Refusing Sophistic Views of Virtue: Genuine Virtue as Preventative

of Civil War

Greg Grady

University of North Texas

Abstract: The Sophists have provided much opposition to Plato, as

much of his philosophical system responds to the Sophists’ claims on virtue

and human nature. The idea of virtue and self interest transgresses

throughout the Sophists, specifically Antiphon, Thucydides, and Callicles.

The Sophists depict virtue as fragile – in that it depends on the law, and that

virtue protects the weak and inferior. This view is particularly displayed

through the Corcyran Revolt and the plague in Athens. I argue here that

Platos response to the Sophists rejects and negates their view of virtue by

explicating that genuine virtue resides within the internal structure of the

tripartite soul, which is predominantly ruled by reason, and virtue that is

dependent on law, is in fact, not virtue at all in that it depends on external

factors. In addition, in a society where genuine virtue is employed, civil war

has the possibility of never occurring.

I. The Problem Posed for Plato

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Through the Platonic dialogues, Plato provides a critique and serves as

opposition to the Sophist’s outlook on such things as virtue, justice, and

human nature. The Sophists, on the other hand, persist to be formidable

opponents to Plato throughout his philosophy. Plato attempts to argue

against the varying views of the Sophists but struggles to find the argument

to sway them away from their conceptions of human nature and justice. In

The Republic, Plato attempts to resolve many of these problems set forth by

the Sophists. More specifically, Plato attempts to tackle the self-interest

motives that can lead to civil war, and explain how genuine virtue can play a

part within this particular construct regarding human nature. In order for

Plato to respond to the Sophists accordingly, and promote genuine virtue,

he must redefine the Sophistic thought on what is natural.

At the core of Sophistic philosophy and tradition, dwells a frame of

reference that facilitates around self-interest. Although the Sophists

mutually ascend to this notion, virtue plays a quite different role through

Sophistry itself. Through Antiphon, Thucydides, and Callicles, the

emergence of virtue takes shape, and its transformation commences as they

each contribute to the Sophist notion of virtue within their own Sophistic

frame of reference. Antiphon begins by postulating that human nature

(acting naturally) is the ultimate life-promoting tool. Thucydides then

presupposes this condition of self-interest in his observations – while

labeling virtue, along with law, ineffective in certain states of chaos. By the

time virtue reaches Callicles, virtue is portrayed as a protection to the weak

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and inferior. Protecting the feeble prevents the strong from fully and freely

cultivating nature and its assets. Ultimately, according to the Sophists,

virtue is impotent and futile within human nature.

Antiphon presents the initial notion of what is innate in human nature is

to promote life, that this is the most natural and basic function of humans.

Essentially, Antiphon reduces the human condition into this logical

approach: “Living results for them from what is advantageous, dying from

what is not advantageous. But advantages which are established by the laws

are bonds on nature, and those established by nature are free” (106).

Antiphon concludes that what is natural for humans are to live and act,

naturally and freely. This sets the pre-text that is adopted and endorsed by

Thucydides – in which Thucydides examines what is natural human

behavior.

Thucydides’ “On Justice Power and Human Nature” provides an account

of specific disastrous events within Athens and Corcyran in which he

designates what he thinks constitutes virtue. Within these events, human

nature is exposed to be a selfish and inherently self-interested species that

employs virtue instrumentally to achieve certain ends, and if there are no

ends to be reached then virtue is only dependent upon law and virtue is not

self-sustainable.

Plato’s confrontation with the Sophistic tradition poses a threat to any

notion of true virtue. In response, Plato creates an entire philosophical

system to negate the Sophistic philosophy. This does not replace the

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Sophistic insight. Plato does however; offer a solution that he thinks could

prevent an outbreak of civil war within a city. Plato’s problem emerges:

How can virtue and an ideal city be sustained if people are naturally

inclined to operate with their own interests being the primary? More

importantly – how can genuine virtue ever emerge in the Sophist view of

human nature? I argue that Plato’s proposed assertion, within this

framework of human nature - one of self-interest, is: Genuine virtue (or the

reality of virtue) not only exists, but when employed has the possibility of

preventing civil war. In order to do this, Plato will have to re-construct

human nature in a way that it resembles the tripartite soul – where reason

is the ruler.

