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  • 7/27/2019 Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimalCurrency Area

    Fz W. Shf

    N. 52 | O 2013

    WORKING PAPER

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    2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    KFG Working Paper Series

    Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Th Tsfv Pw f E

    Th KFG W P Ss svs dss h sh ss f h K-Fsh

    h v d . I s h d xh s w s sh d d

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    A KFG W Ps v h KFG ws www.sf. dd v

    [email protected].

    Ch f hs ss: Fz W. Shf

    Ed sss d d: Ad Bh d F Bh

    Shf, Fz W. 2013: P L N- C A, KFG W P Ss, N. 52, O

    2013, K-Fsh (KFG) Th Tsfv Pw f E, F Uvs B.

    ISSN 1868-6834 (P)

    ISSN 1868-7601 (I)

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    Ph: +49 (0)30- 838 57033

    Fx: +49 (0)30- 838 57096

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    www.sf.

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 3

    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area

    Fritz W. Scharpf

    Abs

    O h ss f f s f h ss d s f h E ss, hs xs, -

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    C: [email protected]

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    4 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    Cs

    1. Id 5

    2. Pf f h O E R 6

    2.1 CentralizedMonetaryPolicyinaNon-opmalCurrencyArea 7

    2.2 EuroCrisisandEuro-rescuePolicies 10

    3. Th Nw R f E Gv 12

    3.1 RevisedProblemPerceponsandtheirImplicaons 13

    3.2 FromSoRecommendaonstoHardenedRequirements 13

    3.3 WhatiftheNewRegimeHadBeeninPlace? 15

    4. Th E R: Wh s Gd d Wh Ws Ls? 17

    4.1 LimitedGains 18

    4.2 InsteadofNominalDevaluaon,CompeveRealDevaluaon 18

    4.3 ObstaclestotheManagementofAggregateDemand 19

    4.4 GlobalCapitalismandSelf-inictedHelplessness 204.5 ButCouldtheRegimebePatched? 20

    5. I L f h Ps E R? 24

    6. Cd P U Pvd h S? 26

    6.1 TheRiskofPolicizaon 26

    6.2 LegimateMajorityRule? 28

    Rfs 30

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 5

    1. Id1

    I s f d d sss f E d d, d s f sd

    ds v s f h E P (EP), 57 f Essd h h dd s h E U S 2007 h s, f h s f h

    s ss. B h d f 2012, hwv, sss h s E qs dd

    h s hd f 33 , d dss f h EU hd s f 32 57 (Z 2013; s

    s, Rh . 2013). B f s ws hh 2007, d f dd s h s f vs

    hs h d qs f E v ss, h sss h h dsd-

    f s d E svs ds f h d d d

    dssss f h d d. Ths d s d h ds w h

    -d d h -d ds f (Shf 1970; 1999) w

    Ls v f h d h w ss d ssv

    v (M 2009).

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    f v dd ss, d d wh s h d h h f

    v v s d f s. A h s , hwv, hs ws

    sd ssv, d, vdv s vs. H h

    f v sf s qs f fs sv h d f h d

    wh s s s d sdds f js. Wh -d h f f

    v ss h d, h -d f d sf-v s s.

    Id, v shd s f h q f zs s-d

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    q, d, d v s.

    Cqs f E d d hv fsd -d ds f EU -

    sss d ss. B s E s ws d d fd -s

    ss, zs w d fd wh h v w f EU v. A h s, -s vs w vs vvd EU -, d vs d d hv

    sd h ws hd h w vs f h xs f v

    ws, dss f h E vs. Bs f hs -d

    d (Shf 2012), dssss f h EUs d d hv d d

    1 Th ws w d s s vs fw f h K-Fsh Th Tsfv Pw

    f E h F Uvs f B (A-J 2013). I f Tj Bz d Ths Rss f h

    v d f h h v d h dssss KFG fws. A

    s d f h d f h x KFG s d f hf

    s Ths Rss, whs s h s vs I hv s d d. A h

    Mx P Is f h Sd f Ss, sh f h hs d f

    dssss wh M H d f h sss f A B. A sh vs f h

    w Of C/S B. H (ds.), D Ps E U d Sss. Oxfd

    Uvs Pss (2014).

