IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERKFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORC~~5 N- ~'~ ~ ~

Atlanta DivisionChoa*

.j

FILE NO: 1 :08-CV-1971

SUPERIOR COURT, et., al.,Defendants

FILED IN CLERKS OFRCEu .s,a .c. Atlanta

SEP - 9 ZOOS

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,JANET D. MCDONALD,

Plaintiffs

vs.

CIVIEL ACTION

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 59(e)AND/ORMOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION UNDER RULE 60(b)

Comes now Plaintiffs, who file their Motion For Reconsideration pursuant

to and in compliance with Fed . R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) within ten

(10) days of this Court's Order and Judgment dated August 26, 2008 .

BRIEF BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their complaint' in this Court June 9, 2008 . Service perfected

upon all Defendants June 10, 2008. Judge Becker dismissed Plaintiffs Superior

Court action dune 11 , 2008 in retaliation for being named Defendant in this action .

This Court Dismissed the case August 26, 2008 .

1 This case was brought to US district Court due to illegal acts, fraud upon theCourt, and conspiracy in a Superior Court action between Plaintiffs and GeorgiaPower Company that resulted in Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Superior Court complaintand leaving only Georgia Power Company' counterclaim .

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AUGUST 26, 2008 OPINION AND ORDER

Superior Court and Judge Becker (Superior Court Defendants) Moved to

Dismiss June 17, 2008; Georgia Power, Brain Watt and Scott Farrow (GA Power

Defendants) moved to dismiss June 27, 2008; all defendants claimed Rooker-

Feldman, and Younger Abstention . This Court Dismissed the case August 26,

2008 on the grounds of lounger .

Plaintiffs address the Court's Opinion and Order in the same sequence as

addressed by this Court. Plaintiffs had asked that irrelevant and immaterial matters

be disregarded (Response to Superior Courts Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

(doc.8, pg.2) and Response to GA Power Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc .9,

pgs.2-3); Nevertheless, this Court addressed several of the issues, and made

incorrect statements, which must not be allowed to stand as stated .

Concerning Stegeman v. Georgia, ef., aL, No. : 1 :06-cv-02954-WSD (fnl

pg. 2 Order and Opinion) see the following :

Page 2, fnl, l" ¶: "Plaintiff claimed he improperly was chargedwith elder abuse and financial fraud . . .wrongfully revoked hisPower of Attorney . . ."

* The statement is incorrect, see the following :

Plaintiff showed through undisputed documentation that without having

been charged, tried or convicted, Stegeman was found guilty of Family Violence

2 Order and Opinion dated August 26, 2008 referred to hereinafter as "Or."

and financial fraud by the Probate Clerk Jeryl Rosh, who lacked jurisdiction over

criminal matters, and lacked power to do so, revoked a special Durable Power of

Attorney with an interest.

Concerning Stegeman, A, aL, v. Wachovia Bank et. , aL, No. : 06-cv-1065-8

Fnl, 2°d ¶: "Wachovia Bank filed an action in DeKalb CountySuperior Court against Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald foraccounting and damages . . ."

* The statement is incorrect, see the following:

Wachovia Bank has never filed suit against either Plaintiff Stegeman or

Plaintiff McDonald. The case being referenced is Superior Court case : Joyner v.

Stegeman, and vice versa No . : 02-cv-9732-8 . Joyner, the County Probate Court

appointed Guardian of Property of Jean Caffrey, filed suit against Stegeman only

for accounting damages . Plaintiff McDonald was not named in the suit.

Attached is a copy of the Docket Report for the case Exhibit A

Fn1 2"d ¶ continues : "Plaintiffs refused to conclude thesettlement, . . . Plaintiffs Stegeman and McDonald brought aseparate pro Se action . . . against Wachovia. . ."

