political theory from hobbes - university of warwick · political theory from hobbes week 3: hobbes...

1

Political Theory from Hobbes

Week 3: Hobbes on The Nature of Man

Compulsory core reading:

1. Hobbes, Leviathan, Introduction & chs.1-12.

2. Listen to: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003k9l1.

The first 12 chapters of Leviathan deal with several different questions. It is

quite a lot to digest. My suggestion is:

Read the Introduction carefully, because it gives a flavour of the

Hobbesian approach;

Go quickly through chs. 1-4 to identify how he understands certain key

notions (look for the capitalized words), such as SENSE,

IMAGINATION, UNDERSTANDING, PRUDENCE, SPEECH (and

how it enables us to make universal claims). Ch. 5 has his conception

of reasoning and science, and is useful to think about Hobbes’s

aspiration to make political philosophy more scientific;

Ch. 6 is worth reading carefully, particularly his view of human

motivation which refers to APPETITES and AVERSIONS; see also his

account of GOOD and EVIL (which is very important);

The first part of ch. 8 has an account of intellectual virtues, which is

revealing about his theory (you can skip his remarks on madness

unless you are interested);

The start of ch. 10 has some important remarks about how he

understands POWER. You can read on for his accounts of worth,

dignity and honour;

The first 6 or so paragraphs of ch. 11 have important claims about

POWER, the desires that lead to conflict and the desires that lead to

peace;

Ch. 12 is a set of explanations of why religion developed. It is

important if you want to think about Hobbes political theory in

relation to God and religion, but you can leave it for now.

2

Supplementary reading:

1. John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

(Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 2008), 23-72.

2. Alan Ryan, On Politics (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 411-26.

3. Tom Sorrell, ‘Hobbes’s Scheme of the Sciences’ in Tom Sorrell (ed.)

The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1996), 45-61.

Seminar Questions

Why did Hobbes want to produce a science of politics modelled on

geometry?

What does Hobbes think is unique to Man?

Should a political theory start with a conception of human nature?

Week 4: Hobbes on The State of Nature and the Social Contract


1. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 13-17.


1. Gregory Kavka, ‘Hobbes’s War of All Against All’, Ethics, 93 (1983),

291-310.



3. Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 2 or 3.

Seminar Questions

Why does Hobbes think that the state of nature is a state of conflict?

Could men get out of the Hobbesian state of nature?

In particular, try to reconstruct Hobbes’s argument that proceeds from the

Laws of Nature to conclusions about why political society is necessary, how

we create a political society, and the conditions under which it is

legitimate.

3

Week 5: Hobbes on The Problem of Obligation


1. Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 18-21 and 29-31.


1. Brian Barry, ‘Warrender and His Critics’, Philosophy, 43 (1968), 117-

37.

2. Alan Ryan, ‘Hobbes’s Political Philosophy’ in Tom Sorrell (ed.) The

Cambridge Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1996), 208-45.



Seminar Questions

What is the status of the Laws of Nature?

Do citizens of dictatorial regimes have an obligation to obey their

states?

What, for Hobbes, are the limits of obligation to the sovereign?

In particular, try to reconstruct Hobbes’s account of political authority (his

conception of the rights of sovereigns and the duties of subjects) and his

arguments for his conclusions about these matters.

Week 7: Locke on Natural Rights and Property


1. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, chs. 1-6 (esp. chs. 2, 3,

and 5).


1. Jeremy Waldron, ‘Locke’ in David Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds.)

Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present (Oxford University

Press, 2003), ch. 11.

2. G. A. Cohen, Lectures on the History of Moral and Political Philosophy

4

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), ch.3.

3. Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 2.

4. Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism Without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2003), chs. 1 and 2.

Seminar Questions:

Can property be justified by labour expenditure?

Can Locke’s theory of property cope with more than one generation?

In particular, try to reconstruct Locke’s account of natural rights,

including his famous account of the right to private property. In addition

to ch. 5, you might think about reading §42 of the First Treatise, which I

include here:

‘But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that

he may starve him if he please: God, the Lord and Father of all, has given

no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the things

of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the

surplusage of his goods; so that it cannot justly be denied him, when his

pressing wants call for it: and therefore no man could ever have a just

power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions;

since it would always be a sin, in any man of estate, to let his brother

perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives

every man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair

acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so charity gives every man

a title to so much out of another’s plenty as will keep him from extreme

want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise: and a man can no more

justly make use of another’s necessity to force him to become his vassal,

by with-holding that relief God requires him to afford to the wants of his

brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master

him to his obedience, and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or

slavery.’

