f. miller plato on the rule of reason

Fred D. Miller, Jr.

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The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2005) Vol. XLIII

“Isn’t it appropriate for the rational part to rule…?”

(Rep. IV.441e4)

1. Introduction:Another Footnote to Plato

The rule of reason is the principle that a system should beruled by its rational part. Although this principle was antici-pated by several early Greek philosophers, Plato was the first toarticulate it clearly, to offer a justification for it, and toinvestigate its political applications in detail.1 The rule ofreason is associated with a rationalist view of political legiti-macy: a regime is legitimate insofar as the authority (whetherit is a monarch, assembly, elected officials, or, more abstractly, aconstitution and laws) exercises power in a rational manner.This is opposed to a voluntarist view of political legitimacy: aregime is legitimate insofar as the authority exercises power ina way that expresses or conforms to the general will of thecommunity.2 For a voluntarist theory of legitimacy, rationality isvaluable only instrumentally, on the grounds that rationaldeliberation is the most effective way of carrying out thepopular will. In contrast, for a rationalist view, consent is atbest a criterion of legitimacy, on the grounds that the peoplevoluntarily support the rulers when they do the right thing; butthe governed may fail to consent if, for example, they are tooirrational (or simply unwilling) to recognize that the govern-ment is legitimate. Political philosophers have divided over thisissue, with some influential theorists (e.g., Plato and Aristotle)favoring reason and others (e.g., Hobbes and Rousseau) the will,although some (e.g., Kant and Hegel) attempt to accommodateboth.

The rule of reason is also associated with a particular viewof legislation: The statesman (πολιτικÒ˚) or legislator(νοµοθ°τη˚) has a role analogous to that of the craftsman(δηµιουργÒ˚).3 Just as a sculptor, for example, creates a statueby imposing a certain shape on a mass of clay according to amodel (παράδειγµα), the legislator bestows a constitution on

Plato on the Rule of Reason

Fred D. Miller, Jr.Bowling Green State University


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preexisting materials (the population) according to a politicalideal grasped by reason. This is very different from the volun-tarist view of the legislator as a guide to the people in carryingout their general will.4

The rule of reason is first promulgated in Plato’s Republic,which argues that the individual soul and the city have ananalogous tripartite structure and that the city and the soulshould each be ruled by its respective rational part. Althoughthis analogy is controversial, it helped set the agenda for futurepsychology and political philosophy. For psychology the issue is:Is reason the natural ruler over the passions, or ought it to betheir slave? In politics it is: Does the legitimacy of the statederive from the rationality of the rulers, or does politicalrationality have merely an instrumental role of efficientlycarrying out the general will?

My project here is to reconstruct the rule of reason as apolitical principle in Plato’s Republic and to consider whether itis still a theory worth considering.5 It might seem obvious thatthe rule of reason should not be taken seriously because it givesrise to a succession of paradoxes which Socrates himselfcompares to waves of laughter that threaten to drown him inridicule and contempt (V.473c6-9).6 On the grounds that it isused to buttress Socrates’ totalitarian utopia, it might besupposed that the rule of reason is inherently illiberal and anti-democratic. In this paper, however, I shall argue that the rule ofreason can be distinguished and detached from the contro-versial proposals advanced in the Republic, so that it may stillbe worthy of serious consideration by modern political philoso-phers.

2. The Rule of Reason:Three Basic Principles

The rule of reason is one of three basic principles at work at theend of Republic IV. The first is that a thing is in a correctcondition if, and only if, it exhibits proper order. This principle isimplicit in the analogy between health and justice in theRepublic, but it is asserted explicitly in a parallel passage inthe Gorgias, which argues that virtue in the soul is analogousto health in the body: “It’s when a certain order (κÒσµος), theproper one for each thing, comes to be present in it that itmakes each of the things there are, good” (506e2-4).7 Similarly,in the Republic the just person has established order(κοσµÆσαντα) within himself and harmonizes (συναρµÒσαντα)the parts of his soul (Rep. IV.443d4-5).

The Republic explains how this order comes about in termsof structural similarities between body and soul. “To producehealth is to establish the components of the body in a natural(κατὰ φÊσιν) relation of control (κρατε›ν) and being controlled,one by another, according to nature, while to produce disease is

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to establish a relation of ruling (ἄρχειν �) and being ruledcontrary to nature (παρὰ φÊσιν)” (444d3-6). By analogy, “[t]oproduce justice is to establish the parts of the soul in a naturalrelation of control, one by another, while to produce injustice isto establish a relation of ruling and being ruled contrary tonature” (444d8-11).8 The analogy assumes that a just soul and ahealthy body each exemplify a second principle: A thing exhibitsproper order if, and only if, some part of it is the natural rulerover its other parts.9

The third basic principle is introduced in connection withSocrates’ theory that the soul has three parts—reason, spirit,and appetite.10 He argues that the first of these parts is bynature the ruler over the other two on the basis of two doc-trines he has used earlier in Book I to argue that the justperson is happy. The first is the functional account of goodness,which involves three claims: (1) The function of a thing is whatit alone can do or what it does better than anything else(I.353a9-11). For example, the function of a knife is to cut. (2)“Anything that has a function performs it well by means of itsown peculiar virtue and badly by means of its vice” (I.353c5-7).The virtue of a knife is a feature like sharpness that enables itto cut well. (3) A thing is good if it performs its function welland bad if it does so badly (cf. 353e4-5). A good knife is one thatcuts well.11 The functional theory of virtue and goodness iscombined with the principle of the natural specialization: eachpart of a system should perform the function for which it isnaturally suited (II.370a-c, 374b-c). In Book IV Socrates askswhether these premises can be applied to the rational part ofthe soul: “Isn’t it appropriate for the rational part (λογιστικ“)to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalfof the whole soul…?” (IV.441e4-5). He defines the virtues ofmoderation and justice in terms of the rule of reason. Anindividual is moderate “when the ruler and the ruled [withinthe soul] believe in common that the rational part (λογιστικÒν)should rule and don’t engage in civil war against it” (442c10-d1,cf. 431a). Similarly justice—in the abstract “doing one’s own”(443b)—is found in the soul when reason rules, because therational part is naturally suited to rule, while the appetitivepart is naturally suited to be ruled, and the spirited part is bynature the helper of the rational part (444b, 441a). Therefore,the rule of the rational part is according to nature (κατὰ φÊσιν),whereas the rule of the nonrational part is contrary to nature(πατὰ φÊσιν) (444d8-11). This is the gist of Plato’s third basicprinciple: The rational part is the natural ruler over thenonrational part.

To sum up, Socrates in the Republic relies on three principles:

1. Principle of order: A thing is in a correct condition if, and onlyif, it exhibits proper order.


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2. Principle of rulership: A thing exhibits proper order if, andonly if, some part of it is the natural ruler over its other parts.

3. Principle of rule of reason: The rational part is the naturalruler over the nonrational part.

Socrates maintains that these principles apply to the city aswell as to the soul (cf. IV.442d, 443b, 444a). The politicalapplication of the rule of reason, however, raises difficultquestions. First, how is the rational part distinguished from thenonrational part? Socrates says that “each of us differs some-what in nature from the others, one being suited to onefunction, another to another” (I.370a7-b1, cf. 370c). How is therational part of the city distinguished from the nonrationalpart? If it is assumed that the rational part alone can possessthe wisdom that confers political legitimacy, what sort ofwisdom is this, and who has it? Second, what is the proper aimof the rational ruling part? If it is supposed that this aim is tobe called “the common good” or “the public interest,” how shouldsuch expressions be interpreted? Third, in what manner is itappropriate for the rational part to rule over nonrationalparts? If it is supposed that the rational part alone possessesthe wisdom that confers political legitimacy, is it permissiblefor it to try to control the nonrational part by means otherthan rational persuasion, for example, by coercion, deception,and emotional manipulation? Fourth, what reason does therational part have to rule over the nonrational, and to do so ina correct or just manner? Several of the problematic policiesthat Socrates proposes in the Republic touch on these thornyissues.

3. Socrates’ Paradoxical Policies

Before considering Socrates’ political applications of the rule ofreason in the Republic, we should briefly review the context inwhich they are proposed. In Republic Book I, Socrates criticizesseveral definitions of justice including Thrasymachus’s definitionthat justice is what is in the interest of the stronger, and heargues in conclusion that justice is more profitable than injus-tice. In Book II, however, Glaucon and Adeimantus challengeSocrates to show that justice is good for its own sake and notmerely due to its consequences, that the benefits of justicecannot be derived from the mere reputation of justice, and thatthe deleterious consequences of injustice are unavoidable.Socrates must explain what justice and injustice are and show“what power each itself has when it’s by itself in the soul”(II.358b5-6). That is, he must demonstrate that the just personis invariably happier than the unjust person, even if they havethe reputation and receive the punishments and rewards oftheir opposites (361c-d).

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To meet this challenge, Socrates compares the soul with thecity. Although bigger and easier to study (II.368d), the city is“just” in the same sense as the soul. For if you call a thing bythe same name, it will be the same in respect of the Form(ε‰δος) regardless of whether it is big or little (IV.435a5-b2).Socrates turns to the city, in order to find out what justice is inthe soul and thereby answer the challenge to show that it paysto be just.12

He invites his interlocutors to join him in making a city intheory (λÒγος) from its beginning (II.369c9). The first city isgoverned by the principle of natural specialization: “everyonemust practice one of the occupations in the city for which he isnaturally best suited” (IV.433a5-6, cf. II.370c3-5, 374b6-c2). Thisanticipates the later definition of justice as “the having anddoing of one’s own” (IV.433e12-434a1). The initial city arises outof mutual need, and the members perform the work for whichthey are best suited: farming, building, weaving, cobbling,trading, etc. They fulfill their subsistence needs, and “they enjoysex with one another but bear no more children than theirresources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war”(II.372b8-c1). Glaucon objects that the city offers no luxuriesand is “a city of pigs” (372d4). Socrates agrees to consider theluxurious city which is “feverish” in contrast to the primitivecity which is “healthy.” The pursuit of luxury goods leads to war.Accordingly, the principle of natural specialization requires thatthere be a specialized class of guardians to protect the city(372d-374e).

