pointer v30n4 decision making in command team

8/14/2019 POINTER V30N4 Decision Making in Command Team

1/21

_ ____JCONTENTSEDITORIALFEATURES5 It's a Systems World - After Allby E.e. Aldridge and N.R. Augustine20 Decision-Making in a Brigade Command Team:

Integrating Theory and Practiceby COL Ong Yu Lin and LTC Lim Beng Chong39 The Challenge of Systematic Leadership Development

in the Singapore Armed Forcesby LTC Chan Kim Yin and CPT Psalm Lew51 The SAF's Experiences In Peace Support Operationsby LTC(Ret) Deep Singh56 Armed Humanitarian Intervention: An Emerging Issue And Controversy

In Need Of A Consensusby LTC Soh Star


2/21

CONTENTS...OTIt'dTECHEDGE @

66 Low Cost Virtual Cockpits for Combat Experimentationby MA l Chia Chien WeiVIEWPOINT

73 Re-Thinking The Political Relevance Of Airpower Transformationby MA l Christopher Chan76 Political vs Military Deterrence

byMA l Ho Peng YungBOOK REVIEW

78 Remembering and Debating The Malayan Campaignand the Fall of SingaporebyMr Toh Boon KioanFEATURED AUTHOR

83 Henry FreiPERSONALITY PROFILES

86 World War II North African Theatre: Rommel vs Montgomery

( 2 )


3/21

Decision-Makingin a Brigade Command Team:Integrating Theory and PracticebyCOL Ong Yu Lin and LTC Lim Beng Chong

Humans make decisions, but,exactly, how do we make decisions?One school of thought is that humansadopt an analytical, rational decisionmaking process. That is , we firstdiagnose the problem, seek relevantinformation, identify a number ofoptions or alternatives, and finally,make a rational choice among the manyoptions.

In the military context, wheredecisions made by military commanders, often have dire consequencesif failed, it is not surprising that militaryorganizations have invested time andresources to develop doctrine andprocedures to guide military decisionmaking, and train military commandersto be cognizant with these requirements. These procedures arelogical and prescriptive in nature.Indeed, the SAF has adopted thisanalytical perspective for its ba ttleprocedure.

Increasingly, there is awarenesstha t the current set of doctrine andprocedures may not be appropriateunder certain conditions. This growinguneasiness among many military

20 )

commanders can be attributed to tworeasons. Firstly, military commandersrealize that this is not how they makedecisions in operations. Often they haveto adapt the prescribed procedures tosuit the way they operate. Secondly,and also more importantly, militarycommanders find it hard to follow theprescribed procedures even if theywant to because of both time pressurecaused by high operational tempoand high level of uncertainty.

So how do humans make decisionsunder time pressure and uncertainty?In 1985, Gary Klein examined howfirefighters made life and deathdecisions under extreme time pressure.Simply put, they found that expertsuse their experience to make rapidand effective decisions under timepressure and uncertainty. The fieldhas come to be known as NaturalisticDecision-Making (NOM).

We believe insights from NOM cancomplement the analytical approachto decision-making, and ad vanceour understanding of decision-makingin the SAF. Hence, in developinga preliminary model of decision


4/21

making, we have incorporated manyof the insights gleaned from NDMresearch. In addition, as teams arethe basic building blocks of anymilitary, we see the need to advanceour understanding of decision-makingin a team context. Specifically, forthis article, we discuss decision-makingin the context of a brigade commandteam. Integrating insights from boththe NOM and team effectivenessliterature to build a framework fordecision-making in the military, webelieve, is critical. Currently, there islittle integration of the two literature .Apart from theoretical perspectives,we see the need to incorporateexperiences of military commandersinto the model building process aswell. This approach is consistentwith the insights from NOM, i.e .,experts use their experience to makedecisions. Hence, in building a modelof decision-making, we should alsoincorporate the experiences of experts;and the experts are none other thanmilitary commanders!

The objectives of this article arethreefold. First, we articulate apreliminary model of decision-makingin a team context for the SAP.This preliminary model can form thebasis for discussions among interestedparties to further improve the utilityof the framework . Second, afterexplicating a theoretical frameworkof decision-making in a team context,we use 3rd Singapore Infantry Brigade(3 SIB) command team as a case studyto illustrate how the framework canbe applied to a brigade commandteam. Finally, the implications of theframework for the SAF in terms ofcommand team training, leader

development, battle p roce . re - human resource (HR) po licies earr.selection will be discussed.A Preliminary Model ofDecision-Making in a TeamContextlnsights from NDM

Klein, in his book Sources of Power:How People Make Decisions, argued thatin natural settings, the conventionalsources of power (e.g., deductive logicalthinking, analysis of probabilities, andstatistical methods) are not as useful as"the power of intuition, mental

s t imula t ion ,metaphor, andstory telling."!He asserts thatintuition allowsindividuals tosize up a situation rapidly,while mentals t imu l a t i onenables decisionmakers to ima

gine how a course of action might becarried out. Furthermore , metaphorenables people to draw on theirexperiences to compare the currentsituation to a situation that they havecome across. Finally, story telling allowsindividuals to consolidate theirexperiences for future use. Theseexperiences are captured as mentalmodels. The development of mentalmodels of a specific domain differentiates an expert from a novice.