5

Week 8: Locke on Political Obligation


1. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, chs. 7-11 (esp. §§ 87-

142), 15, 17-19.

2. David Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’, in Knud Haakonssen (ed.)

Political Essays (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Also available in various other collections of Hume’s essays and,

electronically, at the Liberty Library of Constitutional Classics.




2. Hannah Pitkin, ‘Obligation and Consent’, The American Political

Science Review, 59 (1965), 990-9.

3. A. J. Simmons, On The Edge of Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1993), part 2, 3, or 4.

Seminar Questions:

Does Locke show that political obligation rests upon consent?

Does Locke advocate a class state?

When, according to Locke, is rebellion justified?

In particular, try to reconstruct Locke’s consent-based account of political

obligation (see, esp. ch. 8) and his conception of the conditions under

which rebellion is permissible (see, particularly, ch. 19).

Week 9: Rousseau on Freedom and Its Corruption


1. J-J. Rousseau, “A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality”. The Cole

translation is available online through the website of the Rousseau

Association/ Jean-Jacques Rousseau-Works on the Web at:

http://www.wabash.edu/rousseau/WorksonWeb.html.



http://www.wabash.edu/rousseau/WorksonWeb.html

6


1. Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch. 2.

2. Listen to: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b008w3xm.

3. Joshua Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals (Oxford:


4. Listen to:

http://ec.libsyn.com/p/0/9/f/09f16882cc131456/Chris_Bertram_on_R

ousseaus_Moral_Psychology.mp3?d13a76d516d9dec20c3d276ce028

ed5089ab1ce3dae902ea1d06c98730d8ca5421d6&c_id=7356480

Seminar Questions:

What, for Rousseau, are the characteristics of ‘natural’ man?

How did man become corrupted and what is to be done about this?

If anthropologists disagree with Rousseau, is his argument useless?

Try to reconstruct Rousseau’s conception of our nature, our interests and

what it is for us to live well and to live poorly, our motivations and how they

are shaped by the social circumstances in which we live.

Week 10: Rousseau on Freedom and Authority


1. J-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract. The Cole translation is available

online through the website of the Rousseau Association/ Jean-Jacques

Rousseau-Works on the Web at:

http://www.wabash.edu/rousseau/WorksonWeb.html.




1. Joshua Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals (Oxford:


2. Frederick Neuhouser, ‘Freedom, Dependence and the General

Will’, Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), 363-95.

3. Gopal Sreenivasan, ‘What is the General Will?’, Philosophical Review,

109 (2000), 545-81.

http://www.wabash.edu/rousseau/WorksonWeb.html

7

Seminar Questions:

Would direct democracy express the general will?

What are the major institutional arrangements proposed in The

Social Contract?

How does Rousseau’s 'general will' relate to his conceptions of

freedom?

The Social Contract is a short book and it is worth reading it all, because

unlike others, such as Hobbes, Rousseau’s arguments for his conception of

political morality and institutions are not offered in a linear fashion. Think

about Rousseau’s fundamental problem (Book 1, ch. 6) and how he thinks

is can be solved. In addition, think about objections that might be raised

against his conception.

Week 11: Burke on Historical Legitimacy


1. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. and intro.

C. C. O’Brien, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986, esp. pp. 85-154, 194-

231, 302-323. Or, Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in

France, ed. and intro. L. Mitchell, Oxford, Oxford University Press,

1993, esp. pp.1-63, 96-127, 187-205.

2. Terence Ball, “‘The Earth Belongs to the Living’: Thomas Jefferson

and the Problem of Intergenerational Relations”, Environmental

Politics, 9 (2000), 61-77.


1. Mark Philp, ‘English Republicanism in the 1790s’, Journal of Political

Philosophy, 63 (1998), 235-62.

2. J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 10.

3. Listen to: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00sjqyn.

Seminar Questions:

Explain and critique Burke’s view of an intergenerational contract.

Does Burke present a coherent case against the French Revolution?

The House of Lords has existed for centuries – are we justified in

changing it fundamentally?

8

In addition to compulsory core reading, you might think about reading

Burke’s often quoted speech to the electors of Bristol, which gives a

flavour of his view of the role of politicians. I include it below. Try to

reconstruct Burke’s conception of politics on the basis of which he

advocates an intergenerational contract, adopts a conservative attitude

towards reform, and criticizes the French Revolution.

Extract from Edmund Burke’s Speech To The Electors Of Bristol

I am sorry I cannot conclude, without saying a word on a topick touched

upon by my worthy Colleague. I wish that topick had been passed by; at a

time when I have so little leisure to discuss it. But since he has thought

proper to throw it out, I owe you a clear explanation of my poor

sentiments on that subject.