II. The Sophists: A Progressive View on Human Nature as Seen

Through Antiphon, Thucydides and Callicles.

The Sophists particular view on human nature was characterized by

self-interest, virtue as convention, and law as unnatural to human nature

itself. Sophists spent much of their time differentiating between the natural

and artificial, the “Sophists questioned the foundations and values of the

Greek polis by emphasizing the dichotomy between the natural world and

the moral values which were at the basis of the political community”

(Saxonhouse, Polity, Vol. 10, No. 4 pp. 461-487). Sentiments provided by

Sophists, usually in debates regarding issues of morality in human nature,

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subsisted in the dichotomy between what was natural versus what was man

made conventional law. The natural world remained distinct in and of itself,

while custom, virtue, and law were superfluously added onto the natural

world by men who acted to regulate, restrict, and suppress the stronger.

These conventions prevented men from prospering and living naturally, as

human nature would have intended it.

The Pre-Socratic, Antiphon, discusses the disadvantages a man affronts

when adhering to law and custom excessively, while ignoring the physis or

the natural. Antiphon attempts to compromise between the impulse in

human nature and the convention of laws and justice. In other words, man

must find a way to maximize his profits and promote life to its fullest extent

without violating the laws of the city in a way that brings shame and

punishment to the man. As a result, Antiphon suggests in this loose attempt,

to reconcile the nomos and physis, to make the most advantage of justice by

“treating[ing] the laws as important in the presence of witnesses, and

treat[ing] the decrees of nature as important when alone and with not

witnesses present” (Curd, 105).

In this analysis, it can be seen that laws are contrary to the self interest

drive within nature (though not all), laws are implemented in such a way

that they divert one’s natural desires into what is socially acceptable and

permitted for “laws have been established for the eyes, as to what they

must see and what they must not, and for the ears, as to what they must

hear and what they must not…(106)” To clarify, whatever the ears hear

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initially- this is what is natural, while laws corrupt what is being heard - as

to what should be heard.

In the Polis, obedience will in turn be beneficial within this construct,

while citizens who abide by the law will prosper (or at least, refrain from

being shamed). Acting accordingly in the eyes of others creates a synthetic

social conditioning – that is, people artificially implement and execute virtue

or lawful acts only for approval. In turn, social acceptable behavior becomes

dependent on those who observe a man acting in sync with the law – and it

will ultimately be the guiding hand of the virtue and the virtuous. Laws

might prove successful in suppressing the natural life within the public

forum, however, within the private confines of one’s own life, the natural

life cannot be contained.

Given Antiphon’s prerogative, human nature is not necessarily

venturing to act morally insofar as it’s attempting to unravel and act

naturally; however, acting naturally will be seen by other Sophists

(specifically Thucydides and Callicles) as acting in one’s self interest. The

presentation of this dichotomy (physis / nomos) conveys man as someone

who imposes law onto human nature. In response, nature can exert

resistance against law and conventional bondage; however, it cannot

impose its own being upon the law. In Thucydides’ account of civil war and

the plague, human nature not only shows its resistance against the law, but

how human nature undermines the law entirely when self interest prevails

among all other codes of conduct. Law itself becomes a motivator for virtue

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but is unable to support it when self-interest runs rampant, thus reverting

human nature back to its original form – the life led by self-interest. By the

time that the notion of “virtue” arrives in Thucydides, it has already

transpired into something Plato would disagree with – virtue as dependent

on law. (Moulton, 1975)

Thucydides arrives at a conclusion similar to Antiphons regarding

human nature, but gives a historical account of how law, virtue, and human

nature unravel. Thucydides’ portrayal of particular events gives one an

account of virtue, as it enters the picture of nomos and physis. Thucydides

starts out by designating what he believes to be Athenian virtue and “the

way of life that has made [Athens] great (Woodruff, 40),” love of nobility,

bravery, and good acts towards others (Woodruff, 40-43). He provides

examples of how cordial Athenians act when under the helm of the law and

before the ramifications of the plague: Athenians are “lovers of nobility with

restraint, and lovers of wisdom without any softening of character” (42);