The transition from the “city of pigs” is somewhat puzzlingbecause Socrates calls it “the true city” despite its lack of aqualified rulers. He seems to agree with Adeimantus that thejustice of this city is found in some need that the citizens haveof each other, although he also remarks that by examining theluxurious city we may see “how justice and injustice grow up incities.” His point however may be that the first city is healthybecause all the citizens have self-regulated desires (see 372b-c,cited above). This assumption is abandoned in Glaucon’sluxurious city, leading to “the endless acquisition of money,”and, in turn, to strife within and between cities (see 373e).Because the producers cannot control their own desires, theircity can be restored to health only if they have guardians toprotect them from themselves and from foreign enemies whoare likewise uncontrolled. This leads to the first of Socrates’policies based on the rule of reason:

Policy 1 There must be a class of rational rulers separate fromthe other citizens.

Socrates remarks that the city’s rulers must be not only spiritedand strong but also in a sense “philosophical” (literally, lovers of


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wisdom). “Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength must all, then,be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine andgood guardian of our city” (II.376c4-5). This leads to an exten-ded discussion of the education of the guardians. Later(III.412c-413c) Socrates distinguishes a special subclass ofguardians who are best at ruling the city. These men are guard-ians also of the conviction that they must eagerly purse what isadvantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do theopposite. Neither compulsion nor magic spells will get them todiscard or forget their belief that they must do what is best forthe city. “We must find out who are the best guardians of theirconviction that they must always do what they believe to be thebest for the city” (III.413c5-7). These are the “complete guard-ians,” and their younger colleagues “we’ll now call auxiliariesand supporters of the guardians’ convictions” (414b1-6).

Socrates’ city thus consists of three classes: guardians,auxiliaries, and producers. The citizens are persuaded tosupport this arrangement by means of the myth of the metals,the aim of which is to make the citizens “care more for the cityand for each other” (415d3-4). The grain of truth in this “noblefalsehood” is that the rulers must be naturally capable ofcarrying out the task: “the god who made you [citizens] mixedsome gold [i.e., reason] into those who are adequately equippedto rule,” but anyone without gold in his soul “must have a rankappropriate to his nature” (415a4-5, c1-2).13

The implication of the foregoing characterization of theguardians is that they possess knowledge of the public good.This soon is soon made explicit. The guardians are citizens whopossess the knowledge (§πιστÆµη) which deliberates “not aboutany particular matter but about the city as a whole and themaintenance of good relations both internally and with othercities” (IV.428c11-d3). Socrates claims that the ruling part willconsist of a minority of wise citizens: “A whole city establishedaccording to nature would be wise because of the smallest classand part in it, namely, the governing or ruling one. And to thisclass which seems to me by nature the smallest, belongs a shareof the knowledge (§πιστÆµης) that alone among all the otherkinds of knowledge is to be called wisdom (σοφ�αν)” (428e7-429a3). The innate capacity for knowledge must be carefullynurtured; hence Socrates’ emphasis on the education of theguardians.

Eventually in the analogy between the city and the soul, itbecomes clear that the guardians’ authority is based on the ruleof reason: “Isn’t it appropriate for the rational part (λογιστικÒν)to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalfof the whole soul?” (441e4-5). The four cardinal virtues areexplained in terms of this principle. An individual is courageouswhen “the spirited part … preserves through pains andpressures the declarations of reason (ÍπÚ τ«ν λÒγων) about

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what is to be feared and what isn’t” (442c1-3). An individual iscalled wise “because of that small part of himself [i.e., therational part] that rules in him and makes those declarationsand has within it the knowledge (§πιστÆµην) of what isadvantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is thecommunity of all three parts” (442c5-8). An individual ismoderate “when the ruler and the ruled [within the soul]believe in common that the rational part (λογιστικÒν) shouldrule and don’t engage in civil war against it” (442c10-d1).Finally, an individual is just when each part of the soulperforms its own function (443b1-2). The rational part isnaturally suited to rule, while the appetitive part is naturallysuited to be ruled, and the spirited part is by nature the helperof the rational part (444b1-5, cf. 441a2-3).14 Thus the rule ofreason applies to the soul, and this explains why it applies tothe city.

The political implications of the rule of reason become quiteclear with the paradoxical proposal that some women must bechosen along with men to share in their guardianship (V.456a-b). Socrates argues as follows: In assigning citizens to jobs wemust focus on the form and sameness and difference that isrelevant to their ways of life (454c). Some women havephilosophical natures, while some have spirited natures, andothers appetitive natures (cf. 455d-456a). “So one woman mayhave a guardian nature and another not, for wasn’t it qualitiesof this sort that we looked for in the natures of the men weselected as guardians?” (456a7-8). This argument is anenthymeme. The tacit premiss is clearly the rule of reason: thecitizens who comprise the rational part of the city are by natureguardians over the citizens who comprise its nonrational part.Therefore, insofar as some women naturally belong to therational part, they should be admitted to the guardian class.15

Socrates has already (e.g., at II.376b-c and V. 456a) laid theground for his avowedly most paradoxical policy: “Until politicalpower and philosophy entirely coincide,… cities will have norest from evils” (V.473d3-5).

Policy 2 The rulers must be philosophers.

The rule of the philosopher in the city corresponds to therule of the rational part of the soul over the spirited andappetitive parts. Each part of the soul has its distinctivepleasure, desire, and type of rule (IX.580d-581b). The appetitivepart has desires for food, drink, sex and the like, although it iscalled the money-loving or profit-loving part because itsappetites are most easily satisfied by using cash. The spiritedpart yearns after control, victory, and good reputation and iscalled the victory-loving and honor-loving part. Finally, therational part is “always wholly straining to know where the


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truth lies” and is called learning-loving or wisdom-loving. Thewisdom-lover (φιλÒσοφος), that is, the philosopher, has a soulwhich is ruled by the part of the soul that learns, that is, therational part (582e8-583a3). That is, as noted by Norman O.Dahl, “the objects of the desires of the rational part of the souldominate” this person’s conception of the good.16 Becausephilosophers are devoted to knowing the truth, they are alsouniquely suited to rule the city.

The policy of rule by philosophers rests on the idea thatrulers are craftsmen who require philosophical knowledge. Aruler without knowledge of the Forms is like a painter withoutsight. Rulers who lack the knowledge of each thing that is “haveno clear model (παράδειγµα) in their souls, and so they cannot—in the manner of painters—look to what is most true, makeconstant reference to it, and study it as exactly as possible.Hence they cannot establish here on earth conventions aboutwhat is fine or just or good, when they need to be established,or guard and preserve them, once they have been established”(VI.484c7-d3). The philosopher is also compared to a shipcaptain who must know the art of navigation: “a true captainmust pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars,the winds, and all that pertains to his craft, if he’s really to bethe ruler of a ship.” Sailors who denigrate the genuine naviga-tor as a mere “stargazer” are misguided like citizens who regardphilosophy as useless in politics (487e-489d).17

After studying the Forms the philosophical lawgiver will beguided by “the account (λÒγος) of the constitution,” and therulers who follow him must be guided by this same account(497c-d, cf. 412a-b).18 The Forms possess an intrinsic order andby studying them the philosopher can establish order in hisown soul: “As he looks at and studies things that are organized(τεταγµ°να) and always the same, that neither do injustice toone another or suffer it, being all in a rational order (κÒσµƒ …κατὰ λÒγον), he imitates them and tries to become as like themas he can…. Then the philosopher, by consorting with what isordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that sayotherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered (κÒσµιος) as ahuman being can” (VI.500c2-d1, cf. IX.591e). The true rulermust be able to mark off in account (λÒγος) the Form of theGood, separating it from all other things; without this one canknow neither the good itself nor any other good (VI.534b8-c5).The philosopher alone is able to grasp the Form of the Good,which provides reason with its ultimate norm.

As rational agents, philosophers should use the Form of theGood as a guide not only to order their own souls, but, if theyare rulers, to order their cities (see VI.500e-501c, VII.519e-520a). Their aim broadly conceived is “to see that the city as awhole has the greatest happiness” (IV.421b5, cf. 428d andV.466a). He invokes this principle to justify his proposed

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communistic arrangement for the ruling class: including com-munal property, shared spouses and children, and commonmeals (III.416d-417b, V.457-466a).

Policy 3 The ruler’s aim is the greatest happiness of the wholecity.