Often, experienced decision makersare able to carry out their tasks evenwhen faced with uncertainty due toinadequate information (i.e., missing,

21 )


5/21

ambiguous or unreliable - either dueto errors in transmission or deceptionby the adversary). Essentially, theiracquired mental models can fillthe information gaps and enablethem to extract a storyline or patternfrom the inadequate information. Inaddition, their mental models alsoallow them to focus their attention onthe right set of cues and provide theright weightage to the selected cues.Essentially, this is what differentiatesan expert from a novice for a specificdomain.

Experienced decision makersgenerate an initial feasible course ofaction, mentally simulate the processand consequences of that action, and ifthe simulation suggests that the courseof action will work as desired, they act.Interestingly, there does not appear tobe a process of comparing differentcourses of action, as would be expectedfrom the traditional decision-makingview. They are able to do this becauseof their extensive mental models builtover time. Their experience lets themsee a situation, even a novel one, as anexample of a prototype, so they knowthe appropriate course of action immediately. And this first option is oftengood enough so they are not botheredwith exploring other options.

Even in cases where the decisionmaker actually looks at several options,he never compares any two of them. Heevaluates each in turn, rejects it, andmoves to the next option. He stops oncehe finds one that works. This is calledsatisficing - selecting the first option thatworks. Satisficing is different fromoptimising, which is trying to come upwith the best strategy.

lnsights from TeamEffectiveness Literature

When a task is beyond the capabilityof an individual, organizations oftenrely on teams of individuals who canwork together to accomplish the goals.Military command teams are one goodexample. The combined cognitive andbehavioural capabili ty of a team allowsa team to achieve goals that arepotentially unachievable by an individual. However, simply putting agroup of people together does notensure they will operate as a team.Teams must be systematically developed over time.

There are a number of critical teamprocesses that have been posited byresearchers to affect team effectiveness.These team processes can be categorisedinto affective, behavioural, cognitiveand leader components.Affective components Individualsworking together often develop asense of togetherness and bonding.This sense of togetherness is importantfor the development of some criticalteam affective processes such asteam orientation and team trust.Members of a team that is high onteam orientation tend to have a strongteam identity, believe in a teamapproach to achieving goals, believein the team's ability in the face ofdifficulty, and is highly committed totheir team goals. The trust developedamong team members further bondsthem together.Behavioural components With theappropriate team affective processesas foundation, other more behavioural,

22


6/21

but not le ss critical team processescan be developed. Two such teamprocesses are team communicationpatterns and team self correctionbehaviour s. Optimal team communication patterns facilitate an openflow of constructive informationwi thin the team . In other words,there is no bottleneck in the informationflow . Dysfunctional team dynamics,such as those teams without highlevels of team orientation or team trustoften inhibit the development of anopen, constructive and responsivecommunication patterns. Team selfcorrection behaviours include members engaging in mutual and teamperformance moni tor ing ', demonstrating back up behaviours (i.e., offerto help others) , willingness andinclination to both offer and accept helpfrom others, readiness to providefeedback and are receptive to feedback,and engage in effective correctiveactions if necessary.Cognitive components Researchershave found that a team mind evolvesover time when a group of individualswork together. Not only thatmembers agree on the team task andwork procedures, they are alsocognizant about each other's personalcharacteristics (e .g. , strengths andweaknesses, habits) and the interactionprocesses in the team. Defined as" teammembers ' shared, organized understanding and mental representation ofknowledge about key elements of theteam's relevant environment '" , teammental models have been proposed toenhance team performance especiallywhen time is of essence and opportunities for overt communication anddebate are Iirn ited ." Team mental

models allow team members toanticipate one another's actions and tocoordinate their behaviours . Anotherimportant team cognitive process isteam situation awareness - a processby which team members developcompatible models of teams' internaland task environment at a given pointin time.Leader components Finally, ascommand teams in the military arehierarchical, there is no doubt that teamleaders exert a powerful influence onthe cognitive, affective (motivational),and behavioural aspects of teamprocesses.! In order to facilitate thedevelopment of all these critical teamprocesses, the appropriate leadershipbeing exhibited in the team isparamount. Without belabouring thepoint, we believe that team leadersexhibi ting more transformationalleadership behaviours will be criticalfor the development of such teamprocesses. Transformational leadershipis often contrasted to transactionalleadership. Transactional leadership isoften depicted as contingent reinforcement; leader-subordinate relationshipsbased on a series of exchanges orbargains between them. Transjormaiionalleaders, on the other hand, rise above theexchange relationships typical oftransactional leadership by developingintellectually stimulating, and inspiringsubordinates to transcend their ownself-interests for a higher collectivepurpose, mission, or vision." Noticethat one consequence of this perspectiveis a focus on unit-level interests, beyondthose of the individual person.

