

75. O’Brien 1969: 19-30, esp. 25, 28-30.76. Cf. Phys. 252a7 = A38. But, as Frohn 1980: 129 notes, Aristotle does not

actually mention a sphere. For this we need to look to other sources, e.g. Eudemusat in Phys. 1183.13 (= fr. 110 Wehrli), Hippolytus (below n. 79).

77. A view endorsed by Tannéry 1887 and others after him (cf. Long’s review ofO’Brien, JHS 1970: 238).

78. Frohn 1980: 123.79. Note that this information is not from Simplicius: B29 = Hippolytus Ref.

Her. 7.29.13.3-5; B134 = Ammonius in Cat. 249.6-10.80. A verb normally reserved for Aristotle, passim, or Plato, e.g. in Phys. 1073.4.

It occurs some 8,576 times in in Phys. and in DC (search for didaskei- in TLG-Eonline).

81. The ratio of exegetical narrative to the number of lines from Empedocles is31:76.

82. My main source of information for this section is Sider 2005, chs 1-2.83. By capable scholars such as Schofield 1980; Sider 2005 (reviewed by J.E.

Sisko, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2005.11.13). Pioneering study in Vlastos 1950[= Vlastos 1995: 303-27]. For a newly discovered fragment (not in DK or Sider) seeScholten 2005.

84. For the discussion of his precise dates see O’Brien 1969; Mansfeld 1979 (ptI), 1980 (pt II).

85. Sider 2005: 39-40 with some doubt (‘S. intends us to believe that he had thework �’), but more positively at 42 (‘access to the original text of A.’).

86. On Anaximander, Kahn 1960; Empedocles, O’Brien 1969; on Diogenes ofApollonia, Laks 1981; on Democritus, Taylor 1999; on Ion of Chios, Baltussen2007b. See also n. 89 below.

87. According to in Phys. 163.7-8, this phrase stood at the start of his work(arkhomenos euthus tou suggrammatos).

88. The modern equivalent of this kind of potentiality is perhaps stem cells,which by their nature can differentiate, at some point in their development, intoany type of cell of any body part.

89. According to Ion of Chios (D.L. 2.16 and 23; Simpl. in Phys. 27.23 = A5 DK)the teacher of Socrates (c. 470-399 BCE). See Baltussen 2007b and next note.

90. On Archelaus see KRS 386-89 (esp. 388 n. 1: D.L. 5.42).91. Sider (2005: 35) has established that all of B1-17 (except B10) come from


234

book 1. Sider’s discussion of Simplicius’ method is still fundamental for ourunderstanding of the transmission (37-52, esp. 43f.).

92. The relation between Simplicius and Theophrastus is rather complex, seeabove, pp. 63-5 and §2.1. Sider (2005: 43) rightly points out that Theophrastus’reports offer very few actual words of Anaxagoras – a marked difference comparedto Simplicius.

93. The account in Simplicius relating to Melissus’ arguments depends heavilyon Alexander, see Frohn 1980: 102-15 (for his possible dependence on Theophras-tus see 112f.).

94. Porphyry seems to accept Aristotle’s here in attributing the terms (cf. Sider2005: 44).

95. Such formalisations of Aristotle’s account (not readily approved of in modernscholarship, cf. Weil 1975: 292) often go beyond the text, but signal how the latePlatonists believed that Aristotle’s own argumentative rules could be found in hismore systematic treatises (cf. Alexander ap. Simpl. in DC 108.10). I have arguedelsewhere that their approach could in these contexts be an application of the claimin Top. A.2, that the dialectical method for discovering foundations can be used inthe doxai-discussions of Aristotle’s introductions, such as Metaph. A.2-10, De caeloA.10, De anima A.2-4, Phys. A.2-4 (Baltussen 2000: 32-3 with n. 8).

96. Simplicius continues to evaluate other arguments up to 178-9 (near the endof Phys. A.4), but we do not have the space to deal with all of them here.

97. I use Wildberg’s translation (1990: 116) for lines 26-30. Cf. line 20 fordiaphônias.

98. epi pleon ênankasthêmen mêkunein. On the verb for ‘elaborate’ see above, p.45.

99. See Saffrey 1992: 38-41; Hoffmann 2006: 598-600; and Chapter 5.100. See O’Brien 1969, Sider 2005, Baltussen 2002a, Hankinson 2003.101. A more detailed analysis of this aspect in Baltussen 2002a and Baltussen

forthcoming-3, Theophrastus of Eresus. Fragments in Physical Doxography FHSG225-45 (E.J. Brill: Leiden).

102. A case in point is the discussion by Marwan Rashed (1997), who discoveredlost parts of the Physics of Alexander of Aphrodisias (200 CE) in the margin of amanuscript. This allowed him to compare those marginalia with quotations inSimplicius, from which he inferred that Simplicius was deliberately omittingmaterial. Alexander is one of Simplicius’ most important sources (see Chapter 4).

103. Cf. Mansfeld 1990, 1994, Mansfeld and Runia 1997; Baltussen 2000b andid. forthcoming-3.

104. They did think that the writing of dialogue was acceptable – despite Plato’srejection of plays – because in dialogues the characters are subjected to examina-tion, according to Olympiodorus’ commentary on Gorgias 1,7-19 Westerink (seeSorabji, 2004, vol. 3 Logic, ‘methodology’, section 2.B (i)). But they do not seem toobject to writing as such.

105. On the relevance of the form of dialogues for Plato’s philosophising see Gilland McCabe 1996.

106. polueidous de ontos allon kat’ allon ti tôn eidôn tou topou theasasthai kaiekphênai.

3. Towards a Canon: the Early Peripatetics1. Cf. Gottschalk (2002: 26): ‘Aristotle died in Chalcis � his school was in

abeyance and his will gives no hint that he expected it to survive.’


235

2. For the accounts regarding the succession and his library we rely for the mostpart on Strabo and Diogenes Laertius, and modern scholars still have not reachedagreement on all the details (see esp. Gottschalk 1985; Barnes 1997).

3. Dillon 1996; De Haas 2001a; Karamanolis 2006.4. On Stoic ideas in the Anonymous Commentary on Theaetetus see Sedley 1997.5. He also uses Stoic terms and ideas; see Graeser who notes (1972: xiii) that

Porphyry was already aware of this (V.Plot. 14.4-5), although Platonism in generalmay not necessarily always have realised to what extent it became removed from‘its own generic roots’ (1972: 2-3).

6. See Sorabji 1990, Hadot-Hoffmann 1990, De Haas 2001b, Sharples forth-coming-1.

7. On this particular issue see De Haas 2001a, Sorabji 2004,3: 3 [a], [b], [d].8. Plotinus was less prone to mention his sources anyway (Wallis 1971: 42

mentions his ‘refusal to refer by name to any philosophers later than Epicurus’).Compare Proclus who according to the TLG refers to Eudemus only once in hiscommentary on the Timaeus (3.63.30 in connection with the trajectory of the sunand moon, a hypothesis attributed to Anaxagoras) and six times in his commentaryon Euclid (125.7, 299.3, 333.6, 352.14, 379.2, 419.15).

9. For this point see Sharples 1998: 229. For his complementary role see e.g.Regenbogen 1940: 1547.13-20, 44-60; 1548.8-27, 33-5, 39-43; 1549.22-38 (physics);1550.14-19; Steinmetz 1964: 7, 324; Sharples 1998: 227-30; Baltussen 2006a.Compare the ancient assessment in Cicero De fin. V.12-13 (with Runia 1989),Strabo xiii.609, Plutarch Sulla 26.2.2, Quintilian Inst. or. 3.8.62 (= F694 FHSG),Boethius in De interpr. 12.3-16 (= F72a FHSG), and Priscian Metaphr. 7.20-4Bywater (= F275A FHSG).

10. He is also mentioned in the other commentaries: in Cat. (2) and in DC (4),in DA (2), in Epict. (1). See also n. 17 below.

11. Most of these materials occur in Phys. pp. 22-7 Diels; but compare 115.11,118.2, 149.32, 154.14 where Parmenides, Anaxagoras and others return, see alsobelow and §2.2-3.

12. The hypothesis is most emphatically proposed by Usener 1858 and Diels1879 (above Chapter 2, p. 58; cf. Introduction, pp. 7-8). On its history andweaknesses see Mansfeld 1990b, Mansfeld-Runia 1997, Baltussen 2000 (ch. 2),and forthcoming-3 (commentary on FHSG 225-45), and above, §2.1.

13. On the doctrinal treatment of Theophrastus by Simplicius, see also Sharples1998, Algra 1995, Sorabji 1992.

14. See also §5.1.1.15. An issue to which I shall return, see Chapter 5.16. See the astute remarks in Sider 2005: 39-48 on this problem of transmission.17. E.g. ‘in his On the heaven’, in DC 1.8; ‘the first book of his Prior Analytics’,

ibid. 554.3; ‘his Physics’, ibid. 564.24; ‘in his work On the coming-to-be of theelements’, ibid. 700.6; ‘in his own Topics’, in Cat. 415.15; ‘in his first book ofPhysics’, ibid. 435.27-8; ‘at the beginning of his own Physics’, in Phys. 9.7; ‘in thefirst book of his Physics’, ibid. 20.20; ‘in the work that has reached me, entitled Onnature’, ibid. 25.7; ‘in his first book On motion’, 107.12, 986.5; ‘in his Investigation<into nature?>’, ibid. 149.32; ‘he writes in his Natural investigation’, ibid. 154.15-16; ‘writing this in his second book On Anaxagoras’, 166.17f.; ‘in the Physics’,604.5-6, 639.14, 860.19; ‘in his own Physics’, in DA 286.31.

18. This is the general consensus, found in many of the papers published in theProject Theophrastus publications since 1983 (Rutgers Studies in the ClassicalHumanities, New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers).


236

19. See Sharples 1985, id. 2002.20. Sharples 1998: 228 with n. 645 for further literature.21. For the lists of their work see D.L. book 5.42-50 and Wehrli 1969: 79-123

respectively.22. This section is based on a revised (and in some respects expanded) version

of Baltussen 2003 and parts of Baltussen 2006b.23. See Regenbogen 1940: 1378.28-31. Cf. Gottschalk 1990; Sollenberger 1992:

3853-55.24. Blumenthal 1996: 10.25. Theophrastus’ groundwork in collecting views on many topics may have been

exploited for the composition of reference books in Hellenistic times, when schoolbooksand other didactic material became necessary. Current research is still producing newinsights into the transmission of the material originating in Theophrastean works, seeMansfeld-Runia 1997, Baltussen 2000, id. forthcoming-3.

26. Discussion of first principles, see F141-4 FHSG with Sharples 1998: 35-47(and further literature).

27. See Steinmetz 1964: 111ff.28. Steinmetz 1964: 138-9.29. Regenbogen 1940: 1554.3-7 described him as a scholar who shows signs of

resignation that a full synthesis of an increasing body of knowledge was no longerpossible (‘T. � mit dem wachsenden Erkenntnisumfang eine leichte Resignationbezüglich der Möglichkeit letzter synthetischer Erkenntnisse verbindet’ withspecial reference to in Phys. 18.32 (= F142 FHSG).

30. Sharples 1998: 36.31. See Fortenbaugh 1984 for ethics, Barnes 1985 for logic.32. In his Plato’s First Interpreters (London: Duckworth 2000). Cf. Baltussen

2003.33. Sedley 1997; Dillon 1996: 42.34. Baltussen 2003: 63-9, cf. id. 2005.35. (a) Taurus in Philoponus On the eternity of the world vi.8 (145.20-4 Rabe) =

F241A FHSG but with added context; (b) Taurus in Philoponus On the eternity ofthe world vi.27.5 = F241B FHSG; (c) Taurus in Philoponus On the eternity of theworld xiii.15 [520.4-521.6 Rabe] = F161A FHSG; cf. Simplicius in Phys. 18.29-34= F142 FHSG; Proclus Comm. on Timaeus 35E, 120.8-22 Diehl = F159 FHSG. Cf.Laks 1998: 152-3.

36. Sharples 1998: 97 n. 267 referring to FHSG fragments. In F159 FHSGProclus actually refers to the On the heavens, cf. Simplicius in Phys. 1236.1. Thereference at lines 31-2 could, however, be a later addition (Baltussen 2003: 68 n.54).

37. See Baltussen 2002b, 2006a. Further texts may still be found as, e.g., the(anonymous) paraphrase at Themistius in Phys. 221.9 = F188 W. (I owe thisreference to Robert Todd).

38. Cf. Sharples 1998: 3 n. 24.39. Other references to individual book are at 964.30 and 986.5 (first book of

the On motion), 1236.1 (third book of the Physics = his On the heaven, cf. Steinmetz1964: 158, Sharples 1998: 3 n. 24; 118). But of course they are somehow relevantthematically.

40. A point already made in Baltussen 2003: 71.41. In this particular case (= F281 FHSG) the crucial verb ‘reports’ (historei) is

evidence that the stated view is not Theophrastus’, hence this passage should bemoved to the doxographical fragments in FHSG.


237

42. Note that this could be in any number of areas, since the ‘affections’ are apart of the study of nature (Sharples 1998: 42 after Sedley’s comments on Cael.268a1-7).

43. Diels’ Index (CAG vol. 10: 1447) gives most occurrences. Sider 2005: 47-8notes that Diels thought access occurred via Alexander, but warns that this is notproven. See also n. 17 and n. 39 above.

44. On this issue of separate titles for individual books of Theophrastus’ Phys.see pp. 59-60.

45. In politics it is also a term for party leaders (Polybius 28.4.6); in drama forthe leader of the choros (cf. Arist. Pol. 1277a11 in his account of excellence of thegood citizen). So far as we know Theophrastus was not given the label gnêsiôtatos‘most genuine, most sincere’, which is reserved for Xenocrates’ relation to Plato (inDC 12.22, in Phys. 1165.24), Aristotle to Plato (ibid. 378.21), and for Alexander’sstatus as commentator on Aristotle (in Phys. 258.16).

46. kath’ huperbolên oxutêtos pan to noêthen exermêneuontos. Cf. D.L. 5.35:among Aristotle’s many pupils he was ‘the most distinguished’ (diapherôn mal-ista); 5.36: he was ‘a man of remarkable intelligence and industry’ (anêr sunôtatoskai philoponôtatos).

47. See Sorabji in Urmson 1992: 2ff., id. 1988: 202-15.48. Tr. Urmson 1992: 17.49. My account is based on Sorabji 1988: ch. 12 and id. 1992: 2-5. For additional

discussions and disagreements on details see also Algra 1995: 231-48 (who defendsTheophrastus’ discussion as coherent and expressing a more general concern,against Sorabji 1988), Sambursky 1962.

50. Sorabji 1992: 4.51. For Strato’s theory of the void see the detailed discussion in Algra 1995:

61-9.52. Sharples 1998: 63. Cf. Arist. Phys. 223a24.53. Sharples 1998: 63.54. He refers to Nicostratus’ criticisms at in Cat. 428.3, 429.13, Plotinus at

433.20, Boethus at 433.28. Alexander appears some 43 times in this commentary,but according to TLG not after 429.28 (for the recent find of fragments thought tobe from his own Categories commentary see Appendix II.A).

55. This section has benefited considerably from R. Gaskin’s translation ofSimplicius in Cat. 9-15 (ACA 2000: introduction, translation and notes), andSharples’ 1998 commentary on fragments in ‘Physics’ (137-223 FHSG).

56. Cf. Sharples 1998: 71 with n. 182, id. 2002: 111.57. Gaskin 2000 (above n.55): 244 n. 1086 refers to in Phys. 408.15ff. and

859.16ff.58. Sharples 1998: 72 n. 184 after Steinmetz 1964: 154.59. Wehrli 1969: 10 (F6), 87-8; Sharples 2002: 109-10.60. in Phys. 1036.14-15, see Baltussen 2002b: 130. On the problems concerning

the history of the book division of the Physics, see Ross 1961, 1-19; Moraux 1973:115-16, and above, Chapter 1.

61. Simplicius refers to books 1-4 and possibly to a fifth book (see also next note).62. Discussed in Baltussen 2002b: book 1 at 10.3 (F32 W, cf. F34), 133.21 (F44,

cf. F50); to book 2 at 411.15 (F59, cf. F62); to book 3 at 533.14 (cf. F81, F85-7),732.24 (F88), book 4 at 942.18 (F101, cf. F104-5). Wehrli does not attempt toreconstruct the structure of Eudemus’ work in detail.

63. Wehrli 1969: 87-8. Regarding the Greek letters used to number the bookssee Baltussen 2002b: 131 n. 16.


238

64. Wehrli (1969: 87) calls it ‘verkürzenden Bearbeitung der aristotelischenPhysik, welche deren Anordnung und Problemstellung beibehält und nur inEinzelheiten der Behandlung selbständig ist.’

65. See Sider 2005: 25f. whom I partly paraphrase here.66. See e.g. context of F32-3 (in Phys. 42.5-26), and of F36 (in Phys. 83.10-24).67. F43 is puzzling, see Baltussen 2002b: 135 n. 28.68. Sider 2005: 26 quotes in Phys. 99.12-18 (part of F37a on Wehrli p. 27), but

mistakenly labels it ‘fr. 38’.69. See also Chapter 4 on Alexander.70. If Sider means that the subtext is ‘this is not what Eudemus wrote’, I simply

disagree. How could Simplicius reproach Alexander with bad scholarship, unlesshe had Eudemus’ text to check his version?

71. Even if – as both Sharples (2002, 115 n. 25 on F82a) and Sider (personalcommunication) have pointed out to me – in this instance Simplicius is relying onAlexander for information. Since we know from several examples that manuscriptsdid come in different versions, it is not unlikely to have been the case here (see e.g.in Phys. 167.33ff. where at 168.19-21 the Greek text proves that Alexander had amore elaborate text than Simplicius regarding Anaxagoras (15). I shall say moreon manuscripts and Alexander in Chapter 4.

72. Cf. Wehrli 1969, 88: ‘Die � erhöhte Verständlichkeit machte E.s Physikzum bequemen Ausgangspunkt der Aristoteleskommentatoren’ and n. 19.

73. Compare 83.28-9 = F36 W. enargôs; 433.13 saphesteron exetheto tên Aris-totelous apodeixin [not in Wehrli]). Alexander expressed a similar verdict inMetaph. 83.9-11 (cf. Fortenbaugh 2002: 69).

74. mallon epitrepteon Eudêmoî ginôskein enguterôi tois khronois onti kaiAristotelous akroatêi. See Baltussen 2006a: 9 for further comments on this pas-sage.

75. Wehrli 1969: 88 also infers that, because of both shorter and longertreatment that Eudemus must have skipped those bits which resisted his system-atising tendency. Both remarks are tendentious and ill-founded: the first seems toimply carelessness, but Simplicius never tires of pointing out that in Eudemusconciseness and clarity go hand in hand (see passages just quoted in the text); thesecond accuses Eudemus of ‘doctoring’ the material, but no detailed argument isoffered to support this.

76. Algra (1995: 248) is an exception: they are ‘something more than a merelyexegetical commentary’, ‘a shortened paraphrase � with additions and clarifica-tions’. See further Baltussen 2002a. On Andronicus see now the extensive analysiswith minimalist conclusions by Barnes 1997.

77. This and because of the uncertainty of which descriptive labels are actual‘titles’ in antiquity are reasons for not printing these with a capital initial.

78. The risk of taking ‘notes on’ in this way was kindly pointed out to me by BobSharples (e-mail 6 May 1997).

79. In reply to my question whether he thinks the brevity of Theophrastus’physika is caused by the aporetic approach Sharples wrote (e-mail 6 May 1997):‘Or is it � that he is writing for/ speaking to people who have read Aristotle’s text,whereas Eudemus is seeking rather to replace the latter? (The two explanationsaren’t incompatible, indeed.).’ The matter needs further study.

80. A point made with regard to logic by Fortenbaugh in Sharples 1998: 49 n. 118.81. See Ross 1960: 1-2 for variants. Cf. also CAG 10 index s.v. ‘Theophrastos’

(p. 1447), ‘Loci Aristotelici’ (p. 1459f.).82. There is the further proviso that references to titles tend to become ‘more


239

secure’ as time progresses, even when it is obvious, as for instance in the case ofperi physeôs with reference to the Presocratics, that they will not have used fixedlabels as titles.

83. Algra 1995: 248-58.84. T 1-6 in Baltussen 2002b.85. T2-3, 5, 7 in Baltussen 2002b.86. For details see Baltussen 2002b, section 4 ‘Conclusions’.87. Blumenthal (1996: 10) gives as a possible reason for the neglect by later

commentators that ‘Theophrastus gave no help to those seeking to impose Platon-ist constraints on Peripatetic psychology’. Whether this holds for Eudemus needsfurther analysis.

88. On asapheia in Aristotle and the commentators see Barnes 1992: 268-70 andMansfeld 1994: 24, 29 etc. (see his index s.v.).

89. See Plato Protag. 318B, Phaedo 83E, Sophist 217E; Wallis 1971: 138.90. Gottschalk 1990: 64-5. In n. 53 he mentions that it was criticised by Seneca

Ep. 108.23. On Andronicus and his role in the formation of the canon see alsoBarnes 1997.

91. Sharples 1985 discusses such a case for the On the heaven.92. As Sharples impressed upon me (email, cf. Sharples forthcoming-2).93. Cf. e.g. the Peripatetic Xenarchus whom Simplicius polemicises against in

in DC book 1, discussed in Hankinson 2002-3. See Appendix I for a full list of worksmentioned in his commentaries.

94. For their role as interpretive sources see e.g. D.L. 5.39 exhermêneuontos(above, n. 46 and text thereto); for their closeness to Aristotle, in Phys. 68.32-3enguteros tois khronois (above, n. 74 and text thereto); for their status as ‘col-leagues’ contributing to the educational objective see in Phys. 788.34 didaxantes(above, §3.1, pp. 89-90).

4. Ghost in the Machine? The Role ofAlexander of Aphrodisias

1. Rashed 1997, 2007 and forthcoming (2008, fragments for Alexander’s Physics4-8), cf. Tieleman 1998, Kupreeva 2003, Chianotis 2004b, Rescigno 2004 andforthcoming (fragments for his in DC). See also next note and n. 8 below. See fordistribution of references Appendix II B.

2. I am hoping to use the groundwork already done on the fragments from inPhys. elsewhere.

3. Cf. Barnes et al. 1991: 5 with n. 31; Algra 1995: 231ff. and my Chapter 3.4. Gerson 1995: 261-2, adding that the latter may be a disputable enterprise.

Cf. Sorabji and Dooley 1989: 3. See Rashed 2007 [regrettably not yet available tome at the time of completing this study].

5. After Barnes 1997: 45.6. Tr. Van Ophuijsen 2001, slightly modified. I have translated epi biblia as

‘with reference to books’ to keep the phrase more neutral and allow for theambiguity of the interpretive act the use of such books might entail. Compare mycomment on Plotinus, Chapter 4, pp. 138-9. Van Ophuijsen (2001: 351 n. 268)considers the possibility that the text might have been different, suggesting thattoiauta biblia (‘books of this kind’) could have been tosauta biblia (‘so many books’),but he ends by saying that all Alexander might have wanted to say is that ‘therewere no books for use in dialectical classes before Aristotle and Theophrastuswrote them’.


240

7. This number (1114 for in Phys. and in DC) is based on TLG-D search for‘Alexand(r)-’, and is therefore giving only explicit occurrences of the name (and allits case endings). There is some evidence that Alexander is used without mentionof his name and indirectly, but for those cases to be included in the statistics weneed a survey of all the works.

8. Tarán 1987: 247 n. 2.9. See §5.1; cf. Dillon 1996 (1977), Karamanolis 2006.10. D’Ancona 2002: 206; she adduces the celebrated passage V.Plot. 14.10-14;

and on pp. 208-9 n. 22 lists previous literature in which the influence of Alexanderon Plotinus is discussed. I shall return to some of these studies below (§4.2).