What exactly “the greatest happiness of the whole city”amounts to is very controversial. Unsympathetic modernwriters such as Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper characterizePlato as a statist comparable to modern fascists, Nazis, andBolsheviks.19 C. C. W. Taylor helps to clarify this issue bypointing out three essential characteristics of a totalitarianregime: It is authoritarian, in the sense that the ordinarycitizen has no share, direct or indirect, in making decisions; ithas an ideology, understood as “a pervasive scheme of values,intentionally promulgated by some person or persons andpromoted by institutional means in order to direct all or themost significant aspects of public and private life towards theattainment of goals dictated by those values”; and the locus ofpolitical power directs the ideology.20 It is hard to deny thatSocrates’ ideal city is “totalitarian” in the broad sense definedby Taylor. But what specific kind of totalitarianism doesSocrates advocate?21

Taylor helps here also by distinguishing different types oftotalitarianism: extreme statism (in which individual interestsare abrogated in favor of the good of the state), politicalorganicism (in which individual interests are identified withtheir contribution to the interests of the state), and paternalism(in which individuals are compelled by government to promotetheir own interests). Plato’s text does not support the firstinterpretation, but commentators have defended the other tworeadings.22

Karl Popper adopts the second interpretation, according towhich the city is a “super-individual” or “a kind of super-organism.”23 Some texts support this interpretation when theycompare legislating for the city and painting a statue: “Youmustn’t expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they nolonger appear to be eyes at all, and the same with other parts.Rather you must look to see whether by dealing with each partappropriately, we are making the whole statue beautiful”(IV.420d1-5). Similarly the legislator should be concerned withmaking the whole city happy. “In this way, with the whole citydeveloping and being governed well, we must leave (§ατ°ον) itto nature to provide each group with its share of happiness”(421c3-6). This suggests that individual happiness should be leftto nature rather than provided for through legislation.24

Aristotle criticizes the Republic for extreme organicism andmany commentators have followed his lead. Socrates’ language


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supports this interpretation: “For example, when one of us hurtshis finger, the entire organism that binds body and soultogether into a single system under the ruling part within it isaware of this, and the whole feels the pain together with thepart that suffers.… The city with the best government is mostlike such a person” (V.462c10-d2, 6-7). Raphael Demos alsooffers an organicist interpretation:

What Socrates, in effect, is saying is that the perfection of thewhole requires the subordination of the parts; and that thesubordination of the parts contributes to the perfection of thewhole. Going further he asserts that the parts would not beproper parts if they achieved a perfection independently of theirplace in the whole. For the parts are defined by their function inthe whole….25

Aristotle reads the Republic this way, and objects that Socrates’“hypothesis that it is best for the entire city to be one as far aspossible” implies that the city should be, to the greatest extentpossible, one in the same way as an organism: “if it becomesmore one it will become a household instead of a city, and ahuman being instead of a household.” Aristotle dismisses thisaim as misguided: “even if one could do this, it ought not to bedone; for it would destroy the city” (Pol. II.2.1261a15-22). OnAristotle’s reading, Socrates calls for the rulers to aim at a totalunity of the city that would obliterate individual differencesthrough communism of property, children, and spouses (see Rep.V.462a-464b).

Other passages of the Republic, however, support apaternalist interpretation. For example, “We take ourselves,then, to be fashioning the happy city, not picking out a fewhappy people and putting them in it, but making the whole cityhappy” (IV.420c1-4; this precedes the statue painting analogy).“[O]ur concern at the time was to make our guardians trueguardians and the city the happiest we could, rather thanlooking to any one group (¶θνος) within it and molding it forhappiness” (V.466a2-6). On this interpretation the aim of theguardians should be to promote the interests of the wholecommunity rather than sectional interests; it should not be (asAristotle interpreted) to promote the happiness of the city as anabstract entity at the expense of its individual members. Again,“it isn’t the law’s concern to make any one class in the cityoutstandingly happy but to contrive to spread happinessthroughout the city by bringing the citizens into harmony witheach other … by making them share with each other (ἀλλÆλοις)the benefits that each class can confer on the community”(VII.519e1-520a1).26 As Julia Annas argues,

Plato does undeniably subordinate individual interests to thecommon good; but this is not an entity over and above the

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varying kinds of goodness of the varying kinds of people. Thestate is nothing over and above the people making it up, orrather it is the context in which different kinds of people canattain the excellence appropriate to them. Similarly the city’shappiness is just the happiness of all the citizens.27

Read this way Plato anticipates John Rawls’s view of society as“a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”28

Although each of these interpretations—organicism andpaternalism—has textual support, neither is free of difficulty.A worry regarding organicism is that it foists onto Plato animplausible and perhaps absurd conception of the greatesthappiness. Such an interpretation seems to leave the Republicvulnerable to an objection of the sort raised by Aristotle.

But it is impossible for a whole to be happy unless most or all orsome of its parts possess happiness. For being happy is not thesame as being even; for the latter can belong to the whole even ifneither of its parts does, but being happy cannot. But if theguardians are not happy, what other persons are? For at any ratethe artisans and the multitude of vulgar persons are surely not.(Pol. II.5.1264b15-24)

On Aristotle’s interpretation, Socrates’ guardians are to aim atthe happiness of the city considered as a whole without regardto whether any individual citizens are happy considered asindividuals. Of course, according to organicism individuals arehappy, albeit in a derived sense: individuals are happy insofaras they contribute to the happiness of the city as a whole. ButAristotle would reject this as preposterous (in the sense ofgetting things backwards): the city as a whole is happy becauseits citizens are happy, not vice versa. 29

A proponent of organicism might reply that it depends onwhat is meant by a ‘happy’ city. It is worth noting thatAristotle’s objection that a city cannot be εÈδα�µων unless itsmembers are seems especially telling if εÈδα�µων is translatedas ‘happy’, because ‘happy’ suggests an experiential componentwhich a city could not have on its own. But if εÈδα�µων istranslated as ‘flourishing’, the holistic reading does not soundso absurd. For a city as a whole might plausibly be called‘flourishing’ insofar as it possesses internal harmony or order-liness. Further, the Form of the Good provides philosopherswith a pattern by which they can bring order to things in theperceptible world, including cities. According to John Cooper’ssuggestion, it is “a complex, ordered whole, whose orderliness isdue to the mathematical relationships holding among itsparts.”30 The philosopher “recognizes a single criterion of choice:What, given the circumstances, will be most likely to maximizethe total amount of rational order in the world as a whole?”31


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How far the philosopher can succeed depends on circumstances.At the very least he should establish rational order in his ownsoul insofar as possible (cf. IX.592b), and as a teacher he shouldtry to help others do the same (VI. 500b-d, cf. IX.592b). But, ifthe opportunity presents itself, they should try to establish arational order in the city as a whole. A rationally ordered city—that is, a city ruled by its rational part—will be in a flourishingand optimal condition, and a city as a whole might be rationallyordered to the greatest extent, even though its citizens are notrationally ordered to the greatest extent with respect to theirindividual souls.32 Although this interpretation is supported bythe statue painting analogy, it is unclear whether it convinc-ingly accounts for the claim that wisdom involves “knowledge ofwhat is advantageous for each part and for the whole”(IV.442c6-8) or that the law’s aim is to make the citizens “sharewith each other the benefits that each class can confer on thecommunity” (VII.519e3-520a3).

The paternalist interpretation faces a different sort ofproblem. If the guardians must aim at the happiness of indi-vidual citizens, it must be possible for citizens of all stripes tobe happy. But, as Aristotle, points out, the producers are surelynot happy (see Pol. II.5.1264b23-4, quoted above). Socratesargues that individuals are happy only if they are just, and, onhis definition, an individual soul is just only if its rational partrules over its nonrational parts. But if the producers are ruledby their appetites rather than by reason, they could not possessthe sort of psychic harmony which would make them happy asindividuals.33 Along similar lines, Cooper argues that it wouldbe “extraordinary” for Plato to hold that “a city can be just onlyif its citizens are just” because “Plato consistently restrictsjustice, as a virtue of individuals, to those who possess withinthemselves knowledge of what it is best to do and be.”34 Theproducers of the just city can be neither just nor happy, ifknowledge of the Form of the Good is necessary for justice andhappiness.

A proponent of paternalism might try to overcome thisdifficulty by offering a broader account of what it is to be ruledby reason. The basic idea is that one may be ruled by reasoneither directly or indirectly—directly, when one is guided by theknowledge of the Form of the Good in one’s own soul, or indi-rectly, when one is guided by the knowledge of the Form of theGood in another person’s soul. For example, in the soul of themanual worker the best part (i.e., reason) is naturally weak andunable to rule the beasts (i.e., desires) within.

Therefore, to insure that someone like that is ruled by somethingsimilar to what rules the best person, we say that he ought to bethe slave of that best person who has a divine ruler withinhimself. It isn’t to harm the slave that we say he must be ruled,

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which is what Thrasymachus thought to be true of all subjects,but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by divine reason,preferably within himself and his own, otherwise imposed fromwithout, so that as far as possible all will be alike and friends,governed by the same thing. (IX.590c8-d6)

On this view the producers are ruled for their own good and arein what Gregory Vlastos characterizes a condition of “idealizedslavery.”35 Socrates offers some basis for this interpretation, forexample when he speaks of the most important aspects of themoderation of the masses as being “to obey the rulers and torule the pleasures of drink, sex, and food for themselves”(III.389d9-e2). This implies that the producers can “internalize”to some extent the guidance that they receive from thephilosopher rulers and thus attain a kind of (a lower grade tobe sure) of psychic harmony. Socrates also refers to the “politicalcourage” of the auxiliaries, which is “the preservation of thebelief that has been inculcated by law through education aboutwhat things and sorts of things are to be feared” (IV.429c7-8).Again, the myth of Er describes a soul which had “lived hisprevious life under an orderly constitution, where he hadparticipated in virtue through habit and without philosophy”(X.619c6-d1). On the basis of these passages, it might be arguedthat nonphilosophers are not entirely bereft of virtue andhappiness, although what they enjoy is only an approximationof the virtue and happiness attained by philosophers. Taylordefends the paternalist interpretation along these lines:

The goal of the polis is the production of as much individualeudaimonia as possible. But the majority of people are notcapable of eudaimonia on their own; since they are incapable ofgrasping the Good, they cannot provide for themselves thatimpetus towards it which is a necessary condition for psychicharmony…. The nearest they can get to eudaimonia is to submitto the direction by the intellect of someone else.36

The seemingly intractable issue concerning the aim of theguardians seems to be related to certain ambivalence regardingthe lower classes, especially the producers. As Bernard Williamsremarks,

There have been those who thought that the working classeswere naturally of powerful and disorderly desires, and had to bekept in their place. There have been those who thought that theywere good-hearted and loyal fellows of no great gifts who couldrecognize their natural superiors and, unless stirred up, keepthemselves in their place. There can have been few who thoughtboth; Plato in the Republic comes close to being such a one, eventhough we can recognize that his heart, and his fears, lie with


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the first story. His analogy helps him to combine both stories, inparticular by encouraging us to believe in an outcome appro-priate to the second story from arrangements motivated by thefirst.37

The second story tends to support the paternalistic interpre-tation: the lower classes can attain virtue and happiness whichapproximates, but falls short of, that of the philosopher rulers;while the first story supports the organicist interpretation: thelower classes are really incapable of virtue and must be kept ona tight leash by the guardians. If it is correct that Plato’sRepublic combines both stories, it is not surprising that opposedinterpretations appeal to different commentators.

