Brinksmanship at its BestThe Origins of and Solutions to America’s Political Polarization Problem

By Matt Steiner

Introduction

Today, it is commonplace to assume that American politics is more polarized than it has

ever been. With Washington mired in endless debates over health care, the budget, and the debt

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ceiling, it is no surprise that many Americans have little faith in the political process. Instead,

they lament the hyper-partisanship and political gridlock that they witness on a daily basis.

In this paper, I try to shed greater light on this entire topic. First, I provide evidence to

confirm that American politics has become more polarized. Then, I assess the factors that have

led to this dramatic shift. Finally, I conclude the paper by offering solutions that I believe will

help the country overcome political polarization.

The Evidence of Political Polarization

Many scholars believe that American politics has become more polarized over the past

thirty years (eg. Cameron 2002; Baldassarri et al. 2008). In this section, I provide two types of

evidence to back up this claim. First, I consider anecdotal evidence that seems to support the

political polarization hypothesis. Then, I turn to numerical evidence to verify this finding.

Anecdotal Evidence

There is quite a bit of anecdotal evidence supporting the political polarization hypothesis.

Personal accounts from former politicians like Olympia Snowe and Joe Liebermann seem to

indicate that many in Washington have moved away from the political center (Snowe 2013;

Lieberman 2014). Recent events such as the government shutdown and the health care reform

debate also lend support to this theory.

Several scholars have tried to document this dramatic shift. In their most recent book,

Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2005) blamed political polarization on the Republican

Revolution of the 1990s. To some extent, their findings drew on earlier works, such as David

Rohde’s (1991) in depth analysis of party leadership and its effects on party homogeneity in the

House of Representatives. Since then, many scholars have continued to document political

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polarization in American politics (Sinclair 2006; Mann et al. 2012). Their work has encouraged

others in the academic community to quantify this trend.

Numerical Evidence

Many scholars have increasingly relied on numerical evidence to show that political

polarization has increased. The most common measure to which they have turned is roll-call

voting behavior in Congress. Several studies show that Republicans and Democrats have voted

less frequently with one another on many initiatives than they did in the past (Poole et al. 1997;

Groseclose et al. 1999; Clinton et al. 2004). This change seems to indicate that Congress has

become more polarized.

Other scholars have accepted this finding but have also tried to measure political

polarization in different ways. For example, Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty (2013) found

that the number of political issues outside of party conflict has fallen dramatically. Instead, many

previously non-partisan issues have become politicized. Similarly, Geoffrey Layman and

Thomas Carsey (2002) showed that the attitudes of party activists have moved farther away from

the political center.

Nevertheless, some scholars have challenged this theory. The most poignant critique has

come from Morris Fiorina (2010), a political scientist at Stanford University. According to

Fiorina, everyday Americans haven’t become more polarized. Instead political elites have moved

away from the center. In order to defend this claim, Fiorina relies on a mountain of survey data

measuring political attitudes across the country. In the process, he casts some doubt on the

political polarization hypothesis. Nevertheless, his findings don’t debunk the entire theory

altogether. Instead, they paint a much more intricate picture of political polarization in America.

The Causes of Political Polarization

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The causes of political polarization are multiple and complex. Several scholars have tried

to identify which factors have played the largest role, but the academic community is yet to

arrive at any definitive conclusion. In this section, I outline each of these factors and identify

which ones I believe have polarized American politics most.

Political Realignment

Many political scientists believe that political realignment is the primary cause of

polarization in American politics (Carmines et al. 1990; Kimball et al. 2010, 8; Pildes 2011, 287-

297; Bonica 2014, 7). According to this logic, civil rights legislation alienated many southern

Democrats and moved them more toward the Republican Party. This removed an important

conservative constituency from the Democratic Party and made the party as a whole more

liberal. Over several decades, both parties homogenized and became more ideologically pure.

The net result, according to this theory, is that American politics became more polarized.

Some scholars believe that this narrative oversimplifies American political history and

only looks at the Democratic half of the coin. Nolan McCarty (2011) in particular has challenged

this one-sided view and has said that the death of moderate Republicans played as large a role in

political polarization as southern backlash against the Democratic Party. However, McCarty does

not clearly identify which factors led to the demise of moderate Republicans. It’s possible that

President Nixon’s southern strategy alienated many northern moderates within the party and

discouraged them from voting Republican. This may have made the Republican base more

conservative and homogenous and may have also set the stage for today’s polarized

environment. Whatever the cause may be, it is clear that changes within the Republican Party

have contributed to political polarization as much as changes within the Democratic Party.

