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PLOTINUS' REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF "PARMENIDES" 130a-131dAuthor(s): John FielderSource: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 12, No. 2 (December1978), pp. 1-5Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913410 .

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PLOTINUS' REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF PARMENIDES 130a-131d

In a well-known passage in the Parmenides (130a- 132b) Plato presents a series of objections to the Theory of Forms. The youthful Socrates is unable to reply to these objections and nowhere else in the dialogues do we find a refutation of them. Some of these arguments are taken up by Plotinus.1 His responses have considerable philosophical merit and provide an additional perspective on the philosophical possibilities of the Theory of Forms. In what follows I set out Plotinus' responses to the arguments of Parmenides 130a-131d and show how they meet the objections raised there. There are two arguments to be examined. 1 . The extent of the realm of Forms.

Socrates readily admits Forms of Goodness, Rightness, and Beauty, is unsure about Man, Fire, and Water, and thinks it absurd that there could be Forms of Mud, Hair, and Dirt.2 Parmenides has caught Socrates between two conflicting features of the Theory of Forms. On the one hand the theory gives an account of names and common features, so that if there are Forms corresponding to goodness and justice, there must also be Forms for mud and hair. On the other hand, the Forms are perfect and unchanging, the objects of almost religious veneration, so that it seems absurd to suggest that Mud and Hair are worthy companions of Beauty and Justice. Parmenides predicts that in time Socrates will no longer despise such Forms, thereby indicating that he does not regard this argument as fatal to the theory. Even so, the argument is unanswered and in need of a more philoso- phically mature response.

Plotinus' reply to this objection follows the lines suggested by Parmenides. Forms of insignificant things are not to be despised, for even though they are inferior to other Forms, they have an essential role to play.

A shape, that of a man let us suppose, must include a certain number of differences of part but all dominated by a unity; the part will be inferior in comparison to the total but best in its place. (VI, 7, 10)3

Thus hair, a part of man, is inferior to man as a whole, but without hair and similar things there could be no man. Such things are insignificant in themselves but have worth by virtue of their contribution to the whole. Socrates' mistake reflects the naivete of a young man who, because of lack of experience, does not appreciate the importance of the minor players in the drama. They are not the stars of the production, but they are not to be despised either.

There is another issue, not mentioned in the dialogue, which Plotinus takes up. He is concerned about the last two examples used by Parmenides, mud and dirt (tttjXóç and ¿itfTOÇ).

But on the question as to whether the repulsive and the products of putridity also have their Idea - whether there is an Idea of filth and mud - it is to be observed that all that the Intellectual- Principle (the realm of Forms) derived from the First (the One) is of the noblest; in those Ideas the base is not included: these repulsive things point not to the Intellectual-Principle but to the Soul which, drawing upon the Intellectual-Principle, takes from Matter certain other things and among them these. . . . The products of putrefaction are to be traced to the Soul's inability to bring some other thing into being. . . (V, 9,14)

Apeiron Vol. XII (1978) No 2.

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Hair is to be distinguished from mud and filth4 for the latter are the 'products of putridity' (t&v èn ar}i//ecoç ). Hair, though insignificant in itself, is an essential part of something important. Mud and filth are not essential parts of something valuable, nor are they merely insignificant. They have negative value rather than little or no value. Con- sequently they cannot have Forms corresponding to them, for everything in Nous is of the noblest (apeara). If this were allowed it would violate the basic value orientation of the Theory of Forms. Disvalue is characteristic only of the sensible world, arising from the fact that it is an imperfect copy of the ideal world in Nous. The imperfections of the sensible world, therefore, have no corresponding Forms, for they do not come about through participation but rather are the by-products of the Soul's creation of the sensible world out of Matter. Hence Plotinus supports Socrates' rejection of Forms for mud and filth, for they are not imperfect copies of an ideal Form but are the products of decay and deterioration.