In order to achieve the common good, however it isunderstood, the guardians must maintain control over the othercitizens. According to Socrates a soul is moderate or self-controlled when “the naturally better part is in control of theworse,” that is, reason is in control of spirit and appetite.Analogously in a moderate city “the desires of the inferior manyare controlled by the wisdom and desires of the superior few”(IV.431c9-d2). This condition requires political unanimity orconsensus (ıµÒνοια), that is, the ruler and subjects must sharethe same belief about who should rule (431e10-432a9). Wemight expect rational rulers to guide their subjects by means ofreasoned arguments. Yet Socrates’ city is replete with compul-sory policies. In addition to using coercion if necessary againsttheir fellow citizens (III.415e, V.465a-b), the guardians mustenforce moral conformity by means of censorship and banish-ment against poets and subversive craftsmen (II.377b-c;III.398a, 401b). Socrates observes, that “our rulers will have tomake considerable use of falsehood and deception for thebenefit of those they rule” (V.459c8-d1; cf II.382c, III.414b). Onthe other hand, he is clearly not advocating a brutal dictator-ship, since he sees it as “the law’s concern to contrive to spreadhappiness throughout the city by bringing the citizens intoharmony with each other through both persuasion and compul-sion” (VII.519e1-4).38

Policy 4 Rational rulers should control their subjects throughboth persuasion and compulsion. When it is necessary,they may employ deception, manipulation, propaganda,censorship, and coercion to secure obedience.

Rational persuasion is presumably the norm among theguardians themselves because they are trained to be philoso-phers and, having a “philosophical nature,” will “inevitably growto possess every virtue,” if they are properly educated(VI.492a1-3). But it is permissible for even the guardians to bedeceived on some occasions. It is acceptable to try to use the

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aforementioned myth of the metals, a “noble falsehood,” topersuade even the guardians, who have just been distinguishedfrom the auxiliaries, although Socrates concedes the attemptwill probably not succeed (III.414b-c, 415c-d). And a smallcoterie of “rulers” may deceive the other guardians with a bogusmarriage lottery in order to maintain “the purity of the herd”(V.459d-e).39

Compulsion will be practiced far more extensively upon thelower classes according to Socrates’ relentless logic: If the rulersmust promote the common good and they issue commands basedon their knowledge of the good but the subjects are often unableor unwilling to understand the reasons for these commands,then the rulers are justified in the frequent use of means otherthan reasoned argument to secure obedience. Is Socrates’authoritarianism tempered in any way? This depends on theextent to which the lower classes are amenable to persuasion.Here again, Plato’s text is open to different interpretations.

On an ultra-authoritarian interpretation, the lower classes,especially the producers, are impervious to rational argument.In Popper’s terms, they are “human cattle, whose sole functionis to provide for the material needs of the ruling class.”40 Butthis interpretation seems inconsistent with indications that theproducer has a rational faculty although it is dominated byappetites (see VIII.553d).

On a less authoritarian interpretation, the lower classes areopen to persuasion because the nonrational parts of their soulscan be controlled by true beliefs so that they are capable ofvirtue to some extent.41 Socrates mentions the agreement inbelief (ıµοδοξ�α) between the rulers and subjects and to thelawful belief (δÒξα ¶ννοµος) of the auxiliaries (IV.433c6-8). Inthe case of the auxiliaries at any rate the beliefs are producedby education (429c7) so that they are relatively stable and thusensure a degree of psychic harmony. Similarly, the producerswill be amenable to some kind of persuasion.42 Yet the subjectsremain in a condition of “idealized slavery” because they arecompletely dependent on the philosopher rulers for their correctbeliefs.43 This interpretation arguably leads to a puzzle: if thesubjects are rational to the extent of forming correct beliefs andreasoning, why aren’t they capable of self-government? AsTaylor states, “the intellect of the producers is both sufficientlydeveloped to have genuine control over their lives, and thereforeto ensure psychic harmony, and so weak as to require them tobe enslaved to the guardians for their own good.”44 Thisinterpretation would be more plausible if it were shown how thesubjects could walk such a fine line.45 In any case this interpre-tation allows for considerable compulsion and deception of thesubjects, though less so than the former interpretation.

The proposal that philosophers should rule the city leads toanother problem: What reason do philosophers have to shoulder


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this burden? Socrates regards their reluctance to rule as anendearing trait of philosophers (VII.520d). The philosopher islike a lover consumed by sexual desire: “he neither loses norlessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each natureitself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, becauseof its kinship with it, and, once getting near what really is andhaving intercourse with it and having begotten understandingand truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and—at thatpoint, but not before—is relieved from the pains of giving birth”(VI.490b1-7). After beholding the Form of the Good, the philoso-pher regards himself as happy and nonphilosophers as wretchedso that he would rather “go through any sufferings, rather thanshare their opinions and live as they do” (VII.516d6-7, cf. 518a-b). But only philosophers are qualified to rule, because theirunenlightened fellow citizens “don’t have a single goal at whichall their actions, public and private, inevitably aim” (519c2-3).Socrates concludes that the legislators must not permit thephilosophers to shirk their civic duty (520a, 521b).

Policy 5 Rational rulers must be compelled to rule.

The Republic repeatedly mentions that the philosophersmust be compelled to rule.46 Leo Strauss views this policy as apoison pill in Socrates’ ostensibly ideal city. “The philosopherscannot be persuaded, they can only be compelled to rule thecities.” Strauss infers that “the just city is not possible becauseof the philosopher’s unwillingness to rule.” But, as MylesBurnyeat objects, the text suggests that philosophers are to becompelled by means of rational argument. In fact, Socratesoffers a speech which is to be used to persuade the philosophers(520a-d).47

Another difficulty lurking in this passage is, however, harderto evade. When Glaucon objects that it would be unjust to forcethe philosophers to live a worse life when they could live abetter one, Socrates reminds him that “it isn’t the law’s concernto make any one class in the city outstandlingly happy but tocontrive to spread happiness throughout the city” (519e1-3).Glaucon concedes, “That’s true, I had forgotten.” But Socratesneglects to remind Glaucon about something else: his originalchallenge to Socrates to demonstrate that the just person isbetter off, happier, and more blessed than the unjust person.48

But Socrates himself has not forgotten it. He will later claimthat he has answered the challenge by proving that “justiceitself is the best thing for the soul itself” (X.612b2-3).

Socrates seems to have fallen into inconsistency. He makestwo claims here: (1) If the philosophers are just, they will agreeto rule the city. (2) The philosophers will be less happy if theyrule the city rather than contemplate the Forms. But theseconflict with the main thesis he has been defending since Book

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II: (3) The just life is invariably happier than the unjust life,regardless of considerations such as punishments, rewards, andreputation.

Some interpreters try to avoid the problem by rejecting orqualifying claim (2). On this view, even though the philosopherrulers must forsake the happiness of contemplating the Formswhile they are ruling, their lives are no less happy. After theygrasp the Form of the Good they undergo a momentous per-sonal transformation so that they experience happiness not onlythrough contemplating the Forms but also in restructuringtheir communities in light of the Forms.49 Richard Kraut, indefending this interpretation, concludes that the philosopherrulers really promote their own self-interest after all: “one’shighest good is not always served by purely contemplating theForms; rather, one’s highest good is to establish and maintain acertain initiative relationship with the Forms, a relationshipthat is strained or ruptured when one fails to do one’s fairshare in a just community.”50

This solution is not free of difficulty. Why do philosophershave to be compelled to rule if they know they are better offruling? When Glaucon asks, “are we to do them an injustice bymaking them live a worse life when they could live a betterone?” Socrates concedes that they would live a worse life bycarrying out their duty, so that they must be compelled.51 Thereason is evidently that he regards pure contemplative activityas better than political activity. Even if the philosophers derivesome satisfaction from meeting their just obligations, theywould be more satisfied overall if they were off contemplatingthe Forms. Kraut accepts this, but remarks that “this does notentail that pure contemplation that creates injustice is moreadvantageous than political activity that is justly required.”52

However, if pure contemplation involving injustice is not “moreadvantageous” than political activity involving justice, then thephilosopher rulers make no personal sacrifice in doing theirduty, and it is misleading to suggest otherwise. Moreover, ifSocrates has no independent argument as to why it is not moreadvantageous to shirk one duty’s than not, he seems to bebegging the question.