Individual Personalities

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Some pundits believe that a lack of moderate statesmen is to blame for political

polarization (eg. Poole et al. 2007, 319). To some extent, their analysis is warranted. Over the

past thirty years, the number of congressmen or senators with centrist ideological scores has

dwindled to almost zero (Theriault 2006). This means that there has been less compromise in

Washington and more partisanship.

The problem with this theory is that it fails to recognize the much larger factors at work

that have moved politicians toward the political extremities. Washington has fewer moderate

statesmen because both political parties are more ideologically pure. This theory fails to

recognize this simple fact. Instead, it blames Washington’s dysfunction on a lack of courage and

political will. While many politicians might lack both of these qualities, they also hold

increasingly extreme views that make compromise difficult. As a result, this theory is not valid

and cannot account for today’s polarized environment.

Demographic Changes

Other scholars have turned to demographic factors to explain America’s political

polarization. Famed journalist Bill Bishop (2008) first identified this trend when he wrote his

seminal book The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded Americans is Tearing us Apart.

According to Bishop, America’s socioeconomic landscape has changed considerably over the

past thirty years. Instead of living side-by-side with individuals of different economic and social

standing, Americans have increasingly sorted themselves into homogenous communities. This

has exposed many communities to a narrower range of political views and has made Americans

more ideologically extreme.

Several demographic factors underlie this change. Perhaps the most important of these

factors is the economic success of the south. Beginning in the 1970s, millions of Americans

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began migrating southward. Though some were inevitably drawn by the south’s milder climate, a

large portion moved to seek out new economic opportunities. Their entrepreneurial enthusiasm

injected new energy into the southern economy and helped fuel newfound economic

conservatism all across the Sun Belt. No event more clearly illustrates this trend than the tax

revolts that swept across the entire country during the late 1970s and 1980s. By the 2000s, this

economic conservatism had turned many white southerners into uncompromising Republican

partisans.

Just as important as the economic success of the south was resurgent racial segregation

during the 1970s. Beginning in the 1970s, many affluent whites began to flee from inner cities

and settle in suburbs. This increased the proportion of poor African Americans in cities and

turned many urban areas into de facto areas of economic and racial segregation. Politically, it

also created many more homogenous constituencies with median ideological views that

increasingly diverged from the American political center.

These changes were exacerbated by a surge in income inequality. From the 1970s

onward, wages failed to keep pace with inflation. This left many individuals with less money and

increased the gap between the rich and poor. As a result, it pushed some voters to the left and to

the right. According to Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (2006), this shift

polarized the American electorate and made compromise difficult.

During the same timeframe, the country also sorted itself by age. Younger, more

progressive individuals moved to cities while their older, more conservative parents stayed in the

suburbs. This made cities increasingly liberal and forced many politicians to concern themselves

with progressive issues, such as environmental protection, abortion, and same sex marriage. To a

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large extent, this change reflected a much broader shift in attitudes away from materialism and

toward what political scientist Ronald Inglehart (1977) has called post-materialism.

Finally, religion also played a role. Beginning in the 1970s, churches became

increasingly politicized. On the right, evangelical crusaders like Pat Robertson started to infuse

religious doctrine with overt political gestures (Kurtzman 2013). These efforts culminated in

Robertson’s 1988 presidential campaign, which saw record numbers of churchgoers take their

religious views to the political stage. On the left, the same process occurred, especially within

African American communities where some ministers injected ideological extremism into their

sermons. No minister better typified this phenomenon than Reverend Jeremiah Wright, whose

sermons frequently criticized free market capitalism and conservative racism (Sanchez 2014).

Together, these factors conspired to sort Americans based on their political tendencies and make

the country as a whole more polarized.

Mass Media

One of the least looked-at factors contributing to political polarization is the rise of mass

media (eg. Della Vigna et al. 2007). According to this theory, the rise of cable television, talk

radio, and internet has injected populism and ideological extremism into American politics. This

change has moved Republicans and Democrats farther apart and increased political polarization.