He tells you, that “the topick of Instructions has occasioned much

altercation and uneasiness in this City”; and he expresses himself (if I

understand him rightly) in favour of the coercive authority of such

instructions.

Certainly, Gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a

Representative, to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence,

and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their

wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect;

their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose,

his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and, above all, ever, and in all

cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But, his unbiassed opinion, his

mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to

you; to any man, or to any sett of men living. These he does not derive

from your pleasure; no, nor from the Law and the Constitution. They are a

trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable.

Your Representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement;

and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

My worthy Colleague says, his Will ought to be subservient to yours. If

that be all, the thing is innocent. If Government were a matter of Will

upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But

Government and Legislation are matters of reason and judgement, and

not of inclination; and, what sort of reason is that, in which the

determination precedes the discussion; in which one sett of men

9

deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion

are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the

arguments?

To deliver an opinion, is the right of all men; that of Constituents is a

weighty and respectable opinion, which a Representative ought always to

rejoice to hear; and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But

authoritative instructions;

Mandates issued, which the Member is bound blindly and implicitly to

obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction

of his judgement and conscience; these are things utterly unknown to the

laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental Mistake of the

whole order and tenour of our Constitution.

Parliament is not a Congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile

interests; which interests each must maintain, as an Agent and Advocate,

against other Agents and Advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative

Assembly of one Nation, with one Interest, that of the whole; where, not

local Purposes, not local Prejudices ought to guide, but the general Good,

resulting from the general Reason of the whole. You chuse a Member

indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not Member of Bristol, but

he is a Member of Parliament. If the local Constituent should have an

Interest, or should form an hasty Opinion, evidently opposite to the real

good of the rest of the Community, the Member for that place ought to be

as far, as any other, from any endeavour to give it Effect. I beg pardon for

saying so much on this subject. I have been unwillingly drawn into it; but I

shall ever use a respectful frankness of communication with you. Your

faithful friend, your devoted servant, I shall be to the end of my life: A

flatterer you do not wish for. On this point of instructions, however, I

think it scarcely possible, we ever can have any sort of difference. Perhaps

I may give you too much, rather than too little trouble.

From the first hour I was encouraged to court your favour to this happy

day of obtaining it, I have never promised you any thing, but humble and

persevering endeavours to do my duty. The weight of that duty, I confess,

makes me tremble; and whoever well considers what it is, of all things in

the world will fly from what has the least likeness to a positive and

precipitate engagement. To be a good Member of Parliament, is, let me tell

you, no easy task; especially at this time, when there is so strong a

disposition to run into the perilous extremes of servile compliance, or wild

popularity. To unite circumspection with vigour, is absolutely necessary;

10

but it is extremely difficult. We are now Members for a rich commercial

City; this City, however, is but a part of a rich commercial Nation, the

Interests of which are various, multiform, and intricate. We are Members

for that great Nation, which however is itself but part of a great Empire,

extended by our Virtue and our Fortune to the farthest limits of the East

and of the West. All these wide-spread Interests must be considered; must

be compared; must be reconciled if possible. We are Members for a free

Country; and surely we all know, that the machine of a free Constitution is

no simple thing; but as intricate and as delicate, as it is valuable. We are

Members in a great and ancient Monarchy; and we must preserve

religiously, the true legal rights of the Sovereign, which form the Key-

stone that binds together the noble and well-constructed Arch of our

Empire and our Constitution. A Constitution made up of balanced Powers

must ever be a critical thing. As such I mean to touch that part of it which

comes within my reach. I know my Inability, and I wish for support from

every Quarter. In particular I shall aim at the friendship, and shall

cultivate the best Correspondence, of the worthy Colleague you have

given me.

I trouble you no farther than once more to thank you all; you, Gentlemen,

for your Favours; the Candidates for their temperate and polite behaviour;

and the Sheriffs, for a Conduct which may give a Model for all who are in

public Stations.

FINIS

Week 12: Paine on the Priority of the Present


1. Tom Paine, Rights of Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008),

Part 1, pp. 89-130, 174-5.

2. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789. Available

at: http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl81.htm

3. Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, June 24, 1813. Available at:

http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl219.htm

4. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, February 4 1790. Available at:

http://www.constitution.org/jm/17900204_tj.htm



http://www.constitution.org/jm/17900204_tj.htm

11


1. Mark Philp, Paine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

2. Listen to: http://www.marksteelinfo.com/audio/ThomasPaine.mp3.

Seminar Questions:

On what grounds did Paine reject Burke’s intergenerational

contract?

