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CCoonnffeerreennccee RReeppoorrtt -- PPaarrtt OOnnee Executive Summary 3 Session One: 4 Hamas's Democratic Experience and Western Hostility: The Impact on the Wider Islamist Movement Session Two: 12 Hamas's Electoral Victory: Regional Fears and Re-evaluation of Electoral Strategies Session Three: 16 Palestinian Electoral Legitimacy, President vs. Government: Implications for the Future of Elections in the Occupied Territories

Conflicts Forum : Beirut - London - Washington 2

Executive Summary

In March of 2007, Conflicts Forum conducted a workshop on the political implications of the Hamas electoral victory from Islamist, regional and Western perspectives. The conference, held in Beirut, Lebanon, presented speakers from the region, including Islamist scholars and leaders, those close to Islamist movements, academics and political analysts, leaders of non-governmental organizations, representatives of non-Islamist movements, along with former diplomats and retired government officials. The conference, held over a period of two days, was attended by delegates from the region, as well as from Europe and the United States.

The conference focused on the impact of the January 2006 Hamas electoral victory in the West Bank and Gaza. Participants discussed the reaction of regional political movements to the victory, and the impact of the victory in the Palestinian context. A number of questions were pursued by the participants:

Has the Hamas victory had a salutary or negative impact on other Islamist movements?

How much has the success of Hamas candidates in the parliamentary election — and the subsequent seating of Hamas representatives at senior levels of the Palestinian government — been diminished by Western and primarily U.S. economic sanctions?

What are the prospects for further electoral victories by Islamist movements in light of the Hamas victory?

What impact has the parliamentary victory had on other Palestinian political movements?

These, and other questions, were addressed during the conference. In order to facilitate a free, frank, fair and open exchange of views, the conference was held under the Chatham House Rule — thus no verbatim statements from the meetings can publicly be attributed directly to identified speakers.


Session One Hamas's Democratic Experience and Western Hostility: The Impact on the Wider Islamist Movement 1st Speaker: a leading Sunni Islamist thinker, author, and former Lebanese parliamentarian 2nd Speaker: a Palestinian academic, author and activist 1st Speaker: The first speaker’s observations were more practical than theoretical, deriving from his parliamentary experience in Lebanon in the 1990s. Following that experience the speaker wrote several books based on his Islamic parliamentary experience. He came away from this experience with the initial reaction that neither the experience of Islamic parliamentarianism nor Islamic governance was successful. The problem was based firstly on the fact that in Islam it is forbidden to engage with a state that does not have a theological foundation. The speaker was and remains opposed to Hamas's participation in government even though Hamas has been very successful in its parliamentary activity. The reason for his opposition is that the project of a parliament is very different from that of a government or executive council. When an Islamist movement is in the parliament it does not shoulder responsibilities to the extent that it does once in government. This means that it has to shoulder the economic, political and social responsibilities of the society. Experience has shown that other parties, when they come to power, have divisions within them -- as was the case with the communist party, the Baathist party and other parties. This division created a duality in the Palestinian arena. On one side there was the Hamas movement and on the other there was the Fatah movement -- which believes that historically it has had the responsibility of governing. It seems now that there are two governments in Palestine. This has obstructed the operation of government and has resulted in the blockade that the Palestinians are now facing.


The speaker believed that the position of the United States, of the West, and of Israel towards Hamas was predictable in light of their project for the Middle East. The position of the West in response to Islamists coming to power and having decision-making roles legislatively or in governance is not new and stems from the conspiracy to bring down the Ottoman empire and the Caliphate. The background of this position -- not allowing Islam as a religion or as a legislation to come to power -- has to do with the Western view of religion in general: that religion should have nothing to do with politics or to be engaged in political life.

This tradition dates from when secularism was first developed in Europe. In the secularist view, religion should be separate from the state. Since the West and the Zionist lobby brought down the Caliphate, regardless of how weak it was or how committed to Islam it was, the Sykes-Picot Conference -- fearing the Islamic world -- aimed to separate politics from religion and substitute nationalism in order to replace Islam. What was intended was to confine Islam to the practice of worship, religious rituals, and the administration of cemeteries. Since 9/11 when the World Trade Center was destroyed, President Bush has been attempting to divide Islam; he favors a modified form of Islam. Islam has, in his view, to be removed from international conflict and has to move away from politics or any volatile issue in the world. The West and the United States has always opposed liberation movements and Islamic movements. Following the fall of the USSR and the growth of the Islamic revival, a former NATO secretary general said literally, "following the fall of the USSR we have no enemy other than Islam" -- and of course he means the Islam of liberation, the Islam of jihad.

* * *

The official Arab approach to the Middle East conflict has offered nothing to the Palestinian cause during over half a century. Concession has been followed by concession, followed by yet more concessions. The evidence of this is the Madrid Conference which brought only more concessions, whereas the jihad movements and pre-eminently Hamas, were able to turn the equation upside down and offer an approach that took the Palestinian cause out of the domain of bargaining and concessions. The West in general and specifically the United States and Israel, view the success of Hamas in the legislative elections as the event that may bring down or obstruct the plan for the New Middle East and thwart the Zionist goal of creating a Greater Israel. There is a wider context to the American and Israeli opposition to liberation movements working to end injustice or tyranny. When these movements achieved victories there arose in the international arena (and among many countries and institutions and organizations), a new spirit that challenged American tyranny. These victories have put all oppressed people in the same boat and there is an emerging alliance between these forces.


If the West in general and the United States in particular would like to obstruct the advance of moderate Islamic movements such as Hamas, what will the outcome of this be? What kind of reaction will this produce in the Islamic world? Can there be any other outcome than to drive all these moderate elements towards extremism and support of those who the West labels as terrorist? Pressure leads to an explosion when someone is not allowed to exercise his will peacefully and in politics. The result will be harvested by the West and the US specifically. All these people will return to extremist and militant movements. Will the West then have succeeded or failed to achieve its goals?