* The statement is incorrect, see the following :

When 02-cv-9732-8 concluded, neither attorney would file the agreement

with Superior Court; Stegeman upheld his part of the agreement and Withdrew the

Caveat to the Will. The opposing party refused to honor their part of the

agreement, that's why the case continued . That case finally ended, by Stegeman

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obtaining new counsel to file the agreement ; the new attorney conducted a legal

investigation. After completion of the investigation, Plaintiffs Stegeman and

McDonald filed a pro se action against Wachovia, No . : 06-cv-1056-8; which

Wachovia improperly removed to this District Court; this Court remanded to

Superior Court. Docket report is Exhibit B

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' complaint clearly stated that this case is brought due to illegal

acts, fraud upon the court, and conspiracy that plagued the Superior Court action, 3

and resulted in Plaintiffs' Superior Court action being dismissed with prejudice,

due to a fictional discovery dispute . 4 The Defendant's counterclaim is still

pending and Plaintiffs' property has never been brought under jurisdiction of

Superior Court.

"`Georgia Power filed counterclaims . . . for declaratory judgment and

3 Stegeman, eL, al., v. Georgia Power Company No. : 07-CV-11398-6

A Judge Duffey, Jr . claims not to be bias or prejudice against Pro Se, disabled,and/or Plaintiffs in particular . Reading the Order and Opinion, shows the contrary .The Order quotes not what the complaint said, but what GA Power defendants saidin their Motion to Dismiss . Clearly, when deciding a Motion to Dismiss, allallegations in the complaint are accepted as true ; see Bush v. Reeves, Jr., et., al.,N.D.Ga. No . : 1 :05-cv-13 1STWT page 2 citing Quality Foods de Centro America,S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dep. Corp., S.A. 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 ( 1 1 thCir . 1983) which held: "In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must acceptthe facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiff."

injunctive relief. . .Georgia Power possess a valid easement . . . "(Or. pgs. 2-3)

Plaintiffs have shown through undisputed, documented evidence in this

Court as well as in Superior Court, that GA Power made fraudulent claims of a

valid, legal easement, granted by "Dr . R. F. Wells, R F. Wells, or Mr. R. F.

Wells" . In Superior Court, Plaintiffs provided undisputed evidence that the

document was a fraud (Comp . ¶¶'s 11-14,19, 25-29,36-41), filed Motion to Strike

on that basis March 5-8, 2008 .(Comp. ¶¶'s 31, 32, 64) and filed Motion To Stay

Discovery and All Other Processes March 20, 2008 staying the action (Comp ¶¶'s

64965) .

Plaintiffs have provided this Court with the same and additional evidence .

Dr., Mr., and/or R. F. Wells never existed (dots. 8 & 9), the document was

forged/manufactured . Georgia Power is guilty of fraudulent claims to both Courts .

Under both Georgia and Federal law, the use of a fraudulent/manufactured/forged,

land documents is a crime . Plaintiffs have researched the matter thoroughly, failed

to find anywhere that the laws do not apply to GA Power, the Superior Court

defendants, or the GA Power defendants . GA statutes :

O.C.G.A. §44-2-43Any person who : (1) fraudulently obtains or attempts to obtain adecree of registration of title to and land or interest therein ; (2). . .offers in evidence any forged or fraudulent document in thecourse of an proceedings with regard to registered lands orinterest therein; (3) makes or utters any forged instrument of

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transfer . . . or anv other paper, writing, or document used inconnection with any of the proceedings required . . .or thenotation of entries upon the register of titles; (4) steals orfraudulently conceals any owner's certificate, creditor'scertificate, or other certificate of title provided for under thisarticle ; (5) fraudulent) alters, chi, or mutilates any writing,instrument, document, record , registration, or register providedfor under this article; (6) makes any false oath or affidavit withrespect to anj matter or thing provided for in this article ; or (7)makes or knowingly uses anv counterfeit of iny certificateprovided for by this article shall be guilty of a felony and shallbe punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more thanten years .O.C.G.A. §44-2-44Any clerk, . . . or other person . . . who: (1) fraudulently enters adecree of registration . . . ; (2) fraudulently registers anv title; (3)fraudulently makes any notation or entry upon the title register ;(4) fraudulently issues an r certificate of title, . . .or otherinstrument . . . ; or (5) . . . does any act of omission or commissionunder color of his office in relation to the matters provided for bythis article shall be guilty of a fe lony and shall be removed fromoffice and be permanently disqualified from holding any publicoffice and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less thanone nor more than ten years.