While it is clear that this analysis fits ¡ïvnoç, since its meaning includes disvalue, the inclusion of tttjXoc, is somewhat puzzling. The term is used to refer to the clay used by potters, which is hardly an offensive substance. But perhaps Plotinus is thinking of some sort of festering mire which would belong to the 'products of putrefaction.'5 Regardless of any disagreement we may have with the details of his analysis, it is clear that not only has Plotinus met Parmenides' objection but he has also brought out the more basic issue of the criteria for deciding which sensible characteristics have corresponding Forms. 2 . Objections to 'Participation9

Parmenides' objections to the doctrine of participation can be put in the form of a dilemma: either a sensible object partakes of the whole Form and is thereby separated from itself in many individuals, or it partakes of part of a Form and as a result the Form will not be one but composed of many separable parts.6 Both alternatives lead to the loss of the Form's unity, and since they are apparently exhaustive, participation is demon- strated to be inconsistent with the Theory of Forms. This is a more serious objection, and there is no suggestion that a more mature Socrates will be able to meet it. Since participa- tion is a central concept of the Theory of Forms it is essential that these objections be refuted if the theory is to be accepted.

Parmenides' argument is not refuted in the dialogue, but there is an intriguing suggestion that Socrates puts forward at 13 IB. In response to Parmenides' claim that if that whole Form is shared by many individuals, the Form will be separate from itself, Socrates responds by saying that this consequence does not follow if the Form is like one and the same day which is in many places at the same time and yet is not separate from itself. But this analogy is not followed up and discussion turns to the analogy of a sail and its parts. Runciman7 holds that this suggestion would not have avoided the problem, for to say that different places all share in the daylight is only to say that many places are illuminated by the daylight at the same time. And this is just to say that there are many illuminated things. Hence the relation is not one of participation (sharing in) as in the case of the sailcloth. But this argument depends upon translating quepa as daylight8 (i.e. the light of day) rather than simply the day or a day. It may not be the same light that illuminates each of us, but it is the same day for each of us, (e.g. Nov. 5) regardless of our location. The analogy of the day offers a contrast to the sailcloth because a day is not a physical object that can be shared only by division. Unlike the sail, the day is an example of something that can be in many places at one without being divided into parts, precisely what is needed to avoid the consequences of Parmenides' dilemma. If the Form

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could be present to a number of individuals in the way that they all partake of the same day, then the first horn of the dilemma would be rendered harmless.

Cornford remarks that Parmenides' arguments understand 'part' and 'whole' in the most gross and material sense,9 a point that is emphasized by Parmenides' insistence on comparing the division of a Form to spreading a sail over a number of individuals. Thus what the argument shows is that if Forms are to be understood in terms of the division of material objects, then no account of participation will be satisfactory. Plato seems to realize this when he proposes the analogy of the day, but he apparently had no developed idea to offer. Clearly what is needed is a concept of participation that is not based on a materialistic model of parts and wholes as these apply to Forms.

Plotinus develops such an account by emphasizing the immateriality of intelligible existence. Immaterial individuals are not subject to the spatial restrictions of sensible existents, and are consequently able to occupy a number of different places at the same time. Referring specifically to this argument in the Parmenides, Plotinus writes:

We cannot think of something of God here and something else there, nor all of God gathered at one spot: there is an instantane- ous presence everywhere. . . (V, 5, 9)

In a similar passage (IV, 7, 7) Plotinus points out that such a division of an intelligible being amounts to making it corporeal.

This omnipresence of intelligible reality (to 6v ëv Kai raìnò 6v äfja iravraxov eivai ö'ov)10 is Plotinus' phrase for an entity being entirely present in many places at once, a one that pervades a plurality of locations while remaining whole. As the passage states, this property is characteristic only of intelligible beings.

The nature, at once divisible and indivisible, which we affirm to be soul, has not the unity of an extended thing: it does not consist of separate sections; its divisibility lies in its presence at every point of the recipient, but it is indivisible as dwelling entire in the total and entire in any part. (IV, 2,1)

Hence any participation must be the result of the immanent presence of a higher reality in a lower.