The democracy that the US and the West asserts is a lie, because the principle reflects a double standard. For instance, Iran is forbidden to enrich uranium, is forbidden to have a peaceful nuclear program, whereas the Israeli nuclear project is allowed and supported and not only as a peaceful nuclear project but also with the military nuclear project in Dimona. In South Asia, Pakistan is being scolded while India is being encouraged for their nuclear projects. So this is a false democracy. We must be messengers: we have to tell the world that the US is not a democracy, it is literally a dictatorship which is biased in favor of one group of people and hostile to others.

* * * 2nd Speaker: When it comes to political engagement, there are two basic stances within Islamism. First, there is the "al-Qaeda stance." They believe that as a matter of principle you cannot participate in a power-sharing arrangement with a secular group. You cannot participate in a project whose objective is anything short of the creation of a strictly Islamic state. This is the position as expressed in recent al-Zawahiri video in which he condemned Hamas for joining a Palestinian national unity government. His belief, and that of those who share his ideological position, is uncompromising. The other position - the “Ikhwani stance” - emanates from anxiety that the experiment in political engagement might meet failure. This is not an ideological position. It is pragmatic, stemming from the fear that we may yet again fail as we have failed previously. We saw prior to its decision to participate in the election that an elaborate discussion took place within Hamas. Should we or should we not participate? It is interesting to note that Hamas in the Gaza Strip was overwhelmingly in favor of participation. In the West Bank, Hamas was divided. In the diaspora, Hamas was also divided, but more Hamas members favored participation. But Hamas had no other option than to participate and not simply in parliamentary elections. In the early 1990s, Islamists participated in parliament but not in government and they made a distinction between parliamentary life and participation in a government that is not Islamic. But, this missed the point -- a parliament is a part of a governing system and if you participate in parliament you have already engaged in a power-sharing experiment. You cannot just stop there: because Hamas, like every other Ikhwani movement -- the movements that come from the school of the Muslim Brotherhood -- has presented itself from day one as a holistic movement that is aimed at transforming the lives of the individual and the community, all the way up to the government and the state.


The existing Islamic projects can be categorized in the following way. There are, very briefly, five different attitudes vis-à-vis politics within Islamic activism:

1. There are Islamic movements that accept the status quo and recognize

the legitimacy of the existing political order. This model is represented by some of the Salafi movements that recognize the legitimacy of the Saudi regime.

2. The messianic attitude -- best seen in the thinking and activism of Hizb ut

Tahrir. It believes in politics, but it pins politics on the coming of the Caliphate. The Caliphate here is a messianic idea: once you have the Caliphate, everything will be okay, Sharia will be implemented. It parallels the notion of the Madhi in Shiism; that the Madhi will solve all our problems.

3. The non-political attitude. This is best represented by Tabligh Jamaat.

They believe that eventually, as a result of the process of reforming the individual, reformation through spirituality and through education, will facilitate a divine intervention as a result of which they will gain better rulers and they will implement Islam.

4. The approach in modern Salafism which believes in bringing about

change through the use of force. The way to bring about change is to destroy the existing political structures and replace them by Islamic ones.

5. The Ikhwani model. Since he founded the movement in 1928, Hassan al- Banna and his followers presented themselves as an alternative, but an alternative that would come through peaceful means -- that is what distinguishes them from the Jihadists.

The Ikhwani movements -- because of their intellectual legacy and the principles in which they believe -- cannot afford to be partial participants in the political process. They cannot say they will be content with municipal or local politics, or will only participate in parliamentary politics. Because if you offer yourself as an alternative, you have to go all the way up and an anxiety that you might fail is not an acceptable justification for not participating in governing. Hamas has grown sensitive to public opinion. Whenever Hamas's leadership senses that the public favors a certain position, they modify their policy. And public opinion, especially after the death of Yasser Arafat, overwhelmingly wanted an alternative to the ruling movement. The public was disenchanted with the failure of the status quo and it threw the ball in the court of Hamas; it said to Hamas, now you've been boasting about being authoritative, you've been boasting about your approach, now let's see you in business. Had Hamas not accepted that challenge, it would have been finished as a political movement. Hamas has been taking on that challenge -- which has been a success.


All the difficulties that have faced Hamas since it participated in the election have come from outside Hamas. The world community has been so shortsighted that it never gave Hamas a chance to deal with its own weaknesses. The way that Hamas has been put under the hammer, the way that Hamas has been tested through sanctions and so forth, turned the challenge elsewhere. As a result of Western opposition to Hamas in parliament and government, Hamas's popularity has increased rather than decreased and it has succeeded rather than failed. We've also seen this in the Mecca Agreement where all the negotiations have been made without a single concession from Hamas when it comes to principles, when it comes to strategy and major policy. On the procedural aspects of who gets what, these should not be considered as concessions, because it's all inside the Palestinian house, one family house -- it doesn't matter who gets what.


The experience of Hamas should provide a good lesson to all other Islamic movements who believe in political participation -- that they should participate in full and shouldn't be concerned that their participation might end in failure. If they fail that is the nature of things and the people who elected them into power have the right to elect somebody else if that failure comes from within the movement.