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    6 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    sss d ds s, h hv hvd hh s. I ss s,

    hf, h hh v f s h EU s d f -

    d d f zs f -d ds h E v.

    I h , hwv, hs hv hd. E s w d h h

    d ss d h s f Lh Bs. h f f 2008. Ssq,

    s ss f h E M U (EMU) w hd sv sv

    whh ws d s E ss. I h sv h E s, E hs h

    C, h Css, h E C B (ECB) d h T hv h d vd

    h vs f s f zs d h , s d s fs f s EMU

    ss. I h ds, hs s hv s f sdd h d d

    h s f ss hs ss. I h ss, hwv, h hv s dsd -

    d d hs h v, hv fd s wh

    qs h d j wh dsvw h E . I sh,

    h E ss d h s wh hv dsd h ds f

    d s h d vs, s, d d s f xss f E v-

    h hv d h ssv sss d h hzd

    zs ds wd h EU.

    As sq, h E s w fd wh s d f h -

    d s whh d f h s f h s ss, s wh h

    h sd s f s -d d d whh hs f sd

    h s f E-s s. Ws , I w , h E ss hs d fd -

    d: If h M U s d, h s qd h ss s

    f d hv sqs h w s hv -d

    f ss d hs h E v.

    B d ssh h s f hs s, s s ss x h d

    s ss f h s d f d h ss f v h -

    sv vss f h M U f dsss h s f

    sss h -d ds f E . I dsss h f f h

    M U, I w ddss h f h EMU s h E ss d sh sss, s w s h w E h hs s h s f h

    ss d v s -, d I w h -sv vss f h

    s E-v .

    2. Pf f h O E R

    Th s ds f h EMU d h s h E ss w

    s w dsd (Shf 2011; D Gw 2012; N E 2012): B j h M

    U, ss s h h d s -f-s s d h

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 7

    sd s f d hh h f -

    ds dd. Ad hh s s d vs, h s f -

    ss ws s sd h S P d h f h vs

    d ss ds h w . I dd, ss s s h f s d f s s s f s qd ss. Exh-

    d w zd d xsd h ECB wh d s s

    h Ez. Ths , ws xd, wd d f h s f h M U

    h s whh h qs-s s f h Bundesbankhd dd f h G

    (Ds C 1989; Css 1990).

    2.1 CentralizedMonetaryPolicyinaNon-opmalCurrencyArea

    I s wd wdd, hwv, h h Ez ws h d s w wh R Md

    (1961) dd s (OCA) s, h s, whh zd

    s hv s s s.2 B s w , f s

    sss s v s ss (Fss/Lvss 2013). I f,

    hwv, h Ez ds x hs sh f f hd- d

    s- s wh d ds dv dvs s ss, -

    dsv ss d s d, v , d w-s ss (Shf

    1991; Cfs 2001; H/Shf 2012; H 2013). H, v hh h ECB hs sdd

    w s f h Ez s wh, s d

    ss.3

    Ths ds dd v h s v f s s. B

    h hd h f v hs hh s s w- s, sh s

    G, d v w v v s s h f s- s. As

    sq, ds dd ws dd h s f s d sd

    h sdd v f v h d h sd. Th s dv ws h

    fh hd h ss f f ECB s whh w, f s, sv

    f h s, d s f h sd f s.

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    s fd s.

    3 I M 2005, h ECB xd M d ds hs

    (h://www..//df/h/61_77_200505.df, vd 01 O 2013) d d h h

    E sh ds dd ss v , whs h w vsd wh w h

    Ud Ss. Th s d h f ECB d sd hs

    ds.

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    8 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    Th dsz s f hs s d hv f-

    s, d h w f fs s A d Ks ss (K 1990;

    Eh 1990; Eh/Fd 1994; H/N 1994; Fds 1997). O h

    v E, hs ws hd d s h s ws s s E h f f hss G . Ad h w jd

    h ds h Csss (1990) sd d O M, O M, whh, sd

    s d -xs sss, dsd h s f ss h

    . Mv, ws xd h h M U sf wd

    v h h f Ez s. Rdd s ss wd s d, d

    wd qz s d ds w ss. A h s , h v f -

    ss d f -f-s ss wd f ss-d ws

    h h- dv f v wd s. I sh, h s f -

    wd xd h ss ssd wh h ss f s xh s.