Other interpreters suggest the more radical solution ofrejecting (3) the claim that the just person is always happierthan the unjust.53 On this approach philosophers agree to rulebecause they have discovered upon grasping the Forms thatthey have a higher end than their own happiness. They haveundergone a conversion which leads them to forsake theirpersonal well-being. As Glenn Morrow remarks, “every soul …that has had any vision of the ideal is under an obligation totry to transform the sense-world into its likeness.”54 Accordingto Norman Dahl, “what motivates a person with a harmonioussoul is an impartial desire to instantiate Justice.”55 On John


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Cooper’s interpretation, the philosopher is concerned withmaximizing the total amount of rational order in the world as awhole rather than with promoting his own self interest.56

Plato’s philosophers will settle for a less flourishing existencethan they might have had (519e1-520a4; cf. 420b4-8, 465e4-466a6). On the other hand,… a true philosopher never concernshimself with his own good. His ultimate end is to improve notjust the small part of the world that is constituted by his ownlife, but the whole of it, this part taken together with the rest.57

This solution has an awkward result: The official argumentof the Republic is exposed as a sham, or perhaps a noble lie. Atthe end of the dialogue, Socrates asks “And haven’t we foundthat justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and thatthe soul—whether it has the ring of Gyges or even it togetherwith the cap of Hades—should do just things?” (X.612b2-5),when he knows full well that he has proven nothing of the sort.His ostensible thesis—that the just soul is happier than theunjust—is like a Trojan horse because the philosopher ulti-mately learns that, even if it is not in his interest to be just,this doesn’t matter because he has a higher duty to maximizethe good-itself in the world.58

In conclusion, it is difficult to explain why the philosopherswould choose to be rulers, based on the text of the Republic.59

4. The Rule of Reason withoutParadoxical Policies

Socrates contends that “our city, if indeed it has been correctlyfounded, is completely good” (IV.427e6-8). The rule of reason isthe theoretical bedrock for the Republic on which Socrates hasfounded his Kallipolis, “the beautiful city” (VII.527c2). However,Socrates prescribes some troubling policies for his just city,involving elitism (a segregated class of philosopher rulers),collectivism (the aim being “the greatest happiness of the wholecity”), authoritarianism (extensive use of deception, manipula-tion, propaganda, surveillance, censorship, and coercion), andalienated rulers (who consent to rule only from a sense of duty).These not only conflict with common beliefs about politicaljustice, but in some cases they seem to generate apparentinconsistencies within Socrates’ overarching argument that thejust life is the happy life. This prompts the question: To whatextent is the rule of reason responsible for the totalitarianismof the Republic? Is the rule of reason an inherently authori-tarian and antidemocratic doctrine? Let us review Socrates’policies with these questions in mind.

Policy 1 There must be a class of rational rulers separate fromthe other citizens.

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Socrates’ proposal for a separate class of guardians dependsin part on tendentious claims about the psychology of thedifferent classes that make up the city. Socrates apparentlyassumes that the natural ruling class differs from the naturalsubject classes with respect to both rational capacity andmotivational structure. As Williams remarks:

Criticism of Plato often concentrates on his opinion that ruling isa matter of expertise; but he needs more than that opinion toreach his results in the Republic, and has to combine with it aset of views about what characteristics generally co-exist at thelevel of individual psychology. In that area, he has to believe notonly that λογιστικÒν comes in two sizes (as we might say, regularsize and king size), but also that the talents and temperamentsthat make good soldiers go with thymoeidic motivations, and thetalents and temperaments that make good workers go withepithymetic motivations.60

Although details of Williams’s critique might be called intoquestion,61 he seems right that Socrates’ elitism depends inlarge part on the assumption that most citizens are psycho-logically unfit for rule.

Aside from this controversial psychological theory, Socrates’inference to a separate ruling class seems questionable in amore general way. The rule of reason presupposes that acommunity such as the city consists of two parts: the rationaland the nonrational. Socrates gives an argument for thispresupposition in Republic Book IV based on the hypothesis ofopposites: that a thing cannot act or be affected in oppositeways in relation to the same object, at the same time, in thesame respect, and so forth. But even if it is granted that thecity, like the soul, has rational and nonrational parts and thatthe former should rule over the latter, this does not establishthe need for a separate ruling class, for a thing may be said tohave “parts” in different senses. These parts may be separablefrom each other and from the whole to which they belong, forexample, the wheels of a wagon. Or the parts may be aspects orfeatures of a whole and not separable except in thought, forexample, the concave and convex surfaces of a lens, or the axisand circumference of a spinning top. The latter is of courseSocrates’ own example (Rep. IV.436d-e).62 Hence, even if it isgranted that the city, like the soul, has distinct rational andnonrational parts, it does not follow that these must existseparately from each other. Thus it is not necessary that therational part and the nonrational part be separate classes ofcitizens, for it might turn out that the rational and nonrationalparts are found in each of the citizens individually, or that theyare aspects of the citizenry as a whole. The rule of reason iscompatible with any of these possibilities.


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Policy 2 The rulers must be philosophers.

The rule of reason implies that those who participate in thepolitical process should exhibit rationality. But Socratesassumes a very peculiar understanding of political rationalitywhen he advocates philosopher rulers. According to Socrates theForm of the Good serves as a model for the rulers: “Once they’veseen the good itself, they must each in turn put the city, itscitizens, and themselves in order, using it as their model(παραδε�γµατι)” (VII.540a8-9). Another passage describes themodel as a sort of utopia.

[Glaucon] You mean that he [i.e., the philosopher] will be willingto take part in the politics of the city we were founding anddescribing, the one that exists in theory (§ν λÒγοις), for I don’tthink it exists anywhere on earth.

[Socrates] But perhaps, I said, there is a model (παράδειγµα) ofit in heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and makehimself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It makes nodifference whether it is or will be somewhere, for he would takepart in the practical affairs of that city and no other. (IX.592a10-b5)

It sounds as though Socrates’ model is a real city in heavenpopulated by ideal citizens, of which the human city is but afaint imitation. It would be a literal utopia, having “no place” inthe perceptible world, although it might provide guidance forreal-world legislators. This suggests the sort of “hyperrealism”found in neo-Platonic accounts which treat the Forms as higherrealities of which perceptible particulars are perceptibleparticulars. The Form is an intelligible model analogous to theperceptible human model used by a craftsman to create aproduct. Just as the picture of a bed made by a painter is animitation of the perceptible bed made by a carpenter, theperceptible bed is an imitation of the Form of a Bed made by agod. On the hyperrealist view, crudely stated, the Form of a Bedis not only made by a god, but it is a bed a god could sleep in(see X.597b).63 On an alternative the model is more like a recipeor design according to which the product is made.64 Such arecipe might describe a mathematical structure shared byparticular instances.65 The latter interpretation yields a moreplausible view of the Forms, although it requires us to takeSocrates’ comment about making oneself a citizen of the modelcity as a metaphor for making one’s own soul virtuous.66

But even the less extravagant interpretation goes wellbeyond the rule of reason in assuming that political expertiserequires philosophical knowledge of the Form of the Good. Thisassumption is criticized by Aristotle.

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The idea has a certain plausibility, but seems not to be in accordwith what we find with the various sorts of expert knowledge; forall of them seek some particular good, and though they look forwhatever is lacking, they leave out knowledge of the form of thegood. And yet it is hardly likely that all the experts should beunaware of so great a resource, and should fail even to go lookingfor it. But it is also difficult to see how a weaver or a carpenterwill be helped in relation to his craft by knowing this good“itself ”; or how someone who has seem the form itself will be abetter doctor or a better general. (EN I.6.1096b31-1097a11,trans. Rowe)

Aristotle’s objection is that knowledge of the Form of theGood can provide no practical guidance in ethics or politics.67

Aristotle agrees with the need for political expertise, but heargues that political wisdom is a species of practical wisdom(φρÒνησις) which is expressed in good deliberation about thethings that conduce to the good life, and not a species oftheoretical wisdom (σοφ�α), which is expressed in scientificdemonstrations (in physics, astronomy, optics, and othernatural sciences) (VI.5.1140a25-7, 7.1141a16-20, 8.1141b23-4,cf. a20-b12). Although Aristotle endorses the rule of reason,he does not even discuss the claim that rulers must bephilosophers.

Policy 3 The ruler’s aim is the greatest happiness of the wholecity.

According to the rule of reason the rational element has thenatural right to rule because it alone knows what is good forthe whole of which it is a part (III.412e; IV.441e, 442c, 444d).This whole may be a soul, a city, or even the whole cosmos.However, as was noted above, “the good of the whole” and morespecifically “the happiness of the whole city” can be understoodin very different ways. Commentators disagree over whetherSocrates understands the “happy city” as involving the mutualadvantage of each social class or even of each and every citizenor as involving the collective well-being of the city, which mayentail significant sacrifices on the part of various classes orindividual citizens. It was suggested that the controversy isdifficult to resolve due to the vagueness of crucial passages. Butthe very existence of such an interpretative dispute indicatesthat the rule of reason by itself does not require the wholesalecollectivization proposed by Socrates in the Republic.

Policy 4 Rational rulers should control their subjects throughboth persuasion and compulsion. When it is necessary,they may employ deception, manipulation, propaganda,censorship, and coercion to secure obedience.


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The rule of reason can provide a justification for the use ofcompulsion. For if reason reveals what is objectively good andan individual wants to do otherwise, the individual may becompelled to abide by reason. However, it may be possible tocompel an individual through rational persuasion, as we sawearlier in the passage in which the philosopher rulers arecompelled by means of argument to share in governance(VII.519a-521a).68 But if the individual is unable or unwilling tobe persuaded rationally, other means may be justified, as whena parent tricks a child or a pet unwilling to take its medicine byconcealing it in a tasty morsel. As we saw Socrates advocatesextensive use of such measures especially with the producerswhom he lumps together with children, women, and slaves dueto their defective psychology (see IV.431b-c, X.590c-d).

There is again no reason to suppose that the rule of reasonas such licenses such authoritarianism. Indeed, insofar as eachof the subjects is capable of rational deliberation the rule ofreason requires instead that the rulers use rational persuasionto secure their compliance. And if practical wisdom is distinctfrom philosophical wisdom, as Aristotle argued above, thecapacity for rational deliberation does not need to be limited toa philosophical elite.

Policy 5 Rational rulers must be compelled to rule.