Question and Answer Session Q: If the Western opposition to Hamas’s participation in government pushes the movement to adopt a more violent approach, will this result in a diminishment of popular support or will such an approach win broad support among Muslims? 1st Speaker: Popular support is required and regarded as the basis for pushing a movement to progress and advance, but the victory of any movement must take into account whatever requirements of success this movement has. The leadership has all the requirements and the affairs of life and society. In other words, the vertical interest should not obscure the horizontal or popular interest. There needs to be both the strength of the leadership and also popular support. These are two things that cannot be separated. Many movements have taken interest in horizontal expansion while neglecting leadership and they ended up in utter failure. On the other hand, there have been other instances in which they took care of the leadership -- of the elite -- but did not consider the popular base, and they also ended up in failure. You need both sides to achieve success. We call this achieving a balance between the elite and the popular base. Q: The speaker expressed reservations about Hamas's participation in governance. Are these broadly-based reservations about participation or are they specific? 1st Speaker: These concerns are based on objective reasons; they do not have an emotional basis. The reason is that the policy on which Hamas is based is fundamentally different from the methodology and policy on which the Arab system has been based since 1948. This means that the official pressures that Hamas encounters will be internal and Arab and Islamic. The success of Hamas in parliament followed by its success in forming a government has made a sad situation in the official Arab arena because it has exposed the failure of the official Arab policies concerning the Palestinian cause. There were Arab figures or institutions that did not want Hamas to succeed in this.


Fatah treated the Palestinian cause as its exclusive province and did not welcome Hamas's involvement. That has been clear in the recent conflict that we hope has ended with the formation of the unity government, through Saudi mediation. Fatah regarded Hamas as having crossed red lines that should not be crossed. The same happened in Lebanon. Hezbollah formed a front confronting Israel, but the government did not want that. The March 14 group was formed to oppose this, even though this was the first time that there had been such an Arab victory. As it has been written: If you are being harmed by those who are close to you, this is more harmful than when it is by those who are not related.

Life is being lived through experience and experiments. All institutions including Islamic movements are vulnerable to threats. The economic siege was the first move to provoke Hamas. The first weapon used against Mohamed was also economic. We cannot retreat -- Hamas has engaged the issue and they need to seek all ways to remove obstacles. To retreat would mean failure. Hamas is facing all sorts of external and internal pressures. This may lead to Hamas advancing through its experience in parliament and in governance. The long march always begins with a single step. Before 1948 there was no Jihad project that was related to salvaging Palestine from the conspiracy that was planned then. It is now an international conflict facing a jihadist movement and unfortunately the Arab and Islamic world is just watching while all these pressures are exerted on Hamas. We hope to see an end to the situation where Palestine is living between on the one hand Jewish racism and the other, external pressures, plus this liberation situation wants to return Palestine to its reality. Hamas does not want Palestine to be for one sect or one confession. They want the Al Aqsa mosque to return to Muslims, the Church of the Nativity to the Christians -- meaning they are not moving from confessional or sectarian points of view -- and this will lead to a huge change in the Palestinian and regional situation. Even before Hamas came to power there was the Intifada - there was a generation that believed in the method of complete liberation from this usurping enemy. And Hamas and others came to establish the view of these people who would not give any concessions. There were always those who supported resistance and those who supported the roadmaps offered by Sharon at one time or another. The speaker believes that the Palestinian people in general support the liberation movement. Q: Do you accept the five-part categorization of Islamists presented earlier, and do you agree with the other speaker's conclusion that political participation cannot be partial but must be complete? 1st Speaker:


The violent movements are not only al Qaeda; there are different trends and methods among these movements. Those of us who belong to the Ikhwani movement belong to the mainstream, but that does not mean that we will fail to respond to an attack or occupation of one small part of the Islamic countries. Still, we do not exclude jihadism from our understanding. This can be seen in Egypt and in the 1948 war against Israel. The Ikhwani movement seeks to bring about change without violence, but still, if there is aggression it will not sit by idly. This is in accordance with Sharia law that says that if one part of the Muslim world is occupied then jihad becomes a duty that everyone has to perform. This differs from groups such as al Qaeda which begin and end with violence. They believe

that the US is the root of all evil and is looting the resources of this world, and that as long as American arrogance continues, they need to face the source of this, which they believe is the American administration. As movements we watch from outside; we cannot evaluate what goes on within. Hamas knows that there are rules within Islamic administration that say that the greater harm should be addressed. We should at this point suspend judgment.


-- End of Session One --

Session Two Hamas's Electoral Victory: Regional Fears and Reevaluation of Electoral Strategies 1st Speaker: An Iranian professor of political science and international relations 2nd Speaker: An Iraqi-American lecturer in international relations and Middle East media expert 1st Speaker: Regional Fears: The Arab regimes -- especially Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- are afraid that Hamas's electoral victory may become a model for the Sunni Islamic groups in those countries to get more power through elections. The success of Hamas as a resistance movement in democratic elections is a victory for the force of resistance and a defeat for the course of concessions in the region because it confirms widespread popular support for the path of resistance and popular resentment towards the so-called "axis of moderation" in the region. The success of Hamas has weakened the role of Egypt and Jordan and to an extent that of Saudi Arabia, because these countries prevented their people from supporting Hamas from 2001 to 2006. Iran has filled the vacuum created by the abandonment of the Palestinian cause by Arab countries. Hamas’s victory confirmed Iran's bet on the success of the force of resistance and showed the failure of the Arab bet on the success of concessions. Hamas's victory weakened the role of the first and second generation leaders in the Palestinian Authority and in Fatah's leadership and opened the door for the young generation in them. Reevaluating Election Strategies: There has been a failure of the American project of bolstering democracy and of its project for the Greater Middle East. Through the elections that took place in occupied Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, it became obvious that if free and democratic elections took place in any other Arab countries, the winners would be opponents of US regional policy -- all the groups and personalities that America regards as undesirable. Therefore, in 2006, America gave up on establishing democracy in the region and proposed instead "the axis of moderation" as an alternative. This change in the US strategy cheered and calmed the Arab regimes and allowed them to breathe again.