    M f hs xs w s s f s h w. B h w s . Wh,

    ss, ws d w h sss f s h v h

    vs d dsvs f ss d h dsz s whh hs wd hv

    h vs. I f, hh s s dd d h dd f d G

    d shd h h ss f 20012005, whs G, Id, P, S

    d I (h GIIPS s), ds dd ws sd h sdd v f x

    h d. Th ECB ws sz hs s; s f s

    xdd h s d dd h sss h Ez.4

    I h d, G, whh hd h s f E h f h dd, d

    h s ss hh f w s d s-sd fs. I -

    , hs ss fd x-d v d sd xs f w-w -

    . A h s , hwv, h d f ds dd d s xs d ssv

    x s s - sss d ssv d-v f h

    xh . I h GIIPS s, s, d-d ds dd d s,

    d s dd s, wh ( h -s s), d ws. Ad

    , h ws d- f x s v s - ds d

    vs v-vd v xh s h zd xs, js s G xs w s-sdzd d-v.5

    4 D Gw (2012, 17682) vds d f s dv wh d s, -

    s s, d hs s, d h s dss h dv w h ECB d dsd s

    s f dvd s dd f h s. B h ds h h

    f f s shs h ECB zd, h h h s s s dsz

    ss.

    5 Ths s d h s f s ds ds d s h

    ss d s s, s d v x s f h GIIPS

    s d s d wh s ds f vs d s G.

    Th s h wh h dsf vs d ss d h M U h s

    f sh ds d d wd hv d s sss s s s

    f whh hd x v f h jd h EMU.

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 9

    Figure1:CurrentAccountsasaPercentageofGDP(19992008)

    Figure2:RealEecveExchangeRates,19992008(ULC/Index1999=100;EU15)

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    10 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    R, hwv, hs s w d s s f E

    -s. Rs GIIPS ds w s d ws f G d h ss

    s, d hs sd s h x f h- dv.6 Th

    ECB s hd sdd s h s f s s d sw js fv s ss- d h -s s Id d S. Ad s h

    Msh T d h S P dd s f s (whh w v-

    fd Id d S, d vd P h G F 3, w), h

    h Css vs hd ss f d sh. B h hd

    wh h s f h ss h f f 2008.

    2.2 EuroCrisisandEuro-rescuePolicies

    Th d f h Lh s ws wd-wd d sqz whh h s

    h s d fd vs d s (d h ECB) v Ks

    , d sv h v-xdd ss v s. Ths -s ds s-

    d vwh. B h d sqz h hds hs Ez s h hd

    dd ws f d. Th s w shd h ds s-

    s whh s h h -s ds, whh hd x w Id d S

    d hh P h G f 2008, s s s h. I , hs

    s vh f v-s ddss ws sfd -s d

    (F 3). Ad wh s sdd, h GIIPS ss w dd

    s-d ss.

    F h sv f vss, ss f h M U w v

    h ss dd h w s vs d dfd h sv -

    , d s h Msh h f s sd h

    ECB s d f s s (D Gw 2012, 120). Ad wh h M U, GIIPS ss w

    h s s f sv s s h h - ds sd ds

    h f h s sv d h d v d -s d.

    H s h v ds sd s whh, s sf-f h, dq d h qd f ds, s h s f sv sv, s G,

    d x Id d P.

    6 Ev Nv 2008, h Fh ECB C B Cf, Adw Rs (2009: 251) dd h

    h EMU hs d vs ; s d d h shz f sss s, EMU ds

    h d f . Th s, EMU ss h h

    .

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 11

    Figure3:GovernmentconsolidatedgrossdebtasapercentageofGDP

    O vs G d h ss s zd h G h

    d s h h ss d h E, h s hd sd hw

    sh svs wd h s ss f h w s whh hd sfd svs

    d x sss GIIPS - ds. Mv, s f h E wd s

    hv d h x s f d-vd xh (F 2, v). I hs h,

    h sv h E s d h dsd f h Msh Ts -

    s s svd h s f h d s.