If, then, the divided and quantitatively extended is to participate in another kind, is to have any sort of participation, it can partici- pate only in something undivided, unextended, wholly outside of quantity. Therefore that which is to be introduced by the participation must enter as itself an omnipresent indivisible. (VI, 4, 13)

Sensibles, therefore, participate in Forms by virtue of the Forms' omnipresence in identity within their sensible copies. In other words, each participant has the whole Form, but since the Form is an immaterial object it is not divided among them. The one Form is simply present in many places at once.11

It is clear that this concept delivers Plotinus from the dilemma posed by Parmenides. For he has shown how it is possible for each sensible copy to participate in the whole Form without the consequence of the Form being separate from itself. All that is required is to see that immaterial individuals, Forms or souls, are not bound by the same limita- tions as material things. Parmenides' argument is based on assumptions proper to material existence and when these are exposed the argument collapses.

Plotinus refutes Parmenides' objections by clearing away the philosophical confusions

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on which they rest. The problem of characteristics for which Socrates is unwilling to allow Forms is resolved by distinguishing between those things that are insignificant in themselves but are essential parts of valuable wholes (hair), and those features of the sensible world that reflect its imperfections. The former must have Forms because they are part of the overall character of Nous; the latter cannot have Forms because they are inconsistent with a fundamental epistemological and metaphysical feature of the Theory of Forms, their ideality. Having made this distinction it is easy to accept a Form for hair and deny it for filth.

The argument against participation is met by exposing the materialistic assumptions in it. Once we see that Parmenides' dilemma does not apply to immaterial entities the argument is rendered harmless. A consequence of this way of handling the problem of participation is that the Form itself is present in its sensible images. This has important implications for the Copy theory, which I have examined elsewhere.12

Although Plotinus is clearly concerned to defend the Theory of Forms against these two objections in the Parmenides, he is silent about another famous argument found in the same dialogue, the "Third Man" argument (TMA). No reference is listed in the Henri and Schywzer text,13 nor have I been able to discover any mention of the argument in the Enneads. This is unusual, given the repetition of the argument by critics of Platonism. Although I do not have a convincing reason why Plotinus ignored this argument, I believe that his philosophy possesses the philosophical resources to disarm TMA, just as he was able to meet the other objections posed by Parmenides.14

John Fielder, Villanova University.

Notes

1. Plotinus does not have anything to say about the Third Man' argument {Parm. 130a - 132b), and consequently it is omitted from the present discussion. This point is discussed briefly at the end of the article.

2. Parm. 130b-d.

3. Quotations from Plotinus are taken from Plotinus: The Enneads, tr, Stephen MacKenna (Pantheon: New York), third edition with revisions by B.S. Page.

4. MacKenna - Page translate fiúnoq as filth rather than dirt. 'Dirt' does not have the strong implication of foulness and decay of />i$ttoç, consequently 'filth' is a better translation here.

5. In a conversation on this issue John Immerwahr suggested that it is the relatively formless nature of mud that makes it evil. The more something lacks formal integrity the closer it is to Matter, hence the more evil.

6. Parm. 131a-c.

7. W.G. Runciman, "Plato's Parmenides" in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R.E. Allen, (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London 1965), p. 155.

8. fnxepa is generally translated simply as 'day' rather than 'daylight'. I suspect that if Plato had wished to emphasize the role of light in this analogy he would have made a specific reference to it rather than simply using ïinèpa.

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9. F.M. Cornford, Piato and Parmenides, (Bobbs-Merrill: New York), p. 85.

10. Cf. The Titles of VI, 4 and 5 .

11. A more extensive discussion oi inis nouon may oe iouna m my k,nonsmo5 anu emanation in the Philosophy of Plotinus", in The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R. Baine Harris, (Inter- national Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Old Dominion University: Norfolk, 1976) pp. 101 -

121.

12. "Plotinus Copy Theory", Apeiron, 1977.

13. Paul Henri and H-R. Schwyzer, PlotiniOpera, (Desclee De Brouwer et Cie.: Paris, 1951-1973), three volumes. Vol. Ill contains an Index Fontium.

14. A paper on this topic is in preparation.

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