and “bravery of people who think through what they will take in hand, and

discuss it thoroughly.” Thucydides describes the setting of citizens as they

operate and function exclusively under law and order. The plague of Athens

and the Corcyran Revolt are two events that Thucydides mentions to

demonstrate the unraveling of law and virtue. . These disasters act as the

cause of social upheaval, which leads to an internal implosion of convention

and a period of provisional lawlessness. This implosion exposes human

nature as a self-interested animal in which virtue has no beneficial end

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while at the same time capsizing all previous conceptions of virtue. For

example, during civil war, lawlessness prescribes how “hesitation was held

to be cowardice” (91) and “the good of the whole was considered wholly

lazy.” (91) Man is faced with this realization - what once benefited man only

did so under the law. In this state of chaos, law can no longer ensure that

acting virtuous will reward the citizens. Therefore, virtue – whatever it

might be for the citizens of Athens, is itself, contingent on the law. In other

words, Virtue itself is only as powerful a force as are the laws that convey it.

By this time, law (unnatural and artificial to the physis), contrary to

human self-interest (the physis), has been established as something

upholding virtue. Callicles, in his discussion with Plato, elaborates on the

relationship between virtue and the inferior, by portraying virtue as a type

of sustenance for the lower types. Plato constructs Callicles’ stance within

the dialogues in such a way that the positions of both Antiphon and

Thucydides conflate into Callicles’ argument. Therefore, the Gorgias

dialogue is somewhat a summation of the previous Sophistic views with an

added twist on virtue. Plato can respond to Callicles in a way, that he is

responding to all the problems posed by the Sophistic tradition (regarding

virtue). Traces of Antiphon are found in Callicles, as he presents his

overarching view of human nature, “nature and law, are for the most part

opposed to each other” (Gorgias, 483A) and “I believe that the people who

institute the laws are the weak”(Gorgias, 483B). By the time Callicles

presents this view of law, laws are seen as motivation for virtue, and law

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itself fundamentally violates human nature – in that, it protects the weak

from the strong and prevents people from acting naturally.

In conclusion, the view of the Sophists regarding virtue can be looked

at as a progression: It is in one’s favor to act natural or in one’s own self

interest, the implementation of these laws is unnatural to man, furthermore,

what is virtuous is dependent on the unnatural law and what is virtuous, is

only regarded as such in that it protects the weak or the many. Thus, when

a city enters a state of lawlessness, as seen in the plague or the Corcyra

Revolt, law is undermined, virtue dissipates, and the self-interest nature of

the human individual prevails. Plato’s attempted rebuttal within the

Gorgias dialogues falls short, and ends in a stalemate. Plato is unable to

articulate a sufficient refutation of the Sophistic view on human nature. This

lack of refutation is problematic because Plato’s view of virtue has no way

of originating within this type of rigid naturalism – furthermore, Thucydides

writes how the revolt and the plague reveal human selfishness and self-

interest motivation, in that humans become reduced to their natural nature.

In response, Plato offers a revised picture, one that includes a recalibrated

version of human nature to account for what went wrong in the plague of

Athens and the Corcyra Revolt, and how it could have been prevented.

III. The Tripartite Soul as through Nature, Virtue, and

Preventative

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Plato “inherits” this Sophistic outlook and responds to it by

deconstructing the Sophistic tradition and the components that constitute

this developing view. Plato does not respond explicitly to specific Sophists

per say, but does so indiscriminately with certain aspects of his

philosophical system, in particular, the Tripartite Soul. The Tripartite Soul

serves as a very important function, in that, it is the focal point of Plato’s

philosophy, but more importantly, it can substitute as an alternate

explanation of human nature. The role the Tripartite Soul plays in human

nature is necessary for Plato to offer some kind of refutation that allows for

genuine virtue – meaning, the makeup of the Tripartite Soul itself allows

Plato to account for the events of the plague and the Revolt but also allows

for genuine virtue to be able to develop. The Tripartite Soul consists of

three dimensions, the rational, the spirit, and the appetites. The relationship

dynamics within the soul (which part rules as opposed to which part is

ruled), allows for Plato to give an account for human nature, an account

which differs substantially from the sophistic view insofar that it does not

simplify or reduce humans to a species whose natural instinct is to act in

ones own self interest and is only restrained by law.