See also: The State v. Johnson S97G1681 ; (269 Ga. 370) (499 SE2d 56)(1998):

"OCGA 16-10-20. That statute sets forth three ways to committhe crime of false statement : (1) when a person : . .falsifies amaterial fact ; (2) when a person makes a false, fictitious, orfraudulent statement or representation ; or (3) when a person"makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the sameto contain anv false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry ."Id. This appeal involves the third way of violating OCGA 16-10-20."" . . . the Court of Appeals erred when it held . . . "using" a falsedocument under OCGA 16-10-20 applies only to a person whouses a false document that was prepared by another . State v.

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Johnson, supra at 837. . . .the person who makes a falsedocument containing the false statement has already violated thestatute, id .,""[Statutes should be read according to the natural and mostobvious import of the language, w ithout resorting to subtle andforced constructions, for the purpose of either limiting orextending their operation, [cit .], and this principle is particularlycompelling when interpreting criminal statutes . [Cit.]" State v.Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156, 158 (1) (a) (ii) (419 SE2d 32) (1992) .Even construing OCGA 16-10-20 strictly against the State, seegenerally Dowers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 809 (2) (484 SE2d 803)(1997), the language therein unambiguously prohibitss anindividual from making or _using Any-false writing or document,without regard to the identity . . . who initially made orsubsequently used the false document. . there is no limitationplaced on the prohibited conduct of "making or using" falsedocuments in OCGA 1 6-10-20, the statutory language does notsupport the Court of Appeals' holding that prosecution for use ofa false document is limited to those situations in which anaccused uses false documents prepared by another . State v.Johnson, supra at 837 ."Where statutory language is plain and unequivocal . . ., the courthas no authority to place a different construct ion upon it. Seegenerally Holders v. State, 187 Ga. App. 597 (2) (370 SE2d 847)(1988). It thus follows that under OCGA 16-10-20, allindividuals who use a false writing or document . . ., may bechargedd with violating the statute .""'Anv pprty to a crime who did not directly commit the crimemay be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commissionof the crime . . . ." Id. It is not necessary . . . allege 16-2-20 and 16-2-21 in the indictment . State v. Military Circle Pet Center, 257Ga. 388 (360 SE2d 248) (1987); see also Jenkins v. State, 172Ga. App. 715 (4) (324 SE2d 491) (1984)."

See also :Avery v. Chrysler Motors Copr., et., aL, A94A 1408. (214 Ga .App . 602) (448 SE2d 737) (1994) citing See Robinson v. State,198 Ga. App. 431, 433 (401 SE2d 621) (1991) . :

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"Theft by deception is committed when a person "obtainsproperty by any deceitful means or artful practice with theintention of depriving the owner of the property ." OCGA 16-8-3(a) . "A person deceives if . . . : ( I) Creates or confirms another'simpression of an existing fact or past event which is false . . . ;[or](2) Fails to correct a false impression of an existing fact or pastevent which he has previously created or confirmed ."""A fraud may be committed by acts as well as words ." OCGA51-6-4 (a)."