The failure of American and Israeli attempts to define the Hamas movement and other resistance movements as "terrorist groups" were noticeably and vigorously strengthened after the events of 9/11. The fruit was the listing of Hamas as a terrorist group by the EU. But the Hamas victory and the formation of a Hamas government caused a diplomatic impasse for America and Europe on how to

deal with the Palestinian issue. Hamas's victory proved that there was wide-spread popular support for the resistance movement in occupied Palestine and a broad public refusal of the course of concessions. The Hamas victory presents a strong challenge to the al-Qaeda strategy -- which refuses any democratic process, considering it un-Islamic. Al Qaeda's stances as presented by al-Zawahiri through televised messages are the best proof of its opposition to Hamas's participation in the elections. These messages prove the extent of the worry and fear inside the leadership of the al Qaeda network regarding Hamas’s success and the democratic process. The success of the Hamas movement in power weakens the Salafi wing of the movement and bolsters the realistic wing within it. Hamas's success also represents a challenge to other groups such as Islamic Jihad which refuse any political involvement stressing the armed resistance as the only choice to liberate occupied Palestine. Concerning Hamas's relationship with Iran: 1. Hamas’s success and the boycott of Hamas by the West and the Arab regimes has strengthened its relationship with Iran. It has transformed Hamas from Iran's partner to its ally and created an important model of a Sunni-Shia alliance challenging the American-Israeli strategy of hegemony over the region. 2. The transformation of Hamas from a partner to an Iranian ally improved Iran's relationship with the Arab world and the Sunnis in the Islamic world and reduced the level of sectarian and confessional strife. In conclusion, the American and Israeli strategy in boycotting Hamas and pressuring the EU and other countries to adopt this boycott, were huge favors to Iran, Syria and other groups opposed to the US in the region, because it improved and bolstered the relationship between Hamas and Iran and weakened the role of the Arab countries allied with America. It is also worth mentioning that the Arab regimes allied with America share responsibility for this failure, because they have succumbed to American and Israeli pressure to boycott the Hamas government -- something that Saudi Arabia has tried to correct in recent months.

* * * 2nd Speaker: The second speaker focused on the relationship between Hamas and Iran as represented in the Iranian and regional media during January of 2007. As with all projects in media analysis, it is useful to apply a five-part analysis: 1. Who's the producer?


2. What's the message?

3. What is the medium? 4. What is the audience? 5. What is the context? When was the message produced and why? The Iranian media is not monolithic, the speaker noted. There is plenty of debate inside the media. The Iranian state media tone was somewhat neutral when it came to favoring Hamas over Fatah. The overriding concern is with what will be best for the Palestinian people as a people struggling to overcome oppression. In the context of the sectarian tension following the execution of Saddam Hussein, Iran wanted to underline the importance of Shia-Sunni unity, that America had an interest in promoting division, and that Hamas and Iran's close relationship could be seen as a symbol of unity between Sunni and Shia and proof that Iran does not discriminate between Shia and Sunni. Iran does not discriminate in its support for Shia Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas. Support is based on the issue of jihad and has nothing to do with sectarianism. We saw Hamas being criticized not only because of infighting with Fatah, but also in the region for its dependence on Iranian support. Does Hamas see this support an asset or a liability? Based on its most recent statements, Hamas still sees this relationship as an asset regardless of Arab criticism. Nevertheless, the new wave of anti-Shia discourse following Saddam's execution has played into media portrayals of Hamas as a tool of Iran. In the summer of 2006 we saw broad non-sectarian support from Hezbollah, but with the execution of Saddam we saw how quickly that popular support could dissipate. Another conclusion is that Arab public opinion ("the Arab street") is quite fickle -- it can change quite quickly. An event can quickly change public opinion quite dramatically. There is a debate inside Iran about its relationship with Hamas. There are those who express the opinion (not represented in the media) that Iran at times seems more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves.


The notion of a "Shia crescent" was developed and has been used as a rhetorical weapon -- and the media plays a role in fueling the fear of Shia trans-nationalism (a form of trans-nationalism that has actually long existed). The media is fueling the fear by the attention it gives to the rhetoric -- "Shia revival" and "Shia crescent" -- by framing this in the media as a Shia resurgence. Hence, Hamas's relationship with Iran is something to be feared and a relationship that exists to the detriment of Hamas. A lot of the conflicts in the region have strength because the media gives them a voice. The challenge for the radical axis is how does it master the media and sell its position across the region.

Question and Answer Session: Q: Is there a conversion to "political Shiism" taking place? 1st Speaker: In Iran they laugh about stories of conversions from Sunni to Shia. The main concern is about the nuclear issue -- no one is interested in going abroad in order to convert people to Shia. Iran is calling for political unity among Muslims. A Sunni-Shia split has been emphasized in order to provide political cover for pro-American Sunni regimes to support America's policies under the banner of the defense of Sunnis from a Shia threat. Q: Since Iran has been the beneficiary of democracy across the region, will Iran now become a promoter of more widespread democracy? 1st Speaker: Iran was the first in the region to welcome elections in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was Iran who in Bonn intervened to break a stalemate in negotiations between the US and Afghanis. Iran has never dealt with the liberation movements as tools. Since the Iranian revolution, Iran has sought relations with the liberation movements as allies -- not as tools. If Iran had dealt with these movements as tools the relations would not have progressed, but been undermined. In the Lebanese loyalist media whatever the opposition does gets attributed to orders from Iran, yet when the opposition demonstrated against the government, Iran asked why they were doing this -- they had not been forewarned. Iran regards these movements as respected movements with popular support and as allies.


