phmsa update: aging infrastructure and integrity ... presentation.pdf · pipeline and hazardous...

U.S. Department of Transportation

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials

Safety Administration

PHMSA Update:Aging Infrastructure and

Integrity Verification Process

NAPCA WorkshopAugust 15, 2013

Houston, Texas

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials SafetyAdministration (PHMSA)

Steve Nanney

1




PHMSA Safety Update - Topics

• Performance

• Incidents from 2012 - Overview

• PHMSA’s 2013 Agenda

• Integrity Verification Process

2




Performance

3




Serious Incidents

Downward Trend Continues in 2012

4

Serious Incident – fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization




Significant IncidentsDownward Turn in 2012

5

Significant incidents include any of the following:1. Fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization; 2. $50,000 or more in total costs, measured in 1984 dollars

3. Highly volatile liquid (HVL) releases of 5 barrels or more; 4. Non-HVL liquid releases of 50 barrels or more; and5. Liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion




2012 Hazardous Liquid Incidents

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Top Causesfor AllReported &SignificantCategories

• Material/Weld/EquipFailure

• Corrosion

• IncorrectOperation




2012 Gas Transmission Incidents

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Top Causes forAll Reported &Significantcategories

• Material/Weld/Equip Failure

• Corrosion




2012 Gas Distribution Incidents

Top Causesfor allincidentcategories:

• OtherOutsideForceDamage

• ExcavationDamage

• Other

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Significant Accident BreakdownTotal by Type (Fatalities)

Total forAll Types1

HazardousLiquid

GasTransmission

GasDistribution

2010 259 (19) 121 (1) 79 (10) 54 (8)

2011 284 (12) 139 (1) 83 (0) 60(11)

2012 244 (10) 129 (3) 62 (0) 49 (7)

3 YearAverage

(2010-2012)262 (14) 130 (2) 75 (3) 54 (9)

5 YearAverage

(2008-2012)

268 (12) 124 (2) 74 (2) 62 (8)

10 YearAverage

(2003-2012)

281 (15) 122 (2) 77 (2) 73 (11)

91 includes gas gathering (zero fatality) - excludes “fire first” incidents; data as of 03/29/2013




Incidents from 2012

Overview

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High Profile Incidents

• Chevron; Salt Lake City, Utah (Interstate)

– Crude oil and refined products

– Multiple accidents: 6/10, 12/10, 3/13

• Sissonville, West Virginia (Interstate)

– Impact to major interstate highway; questions on HCAdetermination

– Led to Congressional oversight hearing

– NTSB investigation

• Mayflower, Arkansas (Interstate)

– Canadian heavy crude

– Investigation underway

11




Sissonville Pipeline Incident

• Dec 11, 2012: Rupture of a 20” X-60, gastransmission pipeline (1967 vintage)




Sissonville Pipeline Incident

• No injuries or fatalities (thankfully)

• 3 homes destroyed, others damaged

• Interstate 77 damaged and temporarily closed

• 3 pipelines in vicinity – 20”, 26” and 30”

• PHMSA issued Corrective Action Order

• NTSB investigated cause

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Mayflower, AR Pipeline Accident

• March 29, 2012: 20” crude oilpipeline ruptured in Mayflower,Arkansas

• ~ 5,000 bbls of crude spilled

• Pipeline carrying Canadiancrude oil (Wabusca) fromPatoka, Illinois to Nederland,Texas

• Pipeline installed - 1947/1948.

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Mayflower Pipeline Incident

• Pipeline flow reversalproject was completed in2006

• Line from Patoka, IL toNederland, TX has beenshut in pending the resultsof the investigation

• Considerable mediaattention

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Incidents like these and othersin past years helped to form the

focus of

PHMSA’s 2013 Agenda…

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PSA of 2011 - Mandates

• 42 Mandates in Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, andJob Creation Act (PSA) of 2011

• Includes 9 required studies (Leak Detection, Cover overBuried Pipelines, R&D, Diluted Bitumen, Cast Iron, DamagePrevention, Expansion of IMP, Gathering Lines,…)

• Other topics include:

– MAOP Records Verification,

– Tests to Confirm Material Strength of PreviouslyUntested GT in HCAs

– 1 hour Notification of Incidents,

– Automatic/Remote Shut-off Valves

- 17 -




NTSB Recommendations

• 27 NTSB recommendations:

– ERW Pipe Seam Study/Implementation

– Emergency Response Information Sharing

• Operator Sharing Plan Information

• 911 Notification (Operator and 911 info exchange)

– ASVs/RCVs

– Removal of Grandfather Clause for Gas Transmission

– ILI Piggable Gas Transmission Pipelines

– Pressure testing of Gas Transmission (w/ spike test)

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Nominal Pipe Sizedata as of 7-1-2013 from Part H

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Decade Installeddata as of 7-1-2013 from Part J

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Specified Minimum Yield Strengthdata as of 7-1-2013 from Part K

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PSA of 2011, §23 – MAOP Mandate