There is some evidence to support this hypothesis. Beginning in the 1970s, many

Americans stopped watching local broadcast television and instead turned to national cable

television and in particular, entertainment programs. This choice may have made some

individuals less politically engaged and less likely to vote. As a result, it may have also narrowed

the electorate to include only those individuals who followed the news on a regular basis. When

the conservative Fox News and liberal MSNBC were established in the 1990s, this change may

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have had especially dire consequences. In particular, it may have fed many Americans a biased

view of the news. Over time, this might have made many Americans more partisan and

ideological.

This narrative certainly sounds plausible, but it isn’t necessarily correct. Political scientist

Markus Prior (2013) has pointed out several flaws that potentially invalidate the theory.

According to Prior, most Americans rely on several news outlets that span the entire political

spectrum. This means that most of the country gets a relatively unbiased view of the news, which

precludes most individuals from any form of political indoctrination. Nevertheless, a small

portion of the population does consume news in a noticeably one-sided manner. For these

individuals, the theory does appear to hold.

International Power

Another argument that some scholars have recently advanced is that the level of domestic

polarization is directly linked to the amount of international power that America possesses.

According to the political scientists Joseph Bafumi and Joseph Parent (2012), America has

experienced more political polarization when it has been more powerful. This is largely because

during these times, there have been fewer global threats to pacify domestic divisions and hold

polarization at bay. This is certainly a plausible theory, but it remains under-researched and

requires more investigation.

Campaign Finance

Many everyday Americans blame the campaign finance structure used in American

elections for the country’s political discord (eg. Hollings 2014). According to this logic, many

politicians pursue an ideologically extreme agenda in order to please their campaign donors. This

decision exacerbates political divisions and makes any form of compromise difficult.

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For the most part, the evidence for this theory is mixed. On the one hand, a number

studies show that the sources of campaign funding have little effect on a politician’s voting

behavior (eg. Ansolabehere et al. 2003). Nevertheless, several others show that candidates have

raised more money from individual donors, who are by most accounts more ideological than

their interest group or political action committee (PACs) counterparts (Barber 2013; Bonica

2013). Whether or not this kind of shift in campaign financing will lead to a corresponding shift

in political behavior is still up for debate (Baron 1994; Moon 2004; Ensley 2009). By this token,

it is unclear if America’s campaign finance structure has increased political polarization.

Primary Elections

Primary elections are also another potential cause of political polarization (Gerber et al.

1998; Burden 2004; Brady et al. 2007). In many cases, they force moderate Democrats and

Republicans to move toward the left or right in order to secure their party’s nomination. In the

long run, this encourages politicians to avoid compromise and move away from the political

center.

There is quite a bit of anecdotal evidence to support this hypothesis. Perhaps the clearest

illustration of this theory is John McCain’s reelection bid in 2010. Like many moderate

Republican senators, McCain faced a primary challenger from the right. His opponent, former

congressman J.D. Hayworth, hoped to convince primary voters that McCain wasn’t conservative

enough for the party. In order to address these concerns, McCain tacked to right and abandoned

many of the political initiatives he previously supported. Among these were climate change

legislation, immigration reform, and campaign finance reform. Though this move helped McCain

win reelection, it also led him to oppose several pieces of legislation that he might have

previously supported. As a result, it increased political polarization in Congress.

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Recently, scholars have come to question this theory. For example, one study found that

the level of competition in primary elections has very little effect on political polarization in

Congress (Hirano et al. 2010). Other studies seem to confirm this finding and extend it to other

political contexts (eg. McCarty 2011, 363-366). This means that primary elections might not play

as a large a role in political polarization as previously thought.

Gerrymandering

Perhaps the most talked about cause of political polarization is gerrymandering (Carson

et al. 2007; Miller 2013). Exponents of this theory believe that allowing state legislatures to

control redistricting has created many heavily partisan districts that don’t adequately represent

the American political center. This has encouraged politicians to diverge from the center and

instead support an extreme agenda.

This theory is flawed for several reasons. First, state legislatures don’t always draw

heavily partisan districts (Levitt 2010, 57-66). In many cases, they actually try to maximize the

number of districts that will support their party even if this decision makes each district less

partisan. This is especially true when one party controls the redistricting process. Second, this

theory isn’t supported by the entire academic community. Indeed, many studies show that

gerrymandering has virtually no effect on political polarization (Mann 2006; McCarty et al.

2009). With this in mind, it is hard to accept the gerrymandering hypothesis.