11. See §4.3 below. It is somewhat puzzling that modern scholars insist thatAlexander’s commentary on the Physics is lost ‘except for the new fragmentsrecently found by M. Rashed’ (in Sorabji 1997: 181-95). It must be ‘short-hand for“does not survive as a text in its own right, but only in second-hand reports”’ (asBob Sharples pointed out, personal communication, 9 November 2007). Among thereferences in Simplicius several hundreds contain quotations from the ‘lost’ com-mentary, illustrated by the elaborate paraphrase presented in Moraux (below n.16). An edition (partial reconstruction) of this commentary is being prepared byMarwan Rashed (forthcoming 2008).

12. For instance within the ‘Third and Fourth Academy’ under Philo of Larissaand Antiochus of Ascalon; see e.g. Dillon 1996: 57f. On the syncretistic tendenciesamong the later Platonists, now referred to as Neoplatonists, see below §4.2.

13. Cf. Sorabji 1990: 5.14. Some reference to the other commentaries will be included, but only to the

extent that space allows for it. Selectivity is here motivated by the realisation thatwe cannot deal with the mass of evidence in a convenient way unless we focus ontypes. See also Rescigno 2004 for the fragments from in DC.

15. E.g. in Phys. 707.33, 1170.13, 1176.32; compare Philoponus in APr. 136.20.This is possibly an honorific title (one reserved for Averroes in the middle ages,Sorabji-Sharples 1989: 2 n. 3), though this is disputed by Barnes et al. 1991, 4 n.28, with some justification. Blumenthal 1987: 96 does not see these as ‘merely lipservice’.

16. An assumption palpable in Moraux 2001: 129-80, when he discusses thepassages by paraphrasing them, in some sense ‘reconstructing’ the content of thework (cf. next note). For the Arabic traces of the Physics commentary see D’Ancona2000, below n. 31.

17. Rashed 1997 and forthcoming (2008).18. See, for instance, the extensive discussion on citation techniques by

Inowlocki 2006: ch. 2 and her references in the notes.19. Cf. Sider 2005 and my conclusions in the Epilogue.20. Simpl. in Phys. 707.33-4 Alexandrou tou exêgetou tôn Aristotelous. On in DC

378.21-2 see also below text to n. 80. Barnes et al. 1991 demur on its honorificfunction (above n. 15). See also the quotation on p. 107.

21. We should here distinguish between Quaestiones (ed. Ideler) andProblêmata (not all by Alexander, cf. Sharples-Kapetanaki 2006). See also Shar-ples 1994: 3; Sharples 1987: 1177-1225 (bibliography 1226-43); id. 1994, 2003,2004. D’Ancona 2002. The remains of a commentary on the Cat. (thought lost) havenow turned up as part of the Archimedes palimpsest (see Appendix II A).

22. See for this issue Sharples 1987: 1202-4, Blumenthal 1996: 15-17.23. Its existence is not in doubt: GC II.2-6 was translated by the Arabic version

of Gabir b. Hayyan (eighth century CE) with four extensive discussions of Alexan-


241

der, confirmed by another Arabic source, Ya’qub b. Ishaq (fl. 1202), see Gannagé1998: 35-6, 43-65; it is also extensively quoted by Philoponus (Gannagé 36 n. 4, 42;Sharples 1987: 1185-6). Cf. Hankinson 2002a: 114-15 (n. 116), Zeller 1963: 801 n.

24. Also practised in Alexandria by Ammonius and his students (Philoponus,see §6.2).

25. See Fazzo 2004: 5-6 and the comment on Andronicus above, §3.3.26. Mansfeld 1989.27. See in Phys. 7.1. These incidental references to Presocratics do not form part

of exegetical comments; on pp. 22-8 (Diels) a significant increase of patronymicsoccurs, see Mansfeld 1989.

28. See Hadot 1987a, Mansfeld 1994.29. Aristotle had already indicated the sequence in which to conduct the study

of nature in his Meteorology A.1 (see also Hadot 1987). Cf. Frohn 1980: 21ff.30. The latter option seems unlikely, simply because in every other way the

introductory pages reflect standard topics of preliminary discussion, see §1.2.31. See Sluiter 1990, Atherton 1993, Ford 2002.32. Mentioned by Porphyry in the life of Plotinus, above n. 10. Cf. D’Ancona

2002: 206. At 238-42 she lists the Arabic evidence on Alexander’s commentaries,in particular (at 238 with nn. 160-1) for the commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (lostin Greek, see also Rashed 1995, 1997). More on this connection below, §4.3.

33. Blumenthal 1987 (with reference to earlier literature, e.g. Henry 1960,Blumenthal 1968, Szlezak 1979, Schroeder 1984). See also Tieleman 1995, Corri-gan 1996, Tieleman 1998, Kupreeva 2003, Gerson 2005b, Karamanolis 2006.

34. I admit that the latter point arises from the modern perspective, since theancient commentators would not actively seek to disagree or criticise if he couldavoid it. Alexander’s critical evaluation of some of Aristotle’s doctrines is in itselfnot an obvious part of exegesis.

35. Blumenthal 1987: 96.36. Blumenthal 1987: 101.37. Aspasius lived c. 100-150 CE. See Alberti and Sharples 1999.38. One exception is the commentary on Metaphysics 4 which was important

enough (it defines the subject matter of metaphysics) to study it ‘almost line byline’ (tr. Madigan 1993: 2).

39. On the topos of dividing up the text see Mansfeld 1990: 10-11, 34-6; Barneset al. 1991: 7-8.

40. As Gottschalk points out, he was preceded by Galen in this (1987: 1166 withn. 413).

41. See §3.2 for Theophrastus and Eudemus. A lost work of Alexander wasentitled On the disagreement between Aristotle and his associates concerning[syllogisms with] mixed premisses (id. in APr. 125.30-1, after Sharples 1987: 1196).Strato, Theophrastus’ successor, would build on the latter’s queries and state newviews on place, extension, and matter.

42. See §5.1.2.43. At 192.16ff. Alexander is brought in via Ammonius; then follows Syrianus

(29ff.) who also quotes Porphyry. This clearly concerns a serious issue thatgenerated debate.

44. Tr. Baltussen forthcoming-2, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9 (Duck-worth). For Alexander’s interest in principles see also his extensive discussion atin Metaph. 12.15-15.19; 19.23ff.

45. See Dorandi 1991 on papyri; Skydsgaard 1968 on Varro; French andGreenaway 1986 on Pliny.


242

46. The authorship of this commentary is disputed (Hadot 2002b: Simplicius;Steel 1997: Priscian), but it is clearly of the same time period (early sixth centuryCE), so the issue need not be discussed here.

47. Hoffmann 1987b, Blumenthal 1987: 105.48. Hoffmann 1987b: 59-60.49. Westerink 1990.50. Fazzo 2004: 5-6.51. Interestingly, Alexander was also used by Philoponus of Alexandria, Sim-

plicius’ contemporary and archrival (see §6.2).52. Blumenthal 1987: 99.53. Harran, on which see §1.3, which includes Arabic sources: Lameer 1997,

Gutas 1998, Luna 2001c, Lane Fox 2005b. The whole complex of problems isconveniently laid out and summarised in Thiel 1999, with additional insights inWatts 2006.

54. Cf. Sluiter 1999. Sluiter makes the existence of a commentary in itself anindication that we are dealing with the product of a school activity. I am notconvinced this holds universally, see below p. 83.

55. Baltussen 2002c: 183-4. Cf. Hankinson 2002a: 5.56. On the use of Alexander see nn. 43, 51 above. On the style of commentary

D’Ancona 2002: 221 (Syrianus, Philoponus), 222 (Olympiodorus), 225 (Simplicius).57. O’Meara 1989: 120; cf. Luna 2001b: 72-98. A similar view is already reported

for Themistius (Blumenthal 1987: 97).58. The categories established here are provisional and in no way meant to be

definitive and fixed: they intend to map out broad groups and to make the point ofthe diversity of use for one individual source. One correlation which might beespecially significant is that between length of quotation and whether or not theyagree (see also §6.3).

59. For appeal to authority see e.g. Eudemus F59 with Wehrli’s comments, inwhich Theophrastus is mentioned as having more authority: ‘Die Zitate ausTheophrast, welchen Simplicius noch mehr Gewicht beimißt als denjenigen aus E.,lauten �’ (p. 99). See also pp. 154 and 156 (Dillon 1973 on Proclus / Iamblichus).

60. Some additional examples can be found in 582.21; 584.4.61. Cf. Kahn 1994 (1960): 13 n. 2.62. I am basing myself on a provisional listing of all passages. There is a partial

parallel in later commentators of the early Renaissance, where reference toAlexander is dictated mostly on account of disagreement, see Fazzo 1999, 48:‘Alexander is often the starting point for their work, but they mentioned him byname mainly on controversial issues, in particular when they want to argueagainst his interpretations’ (my emphasis).

63. Urmson 1992: 107 n. 40.64. See Rashed 1997: 186, 188-9.65. See also 407.21ff.66. For a summary of specific points of disagreement see Hankinson 2002: 6-9

(in DC). In this context Simplicius also claims that Aristotle and Plato do notdisagree on change (451.2-4).

67. For earlier analysis of variants see Whittaker 1971, 1973, 1989; Dillon 1989.68. A TLG search produces 50 occurrences for antigraph- (noun and verb forms):

see below, Chapter 6 n. 76.69. E.g. at in Phys. 414.16; 422.25; 423.14, 20; 427.34; 429.23-4; 440.12-15 a

difference in manuscripts is mentioned, with Moraux 1985: 231f., 446 etc. Cf. alsoAlex. In de sensu 86.2-5.


243

70. Cf. Urmson 1994, who (n. 177) compares in Cat. 88.25-7; 228.1-3; see also481.28-34 where a scribal error is suspected by Simplicius (‘muddled’, in the Greek:sunkekhusthai).

71. See above, Chapter 1 above; Grafton and Williams 2006, chs 2-3.72. ‘in some copies they found the text to read �’. At line 20 Simplicius

disagrees with Alexander, but a little later he praises him for a specific remark(36); 459.5-6 Alexander explains ‘so-called’ in another way (allôs) (Urmson 2002);cf. 459.25-8 Eudemus in the second of the Physics (Urmson).

73. Disagreement (for books listed above respectively): 3, 17, 14, 27, 8, 21, 9, 7,8 = 104; quotation: 2, 6, 6, 10, 6, 6, 7, 3, 5 = 51 [based on notes prepared by M.McEvoy].

74. A TLG search produces 423 occurrences for in Phys. (263) and in DC (160).That this is not a neutral interjection is clear from the fact that objections are quiteoften accompanied by evaluative terms such as comparative adjectives (e.g. ‘bet-ter’, ameinon, in Phys. 2.16, 577.6, 673.31, 713.13, kallion 20.26; ‘not appropriate’,oukh hikanon 60.6; ‘more accurate’, akribesteron 83.33, saphesteron 413.5) orapproving adverbs (e.g. saphôs in Phys. 26.18, 550.25, pithanôs 116.7, kalôs513.31).

75. Immortalised in its medieval Latin version amicus Plato sed magis amicaveritas, and also a variant on the comment Plato makes about Socrates at Rep.595C; Phd. 91C. Guerlac 1978: 631 traces this version to the Dutch scholar Ulpiusas added to Erasmus’ Adages in the posthumous edition of 1579 (H. Estienne,Paris).

76. See LSJ9 1311 s.v. II.2. Among its 18 occurrences it is linked to Alexanderthree times (in Phys. 41.1, 483.1, 602.6; others include Philoponus, Damascius,Aristotle).

77. Regarding the point of enabling the reader to form a judgment there is anintriguing parallel in Jerome (347-420 CE) when he describes the purpose of acommentary (Sluiter 2000: 199 with n. 69).

78. Could the passage be based on Proclus? I have no answer. Additionalcomments in §6.3.

79. This judgment is based on preliminary statistics I have compiled.80. in DC 378.22-4 tauta gar ou tôi Platôni monôi edokei, alla kai tôi gnêsiôtatôi

tôn Platônos akroatôn tôi Aristotelei kai tôi epimelestatôi tou Aristotelousspoudastêi tôi Alexandrôi. Cf. ibid. 297.8-10, quoted at the start of this chapter. AsSharples helpfully pointed out to me, in Simplicius’ view Alexander gets Aristotlewrong, so that his very prestige makes it necessary for Simplicius to set the recordstraight. See in Phys. 964.14-15 (also discussed in Rashed 1997) and 1262.3-5 forgood examples of Simplicius’ treatment of Alexander focused on the mortality ofthe soul.

81. For what follows see in Cat. 2.30-3.17 with quotations from De Haas 2001b,3-4. Hoffman 1987a.

82. As is standard in the post-Hellenistic tradition (Sluiter 1999: 173-4). For aclear parallel to this topos (conceit?) compare his contemporary and colleaguePriscian in his Metaphrasis of Theophrastus’ Discourse On the soul: ‘to clarify �the views of Theophrastus, both if he adds anything beyond what Aristotle hashanded down � and if in raising difficulties, he offers us anything’ (F275A.1-4FHSG).

83. On this question I take my cue from Sluiter 1999.84. The Greek verb exêgeisthai may be more neutral than our ‘exegesis’ or

‘interpret’, in that it suggests a ‘leading the way out’ of the confusion and problems,


244

which does not imply the construing or imposing of a certain view. This does notmean of course that Plotinus was incapable of manipulating the meaning of thetext sometimes: he just did not want to be seen to be doing so. disputed by Barneset al. 1991, 4 n. 28, with some justification.

5. Platonist Commentators: Sources and Inspiration1. Karamanolis 2005, Gerson 2006, Edwards 2006, Gavray 2007 (not available

to me), Rashed 2007 (not available to me), id. forthcoming, D’Ancona 2007.2. I quote the phrase from Gerson 2005: 76 n. 1. See now the meta-commentary

by Hadot 1990b, Luna 2001b and Barnes 1992 (review in OSAP).3. A comment made in conversation at IAS by Prof. Michael Lackner (Erlangen,

Germany).4. Dillon 1986: 228 (= 1990a, XIII). Cf. Fazzo’s comment on assimilation of

predecessors (n. 45).5. By describing his activity in this way I do not mean to recast him into the role

of a modern scholar; but I would like to bring out how much skill and thought hadto go into this project to produce these commentaries – a point which is too easilypassed over.

6. Sorabji 1988: 15, 116-17.7. Sorabji 1988: 241.8. Cf. Sorabji 1990: 3-15.9. See Mansfeld 1994; Westerink 1962 and further below.10. Cf. Gerson 1995. Cf. Sheppard 1985: 34 (Rep. not on Iamblichean reading).11. On post-Hellenistic philosophy see Boys-Stones 2001 and Boys-Stones and

Brittain (forthcoming).12. Karamanolis 2006: 3-4, 217-18. A more general account of this period in

Frede 1999b.13. Dillon 1996: 56-9 (with further literature), Karamanolis 2006: ch. 1.14. Westerink 1962, Dillon 1996, Boys-Stones 2001, De Haas 2001b, Sorabji

2005.15. Dodds 1923: 10. Cf. Rist 1967: ch. 13.16. With Fowden 1982: 34. Cf. the comment by the late Platonist David in his

Introduction to philosophy (sixth century CE) 1.4-12 ‘pulled towards these [philo-sophical] arguments by some kind of sane madness and in their souls evoke a lovefor them by the knowledge of things that are’ (my italics). Wildberg 1990: 39introduces this passage by calling it ‘oddly pathetic’, but perhaps the link withProclus might mitigate this assessment somewhat.

17. For a clear account of the style and intentions of Plotinus see Dillon 1992.18. Edwards 2006: 33 referring to V.Plot. 14.10-13.19. As Athanassiadi 1993: 4 explains, the ‘theory of the golden chain’ arose from

the concern to create ‘a pagan identity’ as a result of ‘Christian aggressiveness’.20. Vit. Isid. (EP) quoted in Athanassiadi 1993: 6 n. 17.21. Seminal paper is Sluiter 2000. See also Baltussen 2007a.22. Whittaker 1989: 63-95. On p. 70 n. 5 he mentions another article (or book

chapter) on a text problem for a Parmenides quotation (fr. 8,5-6) and the discussionby the late Platonists of the variant readings. For Porphyry’s use of allegory andsymbolical exegesis of Homer see Pépin 1966.

23. These categories are in fact ancient and known to the grammarians (1989:71 with n. 16).

24. Discussed above, p. 33. The Alexandrian exegetes of the early Christian


245

period already worked with this distinction, in particular Origen (185-245 CE),Eusebius (c. 275-339 CE), and Jerome (c. 350-420 CE).

25. Cure for Greek maladies (Graecarum affectionum curatio) 10.17f. (afterWhittaker 1989: 70).

26. For a fine portrait of Longinus see Edwards 2006: 27-9, whose comment (28)I quote here. The adjective is also used by Simplicius for Iamblichus and Syrianus(see below). On the use of superlative epithets indicating their position in ahierarchy of authorities see Wildberg 1990: 116-17 and text to n. 79.

27. Long 1992 (Stoics), Grant 1957: 121-3 (pagans and Christians), Lamberton1986 (Neoplatonists).

28. Dillon 1971: 126 (= Dillon 1990a, Study XIV, 126). Standard account of theperiod in Dillon 1996.

29. Indications for this are the lack of criticism in the fragments surviving inArius Didymus (Dillon 1996: 126), though one can detect an anti-Peripatetictendency in the down-grading of external goods (ibid. 124).

30. Dillon 1996: 120.31. Ibid. 116 (ousia); 134 (categories).32. Dodds 1928: 139n.33. Moraux 1969 (missed by Dillon 1977, but added in the Afterword to the

reprint of 1996: 436).34. I refer to the latest edition of Bastianini-Sedley 1995.35. BCE: Tarrant 1983: 180-1; CE: Bastianini-Sedley 1995: 254-6. This has been

disputed by Mansfeld 1991: 543-4. It is of course not the earliest commentaryknown to us: for the Derveni Papyrus see Betegh 2004, 2005. Another example ofPlato exegesis with critical signs has been found in a papyrus antedating D.L. 3.65,see Solmsen 1981: 108.

36. The label ‘Middle Platonists’ is mostly chronological of inspiration. Dillondefends the term in his new ‘Afterword’ on practical grounds (‘remains, I think,valid and useful’), although he admits that ‘being a middle anything is a rathertroublesome state’ (1996: 423).

37. For Proclus see Lamberz 1987. For earlier examples Mansfeld 1994, Bal-tussen 2004. Cf. above n. 24 and below n. 42.

38. Karamanolis 2006: 92, 98, 121 etc.; cf. Dillon 1990a.39. Complete list of philosophical works in Dillon 1996: 187.40. See Karamanolis 2006: 93-4.41. Proclus In Tim. 1.305.6. It is unclear (Dillon 1990a: 126 n. 2) whether he is

the grammarian mentioned in Julius Capitolinus (Scriptores Historiae Augustae,Verus II.5).

42. For skopos see his comments to Phaedo 69AC from Olympiodorus in Phaed.;or aporiai to Phaed. 68BC (both at Dillon 1990a: 131-2).

43. Dillon 1990a: 126.44. See Dodds 1960; Frede 1987.45. Fazzo 2004: 5-6 (see Chapter 4, text to n. 50).46. Karamanolis 2004: 102, ‘anticipating’ as he puts it ‘Plotinus’ future teaching

tactic (V.Plot. 14.4-14)’.47. Dillon 1996: 246-7. See also Chapter 3 n. 35 on his importance in the

reception of Theophrastus.48. I borrow the term from Sluiter 1999. For Plotinus’ biography see also Rist

1967: ch. 2.49. But his name is Latin (Dodds 1923: 7 n. 1). Cf. Dillon 1992: 190 ‘from

Lycopolis in Upper Egypt’, information which is not found in Porphyry’s V.Plot.


246

but in two other sources: our knowledge of his life is based on V.Plot., Eunapius’biographies (c. 390 CE; ‘from Lyco’) and the Suda, a ninth-century CE encyclopaedicwork. For the comments on his parents see V.Plot. 1.

50. Porphyry V.Plot. 23. Dodds 1960: 7-11.51. Dillon 1992: 189.52. The phrase is often associated with Max Weinreich who reported it as a

suggestion from the audience when he had given a lecture (YIVO Bletter, 23.3[May-June 1944] 420-1).

53. On Iamblichus’ theurgy, Syrianus’ soteriology see O’Meara, n. 99 below. OnProclus’ theurgy see Sheppard 1982, Dillon 2002. On the influence of Platonism onChristianity, see Smith 2004: ch. 8.

54. Occurrences: 5 for in DC; 84 for in Cat; 14 for in Phys. (retrieved from TLGonline 28.05.07).

55. The totals (see previous note) signal the importance of the Categories again.56. For both titles see Porphyry V.Plot. 5.47 and 4.33. Diels did not really

consider this matter in depth, since other passages can be adduced as relevant tothis remarkable episode: e.g. the peculiar terms eskhêmatismenon kai me-megethusmenon (‘shaped and provided with magnitude’) at 229.16 turn out to bePlotinian and have parallels in Enn. 2.4.8,12 for both terms, and in 2.4.10,24;2.4.12,3 and 7 for the second term (source: TLG-E online, accessed June 2007).

57. A striking distribution and very limited total of 15. The name occurs at inDC 20.12, 21 (with Ptolemaeus, Xenarchus), 115.30; in Phys. 229.12, 398.32,403.17, 706.26, 769.6, 790.30, 790.35, 791.28, 792.2, 792.20 (with Iamblichus),1072.8, 1079.12.

58. Karamanolis 2004: 118-19, Moraux 1968.59. See also Shields 1990 for his influence on Boethius.60. For the fragments see Smith’s 1993 Teubner edition (563 pp.). A list of

complete extant works can be found in Smith 1974.61. Eunapius Lives of the philosophers and sophists III-IV 2 (= 1T Smith).

Plotinus would comment on obscure expressions in Aristotle (e.g. Enn. 3.7.13.13-18, after Karamanolis 2006: 239). See also §3.3.

62. Mansfeld 1994: 25-6, 149-54.63. Karamanolis 2004: 108-9.64. Dillon 1990a, Watts 2005: 288-90. Cf. Dillon 1973, Athanassiadi 1993, de

Haas 2003, Barnes 2003, Finamore-Dillon 2002: 6ff., Sorabji 2004, ‘Introduction’.65. Persuasively argued by Watts 2006. On the problematic term ‘school’ see

also Marrou 1963: 132f.; on the term hairesis, Karamanolis 2006: 250-3.66. Athanassiadi 1993: 1-29 points to the new ‘revelatory wisdom’ propounded

by Iamblichus, yet reiterates ‘renovated paganism of the Hellenised Syrian,Egyptian or Arab which combined an acceptance of all local cults with a moral,intellectual and spiritual teaching that was recognisably Greek’ (ibid. 3, myemphasis). On his criticism of Porphyry see esp. Dillon 1973: 28-9.

67. Finamore-Dillon 2002: 7. At 20-1 n. 52 they report inaccurate quoting.68. Athanassiadi 1999: 149; cf. Blumenthal 1993.69. Finamore-Dillon 2002: 6-7 list his works and exegetical activities. See

Blumenthal 1997 on his commentary activity.70. E.g. Westerink 1990: lxvi, Mansfeld 1994: 10-11, 21, 31-3, 118-19. Sluiter

2000: 201. Chase (2003: 93) has suggested it already appears in Alexander andPorphyry (no source given). I would point to Harpocration (above, text to nn. 28-31)and ultimately to Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras (Baltussen 2004: 30).


247

71. Athanassiadi 1999: 149. The current edition of the Chaldaean Oracles isTheiler 1942 (id. 149 n. 1).

72. On the isagogical issues see Hadot 1978, Mansfeld 1994.73. Porphyry’s Commentary on the Timaeus (reconstructed by Sodano 1964), a

view endorsed by Dillon 1973: 54. For other forms of commentary see Chapter 1nn. 30, 37, 45, 53, 58; below n. 96.