• Verify records for Class Locations 3 & 4 andHCAs

• Reconfirm MAOP for pipe with incompleterecords

– 5,401 miles with Incomplete Records in Class 3 & 4 andHCAs

• Strength test all untested pipe in HCAsoperating at > 30% SMYS

– 3,220 HCA miles with Pressure Test < 1.1 MAOP

- 22 -Gas Transmission 2012 Annual Report data as-of 7-1-2013




Specified Minimum Yield Strengthdata as of 7-1-2013 from Part K

23




NTSB Recommendation P-11-14

• Eliminate Grandfather clause and requirehydrotest with a spike test for all pre-1970 pipe

– 55,120 miles Grandfathered miles reported 192.619(c)(22,717) and 192.619(a)(3) (32,403)

– 93,817 miles with Pressure Test < 1.1 times MAOP

– 20,272 miles with Stress Level > 72% SMYS or Unknown.Except for Special Permit/Alt MAOP pipelines, PHMSA expects thismileage is Grandfathered.

• PHMSA expects that Grandfather miles andPressure Test < 1.1 MAOP are actually close to same #

• Somewhere between 55 and 94 thousand miles

Gas Transmission 2012 Annual Report data as-of 7-1-201324




Pressure Test Range

Pressure Test Range Total Miles % Total

PT ˂ 1.1 MAOP or no PT 93,817 31%

1.25 MAOP > PT ≥ 1.1 MAOP 19,131 6%

PT ≥ 1.25 MAOP 187,628 62%

Gas Transmission 2012 Annual Report data, Part R, as-of 7-1-201325




Pressure Test < 1.1 MAOPdata as of 7-1-2013 from Part R

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Operating Stress Levels over72% SMYS & Unknown

% SMYS Interstate Intrastate Total

> 72 to 80 11,665 231 11,895

> 80 978 321 1,299

Unknown 973 6,074 7,038

Miles operating between 72 and 80% SMYS are eitherGrandfathered, Special Permit, or Alternative MAOP under 619(d)

Miles with Unknown SMYS are Grandfathered

Gas Transmission 2012 Annual Report data, Part K, as-of 7-1-201327




Data Summaryby HCA and Class Location

data as of 7-1-2013 from Part Q

Location Total GTMiles

% in HCA GT HCAMiles

Non-HCAMiles

Class 1 237,756 0.7 1,660 236,096

Class 2 30,210 4.7 1,412 28,798

Class 3 32,613 48.6 15,854 16,759

Class 4 962 78.2 752 209

Total 301,540 19,678 281,862

- 28 -HCA – high consequence area





Manufacturing & Construction DefectsConsidered Stable Only for Pipe with PressureTest ≥ 1.25 times MAOP

• 3,220 GT HCA Miles with Pressure Test < 1.25 MAOP

– 1,483 miles ILI Able

– 1,737 miles ILI Not Able





Pressure Test < 1.25 MAOPdata as of 7-1-2013 from Part R

- 30 -





Configure all lines to accommodate smart pigs,with priority given to older lines

• ILI Piggable 60% of Total

• 118,947 miles ILI Not Able 40% of Total

• 69,579 miles Diameter ≤ 8-inch 23% of Total

• 44,600 miles Diameter ≤ 6-inch 15% of Total

• ???? miles ILI Not Able due to system configuration





ILI Able vs Not Able

- 32 -

Part R Total Miles ILI Able ILI Not Able

Class 1 - HCA 1,658 1,380 278

- non-HCA 234,851 146,035 88,816

Class 2 - HCA 1,409 1,152 257

- non-HCA 28,978 15,073 13,905

Class 3- HCA 15,850 10,469 5,381

- non-HCA 16,751 6,924 9,827

Class 4 - HCA 752 366 386

- non-HCA 209 112 97

TOTAL 300,458 181,511 118,947

Gas Transmission 2012 Annual Report data as-of 7-1-2013




Integrity VerificationProcess

- 33 -




Integrity Verification Process

• GOAL:

Establish a comprehensive program to

effectively address Congressional

Mandates and NTSB Recommendations.

34




Overview

• Held IVP Workshop on August 7• Link to Workshop and Presentations

– http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/MtgHome.mtg?mtg=91

• Speakers– NTSB – Vice Chairman Chris Hart– PHMSA– Pipeline Safety Trust– NAPSR– Operators – Gas and Liquids

• Intrastate (2) – PG&E and Northwest Natural Gas• Interstate – INGAA• Liquids – API/AOPL – Explorer Pipeline

- 35 -

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/MtgHome.mtg?mtg=91

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/MtgHome.mtg?mtg=91




IntegrityVerification

Process (IVP)Chart

Based uponCongressional

Mandates and NTSBRecommendations

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Basic Principles of IVP Approach

• IVP is based on 4 principles

1. Apply to higher risk locations

– High Consequence Areas (HCAs) andModerate Consequence Areas (MCAs)

2. Screen segments for categories of concern(e.g., “Grandfathered” segments)

3. Assure adequate material and documentation

4. Perform assessments to establish MAOP

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Principle #1Apply to Higher Risk Locations

• High Consequence Areas (HCAs)

• Moderate Consequence Area (MCA):