In view of the preceding discussion it is tempting to try to slicethrough the Gordian knot and simply dispense with thephilosopher rulers. It is not clear however that this wouldcompletely solve the problem Plato has unearthed. Granted thatthe rulers are individual agents with their own reason foracting, it seems inevitable that tensions will arise between thepublic good and the good of the rulers considered as individuals.Regardless of whether the rulers are lovers of wisdom, lovers ofhonor, or lovers of pleasure, they must forego their ownhappiness as individuals to some extent if they are to be fullyjust rulers of the city.69 The rule of reason needs a solution tothis problem if it is to be a tenable political theory.

Plato suggests different possible approaches in the Laws.The legislators should try to institute a system of moraleducation not to produce an elite class of absolute philosopherrulers, but a body of citizens each of whom has “a keen desire tobecome a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and be ruled asjustice demands” (I.643e5-6). This would of course require aprofound transformation of the motivations of ordinary citizens.Another approach (compatible with the first) is to make the lawitself the ruler over the city. The Athenian Stranger says thatreason (λÒγος) “strives to become law” (VIII.835e5). The “goldencord” which is the power of calculation (λογισµÒς) in theindividual soul is called the common law in the city (I.644d-

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645a). The Athenian Stranger suggests that it cannot be anaccident that the name of this divine and wonderful thing, law(νÒµος) is so suggestive of intelligence (νοËς) (XII.957c6-7, cf.IV.714a). Rather than hoping for purely disinterested rationalagents, the legislator should design a constitution whichembodies policies for rational cooperation including proceduresto ensure that the aberrant tendencies of public officials areheld in check. Echoing these arguments for the rule of law,Aristotle adds, “That is a better ruler which is free from passionthan that in which it is innate. Whereas the law is passionless,passion must always sway the human soul” (III.15.1286a17-20).“Appetite is a wild beast, and spirit perverts the minds ofrulers, even when they are the best of men. That is why the lawis intelligence (νοËς) unaffected by desire” (16.1287a30-2).Although the rule of law is itself a controversial doctrine, it isno surprise that proponents of the rule of reason are drawn toit.70

5. Conclusion

I have argued here that the rule of reason can be extricatedfrom other, more controversial doctrines in the Republic, suchas elitism, collectivism, and ubiquitous compulsion. But the ruleof reason is so far only a skeletal doctrine. The principle thatthe rational part of the state should govern the nonrationalpart rests on the claim that the rational part alone is capable ofknowing the common good, that is, what is good for the wholecommunity. On the basis of this knowledge, it is possible todistinguish between just political systems and policies (thosethat promote the common good) from unjust ones. The task ofpolitical science should be to found or reform political systemsand policies so that they are just or at any rate as just aspossible. Further, insofar as the citizens are rational, they havea right (just claim) to participate in governance.71

Fleshing this out would require a number of questions whichare answered in the Republic in a controversial way: Is there anobjective good, and can it be known through a rational process?What sort of rational process would this be? Who is capable ofcarrying out such a process successfully? Further, in what senseis the common good “common”—is it good for each and everyoneor good for the whole community in some other sense? Shouldpolitical rule may be exercised directly by rational individualsissuing commands or indirectly through laws, customs, andintermediate institutions? Or does this depend on circum-stances?

If persuasive answers are forthcoming, the rule of reasonmay still be relevant to modern political philosophy. Forexample, it might be argued that democracy is the mostdefensible political system because it is best suited for makingcorrect political decisions. Aristotle seriously considers this sort


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of “wisdom of the multitude” argument: “the many, each ofwhom is not excellent man, none the less by coming togethercan be better (not individually but collectively) than those….For each individual among the many has a portion of virtue andpractical wisdom, and when they come together the multitudebecomes like one human being, having many feet, hands, andsenses, so also regarding character and thought” (Pol.III.11.1281a42-b7). This type of argument is developed muchmore fully in John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on Represen-tative Government and in the burgeoning contemporary litera-ture on deliberative democracy. If an argument along theselines is sound, then the rule of reason may form the theoreticalbasis for a democratic constitution that ensures rationaldeliberation concerning public policy.72

In conclusion, the rule of reason is one of Plato’s ideas thatmodern political philosophers may still be able to defend. It isworth the effort.73

Notes1 This in an important theme in early cosmology, e.g., Xenophanes:

“There is one god, greatest among gods and men, similar to mortals inneither body nor thought (νÒηµα),” (B23) and “without effort with thethought of his mind (νÒου φρεν‹) he shakes everything” (B25).Anaxagoras: “he has knowledge (γν≈µγν) of all things and greatestpower; and mind controls (νοËς κρατε›) all things that have soul …”(B12). Diogenes of Apollonia: “what has thought (νÒησιν) is that whichmen call air, and by this all things are governed (κυβερνᾶσθαι) and itcontrols (κρατε›ν) all things …” (B5). Aristotle made the rule of reasona fundamental principle in his own political science, e.g., “It is clearthat it is natural and advantageous for the body to be ruled (ἄρχεσθαι)by the soul over the body, and the passionate part by the mind (ÍπÚτοË νοË) and the part possessing reason (λÒγον)” (Pol. I.5.1254b6-9).

2 According to Rousseau, “the general will alone can direct theforces of the State according to the end of its institution, which is thecommon good” (Of the Social Contract II.1.1, trans. Gourevitch).Voluntarist theories take different forms: they may require that therulers have the consent of the governed (either tacitly or expressly) orthat the regime embodies the general will in a less definite way.Subjectivist variants of this approach appeal to interests, desires,subjective preferences, and so forth. It does not seem necessary tomake the voluntarist/subjectivist alternative more precise for thepurposes of this paper, which is narrowly concerned with therationalist view found in the Republic.

3 The guardians are called craftsmen (δηµιουργÒι) (Rep. III.395b9-c1, IV.421c2), and the legislator is compared to a statue painter(IV.420c). Compare Laws X.889d6-e1 where politics is called a craft(τ°χνη) and legislation is a matter of craft. Similarly, the Timaeusemploys the craftsman analogy in its “likely story” about the origin ofthe empirical world, with an immaterial intelligent demiurge shapingpreexisting matter into an orderly cosmos (30a, c, 37d, 53a-b, 69b-c).Many scholars have commented on the parallels between the cosmicdemiurge and the human legislator, e.g., Morrow 1953-54, Laks 1990

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and 2000, and Bobonich 2002.4 Rousseau argues that the legislator is necessary as a guide

because “by itself the people always wills the good, but by itself it doesnot always see it. The general will is always upright, but the judgmentwhich guides it is not always enlightened … the public enlightenmentresults in the union of understanding and will in the social body, fromthis union results the smooth cooperation of the parts, and finally thegreatest force of the whole. Hence arises the necessity of a Lawgiver”(Of the Social Contract II.6.10, trans. Gourevitch). Rousseau’svoluntarist view of legislation is the antithesis of Plato’s rationalistaccount.

5 Owing to space constraints this paper is confined to the Republicexcept for a few brief references to other dialogues which shed light onthe Republic. I plan in a sequel to examine the rule of reason inPlato’s later dialogues. It should be noted, however, that the rule ofreason is implied by Socrates’ claim in the Gorgias that he alone putshis hand to political expertise (πολιτικØ τ°χνη) and practices politicalthings (521d6-8). The rule of reason becomes a cosmological principlein later dialogues which claim that mind (νοËς) regulates and directsthe cosmos (Phil. 28d, cf. 30c; Polit. 272e, 273c-d; Tim. 30a, 37d, 53a,69c; Laws XII.966e, 967b). As Broadie remarks, “Plato holds that thissense-perceptible universe of ours can also become intelligible to ushumans because it was constructed according to a rational plan, andwe are in a position to make reasonable assumptions about thecontent of that plan” (2004, 72). Similarly, Plato holds that political lifebecomes intelligible only if it is constructed according to a rationalplan and we are in a position to make reasonable assumptions aboutthe content of that plan.

6 Demos 1957 offers an overview of the paradoxes in Plato’sRepublic and attempts to solve them.

7 Trans. Donald J. Zeyl in Cooper 1997. This principle is explicitlyexpounded in the Gorgias, where Socrates argues that “when a certainorder (κÒσµος), the proper one for each thing, comes to be present in itthat it makes each of the things there are good” (506e2-4). This orderarises from organization (τάξις), correctness (ÙρθÒτης), and craftsman-ship (τ°χνη). Socrates has earlier argued that the true craftsman, e.g.,shipbuilder or housebuilder, imposes order on his subject matter andcompels one thing to be suited for another and to fit to it until theentire object is put together in an organized and orderly way; likewisegym teachers and doctors give order or organization to the body (503e-504a). Order results in health and strength of the body. Similarly anorderly soul is better than a disorderly soul, since it is lawful,moderate, and virtuous (506d-507a). Finally, Socrates argues that aman who has an orderly virtuous soul is happy whereas a man with adisorderly vicious soul is miserable (cf. 507c). He also suggests thatthis principle applies to the universe as a whole: “Partnership andfriendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice hold heaven and earth,and gods and humans, and that is why they call this universe a worldorder (κÒσµος), and not an undisciplined world-disorder (ἀκοσµ�αν)”(507e6-508a4). Similarly, the Philebus connects the good with beauty,proportion (συµµετρ�α), and truth (65a1-2), which are exemplified by“an incorporeal order (κÒσµος) that rules beautifully over an ensouledbody” (64b7).

8 All translations from the Republic are by G. M. A. Grube, revised


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by C. D. C. Reeve, in Cooper 1997 unless otherwise indicated.9 This principle is also invoked in the Phaedo: “When the soul and

the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to beruled, and the other to rule and be master” (79e9-80a1, trans. G. M. A.Grube in Cooper 1997; cf. 94c-d). See also Rep. I.353d.