Initially, the Tripartite Soul can be seen as an answer to Antiphon’s

view on the naturalness of human nature. Plato’s Tripartite Soul resides

internally and constitutes human nature itself. Rather than human nature

simply acting in one’s self interest. Plato utilizes this model to explain that

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acting and indulging one’s own selfish endeavors is merely a function of the

soul. In other words, human self-interest or selfishness (acting on the

presumption that the two can be equated) does not compose of human

nature itself, rather, human selfishness is but a mode of the Tripartite Soul -

for instance, if the appetites rule over reason. The Tripartite Soul,

essentially, can be viewed as human nature, insofar as it encompasses

explanations of human action, deliberation, thoughts, desires, etc. The

relationships and interactions among these three dimensions have

implications for the human being – this comes to assume a prominent role in

how this schematic plays out in Thucydides account of the civil war and the

plague.

One function of the Tripartite Soul is its ability to account for the

prolific events that occurred during the Peloponnesian War, in particular

the events described by Thucydides known as the Corcyran Revolt and the

plague in Athens. In these particular events, human nature is shown to be

dependent on law, or more fundamentally, virtue itself is not sustainable. In

order to rectify this, Plato must find a way to explain why virtue collapses in

the manner that it did. To address this, the imbalance and immoderation of

the Tripartite Soul is utilized as an explanation of the state of human nature

during the revolt and plague. For example, Thucydides writes “no one was

held back by fear of gods or by the laws of men,” (50) The Sophists would

extract from that – virtue dissipating under the absence of law and the

motivation of reward, Plato, however, responds to this by saying the

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Tripartite Soul implies that rather than man being observed as innately

selfish, the current condition can be seen as one in which the appetites are

ruling over both spirit and reason. In addition, Thucydides writes the

individual had a “desire to rule out of avarice and ambition.” (91) The

Tripartite Soul suggests that spirit and appetites are ruling over reason. The

disproportion in the soul implies that the spirit and appetites are

overwhelmingly alluring, in that - reason cannot constrain or keep them in

check, thus ruling out of greed or ambition

In the application of the Tripartite model, one can conclude upon

examination of these events, that the common deficiency is reason - and

here in lies the problem. In this model, Plato is able to make the argument

that it is not human nature selfish tendencies that motivates and dictates

this chaos, but rather an imbalance between the parts of the soul – for

virtue to emerge, the soul must be ruled by reason. Although the Tripartite

Soul provides an explanation for the events described in the plague and

revolt, it has not, however, provided an explanation as to how virtue does

not necessarily depend on the law to function. Additionally, The Tripartite

Soul must explain how virtue can be sustained intrinsically.

This question is one Plato must address and does so by using the

Tripartite Model, and elaborates further by explicating what qualifies as

genuine virtue –or rather, the condition of virtue itself that must be

necessary. This begins with Plato’s critique of virtue and its dependence on

law, moreover – virtue as dependent on anything external to the soul. This is

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the next point the Tripartite Soul addresses – The Tripartite soul reclaims

virtue (that is, true virtue) from its corruptive and distortive influences,

such as law, as an instrumental mean, and acting virtuous for public

recognition. If virtue finds itself employed and supported by these means or

engaged in instrumentally to reach a desired end it will be unable to sustain

when these types of securities, customs, or conditionings are under

provisional duress. In this internalization, virtue finds itself dependant on

the internal state or condition of the Tripartite Soul. In order for virtue to

emerge and develop, virtue must find itself originating internally, but it is

important to note that the Tripartite Soul itself does not designate virtue,

although it does allow for the intrinsic development and cultivation of virtue

within the soul. In order for virtue to develop accordingly, it must be

instructed, guided, and shaped by reason, any other form of virtue (as a

product of appetites or spirit) would be falsely contrived and illegitimate.

The importance of virtue residing internally, within the structure of the

Tripartite Soul, has implications on its ability to be sustained in states of

lawlessness or disorder. Plato’s emphasis on the internal nature of the

Tripartite Soul proves to be pivotal when the external conditions (such as

law) that virtue is accustomed to being dependent on, start to collapse. In

other words, with virtue being dependent on the internal composition of the

soul it will be able to sustain itself, even with no enforced law to mandate

virtue. Through this description, Plato is able to address Thucydides, and

provide an alternate explanation as to why human nature was revealed in

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the way that it was and can be regarded that, Thucydides observations were

not that of virtue at all. Thucydides account portrays virtue as dependent on

law therefore making virtue not intrinsically sound, however, this itself, is

the problem. The fact that virtue is dependent on anything at all outside of

the soul sets virtue up for failure, it becomes conditioned on the temporary

existence of external factors, and when these change, so does virtue itself.