– Non-HCA pipe in Class 2, 3, and 4 locations

– Non-HCA pipe Class 1 locations that are populated in PIR(proposed 1 house or occupied site) to align with INGAAcommitment

– House count and occupied site definition same as HCA,except for 1 house or 1 person at a site (instead of 20)

• PHMSA Estimates 91,000 miles HCA/MCA (out of 300,000 miles)

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HCAs and Est. MCA Mileage

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• Scope of Proposed IVP Process Estimated to Apply to:

– Total Estimated HCA + MCA Mileage = 91,000 miles

PHMSA estimates approximately 33,000 miles of GT pipe (approximately 11% of totalGT mileage) would meet screening criteria & require IVP assessment to establishMAOP – IVP Process Steps 1 – 12 based upon 2012 Annual Report Data.

Total HCA Non-HCA MCA

Class 1 237,756 1,660 236,096 (est.) 25,394

Class 2 30,210 1,412 28,798 28,798

Class 3 32,613 15,854 16,759 16,759

Class 4 962 752 209 209

Total 301,540 19,678 281,862 (est.) 71,160




Principle #2Screen for Categories of Concern

• Apply process to pipeline segments with:

– Grandfathered Pipe

• Based upon 5-year highest actual operating pressure ofsegment prior to July1,1970

– Operating pressures over 72% SMYS

• pre-Code – Grandfathered Pipe

– Lack of Records to Substantiate MAOP

– Lack of Adequate Pressure Test

– History of Failures Attributable to M&C Defects

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Principle #3Know & Document Pipe Material

• If Missing or Inadequate Validated Traceable MaterialDocumentation, then Establish Material Properties by anapproved process:

– Cut out and Test Pipe Samples (Code approved process)

– In Situ Non-Destructive Testing (if validated and Codeapproved)

– Field verification of code stamp for components such asvalves, flanges, and fabrications

– Other verifications

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Principle #4Assessments to Establish MAOP

• Allow Operator to Select Best Option to Establish MAOP

• Candidate IVP Options for Establishing MAOP

– Subpart J Test with Spike Test

– Derate pressure

– Engineering Critical Assessment

– Replace

– Other options PHMSA should consider?

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Draft - Process Steps

• 21 Step Process

– Grandfather Clause and MAOP Review – ProcessSteps 1 – 4

– Integrity Review – Process Steps 5 – 8

– Low Stress Review – Process Steps 9 – 12

– Material Documentation Review – Process Steps 13 –15

– Assessment and Analysis Review – Process Steps 16 –20

– Implementation – Process Step 21

– Deadlines for Implementation43




Draft Process Step 1Grandfather Clause Screen

• Related Mileage

– 22,717 miles reported asGrandfathered MAOP (192.619(c))

– 32,403 miles reported for MAOP(192.619(a)(3))

– Estimated 14,000 HCA/MCA Miles for192.619(a)(3) and 192.19(c) MAOP

192.619(c)MAOP Est. by“Grandfather”

1

44




Draft Process Step 9HCA/MCA Screen

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• A major screening criterion is location risk (HCAor MCA)

• Even though listed on the draft flow chart as Step9, the HCA/MCA screening step may beaccomplished first.

• HCA/MCA screen should be done first to avoidexhaustive and expensive documentation reviewfor segments that are screened out by virtue oflow location risk

• 91,000 HCA/MCA miles (out of 300,000 mi.)

Segmentin HCA or

MCA?

9




Assessment & Analysis - Steps 15-21

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Assessment and Analysis to Establish MaterialCondition of Pipeline and MAOP, commensuratewith segment-specific issues and documentationshortcomings. Assessment could include, asappropriate, specific assessments such as: ILI Program

CIS

Coating Survey

Interference Survey

Engineering Critical Assessment

Perform Subpart J Pressure TestSupplemented with “Spike”Pressure per NTSB P-11-14

Derate PipelineCommensurate with Class LocationAnd Perform Remaining Life Fatigue

Analysis.Future Uprating allowed per Subpart K

ORReplace Pipe

Document Basis for MAOP andPerform Remaining Life Fatigue

Analysis

Based onResults TakeAppropriate

Action to Est.MAOP

Develop Specific Guidelines



DevelopSpecific

Guidelines


16

19

17

18

20

SelectMethod to Establish

MAOP

15

Continue to Operate andMaintain in Accordance

with Part 19221

21

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Specific Guidelines & Criteria

• IVP Chart is high level concept

• Details and specifications underdevelopment– Will use knowledge from workshop and comments on

web site to develop details

– Details to Develop:

• Spike pressure test specs (pressure, hold time, etc.)

• De-rate criteria (amount of MAOP reduction)

• ILI program requirements and specifications

• Material verification specs (# of cutouts, etc.)

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• Implementation Timeframe

– Multi-Year Effort

– Graduated timeframes with priority to:

• Legacy (LF-ERW /Seam Issue) pipe segments

• HCAs

• High Stress segments

• Proposed deadlines under development

Target Completion Timeframes

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Thank you

Steve Nanney

US DOT / PHMSA

(713) 272-2855 office

[email protected]

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