10 See Miller 1999 for critical analysis of the argument for thetripartite soul.

11 See Santas 2001 for an illuminating discussion of the functionaltheory of the good and its role in the Republic.

12 There is a great controversy over whether and to what extentSocrates’ argument succeeds. In a famous article Sachs (1963) arguesthat Socrates commits the fallacy of relevance: The challenge is toprove that it profits one to possess vulgar (i.e., conventional) justice,which is displayed for example in caring for one’s parents and inrefraining from fraud, theft, murder, adultery, impiety, and so forth(see Rep. IV.442e-443a). Socrates argues that it benefits someone tohave Platonic justice, i.e., a harmonious soul, which is analogous tohealth in the body (444d-445b). But, Sachs objects, the argument failsbecause Socrates does not show that Platonic justice is a necessaryand sufficient condition for vulgar justice. Two valuable overviews andattempts to resolve the problem the problem are Dahl 1991 and Kraut1992. This issue is relevant to the central theme of this paper insofaras it bears on the relation between the rule of reason and psychicharmony, especially in connection with the fifth Socratic policydiscussed below.

13 It is interesting to contrast this myth with the democratic mythin the Menexenus, which argues that all the citizens are equal becausethey have a common mother: “equality of birth (!σογον�α) in thenatural order makes us seek equality of rights (!σονοµ�αν) in the legal”(239a2-3, trans. Paul Ryan in Cooper 1997). The myth of metals alsocontrasts with Protagoras’s myth, in which Zeus gives all cities ashare in justice and political wisdom (Prot. 322d-323a).

14 Cooper points out that reason is assigned “a double job: to knowthe truth and to rule (ἄρχειν, 441e4, 442c5). For reason to rule heretakes the form of its deciding on its own authority what is the bestthing to do, issuing injunctions (442c6, ταËτα παρÆγγελλεν), andseeing to it that the required action is undertaken” (1984, 6; cf. 1977,152). It should be noted, however, that the other parts also havesecondary jobs: being ruled (appetite) or helping the ruler (spirit).

15 Scholars disagree over whether the argument implies “feminism”in the sense of some commitment to equal rights for women: Vlastos1989 argues (qualifiedly) that it does, and Annas 1976 that it doesn’t.

16 Dahl 1991, 820. Dahl argues persuasively that the rule of reasondoes not consist in merely choosing in accordance with the agent’s“overall conception of the good.”

17 See Keyt 2005 for a critical discussion of the ship of stateanalogy, which presumes that rationality and virtue are confined tothe rulers. As Keyt shows the steersman (κυβερνÆτης) “was captain,helmsman, and navigator all rolled into one.” He argues that the pointof the analogy is that just as the steersman knows how to get theship’s passengers to its true destination, the philosopher ruler knowshow to get the citizens to the real good.

18 As noted earlier the human ruler is analogous to the divineintelligent craftsman (δηµιουργÒς) of the Timaeus who looks to an

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unchangeable model (παράδειγµα) in fashioning the sense-perceptiblecosmos (28a-29d). In order for the creation and creator to be as good aspossible, the maker must have been guided by an eternal model, notone that has come to be (28c5-29a3). Broadie (2004, 76) points out ananalogy with human producers who often take created perceptibleobjects as their model: “human makers are at their best and mostgodlike (cf. 90b6-c6) if and only if they look instead to the eternalparadigm of whatever it is they proposed to make.” A product modeledafter a created product is apt to be inferior because the maker mayreproduce characteristics of the model which are inessential or whichwere formerly necessary but are now inappropriate. Along similarlines Sellars 1959 compares the divine craftsman to the soul andstatesman.

19 According to Popper (1966, 107), for Plato, “[t]he criterion ofmorality is the interest of the state,” and “the individual is nothing buta cog (sc. in the state machine)” and hence “ethics is nothing but thestudy of how to fit him into the whole” (108; cited by Taylor 1997, 35).Regarding Bolshevism, Russell comments, “Far closer than anyhistorical parallel is the parallel of Plato’s Republic…. The CommunistParty corresponds to the guardians; the soldiers have about the samestatus in both; there is in Russia an attempt to deal with family lifemore or less as Plato suggested” (1949, 28–9).

20 Taylor 1986, 4–5.21 See Schofield 2000, 218–19 on this controversy.22 See Taylor 1986, 6–8. Likewise, unabashed modern proponents of

extreme statism are scarce, if only because it is a hard sell. Onesuspects that would-be extreme statists often package their ideologyas political organicism.

23 Popper 1966, 76 and 79.24 The word §ατ°ον (IV.421c4) means “must be let alone” or “given

up.”25 Demos 1957, 167.26 Cited by Vlastos 1977, 28, who notes that Popper (1966, 80)

omits “with each other” in his translation of 519e5-520a1. CompareLaws V.739d7 where the Athenian Stranger claims that in a city inwhich property is owned in common, the inhabitants will enjoythemselves (εÈφραινÒµενοι) (cited by Taylor 1986, 15).

27 Annas 1981, 179.28 Rawls 1971, 4. Vlastos (1978) argues further that Plato’s

conception of justice implies “rights of persons” although not the sortof equal human rights espoused by modern liberalism.

29 Taylor (1986, 20) raises a related criticism: “The concept of aeudaimôn polis seems … to contain a crucial ambiguity.” It can meaneither a city where each citizen considered as an individual isεÈδα�µων (individualistic reading) or a city which is εÈδα�µων as awhole even though its citizens considered as individuals are not(holistic reading). Taylor regards the apparent incompatibility of thesetwo readings as a central problem in making sense of the Republic.

30 Cooper 1977, 155.31 Cooper 1977, 156. Other commentators offer similar inter-

pretations, e.g., Kraut (1992) and Irwin (1977, 237). Cooper is moreexplicit in emphasizing the role of maximization. It is not clear whatevidence there is for this interpretation in the Republic, althoughit might be suggested by Timaeus 30a1-2: the demiurge “wanted


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everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that waspossible.”

32 Platonic justice on Cooper’s interpretation resembles modernutilitarianism, the view that the rightness of actions involvesmaximizing the good however it is distributed. Cohen (1977) raisessome interesting problems for this interpretation. For example, even ifit is granted that the just person should try to transform the per-ceptible world into a likeness of the rationally ordered Form, does thisentail trying to maximize the total amount of rational order in theworld (utilitarianism) or trying to bring about the most perfectinstance of rational order (perfectionism)? Should the philosopher tryto produce a small amount of nearly perfect order (e.g., in his ownsoul) or a greater amount of less perfect order (e.g., in the city)?

33 This problem is related to an objection raised by BernardWilliams (1973), who contends that Socrates’ argument relies on twoprinciples: First, “A city is F if and only if its men are F” (cf. Rep.IV.435e), which Williams calls “the whole-part rule.” Second, “Theexplanation of a city’s being F is the same as that of a man’s being F(the same ε‰δος [Form] of F-ness applies to them both)” (cf. 435b1-2),which Williams calls “the analogy of meaning.” Williams objects thatthese two principles come into conflict when ‘just’ is substituted for ‘F’.On Plato’s theory of justice, a soul or city is just if, and only if, each ofits parts does its job, and the job of the rational part is to rule over thetwo nonrational parts (i.e., the spirited and appetitive). Given thewhole-part rule, the warriors and producers cannot governed by theirrational part because, otherwise, they would belong to the rationalpart of the city. But if they are not governed by their rational part, thewarriors and producers, considered as individuals, cannot be just,given the analogy of meaning.

34 Cooper 1977, 153 n. 7. Cooper notes the repeated references ofknowledge at 428b6, c11, d8, e8, 429a1-3. Cf. Irwin 1995, 323-6;Bobonich 2002, 43.

35 Vlastos 1977, 28. Vlastos defends the paternalist interpretation.36 Taylor 1986, 20–1. This interpretation of the passages is

controversial. Other commentators (including Bobonich, Cooper, Irwin,and Kraut) contend that virtue requires philosophical knowledge inthe Republic. Another passage (VII.518d9-e3) mentions “what arecalled the virtues of the soul” which are akin to those of the bodybecause they are added later “by habit and practice” and contraststhem with the virtue of reasoning (φρον∞σαι). “What are called”translates καλοÊµεναι, which is sometimes equivalent to “so-called,”and may suggest that habitual virtue is not really a virtue.

37 Williams 1973, 204.38 The translation departs from Grube and Reeve, who render

πειθο› κα‹ ἀναγκ˙ as “through persuasion or compulsion.” While notmistaken, “or” for κα‹ might misleadingly suggest that persuasion andcompulsion are mutually exclusive. The present passage leaves it openwhether the guardians can compel their subjects by persuading them.For further discussion of this passage, see below in connection withPolicy 5 below. Compare IV.421c1: ἀναγκαστ°ον … κα‹ πειστ°Òν,quoted in n. 42 below.

39 Reeve (1988, 195–7) suggests that the philosopher rulers are anelite subclass “spawned” by the complete guardians. Presumablyphilosopher rulers would not need to lie to each other.

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40 Popper 1966, 47.41 See Vlastos 1973, sec 8.42 This seems to be suggested by IV.421b7-c3: “We must compel and

persuade the auxiliaries and guardians to follow our other policy andbe the best possible craftsmen at their own work, and the same withall the others.” Here “all the others” (τοÁς ἄλλους ἄπαντας) clearlyrefers to the producer class.

43 Vlastos 1977, 20.44 Taylor 1986, 28 n. 17.45 Lear (1992) offers a solution to this problem, involving a complex

psychological process of internalization and externalization wherebythe souls of the citizens are adapted to the constitution. In brief, thephilosopher rulers initially internalize the Form of the Good in theirown souls and then externalize it by reshaping the souls of theirsubjects, who in turn internalize the appropriate cultural influences.Although the lower classes continue to be ruled by their nonrationaldesires, they are habituated to control these desires and to believethat it is better for them to share with the rulers the belief thatphilosophers should rule (III.389d-e; IV.431d-e, 433c-d).