Traditionally, especially in themilitary, leadership is often conceived

23


7/21

as resid ing in one individual. Som eone w ill impact the decision-mak ing processis "in charge" while the res t are simply of a te am . Hence , it is p aramountfollowers. H ow ever, recen t views of that a leader 's mental model is wellleadership h ave broaden ed to include developed .the ide a that team le ad ers and teammembers can share leadership. Th at is, Proposed Frameworkleadership is ro tated to the p erson withthe key knowledge, skill s, and abilities Decision -making is de fined here asfor the p articular issue facing the team the manner in which an individual or aat any given moment. ' Indeed, team team ac ts on the informa tion an dresearch has shown th at less effective elements as perceived in th eir situa tionteams tend to be dominated by the team awareness, and h ow this informationleader, w hile effective teams di spl ay interacts wi th their more s table mentalmore dispersed leadership patterns i.e. models of reality, to make and arrive atteam leadership. Moreover, rese arch decisions. At the individual level, theindicates that teams that have tasks that in d iv id ua l biases an d ex per ie ncesare hi ghly interdependent, requir e a emplo yed b ecom e imp ortant an dgreat dea l of crea tivity and are h ighly crucial in the qua lity and speed ofcomple x will d o w el l w ith team decision-m aking. At the te am le vel,leadership . human in teraction p atterns and group

dynamics will also play an importantAnother w ay a leader can influence role.As such, decision-making processes

the team effectiveness is th rough hi s can be seen as transcending four domental models. What he knows or does mains - Cognitive, Social, Information andnot know, his biases and inclinations Physical (see Table 1).

What is it? How is it related to What is the desireddecision-making? endstate?

Ph ys ical Domain : Where decisions The righ t ac tions at theWhere Strike, Protect an d are executed as actions right places at the rightManoeuvre take pla ce tim e Information Domain: Where informa tion is put The right information inWhere information is into con text to facilitate the right forma t a t th ecreated, m anipulated iden tification of pa tte rns right timean d shared Social Domain: Where re lationships and The right dissemina tionWhere ind ividu als team dynamics affec t of in tent/vision, and theintera ct the process and qua lity right rul es, roles andof decision-making relationships at th e righttime Cognitive Domain : Where dec isions are mad e The right un derstandingWhere mental models, at the right timepe rcep tions, situa tionawa reness , beliefs andva lues res ide

Table 1: Domains of Decision-Making.

24 J


8/21

When time permits elaboratedeliberations, the analytical approach todecision-making is still useful; however,under difficult circumstances (e.g., timepressure, high stakes , inadequateinformation, ill defined goals, dynamicand uncertain conditions), naturalisticdecision-making process will becomemore relevant.

Figure 1 (please refer overleaf)depicts a preliminary model of decisionmaking in a team context.As mentionedearlier, many of the insights weregleaned from NDM and team effectiveness literature. In this article, we valueadd by integrating both literature withmilitary commander s' experiences.There are perhaps 10 key componentscritical to decision-making in a teamcontext: two affective components(i.e., positive team orientation , highlevel of mutual trust), two behaviouralcomponents (i.e., open and constructivecommunication patterns, high level ofteam self correction), four cognitivecomponents (i.e., high level of teamsituation awareness, accurate/sharedmental models, collective sense making,collective understanding of commandintent), and leader components (i.e.,team leadership, leader 's expert mentalmodel or experience).

Thi s framework depicts how a teamgoes about making deci sions under timepressure and high level of uncertainty.The st a r t state of thi s frameworkassumes that the team leader and teammembers are experts in their specificdomains, and these experiences arecaptured in their individual m entalmodels. Their mental model s guidetheir information search by focusingtheir attention on relevant cues via

situation awareness. At the same time .their mental models also facilitate therecognition of patterns in the arrays otcues and information. Both of theseprocesses help the expert to size up thesituation quickly. The interplay amongthe three processes - sense making,command intent and mental stimulation- enables the expert to first determine acourse of action, evaluate it against thecommand intent by mentally simulatingthe consequences when that course ofaction is executed. I f the consequencescannot fulfil the command intent, theexpert will then seek another course ofaction. The judgement process repeatsitself until the expert determines the firstcourse of action that works (satisficing).Individually, the team leader and teammembers are capable of conducting thiscognitive process at any point in timeduring the operation (i.e., individualcognition). As these experts do notoperat e in isolation, they need tofunction as a team. There is anotherlevel of cognition that will be operatingas well - team cognition. At the teamlevel, th e extent to which the teamleader and team members have similarmental model s (i.e., team mentalmodels), have a similar perception of thesitu ation (i.e., team situation awareness), have a shared understanding ofthe situation (i.e., collective sensemaking), and hav e a common understanding of command intent, the teamwill be able to make swift and qualitydecisions.