74. Dillon 1987: 878-80; id. 1973: 26ff.75. Edwards 2006: 38 (based on Dillon 1973) lists the works, including many

elucidations to Plato and Aristotle. For the point on exegetical principles seeO’Meara 1989: 98-101.

76. Athanassiadi 1993: 4.77. O’Meara 1989: 214-15.78. In Phys. 60.7; 639.23; 642.18; 702.19; 767.20; 786.11; 787.4,11,27; 792.20;

(793,22-3 = Sorabji 2004,2: 11 [e.18]); 795.3,6,16.79. Urmson 1992: 31 n.80. He would pay particular attention to Proclus’ reading of Iamblichus, see

Watts 2006: 126-7.81. Dodds 1963: xxiii (quoting from Marinus V.Procl. 12).82. Van den Berg 2001, Saffrey 1984.83. Cf. Hadot 2001, introd. xlviiff.; Dodds 1963; Barnes 1992 ‘Simplicius follows

Proclus’.84. See R.W. Sharples and P.J. van der Eijk, Nemesius, On the Nature of Man

(forthcoming, Liverpool University Press 2008).85. Lambertz 1987: 1-2 who distinguishes between lecture notes (‘Vorle-

sungsnachschriften’, 2) and commentary proper (‘von den Exegeten selbstredigierten Kommentare’ which Proclus himself calls hypomnêmata); cf. Dillon1973: 54, Festugière 1963, Lamberz 1987. Early use was noted for CalvenusTaurus, above n. 47.

86. See most recently Cleary (2006: 147): ‘it is clear that Proclus is conscious ofstanding at the end of a long tradition of interpreting Plato’s Timaeus that goesright back to the Academy, and obviously this tradition dominates his wholeinterpretation of the dialogue’. A translation is being produced by H. Tarrant andD. Baltzly for Cambridge University Press (so far vols 1 and 3 have appeared).

87. See Dodds xxviii n. 4, who adds examples from Damascius Life of Isidore48.11ff., 92.26ff. and Simplicius in DC 370.29. Cf. Watts 2004 and 2006.

88. E.g. his view on kat’ ousian on which see Cleary 2006: 147.89. Westerink 1987.90. Saffrey 1992.91. Urmson 1992: 32 n. 24; plausible given the mention of Rep. at 613.1. Cf.

Sorabji 1988: 207 on Proclus’ interpretation of place as a ‘kind of body’ (614.10).92. This, as Urmson points out, is ironic, since Simplicius’ references to other

texts are quite vague. But the whole section shows that other authors/texts areinvolved: Chaldaean Oracles, Timaeus, Theophrastus.

93. Falcon 2005 (§4). See also the opening quotation of this chapter.94. On his influence see Dodds 1963; Gersh 1986, 2005. The growing literature

on Proclus is now conveniently listed at http://www.hiw.kuleuven.ac.be/dwmc/plato/proclus/probiblio.htmSimplicius acknowledges Syrianus as Proclus’ teacher at 618.27 (ton tou LukiouProklou kathêgemona). For further literature see Sorabji 1990: 500, 503.

95. D’Ancona 2002: 208-11.96. For instance, lecture notes (‘from the master’s voice’, apo phônês), or


248

http://www.hiw.kuleuven.ac.be/dwmc/plato/proclus/probiblio.htm

discussion divided into theôria and praxis (Olympiodorus, c. 650 CE), or interpre-tive paraphrase (Themistius, c. 317-87). Cf. above, p. 156.

97. Cf. Sluiter 2000. For the argument from riddles in Christian circles seeGrant 1957: 120 (ainigma).

98. O’Meara 1989: 120-1.99. O’Meara 1989: 122. He adds: ‘Aristotle, we are told, owed his book On

Generation and Corruption to the “Pythagorean” Ocellus; his physics in general toPlato’s Pythagorean, Timaeus; his Categories to Archytas.’ (See his n. 11: 175.8-11;192.16-21; cf. in Hermog. II 58, 23-5.) According to Suda (s.v.) Syrianus also wroteon the agreement (sumphônia) between Platonic and Pythagorean philosophy(lost). See Karamanolis 2006: 251-2.

100. O’Meara 1989: 123, 127-8.101. O’Meara 1989: 125.102. The most common epithets for (near-)contemporaries are philosophos, daimo-

nios, and thaumasios; it is not clear whether Simplicius is adding any himself.103. See Chapter 4 n. 57. For Syrianus and Alexander see Luna 2001b: 72-98.

In Gillian Clarke’s review of Athanassiadi (CR 50-1 [2000] 33) a similar commentfrom Isidore to Marinus is mentioned: when asked whether he should publish hisextensive commentary on Plato’s Philebus (Philos. hist. F38A), Isidore is reportedto have said that Proclus’ commentary on the Philebus was quite sufficient;Marinus burnt the book. Here, however, the reason was probably that Marinuswas considered a mediocre philosopher.

104. Previous ACA volumes (index) have limited comments in terms of suchoblique or subtle influences on the writing style and interpretation of Simpliciusby Plotinus, Iamblichus and Syrianus. Richard Sorabji pointed out to me (personalcommunication, email Nov. 2006) that for Epictetus it has been noted that thereare long Neoplatonist excursûs and short Epictetan paraphrases (see Brennan-Brittain 2002), while in the In Cat. 5-6 Iamblichus is the reason for a very differentstyle, and one that is well marked (De Haas 2001a).

105. Perhaps it ends at line 34 kaitoi or at 35 the second mêpote (althoughmêpote usually introduces Simplicius’ opinion, cf. line 25 and above p. 127). Notethe verb paralambanein appearing here four times (verbal form: lines 28, 30, 32;adjectival form: line 34), cf. Syrianus in Metaph. 62.19; 184.25; 185.6; 192.23. Alsonote the idea of ‘turning’ (trepô) as ‘changing’ (atreptos, katatropê, line 29; accord-ing to a TLG search, the latter occurs only here), cf. his in Metaph. 42.3 (atreptôs);and finally aparaleipton for which LSJ gives this passage in Simplicius (123.34)as well as Syrianus in Metaph. 132.23 (cf. 140.17; 150.4, all adverbial) and Proclusin Parm. p. 833 Stallbaum [= 1061.17 Cousin; cf. 1062.8 and in Remp. 2.2.9 Kroll(adverbial)].

106. in Phys. 15.11, 20.6, 20.9, 37.21, 54.6, 182.3, 207.34 etc. (a total of 39 casesfor in Phys. and in DC).

107. On this issue David Konstan noted (email Nov. 15, 2006): ‘there is thequestion of different stylistic registers for different kinds of argument or exegesis,and here I can confirm your intuition: Aspasius’ discussion of the nature ofemotion, for instance, is in quite a different style from his line by line commentson Aristotle’s text, which are in the prosy manner of the commentators generally.’I am grateful to him for sharing his thoughts on this matter, some of which havebeen incorporated into this section.

108. Lamberz 1987: 6.109. As David Konstan reminded me in an email exchange (see n. 107) on the

style and teaching practices in the commentator tradition.


249

110. Athanassiadi 1999: 30ff. A different take on the event in Sorabji 2005: 205f.111. Hankinson 2004: 6, who also refers to in Phys. 1361-63 where Ammonius’

arguments are summarised.112. Combès 1986 (introduction to his Budé edition).113. Sorabji in Urmson 1992: 2-3.114. After Sorabji 1983: 208 with nn. 40-5; cf. id. 2004, 2: 13(a).115. Sorabji 1983: 209-10. On Theophrastus’ role in late Platonism, see also §3.2.116. I am preparing a translation of in Phys. 1.5-9 for the ACA series (forthcom-

ing).117. In addition, the indices of the CAG volumes are known to be flawed (R.

Todd 1974). One recent contribution on this part of the commentary is Tornau 2000(on Moderatus at 230.34ff.).

118. The total number (160) suggests his personal engagement is higher thanoften suspected. One particularly clear example is found at in Phys. 946.24-7(noted by Champion 2004, 22 n. 12): ‘It occurred to me, indeed, both to pose thispuzzle in this way and to solve it, since I have found it in none of the commentators,but if anyone should address [it] in a more plausible way, he wins as a friend ratherthan an enemy [cf. Plato Tim. 54A5]’ (tr. Konstan [ACA] 1989: 40).

119. On the latter’s cosmology and the use of akra etc. in the mapping out of theworld see Dillon 1987: 900. See also in Phys. 206.25, 220.30 (with notes inBaltussen forthcoming-2 [ACA]).

120. See Blumenthal 1996 on Themistius’ relation to Aristotle and Plato.121. The first two are extant in Greek (see Todd 1996, 2004), the last survives

only in Hebrew (Hankinson 2002a: 121 n. 226). As to precedents for paraphraseSluiter (2000: 200) points to Plato’s account of Iliad 1 in the Republic.

122. Wildberg 1987a: 83 n. 93 refers to Phys. I.7 at Cael. 279a17.123. We seem to have here a cluster of the kind discussed earlier (§4.1):

Simplicius exhibits a specific knowledge of comments on specific topics fromdifferent earlier exegetes of Aristotle.

124. At in Phys. 422.20 Aspasius’ and Themistius’ text are said to concur.125. Fuller account in Todd 1996: 2-7.126. On his commentaries see Smith 1978, Mansfeld 1994, chs 4-5, Sluiter 1995,

Vallance 1999: 230-1.127. At in Phys. 708.28 he mentions ‘the eighth book of his On demonstration’

(Apodeiktikês <Tekhnês?>). This Galenic work, already rare by the time of Hunainibn Ishaq around 850 CE (Nutton 2004: 6-7), does not survive except in a fewfragments (id. 222); Nemesius On the nature of man ch. 21 mentions On demon-stration book 3. The limited knowledge of Galen’s medical work in thecommentators has been pointed out by Todd 1977. Cf. Vallance 1999: 230-1.

128. See Mansfeld 1994: 161-73 for Galen’s comments on the requirements fora commentator. As Galen only appears in the commentary on the Physics, onesuspects that Porphyry is the source. Moraux 1985 has made it highly plausiblethat Porphyry wrote a detailed commentary on books 1-4, and a summary para-phrase of books 5-8. The praise for Galen’s as ‘most learned’ in three out of sixpassages and with three different adjectives, and logic as one of the areas wouldfit Porphyry’s profile and interests.

129. It is not clear which work Galen’s ideas on this point come from: Sorabjidiscusses his ideas on time and motion in his study on time (1983: 82-3, 271), butconsiders the evidence from a late Arabic source suspect (83), and thinks it possiblethat Galen followed an interpretation like that of Atticus, in which disorderlymotion of the universe precedes the creation of orderly motion (270-1).


250

130. For the phrase ‘framework of consensus’ see Dillon 1973: 28.131. Gerson 2005a plausibly argues that the interpretation of Aristotle has been

rather one-sided (for a good example see 67ff. regarding On philosophy) and offershis interpretation as a way to counter-balance that dominant approach (290). Seealso the very useful synopsis in Share 2003 ‘Introduction’. For a balanced reviewsee Baltzly 2005.

132. Karamanolis 2006: ch. 2.133. On all these issues see esp. Karamanolis 2006: 229-41.134. Hankinson 2002a: 8.

6. Polemic and Exegesis in Simplicius:Defending Pagan Theology

1. See Baltussen 2007a for a fuller argument. A seminal article on philosophicalpolemic is Owen 1983.

2. Cf. Hankinson 2002a: 3 ‘when he deals with Philoponus, Simplicius’ normallydry style becomes greatly enlivened with the characteristic Greek relish forpersonal abuse’.

3. Cf. Watts 2006, discussed above, §5.2.4. Sorabji 1983: 193-209 and 1988: 106-22; Hoffmann 1987a; Wildberg 1987a:

ch. 11; Wildberg 1990; Hankinson 2002, 2004; Mueller 2004. For Simplicius’discussion of the Peripatetic Xenarchus, see the illuminating case study by Hank-inson 2002-3.

5. I am thus developing an idea already mooted in Hoffmann 1987b: 63. Forsome general comments on Platonists and Christianity see Sorabji 2004 (vol. 2):19-25 and ch. 5.

6. Frede 1999. For the polemical nature of medical commentaries on Hippocraticworks, see von Staden Herophilus ch. 9, 14 [after Vallance 1999: 231 n. 18]. Thissection is based on Baltussen 2007a, §§1-3.

7. See Cherniss 1977.8. Janko 2002-3: 7-8; Lamberton-Keaney 1992.9. See Dorandi 1991. For a thumbnail history of exegesis see Obbink 2003:

177-8.10. Cf. Mansfeld 1986 and Nehamas 1990.11. There were no rules of fair play in debate (Long 1992: 50). The seminal

article on polemic in this context is Owen 1983. See also Baltussen 2003b, 2004.12. For a more detailed account of the role of polemic in the development of

philosophical commentary see Baltussen 2007a.13. Sluiter 2000.14. I paraphrase and quote from Wallis 1971: 101 (referring to Synesius Epist.

105) and 102.15. Sorabij in Wildberg 1987a: 20.16. My main guides in this difficult territory are de Labriolle 1948, Momigliano

1963a, Dodds 1970 (1965), Wallis 1971: 100-10, Fowden 1982, O’Meara 1982, LaneFox 1986, Hadot 1978, Athanassiadi 1993, Pearson 1996: 55-71, MacMullen 1997,Smith 2004, Rhee 2005 (ch. 2), Edwards 2006: 146-61.

17. Wallis 1971: 100-1.18. See Pliny the Younger, Epist. 10.96, in which he refers to it as ‘inflexible

stubbornness’, ‘depraved superstition’, or a ‘contagious superstition’ (pertinaciamcerte et inflexibilem obstinationem � superstitionem pravam et immodicam �superstitio istius contagio).


251

19. Rhee 2005: 50-61. For the reception of Socrates in Christian circles see Frede2006.

20. Discussed most recently by T.D. Barnes 1994, Berchman 2005. See also DeLabriolle 1948 and below.

21. For Porphyry see Barnes 1994: 65; for Theodosius, Momigliano 1963b: 10.22. De Labriolle 1942: 118-19. Cf. Numenius who called Plato an ‘atticizing

Mozes’ (ibid. 228) on which see also Whittaker 1967. For the enormous range ofcriticisms of Christian doctrine see the informative paper by Courcelle 1963 (mostprimary sources in his notes). Synesius’ struggle with ‘enemies of culture’ (e.g.monks) epitomises the problem of ‘the emergence of professional philosophy withinthe Christian Church’ (Marrou 1963: 144-5).

23. Athanassiadi 1993: 1. Her paper discusses the evidence in Damascius, seebelow. MacMullen 1997 covers some aspects of persecution (esp. his ch. 1). See alsoBenko 1980, Bradbury 1994.

24. In his discussion of the problematic term ‘school’ (cf. Chapter 5 n. 65) Marroumakes the interesting point (1963: 134 with n. 3) that in a papyrus from c. 490 CE(P. Cairo Maspero 67295, i.15) there is talk of ‘museums’ and ‘academies’ in theplural (mouseious, akadêmias). It shows the diversity of religious groups active atthe time. Cf. Haas 1997: 131-2.

25. See Katz 1954.26. On the extant fragments, see T.D. Barnes 1994 and Berchman 2005. Cf.

Wallis 1971: 101.27. See esp. Dzielska 2001 (1995): 79-93. On the violence in Alexandria in the

fourth and fifth centuries see also Athanassiadi 1993: 13-17 (Hypatia at 16), Haas1997: 128-72 (for Hypatia see 313-16).

28. See Marrou 1963: 136-7, who mentions a story in Zacharias in which ‘paganstudents lynched one of their fellows, Paralios, who was about to become a convertto Christianity for having dared to defame publicly their great goddess Isis’ (137).

29. Haas 1997: 130-8 on problems of defining the pagan and Christiancommunities.

30. Fowden 1982.31. De Labriolle 1942: 262-4; Dodds 1970 (1965): 108-9.32. Athanassiadi 1999: 30. Cf. Synesius’ report in his letter from c. 400 CE

(below, n. 39).33. Athanassiadi 1999: 27-9. For the issue of whether or not he betrayed his

school members see id. 31 (we will never know for sure) and Sorabji 2005: 205-8(the concession only concerned the religious, not the doctrinal).

34. Watts 2006: 111. See Marinus V.Procl. 15.35. Watts 2006: 128, 136-8; at 140 and nn. he mentions that Damascius had

earlier chosen exile over cooperation with the hostile Christian community.36. Fowden 1982: 38 (italics his). Cf. Brown 1971, 1998.37. Dodds 1970 (1965): 132.38. Dodds 1970 (1965): 120. Cf. below, n. 83 (Rist).39. Dodds 1970 (1965): 122. Cf. MacMullen 1997: 78-90. Momigliano 1963a.40. Cf. Haas 1997: 154f. For a useful assessment of Synesius’ position see

Marrou 1963.41. See Athanassiadi 1993: 6-7 for this quote (n. 27) and many more illuminat-

ing comments on the nature of the Platonist community as an ascetic caste.42. See Athanassiadi 1993: 11 with n. 66.43. Athanassiadi (1993: 1) puts it far more elegantly: ‘no pagan church emerged

out of the turmoil to canonise its dead and expound a theology of martyrdom’.


252

44. Hoffmann 1987a: 57; 1987b: 83 n. 145 on in DC 91.7-13. See also Wildberg1987b: 197.

45. On the hymns and their philosophical role see Van den Berg 2001; a veryuseful (but far from comprehensive) treatment of prayer in late Platonism isavailable in Dillon 2002b.

46. Vita Isidori (Photian epitome) 17, see Athanassiadi 1993: 2 with n. 4.47. Dillon 2002b: 279.48. This brief summary is based on Dillon 2002b: 286-90 which has more detail.49. Dillon 2002b: 287.50. Dillon 2002b: 292. On their treatment of Homer as ‘theologian’ see Lamber-

ton 1986.51. For the philosophical arguments see esp. Sorabji 1983, ch. 13.52. Verbeke 1982: 45. On the importance of Synesius for Alexandrian Platonism

see Marrou 1963. Cf. Wildberg 1987: 27-31, 70-3.53. Cf. Athanassiadi 1993: 6 on Damascius’ judgement of Horapollo’s conver-

sion. The verb does not occur in Simplicius.54. Porphyry’s work is dated by Barnes 1994. De Labriolle 1948: 243-4. First

under Constantine (mentioned in a letter after the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE, seeSocrates Hist. Eccl. I.9) and then again under Valentinian II and Theodosius in448 CE. Clearly some copies had survived the first ban.

55. Verrycken 1990; MacCoull 1995. See Pearson 1999: 12 n. 11 for other criticsof Verrycken.

56. Bradbury 1994, Pearson 1999: 127-31, Lang 2005. Marrou (1963: 148) notesthat Zacharias Scholasticus (c. 485 CE) already criticised Ammonius, son of Her-meias, in his Ammonius or the creation of the world. Cosmas Indicopleustes alsoattacked Philoponus.

57. Pearson 1999: 128.58. See in DC 271.19-20, 1363.8-12; Verbeke 1982: 46, McKirahan 2000:

152-4.59. See Hoffmann 1987b: 76-9, Baltzly 2002, and Mueller 2004: 131 n. 43.60. Hoffmann 1987b.61. Pearson 1999: 11.62. Hoffmann 1987a: 60-1. On the remarkable richness of the vocabulary see id.

62 n. 34.63. Hoffmann 1987b: 60. Cf. Dodds 1970 (1965): 116-19 about how close their

views were.64. On the dating see Evrard 1953 and Wildberg 1987b: 200-7.65. Cf. Hoffmann 1987b: 63 n. 43. I note that in Hadot 1990a (Commentaire sur

les Cat. p. 169) the table shows how both Simplicius and Philoponus are exceptionsto the general sequence of isagogical topics. Simplicius claimed (in DC 26.17-19)he never met Philoponus (cf. Sorabji 1987: 23-4).

66. Pearson 1999: 137.67. Cf. Cameron 1969: 25 ‘� the leisure to refute Philoponus’.68. As is for instance Tarán’s position, see above, Introduction, n. 43.69. See Hankinson 2006: 96 n. 192 indicating the possible wordplay on Phi-

loponus. Cf. Hoffmann 1987b: 83, where he points to the punning on Philoponus’name by the third council of Constantinople in 860 CE (mataioponos: ‘man whoselabour is lost’), a sign that his efforts were considered fruitless. Ridiculing peoplefor their name is clearly an ancient game.

70. in Phys. 291.21-2: Alexandros philoponôs lexin tina Geminou paratithêsin


253

ek tês epitomês tôn Posidôniou Meteôrologikôn <tês> exêgêseôs tas aphormas apoAristotelous labousan.

71. See p. 111 with n. 20 and pp. 123-9. Some reasons for long quotations fromthe Presocratics are given above, §2.1.1.

72. Cf. Sorabji in Urmson 2002: 1. The second topic is in a way a ‘prequel’ to thedebate of the eternity of the universe.

73. Noted by Lautner in Urmson 2002: 148 n. 40. Cf. in Phys. 526.16-26, wherehe is used to show how understanding mathematical objects helps in under-standing that differences in place are naturally determined, hence that place issomething.

74. Not surprisingly this issue is also treated in Proclus, in his Elements oftheology which was set out with mathematical precision as Lautner has pointedout (Urmson 2002 n. 355) namely in ‘El. theol. 6; 64; 113-15; 135-9; 149’.

75. ‘Let it be granted that a straight line can be drawn from any point to anyother point’, i.e. it has two ends and is therefore finite.

76. Additional ‘over-long’ quotations can be found, for instance, at 753.10ff.which has 20 lines quoted on the topic of time and contains information ondifferent manuscript readings (antigrapha); 765.4ff. contains two quotations anda reference to Themistius; 964.14ff. has 12 lines quoted and hints at possibledistortion in Alexander (suggested by the participle helkôn) and mentions Theo-phrastus and Strato; 968.16ff. has 37 lines quoted (the topic is linked to 966) andshows there is not all agreement among commentators (again mention of Themis-tius). See also Appendix II B.

77. Briefly discussed above, Chapter 4, text before n. 75.78. See Sorabji 2004-2: chs 19-24; Haas 1997: 152-6.79. On the holy men see Fowden 1982, Brown 1998.80. MacMullen (1997: 85-6 and n. 24) helpfully illustrates the semantic shift of

the word philosophia to ‘ascetic piety’ by this time. It meant that philosophy (inthe traditional sense) and religious doctrines were regarded on equal footing, andjust two among many ‘schools of thought’ (see also n. 22 and Syrianus’ comment inthe text to n. 41).

81. Cf. above, p. 180 (with n. 38, Dodds’ quotation on logismos and pistis).82. See Dodds 1970 (1965): 121-2 for a more detailed account.83. Rist 1967: ch. 17.84. MacMullen 1997: 85 translating Anon. Asclepius 1.12f.85. Rist 1967: 240, paraphrasing in Phys. 5.19.86. We can compare the later Prolegomena philosophiae of commentators such

as Elias and David which ‘are often strikingly reminiscent of more renownedexamples of ancient protreptic literature’ (Wildberg 1990: 34 and 42).

Epilogue. Simplicius and Greek Philosophy:The Last Pagan Gospel?

1. I owe both the quotation and the clarification to Michael Gilleland whopublishes his thoughts on obiter lecta at http://laudatortemporisacti.blogspot.com.

2. The irksome features of modern commentary are fragmentation, parallel-lomania, and the reference-book function, as Gibson 2002 has well brought out.

3. See, e.g., Grant 1999. Often religious doctrines were referred to as ‘philo-sophies’ (plural), e.g. Eunapius Vit. philos. 5.3.10, P. Cairo Maspero 67295, i.15(see Chapter 6 n. 24), Syrianus in Metaph. 81.9 (quoted above, §5.3).