    I h d, hwv, h f d-sd E-s fds d h f T-2

    sss h ECB s f d s (S/Wshs 2011) hd h f

    sf v-s ss -s ss whh, h s f df, wd hv

    hd d-s xs.

    Mv, s h G v hd dd h s d sss hd fdd v h s,

    h E ss ws wd d h s ss f h G d h GIIPS vs.

    Ad v hs f (whh ws s f G d w f Id d

    S7), s ds d fds sd d s w vdd -

    , hs, d sv. Ad d h d f fh ds s q s ss, h

    w d d d ds q ssv sd s d x ss whs

    ws s d T f s f h Css, h ECB, d h IMF. As

    7 S F 3, v. G -s d hd v hh , hd sd f h

    s f h ss. S d Id, hwv, hd d dd -s ddss

    vs f w h Msh f 60 f GDP, d v fh w h G v. I s f

    -s d, v P hd f fd h G f 2008.

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    12 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    d d shd hv xd, hwv, s s s d d s-

    s wd d h d d hs s -s ds (Thd/W

    2012; K 2013). I , hf, E-s s fs h s f GIIPS -

    s xsv h s-d s hv shd d s d d ss d s ss, wh s xd 25 d h

    v 50 G d S, d xssv hh vs h d s s w.

    Figure4:Unemploymentratesasapercentageofthelaborforce

    3. Th Nw R f E Gv

    I h , hwv, s h h f sv sv ss hv d.

    B h s f sss ws hvd hh h sss f s fds (whs

    s, s s d , dd d ssq sv s), hhh h ECBs d d whv s sv h E. I , h

    h, f ss, wd h ds f hd ss hh Oh M

    Tss (OMT) ws wd s h h ECB ws w d w s qs-d

    f s s f s f vs s w. As sq, s qs

    dfdd s d v d f s-d ss, hv

    f w E whs s s s h - v f h M U d whh

    s f d h vs ss -s s .

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 13

    3.1 RevisedProblemPerceponsandtheirImplicaons

    Th s v h s E w fd h E Css (2010)

    h f v w h s f h ss d h s f fs Ess s I-E-A Cvss d Is. I ss ssh,

    hh wdd, vs f h h-sd xs whh, h Csss (1990)

    O-M-O-M , hd jsd d dd h f h M U.

    Ev hh h s- d s hd, h xs dvd f

    hv dd d. Th f h fs wd v h-

    h Ez hs dsd. Isd, h s dd f h E s dsd s d

    f s s f s d d sss f vss s s

    whh w s s h hs h sssf d ss f f EMU h

    (Css 2010: 3). Isd f fs, s s h shd hv vd

    hs d h s w d h s. B s h Css qs

    h M U sf d s ss, s dsss h h f

    s. Ad v hh h ws d s w hvd hh s

    , h s f ( d s) f

    dd h E vs d.

    B xs, hf, h Csss ss fs xsv wh w w

    d-, d- d s d h ds sds d h

    v. Dvd f ss f , vs ssd

    v d x s wh h ss f d x d

    sd s: ItisthereforeessenalthatMemberStatesputinplaceanambiousandcomprehen-

    sivepolicyresponsegearedatspeedingupandimprovingintra-areaadjustmentmechanisms().The

    policyresponseshouldbecomprehensive.Itshouldcovermeasuresinfourkeyareas:scalpolicies,credit

    markets,labourmarkets,andproductandservicemarkets (Css 2010: 3). Th f h

    s hf dvd -s dssss d ds ss h s

    h shd svd h vs qs.

    3.2 FromSoRecommendaonstoHardenedRequirements

    Wh ws sd J 2010, hwv, h hd f h h d -

    ds f h Bd E P Gds d h xhs f h Ls Pss, whh

    hd hs (Ds . 2008). B h hd d wh

    h d ss d E ss d wh s ds s f G d

    h f Id d P w ssd wh h ds h w dd

    h Css d d h T. Ths dd x s s -

    qs s wd f s fs sd h ds d

    h 2010 x h w hs d fd whhd h x s f h

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    14 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    ds h wd sv h s f sv. Ad wh h hd dd h d

    f fs s, h q Md f Udsd d h Ts

    s w d d dd, s whh ws d s s shd

    hd; whh zs shd zd; whh s fs d s-wdss hv vzd; whh ss, wf s d ws s ; d

    hw -s js hv d.