Like individuals who hav e toaccumulate experience to becomeexperts, team cognition takes timeand effort to develop . Moreover,team cognition can only be developedwhen the team develops the fiv e

25


9/21

E

Memn

Mem3

Mem2

Mem1

Pen

R

o

Podn

C

D

ofow

reeao

&m

m

Jumen

Mea

Smao

S

Cm

Man

Ine

Cev

S Man

Cev

Uran

ocm ine

Contv

Dman

Sa

Dman

Inomaon

Dman

Pca

Dman

Fge1AMoDsoMnnTamCe


10/21

critical team p rocesses in th e socialdomain of d ecision-making - teamleadership , te am communication ,team se lf correction, mutu al trust,and team orientation. Th e existence ofthese key team processes will facilitatethe d evelopment an d maintenanceof the team cognition ov er time .In other words, we fi rs t de vel opindividual experts, th en de velop th en eces sary team processes to tr ansfo r m " tea ms of ex per ts into exp ertteams '" .

Once th e pl annin g p roce ss iscompleted, directives are disseminatedfollowed by synchroniza tion acti vitiesthat are then tr anslat ed in to actions.These ac tions inevitabl y will effectenvironmental ch anges. Changes inthe si tua t ions are repre sented asdata an d information for the consu m p tio n of th e co mman d team .However, the extent to which a pie ceof dat a or infor ma ti on a ffect steam situa tion aw aren ess or individual si tuat ion aware ne ss d epend sve r y mu ch on the r epresentation sand flow of th e information.

The w hole cy cle then repeatsitse lf. No te th at, indiv iduals ' mentalmodels may be updated or ma y undergo ref inements after ge tting feedbackfro m the e nviron m e n t a l changes(i.e., reality check). Hence, the wholeprocess is very dynamic.

In the next se ction, theory is putinto practice.Using 3 SIBas an example,the first author (then Commander 3 SIB)shares his first hand exp erience in building up his command team, in accordance w ith the depicted framework.

Developing Decision-MakingProcess in a Brigade CommandTeamIQi@Mi' Vision, Role, Rule, andRelationship Developing a commandteam is a d e liberate pro cess. Th is

section briefly documents the efforts inbuild in g up a brig ade commandteam . The bu ild-up comprised tw ophases . In Ph ase 1, efforts were targetedat d evel oping a sha re d v isio n an dbuil ding team s t ructu res andrelation ships. The Vision, Role, Ruleand Relationship (V3R) team building program advoc ated by Fiel dPsychologists was ad opted. Within thebri gade, a shared vision was developed.The roles to be played by each memberof the team w ere agreed on . Finally, aset of rules was set to guide the workand intera ctions of the t eam. Forex a mp le, so me of th e rul es w ere"Quest ion an d und erstand the reas onswhy", "Make it happen", "Don't complainabout the problems - so lve them!", "Ifthere are no rul es, invent them", "Whoelse ne eds to know and why". Theseefforts were consistent w ith building upthe social dom ain in the framewo rk.I QiHOfiJUnderstand and develop

the thinking process, mentalmodels, analytical skills of teammembers, and the informationmanagement process In thi s phase,the effort w as to focus on building thecognitive domain of team functioning.Th e focus was on understanding oneanoth er's thinkin g pro cess, m enta lmodels and analytical skills.The processstarted off by analysing the streng thsand weaknesses of each team memberin terms of h is thinking and analytical

- 27


11/21

skills. This shared understanding ofcollective strengths and weaknessesallowed team members to complementone another. For this process to work,mutual trust was critical. From theonset, members were assured thatthese discussions would not be usedfor annual ranking purposes. Under-standing the background of each teammember, their past postings, ex-periences enabled other team membersto have a better understanding of howtheir mental models were shaped anddeveloped. All these efforts built sharedunderstanding in the team (i.e., teammental models). In addition, teammembers also agreed on a commontheory of success.Shared Theory of Success

--- l Quality ofR e l a t i O " S h ' P S Quality of 0 Quality ofActions Communication\} y

Qualityof PUnderstandingTo improve the team communica-

tion process and team situationawareness, especially under time con-straint, technology was leveraged on toenhance information dissemination andmanagement. The Brigade Commandpost used webpages to present/organisemost frequently used information. Thisinformation was just one click away.

These were some of the considera-tions when designing the brigadeinformation management process:

Post before ProcessingPopulate the network with informa-tion in a timely way to facilitateparallel processing to achieve speed.Experience showed tha t 80 % ofinforma tion in a product remainsrelevant/unchanged/unaffected. Wherepossible, new information were postedand merged with existing knowledge toproduce richer products . Users wereinformed/updated of changes byhighlighting what has changed and i fpossible why. Pull and PushPull/push the right information in theright format to the right persons at theright time and right place by asking whoelse needs to know. Team members wereconstantly reminded that informationhas no hierarchy even though themilitary organisation has. Define what information is and

what it is supposed to facilitateTable 2 was instrumental in helping theBrigade make sense of the data,information and knowledge as part ofthe information management process.