4. The apocryphal letter of Alexander of Macedon to Aristotle reproaching him


254

http://laudatortemporisacti.blogspot.com

for publishing the Metaphysics is a good example (in Phys. 8.16ff.; cf. Plutarch Lifeof Alexander). On the pagan holy men, see Brown 1980, Fowden 1982.

5. Most 1999a: ix.6. It might be interesting to cross-reference these passages with the occurrence

of ‘I’ (egô).7. Compare Chapter 4 n. 4 and text thereto.8. See above, p. 61 and Baltussen 2000: ch. 2.9. Key phrases are: exetastikên tou Aristotelous akribeian, diarthrôsai, epi-

kheirêma, ennoias.10. A TLG-E (online) search produced these results: 80 occurrences of didaskei-,

60 occurrences of didax- for in DC and in Phys.11. Hadot 1995; accepted in Hoffmann 2006. Comparable statement in Sorabji

1990: 5.12. Cameron 1969: 24-5.13. in Phys. 601.10-13, in Cat. 7.23-32 (quoted in §1.2.1).14. The concept and example are from Aristotle Metaphysics 3.2.15. Cf. Chapter 1 n. 3.16. Cf. Westerink 1962, Wallis 1971: 19.17. Baltussen 2000: ch. 2.18. Cf. pp. 182-3 on Plotinus and Proclus (including in DC 485.21 which

mentions a work by Aristotle On prayer).19. See Karamanolis 2006: 57n.20. Urmson 1992: 86-7 n. 4 (based on Westerink 1990). For Syrianus and

Proclus harmonisation was far less of a concern than it was to Simplicius, asSorabji has noted: ‘Those least inclined to harmonise were perhaps Syrianus andhis pupil Proclus’ (2004, 3: 37). Syrianus was interested in harmonising Plato withOrpheus and Pythagoras (see Chapter 5 n. 99).

21. This section builds on and expands my previous discussions of Simplicius’method (Baltussen 2002c, id. 2003) and Hoffmann 1987a, 1987b, 2000, 2006, DeHaas 2001a, Chase 2003. I note that Rappe 2000, although she contributes muchto our understanding of exegetical strategies in Neoplatonism, hardly ever men-tions Simplicius (see her Index s.v.).

22. Rashed 1997 and forthcoming.23. For some clear examples see e.g. O’Brien 1969; Gaskin 1997: 100 n. 23, 104

n. 33; De Haas 2001a: n. 155; Rashed 1997.


255

BibliographyA. Texts and translations

Abu Bakr al-Razi, Kitab al-Hawi fi a-tibb (Comprehensive Book on Medicine)(Beyruth 1977).

Agathias, Histories, ed. R. Keydell (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967).Abu l-‘Abbas an-Nayrizis, Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?)Simplicius Kommentar zu den De-

finitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I [Anaritius, d. c. 922]eingeleitet, ediert und mit arabischen und lateinischen Glossaren versehen vonRüdiger Arnzen (Köln: R. Arnzen, 2002) xl, 140p. [non vidi]

Alexander, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in De sensu, ed. A. Wendland, vol.3.1 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1901).

Alexander, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in Metaphysica, ed. M. Hayduck,vol. 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1891).

Alexander, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in Topica, ed. M. Wallies, vol. 2.2(Berlin: De Gruyter 1891).

Damascius, On Principles, text and translation by A. Combès (Paris: Budé 1986).al-Nadim Muhammad ibn Ishaq, Kitab al-Firhist, ed. G. Flügel (Leipzig: Vogel 1871).Hermeias, Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia in the 133rd

fascicule of the Bibliothèque de l’École des hautes Études, Sciences Historiqueset Philologiques, ed. P. Couvreur (Paris 1901).

Simplicius Simplicissimus by Hans Jacob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen, trans-lated from the original German edn of 1669 by Hellmuth Weissenborn andLesley Macdonald; with engravings by Hellmuth Weissenborn (London: JohnCalder 1964.

Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in De anima, ed. M. Hayduck, vol.11 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1882).

Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in De caelo, ed. J.L. Heiberg, vol.7 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1894).

Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in Physika, ed. H. Diels, vol. 9(Berlin: De Gruyter 1882) and vol. 10 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1895).

Simplicius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: in Categorias, ed. C.Kalbfleisch, vol. 8 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1907).

Simplicius of Cilicia, Aristotelis De caelo commentaria. Latin. Commentaire sur letraité Du ciel d’Aristote, vol. 1, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke; Éditioncritique par F. Bossier avec la collaboration de Chr. Vande Veire et G. Gulden-tops (Leuven: Leuven University Press 2004).

Simplicius, Commentarius in Aristotelis. Categoriae. Commentarium in decemcategorias Aristotelis. Übersetzt von Guillelmus Dorotheus; Neudruck derAusgab Venedig 1540, mit einer Einleitung von Rainer Thiel und Charles Lohr(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog 1999).

Simplicius, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle [ACA]: various volumes listedunder translator in general bibliography (London: Duckworth 1987- ).

Taylor, T., Aristotle. De caelo. Translated from the Greek; with copious elucida-tions, from the commentaries of Simplicius on the first, and of Olympiodorus on

257

the last of these treatises (London: Robert Wilks 1807) vii, 608p.; Contents: Onthe heavens. – On generation and corruption. – On meteors.

Themistius, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca: In de anima, ed. R. Heinze, vol.5.3 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1899).

B. Biographical reference works onSimplicius (chronological)

‘Simplikios’, RE IIIA.1 (1927) 204-13, no. 10 (K. Praechter).‘Simplicius’, in P. Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (New York:

Macmillan, 1967) 7.448 (A.C. Lloyd).‘Simplicius’, Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York: Scribner’s, 1975)

12.440-3 (G. Verbeke).‘Simplicius’, Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1996) 1409-10 (R. Sorabji).‘Simplicius’, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 8 (London: Routledge 1998)

788-91 (C. Wildberg).‘Simplicius’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (online, 2007) (C. Wildberg).‘Simplikios’, Der Neue Pauly vol. 11 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2001) 578-80 (I. Hadot).‘Simplicius of Kilikia’, Biographical Encyclopedia of Ancient Scientists (London:

Routledge 2008) (H. Baltussen).

C. Books, articles and reviewsAdamson, P., Baltussen, H. and Stone, M.W.F. (eds) (2004) Philosophy, Science

and Exegesis in Greek, Latin and Arabic Commentaries, Conference proceed-ings in honour of R.R.K. Sorabji, BICS suppl. vols 83.1-2.

Alberti, A. and Sharples, R.W. (eds) (1999) Aspasius: the Earliest Extant Commen-tary on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berlin: De Gruyter).

Algra, K.A. (1995) Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Leiden: E.J. Brill).Allan, D.J. (1950) Mediaeval Versions of Aristotle, De Caelo and of the Commentary

of Simplicius, offprint from Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 2.Allen, M.B.J. (1984) The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino: a Study of his Phaedrus

Commentary, its Sources and Genesis (Berkeley: California University Press).Altmann, G. (1906) De Posidonio Timaei Platonis commentatore (PhD Diss. Berlin,

E. Ebering).Athanassiadi, P. (1993) ‘Persecution and Response in Late Antiquity: the Evidence

of Damascius’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 113: 1-29.Athanassiadi, P. (1999) Damascius. The Philosophical History (Athens: Agape).Athanassiadi, P. and Frede, M. (eds) (1999) Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity

(Oxford: Oxford University Press).Atherton, C. (1993) The Stoics on Ambiguity (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press).Badawi, A. (1968) La Transmission de la Philosophie Grecque au Monde Arabe

(Paris: J. Vrin).Balleriaux, O. (1989) ‘Philosophos ta theourgika eksetazein. Syrianus et la téles-

tique’, Kernos 2: 13-25.Baltussen, H. (1998) ‘The Purpose of Theophrastus’ De sensibus Reconsidered’,

Apeiron 31.2: 167-200.Baltussen, H. (2000) ‘Plato in the Placita (Aëtius book IV): A Dielsian Blind Spot’,

Philologus 144.2: 227-38.

Bibliography

258

Baltussen, H. (2002a) ‘Theophrastean Echoes? Theophrastus’ De sensibus in thePlatonic and Aristotelian Tradition (Alcinous, Alexander, Plotinus)’, in W.W.Fortenbaugh and G. Wöhrle (eds) On the Opuscula of Theophrastus (DiePhilosophie der Antike 14, Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag) 39-58.

Baltussen, H. (2002b) ‘Wehrli’s Edition of Eudemus of Rhodes. The physicalfragments in Simplicius On Aristotle’s Physics’, in W.W. Fortenbaugh and I.Bodnár 2002: 127-56.

Baltussen, H. (2002c) ‘Philology or Philosophy? Simplicius on the Use of Quota-tions’, in J. Foley and I. Worthington (eds) Epea and Grammata: Oral andWritten Communication in Ancient Greece, vol. IV (Leiden, Köln and New York:E.J. Brill) 173-89.

Baltussen, H. (2003) ‘Early Reactions to Plato’s Timaeus. Polemic and Exegesis inTheophrastus and Epicurus’, in R.W. Sharples and A. Sheppard (eds) AncientApproaches to the ‘Timaeus’, BICS suppl. vol. 78: 49-71.

Baltussen, H. (2004) ‘Plato Protagoras 340-48: Commentary in the Making?’, in P.Adamson, H. Baltussen and M.W.F. Stone (eds) Philosophy, Science and Exe-gesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, BICS suppl. vols 83.1-2:1.21-35.

Baltussen, H. (2005) ‘The Presocratics in the Doxographical Tradition: Sources,Controversies, and Current Research’, Studia Humaniora Tartuensia [onlinejournal] vol. 6.6: 1-26 http://www.ut.ee/klassik/sht/2005/Baltussen1.pdf

Baltussen, H. (2006a) ‘Addenda Eudemea’, Leeds International Classical Studiesvol. 5.1: 1-28 http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/2006/200601.pdf

Baltussen, H. (2006b) ‘Theophrastus’, in D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philo-sophy, 2nd edn (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA) 9: 411-13.

Baltussen, H. (2007a) ‘From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient PhilosophicalCommentary’, in J. Lavery (ed.) Genres in Philosophy. Poetics Today (SpecialIssue) 28.2: 247-81.

Baltussen, H. (2007b) ‘Playing the Pythagorean: Ion’s Triagmos’, in V. Jenningsamd A. Katsaros (eds) The World of Ion of Chios, Mnemosyne Supplement vol.288 (Leiden: E.J. Brill) 295-318.

Baltussen, H. (forthcoming-1) (2008) ‘Simplicius’, and ‘Priscian’, in P. Keyser andG. Irby-Massie (eds) Biographical Encyclopaedia of Ancient Scientists (London:Routledge).

Baltussen, H. (forthcoming-2) Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 1.5-9, AncientCommentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Baltussen, H. (forthcoming-3) Theophrastus of Eresus. Fragments in PhysicalDoxography, FHGS 225-45. Commentary volume 3.2.1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Baltzly, D. (2002) ‘What Goes Up: Proclus Against Aristotle on the Fifth Element’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80: 261-87.

Baltzly, D. (2005) Review of Gerson 2005, in Bryn Mawr Classical Review2005.11.17.

Barnes, J. (1985) ‘Theophrastus on Hypothetical Syllogisms’, in W.W. Forten-baugh, A.A. Long and P.M. Huby (eds) Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life andWorks (New Brunswick: Transaction Books) 125-41.

Barnes, J. (1987) The Presocratics, introduction and translation (London: Penguin).Barnes, J. (1989) ‘Aristotle at Rome’, in M. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds) Philosophia

Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress) 1-69.

Barnes, J. et al. (1991) Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Prior Analytics1.1-7, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Bibliography

259

http://www.ut.ee/klassik/sht/2005/Baltussen1.pdf

http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/2006/200601.pdf

Barnes, J. (1992) ‘Metacommentary’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy X:267-81.

Barnes, J. (1997) Logic and the Imperial Stoa (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill).Barnes, T.D. (1991) ‘Pagan Perceptions of Christians’, in Ian Hazlett (ed.) Early

Christianity: Origins and Evolution to AD 600, in honour of W.H.C. Frend(Nashville: Abingdon Press).

Barnes, T.D. (1994) ‘Scholarship or Propaganda? Porphyry Against the Christiansand its Historical Setting’, BICS 39: 53-65.

Barney, S. (1991) Annotation and its Text (New York: Oxford University Press).Bastianini, G. and Sedley D.N. (eds) (1995) ‘Commentarium in Platonis

Theaetetum’, in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini (Firenze: CPF/Olschki)vol. III, 227-562.

Bates, D.G. (ed.) (1995) Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions (Cam-bridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).

Benko, S. (1980) ‘Pagan Criticism of Christianity During the First Two CenturiesA.D.’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (Berlin: De Gruyter) II23.2: 1055-118.

Berchman, R. (2005) Porphyry, Against the Christians, translation and commen-tary on the fragments (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Berg, R.M. van den (2001) Proclus’ Hymns: Essays, Translations, Commentary(Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Bernays, M. (1899) ‘Zur Lehre von den Citaten und Noten’, Schriften zur Kritikund Literaturgeschichte IV (Berlin) 255-347, esp. 302-22.

Betegh, G. (2004) ‘Exegesis in the Derveni Papyrus’, in Adamson, Baltussen andStone (eds) 2004: 1.37-50.

Betegh, G. (2005) The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Billerbeck, M. (1990) ‘Philology at the Imperial Court’, Greece & Rome 37.2:191-203.

Bloomfield, M.W. (1972) ‘Allegory as Interpretation’, New Literary History 3:301-17.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1968) ‘Plotinus’ Ennead IV 3,20-1 and its Sources: Alexander,Aristotle, and Others’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 50: 254-61.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1974) ‘Did Iamblichus Write a Commentary on the De Anima?’,Hermes 102: 540-56.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1979a) ‘Themistius, the Last Peripatetic Commentator onAristotle?’ in Bowersock et al. (1979) 391-400.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1979b) ‘Photius on Themistius (Cod. 74). Did Themistius WriteCommentaries on Aristotle?’, Hermes 107.2: 168-82.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1981) ‘Plotinus in later Platonism’, in H.J. Blumenthal and R.A.Markus (eds) Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought (London: Variorum)212-22.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1986) ‘John Philoponus: Alexandrian Platonist?’ Hermes 114:314-33.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1987) ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias in the later Greek Commentar-ies’, in J. Wiesner (ed.) Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung. II Kommentierung,Überlieferung, Nachleben (Berlin: De Gruyter) 90-106.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1988) ‘Simplicius and Others on Aristotle’s Discussions of Reason’,in J. Duffy and J. Peradotto (eds) Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studiespresented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75 (Buffalo, NY: Arethusa) 103-19.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1993) ‘From Ku-ru-so-wo-ko to THEOURGOS: Word to Ritual’, in

Bibliography

260

H.J. Blumenthal, Soul and Intellect: Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplaton-ism, Variorum (Aldershot: Ashgate) Study XI.

Blumenthal, H.J. (1996) Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity: Interpreta-tions of the De Anima (London: Duckworth).

Blumenthal, H.J. (1997) ‘Iamblichus as a Commentator’, Syllecta Classica 8: 1-13.Blumenthal, H.J. and Lloyd, A.C. (eds) (1983) Soul and the Structure of Being in

Late Neoplatonism: Syrianus, Proclus, and Simplicius, colloquium, Liverpool,15-16 April 1982 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press).

Börm, H. (2006) ‘Der Perserkönig im Imperium Romanum. Chosroes I. und dersasanidische Einfall in das Oströmische Reich 540 n. Chr.’, Chiron 36: 299-328.

Bossier, F. (1987) ‘Traductions latines et influences du commentaire in De caeloen occident (XIIIe-XIVe s.)’, in Hadot 1987a: 289-325.

Bossier, F. (1992) ‘Le problème des lemmes du De caelo dans la traduction latinedu commentaire in de caelo de Simplicius’, in J. Hamesse (ed.) Les problèmesposés par l’édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux (Louvain-la-Neuve)361-97.

Bossier, F. et al. (2004) see section A above under Simplicius of Cilicia.Boys-Stones, G.R. (ed.) (2001) Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: a Study of its Develop-

ment from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Boys-Stones, G.R. and Brittain, C.F. (forthcoming) The Post-Hellenistic Philo-

sophers, vol. 1: The Platonist Revival: a Source-book and Philosophical Com-mentary on Platonism from the Late Hellenistic Period to Plotinus (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).

Bowen, Alan C. (2002) ‘Simplicius and the Early History of Greek PlanetaryTheory’, Perspectives on Science 10.2: 155-67.

Bowersock et al. (1979) = Bowersock, G.W., Burkert, W. and Putnam, M.C.J. (eds)Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox on the Occasion ofHis 65th Birthday (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter).

Bradbury, S. (1994) ‘Constantine and the Problem of Anti-Pagan Legislation in theFourth Century’, Classical Quarterly 89.2: 120-39.

Brennan, T. and Brittain, C. (2002) Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 27-53,Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Brittain, C. and Brennan, T. (2002) Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 1-26,Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Brown, P.R.L. (1971) ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity’,Journal of Roman Studies 61: 80-101.

Brown, P.R.L. (1980) The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity (Center forHermeneutical Studies. Protocol Series of the Colloquies 34, Berkeley).

Brown, P.R.L. (1996) The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity,AD 200-1000 (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell) part III: ‘End of Ancient Christi-anity’.

Brown, P.R.L. (1998) ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity,1971-1997’, Journal of Early Christian Studies 6.3: 353-76.

Brucker, J. (1742) Historia critica philosophiae (Leipzig: Weidemann and Reich).[non vidi]

Califf, D.J. (2003) ‘Metrodorus of Lampsacus and the Problem of Allegory: anExtreme Case?’ Arethusa 36: 21-36.

Cameron, Alan (1969) ‘The Last Days of the Academy at Athens’, Proceedings ofthe Cambridge Philological Society n.s. 15: 7-29.

Cameron, Averil (1969-70) ‘Agathias on the Sassanians’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers23-4: 67-183.

Bibliography

261

Campbell, G. (2006) ‘Empedocles’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy athttp://www.iep.utm.edu/e/empedocl.htm

Céard, J. (1981) ‘Les transformations du genre du commentaire’, in J. Lafond andA. Stegmann (eds) L’automne de la Renaissance, 1580-1630 (Paris: J. Vrin)101-15.

Champion, M. (2004) The Eternity of the World in the Sixth Century: Philoponus,Simplicius and Cosmas Indicopleustes (unpublished Honours thesis, Disciplineof Classics, University of Melbourne).

Chaniotis, A. (2004a) ‘Epigraphic Evidence for the Philosopher Alexander ofAphrodisias’, BICS 47: 79-81 [preview of 2004b].

Chaniotis, A. (2004b) ‘New Inscriptions from Aphrodisias (1995-2001)’, AmericanJournal of Archaeology 108.3: 377-416.

Chase, M. (2003) Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1-4, Ancient Commentatorson Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Cherniss, H. (1935) Aristotle’s Criticism of the Presocratic Philosophy (repr. 1964,New York: Octogon Books).

Cherniss, H. (1944) Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore:Russell and Russell).

Cherniss, H. (1977) ‘Ancient Forms of Philosophic Discourse’, in L. Tarán (ed.)Harold Cherniss, Selected Papers (Leiden: E.J. Brill) 14-35.

Cleary, J.J. (2006) ‘Proclus as a Reader of Plato’s Timaeus’, in Tarrant and Baltzly(eds) 2006: 135-50.

Corrigan, K. (1996) Plotinus’ Theory of Matter-Evil and the Question of Substance:Plato, Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Leuven: Peeters).

Courcelle, P. (1963) ‘Anti-Christian Arguments and Christian Platonism: FromArnobius to St. Ambrose’, in Momigliano 1963a: 151-92.

Coxon, A.H. (1968) ‘The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius’ Commentary onAristotle’s Physics i-iv’, Classical Quarterly 18: 70-5.

Curd, P. (1998) The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later PresocraticThought (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

D’Alverny, M.-Th. (1977) ‘Les Solutiones ad Chosroem de Priscianus Lydus et JeanScot’, in Jean Scot Érigène et l’Histoire de la Philosophie, ed. R. Roques (Paris:Editions CNRS) 145-60.

D’Ancona, C. (2002) ‘Commenting on Aristotle: From Late Antiquity to the ArabAristotelianism’, in Geerlings and Schulze 2002: 201-51.

D’Ancona, C. (ed.) (2007) The Libraries of the Neoplatonists, Philosophia Antiqua107 (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill).

Diels, H. (1879) Doxographi Graeci (Berlin: Reimer).Diels, H. (1910) ‘Die Anfänge der Philologie bei den Griechen’, Neue Jahrbücher

für die klassische Altertumswissenschaft 25: 1-18.Dillon, J. (1973) Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum

Fragmenta, edited with translation (Leiden: E.J. Brill).Dillon, J. (1976) Review of Moraux 1973, in Phoenix 30.2: 204-7.Dillon, J. (1982) ‘Origen’s Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neoplatonic

Theories’, in O’Meara 1982: 19-23.Dillon, J. (1986) ‘Plutarch and Second Century Platonism’, in A.H. Armstrong (ed.)

Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman (New York:Crossroad Publishing Company) 214-29 [= Study XIII in Dillon 1990].

Dillon J. (1987) ‘Iamblichus of Chalcis’, Aufstieg und Niedergang der RömischenWelt (Berlin: De Gruyter) II.36.2: 862-909.

Dillon, J. (1989) ‘Tampering with the Timaeus: Ideological Emendations in Plato,

Bibliography

262

http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/empedocl.htm

with Special Reference to the Timaeus’, American Journal of Philology 110:54-72.

Dillon, J. (1990a) The Golden Chain: Studies in the Development of Platonism andChristianity (Aldershot: Variorum/ Brookfield: Gower).

Dillon, J. (1990b) Review of Hadot 1987, in Journal of Hellenic Studies 110: 244-5.Dillon, J. (1992) ‘Plotinus at Work on Platonism’, Greece & Rome xxix-2: 189-204.Dillon, J. (1996) The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220,

2nd edn with a new Afterword (London: Duckworth; 1st edn 1977).Dillon, J. (1999) ‘A Case Study in Commentary’, in Most 1999a: 206-22.Dillon, J. (2002a) ‘Theophrastus’ Critique of the Old Academy in the Metaphysics’,

in W.W. Fortenbaugh and G. Wöhrle (eds) On the Opuscula of Theophrastus(Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag) 175-87.

Dillon, J. (2002b) ‘The Platonic Philosopher at Prayer’, in T. Kobusch and M. Erler(eds) Metaphysik und Religion: Zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens(München and Leipzig: K.G. Saur) 279-96.

Dillon, J. (2005) ‘Philosophy as a Profession in Late Antiquity’, in Smith 2005:1-17.

Dodds, E.R. (1923) Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism, translation withintroduction (London: SPCK).

Dodds, E.R. (1928) ‘The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic“One”’, Classical Quarterly 22.3/4: 129-42.

Dodds, E.R. (1960) ‘Numenius and Ammonius’, in Les Sources de Plotin (EntretiensFondation Hardt 5; Vandoeuvres-Genève) 3-32; 33-60.

Dodds, E.R. (1963) Proclus: Elements of Theology, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Dodds, E.R. (1970) Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects of

Religious Experience From Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (New York: W.W.Norton; first published with Cambridge University Press 1965)

Dorandi, T. (1991) ‘Den Antiken Autoren über die Schulter geschaut: Arbeitsweiseund Autographie bei den antiken Schriftstellern’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologieund Epigrafik 87: 11-33.

Dörrie, H. (1974) ‘Zur Methode antiker Exegese’, Zeitschrift für die Neutestamen-tliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der ältern Kirche 65: 121-38.

Dzielska, M. (2001) Hypatia of Alexandria (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress; 1st edn 1995).

Ebbesen, S. (1981) Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s SophisticiElenchi: a Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Falla-cies, 3 vols (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Eden, K. (1997) Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition (New Haven andLondon: Yale University Press).

Edwards, M. (2006) Culture and Philosophy in the Age of Plotinus (London:Duckworth).