Congressional Leadership

Some political insiders believe that the increasing power of congressional leaders has

contributed to political polarization (Rottinghaus 2013). According to this theory, congressional

leaders have used their authority to force moderates within their respective parties to avoid

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compromise and support party-line initiatives. This has increased partisan gridlock and

exacerbated political polarization.

There is some evidence to support this theory. For example, congressional reforms during

the 1970s weakened the seniority rule, a little-known rule that historically guaranteed a

committee’s chairmanship to the committee’s longest serving member. Instead, party leaders

assumed more control of the committee appointment process. This trend continued during the

1990s when Newt Gingrich was Speaker of the House. Under Speaker Gingrich’s reign, the

seniority rule was eliminated and congressional leaders assumed even more control. Thereafter,

earning a committee chairmanship was contingent on supporting party leaders and their

initiatives. All of these changes coincided with increased polarization in Congress, which seems

to suggest that this theory is valid.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons to doubt the congressional leadership hypothesis.

Perhaps the main reason is the state of affairs in the current session of Congress. Far from being

all powerful, Republican leaders in the House of Representatives have had to give in to insurgent

tea partiers on several occasions. This has intensified partisan gridlock and made legislative

progress nearly impossible.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the theory does have some support. For example,

former Congressman Mickey Edwards (2012) has blamed political dysfunction in Washington

on congressional leaders. Some academics agree with Edwards and have also lent support to the

theory (eg. Hall et al. 2014). From this, one could reasonably conclude that this theory might be

valid.

The Solutions to Political Polarization

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In order to fulfill its destiny as a fully functioning liberal democracy, America must

overcome political polarization. In this section, I outline several policy changes that I believe

will move the country in this direction. These solutions aren’t radical and don’t represent a huge

departure from past practices. Instead, they are practical fixes that could potentially garner

enough political support to be enacted. Nevertheless, these solutions aren’t perfect and won’t

entirely eliminate political polarization in America.

Reinstating the Fairness Doctrine

The first potential solution involves the Fairness Doctrine. The Fairness Doctrine was a

rule created in 1949 by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that required all

broadcast outlets licensed by the FCC to cover controversial issues in an unbiased manner. The

rationale behind this rule was simple. Since the number of broadcast outlets was very limited,

federal authorities wanted to ensure that Americans were receiving a fair and balanced view of

the news. In most cases, this meant that broadcasters had to give equal airtime to both

conservative and liberal points of view. Beginning in the 1980s, this rule came under attack.

Even though the Supreme Court had upheld it on a number of occasions, President Reagan

decided to repeal it during his second term in office. This decision enabled ideologues like Rush

Limbaugh and Howard Stern to fill the airwaves with relatively fringe views. Over time, this

may have radicalized regular listeners and moved them away from the political center.

The best way to address this problem is to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine (Holm 2014).

Though this change might generate some backlash, it would go a long way toward removing

populist extremism from many media outlets. At the same time, it would also encourage

Americans to consider both sides of important political debates. This might moderate political

discourse across the country.

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Nevertheless, this change would only influence a small minority of the population that

consumes media in a one-sided manner (Prior 2013). As a result, it would not eliminate all

political extremism in America. By the same token, it would not directly address all of the other

ways in which the country has become polarized.

Reforming Primary Elections

Reforming primary elections is another potential option that policymakers can pursue

(Kraushaar 2013). Even if primary elections don’t contribute to political polarization, pursuing

reform might increase civic engagement and public trust in American political institutions. In the

long-run, this could help eliminate America’s social capital deficit (Putnam 2001) and maybe

even moderate political views (Steketee 2011).

There are three basic ways in which America could accomplish this task. First, the public

could encourage state governments to use open primaries. Open primaries enable voters to

participate in any primary election regardless of political affiliation. This means that centrist

independents can vote in a political primary and potentially moderate the outcome. However, it

also means that members of the opposite party can engage in strategic voting and support an

extreme candidate in another party (Chen et al. 2002). To some extent, this defeats the purpose

of the open primary and makes moderation harder to come by.

Second, state governments could experiment with blanket primaries. Blanket primaries

are very similar to open primaries, but they require that all candidates be on the same slate

regardless of political affiliation. Under these rules, the top two candidates in the primary

election proceed onto the general election. Since political independents can participate, some

believe that this electoral formula encourages moderation. However, just like open primaries,

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blanket primaries can see quite a bit of strategic voting (eg. Alvarez et al. 2002). Therefore, they

aren’t an ideal solution.