Superior Court violated Georgia law concerning land procedures . Superior

Court, once noticed that the case about real estate, and an easement document was

being challenged as not pertaining to the property in question, the Court was

obligated to perform the following tasks :

a) have the Sheriffs Office bring the property underjurisdiction of the Courtb) have an examiner of title appointed

a): To Brim under Jurisdiction of the Court :O.C.G.A. §44-2-64,(, . . .shall contain a full description of the land, its valuation, . . .show when, how, and from whom it was acquired, a descriptionof . . ., and an abstract of title ; shall state whether or not it isoccupied; . . . Full names and addresses, . . . who may have anyinterest , . ., including adjoining owners and occupants, shall begiven. The description of the land . . . in terms which will identify. . . fully . . . . in which land is divided into land districts and lotnumbers . . . shall state the number of the land district and the lotnumber . . .Upon the recommendation of the examiner, . . ."O.C.G.A. §44-2-67(a)(1) . . . the clerk shall issue a process directed to the sheriffs . . .(2) A copy . . . shall be served . . .upon each party who is named(3) The clerk . . .shall also cause to be published . . .O.C.G.A. §44-2-72

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(a) A notice . . . shall be delivered by the clerk to the sheriff . . .shall, within 30 days . . ., post the same upon the land . . .(b) If . . . one or more . . ., the sheriff shall conspicuously postupon each . . .the notice . . . in subsection (a) . . . he shall state thisin his return to the court.(e) After the sheriff . . .has entered upon the land, posted thenotices provided for in subsections (a) and (b) of this Codesection, and made his return to the court . . ., the land shall bedeemed . . .seized and brought into the custody of the court .. .and the court's jurisdiction in rem . . . .and quasi in rem. . . forpurposes of landd registration proceedings . . ."

b): Examiner of titlesO.C.G.A. §44-2-77"While . . . pending . . .before the examiner of titles . . . beforefinal decree, . . . may require the land to be surveyed . . ."

This Court continues with the dismissal saying: "On June I 1, . . .dismissed

Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. . . failure to appear at a duly noticed motions

hearing . . . failure to appear at depositions as ordered by the Court ."

Plaintiffs respond that the complaint they filed in this Court shows dismissal

of their complaint was for a fictional discovery dispute, and failure to appear at an

unscheduled hearing. Motions Hearings are scheduled on the Motion Calendar .

Plaintiffs were only provided a tentative date for a hearing, they requested more

than once that if the hearing is in fact scheduled, it needed to show on the Motion

Calendar and/or in the "Scheduled Events" on the Docket Report . The hearing

never showed in either place. Plaintiffs have stated that they tried numerous times

to contact Judge Becker's calendar clerk, left messages for her, she never returned

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any calls . Uniform Superior Court Rules clearly show that if your name does not

appear on the Calendar, you do not have a hearing scheduled, see the following :

Rule 2.4. Calendar clerk.". . . "calendar clerk" . . . responsibility of setting and schedulingall hearings and trials . . ."Rule 8.1. Scheduling trials."The assigned judge . . . sole responsibility for setting hearings. . ., for the scheduling of all trials . . .and for the publication of allnecessary calendars in advance . . . ."Rule 8.3. Trial calenda r."The calendar clerk shall prepare a trial calendar . . . The calendarshall state the place of trial and the date and time . . .trial calendarshall be delivered to the clerk of the court . . .published asufficient periodd of time, but not less than „20days, prior to thesession of court . . ."Rule 8.4. Trial date."The parties and counsel in the first 10 actions on the published. . . calendar shall appear ready for trial on the date specified . . ."

See also :

Green v. Green, 437 S .E.2d 457, (263 Ga. 551)(1993) theSupreme Court discusses whether the first five or first ten listedon the calendar must appear for hearing :

" . . . in Fulton v. State of Ga., 183 Ga. App. S70 (359 S.E.2d726) (1987), that only the first five *fn2 cases on the publishedcalendar were required to be present . In this case, as in Fulton,which we believe to state the better interpretation of USCR 8 .4,judgment was entered against a party who was not required bythe rule to be present; in this case, as in Fulton, the judgmentshould have been set aside"

"In addition to the purely legal question regarding presenceat calendar call, the role appellee's counsel played in procuringthe judgment must be examined. . . "

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" . . . on the federal and state level, courts . . .have sought toencourage professionalism among lawyers . . . In furtherance . . .ofthese goals, . . . this court established the Chief Justice'sCommission on Professionalism . . . to maintain . . ., a sense ofcivility and courtesy among lawyers . . . ., Chief Justice Clarke hasoften said that "ethics is that which is required andprofessionalism is that which is expected .""