Evrard, E. (1953) ‘Les convictions religieuses de Jean Philopon et la date de soncommentaire aux “Metéorologiques”’, Bulletin de l’académie royale de Belgique,classe des letters 5: 299-357.

Falcon, A. (2005) ‘Commentators on Aristotle’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) TheStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online encyclopedia available athttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/aristotle-commentators/

Favaro, A. (1886) ‘La Libreria di Galileo Galilei’, Bulletino di Bibliografia e Storiadelle Scienze Matematiche e Fisiche 19: 219-93.

Fazzo, S. (1999) ‘Philology and Philosophy in the Margin of Early Printed Editionsof the Ancient Greek Commentators on Aristotle, with Special Reference to

Bibliography

263

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/aristotle-commentators/

Copies Held in the Biblioteca Nazionale Braidense, Milan’, in C. Blackwell andS. Kusukawa (eds) Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries:Conversations with Aristotle (Aldershot: Ashgate) 48-75.

Fazzo, S. (2004) ‘Aristotelianism as a Commentary Tradition’, in Adamson, Bal-tussen and Stone (eds) 2004: 1.1-19.

Ferrari, G.R.F. (1984) ‘Orality and Literacy in the Origin of Philosophy (Discussionof K. Robb 1983)’, Ancient Philosophy 4: 195-205.

Festugière, A.J. (1948) ‘Un vers méconnu des Oracles Chaldaeïques dans Sim-plicius. In de Caelo II.1, 284a14 (375.9 ss. Heiberg)’, Symbolae Osloenses 26:75-7.

Festugière, A.J. (1959) Antioche païenne et chrétienne. Libanius, Chrysostome, etles moines de Syrie (Paris).

Festugière, A.J. (1963) ‘Modes de composition des commentaries de Proclus’,Museum Helveticum 20: 77-100.

Finamore, J. and Dillon, J. (2002) Iamblichus De anima (Leiden: E.J. Brill).Finkelberg, A. (1986) ‘The Cosmology of Parmenides’, American Journal of Philo-

logy 107.3: 303-17.Finocchiaro, M.A. (1997) Galileo on the World Systems: a New Abridged Transla-

tion and Guide (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of CaliforniaPress).

Fitzgerald, A. (1926) The Letters of Synesius of Cyrene (London: Oxford UniversityPress, H. Milford).

Fontenrose, J. (1978) The Delphic Oracle: its Responses and Operations – with aCatalogue of Responses (Los Angeles and London: University of CaliforniaPress).

Ford, A. (1994) ‘Protagoras’ Head: Interpreting Philosophic Fragments inTheaetetus’, American Journal of Philology 115: 199-218.

Forster, E.S. (1945) ‘Riddles and Problems from the Greek Anthology’, Greece &Rome 14: 42-7.

Fortenbaugh, W.W. (1984) Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts (Amsterdam: B.R.Grüner).

Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Gutas, D. (1991) Theophrastus: His Psychological, Doxo-graphical, and Scientific Writings (New Brunswick and London: TransactionPublishers).

Fortenbaugh, W.W. (2002) ‘Eudemus’ Work On Expression’, in Fortenbaugh andBodnár (eds) 2002: 59-83.

Fortenbaugh, W.W. and Bodnár, I. (eds) (2002) Eudemus of Rhodes (New Bruns-wick and London: Transaction Publishers).

Fotinis, A.P. (1979) The De anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias: a Translation andCommentary (Washington, DC: University Press of America).

Foulkes, P. (1992) ‘Where was Simplicius?’ Journal of Hellenic Studies 112: 143.Fowden, G. (1982) ‘The Pagan Holy Man in Late Antique Society’, Journal of

Hellenic Studies 102: 33-59.Frantz, A. (1988) The Athenian Agora: Late Antiquity, A.D. 267-700, American

School of Classical Studies at Athens, vol. 24 (Princeton, NJ: The AmericanSchool of Classical Studies at Athens).

Frede, D. (1997) ‘Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit: von Platon zu Plotin’, in G.Sellin and F. Vouga (eds) Logos und Buchstabe, Mündlichkeit undSchriftlichkeit im Judentum und Christentum der Antike (Tübingen) 33-54.

Frede, D. (2003) ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Stanford

Bibliography

264

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online encyclopedia available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/alexander-aphrodisias/

Frede, M. (1987) ‘Numenius’, in W. Haase (ed.) Aufstieg und Niedergang derRömischen Welt (Berlin: De Gruyter) II 36.2, 1034-75.

Frede, M. (1999a) ‘Monotheism and Pagan Philosophy in Later Antiquity’, in P.Athanassiadi and M. Frede (eds) 1999: 41-67.

Frede, M. (1999b) ‘Epilogue’, in Algra et al. (eds) The Cambridge History ofHellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 771-97.

Frede, M. (2006) ‘The Early Christian Reception of Socrates’, in L. Judson and V.Karasmanis (eds) Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press) ch. 12 [cf. Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.08.41]

French, R. and F. Greenaway (eds) (1986) Science in the Early Roman Empire:Pliny the Elder, his Sources and Influence (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books).

Frohn, W. (1980) The Sources of Alexander of Aphrodisias for the Presocratics (PhDthesis, Laval University).

Furley, D. (1987) The Greek Cosmologists, vol. 1: The Formation of the AtomicTheory and its Earliest Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Furley, D. and Wildberg, C. (1991) Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void withSimplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World, Ancient Commen-tators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Gaiser, A. (1972) Plotinus and the Stoics: a Preliminary Study (Leiden: E.J. Brill).Gallop, D. (1984) Parmenides of Elea: Fragments, text, translation and introduc-

tion (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press).Gannagé, E. (1998) ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise In de generatione et corruptione apud

Gabir b. Hayyan, K. al-Tasrif’, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione FilosoficaMedievale IX: 35-86.

Gatti, M.L. (1996) ‘Plotinus: the Platonic Tradition and the Foundation of Neo-platonism’ in Gerson 1996: 10-37.

Gavray, M.-A. (2007) Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste: contribution à l’étude del’exégèse néoplatonicienne, Études et Commentaires, 108 (Paris: Klincksieck).[non vidi]

Geerlings, W. and Schulz, C. (eds) (2002) Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittel-alter: Beiträge zu seiner Erforschung (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Geffcken, J. (1932) ‘Zur Entstehung und zum Wesen des Griechischen Wissen-schaftlichen Kommentars’, Hermes 67: 397-412.

Gersh, S.E. (1973) Kinesis akinetos: a Study in Spiritual Motion in the Philosophyof Proclus (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Gersh, S.E. (1978) From Iamblichus to Eriugena: an Investigation of the Prehistoryand Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Gersh, S.E. (1986) Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: the Latin Tradition, 2 vols(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press).

Gersh, S.E. (2005) Reading Plato, Tracing Plato: from Ancient Commentary toMedieval Reception (Burlington, VT: Ashgate).

Gerson, L.P. (1995) Review of ACA translation volumes (Alexander, Simplicius,Philoponus), in Philosophical Quarterly 45.1: 260-4.

Gerson, L.P. (ed) (1996) Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press).

Gerson, L.P. (1997) ‘Epistrophê pros heauton: History and Meaning’, Documenti eStudi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale VII: 1-32.

Gerson, L.P. (2005a) ‘What is Platonism?’ Journal of the History of Philosophy43.3: 253-76.

Bibliography

265

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/alexander-aphrodisias/

Gerson, L.P. (2005b) Aristotle and Other Platonists (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress).

Gerson, L.P. (2006) ‘Festschrift [Peter] Brown’, review of A. Smith 2005, inClassical Review 56.1: 191-3.

Gibson, R.K. and Shuttleworth Kraus, C. (eds) (2002) The Classical Commentary:Histories, Practices, Theory (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Gibson, R.K. (2002) ‘ “Cf. E.g.,”: A Typology of “Parallels” and the Function ofCommentaries on Latin Poetry’, in Gibson and Shuttleworth Kraus 2002:331-57.

Gill, C. and McCabe, M.M. (eds) (1996) Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford).Goldin, O. (2001) Review of John A. Palmer, Plato’s Reception of Parmenides

(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999), in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2001.02.05.Golitsis, P. (2007) ‘Nicéphore Blemmyde Lecteur du Commentaire de Simplicius à

la Physique d’Aristote’, in D’Ancona 2007: 242-56.Gottschalk, H.B. (1985) ‘Prolegomena to an Edition of Theophrastus’ Fragments’,

in J. Wiesner (ed.) Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet,Erster Band, ‘Aristoteles und seine Schule’ (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter)543-56.

Gottschalk, H.B. (1987) ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World’, in W. Haase(ed.) Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (Berlin: De Gruyter) II 36.2,1079-174.

Gottschalk, H.B. (1990) ‘The Earliest Aristotelian Commentators’, in Sorabji 1990:55-81.

Gottschalk, H.B. (1998) Review of Mansfeld 1994, in Journal of Hellenic Studies118: 233-4.

Gottschalk, H.B. (2002) ‘Eudemus and the Peripatos’, in Fortenbaugh and Bodnár2002: 25-37.

Goulet, R. (2007) ‘La conservation et la transmission des textes philosophiquesgrecs’, in D’Ancona 2007: 29-61.

Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. (ed.) (2000) Le commentaire, entre tradition et innovation,Actes du colloque international de l’Institut des traditions textuelles, Paris etVillejuif, 22-25 septembre 1999; avec Tiziano Dorandi [et al.] (Paris: Vrin).

Graeser, A. (1972) Plotinus and the Stoics: a Preliminary Study (Leiden: E.J. Brill).Grafton, A. (1985) ‘Renaissance Readers and Ancient Texts: Comments on Some

Commentaries’, Renaissance Quarterly 38.4: 615-49.Grafton, A. (1997) The Footnote: a Curious History (London: Faber & Faber).Grafton, A. and Williams, M. (2006) Christianity and the Transformation of the

Book: Origen, Eusebius and the Library of Caesarea (Cambridge, Mass. andLondon: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).

Graham, D.W. (2006) Review of Sider 2005, in Aestimatio 3: 166-9.Grant, R.M. (1957) The Letter and the Spirit (London: SPCK) ‘Appendix: Exegeti-

cal Terminology’.Grant, E. (2004) Science and Religion, 400 B.C.E. to A.D. 1550: From Aristotle to

Copernicus (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).Gregory, T. (1988) ‘The Platonic Inheritance’, in P.D. Dronke (ed.) History of

Twelfth Century Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)54-80.

Gregory, T.E. (1995) Review of Hällström in Castrén 1994, in American Journalof Archaeology 99.3: 547-9.

Gregory, A. (2003a) ‘Eudoxus, Callipus and the Astronomy of the Timaeus’, inSharples and Sheppard 2003: 5-28.

Bibliography

266

Gregory, A. (2003b) ‘Aristotle and some of his Commentators on the TimaeusReceptacle’, Sharples and Sheppard 2003: 29-47.

Grignaschi, J. (1966) ‘La Littérature Sassanide: Le Karnamag d’Anusirwan’,Journal Asiatique 254: 16-45 [diary(?) of Kushro Anusirwan].

Grondin, J. (1994) Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated by J.Weinsheimer (New Haven: Yale University Press).

Guerlac, H. (1978) ‘Amicus Plato and Other Friends’, Journal of the History ofIdeas 39.2: 627-33.

Gustafsson, B. (1961) ‘Eusebius’ Principles in Handling his Sources, as Found inhis Church History, Books I-VII’, Studia Patristica IV: 429-41.

Gutas, D. (1998) Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: the Graeco-Arabic TranslationMovement in Baghdad and Early ‘Abbasid Society (2nd-4th/8th-10th Centu-ries) (London: Routledge).

Gutas, D. (1999) ‘The “Alexandria to Bagdad” Complex of Narratives: a Contribu-tion to the Study of Philosophical and Medical Historiography among theArabs’, Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale X: 155-93.

Haas, C. (1997) Alexandria in Late Antiquity: Topography and Social Conflict(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press).

Haas, F.J.A. de (1998) ‘Philoponus on Theophrastus on Composition in Nature’, inJ. Van Ophuijsen and M. Van Raalte (eds) Theophrastus: Reappraising theSources (New Brunswick: Transaction Books) 171-89.

Haas, F.J.A. de (2001a) ‘Did Plotinus and Porphyry Disagree on Aristotle’s Cate-gories?’ Phronesis 46.4: 492-526.

Haas, F.J.A. de (2001b) (with Barrie Fleet) Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 5-6,Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Hadot, I. (1978) Le problème du néoplatonisme Alexandrin: Hiéroclès et Simplicius(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter).

Hadot, I. (1987a) Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie (Berlin and New York:De Gruyter).

Hadot, I. (1987b) ‘Recherches sur les fragments du commentaire de Simplicius surla Métaphysique d’Aristote’, in Hadot 1987a: 225-45.

Hadot, I. (1990a) Simplicius. Commentarie sur les Catégories, traduction commen-tée, fasc. 1: introduction, première partie (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Hadot, I. (1990b) ‘The Life and Works of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic Sources’,in Sorabji 1990: 275-303.

Hadot, I. (1996) Commentaire sur le Manuel d’Epictète, introduction et éditioncritique du texte grec, Philosophia Antiqua, vol. 66 (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Hadot, I. (1997) ‘Le commentaire philosophique continu dans l’Antiquite’, Anti-quité Tardive 5: 169-76.

Hadot, I. (2001) Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote, Chapître1 (Leiden : E.J. Brill).

Hadot, I. (2002a) ‘Der fortlaufende Philosophische Kommentar’, in Geerlings andSchulz 2002: 184-99.

Hadot, I. (2002b) ‘Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary onAristotle’s De Anima (CAG XI): a Methodological Study’, Mnemosyne 50.2: 159-99.

Hadot, I. (2003) ‘Der philosophische Unterrichtsbetrieb in der romischen Kaiser-zeit’, Rheinisches Museum 146.1: 49-71.

Hadot, I. (2004) ‘Simplicius, in Cat., p. 1,3-3,17 Kalbfleisch: an Important Contri-bution to the History of the Ancient Commentary’, Rheinisches Museum147.3-4: 408-20.

Hadot, P. (1974) ‘L’harmonie des philosophes de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Por-

Bibliography

267

phyre dans le Commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories’, Plotino e il Neo-platonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Quaderni N. 198, Roma: AccademiaNazionale dei Lincei).

Hadot, P. (2004) Apprendre à philosopher dans l’Antiquité: l’enseignement du‘Manuel’ d’Epictète et son commentaire néoplatonicien (Paris: Livre de Poche).

Hager, F.P. (1983) ‘Zur Geschichte, Problematik, und Bedeutung des Begriffes“Neuplatonismus”’, Diotima 11: 98-110.

Hall, J.J. (1971) ‘ “Planets” in Simplicius De Caelo 471,1 ff.’, Journal of HellenicStudies 91: 138-9.

Hällström, G. (1994) ‘The Closing of the Neoplatonic School in A.D. 529: AnAdditional Aspect’, in Paavo Castrén (ed.) Post-Herulian Athens: Aspects of Lifeand Culture in Athens A.D. 267-529 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute at Athens)141-65.

Hankey, W. (1998) Review of Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Physics 5, translated byJ.O. Urmson, notes by Peter Lautner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press1997), in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 98.3.19.

Hankinson, R.J. (1991) Galen on Antecedent Causes, introduction, translation,commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Hankinson, R.J. (1998) Galen: On the Therapeutic Method, introduction, transla-tion, commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Hankinson, R.J. (2002a) Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.1-4, AncientCommentators on Aristotle (Duckworth: London).

Hankinson, R.J. (2002b) (review article) ‘Doctoring History: Ancient MedicalHistoriography and Diocles of Carystus’, Apeiron 25.1: 61-86.

Hankinson, R.J. (2002-3) ‘Xenarchus, Alexander, and Simplicius on Simple Mo-tions, Bodies and Magnitudes’, BICS 46: 21-42.

Hankinson, R.J. (2003) Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.5-9, AncientCommentators on Aristotle (Duckworth: London).

Hankinson, R.J. (2004) Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10-12, AncientCommentators on Aristotle (Duckworth: London).

Häring, N.M. (1982) ‘Commentary and Hermeneutics’, in R.L. Benson and G.Constable (eds) Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press) 173-200.

Harris, W.V. (1989) Ancient Literacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Havelock, E.A. (1982) ‘Preliteracy and the Presocratics’, in E.A. Havelock, The

Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences (Princeton: Prince-ton University Press) 220-60 [= BICS 13 (1966) 44-67].

Hazlett, I. (1991) Early Christianity: Origins and Evolution to AD 600. In Honourof W.H.C. Frend (Nashville: Abingdon) esp. chs 12-13, 20.

Heinen, H. (1991) ‘Alexandria in Late Antiquity’, in The Coptic Encyclopedia, vol.1: 95-103.

Helmbold, W.C. and O’Neil, E.N. (1959) Plutarch’s Quotations (Oxford: ClarendonPress).

Henderson, J.B. (1991) Scripture, Canon and Commentary (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press).

Henry, P. (1960) ‘Une comparaison chez Aristote, Alexandre and Plotin’, in LesSources de Plotin (Entretiens Fondation Hardt 5; Vandoeuvres-Genève) 429-49.

Higbie, C. (1999) ‘Craterus and the Use of Inscriptions in Ancient Scholarship’,Transactions of the American Philological Association 129: 43-83.

Hoffmann, P. (1987a) ‘Aspects de la polémique de Simplicius contre Philopon’, inHadot 1987: 183-221.

Bibliography

268

Hoffmann, P. (1987b) ‘Simplicius’ Polemics’, in R. Sorabji (ed.) Philoponus and theRejection of Aristotelian Science (London: Duckworth) 57-83.

Hoffmann, P. (2000) ‘Les catégories aristotéliciennes pote et pou d’après le com-mentaire de Simplicius. Méthode d’exégèse et aspects doctrinaux’ in M.-O.Goulet-Cazé (ed.) Le commentaire entre tradition et innovation (Paris: LibrairiePhilosophique J. Vrin) 355-76.

Hoffmann, P. (2001), see Luna 2001.Hoffmann, P. (2006) ‘What was Commentary in Late Antiquity? The Example of

the Neoplatonic Commentators’, in M.L. Gill and P. Pellegrin (eds) A Compan-ion to Ancient Philosophy (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, Malden, MA;Oxford: Blackwell) 597-622.

Hoffmann, P. (2007) ‘Les bibliothèques philosophiques d’après le témoignage de lalittérature néoplatonicienne des Ve et VIe siècles’, in D’Ancona 2007: 135-53.

Holub, Robert C. (1984) Reception Theory: a Critical Introduction (London andNew York: Methuen).

Humphreys, S.C. (1997) ‘From Riddle to Rigour: Satisfactions of Scientific Prose inAncient Greece’, in S. Marchand and E. Lunbeck (eds) Proof and Persuasion: Essayson Authority, Objectivity and Evidence (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Hussey, E. (1999) ‘The Enigmas of Derveni’, review of Laks and Most 1997, inOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17: 303-24.

Inowlocki, S. (2006) Eusebius and the Jewish authors: His Citation Technique inan Apologetic Context (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill).

Inwood, B. (2002) The Poem of Empedocles, with Greek text, facing Englishtranslation and introduction (Toronto, ON; University of Toronto Press; 1st edn1992).

Jackson, H.J. (2001) Marginalia: Readers Writing in Books (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press).

Janko, R. (2002-3) ‘God, Science, and Socrates’, BICS 46: 1-18.Janko, R. (2005) ‘Empedocles’ Physica Book I : a New Reconstruction’, in A. Pierris

(ed.) The Empedoclean Kosmos, Proceedings of the Symposium Tertium Philo-sophiae Antiquae Myconense 2003 (Patras: Inst. for Philosophical Research)93-135.

Janko, R. (2006) Review of Theokritos Kouremenos, George M. Parássoglou,Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou, The Derveni Papyrus: Edited with Introduction andCommentary (Florence: Casa Editrice Leo S. Olschki, 2006), in Bryn MawrClassical Review 2006.10.29.

Johnson, S. (2006) Everything Bad is Good for You: How Today’s Popular Cultureis Actually Making Us Smarter (New York: Riverhead Trade).

Jones, A. (1999) ‘Uses and Users of Astronomical Commentaries in Antiquity’, inMost 1999a: 147-72.

Jong, F.L. (2004) Ancient Rhetoric and Paul’s Apology: the Compositional Unity of2 Corinthians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). [non vidi]

Kahn, C. (1994). Anaximander and Early Greek Cosmology (Indianapolis: HackettPublishing Company Inc.; 1st edn Columbia University Press 1960).

Kahn, C. (2003) ‘Writing Philosophy’, in Yunis 2003: 139-61.Karamanolis, G. (2004) ‘Porphyry: the First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle’,

in Adamson, Baltussen and Stone: 1.97-120.Karamanolis, G. (2006) Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle’s

Philosophy from Antiochus to Porphyry (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Katz, J. (1954) ‘Plotinus and the Gnostics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 15.2:

289-98.

Bibliography

269

Kerferd, G. (1991) ‘Aristotle’s Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides’, in H.Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds) Aristotle and the Later Tradition (OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy suppl. vol.) 1-7.

Kingsley, P. (1994) ‘Empedocles and his Interpreters: the Four-Element Doxo-graphy’, Phronesis 39.3: 235-54.

Kingsley, P. (1995) Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and thePythagorean Tradition (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford Uni-versity Press).

Kohlschitter, S. (1990) ‘Parmenides and Empedocles in Porphyry’s History ofPhilosophy’, Hermathena 150: 43-53.

Kragh, H. (2004) Matter and Spirit in the Universe: Scientific and ReligiousPreludes to Modern Cosmology (London: Imperial College Press).

Kristeller, P.O. (1943) The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, English translation byV.Conant (New York: Columbia University Press).

Kupreeva, I. (2003) ‘Qualities and Bodies: Alexander Against the Stoics’, OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy XXV: 297-344.

Labriolle, P. de (1948) La réaction païenne: étude sur la polémique antichrétiennedu Ier au VIe siècle (Paris: Artisan du livre; 1st edn 1934).

Lafrance, Y. (2001) (review) ‘Commentaire et Herméneutique’, Apeiron XXIV (4):349-60.

Laks, A. (1981) Diogène d’Apollonie: la dernière cosmologie présocratique, édition,traduction, et commentaire des fragments et des témoignages (Lille: PressesUniversitaires de Lille; 2nd revised and expanded edn, Sankt-Augustin: Acade-mia-Verlag, 2008).

Laks, A. (1997) ‘Du témoignage comme fragment’, in G.W. Most (ed.) CollectingFragments – Fragmente Sammeln (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Rupprecht)237-72. [= ‘Le témoignage comme fragment’, in id., Histoire, Doxographie,Vérité. Etudes sur Aristote, Théophraste, et la philosophie présocratique (Lou-vain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 2007), pp. 27-55.]

Laks, A. and Most, G.W. (eds) (1997) Studies on the Derveni Papyrus (Oxford:Oxford University Press).

Lamberton, R. (1986) Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading andthe Growth of the Epic Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Lamberton, R. and Keaney, J.J. (eds) 1992) Homer’s Ancient Readers: the Herme-neutics of Greek Epic’s Earliest Readers (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Lamberz, E. (1987) ‘Proklos und die Form des philosophischen Kommentars’, in J.Pépin and H.D. Saffrey (eds) Proclus: lecteur et interprète des anciens (Paris:CNRS) 1-20.

Lameer, J. (1997) ‘From Alexandria to Bagdad: Reflections on the Genesis of aProblematical Tradition’, in G. Endress and R. Kruk (eds) The Ancient Tradi-tions in Christian and Islamic Hellenism: Studies on the Transmission of GreekPhilosophy and Sciences dedicated to H.J. Drossart Lulofs on his NinetiethBirthday (Leiden: CNWS) 181-91.