The brigade 's human intelligencesensors were trained to report dataaccurately and to highlight ifthey were reporting da ta or theirinterpretations/assessments, in ordernot to confuse receivers due todifferent experience levels and mentalmodels. Likewise, as a standard opera-ting procedure, planners in the HQwould highlight if they were statingdata or information. To facilitateprocessing time, data and analysis werepresented on webpages early so thatteam members had access to themahead of time. When team members

28


12/21

DEFINITIONCONTENT

FORMINFO TASKHUMANELEMENTORG INTENTVALUE TEST

DataRaw FactsEvents

TransactionsRepresentationObservation

AutomationBuilding Blocks

InformationData organized toshow patternsTrends

PatternsManipulationJudgement

Decision-MakingUncertaintyReduction

KnowledgeInformationstructured for actionExpertiseLearningCodificationExperience

ActionNew Understanding

Table 2: Making sense of data, information and knowledgeSource: Sensemaking Symposium 23-25 Oct 2001subsequently came together, dis-cussions were focused on what theevent meant, and what the implicationswere.

Every effort was also made tocreate an open HQ structure to increasesituation awareness and facilitateinformation flow. For example,webpages were used to facilitateinformation flow in the command post.The Fire Support Cell was also movedfrom the fringe to the centre of thecommand post to enhance awarenessand coordination.

To further develop the teammental models and collective sense-making ability, there was a commonunderstanding of what constitutedteam situation awareness and sense-making.

Situation Awareness was defined asthe following: Not what is on display but what isin the head Not static but a rich, dynamic com

prehension of a situation and whatdrives it Looking beyond data to noticetrends , build expectancies, spotanomalies and see windows ofopportunities for exploitation

Good situation awareness alsoenvisions more than one potentialfuture and recognises uncertainty asa key element of the situationSensemaking was defined as:

More than just sharing informationand identifying patterns

Going beyond what is happeningand what may happen to what canbe done about it

We educated our human intelligence sensors to report dataaccurately and to highlight if they were reporting data or theirinterpretations/assessments, in order not to confuse receivers

due to different experience level and mental models.( 29


13/21

Involve generating options, predicting adversary's actions andreactions and understanding theeffects of particular courses of actionsThis shared understanding of what

constituted team situation awarenessand sensemaking engendered thedevelopment of many team-orientatedbehaviours. For example, there weremore backup behaviours; memberswere more proactive in pushinginformation to the relevant people;members began to ask new questions;members began to see how the variousmoving parts fit together rather thanpiecemeal understanding.

Mission Analysis CAOSDevelop Analyse andOperationalise COAs

Issue detailed CPG outlining a visionof how the battle is shaped and thepossible concepts of operations toachieve this- Intent Concepts Options

Figure 2: Deliberate Planning Process.The planning process was seen as alearning process. The purpose was to

create shared mental models orframework to facilitate discussions anddeliberations. Senge noted that "sharedmental models are importantmechanisms for development ofeffective communication strategies andalso increase team performance".

30 )

Before the start of any exercise, therewould be a deliberate planning process,adapted from Klein's work, as depictedin Figure 2 below.

As mentioned earlier, the leadercomponent is critical to the teameffectiveness. Hence, the Commanderwas made an integrated planner toshare his experiences and knowledgeinstead of functioning as an approverof plans. Detailed commander planningguidance (CrG) was meant to providepossible frameworks for own course ofactions (COAs) and enemy COAs sothat staff can quickly fill in the gaps anddetails.

Mental SimulationAction & Reaction Compile OrdersWargaming

Develops multiple COAs NOT forcomparision but to understand thealternatives and the relationshipsbetween them- Line of Options- SWOT Analysis of each COA

As the intent of the deliberateplanning phase was to generate options, the end state was not to developmultiple COAs for comparison, but tounderstand the strengths and weaknesses of each option using a strengthweakness-opportunity-threat (SWOT)analysis, and to understand therelationships between the options. These


14/21

relationships were then mapped asLines of Options wi th critical battlefieldevents as nodes in the lines of options.This line of options provided sharedment al models of the v ariou sposs ibilities of how the battle canunfold. This process greatly enhancednot onl y the team mental models, butalso the collective sense makin gcapability of the team .

Mapping of the relationship s alsofacilitated the suppor t planners inworking out their support plans withsufficient flexibilit y and robustness tosupport the alternatives. The variety ofalternative paths to mission accomplishment was also an indicator of degree offlexibility. The line of options framework - a creative process stimulated bycollaboration among multiple participants with differ ent perspectives al lowed the te am to develop it scognitive domain of team functioning,as depicted in the framework.

The experience in the brigade alsoshowed th at the team did not have togo th rough a deliberate sel ection ofeOA process to determine which eOAto be selected as the plan, but intuitivelyeach knew which option was the best

PerceivedState

, 1 _-.. ' "- "- "- " "-Time "-

to be adopted as the plan. Toensure thatall members were informed, thecommand er would confirm th at acertain eOA was selected, often withunanimous agr eement.