This Court states: "When the Superior Court ordered Plaintiffs to appear at

their depositions, the Court warned that their failure to appear would result in the

action being dismissed." (Or. pg.3) .

Plaintiffs received the Order past noon on the day the depositions were

scheduled for 9 :00 or 9:30 a.m., Notice of Deposition did not have the Order

attached ; Plaintiffs provided this Court undisputed evidence see the fo llowing:

77. & 130. Apparently Judge Becker presided over a hearing May27, 2U08 which was not on the Motion Calendar "Exhibit 9"

80. Plaintiffs left a message that the Motion Calendar did notshow a hearing set for May 27, 2008, Plaintiffs have attachedJudge Becker's May 27th Motion Calendar as "Exhibit 10"

83. Defendants Notice To Take Video Depositions5 were inviolation of Georgia Codes . . . Superior Court Rules .84. Plaintiffs filed Objection to Depositions June 2, 2008 . . . theywould be unable to attend on June 4, 2008, see "Exhibit 11" .

5 Although Plaintiffs believe the Notice to Take Deposition MUST have the Orderattached, the Order was not signed until the following day, and could not beattached to the Notice; since the Court mailed the Order in the afternoon the daybefore the Depositions were to be held, Plaintiffs had no way of knowing what theOrder said .

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85. The Plaintiffs were unable to hand deliver the Objections . . .U.S.P.S. ExpressMail . . .tracking shows . . .delivered and signedfor by the Court June 3, 2008 .

86. Plaintiffs' Objection . . . was returned by Law Clerk Hash,postmarked June 6th as shown by "Exhibit 12"

131 . Watt sent Notice of Video Depositions see "Exhibit 10"

Plaintiffs also showed Notice of deposition mailed by GA Power was dated

and mailed May 27, 2008, before the Order was signed, and made no mention of

an Order (Comp. ¶131 & Exhibit 10); Judge Becker signed the Order May 28,

2008 and mailed it to Plaintiffs June 3, 2008, see complaint "Exhibit 13". It

would be impossible for Plaintiffs to have known "the Court warned that their

failure to appear would result in the action being dismissed" .

II. A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Recusal

Although Judge Duffey may believe that Plaintiffs' Motion to Recuse or

Disqualify was based only on past issues decided by the Court (Or . pgs. 7-8) ; and

that "plaintiffs argue, confusingly, that the Court did not fully address certain

unspecified issues . . . even though the Court found it did not have jurisdiction . . . and

remanded it to the state court, as Stegeman requested."

Before this case was dismissed, Plaintiffs filed Response to Motion to Stay

Discovery. Plaintiffs' Response to the Motion, page 5 and Exhibit 1 show that

when the Wachovia case was in this Court, a Ruling was made concerning

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Discovery, the same Discovery that none of the current defendants filed . This

Court, said that should Plaintiffs not file the discovery within fifteen days, their

complaint would be dismissed ; Plaintiffs filed the material on time, the Court

decided it did not have jurisdiction. Was the Order not an exercise of jurisdiction?

Why would the Plaintiffs in Wachovia be different than any of the defendants this

Court just granted dismissal? Further, the Court stated that the case had been

improperly Removed, but did not say how . Facts clearly showed that Removal

was filed to the wrong Superior Court Judge ; Wachovia was in default, etc . This

Court allowed numerous filings, Remanded the case in mid April, Wachovia had

been in default since February 5'~ .

(3r- page 8, " . . .Stegeman claims. . .granting Defendant's . . . Summary

Judgment the Court denied Stegeman's disabilities . . ." Stegeman is not aware of a

Summary Judgment in the Georgia case, this Court dismissed on statute of

limitations and immunity and ignored that Stegeman is one a of a protected class .