-- End of Session Two --

Session Three Palestinian Electoral Legitimacy, President vs. Government: Implications for the Future of Elections in the Occupied Territories 1st Speaker: A senior Palestinian political leader and Fatah member. 2nd Speaker: A senior Palestinian Islamist representative. 3rd Speaker: A senior Palestinian political leader and security expert. 1st Speaker: The first speaker began the session by asking the question: is it allowed to conduct an election while under occupation? That was the question raised in 1996. Arafat insisted that Israel had to withdraw from all the towns and villages and that happened at that time. As a result the elections were held at that time. The speaker then point out that in the Oslo agreement it is not stated that there should be a legislative council. It is allowed to elect 25 administrators to manage the Authority, but Arafat succeeded with Rabin and Peres to shift that administrative council to a legislative council composed of 87 members plus the president who was at that time President Arafat. During the recent election, Israel refused to withdraw from the villages and towns and at that time only provided facilities for elections. So, if Arafat had still been alive, he would not have allowed elections to take place under those circumstances. After the meeting in Camp David, Arafat came to the conclusion that Israel is not looking for a political treaty but is looking for a security treaty and this security treaty would allow Israel to keep three military bases in the West Bank along with other things. Then came the Intifada after the visit of Sharon to the al Aqsa mosque. At that time, Mr. Arafat insisted on the continuation of the Intifada until the terms of reference could be changed in light of his experience of Camp David. Now, President Abu Mazen has been elected and the Fatah movement has seen the urgency for a political solution, or a treaty, because the concern remains that Israel will dictate the terms of the final status agreement. While Arafat could have gone to final status negotiations and convinced the whole Palestinian people to support him, the situation now is different. If we reach any political solution we have to go the legislative council, to the Palestinian National Council, to a referendum, to the Palestinians, to make it legitimate.


So, for that reason, Fatah decided to first unite the political body of the Palestinians. That meant going to elections despite all the circumstances and to facilitate conditions in which everyone could take part. For instance, Fatah did not put any political conditions that first you have to accept Oslo before you can participate or you have to make such a declaration. Fatah required that only two percent from the electorate is enough to have a seat in the legislative council. Why? Because the council needed to be a floor for all Palestinians to discuss and reach a common position about all the main issues. Fatah succeeded in that step and there is now no power outside the legislative council. But both Fatah and Hamas were astonished at the level of Fatah's defeat in the election. Hamas, this speaker noted, was also astonished at the level of success in the election. The speaker said he reviewed this history in order to suggest that Hamas was not prepared for taking power with that size of majority. In order to govern you have to have an economic policy and a political strategy laid out. So, Palestinians were now in a dilemma because neither were the Americans nor the Europeans prepared for the outcome of the election. Fatah was sure it would not secure an outcome like the elections of 1996 because after one party has been in power for ten years the people want a change. Secondly, once Abu Mazen took power Fatah jumped ten points in the polls, but after three months neither the Americans nor Israelis had helped him implement his political program. As a result, the Fatah party suffered politically. Now the problem is not between Fatah and Hamas, but the fact that no one was willing to deal with the new Hamas government -- neither the Americans nor the Europeans. The question can be raised, why wasn’t a coalition government formed at the outset? The speaker said that to do that, would have meant that the boycott would have been on the president and Hamas at the same time. Because then everyone will be boycotted. A year was required until there a common ground was established. Fatah now believes this has occurred. The speaker said he believes that Hamas is now going in the right direction because Fatah has stated things that while in opposition they would have never said -- that Israel has de facto existence, as Khalid Meshaal said, that Hamas is seeking a state with the 1967 borders. Hamas in Moscow stated that they are ready to stop rocket shooting and military actions from Gaza -- all these steps were necessary to break the boycott. Hamas should be encouraged, the speaker noted, because this is not a defeat.


Back in 1979, the Fatah movement asked Egypt not to sign the Camp David agreement, but after Egypt rejected this there were only two alternatives: either you achieve nothing or you join the political process. The basis of international legality was that Fatah had to accept. After Egypt made an agreement with Israel, Fatah realized there could be no military solution to the Palestinian conflict with Israel. In Mecca, the fear across the Middle East that civil war will spread across many nations was discussed. If there is a civil war in the West Bank it will shift to Jordan. If there is a civil war in Iraq maybe it will shift to Kuwait and Saudi

Arabia. Civil war in Lebanon could shift to Syria and other countries. For that reason, the Saudis intervened and in Mecca and real achievements were made. Firstly, Hamas stated that they would honor signed treaties. They will accept Arab summit meetings. If Hamas was to now take a further step and recognize the Arab Initiative then Palestinians will be in a very strong position. They will have a strong political basis and will be united, because no one who is reasonable will ask Hamas to recognize Israel. Why? Fatah did it and what did they get? They got nothing. They signed Oslo in 1993 and in five years should have got back 92 percent of the land and negotiated a settlement for Jerusalem and the military bases there. After hard work they got only 18 percent in Area A, 22 percent Area B and then the occupation was resumed. Since accepting democracy, Fatah could not dominate because you always have to accept the outcome of elections and no party in Palestine can have exclusive power. Palestine is the land of the prophets -- Fatah started out as radicals and then shifted to real politic. In politics, if you want to achieve something, you need a balance of power. Without a balance of power you cannot achieve anything. The first to speak of a balance of power was the Koran. Mohamed, the prophet, made the idea very clear. For that reason, the Mecca agreement should be seen as a strategic step; now the new government must be built. What are the problems being faced now? The first problem is that Europe wants Hamas to change its policy and only then is it ready to deal with it. This is understandable. But America is insisting on dismantling Hamas. If Hamas changes its political direction that will not be enough. Why? Because Israel is insisting on destroying Hamas. Israel is working on starting a Palestinian civil war in order to avoid arriving at any political solution. Tzipi Livni, Israel's foreign minister, who is now moderate compared with others, said there are positive points in the Arab Initiative. But what Israel cannot accept is the right of return, the borders must be changed and there can be no discussion about Jerusalem. If you cannot discuss the border, there can be no solution. As those who signed the Oslo agreement recognized, the West Bank and Gaza is the Palestinian state and the other 78 percent is Israel. But Israeli policy is arguing that the 78 percent is for us, but the West Bank is for you and for us. So, they are seeking to share out the West Bank. So that is really the problem.