An example for offensive operationsis shown in Figure 3 overleaf.The line of options framework wa s

subsequently used in the conduct ofoperations ph ase. As it captu redthe shared under standing of te ammembers, it provided possible framesto interpret battlefield events as theyunfold in a seemingly random fashion.Team members then made use of theseframes to interpret the event in contextas well as use the event to explainpossible emerging frames or to discardframes (i.e., collective sensemaking). Inthe operations phase, team membersused the line of options to elaborate,qu estion , preserv e, seek a frame,reframe or compare frames*, with eachline of options as a possible frame. Inessence, this is an ope rationalisa tionof Klein 's Data-Frame theory. Theprocess is shown in Figure 4 below.This proces s als o enhanced sharedsituation aw areness and sharedunderstanding of the situation.

Transition toother COAs. - = : ~

'"'"

Figure 4: Operational Process of Klein's Data-Fram e Theory.'Personal communication between Klein & authors

( 31 )


15/21

LnoOpo

B1N

OO

HMNEEM

3N

OO

DS

OFO

4HIGHEHQ

TG 5C M (SB

E

6TGFO

A

MDA

7C IN

OO

DHFO

KERS

IA

OI

9T

A

T

EBK

AOCM

D

.OBULN

9T

O

C

TOC

OSFO

LA T

&T2

lOaCU

S

E

ZMBAA

WILR

CCVlE

PO

A

A

Fge3Aeampeooenvopeatons


16/21

The line of options facilitated controlof operations in several exercisesparticipated by 3 SIB as it provides: A frame for more rapid recognition

of changes in the battlespace Seamless transition to foreclose ormarginalise some options andmaintenance of momentum with-out need to develop detailed con-tingency plans

Foreseeable multiple futures -building blocks for actions

Less likelihood of surprise anddislocationTo further facilitate the diagnosis of

the evolving battle situation, all teammembers were asked to constantlyreview these four questions: Is the situa tion clear or uncertain?

What are the key indicators/patterns emerging? What are theimplications?

Is the opera tions proceedingaccording to plan? If not , what arethe anomalies? What are theimplications?

Is the Commander Intent for thisphase and entire operations achiev-able? I f not, what are the alternativesor adjustments needed? What are theimplications?

Is the plan still relevant? If not, whatare the alternatives or adjustmentsneeded? What are the implications?The team's discussions focused on

interpreting the situation, and theimplications for both enemy and ownforces, and inevitably, a discussion of theoptions available using the line ofoptions. If an event occurred and has not

been considered as a possible line ofoptions, the team would deliberate onthe possibility of a new frame andthe components of this new line ofoptions. Experience from past exercisesshowed that the team was able todevelop a good shared understandingof the situation and of the possiblefuture states .Active Information Search

The process was supported byan active search of information duringthe planning phase and conduct ofoperations phase . It is important to notethat as the team saw the planningprocess as a learning process andaccepted that it was an iterative process,it was inevitable that the teamperiodically referenced a previousproduct to make improvements as wellas removed parts of the plan, as theycrystallized the problem.

The team also acknowledged thatinformation was unbounded andneeded to be bounded by our ownoperational concepts as well as themost probable enem y CGA. Theinformation needed was then derivedand crafted as Essential Elements ofIntelligence (EEl) for the enemy aswell as Blue Critical InformationRequired (BCIR) for subordinates toreport the a ttainmen t of criticalbattlefield events. These informationrequirements were crafted to: Facilitate recognition of changes and

emerging patterns which in turnfacilitate the determination of thecurrent perceived state

Facilitate interpretation of possible33 )


17/21

enemy intent with a supporting listof descriptions of indicators and cues(which become Specific InformationRequirment - SIRs) to allow us toforeclose or marginalise optionsand thus reducing enemy flexibilityand prevent surprises

The descriptions of indicators/cuesallowed us to determine possibleoptions (using the line of options) tocounter emerging threats or exploitopportunities by disrupting enemyintent and decision cyclesIn cases where the intelligenceagencies were not able to provide a

positive response on the EEl (i.e., nosightings), it was not to be taken asa non-event but rather it triggeredfurther thinking and questions such as"so what can he be possibly doing?".Other intelligence agencies were thenredirected to confirm the most likelyalternatives.lmplications for SAF

There are a number of implicationsfor SAP. Team Training/Field Psychologist

ServicesTo enhance decision-making in

command teams, it is important thatteam training for command teamsshould be systematically developed andconducted. Based on the proposedframework, efforts should focus ondeveloping the cognitive and socialdomains of a team . Specifically, weshould develop measurement tools toassess and outline interventions fordeveloping team mental models, teamsituation awareness, team orientation,

34

mutual trust, team self correction, andteam communication . Team buildingprograms advocated by both fieldpsychologists from Applied Behavioural Science Department (ABSD), G6and TRADOC have focused primarilyon enhancing the social domain of teameffectiveness (e.g., V3R framework ofteam building). To this end, fieldpsychologists from ABSD can workwith TRADOC to improve the currentversion of the team building programby augmenting it with measurementtools and interventions for enhancingthe cognitive domain of teameffecti veness.