Lane Fox, R. (1986) Pagans and Christians (London: Penguin).Lane Fox, R. (2005a) ‘Movers and Shakers’, in Smith 2005: 19-50.Lane Fox, R. (2005b) ‘Harran, the Sabians and the Late Platonist “Movers”’, in

Smith 2005: 231-44.Lang, H. (2005) ‘Perpetuity, Eternity and Time in Proclus’ Cosmos’, Phronesis 50.2:

150-69.Lautner, P. (2000) ‘Iamblichus’ Transformation of the Aristotelian “katharsis”, its

Middle-Platonic Antecedents and Proclus’ and Simplicius’ Response to it’, Acta

Bibliography

270

Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae (AantHung), Budapest 40.1/4:263-82.

Lee, A.D. (2000) Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity: a Sourcebook (London:Routledge).

Lloyd, A.C. (1967) ‘Simplicius’, in P. Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol. 7 (New York) 448-9.

Long, A.A. (1974) Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (London:Duckworth).

Long, A.A. (1992) ‘Stoics Readings of Homer’, in R. Lamberton and J.J. Keaney(eds) Homer’s Ancient Readers (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 41-66.

Lord, C. (1987) ‘On the Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus’, AmericanJournal of Philology 107.2: 137-61.

Louth, A. (1989) ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius: The History of the Church From Christto Constantine, translated by G.A. Williamson 1969, re-edited with introductionby A. Louth (London: Penguin).

Luna, C. (2001a) Simplicius. Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristote, Chapîtres2-4, traduction par Philippe Hoffmann, avec la collaboration de I. Hadot et P.Hadot; commentaire par Concetta Luna (Paris: Les Belles Lettres).

Luna, C. (2001b) Trois études sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à laMétaphysique d’Aristote (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Luna, C. (2001c) Review of Thiel 1999, in Mnemosyne 54.4: 482-504.MacCoull, L.S.B. (1995) ‘A New Look at the Career of John Philoponus’, Journal

of Early Christian Studies 3.1: 47-60.MacKenzie (now McCabe), M.M. (1982) ‘Paradox in Plato’s Phaedrus’, Proceedings

of the Cambridge Philological Society, n.s. 28: 64-76.Mansfeld, J. (1979 and 1980) ‘The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian Period and

the Date of his Trial’, Pt. I Mnemosyne 32: 39-60; Pt. II, Mnemosyne 33: 17-95.Mansfeld, J. (1986) ‘Aristotle, Plato, and the Pre-Platonic Doxography and

Chronography’, in E. Cambiano (ed.) Storiografia e dossografia (Torino) 1-59.Mansfeld, J. (1987) ‘Theophrastus and the Xenophanes Doxography’, Mnemosyne

40: 286-313 [= Mansfeld 1990a: 147-73].Mansfeld, J. (1989) ‘Gibt es Spuren von Theophrasts Phys. Op. bei Cicero’, RUSCH

IV, 133-58 [= Mansfeld 1990a: 238-63].Mansfeld, J. (1990a) Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy (Assen and

Maastricht: Van Gorcum).Mansfeld, J. (1990b) ‘Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita’,

Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (Berlin: De Gruyter) II 36.4:3056-3229.

Mansfeld, J. (1991) ‘Two Attributions’, Classical Quarterly 42.1: 541-4.Mansfeld, J. (1992) Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for

Greek Philosophy (Leiden, Köln and New York: E.J. Brill).Mansfeld, J. (1993) Review of Tardieu 1990, Mnemosyne 46: 572-5.Mansfeld, J. (1994) Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an

Author, or a Text (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill).Mansfeld, J. (1996) ‘Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Théophraste’,

Phronesis 41.2: 158-88.Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D.T. (1997) Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context

of a Doxographer, vol. I: The Sources (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill).Mansfeld, J. (1998) ‘Doxographical Studies, Quellenforschung, Tabular Presenta-

tion and Other Varieties of Comparativism’, in W. Burkert, L.G. Marciano, E.

Bibliography

271

Matelli and L. Orelli (eds) Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte derAntike. Aporemata 3 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Rupprecht) 16-40.

Mansfeld, J. (1999a) Prolegomena Mathematica from Apollodorus of Perga to theLate Neoplatonists, with an Appendix on Pappus and the History of Platonism(Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Mansfeld, J. (1999b) ‘Doxographi Graeci’, in W.M. Calder and J. Mansfeld (eds)Hermann Diels (1848-1922) et la Science de l’Antiquité (Entretiens FondationHardt 45, Huit exposés � 17-21 août; Vandoeuvres-Genève) 143-64.

Mansfeld, J. (2005) ‘Doxography’, Stanford Online Encyclopedia available athttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxography-ancient/

Manuwald, B. (1971) Das Buch H der aristotelischen Physik: eine Untersuchungzur Einheit und Echtheit (Meisenheim am Glan).

Markus, R.A. (1990) The End of Ancient Christianity (Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press).

Marmodoro, A. (2003) Review of M. Bonelli, Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisicacome scienza dimostrativa (Napoli: Bibliopolis 2001), in Bryn Mawr ClassicalReview 2003.07.24.

Marrou, I.R. (1963) ‘Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Platonism’, inMomigliano 1963a: 126-50.

Marrou, I.R. (1982) A History of Education in Antiquity (Madison and London:University of Wisconsin Press; 1956 repr. of the first edn, Paris 1948).

Martin, A. and Primavesi, O. (1999) L’Empédocle de Strasbourg (P. Strasb. gr. Inv.1665-1666), introduction, texte et commentaire (Berlin: De Gruyter).

Martindale, J. (1992) The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, vol. IIIa(Cambridge) 303-6.

McCarty, W. (2002) ‘A Network with a Thousand Entrances: Commentary in anElectronic Age?’ in Gibson and Shuttleworth Kraus 2002: 359-403.

McDiarmid, J.B. (1953) ‘Theophrastus on the Presocratic Causes’, Harvard Stud-ies in Classical Philology 61: 85-156.

McKirahan, R. (2000) Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 8.6-10, Ancient Commen-tators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

MacMullen, R. (1997) Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

Martini, E. (1909) ‘Eudemos (11)’, RE VI, cols 895-901.McLeod, W.E. (1961) ‘Oral Bards at Delphi’, Transactions of the American Phi-

lological Association 92: 317-25.Minio-Paluello, L. (1957) ‘A Latin Commentary (?Translated by Boethius) on the

Prior Analytics, and its Greek Source’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 77.1: 93-102.Momigliano, A. (1963a) (ed.) The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in

the Fourth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Momigliano, A. (1963b) ‘Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire’, in

Momigliano 1963a: 1-16.Moraux, P. (1942) Alexandre d’Aphrodise: exégète de la noétique d’Aristote (Paris:

E. Droz).Moraux, P. (1969) ‘Eine Korrektur des Mittelplatonikers Eudoros zum Text der

Metaphysik des Aristoteles’, in R. Stiehl and H.E. Stier (eds) Beiträge zur AltenGeschichte und deren Nachleben. Festschrift für Franz Altheim zum 6.10.1968,Erster Band (Berlin: De Gruyter) 492-504.

Moraux, P. (1973) Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I (Berlin and New York: DeGruyter).

Bibliography

272

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxography-ancient/

Moraux, P. (1974) ‘La critique d’authenticité chez les commentateurs grecs d’Aris-tote’, in Mélanges Mansel (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi) 265-88.

Moraux, P. (1985) ‘Porphyre, Commentateur de la Physique d’Aristote’, in Aris-totelica: Mélanges offerts à Marcel de Corte (Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia) 225-39.

Moraux, P. (2001) Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen III. Von Andronikos bisAlexander von Aphrodisias. Dritter Band: Alexander von Aphrodisias (PartsI-IV by P. Moraux; Part V by R.W. Sharples.) ed. J. Wiesner (Berlin: DeGruyter).

Most, G. (ed.) (1999a) Commentaries – Kommentare, Aporematea 4 (Göttingen:Vandenhoeck and Rupprecht).

Most, G. (1999b) ‘The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy’, in A.A. Long (ed.) TheCambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press) 332-62.

Most, G. (2005) ‘More on Commentaries’, review of M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (ed.) LeCommentaire entre tradition et innovation (Paris 1999), in Classical Review55.1: 169-71.

Müller, C.W. (1969) ‘Die neuplatonischen Aristoteles kommentatoren über dieUrsachen der Pseudepigraphie’, Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 112: 120-6.

Nagy, G. (1990) Pindar’s Homer (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Univer-sity Press).

Nehamas, A. (1990) ‘Eristic, antilogic, sophistic, dialectic: Plato’s demarcation ofphilosophy from sophistry’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 7: 3-16.

Netz, R. (2000) ‘Insight by Oversight’, review of Mansfeld 1999, in Apeiron XXXIII(2): 171-9.

Nutton, V. (2004) Ancient Medicine (London: Routledge).O’Brien, D. (1965) ‘Emped. Fr. 35.14-15’, Classical Review XV.1: 1-4.O’Brien, D. (1969) Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press).O’Meara, D.J. (ed.) (1982) Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Norfolk, VA:

International Society for Neoplatonic Studies).O’Meara, D.J. (1989) Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in Late

Antiquity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press).O’Meara, D.J. (2004) ‘Simplicius on the Place of the Philosopher in the City (in

Epict. Chap. 32)’, Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 57: 89-98.O’Meara, D.J. (2006) ‘Patterns of Perfection in Damascius’ Life of Isidore’, Phrone-

sis 51.1: 74-90.Obbink, D. (2003) ‘Allegory and Exegesis in the Derveni Papyrus: the Origin of

Greek Scholarship’, in G.R. Boys-Stones (ed.) Metaphor, Allegory, and theClassical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press) 177-88.

Ong, W.J. (1982) Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word (London andNew York: Methuen).

Ong, W.J. (1988) Orality and Literacy (London and New York; 1st edn 1982).Ophuijsen, J. van and Raalte, Marlein van (eds) (1998) Theophrastus: Reapprais-

ing the Sources (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).Ophuijsen, J. van (2001) Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle Topics 1, introduc-

tion, translation and notes (London: Duckworth).Osborne, C. (1987a) Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and

the Presocratics (London: Duckworth).Osborne, C. (1987b) ‘Empedocles Recycled’, Classical Quarterly ns 37: 24-50.Osborne, C. (2000) ‘Rummaging in the Recycling Bins of Upper Egypt: a Discussion

Bibliography

273

of A. Martin and O. Primavesi, L’ Empédocle de Strasbourg’, Oxford Studies inAncient Philosophy 18: 329-56.

Owen, G.E.L. (1983) ‘Philosophical Invective’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philo-sophy 1: 1-25.

Patzia, M. (2007) ‘Anaxagoras’ in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (online)http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/anaxagor.htm

Pearson, C.W. (1999) Scripture as Cosmology: Natural Philosophical Debate inJohn Philoponus’ Alexandria (PhD Harvard).

Pépin, J. (1966) ‘Porphyre, Exégète d’Homère’, in Porphyre (Entretiens FondationHardt 12; Vandoeuvres-Genève) 229-66.

Pépin, J. (1975) ‘L’hermeneutique ancienne: les mots et les idées’, Poétique 23:291-300.

Pépin, J. (1976) Mythe et allégorie: origines grecques et les contestations judéo-christiennes (Paris: Études Augustiniennes).

Perkams, M. (2003) ‘Doppelte Entelecheia: Das Menschenbild in “Simplikios”’Kommentar zu Aristoteles De anima’, Elenchos 24: 57-91.

Perry, B.M. (1983) Simplicius as a Source for and Interpreter of Parmenides (PhDUniv. of Washington).

Pfeiffer, R. (1970) Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie. I: Von den Anfängen zumEnde des Hellenismus (München: Beck’sche Elementarbücher; translated fromthe English edn Oxford 1968 by M. Arnold).

Post, C. (1998) ‘The Idea(s) of Order of Platonic Dialogues and their HermeneuticConsequences’, Phoenix 52.3-4: 282-98.

Praechter, K. (1929) ‘Simplikios’, Realenzyklopaedie der Antike 3A,1 (2nd series)cols 204-13.

Quandt, K. (1983) ‘a; g>r tîn 1nant8wn e9s8n. Philosophical Program and ExpositoryPractice in Aristotle’, Classical Antiquity ii: 279-98.

Rappe, S. (2000) Reading Neoplatonism: Non-discursive Thinking in the Texts ofPlotinus, Proclus, and Damascius (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Rashed, M. (1997) ‘A “New” Text of Alexander on the Soul’s Motion’, in R. Sorabji(ed.) Aristotle and After, BICS suppl. vol. 68: 181-95.

Rashed, M. (2004) ‘Traces d’un commentaire de Simplicius sur la Métaphysique àByzance’, in Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques 84: 275-84 [re-pub-lished in L’héritage aristotélicien: textes inédits de l’Antiquité (Anagôgê) (Paris:Les Belles Lettres) I-XIV (2007) 381-90].

Rashed. M. (2007) Essentialisme: Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre logique, physique etcosmologie (Berlin: De Gruyter). [non vidi]

Rashed, M. (forthcoming) (2008) Alexandre d’Aphrodise: commentaire perdu à laPhysique d’Aristote (livres IV-VIII) (Berlin: De Gruyter).

Reeve, M.D. (1996) ‘Scholia’, Oxford Classical Dictionary 3rd edn (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press) 1368.

Regenbogen, O. (1940) ‘Theophrastos’, RE Suppl. 7, cols 1354-62.Rescigno, A. (2004) Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario al De Caelo di Aris-

totele, Frammenti del Primo Libro, Supplementi di Lexis, 26 (Amsterdam:Hakkert). [non vidi]

Reynolds, L.D. and Wilson, N.G. (1991) Scribes and Scholars: a Guide to theTransmission of Greek and Latin Literature (3rd edn; 1st edn 1968) 6-15, 31ff.

Reynolds, S. (1996) Medieval Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Rhee, H. (2005) Early Christian Literature: Christ and Culture in the Second and

Third Centuries (London and New York: Routledge).Richard, M. (1950) ‘APO PHÔNÊS’, Byzantion 20: 191-222.

Bibliography

274

http://www.iep.utm.edu/a/anaxagor.htm

Richardson, N.J. (1975) ‘Homeric Professors in the Age of the Sophists’, Proceed-ings of the Cambridge Philological Society 21: 65-81.

Richardson, N.J. (1980) ‘Literary Criticism in the Exegetical Scholia to the Iliad:a Sketch’, Classical Quarterly 30.2: 265-87.

Richardson, N.J. (1990) ‘Aristotle’s Reading of Homer and its Background’, inLamberton and Keaney 1990: 30-40.

Richardson, N.J. (1993) ‘Aristotle and Hellenistic Scholarship’, in F. Montanari(ed.) La Philologie grecque à l’époque hellénistique et romaine (EntretiensFondation Hardt 40; Vandoeuvres-Genève) 7-28 (paper) and 29-38 (discussion).

Ricoeur, P. (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language,Action and Interpretation, edited, translated and with introductiuon by John B.Thompson (Cambridge, London and New York: Cambridge University Press).

Riet, S. van (1991) ‘À propos de la biographie de Simplicius’, Revue Philosophiquede Louvain 89: 506-14.

Rist, J. (1962) ‘The Neoplatonic One and Plato’s Parmenides’, Transactions andProceedings of the American Philological Association 93: 389-401.

Rist, J. (1965) ‘Monism: Plotinus and Some Predecessors’, Harvard Studies inClassical Philology 69: 329-44.

Rist, J. (1966) ‘On Tracking Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Archiv für Geschichte derPhilosophie 48: 82-90.

Rist, J. (1967) Plotinus: the Road to Reality (London and New York: CambridgeUniversity Press).

Robb, K. (ed.) (1983) Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy (La Salle,Illinois: Hegeler Institute).

Rosenberger, V. (2001) Griechische Orakel: eine Kulturgeschichte (Stuttgart: Wis-senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft).

Ross, W.D. (1961) Aristotle’s Physics: a Revised Text with Introduction and Com-mentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press; first edn 1936).

Rouse, M.A. and Rouse, R.H. (1991) Authentic Witnesses (Notre Dame: NotreDame University Press) chs 4-7.

Rubin, Z. (1995) ‘The Reforms of Khusro Anurshiwan’, in A. Cameron (ed.) TheByzantine and Early Islamic Near East, vol. 3 (Princeton: Darwin Press)227-98. [non vidi]

Runia, D.T. (1986) Philo of Alexandria and Plato’s Timaeus (Leiden: E.J. Brill).Runia, D.T. (1989) ‘Cicero on Aristotle and Theophrastus’, in W.W. Fortenbaugh

and P. Steinmetz (eds) Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos (New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers) 23-38.

Runia, D.T. (1999) ‘What is Doxography?’, in P. Van der Eijk (ed.) Ancient Historiesof Medicine: Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in ClassicalAntiquity (Leiden: E.J. Brill) 33-55.

Russo, J. (1997) ‘Prose Genres for the Performance of Traditional Wisdom inAncient Greece: Proverb, Maxim, Apophthegm’, in L. Edmunds and R.W.Wallace (eds) Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece (Baltimore andLondon: Johns Hopkins University Press) 49-64.

Sabra, A.I. (1969) ‘Simplicius’s proof of Euclid’s parallels postulate’, offprint fromJournal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 32. [non vidi]

Saffrey, H. (1984) ‘La Théologie platonicienne de Proclus, fruit de l’exégèse duParménide’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie 116: 1-12.

Saffrey, H. (1992) ‘Accorder entre elles les traditions théologiques: une caractéris-tique du néoplatonism Athénien’, in E.P. Bos and P.A. Mejer (eds) On Proclusand his Influence in Medieval Philosophy (Leiden: E.J. Brill) 35-50.

Bibliography

275

Sambursky, S. (1962) The Physical World of Late Antiquity (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul) ch. VI.

Sanders, K.R. (2002) ‘Much Ado About “Nothing”: mêden and to mê on in Par-menides’, Apeiron 25.2: 87-104.

Sandys, J.E. (1921) A History of Classical Scholarship, vol. 1: From the SixthCentury B.C. to the End of the Middle Ages, 3rd edn (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press).

Schaüblin, C. (1974) Untersuchungen zu Methode und Herkunft der Antiochen-ischen Exegese (Köln and Bonn: Peter Hanstein Verlag).

Schäublin, C. (1977) ‘Homerum ex Homero’, Museum Helveticum 34: 221-7.Schenkeveld, D.M. (1992) ‘Prose Usages of AKOUEIN “To Read”,’ Classical Quar-

terly 42: 129-41.Schippmann, K. (1990) Grundzüge der Geschichte des sasanidischen Reiches

(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft).Schmalzriedt, E. (1970) Peri Physeôs: zur Frühgeschichte der Buchtitel (München:

W. Fink)Schneeweiss, G. (1979) ‘History and Philosophy in Plutarch: Observations on

Plutarch’s Lycurgus’, Bowersock et al. (1979) 376-82.Schofield, M. (1980) An Essay on Anaxagoras (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press).Schofield, M. (2002) ‘Leucippus, Democritus and the ou mallon Principle: An

Examination of Theophrastus Phys. Op. Fr. 8’, Phronesis 47.3: 253-63.Schöbe, U. (1931) Quaestiones Eudemeae. De primo Physicorum libro (Diss. inaug.

Halle).Scholten, C. (2005) ‘Unbeobachtete Zitate und Doxographische Nachrichten in der

Schrift De Aeternitate Mundi des Johannes Philoponos’, Rheinisches Museum148.2: 202-19 (Anaxagoras 209-10).

Schroeder, F.M. (1981) ‘The Analogy of the Active Intellect to Light in the DeAnima of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Hermes 109: 215-25.

Schroeder, F.M. (1982) ‘The Potential or Material Intellect and the Authorship ofthe De intellectu: A reply to B.C. Bazan’, Symbolae Osloenses 57: 115-25.

Schroeder, F.M. (1984) ‘Light and the Active Intellect in Alexander and Plotinus’,Hermes 112: 137-48.

Schroeder, F.M. and Todd, R. (eds) (1990) Two Greek Aristotelian Commentatorson the Intellect (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies).

Schroeder, F.M. (1996) ‘Plotinus and Language’, in Gerson 1996: 336-55.Schubart, W. (1950) ‘Alexandria’, Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum 1:

271-83.Sedley, D.N. (1995), see Bastianini and Sedley.Sedley, D.N. (1997) ‘Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradi-

tion’, in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds) Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotleat Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 110-29.

Sedley, D.N. (1998) Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press).

Sedley, D.N. (2003) ‘Philodemus and the Decentralisation of Philosophy’, CronacheErcolanesi 33: 31-41.

Sedley, D.N. (2005) ‘Empedocles’ Life Cycles’, in A. Pierris (ed.) The EmpedocleanKosmos, Proceedings of the Symposium Tertium Philosophiae Antiquae My-conense 2003 (Patras: Inst. for Philosophical Research) 331-71.

Sezgin, F. (1971) Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums, Band IV: Alchimie –Chemie, Botanik – Agrikultur bis ca. 430 H. (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Bibliography

276

Szlezák, T. (1999) Reading Plato, translated by Graham Zanker (London: Rout-ledge).

Sharples, R.W. (1985) ‘Theophrastus on the Heavens’, in J. Wiesner (ed.) Aris-toteles, Werk und Wirkung, Paul Moraux gewidmet (Berlin: De Gruyter) 577-93.

Sharples, R.W. (1987) ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation’,Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 36.2 (Berlin: De Gruyter)1176-243.

Sharples, R.W. (1990) ‘The School of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, in Sorabji 1990.Sharples, R.W. (1994) Alexander of Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 2.16-3.15, Ancient

Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).Sharples, R.W. (1998) Theophrastus of Eresos: Sources for his Life, Writings,

Thought and Influence. Commentary volume 3.1: Sources on Physics (Texts137-223) (Leiden: E.J. Brill).

Sharples, R.W. and Opsomer, J. (2000) ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu110.4: “I heard this from Aristotle”. A Modest Proposal’, Classical Quarterly50.1: 252-6.

Sharples, R.W. (2002) ‘The Physics of Eudemus of Rhodes’, in Fortenbaugh andBodnár 2002: 107-26.

Sharples, R.W. (2004) Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to On the Soul,Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Sharples, R.W. (2005) ‘Implications of the new Alexander of Aphrodisias inscrip-tion’, BICS 48: 47-56.

Sharples, R.W. forthcoming-1, ‘The Hellenistic Period: What Happened to Hylo-morphism?’ in P. Destrée and G. van Riel (eds) Aristotle: Soul and Mind(Leuven: Leuven University Press).

Sharples, R.W. forthcoming-2, ‘Habent sua fata libelli: Aristotle’s Categories in thefirst century BC’ (paper presented May 2007 at Cambridge University).

Sharples, R.W. and Kapetanaki, S. (eds) (2006) Pseudo-Aristoteles (Pseudo-Alex-ander) Supplementa Problematorum, a new edition of the Greek text withintroduction and annotated translation (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter).

Sharples, R.W. and van der Eijk, P.J. (2008) Nemesius, On the Nature of Man,translation, commentary and notes, Translated Texts for Historians (Liverpool:Liverpool University Press).

Sheppard, A. (1980) Studies on the 5th and 6th Essays of Proclus’ Commentary onthe Republic (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht).

Sheppard, A. (1982) ‘Proclus’ Attitude to Theurgy’, Classical Quarterly 32.1:212-14.

Shields, C. (1990) ‘Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle’, in Sorabji 1990: 349-72.Shields, C. (2003) Classical Philosophy: a Contemporary Introduction (London:

Routledge).Sider, D. (2005) The Fragments of Anaxagoras, introduction, text and commentary,

2nd edn (Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag; 1st edn 1981).Silvestre, M.L. (1989) ‘Simplicius’ Testimony Concerning Anaxagoras’, in K.J.

Boudouris (ed.) Ionian Philosophy (Athens: International Association for GreekPhilosophy and Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture) 369-74.

Siorvanes, L. (1998) Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Sience (Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press).

Skydsgaard, J.E. (1968) Varro the Scholar: Studies in the First Book of Varro’s Dere rustica (Copenhagen: E. Munksgaard).