    I, f s, hs ws w v f s hd d f s ds s f

    w, G, Id, P, d Cs d s hs Sv. B D 2011, C d

    P dd Sx P f s d dvs h EMU ss, d-

    ss f d hs f s sv. Th wh h Tw P, h E Ss,

    h Fs P, d h zd svs h s w v-

    f h M U h xds zd s f d h h d

    h s f h Msh T.

    Th s s s d v s h Exssv I Pd

    (EIP) sshd w s f h Pv d C f M Is (EU

    1174 d 1176/2011). Th xd h Csss svs, , d s ws

    dd f s, wh f h dvs f E d

    s. Wh s s h h w ws w ssf theneedforastrongerframework,

    andreinforcedgovernance,includingnancialdisincenves,toensurethatrecommendaonsareappro -

    priatelytakenintoaccountatnaonallevel(Css 2012).

    Th, h EIP ss Css-dd Sd f s v ss ds

    whh, h wh d w hshds, d h f x

    d s8 h w d s h Css. Fds sd

    d hs s, d -dh vws f s whh s

    hv dd. If h Css ds xssv , h x s w s f

    ds fwd d dd wh whh h M S d s

    s v (1176/2011, A. 7.2). If d h Css d C, h

    s d. If h Css s ssd wh s , s ds

    ssh -, whh w v ss h C ss qd -j (1176/2011, A. 10. 4). Th x s h s ds, s s-

    ds f 0.1 f GDP h s f -, d h s

    ss f d - d f s v . A,

    ss sd h Css sd h C hh vs-qd-

    j vs (1174/2011, A. 3).

    8 Ths d s, s, x shs, ss, v xh

    s, v s d, v s d ws, hs hs s, v d, -

    s d s s.

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 15

    Q f h ds ds h Cs , hs s f sv-

    ss: Fs, wh h x f -s d, f h s sd h

    Sd d d h f vs. I s s ssd h h h

    d d hh h s f ss v ss. Sd, hs d sf whh s d. Isd, recommendaons()

    shouldbeaddressedtotheMemberStateconcernedtoprovideguidanceonappropriatepolicyresponses.

    ThepolicyresponseoftheMemberState()shoulduseallavailablepolicyinstrumentsunderthecontrol

    ofpublicauthories(1176/2011, #20). I h wds, h s f E d

    s h ws hvd h Ls T w s h d f d -

    ds h EIP s d. Mv, h s vd s f h Csss

    ssv hs. S hs s -s d sd hh d

    v ds, h s sd h Csss f f d s

    -dh vws. U h S P, hf, h Exssv I Pd s ,

    d , -sd . Wh hs s s d -

    sd x . B h, f s, ds s s -sv vss.

    3.3 WhatiftheNewRegimeHadBeeninPlace?

    A h f w, h vss f h w ssssd h ss f s -

    d. Nvhss, x, f, hw d hv vd h s f

    s h s f h M U d, hh, hw d d wh h s

    ss f h Ez. I hs ssss, w ss s d s v.

    Fs, h w E ds df h fd ds f M U -

    . I h wds, xh s djsd, d

    s f f h Ez. Gv ds s, w hs -

    - dsz d dv-s ss f s

    wh v-v d w-v ds (Ed 2004; N E 2012). Ad,

    sd, h Fs P d h Sx-P d Tw-P s hv shd, h h xd,

    h s v h s f xs s s h v. Th qs s, hf,whh h ss s v vs (ss h h Css

    d hv f v h xs) wd s h s f d x

    s f d ss.

    19992008:CouldtheRiseofImbalancesHaveBeenPrevented?