Finally, state governments could turn to semi-closed primaries. Semi-closed primaries

have many of the same rules as open primaries, but they bar voters registered with political

parties from voting in another party’s primary. At the same time, they still allow political

independents to participate in any primary election. Together, these two rules ensure that

strategic voting doesn’t occur on a widespread basis (Gerbert et al. 1998, 310-312). As a result,

they also make semi-closed primaries the best potential reform option.

Eliminating Gerrymandering

Policymakers could also consider eliminating gerrymandering (Levitt 2010). Like

primary election reform, this change might not reduce political polarization, but it could very

well increase civic engagement, social capital, and public trust. In the long-run, this could

potentially moderate American political discourse (Steketee 2011).

In order to eliminate gerrymandering, state legislatures should turn redistricting over to

independent, non-partisan commissions. These commissions should be transparent and should

operate under a specific set of rules. First, they should try to make electoral districts as

competitive as possible. Second, they should make sure that local communities aren’t split up

even if this means that some districts are slightly less competitive than they otherwise would

have been. Third, they should operate in accordance with the Voting Rights Act, which requires

that minority communities receive adequate electoral representation. Finally, they should avoid

using certain redistricting tactics like cracking, packing, and tacking when they draw electoral

districts. This will make many districts more competitive and potentially encourage more centrist

independents to vote. Eventually, this might lead to greater political moderation.

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Reinstating the Seniority Rule

Policymakers could also address political polarization by reinstating the seniority rule

(eg. Parker 1996, 142). This move would make the committee chairmanship selection process

less political and would encourage members of Congress to sometimes vote against their

respective parties. In the process, it would also give congressional leaders less power and

potentially lead to more moderation.

Nevertheless, it would do little to address political polarization in the Senate. This is

largely because the Senate still uses the seniority rule to fill committee chairmanships. Therefore,

this solution wouldn’t entirely eliminate political polarization in Washington.

Other Potential Solutions

There is also a myriad of other solutions that might reduce political polarization.

However, quite a few of them are not feasible or wouldn’t garner enough political support. Still,

they are worth noting.

First, the federal government could try to enact measures to combat the demographic

changes and geographic sorting that has occurred throughout the United States. These could

include tax breaks to encourage wealthy families to move into poorer areas or federal mandates

that force localities to build mixed income communities. These reforms would probably run into

stiff opposition and fail to change the status quo. Even if they were enacted, they wouldn’t

necessarily end partisan gridlock and bring political moderation. This is especially true given that

past efforts at integration such as school busing have ended in failure. Therefore, these changes

aren’t the best way to cut through political polarization.

Second, Washington could change its strategic objectives, cut defense spending, and

reduce its international power (eg. Press et al. 1997). This, in theory, might increase security

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competition and help unify the populace around a common security threat. In the long-run, these

changes might also bring an end to political polarization. The problem with this solution is that it

doesn’t account for the natural security that America’s geographic location already provides

(Van Evera 1998, 19). Since America is surrounded by two large oceans and flanked by two

relatively docile countries, it is a very secure country. Only a massive shift in the global

distribution of power could change this situation. The rise of China might represent this very

shift (Ross 2010), but until Beijing reaches parity with Washington, it will be impossible to tell

whether international power actually influences domestic political polarization.

Third, the federal government could change the campaign finance structure of American

elections. This might reduce the influence of special interests and make Congress less polarized.

However, given that the Supreme Court has not been very amenable to strict limits on campaign

spending (Kennedy 2010; Roberts 2014), it is highly unlikely that any strong measure would

survive a battle in court. Therefore, policymakers should consider other options if they want to

overcome political polarization.

Conclusion

Over the past decade, America has been plagued by political polarization. Both anecdotal

evidence and numerical evidence seem to confirm this claim. The causes of this political shift are

indeed complex, but they do boil down to a concrete set of factors, such as political realignment,

demographic change, the rise of mass media, and empowered congressional leadership.

Reversing this trend will be difficult, but as this paper has demonstrated, it isn’t impossible. By

reinstating the Fairness Doctrine and the seniority rule, reforming primary elections, and

eliminating gerrymandering, American can once again put itself on the right path toward political

consensus.

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