Slater, W. (1982) ‘Aristophanes of Byzantium and Problem-Solving in the Mu-seum’, Classical Quarterly 32.2: 336-49.

Bibliography

277

Sluiter, I. (1990) Ancient Grammar in Context (PhD, Amsterdam).Sluiter, I. (1995) ‘The Embarrassment of Imperfection: Galen’s Assessment of

Hippocrates’ Linguistic Merits’, Clio Medica 28: 519-53.Sluiter, I. (1999) ‘Commentaries and the Didactic Tradition’, in Most 1999a:

173-205.Sluiter, I. (2000) ‘The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature

and Genre in Antiquity’, in M. Depew and D. Obbink (eds) Matrices of Genre:Authors, Canons and Society (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press)183-203.

Smith, Ole L. (1996) ‘Medieval and Renaissance Commentaries in Greek onClassical Texts’, Classica & Mediaevalia 47: 391-405.

Smith, W.H. (1996) The Hippocratic Tradition (Cornell: Cornell University Press;1st edn 1978).

Smith, A. (1974) Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: a Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism (The Hague: M. Nijhoff).

Smith, A. (2004) Philosophy in Late Antiquity (London: Routledge).Smith, A. (ed.) (2005) The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Essays in

Honour of Peter Brown (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales).Smith, M. (1988) ‘A Hidden Use of Porphyry’s History of Philosophy in Eusenius’

Preparatio Evangelica’, Journal of Theological Studies 39.2: 495-504.Snell, B. (1953) The Discovery of the Mind (New York: Harper; 1st edn 1948) chs

9-10.Solmsen, F. (1965) ‘Love and Strife in Empedocles’ Cosmology’, Phronesis 10:

123-45; repr. in R.E. Allen and D.J. Furley (eds) Studies in Presocratic Philo-sophy (London, 1975) II.221-64.

Solmsen, F. (1981) ‘The Academic and the Alexandrian Editions of Plato’s Works’,Illinois Classical Studies VI.1: 102-11.

Sollenberger, M.G. (1992) ‘The Lives of the Peripatetics: an Analysis of theContents and Structure of Diogenes Laertius’ Vitae philosophorum Book 5’,Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt (Berlin: De Gruyter) II 36.6:3793-879.

Sorabji, R. (1983) Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity andthe Early Middle Ages (London: Duckworth).

Sorabji, R. (1988) Matter, Space and Motion (London: Duckworth).Sorabji, R. (1989) ‘Introduction’, in W. Dooley, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On

Aristotle Metaphysics 1, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duck-worth).

Sorabji, R. (1992) ‘Introduction’, in J.O. Urmson (tr.) Simplicius: Corollaries onPlace and Time, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth) 1-10.

Sorabji, R. (2004) The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: a Sourcebook,3 vols (London: Duckworth).

Sorabji, R. (2005) ‘Divine Names and Sordid Deals in Ammonius’ Alexandria’, inSmith 2005: 203-13.

Sorabji, R. (ed.) (1987) Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (Lon-don: Duckworth).

Sorabji, R. (ed.) (1990) Aristotle Transformed: the Ancient Commentators and theirInfluence (London: Duckworth).

Sorabji, R. (ed.) (1997) Aristotle and After (London: Institute of Classical Studies)BICS suppl. vol. 68.

Spitzer, A.B. (1996) Historical Truth and Lies about the Past (Chapel Hill/London:University of North Carolina Press).

Bibliography

278

Steel, C. and Huby, P. (2002) Priscian: On Theophrastus On Sense Perception with‘Simplicius’: On Aristotle On the Soul 2.5-1, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle(London: Duckworth).

Steel, C. and C. Helmig, (2004) ‘Neue Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (1995-2003). Teil II’, Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 29: 225-4.

Steel, C. and C. Helmig (forthcoming) ‘Simplikios von Kilikia’, Ueberweg-Praechter

Steel, C. (2005) ‘Proclus’ Defence of the Timaeus against Aristotle’s Objections’, inThomas Leinkauf and Carlos Steel (eds) Platons Timaios als Grundtext derKosmologie in Spätantike, Mittelalter und Renaissance (Leuven: Leuven Uni-versity Press, 2005) 163-93. [non vidi]

Steinmetz, P. (1964) Die Physik des Theophrastos (Palingenesia: Stuttgart).Stern, M. (1980) Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, vol. 2: From

Tacitus to Simplicius, edited with introductions, translations and commentary(Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities).

Stevens, A. (1990) Postérité de l’être: Simplicius interprète de Parménide (Brussels:Ousia). [non vidi]

Stierle, K.-H. (1990) ‘Les lieux du commentaire’, in G. Mathieu-Castellani and M.Plaisance (eds) Les commentaires et la naissance de la critique littéraire (Actesdu Colloque Intern. sur le Commentaire, Paris) 19-29, esp. 23ff.

Szlezák, T.A. (1979) Platon and Aristoteles in Plotins Nuslehre (Basel/Stuttgart)135-66.

Szlezák, T.A. (1999) Reading Plato (London: Routledge).Tannéry, P. (1887) Pour l’histoire de la science hellène, ed. A. Diès (Paris: Gauth-

iers-Villard).Tarán, L. (1981) Review of Moraux 1973, in Gnomon 53.8: 721-50.Tarán, L. (1987) ‘The Text of Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics’, in

Hadot 1987a: 246-66.Tardieu, M. (1987) ‘Les calendriers en usage à Harran d’apres les sources arabes et le

commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d’Aristote’, in Hadot 1987a: 40-57.Tardieu, M. (1990) Les paysages reliques: routes et haltes syriennes d’Isidore à

Simplicius (Louvain: Peeters).Tarrant, H. (1983) ‘The Date of Anon. in Theaetetum’, Classical Quarterly 33:

161-87.Tarrant, H. (1996) ‘Orality and Plato’s Narrative Dialogues’, in I. Worthington

(ed.) Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece (Leiden: E.J. Brill)129-47.

Tarrant, H. (2000) Plato’s First Interpreters (London: Duckworth).Tarrant, H. and D. Baltzly (eds) (2006) Reading Plato in Antiquity (Duckworth:

London).Taylor, C.C.W. (1999) Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus: Fragments, text and

translation with commentary (Toronto: Toronto University Press).Thiel, R. von. (1999) Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen

(Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen derGeistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse; Jahrg. 1999, Nr. 8).

Thomas, R. (1992) Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press).

Tieleman, T.L. (1997) ‘The Hunt for Galen’s Shadow: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Deanima 94.7-100 Bruns reconsidered’, in K.A. Algra et al. (eds) Polyhistor:Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to J.Mansfeld (Leiden: E.J. Brill) 256-83.

Bibliography

279

Tieleman, T.L. (1998) ‘Plotinus and the Seat of the Soul: Reverberations of Galenand Alexander in Enn. IV 3 [27], 23’, Phronesis 43: 306-25.

Todd and Schroeder, see Schroeder and ToddTodd, R.B. (1972) ‘Lexicographical Notes on Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Glotta 52:

207-15.Todd, R.B. (1976) Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: a Study of the De

mixtione with preliminary essays, text, translation and commentary (Leiden:E.J. Brill).

Todd, R.B. (1977) ‘Galenic Medical Ideas in the Greek Aristotelian Commentators’,Symbolae Osloenses 52: 117-34.

Todd, R.B. (1984) ‘Philosophy and Medicine in John Philoponus’ Commentary onAristotle’s De anima’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 38 (Symposium on ByzantineMedicine) 103-10.

Todd, R.B. (1996) Themistius: On Aristotle On the Soul, Ancient Commentators onAristotle (London: Duckworth).

Todd, R.B. (2003) Themistius: On Aristotle Physics 4, Ancient Commentators onAristotle (London: Duckworth).

Todd, R.B. (2005) Review of Rescigno 2004, in Bryn Mawr Classical Review2005.10.38.

Todd, R.B. (forthcoming 2008) ‘Routes to Aristotle: Aspects of Pro-AristotelianExegesis in Alexander of Aphrodisias (� and Themistius)’, Laval théologique etphilosophique.

Tornau, C. (2000) ‘Die Prinzipienlehre des Moderatos von Gades. Zu Simplikios inPh. 230,34-231,24 Diels’, Rheinisches Museum 143.2: 197-220.

Trepanier, S. (2000) ‘The Structure of Empedocles Fr. 17’, Essays in Philosophy(online journal) vol 1. no. 1 at http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/paper1.html

Trepanier, S. (2003) ‘Empedocles and the Ultimate Symmetry of the World’,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24: 1-58.

Trepanier, S. (2004) Empedocles: an Interpretation (London: Routledge). [non vidi]Tribble, E.B. (1993) Margins and Marginality (Charlottesville and London).Triefenbach, Peter. (1979) Der Lebenslauf des Simplicius Simplicissimus: Figur,

Initiation, Satire (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta).Ullmann, M. (1970) Die Medizin im Islam (Leiden and Köln: E.J. Brill)Urmson, J.O. (1992) Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time, Ancient Commen-

tators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).Usener, H. (1858) Analecta Theophrastea (Diss. Bonn).Usener, S. (1994) Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum: Hörer und Leser von

Literatur im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Tübingen: G. Narr).Vallance, J.T. (1999) ‘Galen, Proclus and the Non-submissive Commentary’, in

Most 1999a: 223-44.Verbeke, G. (1975) ‘Simplicius’, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, vol. 12: 440-3.Verbeke, G. (1982) ‘Some Later Neoplatonic Views on Divine Creation and the

Eternity of the World’, in O’Meara 1982: 45-53.Verrycken, K. (1990) ‘The Development of Philoponus’ Thought and its Chrono-

logy’, in Sorabji 1990: 233-74.Verrycken, K. (1997) ‘Philoponus’ Interpretation of Plato’s Cosmogony’, Documenti

e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8: 269-318.Vincent, J.R. (2003) An Intelligent Person’s Guide to History (London: Duckworth;

1st edn 1996).Vlastos, G. (1950) ‘The Physical Theory of Anaxagoras’, Philosophical Review 59:

31-57, repr. in Vlastos 1995: 303-27.

Bibliography

280

http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/paper1.html

Von Staden, H. (1995) ‘Anatomy as Rhetoric: Galen on Dissection and Persuasion’,Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 50.1: 47-66.

Von Staden, H. (1997) ‘Galen and the “Second Sophistic”’, in R. Sorabji (ed.)Aristotle and After, BICS suppl. vol. 68: 33-54.

Von Staden, H. (2002) ‘“A Woman Does Not Become Ambidextrous”: Galen and theCulture of Scientific Commentary’, in Gibson and Shuttleworth Kraus 2002:109-39.

Walker, J. (2002) ‘The Limits of Late Antiquity: Philosophy between Rome andIran’, Ancient World 33: 45-69.

Walker, J.T. (2006) The Legend of Mar Qardagh: Narrative and Christian Heroismin Late Antique Iraq (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of Califor-nia Press) ch. 3: ‘Refuting the Eternity of the Stars. Philosophy betweenByzantium and Iraq’.

Walker, P.E. (1994) ‘Platonisms in Islamic Philosophy’, Studia Islamica 79: 5-25.Wallis, J. (1971) Neoplatonism (London: Duckworth).Walzer R. (1962) ‘Islamic Philosophy’, in id. Greek into Arabic: Essays on Arabic

Philosophy (Bruno Cassirer, Oxford) 1-28 [= The History of Philosophy, Easternand Western (London Allen & Unwin) vol. II, 120-48; bibliography omitted]

Wardy, R. (1990) The Chain of Change: a Study of Aristotle’s Physics VII (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press).

Wardy, R. (1996) The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and their Successors(London: Routledge).

Watts, E. (2004) ‘Justinian, Malalas, and the End of Athenian PhilosophicalTeaching in A.D. 529’, Journal of Roman Studies 94: 168-82.

Watts, E. (2005) ‘Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century?Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia’, Greek, Roman & Byzan-tine Studies 45.3: 285-316.

Watts, E. (2006) City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria (Berkeley,Los Angeles and London: University of California Press).

Wehrli, F. (1969) Eudemos von Rhodos. Schule des Aristoteles, Heft VIII, zweite,ergänzte und verbesserte Auflage (Basel/ Stuttgart; 1st edn 1955).

Weil, E. (1975) ‘La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotélicienne’, in J. Barneset al. (eds) Articles on Aristotle, vol. 1: Science (London: Duckworth) [= Revue deMétaphysique et de Morale 56 (1951) 283-315].

Weiss, R. (1988) The Renaissance Discovery of Classical Antiquity (Oxford: Blackwell).West, M.L. (1971) Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford: Clarendon

Press).Westerink, L.G. (1962) Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amster-

dam: North-Holland Publishing Company).Westerink, L.G. (1987) ‘Proclus et les Présocratiques’, Pépin and Saffrey (eds)

Proclus: lecteur et interprète des anciens (Paris: CNRS) 105-12.Westerink, L.G. (1990) ‘The Alexandrian Commentators’, in Sorabji 1990: 325-48.Whittaker, J. (1971) ‘Parmenides, Fr. 8, 5’, in id., God Time Being: Two Studies in

the Transcendental Tradition in Greek Philosophy. Symbolae Osloenses, suppl.vol. 23 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget) 16-32.

Whittaker, J. (1967) ‘Moses Atticizing’, Phoenix 21: 196-201.Whittaker, J. (1973) ‘Textual Comments on Timaeus 27c-d’, Phoenix 27: 387-91.Whittaker, J. (1989) ‘The Value of Indirect Tradition in the Establishment of

Greek Philosophical Texts or the Art of Misquotation’, in J.N. Grant (ed.)Editing Greek and Latin Texts, 23rd Conference on Editorial Problems, Toronto1987 (New York: AMS Press) 63-95.

Bibliography

281

Wiesner, J. (1989) ‘Theophrast und der Beginn des Archereferats von Simplikios’Physik-kommentar’, Hermes 117: 288-303.

Wilberding, J. (2005) ‘Aristotle, Plotinus, and Simplicius on the Relation of theChanger to the Changed’, Classical Quarterly 55.2: 447-54.

Wildberg, C. (1987a) Philoponus: Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World,Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duckworth).

Wildberg, C. (1987b) ‘Prolegomena to the Study of Philoponus’ contra Aristotelem’,in Sorabji 1987: 197-209.

Wildberg, C. (1988a) John Philoponus’ Criticism of Aristotle’s Theory of Aether,Peripatoi vol. 16 (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter).

Wildberg, C. and Furley, D. (1988b) Philoponus: Corollaries on Place and Void [tr.David Furley] and Simplicius: Against Philoponus on the Eternity of the World[tr. Christian Wildberg], Ancient Commentators on Aristotle (London: Duck-worth).

Wildberg, C. (1990) ‘Three Neoplatonic Introductions to Philosophy: Ammonius,David, and Elias’, Hermathena 149: 33-51.

Wildberg, C. (1993) ‘Simplicius und das Zitat. Zur Überlieferung des Anführungs-zeichens’, in F. Berger (ed.) Symbolae Berolinenses. Für Dieter Harlfinger(Amsterdam) 187-99.

Wildberg, C, (1998) ‘Simplicius’, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8(London: Routledge) 788-91.

Wildberg, C. (1999) ‘Impetus Theory and the Hermeneutics of Science in Sim-plicius and Philoponus’, Hyperboreus 5: 107-24.

Wildberg, C. (2005) ‘Philosophy in the Age of Justinian’, in M. Maas (ed.) The Ageof Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 316-40.

Wildberg, C. (2007) ‘John Philoponus’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclo-pedia of Philosophy, online encyclopedia available athttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/philoponus/

Wilson, N.G. (1969) ‘Philologia Perennis’, review of Pfeiffer 1970 (1968), in Classi-cal Review xix: 370-2.

Wilson, N.G. (1984) ‘The Relation of Text and Commentary in Greek Texts’, in S.Questa and R. Rafaella (eds) Il Libro e il Testo (Università degli Studi di Urbino)105-10.

Wright, M.R. (1995) Empedocles: the Extant Fragments, Greek text, Englishtranslation, introduction and commentary, 2nd edn (London: Bristol ClassicalPress).

Yunis, H. (ed.) (2003) Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in AncientGreece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Zeller, E. (1963) Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen EntwicklungII 2 Aristoteles und die Alten Peripatetiker (Leipzig; repr. G. Olms: Hildesheim,1921).

Zhmud, L. (2006) The Origin of the History of Science in Classical Antiquity(Berlin: De Gruyter).

Zumthor, P. (1990) ‘La glose créatrice’, in G. Mathieu-Castellani and M. Plaisance(eds) Les commentaires et la naissance de la critique littéraire (Actes du Collo-que Internationale sur le Commentaire, Paris) 11-18.

Zwierlein, O. (2002) ‘Interpretation in Antike und Mittelalter’, in Geerlings andSchulz 2002: 79-101.

Bibliography

282

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/philoponus/

Index Locorum

References to page and note numbers of this book appear in bold. Bold italicnumbers indicate that the passage is translated on that page.

AENEAS OF GAZATheophrastus 12.1ff.: 146

AGATHIASHistories 2.29.1ff.: 49; 2.28.1:

230n.97; 2.31.3-4: 228n.101ALEXANDER

Commentary on Metaphysics 32.16:80; 83.9-11: 239n.73

Commentary on Topics 27.12-14:108

Quaestiones 3.12: 116AMMONIUS

Commentary on Aristotle’sCategories 7.10-11: 158-9

ANAXAGORAS (DK)A35: 79; A46: 80; B1: 79; B11-12:

80; B13: 80; B14: 80ANONYMOUS

Asclepius 1.12f.: 195ANONYMOUS

Commentary on Theaetetus col.2.11ff.: 145; col. 3.29-37: 145;col. 3.37-8: 145; col. 3.40: 145

ARISTOTLECategories 15a13-33: 98History of Animals 3.8: 37Metaphysics 985a17-20: 80;

986b12-17: 70Nicomachean Ethics 1096a14-17: 130On Generation and Corruption

314a18-19: 65, 80On the heavens 2.12: 37Physics 184a14: 37; 184b25-85a1:

70; 187a21: 77; 188a5-18: 81;191a7: 151; 200b21: 37; 202a14:228n.61; 208b11: 97; 223a24:238n.52; 256b24-6: 80;279b17-21: 191

Topics 101a26-36: 108-9

AULUS GELLIUSAttic Nights 13.5: 91; 19.6: 147

BOETHIUSCommentary on Aristotle’s On

interpretation 12.3-16: 236n.9CICERO

De finibus V.12-13: 93DAMASCIUS

Life of Isidore 48.11ff.: 248n.87Philosophical History

(Athanassiadi) 118B: 163Problems and Solutions on the

Principles 1.24.14-15: 233n.59;1.54: 165; 1.150.1: 70; 1.214.3:233n.59

Theological Arithmetic 16: 165DAVID (ELIAS)

Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagogêproem: 152

DIOGENES LAERTIUS1.16: 79; 2.16 and 23: 234n.89;

3.65-7: 227n.59, 246n.35; 5.36:93; 5.39: 96, 240n.94; 5.42-50:237n.21; 5.46: 58; 5.48: 58; 5.58,61: 97, 105; 5.64: 97; 8.65: 165

ELIASCommentary on Aristotle’s

Categories 107.24-5: 225n.15EMPEDOCLES (DK)

A28: 78; A86: 78; A92: 78; B1: 77;B17: 66, 77, 78, 228n.78; B21:78; B22: 78; B24: 165; B27: 76;B29: 76; B38: 77; B48: 77; B90:77; B109: 78; B115, 117: 5, 77,78; B124: 77; B134: 76, 78;B157: 165

EUDEMUS OF RHODESFragments (Wehrli) 32-3: 239n.66;

33b: 167; 34: 101; 36: 239n.66;37a: 100; 43: 100; 44: 100;

283

79-80: 103; 98: 101; 100: 100;122b: 100; 188: 237n.37

EUNAPIUSLives of philosophers and sophists

IV.1.3: 152; IV.6.13-15: 152;460: 226n.30

EUSEBIUSPraeparatio Evangelica 4.7.1: 143

GALENPHP 5.3.31: 67De comp. medic. 13.455.11: 67

HERMIASOn Plato’s Phaedrus 275A-C: 47

IAMBLICHUSVita Pythagorae (Klein) 29.162,3-4:

155Theologia Arithmetica 20.7: 165

JULIANLetter 61c (423c): 169

MARINUSV.Procl. 1: 155;12-13: 226n.36,

248n.81; 15: 156; 19: 183NEMESIUS

On the nature of man 21: 250n.127OLYMPIODORUS

Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias1,7-19: 235n.104

PARMENIDES (DK)A7: 72; A34: 72; B1: 71; B2: 71;

B6-9: 71; B8: 68, 69, 70-1ST PAUL

2 Corinthians 3:6: 143; Romans2:29; 7:5-6: 143

PHILOPONUSFragments (Wildberg) 54: 185

PLATOApology 26D-E: 79; 40A: 155Phaedo 83E: 240n.89; 97B-C: 80Phaedrus 276-8: 47, 48, 187;

279B-C: 183Protagoras 316D-E: 231n.4; 318B:

240n.89; 341E1-2: 225n.15Republic 548D: 47Seventh letter 342-4: 47Sophist 217E: 240n.89Theaetetus 144A: 226n.35; 176A:

196Timaeus 27C: 183; 32C: 59; 46D:

37; 57Eff.: 150PLINY THE YOUNGER

Letters 10.96: 251n.18

PLOTINUSEnneads 1.1: 150; 1.8: 150; 2.1:

151; 2.4.7.2-4: 79, 150; 2.4.8,12:247n.56; 2.4.10,42: 247n.56;2.4.12,3: 247n.56; 2.5: 150;2.9.10.12-14: 175-6; 3.5.9: 185;3.2.7: 223n.35; 3.7.13.13-18:247n.61; 3.8.11.40: 68; 4.8.1:151, 232n.27; 4.8.3: 47-8; 5.1.6:76; 5.1.8: 133, 232n.27; 5.1.9.1:80-1, 33, 232n.27; 5.3.15.28-30:68; 5.3.13.1: 68; 5.9.1: 70;6.3.27: 98

PLUTARCH OF CHAERONEAAgainst Colotes 1114F: 74Aristides 26.4: 66De fort. 98F: 79De Stoic. Repugn. 1051E: 67On the obsolescence of oracles

418C: 165Roman Questions 288b: 77Sulla 26.2.2: 236n.9

[?] PLUTARCHConsolation to Apollonius 115E: 67

PORPHYRYFragments (Smith) 303F (= Eus.