It is really unfair that the world banished the Palestinians because of the outcome of democracy. Fatah is not happy that Hamas did so well and defeated it in the election -- but this is democracy! You have to work to change the outcome of the next election. You cannot insist from the outset that the outcome of a democratic process should be so-and-so. In that case, it will no longer be a democracy. This American administration is the most unjust in the history of the United States. If America wants to have a political treaty the Palestinians can have it in one month, because all questions are clear. But America is postponing the solution of the Palestinian cause until they control the region. Now there is a suitable

moment when America is not comfortable in the area -- it is defeated in Iraq, in Afghanistan. Israel's defeat in Lebanon proves that America can no longer rely on Israel to change realities in the Middle East. The last war proved that Israel can start a war but they cannot end it the way they want. Condoleezza Rice is very optimistic. She is coming on the March 23 and she has a concept of how there will be a Palestinian state in a year and a half. This arouses fear because everyone remembers Mr. Clinton coming to Gaza and opening the airport and then almost immediately bombing Iraq. Is the diplomatic initiative now being driven by concerns about Iran, or, because the world believes that a solution in the Middle East must be found? The coalition government must do its best and remain alert to Israeli attempts to stir up a civil war in Gaza. All factions must cooperate to prevent that from happening. Neither Hamas nor any Palestinian is against a just political treaty. The speaker then recounted one time Arafat sent him to learn about what happened between Nixon and Mao Tse Tung. As he was brought to meet with the Chinese officials they said you can sit here. He asked, where is that? They said that was where Nixon sat. As Nixon came to sit on that chair, Mao said, before you sit down tell me what you want from me? Nixon said, I come for peace and to offer peace. Mao said, is that enough? And Nixon corrected himself and said, I came to offer you a just peace and to offer you a just peace, and Mao Tse Tung said, now you can sit because now we can start.

* * * 2nd Speaker: Why was important to have the elections in 1996? Arafat worked hard for the election and sought votes for legitimacy. He already had legitimacy as a fighter but wanted legitimacy as a governor, as a political leader for his own people. So, from this point it started and on this basis Hamas came to the elections in 2006. For the same reasons, Abbas wanted the elections even more than Arafat. He had no legitimacy as a fighter -- he wanted it as a president and head of the main political group in Palestine. He talked to some Arab neighbors about the majority and how the minority is supposed to follow democracy, accepting the rules of democracy and you are supposed to accept that you might be the minority. One month before the elections Hamas had discussions about how many seats they could expect to win. The number was 65 to 70 -- so the outcome was not far from the expectations. Two weeks before the elections, the speaker said that he visited a central Arab state in the region. All the talk was that Hamas has to accept the result of the elections and the Arab states will do their best to convince Fatah to give Hamas a space in the coming government. Things went in the other direction.


The speaker rejected the claim that Hamas was not ready to govern. On the contrary, it was Fatah that was not ready for defeat -- this was the main problem. Fatah had ruled the Palestinian people for 40 years and they were not ready to leave the chair for someone else. If Yasser Arafat had still been alive, the results might not have been the same -- but now everyone must focus on the future. So, Fatah was not ready to accept the results. This was the comment from most of the leaders in Fatah. Some of them accepted the result, but their voices were not enough and the very loud voices were supported by the United States and Israel -- everyone knows what Elliot Abrams was doing during the last year. A rejection of the outcome of the election, even from some people in Fatah along with the Americans and Israelis caused problems. Why were there problems between the government and Abu Mazen, the president? There appear to have been four important reasons for that: 1. Most of the leaders of Fatah did not accept the result of the elections and they used the position of the president to untrack the results; 2. The constitution or the basic law. It was written first for Yasser Arafat as the only leader of the Palestinian people. It was his right, but when the United States decided to make a change in power and created the position of prime minister. There was an adjustment of the authorities of both the president and the prime minister. It wasn't easy to have this adjustment while Yasser Arafat was alive and most people supported him. Most of the people in Fatah supported him. Everyone should remember that there were people demonstrating in the streets against Abu Mazen and against Dahlan, shouting loudly that Abbas and Dahlan were American collaborators. That was after 100 days of Abu Mazen in his position as prime minister, so he resigned. Then Ahmed Qurei proposed a partial adjustment, so that there wouldn’t be a complete presidential position or a completely parliamentary position, so you can't say this is completely right or that is completely wrong. 3. There are two political establishments. One in which Hamas participated (the Palestinian Authority), the other in which it does not (the PLO). When you can use your majority in the PA they will tell you that they have the PLO and they are the majority in the PLO and so there was a division in the Palestinian decision-making. 4. The external effect. The Americans and Israelis were ready to make use of people who were willing to serve the goal that they wanted -- to bring down the government. Some people aimed at that but they did not succeed and the signing of the Mecca Agreement was a clear indication of that. Most of the leaders of Fatah did not back Israel's efforts to undermine the Hamas government. But there were those who did accept Israeli support and made use of it but they did not succeed.