A problem for this interpretation is that Socrates makes no explicitprovision for moral education of the producers, although he mentionseducation (παιδε�α) in law of the auxiliaries (IV.429c). He alsocontrasts the education of the guardians with that of “cobblers, whoare educated in cobblery” (V.456d10), which according to Taylor“implies that the producers are confined to a purely technicaleducation” (Taylor 1986 n. 17; cf. Hourani 1949). But this is anargument from silence. The passage clearly implies that the producersare unqualified for the education received by the guardians. It doesnot imply that the producers are incapable of any sort of moraltraining. Socrates does not rule out all moral education of theproducers. Taylor also makes reference to IV.430b which contrasts thecorrect belief of animals and slaves which is not the result ofeducation, to be inculcated by law, with the political courage of theauxiliaries involves the latter sort of belief. But again the passagedoes not necessarily imply that the producers have only the sort ofbelief found in animals and slaves. Socrates makes a vague referenceat III.414d1-5 to having educated the rulers, the soldiers, and “the restof the city” (i.e., presumably, the producers), but unfortunately he doesnot say anything specific about the form this education took.

46 Brown 2004, 280 and n. 25 lists seven explicit references tocompulsion: VI.500d4-8; VII.519e4, 520a8, 520e2, 521b7, 539e3, and540b5.

47 Strauss 1964, 51–3; Burnyeat 1985, 36.48 See II.357b1, 358a3, 360c8, 361d3, 367d3-4, 368c6. Kraut (1992,

313) cites these passages.49 Kraut offers an eloquent description of the Platonic

transformation: “We must transform our lives by recognizing aradically different kind of good—the Forms—and we must try toincorporate these objects into our lives by understanding, loving, andimitating them, for they are incomparably superior to any other kindof good we can have…. [Plato] takes the discovery of the Forms to bemomentous because they are the preeminent good we must possess inorder to be happy, and he takes reason to be the most worthwhilecapacity of our soul because it is only through reason that we can


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possess the Forms” (1992, 319). Irwin (1995) and Vernezze (1992) offersimilar solutions.

50 Kraut 1992, 337.51 Some commentators argue that Socrates only means “compul-

sion” in a weaker sense, e.g., “necessary if they are to fulfill therequirements of justice” (Irwin 1995, 299). Brown (2000) arguesconvincingly that such “deflationary readings of ἀνάγκη” fail becauseSocrates is clear that the philosophers prefer not to rule even afterthey have been educated. Brown’s essay is a valuable critical overviewof the controversy.

52 Kraut 1992, 337 n. 34.53 See Cooper 1977, Annas 1981, 266–7, and White 1986.54 Morrow 1953-4, 9.55 Dahl 1991, 826.56 Cooper 1977, 155–6.57 Cooper 1977, 157. Cooper argues that the just man is neither an

egoist nor an altruist: “Plato’s just man is no egoist, in any acceptablesense of this term. Not only does he not do everything he does out ofconcern for his own good, he never does anything for this reason. Evenwhere he acts to benefit himself, recognizing that he does so, hisreason for acting is that the good-itself demands it. That his gooddemands it is strictly irrelevant. By the same token, at no time doeshe act to benefit others out of regard for them and concern for theirgood, just because it is theirs. Again, he confers all benefits out ofregard for the good-itself, not out of regard for these more immediatehuman beneficiaries … the just man is no egoist, and no altruisteither, but a sort of high-minded fanatic.…” By a “fanatic” Cooperseems to mean that the just person is a sort of utilitarian, devoted tomaximizing the good itself (see n. 32 above).

58 White 1986 maintains that in agreeing to rule the philosophersare moved to act contrary to their own interests. This interpretationcarries a high price: the official argument of the Republic collapses.Dahl (1991, 829 n. 34) contends that “even if Plato does maintain thata philosopher sacrifices his interests when he chooses to rule, this willnot undermine Plato’s overall defense of justice.” But Socrates’response to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus has beenseriously compromised by this move.

59 Brown (2000, 9–10) suggests that the reason philosophers agreeto rule is that the law commands them to and they have “a conceptionof justice which makes obedience to just laws obligatory.” Hence, “thelaw changes the circumstances and thereby alters how muchhappiness is available.” A problem with this solution is that it isunclear how acting justly in this sense makes one happier. Moreoverthere is little textual evidence for the legalistic conception of justice inthe Republic, and the legislators’ speech to the philosophers makes noreference to the law’s command (VII.520a-d).

60 Williams 1973, 204.61 For example, it is questionable whether Socrates argues in the

way that Williams maintains because Socrates does not actually assertthat the whole-part rule holds for the predicate ‘just’. Williams himselfentertains the possibility that Socrates holds instead that “a city is Fif and only if the leading, most influential, or predominant citizens areF” (1977, 53). Socrates clearly holds the latter version in the case ofwisdom, and the suggestion is that he also holds it for justice as well.

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On this account only the philosopher-kings possess virtue, includingjustice, and the city as a whole is virtuous because its rulers are.

62 See Shields 2001 for an excellent discussion of this point. Shieldsdistinguishes three sorts of parts: (1) x is an aggregative part of y iff:(i) x is a portion of y; (ii) x can exist as x after the dissolution of y. Forexample, a single brick is an aggregative part of a pile of bricks. (2) xis an organic part of y iff: (i) x is a portion of y; (ii) x is a functionallydefined entity; and (iii) x is parasitic on y for its identity conditions.For example, my heart is an organic part of my body. (3) x is aconceptual part of y iff: (i) x is a portion of y; (ii) x is a not afunctionally defined entity; and (iii) x is parasitic on y for its identityconditions. For example, the beauty of Helen is a part of her if she isbeautiful. Shields is mainly concerned with the issue of separability. Ifthe parts of the soul distinguished in Republic Book IV can existseparately from the whole soul, this would seem to undermine theproof in Book X that the soul is immortal. Shields argues however thatonly aggregative parts are separable, but that the argument of BookIV is consistent with the soul having merely conceptual parts (apossibility left open by Socrates’ example of the spinning top example).Hence, the argument in Book IV does not show that the soul iscomposite in a sense which would contradict the claim defended inBook X that the soul is immortal. As I argue in the main text, Shields’analysis seems to have an important implication for the parts of thecity as well, although he does not discuss it.

63 As Broadie (2004, 79) observes, “Hyperrealism gives us an intel-ligible world thick with far more reality than needs to be postulated tomake sense of our universe and of human intellectual endeavours.”

64 Broadie (2004) defends this interpretation. She mentions (78 n.13) a passage in which the laws are a παράδειγµα for good conduct:Prot. 326c8.

65 Compare Cooper who describes the Form as “a complex, orderedwhole, whose orderliness is due to the mathematical relationshipsholding among its parts” (1977, 155). The craftsman should endeavorto replicate this kind of order in the sensible world.

66 Burnyeat 1992 offers yet another interpretation, according towhich the model city exists not in the world of Forms but in the worldof imagination. “The whole Republic is an exercise in the art ofpersuasion, designed to lead us from here to there. The ideal city isbuilt in our imagination by persuasive argument, in such a way thatsuccessful persuasion in the world of imagination guarantees thepossibility of success in the actual world.”

67 Popper objects along similar lines: “purely formal information isall we get. Plato’s Idea of the Good nowhere plays a more direct ethicalor political role …” (1966, 145). “Plato’s Idea of the Good is practicallyempty. It gives us no indication of what is good, in a moral sense, i.e.,what we ought to do” (274).

68 Bobonich argues that the Laws explicitly asserts the compati-bility of persuasion and compulsion: “none of the lawgivers has everreflected on the fact that it is possible to use two means of giving laws,persuasion and force (πειθο› κα‹ β�α).… They have used only the latter;failing to mix compulsion (ἀνάγκην) with persuasion in theirlawgiving, they have employed unmitigated force alone” (LawsIV.722b5-c2, trans. Bobonich 2002, 97, adopting Ast’s emendation ofἁνάγκην for µάχην found in the manuscripts). Compare X.890b-c. The


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Athenian Stranger recommends that persuasion be provided by meansof preambles or preludes attached to the laws (723a). The argumentoffered in Republic VII.520a-d to persuade the philosophers to serve asrulers may be viewed as a prototype of the preambles of the Laws.

69 Irwin 1977, 242–3 suggests that Plato “mistakenly suggests” thatthe philosopher ruler must be compelled to rule because “he isinfluenced by the contemplative view of the philosopher.” It seems truethat the policy proposed by Socrates assumes that the philosophervalues contemplation most highly. But the sort of conflict envisaged byPlato can arise if the rulers are assumed to be individual agents withany distinct values of their own.

70 These comments are only meant to be suggestive. I plan todiscuss the rule of law in connection with the rule of reason in Plato’slater dialogues in a sequel to this paper.

71 This is implicit in Socrates’ argument that women are qualifiedto be guardians if they have a philosophical nature (Rep. V.456a).

72 Such an argument for democracy is not uncontroversial. AsRunciman remarks, “Cognitive defences of democracy tend to put theemphasis on elite forms of representation and a ‘filtering’ of publicopinion, in order to protect political decision-making from the un-thinking preferences of the general public; as a result, they oftensound distinctly undemocratic” (2004, 20). Runciman considerspossible responses to this objection. The rule of reason would in anycase probably not endorse extreme democracy. It would no doubtrequire, for example, provision for an educated and responsibleelectorate and constitutional constraints on majority voting.

73 I carried out the research for this essay as a visiting scholar atthe Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs at the Universityof St. Andrews. I am grateful to John Haldane the Centre Director,Sarah Broadie, Stephen Halliwell, and Peter Woodruff for theirvaluable suggestions. I also benefitted from comments of Eric Brownand other Spindel Conference participants, especially Timothy Roche.

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f. miller plato on the rule of reason

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