PE 4.7.1): 143Quaest. Hom. Il. 8.323: 42Testimonia (Smith) 152F: 35V.Plot. 1: 247n.49; 4: 148; 5: 48;

14.4-14: 246n.46; 14.5-8: 150;14.14: 32, 109; 14.20: 31, 32, 89,144; 15: 198; 20: 47; 24: 152

PRISCIAN OF LYDIAMetaphrasis 7.20-4: 236n.9

PROCLUSPlatonic Theology 1.1: 141, 170Commentary on Plato’s Republic

2.198-202: 157 (cf. 248n.91)Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus

(Diehl) 1.16.6-12: 47; 2.277,8:94; 3.9,22: 155; 3.63.30: 236n.8;120.8-22: 237n.35; 1.305.6:246n.41

PROCOPIUSWars 2.3-4: 230n.101

SENECALetters 108.23: 31

SIMPLICIUSCommentary on Aristotle’s

Categories 1.1-2: 34; 1.1-4: 136;

Index Locorum

284

1.7: 154; 2.6-8: 136; 2.23-32: 6,33, 120, 199; 2.30-3.4: 138;3.4-6: 53; 3.4-11: 138; 3.13: 34;4.8-16: 34; 4.17ff.: 34; 5.27-31:34; 5.32ff.: 34; 6.6-18: 56;7.1-22: 104; 7.6-8: 152; 7.23-32:6, 33, 85; 7.26-30: 28, 115;7.27-9: 53; 8.15: 154; 9.5-11.1:154; 10.25: 96; 23.13: 159;41.22ff.: 41; 64.20-5: 66; 72.10:160; 107.5ff.: 41; 108.22: 150;127.12: 151; 164.4-5: 159, 160;187.10: 144; 191.10: 151;331.23ff.: 190; 346.14: 97;352.22-4: 44; 415.15-16: 6n.17,96; 428.3: 238n.54; 429.13:238n.54; 433.20: 98; 433.28-9:98; 435.17-436.3: 98-9; 435.26:96; 435.27-8: 236n.17; 733.4:150; 790-2: 150

Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics1.1-3: 154; 2.5: 113; 3.13ff.: 154;4.22-5: 117; 5.18-20: 182; 6.31:40; 6.5-10: 34; 7.3: 73; 8.19: 152;9.7: 55, 73, 77, 96; 11.16-17:102; 19.5: 113; 20.8: 75; 20.19:58; 20.29-21.19: 64, 73; 21.14:61; 21.16-19: 73; 21.19: 152;22.20: 73; 25.6: 95; 25.19-21: 75;25.21-6: 78; 28.30-2: 58; 28.32-4:112, 228n.77, 231n.14; 29.3-5:45, 112; 30.2: 71; 31.19: 76;36.24-31: 83; 36.25: 67; 36.30: 55; 37.3: 84; 37.7-8: 84; 38.29:74; 39.10ff.: 72; 39.12-20: 72;39.18: 72; 42.5-26: 239n.66;42.13-17: 167; 43.28-9: 167;44.1: 167; 44.11: 113; 44.28, 32:39; 48.6-7: 101; 48.26-7: 101,103, 104; 48.26-9: 103; 60.8: 38;60.27: 53; 62.12: 166; 63.19:166; 63.19-20: 103; 70.5: 42;70.10: 166; 70.32: 118; 71.5:124; 74.29-30: 103; 77.9-10: 122;77.11: 84; 80.15: 67, 111, 193;80.16-17: 45; 83.19: 124; 84.22:124; 107.5: 41; 107.12: 13;110.23: 129; 111.15-17: 43;115.11: 100; 115.12: 96; 116.2-4:73; 116.6-18: 72 116.25ff.: 71,72; 117.2ff.: 71-2; 118.3-20: 102,

103, 104; 121.9: 104; 126.3: 165;129.16: 101; 129.32: 189;137.15: 71; 140.29: 53; 144.25-8:44, 45, 57, 66; 144.29ff.: 71;147.28: 71; 149.32: 96; 150.25:101; 151.6, 21, 24: 81; 153.25ff.:77; 154.3-157.24: 77, 81; 154.14:77; 154.16: 96; 154.17: 77;155.4-7: 81; 155.26: 79; 157.7-9:80; 158.1-159.4: 77, 78;159.13-26: 78; 160.1-11: 78;160.25-6: 81; 161.23-162.2: 81;162.11-12: 82; 162.28: 79;163.10: 82; 163.16-18: 82;164.11-166.13: 82; 165.5-7: 83;65.22: 83; 166.17f.: 236n.17;166.3: 83; 167.33ff.: 239n.71;169.24: 118, 167; 178.8-11: 42;179.31: 71; 184.29: 162;188.30-1: 75; 191.13-17: 160;192.4: 161; 192.14: 160, 161;192.14-21: 119; 192.29: 159, 160;193.16-19: 160; 193.4: 160; 196.10ff.: 164; 197.12-15: 165;206.25: 165; 207.7: 39; 207.19,22, 26: 162, 165; 209.33-210.5:165; 210.28: 101; 1.20ff.: 123;213.24: 159; 213.24ff.: 161;214.13: 161; 216.10: 161;216.28: 101; 229.12: 150; 233.3:67; 234.25-9: 123; 241.22: 159;258.16: 238n.46; 259.3ff.: 35;273.15: 39; 274.23: 124;291.21-2: 253n.70; 297.8: 113;297.8-10: 107; 300.27: 80;300.32: 80; 300-1: 80; 308.12:39; 329.19: 39; 331.10: 66, 31;332.20: 38, 113; 342.20: 124;349.27: 39; 358.8: 75; 363.16:46; 374.32: 39; 378.20-1: 111;381.29: 75; 393.13: 38; 394.3-5:35; 395.14-15: 35; 395.20-1: 34;396.20: 124; 398.32: 150; 399.9:127; 399.19: 42, 127; 400.1: 118,127, 167; 400.7: 42; 403.9-10:150, 190; 403.14-22: 189;404.14: 228n.61; 406.28: 162;407.4-6: 118;407.4-16: 35;407.27: 127; 413.1: 96; 413.5:96; 413.25: 162; 414.15-18: 128;414.17: 118; 414.17-18: 167;

Index Locorum

285

414.19: 39; 416.19: 40;416.27-32: 40, 124; 422.20: 39;422.22: 127; 423.12-21: 41;423.14: 39; 423.21: 39; 423.24: 39; 424.14: 52; 427.34: 39, 41;427.35: 152; 428.2: 39; 428.2-3:152; 429.27: 39, 152; 430.3: 113;431.5-6: 150; 432.17: 150;433.13-18: 104; 433.14: 150;434.36-7: 124; 436.13ff.: 40;436.19: 39; 437.10: 124; 437.11:121; 437.19: 39; 443.10: 124,128; 449.5-17: 126; 450.32-3:128; 450.32-6: 40; 457.12-13: 38,124; 458.30: 77; 459.4-5: 127;461.15: 38; 469.10: 124; 470.1:162; 472.8: 39; 472.36: 124;489.21: 112; 510.18-20: 190;511.30-512.9: 190; 512.2-9: 190;519.3-16: 35, 190; 526.16: 127;526.17: 39 530.15: 38, 112;530.16: 113; 530.16-23: 125;533.28: 90; 538.6: 38; 563.29:39; 566.18: 91; 573.19-23: 168;583.10: 91; 601.1ff.: 96;601.5-13: 199, 255n.13; 601.15:155; 604.5: 96, 97; 604.6: 96;606.33: 92; 611.11: 155, 156,157; 612.5: 6, 96; 614.8: 157;615.13ff.: 157; 616.26-32: 157;616.31: 157; 618.26: 159;618.27: 248n.94; 625.2: 139;625.28: 163; 627.2: 163;629.8-12: 164; 635.12: 159, 160;636.8-13: 163; 637.25-30: 163;639.14: 236n.17; 639.23: 154;640.16-17: 87; 642.18: 92;642.18f.: 96; 643.36-644.2: 157;644.10-11: 163; 644.25: 101;645.4-6: 163; 684.2: 118;684.2-3: 167; 691.3: 40; 700.9:111; 700.18: 91; 700.19: 91;706.26: 150; 707.33-4: 241n.20;708.27: 167; 708.28: 250n.127;717.14-20: 103; 717.15: 104;718.14-719.22: 168; 719.5-6:168; 725.19-24: 103; 728.10-14:118; 728.5: 127; 733.4: 150;769.6: 150; 770.22-771.23: 191;773.8ff.: 97, 200; 788.33-789.2:97; 788.34-6: 90, 96; 788.36: 91;

789.1: 96, 97; 790.30: 150;790.34-5: 150; 795.4-5: 155, 156;795.33-5: 139; 801.3-6: 35;801.13-16: 34; 802.8-11: 34;854.20: 118, 167; 860.19: 95, 96,236n.17; 860.19-861.23: 91;861.23: 96; 864.15: 16, 167;888.16: 101; 918.13: 118;920.4-922.19: 35; 923.7-924.4:35; 923.10-16: 228n.60;923.15-16: 35; 924.5-6: 35;924.6: 35; 924.7: 36; 924.18:101; 930.34: 100; 934.30-1: 96;936.25: 40; 937.25ff.: 124;946.24-5: 136; 950.4: 118, 167;964.14-15: 244n.80; 964.30: 96,237n.39; 968.30: 167; 969.14-24:118; 986.5-6: 96; 986.30: 118;1024.6: 124; 1036.13: 101, 102;1036.13-15: 36, 238n.60; 1037.4:36; 1039.13: 167; 1051.5: 41;1072.8: 150; 1079.12: 150;1111.29-1116.14: 36; 1120.20:76; 1125.11: 53; 1129.29-1130.3:187; 1130.3-6: 118; 1132.26-7:150; 1165.20: 150; 1174.29: 165;1206.27: 101; 1236.1: 96,237n.36, 39; 1236.1-2: 117;1244.15: 39; 1253.7: 118, 167;1254.22-3: 76; 1292.2-3: 112;1253.7: 118, 167; 1262.3-5:244n.80; 1318.10-15: 44, 57, 66;1325.24: 53; 1326.39: 38;1328.11: 38; 1333.33: 43;1355.28ff.: 100; 1358.5-8: 36;1358.8-9: 34; 1358.39-40: 125;1359.13-15: 36; 1363.8: 163;1363.11-12: 163

Commentary on Aristotle’s On theheavens 1.1-3: 117, 154; 1.5-6:37; 1.8: 58, 236n.17; 2.5: 37;2.6: 159; 2.8-9: 160; 2.17: 37;3.11-4.5: 117; 3.14-16: 36; 3.19:37; 3.30-4.4: 36; 4.5: 117; 4.26-7:36, 117; 4.26-30: 117; 5.35-6:117; 5.36-7: 117; 9.21: 38; 9.29:36; 11.25: 67; 12.12: 151; 12.22:238n.45; 20.21: 151; 22.18: 124;24.19-20: 36; 30.26-34: 185;37.33: 151; 41.7: 124; 42.18:186; 44.9: 36; 45.5: 17; 51.5:

Index Locorum

286

124; 55.1-12: 194; 58.14-15: 185;62.11-12: 167; 62.12-13: 118,166; 69.9-10: 166; 82.10-14: 45;106.6: 169; 110.24: 37; 119.7-13:187; 131.21: 166; 135.31-136.1: 187; 140.2-3: 57; 140.25-7: 75;140.30-2: 44, 57; 140.32-3: 66;168.17: 125; 168.18: 38;169.28ff.: 37; 176.30-177.9: 167;176.32: 118; 176.33-4: 113, 118;188.6,26,30: 167; 190.15-20:185; 201.7: 186; 201.26-8: 117;232.23: 152; 272.21: 125;274.23: 124; 293.23: 76;294.32-3: 75; 297.8: 113;297.8-10: 107, 244n.80;297.10-98.19: 130, 191;298.20-6: 130; 298.21-2: 66;299.13-14: 131; 301.19-21:129-30; 307.16-17: 75; 316.3-5:189; 342.20: 124; 349.21: 152;367.12: 75; 370.3-5: 186;377.20-34: 131, 207; 377.27:155; 378.20-1: 111, 193;378.20-2: 132; 378.22-4: 244;397.29: 159; 397.29-30: 160;462.20: 163; 485.21: 182,255n.18; 497.24: 101; 499.7: 53;528.32-3: 57; 530.16: 38; 554.3:236n.17; 556.12ff.: 72;556.17-20: 200; 557.20-558.2:71; 557.25ff.: 71; 559.20ff.: 72;564.11: 155; 564.24: 236n.17;566.4-5: 46; 566.17-20: 200;576.14: 95; 586.10: 76; 602.6:95; 640.25: 155; 641.8: 95;700.6: 236n.17; 700.7: 96;711.26-7: 160; 773.8ff.: 97;788.33-789.2: 97; 969.14-24: 118

Commentary on Epictetus’Enchiridion 111.48ff.: 56;194.57-60: 43

PS.SIMPLICIUSCommentary on Aristotle’s De

anima 118.9: 78; 286.31:236n.17

SOCRATES SCHOLASTICUSChurch History I.9: 253n.54

STRABOxiii.609: 236n.9

SUDA4.178.24-5: 27

SYNESIUSLetters 105, 102: 251n.14; 136: 181

SYRIANUSCommentary on Aristotle’s

Metaphysics 42.3: 249n.105;62.19: 249n.105; 80.5-6: 159;81.8-10: 181; 81.31: 155; 84.25:249n.105; 192.23: 249n.105

THEMISTIUSParaphrasis on Posterior Analytics

1.2-12: 167Paraphrasis on De anima 107.30:

66, 228n.78Paraphrasis on Physics 192.12-22:

118; 221.9: 237n.37THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS

Fragments (FHSG) 72A: 236n.9;141-4: 237n.26; 142: 237 nn.29,35; 146: 14, 97; 149: 14, 97;151A-B: 97-8; 153: 98; 159:237n.36; 161A: 237n.35;165B-D: 117; 169: 117; 171: 117;176: 117; 231: 60; 240: 231n.16;241AB: 237n.35; 241B: 60; 245:58; 275: 236n.9; 277C: 60; 281:237n.41; 301A,B: 93; 694:236n.9

On fire 1-2: 94XENOPHANES OF COLOPHON

B17: 70

Index Locorum

287

Index of Names

Abu Bakr al-Razi, 13Adrastus, 109Aeneas of Gaza, 146Aëtius, 58, 63, 77Agathias, 49Alexander of Aphrodisias, 34, 36, 37,

38, 40, 41, 60, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 92,96, 100, 103, 107-35, 139, 160, 167,188-93, 216

Alexandria, 24, 179Ammonius, 12, 29, 47, 78, 118, 119,

123, 139, 147, 153, 160, 163, 179Anaxagoras, 55, 64, 65, 76, 77, 83,

106, 152Anaximander, 81Andronicus, 105Antiochus, 26, 88, 140-1, 144, 145Aphrodisias, 50Arcesilaus, 26, 89Archelaus, 80Archytas, 44Aristotle, 36, 80Aspasius, 40, 41, 109, 115, 118Atticus, 146, 250 n.129 Baalbek, 50Boethus, 98, 146 Calvenus Taurus, 60, 94, 147Carrhae, see HarranCelsus, 178, 179Clement of Alexandria, 25, 67, 77Colotes, 146 Damascius, 12, 91, 96, 97, 133, 153,

155, 163-4, 179David, 152Democritus, 76, 80, 83, 97, 167Derveni, 75Dexippus, 228 n.61Diels, Hermann, 4, 7, 59, 63, 72Diogenes of Apollonia, 63, 65

Eco, Umberto, 1, 196Edessa, 50Empedocles, 44, 55, 56, 63, 64, 74-8,

81, 106, 165Epictetus, 12Epicurus, 59, 145Eudemus, 16, 72, 75, 91, 98, 99-104,

106, 115, 118, 121, 124 (‘lover oftruth’), 133, 167

Eudorus, 144-5Eunapius, 151-2, 178Eusebius, 25, 66, 67, 178 Fihrist, 13 Gabir b. Hayyan, 241 n. 23Galen, 60, 166, 167-9Galileo, 3 Harpocration of Argos, 146-7Harran, 49-50Heraclitus, 75Hermogenes, 13Hierocles, 156Hippocrates of Chios, 1011Hippolytus, 78Homer, 173Hunayn b. Ishaq, 13, 250 n.127 Iamblichus, 11, 16, 41, 87, 91, 96, 117,

133, 139, 153, 154-5Isidore, 142, 249 n.103 Jerome, 25, 178Jesus, 154Justin Martyr, 177Justinian, 49-50, 178 Leucippus, 80Lewis, C.S., 197Longinus. 151Lucretius, 59

288

Marcus Aurelius, 115Melissus, 43, 63, 72, 82Metrodorus, 83Moderatus, 250 n.117Moerbeke, Willliam van, 3 Nemesius of Nemesa, 156, 250 n.127Nero, 177Nikolaos, 81Numenius, 109, 146, 148 Olympiodorus, 146Origen, 66, 67, 139, 179Osborne, Catherine, 54 Parmenides, 43, 55, 56, 63-4, 69-74,

82, 106, 174Peripatetics, 35Persia, 50Philo Judaeus, 25Philo of Larissa, 89Philoponus, 43, 87, 120, 124-5, 126,

176-88Platonists, 26Plotinus, 10, 16, 29, 56, 68, 81, 89, 98,

109, 114, 123, 146, 150-1Plutarch of Athens, 158Plutarch of Chaeronea, 60, 94, 120,

145-6Porphyry, 16, 27, 29, 35, 38, 40, 41,

62, 67, 68, 72, 75, 81, 100, 109, 118,121, 123, 127, 139, 151, 154, 160,167, 177, 179, 207

Presocratics, 16, 62, 156

Proclus, 10, 12, 16, 62, 68, 71, 94, 97,139, 145, 153, 155-7, 207

Ptolemaeus, 36Pythagoras, 154Pythagoreans, 64, 75 Severus, 109Sextus Empiricus, 71, 73, 77Sinbliqiyus (Simplicius in Arabic), 14Socrates, 154, 159Stephanus, 120Strato, 89, 91, 97-8, 105, 106Synesius, 181, 184Syrianus, 12, 16, 47, 97, 117, 118,

121, 123, 133, 153, 155, 158-63(epithets at 159), 160

Thaumasius, 109Theagenes, 174Themistius, 40, 41, 100, 118, 127,

166-7Theophrastus, 16, 56, 58, 59 (Physikai

doxai), 73, 75, 77, 78, 81, 86, 93-9,115, 118, 163

Thomas Aquinas, 3 Usener, Hermann, 7, 59, 86 Xenarchus, 16, 36, 139Xenophanes, 72, 174 Zeller, 65Zenobius, 112

Index of Names

289

Subject Index

adverbial tags, 101, 123akouein (listen, interpret), 45, 128allusion, 150anonymous commentary, 145antigraphos (manuscript, copy), 39,

112, 127antilegô (refute), 83-4apo phônês, 29, 67, 162, 206; see also

viva voceapodeixis, 36aporia, 92, 96, 115, 145, 150arkhai (principles, causes), 37, 73,

119, 136asapheia (obscurity), 28, 73, 104, 152,

158, 228 n.64assimilation, 64, 146, 171astronomy, 77audience, 162, 201authenticity, 42, 105, 145authority, 41, 96, 98, 116, 124-5

(argument from), 127, 175axiômata, 82 canon(isation), 104, 105, 152, 153,

203, 205cause, 37, 68, 69, 75, 77Chaldean oracles, 85, 156, 158, 206change, 91citation, see quotationclarity, 84, 101clepsydra, 168clusters, 91, 112, 122commentary, 24, 108 (like weaving or

composing a symphony), 109, 111;forms of, 116, 118, 136, 162, 207

commentator(s), 35, 110, 117, 120,123; ideal, 33-4, 132, 197

concordia, 14consolidation, 88corollaries, 155, 163cosmic stages, 76cosmology, 72creationism, 59

creator-god, 139, 182 demonstration, 44dialectic, 61, 175differences (diaphorai), 93digress (mêkunai), 45, 67disagreement (diaphonia), 10, 37, 83,

90, 92, 97, 112, 114, 118, 125, 128division (dihaeresis), 73dogmatism, 148doxai (opinions), 59, 86doxographical, 60, 86doxography, 95dualism, 80 elements, 68, 117, 160, 167endoxographical, 199enigmatic (ainigmatôdôs), 55, 73, 83ennoia (notion, meaning), 101epithets, 96, 111, 151, 154, 155

(hierarchy of), 159, 163, 166, 167erase (diagraphein), 39eternity, 139evidence (pistis), 74, 78, 124exegete (exêgêtês), 33, 35, 94, 98, 136 faith (pistis), 180flavours, 77form, 119, 160 geometry, 91god, an efficient cause, 171golden chain, 139-40, 152, 153, 155,

157, 177grammar, 127, 129Grammarian, the, 125, 173, 176grammatikos, 31graphê, 39 harmonisation, 61, 86-7, 90, 141, 144,

156, 169, 193, 203harmony (sumphônia), 27, 29, 62, 97,

218-20

290

headings (kephalaia), 35, 102heap (sorites), 116hermeneia, 127hermeneutical, 25, 38holy book, 154homoiomeries, 82hypographê (outline), 47hypomnêma, 15, 34, 38, 109, 113, 146,

201hypostases, see levels of being impose a reading (biazein), 39incipits, 40ineffable, 90interpreter, 94 (first interpreter of

Plato)invective, 182ipsissima verba, 23, 44, 48, 63, 65isagogical questions, 42, 117, 152 khôros, 39koruphaios (leader), 96 lemma, 29, 115-16, 118, 121, 158, 207levels of being, 68, 76, 119lexis, 33, 39, 40, 101, 122, 136, 147,

156like-by-like, 74Love, 78 magic, 153manuscripts (antigraphoi), 22, 29, 38,

39-41, 127, 167marginal note, 40, 125, 128; marginal

commentary, 67martyrs, 177megalonoia, 33mêpote (maybe), 127, 129, 160methodology, 21, 31ff., 132-5, 143,

146-7Middle Platonists, 110, 137, 144-7misquotation, 142-4monism, 64, 144monobiblion, 38mysteries, 52, 106, 141, 198, 208 Nicene creed, 178nous, 33, 64, 78, 80-1, 149 obscurity, 100; cure for, 104; see also

asapheia

originality, 23, 133, 157 pagan, 149, 154, 173paradoxes of time, 164paragraphein (mark the text), 45-6,

66-8paraphrase, 42, 44, 72, 81, 82, 83,

100, 101, 150, 151, 159, 164, 166,208, 250 n.121

paratithesthai, 45, 66-8, 103, 124philologos, 31phusikoi, 61pioneer, 135pistis, see evidenceplace, 91, 97, 157, 163Plato, prophet, 169; expounder of

truth, 224, n.2Platonism, 140-7, 149, 156Platonisms, 142pluralism, 64poetry, 65polemic, 65, 125pollution, 77, 78prayer, 182-3, 207primary text, 40, 77principles, 35, 37, 38, 61, 79, 93, 119,

156, 160privation, 119, 160problêmata, 112, 145prophet, 169prose, 43, 65prototype, 135protreptic, 195psukhagôgia (leading of the soul), 43punctuation, 42, 127punning, 189, 253 n.69purifications, 75 (katharmoi)Pythagoreanism, 11, 154 quotation, 22, 37; art of, 42-8; reasons

for, 65-8, 44, 82, 99, 109, 111, 121,124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 142-4, 144,150, 188-93, 208, 218

refutation, 83reincarnation, 75riddles, 249 n. 97; cf. enigmaticroots, 68 salvation, 155scarcity (spanin), 66, 74

Subject Index

291

sceptic, 112scholai, 38, 98, 227 n.45, n.53science, 138skopos (subject), 26, 34, 36, 37, 117,

145, 153, 154, 225 n.15, 226 n.43sources: discussion of, 116; access to,

34, 40, 42, 56-60, 63-4, 70-1, 73, 75,77-8, 79, 92, 95-6, 100, 150

Stoics, 140, 141, 145Strife: 78 (divisive role)style, impersonal, 138subtext, 25subversion, 129summa, 138, 202, 209summary, of main points (kephalaia),

35; of whole Physics, 36sumphônia (agreement), 9, 62, 108,

117, 118, 121, 124, 170, 218-20(=App. III)

sunanagnôsis, 26, 128, 206sungramma, 38sunousia, 104-5superstition, 149, 177surface meaning, 83, 106, 131symphony, 108syncretism, 87, 97syntax, 42

taxis, 26, 34, 117testimonia, 44textbook, 22textual criticism, 41-2, 71, 118, 127,

143, 145, 167theurgy, 153, 208; and prayer, 183time, 91, 97-8, 156, 163, 168titles, 59-60, 102, 151, 236 n.17topos of modesty, 38treatise, 50 ungrammatical, 39unity: of reality, 70; of the world, 76;

of Greek philosophy, 84-6, 207; ofbody and soul, 115

universe, 151unveiling, of the truth, 73, 152 verse, 43views, Simplicius’ own, 12, 129

(oimai), 162, 199; see also mêpoteviva voce, 47, 67, 101, 139; see also

apo phônês wisdom, 71 (ancient), 84, 134, 156witness (marturein), 96, 104, 117writing, 43

Subject Index

292

philosophy and exegesis · 2019. 8. 3. · works of simplicius of cilicia (c. 480-c. 540 ce), a...

Documents