Looking ahead, a revised commandteam development program mayinclude three phases: phase 1 - buildthe basics through team building,phase 2 - enable component development through PC based simulation,phase 3 - make further refinements ofthe command team operations throughfield exercises.

In Phase 1, build team orientationthrough building team mental models(i.e., shared understanding of oneanother), and establishing mutual trust.This effort is similar to the currentteam building intervention (i.e., V3Rmodel) advocated by ABSD fieldpsychologists. One addition may be toprovide feedback on team leader's teamleadership style so that the leader canbegin to enhance his leadershipeffectiveness in a team context.

In Phase 2, team developmentshould continue to build up the teammental models, communication patterns,and team self correction strategies


18/21

systematically through scenario basedtraining. While this team development can be done using traditionalfield exercises, the use of PC basedsimulations for team development isalso advanced in this phase. This isbecause PC based simulations (e.g.,command and conquer) can be easilycustomized to simulate various militaryscenarios so as to develop certainaspects of their mental models (i.e.,experience with different militaryscenarios), and critical team processes(e.g., team mental models, communication patterns, team leadership,mechanisms to promote team situationawareness, collective sensemaking andcollective understanding of commandintent, and team self correctionstrategies). All these learning can beacquired within a shorter time periodand possibly with lesser resources.Moreover, PC based simulations oncedeveloped, can be used for othercommand teams. Not al l trainingneeds to be done in the field . Teamdevelopment training can be moreeffectively carried out at a simulationcentre, as long as the learning takesplace in the cognitive and socialdomains of decision-making . Oncethe critical mental models andteam processes have been developed,then the command team is ready forphase 3.

In Phase 3, the command teamwill be ready for field exercises.Further refinements would be made toensure the decision-making process inthe command team is optimised.

Expertise takes time and effortto develop . However, in order to

maintain our professional edge,knowledge management is critical. Itis essential to capture expertise from thesenior commanders and package themin a useful and meaningful manner forlearning by the junior commanders.One way is to first identify criticalmili tary scenarios faced by militarycommanders in operations . Knowledge databases can then be built byeliciting expertise from experts (i.e. ,senior commanders) on how they goabou t making decisions in thesescenarios using Cognitive Task Analysis(CTA) methodology. This newlyacquired knowledge can then be usedto design military scenarios forcommand team training. Leader Development

Similarly, incorporating scenariobased training into leader developmentis critical to build expertise (i.e., expertmental models). Leaders have a disproportionate influence on decisionmaking in the team. As men tioned,leaders can affect the team process notonly with his leadership style but alsowith his mental models (i.e., what heknows and does not know, and hisbiases and inclinations). Klein contendsthat "if we can present many situationsan hour, several hours a day, for daysor weeks, we should be able to improvethe trainee's ability to detect familiarpatterns."? I f the hypothesis is correct,leveraging on technology (e.g., PCbased simulation) to deliver scenariobased training may be effective. Battle Procedure

There is a need to align the currentIS-step battle procedure to the decision

35 )


19/21

making framework. The objective ofprocedures should be to facilitatehuman decision-making rather than toinhibit it . Given that there is nowgreater insight into how humans goabout making decisions , battleprocedures should be aligned tofacilitate the naturalistic decisionmaking cycle of human decisionmakers. Here, the experience of thebrigade command team is again usedas a case study to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed framework. Human Resource Policies/Team

SelectionHuman Resource policy makers

must break away from the traditionalmindset of viewing job postings asindependent decisions for individuals.They must begin to be more teamfocused and take into considerationhow personnel movement can affectcommand team effectiveness. Theobjective of personnel movementshould be to retain or build the idealcommand team configuration. Considerations should be given to the makeup of a command team. Personnelmovement should not be piecemeal.Collective attributes of a commandteam must be considered. This wouldhowever require some radical change inthe mindset of the Human ResourceDepartments/Personnel ManagementCentres. Disrupt the Adversary's DecisionCycles

In order to enhance one's probabilityof success, one can enhance one'sdecision-making process. On the otherhand, one can also attempt to disrupt

36 )

the adversary's decision cycles.The framework mentioned here isequally applicable to the adversary.Given what we know about the humandecision-making process, militarycommanders can attempt to disruptthe adversary 's decision cycle byoverwhelming him in the physicaldomain like what the Americans did inOperation Iraqi Freedom with superiorfirepower. Unlike the Americans, thisoption may not be applicable to theSAF given that we may not havesignificant technological advantageover our adversary. Disrupting theadversary in the information, socialand cognitive domains of decisionmaking may be the s trategy to explore.These are some suggestions.