Pacer fees, Stegeman stated he does not own a car. Perhaps this Court

Clerk's Office has free Pacer access ; this Court would have a person with a

physical mobility impairment, in constant pain go from Stone Mountain to

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downtown by bus to view Pacer for free? 6 Obviously this court deemed Stegeman

undeserving. Free access to Pacer would cost neither this Court, nor the public

anything. Denial warms bias/prejudicial.

B. Motions to Dismiss The Younger Abstention Doctrine

The following paragraphs shows why Younger fails .

(1) "the state proceeding is `an ongoing state judicial proceeding"'

The only remaining "state proceeding" is Georgia Power's counterclaim .

Since Plaintiffs' case has been Dismissed with prejudice, they are estopped from

ever being able to properly defend against Georgia Power.

(2) "proceedings implicate important states interest s"

This Court cited RPD Long Beach v. Tranter Hare Inv. Bldg. Corp., No.

1 :07-cv-00475, 2005 WL 269444, at *4 (S .D. Oh. Jan 30, 2008) "(Younger

abstention applies to dispute implicating state law on the validity of easements) ."

Plaintiffs address the relation of RPD Long Beach and "state interests" . RPD

Long Beach had to do with validity of easement granted by a lessee:

"Younger abstention applies here because Plaintiff's claimsinvolve important state interests in a property dispute implicating. . . lease interpretation . ."

The case shows nothing to indicate that the dispute between Plaintiffs and

6 Stegeman wantedd only to view his own case, to make sure he met all thedeadlines, etc, just an attorney would do . Nothing more .

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GA Power creates implications of Georgia's law and their private property .

Younger is not applicable .

This Court also cites Crown Point I LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec.

Assn 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10"' Cir. 2003) "(condemnation action against

easement implicates important state intere st)" . In counter to that, Crown Point

proves that Younger is not applicable . Crown Point was a condemnation action to

gain an easement in which a Land Development Code special use code was

amended giving a state interest .

Again, Crown fails to show that the case before this Court has a showing of

state interest . Georgia Power used a forged easement documents to prove they

have an easement. Under Georgia law, one uses condemnation to gain an eminent

domain unless easement is granted by the property owner ; it is illegal to take land

then forge documents to show that you were granted easement by a person that

never existed.

Crown Point also states :

Younger abstention "is the except ion, not the rule ." Joseph A. v.Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir . 2002) (quotingAnkenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S . 689, 705 (1992)). Indetermining whether Younger abstention is appropriate, a courtconsiders whether : "(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil,or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides anadequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federalcomplaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state

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interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for theirresolution or implicate separately articulated state policies ."Amanatullah v. Colorado Bra of Med. Exam 'rs, 187 F.3d 1160,1163 (10th dir . 1999) (internal quotations omitted) .

Georgia Power has no rights over Plaintiffs' property, they committed fraud

upon the court; their acts are illegal : theft by deception, false statements, fraud and

forgery. In Superior Court, Plaintiffs disputed the validity of the easement

document, GA Power refused to address the document, claiming the need to

depose Plaintiffs . Until such time the Court would appoint the necessary examiner

of title, and bring the property under jurisdiction of the Court, and the examiner of

title confirm or deny the validity of the document, nothing else could happen .

Superior Court allowed the creation of a fictional discovery dispute .

Six months after filing of the suit, Georgia Power filed an Amendment to

their Verified Answer and Counterclaim, hidden within the Amendment was

Motion for Reformation attempting to make the document legal . Plaintiffs showed

a reformation could not be performed . Both The United States and Georgia

Constitutions prohibit the taking of private land for public use without just

compensation being paid. This did not happen in Plaintiffs situation, Georgia

Power asks the state Court to just give them Plaintiffs' land . Once illegally taken,

the Court cannot just give them the property they stole .