    B wh h s foverheangeconomies, sh s S Id, ss s h

    hh xs s d w d s d hv dd h d-

    d s f ds dd. Mv, vs d hv sd s s h

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    16 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    v vss f s d hs d. B s, h s h d hv

    d v h s f ss d. Ex hs shw h s w s

    xd d f (Shf 1991), d h s ds d whh

    s d s d f v w s x d-d d hh h-dd d h d dd xs -ss Sh E

    Id (H 2013). Mv, h s-sd fs whh h Css s s s

    hh s Md f Udsd wd hv dv h d-2000s: Th

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    s w s s hh x s d d sd w d ,9 s wh

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    Ev f s svs w vd h ECBs s f OMT s d h d v-

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    szs.

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    hh h dss hs dd ds dd d ws, s s d d,

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    vss G f h ss s h q s.

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    18 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013

    4.1 LimitedGains

    Cd h h f h O M, O M (Css 1990), s d-

    fss f h E h sd. B h s ss h h s hs sd Eswh s; h hs dd s ss d

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    4.2 InsteadofNominalDevaluaon,CompeveRealDevaluaon

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    s s. B dvs w v , d vs hd d f f h sd

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    d, hh wf s d s-sd fs h s h ss f ss -

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    fs xsv ws, wh ws w f ss h v

    h f vss.

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    4.3 ObstaclestotheManagementofAggregateDemand

    Th M U shd h w s f d f s whh fs

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    11 M Fd s d hv sd: Th dv f s h s s h h

    f h hsds f v s.

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    4.4 GlobalCapitalismandSelf-inictedHelplessness

    I shd hszd, v, h hs s sss sf-d. Th

    f h E h hs h d wh h sss d ss f zd d d s. Of s, hh dszd s d h s sh d s-

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    sd I-M s d E w (Shf 1999; 2010).

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    I h , dsssf wh h s E s w, h ss

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    12 Mh f h -E dsss h E L s, vw, d w s d

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    v.

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    sss h w s Ez s shd fw h Gd R, d whh

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    w s d d ss q ss s sss w

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    Ks w d.

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    Th sd s f an-cyclicalscalcapacity h f f djs s fd

    sshd h E v ws dd J 2012 h Ts Pd-

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    d ws h f h F Psds (f h E C, h Css,

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    theeconomiccycle(V R . 2012: 1011).14 I h , v, Ed . (2013)

    hv sd h f djs s fd d d sd s-

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    O qs s h v vss f - s wh s wh

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    d x dsshs hs f s s d vd h vs

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    s s v.

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    Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 23

    G d h, s f h qs fgrowthpromoonthroughscalreaon

    h wd s h sv ss h ss s. Sh

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    d h d s qs sd h ss s (f x, Bh2013; K 2013). If hs w xd, f s, wd d sd wd s

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    h sss f h -dv s dds. If dv w f, hwv, d f

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    q v sf (d q ) f s16 vd s

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    dd Dsh.

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    d vss; f h w d s s, s d-

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    s, h wd d d ss d h v vss s w s h -

    .

    17 Wh Es G ws d wh Ws G ss vvd xh whh ws -

    d hh dv, hs h w dds, w Es f Ws-Es sfs

    d ssds, s ssv - s GDP h s s 70 f

    h Ws v.

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    f sz s-s sss d v ss v, d h h s s

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    s f h E s d f f s ss s h

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    Mv, z E vs f -f- wd hdd

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    ssv s f whh h s d ss. Ev ss f Ks

    d E Msh P, whh -f- wd s , s-sd wh s ss d dv sd s h d hd s h d f

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    v wh whh s d qs h s f Id d h xs f Sv

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    (A 2013). If hs sss w s E s, s h h d

    svd sss.

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    js f sss hs dss dss h s s, d h

    f h ss d vs vvd s ss w s

    h, wh sd d s w s xsv ds. Ev, h,

    h w s f h h dvsv s, d s fv- h s f h h (Hs 1998) h s j v

    f s sss. Th s s h h E zs, s h

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    s s ss ( d, f h ) dssss f v vs

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    s h s v.19

    19 Th s, f s, -dd: I h s f ss wds, s-sd ds h

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    Theodoropoulou, Soria/Wa, Andrew 2012: Wh Dd Th Ex? Lsss f E f sv x- v f h s G - , : ETUI W P2012/10, Bsss: E Td U Is.

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