Cognitive domain We can profileadversary commanders by understanding the adversary's mentalmodels, values, beliefs, doctrine, andcultural values and beliefs. Armed withthis information, our military commanders can better read the actions ofthese adversaries, and subsequentlyexploit their cognitive vulnerabilities(e.g. , biases and heuristics) of theseadversary commanders.

Social domain The effectivenessof exploiting the vulnerabilities ofthe adversary commanders' cognitioncan be further enhanced by disruptingthe social domain of the adversary'sdecision-making cycle. To do thiseffectively profiling the other teammembers in the adversary commandteam is critical. Based on this profiling,a team can be postulated in terms oftheir communication patterns, level oftrust among members, level of team


20/21

orientation, team mental models, teamsitua tion aw areness, existence of teamself correction strategy or adaptability.Once the adversary team profile can beidentified, vulnerabilities and weaknesses in th eir soc ia l dom a in ofdecision-making cycle can be targetedand exploited.The objective is to disrupttheir team dynamics.

Information domain I f the strengthsand limitation s of the ad versary 'sComm and and Control Inform ationSystems (CCIS) and decision supporttool s are well understood, it will en ableus to attack the info rmation domain oftheir d ecision-m aking cy cle. Theadversary's information domain can betargeted to disrupt their cognitive andsocial dom ain . Essentially, the aim is toshape the adversary' s decision-makingby letting him see what we want himto see. Leverage on Technology

People first. Technology must bebuilt to facilitate human funct ioningand not the reverse. Hopefully, th isframework can provide some insightsfor decision support tools developmentand CCIS.Conclusion

Research in d ecisi on-m akingha s spa n n ed th re e decad es. Muchmore work is needed to further ourund erstanding of d ecision-making,especially in a tea m context. In thi sarticle, a preliminary fram ework ofdecision-making in a team context hasbeen put forth , u sing 3 SIB as a casestudy to illustrate its utility. We have

also drawn up the implications for teamtraining, leader development, humanresource policy, and use of technologyto facilitate human decision-making.

It is our hope th at this article canengender some lively discussions anddialogue on this important topic. Endnotes

Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How PeopleMake Decisions (Cam bridge, Massachuse tts:MIT Press , 1998), p3.McIntyre, RM ., and Salas, E., "Measuringan d Managing for Team Perform ance:Emerg ing Principles from Complex En vironments", in RA . Guzzo, and E.5a las(eds .), Team Effectiveness and Decisionmaking in Organizations (San Franc isco :Jossey-Bass, 1995).Mohamme d, S. and DumviIIe, B.C., "TeamMe nta l Mo de ls in a Team Kno w le dgeFramew ork: Expa n d ing Theory andMeasu remen t across Di scipli naryBoundarie s", Journ al Of Organiza tionalBehavior, Vol.22 (2001), p90.Mathie u, [.E, Heffner, T.S., Goodwin, G.F.,Sa las, E.,' & Ca nno n- Bowe rs, J.A ., "TheInfluence of Shared Mental Models on TeamsProcess and Performance", [ournal Of AppliedPsychologJj, Vol. 85, pp273-283.Stephen Zaccaro, And rea Rittman, andMicheIIe Marks, "Team leadership", TheLeadership Quarterly, Vol.12 (2001), pp451-483.Bern ard Bass, Transformational Leadersh ip:Industrial, Military and Educational Impact(New Jersey, Law rence Erlbaum Associates,1998).Pearce CL., "Th e Future of Lead ersh ip :Combining Vertical and Shared Leadershipto Tran sform Kn o w ledge Work", TheAcademy Of Management Executive VoI.18No.1 (2004), pp47-60.Carol R Paris, Eduardo Salas, and Janis A.Ca nnon-Bowers, "Teamwork in M ultiPerson Systems: A Rev iew and Analysis ",Ergonomics Vol.43 No.8, p1052.Gary Klein, op cit, p30.

37 )


21/21

COL Ong Yu Lin is currently the Commander of Officer CadetSchool in SAFTI Milit ary Institute. He is a Guards Officer bytraining, and has attended the Ro yal Militar y Academy atSandhurst, UK, the US Army Infantry School at For t Benning, andthe Australian Command & Staff College . He has previousl y heldcommand appointments at the battalion and brigade level s. Heholds a BSc in Physics from the National University of Singa pore,a Master of Mana gement in Defenc e Stud ies from the Universityof Canberra, Au stralia, and an MBA from the Nanyang Fellow sProgramme at Nanyang Business School.

LTC Lim Beng Chong, PhD, a Guards Officer, is currently HeadTrai ning Psychology Branch, Applied Behavioural SciencesDepartment . He holds a BSc (Honours) in Psychol ogy fromUniversity ofNottingha m, MSc in training and development fromLeicester University, MA and phD in Industrial and Occu pationalPsychology from Uni versity of Maryland .

pointer v30n4 decision making in command team

Documents