Superior Court, having failedd to abide by Georgia law, allowed GA Power to

Crown Point goes on to state :"However, we find that plaintiff does not have an adequateopportunity to raise its federal claims in state court ."" . . .the state court found that plaintiff was collaterally estoppedfrom raising its due process claims due to . . . dismissal . . ., did nothave an opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state courtproceedings . . ."

This Court also cites Wexler stating " . . .abstention may be

commit fraud upon the Court, thereby making a mockery of the Court, and

manipulate the judicial system, Judge Becker then dismissed with prejudice

Plaintiffs case, forever preventing them to properly defend themselves and their

property from GA Power. Having shown all of these facts to this Court, this Court

then states that it has faith that Plaintiffs will be able to address their constitutional

challenges in State Court .

(3) "adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raiseconstitutional challenges"

Plaintiffs have shown that the State Court refused to follow Georgia statute,

then dismissed their complaint with prejudice without a hearing. Plaintiffs will not

have an adequate forum to raise their federal claims in the state proceedings . .

appropriate . . . where the plaintiff in the federal case chose not to assert a

constitutional defense as a defendant in state court ."

Plaintiffs in this case were also Plaintiffs in Superior Court , not defendants;

furthermore, the Wexler Ruling by District Court was vacated and remanded :

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. . .The comity Justice Black wrote . . . between state courts andfederal courts . . .does not offend the respectful relationshipbetween state and federal courts, nor would it place the districtcourt in the role of supervisor of state litigation or the state court .

. . ., an exercise of jurisdiction by the district court merelypreserves the federal forum for federal claims raised by plaintiffsin a federal proceeding, although a similar state action was alsofiled. Most important, if the injunctive relief Plaintiff-Appellantsrequest is granted, the result will not be the kind of federaltakeovers at issue in 3l Foster Children or Miller.""But there is no doctrine that the availability or even thependency of state judicial proceedings excludes the federalcourts." NOPSI, 109 S .Ct. at 2521"

"Thus, the parallel proceedings brought by Appellant Wexler donot present the "undue interference" in state court proceedingsnecessary to apply Younger. NOPSI, 109 S.Ct. at 2513. Norwould a federal injunction of the kind sought in this case, usurpthe state courts' ability to "perform their judicial Functions ." Id . at2518 . See also Pennzoil Co., 107 S .Ct. at 1526. We, therefore,vacate the district court's dismissal and remand the action for adetermination of Appellant-Plaintiffs' claim ."

Wexler goes against this Court's decision:

"First, we find no federal authority supporting the propositionthat federal claims that might be supported by the same allegedfacts must be raised by state plaintiffs in cases arising under statelaw in state courts. Instead, we recall the Supreme Court'sreasoning from 1964 : "[t]here are fundamental objections to anyconclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked thejurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federalconstitutional claims can be compelled . . . to accept instead astate court's determination of those claims ." England v. La. StateBd. of Mere Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 46413 11L.Ed.2d 440 (1964).5 We recently wrote that "generally, asbetween state and federal courts, the rule is that the pendency ofan action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning

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the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction."Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F .3d 1320, 1328(llth Cir.2004) (quoting Colorado River)."

"Other circuits have reached the same conclusion on the sameissue before us that we do today . The Younger doctrine does notrequire abstention merely because a federal plaintiff, alleging aconstitutional violation in federal court, filed a claim under statelaw, in state court, on the same underlying facts . See Rogers v.Desiderio, 58 F.3d 299, 301 (7th Cir.1995} ; Marks v. Stinson, 19F.3d 873, 882 (3rd Cir.1994); Crawley v. Hamilton CountyComm'rs, 744 F.2d 28, 30 (6th Cir.1984). As recognized, theexercise of federal jurisdiction in such a circumstance would notprevent the state court from exercising its jurisdiction just as astate court's ruling against the parties who are federal plaintiffswould not offend the federal courts ."