What happened next? There were many problems that eventually led to clashes on the ground between both sides, Hamas and Fatah. How were these dealt with? Firstly, Hamas did not give up. They had been elected by the people and so had to do their job. Secondly, without any internal fighting there was a will to solve problems through dialogue. Thirdly, it was understood that there would have to be reform and a rearrangement of the internal Palestinian political situation through a national unity government, reforming the PLO, and building a new Palestinian political system. Fourthly, two issues required serious engagement -- working against corruption, and breaking down, overcoming or living with the sanctions of the international community. What happened then was that a national unity government was formed. In Mecca, there was an important deal. This did not result from a political change in Hamas's position -- that conclusion could only be drawn through not reading or listening well. Hamas has been talking about a state on the borders of June 4, 1967 since the year 1993 -- that was the first time when Moussa Abu Marzouk said that; Sheikh Ahmed Yassin clearly said that in 2003, but no one wanted to hear that at the time because there was another side that was negotiating with Israel and you are talking about a side that was not negotiating, so you have to deal with the side that is negotiating and giving them most of the things they are asking for. On militant actions there were no concessions. There was a kind of hudna or truce that has happened several times before, but this is nothing new in Hamas's political work. As for elections in the coming years, every Palestinian is committed to democracy. What happened in the last year forced the whole international community to respect Palestinian democracy. The main lesson for all the Palestinian leaders is that you have to work to gain the support of your people -- not external support because that will not be useful. Is there any chance for new, free elections in the Palestinian territories? This depends on two important things: firstly, the political situation -- the presence of the occupation when we are supposed to hold those elections. Secondly, our success in reforming and rebuilding the internal Palestinian situation. Before the parliamentary elections there will be presidential elections. What happens at that time will affect the whole system. The speaker noted that international community uses the term "Hamas government" when referring to the Haniyeh government, but they do not use the term "Fatah government" when dealing with the Abu Mazen or Ahmed Qurei governments. The speaker also noted that the polls before the elections were not correct. They were fooling the people. They were trying to have an effect on our people in order to affect the outcome, but it didn't work.


Recognition. The first speaker should be thanked for acknowledging that no one should ask Hamas to recognize Israel. Indeed, the issue of recognition cannot be addressed before there has been a clear, real recognition for Palestinian rights and a clear, real commitment towards those rights from Israel and the whole

international community. At this time, it is to Abu Mazan and Fatah's advantage that Hamas does not recognize Israel. Alternatively, if Hamas was to recognize Israel, it would negotiate and accrue all the political benefits. So it is to the advantage of these others that Hamas does not recognize Israel. At the moment everyone is talking about a political solution, but is there a real opening for a political solution? In this situation, with 3 percent of Israelis supporting Olmert, and Kadima on the way out, is there a real chance to have a peace with this Israeli mentality which bombed Lebanon for 33 days just to save the lives of two soldiers, or bombed Gaza killing 350 Palestinians just to save one soldier who was killing our people before he was taken? Is there a possibility to have peace with those who do not accept the presence of the Palestinian people as a people and a nation? The Israeli government has declared that it will not deal with the national unity government -- this means that Israel does not want to deal with the Palestinians. Can you expect that they are willing or desire to have peace with those people? It seems not. Finally, concerning the elections let us remember the story of Cinderella. Cinderella loses her shoe. The prince who falls in love with Cinderella goes to every house to find the girl whose foot would fit this shoe. Likewise the United States is in search of a Cinderella democracy. 3rd Speaker: No matter whether Hamas has a majority or a minority, Hamas is an important part and element in Palestinian society and the Palestinian resistance and so those outside Hamas have no problem with this issue. Since the emergence of Hamas, there has been a real problem in finding how to unify the Palestinian people behind a unifying platform. Fatah did its best to achieve this goal. Since 2004, Fatah has been promoting national dialogue towards this end. In Fatah there were three expectations going into the elections. Firstly, that Fatah would have a majority, secondly that it would be a very close result, and thirdly, that Hamas would be in the minority. Right up to the election Fatah was watching and some said that winning by just 51 percent would be acceptable. This means that Fatah did recognize that Hamas might win. After the election, Fatah took all necessary steps for a smooth transfer of authority and although there were some in Fatah who wanted to prevent the election from taking place, the majority supported it.


Now that there is a national unity government it is better to look forward. Hamas made a lot of mistakes during the last year while it was gaining experience. The speaker hopes that as a political movement, Hamas will maintain a certain distance from the national unity government. Abu Mazen should have the freedom to negotiate as long as he is committed to the idea of coming back to the relevant institution for approval. Neither Hamas nor Fatah should place

impediments in Abu Mazan's capacity to negotiate. There also needs to be a unified approach on how to deal with the conflict with the Israeli occupation. This government can survive if it can meet the challenge of protecting the democratic process, assuring public order and security, on the issue of the reforms, and the issue of preventing a civil war and ending all kinds of violence inside Palestinian society and between Palestinian political factions. Security is the most important challenge for this government and the Palestinian political factions and the national unity government must find the right approach on how to deal with this sensitive issue. Consolidating and strengthening the home front is the starting point for everything. Will this be approached in response to factional agendas or the Palestinian national agenda? To accomplish this, security must be separated from politics This means that security services must operate under political control. Neighbors and the international community need to be assured that security is operating in accordance with the Palestinian national agenda. Fatah was never an end; it is a means. The end is to end the Israeli occupation and to have an independent Palestinian state. 2nd Speaker: Anyone watching what is happening across the region will observe a change. Islamists are growing and they are gaining more power inside their communities. They are trying to find the tools to participate in the political establishment. There are two choices: Either allow the Islamists to participate through the democratic process, or, you can pressure them for a while but then the whole situation will explode. You can't prevent this process of political change from occurring; you may delay the change but you can't prevent it. If you try to prevent it you will have an explosion that will not be confined within the state -- it will spread elsewhere. The Islamists are accepting the principal of democracy. That happened in Egypt even though the Islamists were being beaten to death during the last elections. They are participating in Morocco and Algeria, in Lebanon, in Yemen. So, they are trying to say we are ready to share power and participate in the democratic process in order to reform our communities and to generate more opportunities for those communities to be more civilized. If offered the chance, they will all be part of the system and they will keep the others with them in the system. If you exclude them they will find another approach. Now in the whole world, there are two approaches. Working within the system or attempting to destroy the system. Which is better for the non-Islamists? To keep the system and allow it to include Islamists, or to let some of them burn the system so that others can rebuild it and exclude you? Question and Answer Session:


Former US ambassador to a Middle East state: The Mecca agreement reflects the legitimizing power of elections. Elections do legitimize but legitimacy is not

enough; the issue of competence and the ability to deliver results now has to be proven. The unity government now has the opportunity -- assuming that it has some kind of partner on the other side to bargain with -- the unity government now has the opportunity to demonstrate its competence, its ability to keep its word and to implement agreements. A bad or unjust agreement -- that is an agreement that cannot be genuinely accepted by a very large majority of those whom it affects -- is worse than no agreement at all. That point is not widely understood in Washington, nor adequately understood in Israel, and it is something that everyone needs to be reminded of. The significance of the Arab Initiative has not been widely understood. It has been mischaracterized. It is not a negotiating proposal or a plan -- it is a reward for the success of negotiations conducted between Palestinians and Israelis. That is to say, if an agreement acceptable to the political authority in Palestine is reached, then Saudi Arabia and other countries are prepared to put their weight behind that agreement and make it succeed by offering their own recognition of Israel. The recognition of Israel is the result of negotiation and should not be a precondition for negotiations. It is something to be defined. What Israel? What Israel is being recognized is something to be agreed through negotiation. Will there be a proposal for a negotiating process coming out of Riyadh? This will probably not come from Washington. The US is too remote, too divided and too partisan. Both the Mecca Agreement and the willingness of the Saudis to convene the Arab League meeting in Riyadh reflect a recognition on the part of the Saudis of an important change in the American position in this region. If you go back to why Aziz sought the relationship with the United States that he did, why his successors sustained that relationship, one of them was anti-communism -- a concern about what the Saudis saw as atheism and the US saw as Soviet ideology -- there were other reasons, but one of the main was the Saudi belief that the United States could protect them by restraining Israel and ensuring that Israel would not do things that damaged the Saudi state. The last several years have demonstrated that the US cannot or will not protect Saudi interests by constraining Israel. The result has been that the Saudis have decided to take action themselves without regard to the United States. Some in Israel welcome this as it presents the opportunity for Israel to deal directly with the Saudis, though it’s not clear that they should welcome that prospect. In any event, it means that the geopolitical context of the Palestinian issue has changed. So yes, the Mecca agreement was very important -- it is a strategic development, it expresses recognition of new realities both in Palestine and in the region and is pregnant with opportunity and that opportunity has yet to be defined. 2nd Speaker:


The Mecca Agreement marks the first recognition outside Palestine of the election results -- one year after the election -- especially in the region. This is

important because it builds for the future rather than focusing on the past. Secondly, it stopped the chances for civil war which was a real threat in the last days before the Mecca Agreement. It thus minimizes the interference of the Israelis and Americans in day-to-day internal issues and protects the Palestinians from further interference. Thirdly, it gives the Palestinians a chance to say to the whole international community we are ready. We have a conciliation agreement that was signed in June 2006. In that agreement we expressed a united position towards the political process. We have a clear instrument, meaning that Abu Mazen is supposed to negotiate and we have a clear instrument to accept or reject the results through a new national council or through a general poll. This is important because it presents to the whole international community a new political platform that they can deal with or not. Q: Olmert and Livni have insisted on eliminating UN Res. 194 and said that the right of return cannot be considered. How is the national unity government going to respond? 1st Speaker: In Camp David, Clinton tried to impose three conditions on Arafat: 1. Forget the refugee question. 2. The history of the Jewish people is under the al-Aqsa mosque, so let us say that under the mosque is for the Jews and the mosque itself is for Muslims. 3. Sovereignty in the land, sky and water is for Israel. Arafat responded by saying that in order to have a state, you need three dimensions. Firstly, people -- and you ask me to forget half my people by canceling the refugee question. Secondly, land -- and you are asking me to give up 15 percent of the land. Thirdly, sovereignty -- you want us to possess no sovereignty. It is understandable that the Israelis would say that to accept so many Palestinians would be a threat to their national security, but this needs to be discussed. The Israelis want to take the issue off the table. In the Arab Initiative there is a concession. They haven't said that 194 must be implemented -- they said that this will be subject to negotiation. So Olmert's conditions are a disaster. No Jerusalem, no border, no 194. It was the United States that originally insisted on 194 -- it was for years called the baby resolution of the United States. The Israelis want to have everything without paying anything! Everywhere in the world there are peacekeeping forces. Why are they not sent to the West Bank? Everyday the Israelis are killing in the West Bank without mercy. Why? Because they regard the West Bank as their own. To accept peacekeeping forces would mean that they would have to accept that this is not part of Israel.


If Fatah had wanted to exclude Hamas from the election it could have done so. Fatah could have insisted that Hamas make a statement saying that they accepted Oslo. They would not have done so and thus would not have participated in the election. Secondly, in an election, you have to elect a party

and a person. In the party election, Fatah got 41 percent and Hamas got 42 percent. [These figures are disputed -- ed.] Fatah heads the PLO, even though for 40 years Fatah refused to take the chair. This was 40 years of fighting and during this period, 11 member of the central committee were killed. With the unity government we want to place the Israeli government in a corner. Sharon got from Bush a letter guaranteeing that Israel can keep the block of settlements -- in contravention of Res. 242 -- because Sharon agreed to bomb Iran. If the Israeli army bombs Iran successfully, the Palestinian cause will end up being just be a comma in a statement.

-- End of Session Three --

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