For example, if virtue were exercised to attain a particular end, and for

whatever reason comes a time when this virtue cannot adequately attain

this end, virtue would be null. Virtue, within the Tripartite Soul has more

permanence, in that it is a product of reason and not of law. Thus, virtue

being externally grounded or used instrumentally is, to Plato, the display of

the appearance of virtue and not virtue in and of itself. (Guess, 2005)

Given this conclusion, virtue is dichotomized: The Sophistic virtue,

characterized as originating outside of the soul, a guise, external,

dependent, and instrumental then therein lies Platonic virtue construed as

real, internal, practiced for its own sake. In light of these characteristics,

the claim can be made that Platonic virtue, as seen through the rule of

reason in the Tripartite Soul, has the possibility of preventing civil uprising

within cities. Comparatively, Sophistic ideation of virtue could be regarded

as such, that it perpetuates civil uprising, in that, it serves as a temporary

fix under illusory pretenses or provisional conditions (law, benefits, custom).

As long as people are ruled by the appearance of virtue, social entropy will

serve as a potential threat. On the contrary, virtue through the Tripartite

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Soul is predominantly ruled by reason, it is done so for the sake of what is

virtuous, in that it is ruled by reason and not by the appetites or passions.

Thus, in a state of lawlessness and chaos ones virtue would not seek out

gratification of ones appetites or ruthless attempts at acquiring honor.

In addition, because Platonic virtue is not done so for the sake of other

things, it has no qualms when rewards cease to be available to it. Therefore,

civil disorder, as described by Thucydides, could have been prevented if

virtue had been illuminated in such a way that it directed people towards a

more intrinsically stable notion of virtue, as found in the Tripartite Soul.

Furthermore, with true virtue being led by reason, it can be inferred that

the aberrant response by the mobocracy would have never occurred, that

all appetites and passions that would seek fulfillment would be regulated

and disciplined by reason. Law would be irrelevant, meaning– with or

without it, reason would always be active within the soul, thus doing what is

virtuous would rein top priority, and exist even when law is in shambles. For

this to be possible human nature can no longer be limited by the narrow

scope of Antiphon’s view of human nature, it must be diversified to include

the components provided to us by the tripartite model. The model will

provide for us the components of human nature, and its interactions and

dynamics will provide explanations as to what gives rise to particular

behaviors.

To recapitulate, Plato provides an alternate explanation for human

nature, one that deviates greatly from the Sophistic tradition. He takes one

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step back to create a more complete system, the Tripartite Soul, one that

includes human self-interest as a result rather than some epitomizing

aphorism on human nature. This construct, divided into three dimensions

(reason, appetites, spirit or passion) acts as a type of referencing guide

behind human behavior. Instead of limiting human nature to a selfish one of

self -interest, it is able to be account for and articulate an explanation

behind the behaviors and actions of people, especially in conditions of chaos

(but not limited to). It also serves as a breeding ground for genuine virtue

(also contrary to Sophist belief. The idiosyncrasies of the Tripartite Soul

offer the necessary conditions that are required for genuine virtue to

develop - in particular, its internal foundation and the rule of reason.

Essentially, this enables the Tripartite Soul to have the necessary functions

to prevent civil war.

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References

Curd, Patricia, ed. A Presocratics Reader: Selected Fragments and Testimonia. Indianapolis:

Hacket Publishing Company, 1995. Print.

Cooper, Johm M., and D.S. Hutchinson, eds. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hacket

Publishing Company, 1997. Print.

Guess, Raymond. Outside Ethics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005. Print.

Saxonhouse, Arlene W. "Nature & Convention in Thucydides' History." Polity 10.4 (1978):

461-87. JSTOR. Web. 3 Nov. 2009. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234401>.

Moulton, Carroll. "Antiphon the Sophist, on Truth." Transactions and Proceedings of the

American Philological Association 103 (1972): 329-66. Web. 14 Nov. 2009.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2935980>.

Woodruff, Paul. On Justice Power and Human Nature: Selections from The History of the

Peloponnesian War. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1993. Print.

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