Further: In Younger, a federal plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a

state statute under which he was being prosecuted as a defendant. The Court

abstained from hearing plaintiffs claim, concluding that a sufficient state forum

existed for the plaintiff to raise his constitutional defense . Younger, 91 S.Ct. at

755. The Plaintiffs before this Court are not being prosecuted, are not defendants

in state court, are not challenging state statute, and are not raising a constitutional

defense. They are suing for Civil and Constitutional Rights violations for illegal

acts committed under color of law or color of authority to obtain a judgment

against the Plaintiffs, having Plaintiffs' state case dismissed with prejudice .

This Court indicates that the "central question is regarding the application of

Georgia real property law, especially the existence and scope of rights within an

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easement." (Or. pg . 19) And "the DeKalb Easement Case concerns . . . literally

effect the welfa re and well-being of the community".

Neither statement is correct . Plaintiffs fully understand and accept Georgia

Easement Law, and has nothing to do with Georgia Power's use of a fraudulent

document signed by a man that never existed . Moving a power pole to it's proper

location, prohibiting theft of private property, prohibiting Georgia Power's use of

forged documents when claiming easement rights would be much better for the

welfare and well-being of a community. Georgia Power is not above the law.

This Court then states that "Plaintiffs . . . have an adequate opportunity to raise

their constitutional challenges in the state court . . ."

Plaintiffs have shown that this is also incorrect . They have had their Rights

violated in the state court, there has been conspiracy, fraud upon the correct, a

fictional discovery dispute and unscheduled hearings that lead to Plaintiffs' case

being dismissed with prejudice . This Court has now barred Plaintiffs from ever

raising their constitutional challenges using Younger Abstention which does not

apply by this Court's own caselaw.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Move this Court to reconsider it's dismissal of their case . The

Plaintiffs must not be prohibited from using the Federal Court system in the

a manifest injustice to dismiss this case thereby denying the ability to be able to

ever again protect their private property .

Plaintiffs can hardly believe that this Court or any Court would be willing to

allow violations of Federally protected Rights when a party has been barred by the

State Court from being able to protect themselves due to fraud upon the Court .

This Court has stated that Plaintiffs may refile the case if Plaintiffs claims

are not precluded by state court decisions , including res judicataa and collateral

estoppel. In other words, Plaintiffs can file later, but that will be dismissed too .

Respectfully submitted this 5 h day of September, 2008

ByJ S B. o

821 Sheppardto e Mountain, GA 30083

(7qU) 879-8737

By:ANET D. MC NALD, Pro Se

821 She axd Rd.Stone Mountain, GA 30083

(770) 879-8737

-21

In compliance with LR 7-11), N.D. Ga., I certify that the foregoing Motion

This 56 day of 2008

Stone Mountain, GA 30083(770) 879-8737

DIET D. MCDC3 ALD, Pro Se821 Shepp d Rd

Stone Mountain, GA 30083(770) 879-8737

-22-

TE OF

has been prepared in

with Times New

(1 .5"') inches and a left

ity with LR 5 .1, N.D. GA. This Motion was prepared

(14 point) type, with a top margin of one and one-half

of one (1") inch, is proportionately spaced .

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA,

Atlanta Division

CIVIL ACTIONFILE NO: 1:08-CV 1971-WSD

SUPERIOR COURT, et., al.,Defendants

First Class Mail, proper postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows :

Daniel S. ReinhardtTroutman Sanders, LLPBank of America Plaza - Suite 5200600 Peachtree Street, NEAtlanta, GA 30308-2216

Devon OrlandState of Georgia Dept. of Law

40 Capitol Square, S .W.Atlanta, GA 30334-1300

-23-

JAMES B. STEGEMAN,JANET D. MCDONALD,

Plaintiffs

vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I Certify that I have this 5th day of September, 2008, served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration upon

Defendants , through their attorney on file by causing to be depo sited with U.S.P. S .,

821 Sheppard RdStone Mountain, GA 30083

(770) 879-8737