Is it legitimate for one generation to incur debts payable by their

successors?

What sort of welfare provision does Paine advocate? Why?

In the seminar, we shall concentrate on two aspects of Paine’s reply to

Burke’s view: first, his view that ‘Every age and generation must be as free

to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generations which preceded it’

(91-91), and, second, his account of the relationship between natural and

civil rights. Try to identify Paine’s views about these matters and his

argument for those views. With respect to the first, it is also interesting to

review the debate between Jefferson and Madison about whether one

generation ought to be free to bind future generations. Please read that

correspondence as well (the letters are reasonably short).

Week 13: Wollstonecraft


1. M. Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, in M.

Wollstonecraft, Political Writings (Oxford, Oxford University Press,

1994), esp., Dedication/Introduction (pp. 65-75), and ch. IX. Also

available at:

http://www.swan.ac.uk/poli/texts/wollstonecraft/vindib.htm


1. Elizabeth Frazer, ‘Mary Wollstonecraft on Politics and Friendship’,

Political Studies, 56 (2008), 237-56.

2. Carole Pateman, ‘Wollstonecraft’ in David Boucher and Paul Kelly

(eds.) Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present (Oxford

University Press, 2003), ch. 16.

3. Listen to: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00pg5dr.

http://www.swan.ac.uk/poli/texts/wollstonecraft/vindib.htm

12

Seminar Questions:

What are Wollstonecraft’s objections to received views of the rights

of man and what alternative social arrangements does

Wollstonecraft propose?

What distinction, if any, does Wollstonecraft draw between the

private and the public spheres?

Try to reconstruct Wollstonecraft’s argument exploring the roles of

independence, reason, virtue, and sentiment. You might also think about

the relationship between her account and Rousseau’s view.

Week 14: Mill on Utilitarianism


1. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, chs. 1-2, 4-5, in On Liberty and Other Essays

ed. and intro (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).



3. Listen to: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003c1cx.


1. David Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2013), chs. 3 and 5.

2. Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Basingstoke:

MacMillan, 1987) (as much as you can read).

Seminar Questions:

What are the major features of Benthamite utilitarianism?

Does Mill offer a satisfactory account of what it is for someone’s life

to go well? (esp. ch. 2)

How plausible is Mill’s defence of the principle of utility? (esp. chs.

2 and 4)

Utilitarianism is an influential, but much criticised, conception of morality.

Mill engaged with critics of the conception of utilitarianism associated

with Bentham and his own father, responded to objections and revised the

doctrine in certain ways. It is important to gain (a) a sense of what is

distinctive about Mill’s conception of utilitarianism—you might also

evaluate whether he abandoned it, as some claim—and (b) whether

13

utilitarianism, both in its Millian and non-Millian variety, is a plausible

account of morality. In doing so, you might think about these two cases.

THE EXPERIENCE MACHINE

(From Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974),

42-3.)

Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any

experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate

your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great

novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you

would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should

you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life's

experiences? If you are worried about missing out on desirable

experiences, we can suppose that business enterprises have researched

thoroughly the lives of many others. You can pick and choose from their

large library or smorgasbord of such experiences, selecting your life's

experiences for, say, the next two years. After two years have passed, you

will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to select the experiences

of your next two years. Of course, while in the tank you won't know that

you're there; you'll think it's all actually happening. Others can also plug

in to have the experiences they want, so there's no need to stay unplugged

to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service the machines if

everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other

than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain because of the

few moments of distress between the moment you've decided and the

moment you're plugged. What's a few moments of distress compared to a

lifetime of bliss (if that's what you choose), and why feel any distress at all

if your decision is the best one?

THE CHILD’S ARM CASE

(From Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1986), 176.)

You have an auto accident one winter night on a lonely road. The other

passengers are badly injured, the car is out of commission, and the road is

deserted, so you run along it till you find an isolated house. The house

turns out to be occupied by an old woman who is looking after her small

grandchild. There is no phone, but there is a car in the garage, and you ask

desperately to borrow it, and explain the situation, She doesn't believe

you. Terrified by your desperation she runs upstairs and locks herself in

14

the bathroom, leaving you alone with the child. You pound ineffectively

on the door and search without success for the car keys. Then it occurs to

you that she might be persuaded to tell you where they are if you were to

twist the child's arm outside the bathroom door. Should you do it?

Week 15: Mill on Liberty in Mass Society


1. J.S. Mill, On Liberty in On Liberty and Other Essays ed. and intro.

(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).


1. Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Mill and Experiments in Living’, Ethics, 102

(1991), 4-26.

2. Richard Arneson, ‘Mill versus Paternalism’, Ethics, 90 (1980), 470-

89.

3. Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Vol 1, Harm to

Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 1.

Seminar Questions:

What is Mill’s principle of liberty (the harm principle)? What does

it permit? What does it prohibit?

Are Mill’s arguments in favour of freedom of thought and

expression satisfactory? Should we allow such freedom to

extremists?

How does Mill understand the relationship between liberty and

individuality and autonomy?

The aim is to understand the so-called harm principle, Mill’s wider view

of the ‘permanent interests of man as a progressive being’ and the

relationship between the two. Is the harm principle attractive? Is it too

vague to serve as a guide to the criminal law? Is Mill’s defence of freedom

of expression to permissive? Is his account the right kind of justification of

liberty or are there better justifications? Is Mill an elitist? Is his conception

of the good life for human’s convincing? And, is his defence of liberty

utilitarian?

15

Week 17: Mill on Utility, Equality and the Liberation of Women


1. J.S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, in On Liberty and Other Essays ed.

and intro. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991).


(Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 2008), 266-83 and 297-

313.


1. Susan Mendus, ‘John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor on Women and

Marriage’, Utilitas, 6 (1994), 287-99.

2. Susan Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1992), ch. 2.

3. Julia Annas, ‘Mill and the Subjection of Women’, Philosophy, 52

(1977), 179-94.

Seminar Questions:

How does Mill argue against received views of the legitimacy of the

subjugation of women in his day? How strong are his arguments?

Do Mill’s arguments rest on utilitarian, egalitarian, or libertarian

foundations (or more than one of these)?

Is women’s equal access to the labour market sufficient for gender

equality?

In particular, think about whether Mill’s arguments are the right kinds of

argument for the liberation of women. In addition, Mill is sometimes

criticised for (a) focusing on legal barriers to emancipation rather than

non-legal barriers, and for (b) making assumptions about the nature of

women that are unwarranted. Think about whether those criticisms are

unfair.

Week 18: Marx on Alienation and Labour


1. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (particularly

sections on ‘Alienated Labour’ and ‘Private Property and

Communism’—MC; On James Mill; Communist Manifesto; Critique of

the Gotha Programme.

16

All in: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/ or: Karl Marx:

Selected Writings, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).




1. Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1985), ch. 9.

2. G. A. Cohen, History, Labour, and Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon,

1988), ch. 10.

3. Listen to: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p003k9jg.

Seminar Questions:

How did Marx understand 'alienation?

What is Marx’s understanding of man’s ‘species-being’?

Did the early or the later Marx have a plausible view of free labour?

Read, in particular, Marx’s remarks on alienated labour. Some people read

Marx as offering an account of what human flourishing consists in. The

main task, then, is to identify what his conception of human flourishing is,

his argument for his conception, and whether his conception is right.

Week 19: Marx on Historical Materialism


1. Karl Marx, 1859 Preface to A Critique of Political Economy. Available

at: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/ (see extract below).


1. G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford:

Clarendon, 1978), ch. 2, 3, and 6. Or, G. A. Cohen, ‘Forces and

Relations of Production’ in G. A. Cohen, History, Labour, and

Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).

Seminar Questions:

What are the main features of Marx’s account of history?

What role did Marx ascribe to human agency in history?

Is Marx’s theory of history theoretically coherent and plausible?

http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/


17

Read the extract below, which provides a compendious account of Marx’s

conception of history. It is important to understand this conception as it

informs his understanding of political theory—its nature and limits. For

those keen to pursue this further, you might read G. A. Cohen’s If You’re

an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge MA.: Harvard

University Press, 2000), chs. 3-5.

Extract from Karl Marx, ‘Preface to A Contribution to the Critique

of Political Economy’ (1859).

The general conclusion . . . which became the guiding principle of

my studies can be summarised as follows. In the social production

of their existence, men enter into definite relations that are

indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production

which correspond to a definite stage of development of their

material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of

production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real

basis, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to

which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode

of production of material life conditions the social, political and

intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of

men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social

being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of

their development, the material productive forces of society come

into conflict with the existing relations of production or—what is

but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property

relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From

forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn

into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With

the change of economic foundation the entire immense

superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering

such transformations, a distinction should always be made between

the material transformation of the economic conditions of

production, which can be determined with the precision of natural

science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in

short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this

conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individuals is not

based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a

period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary,

this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions

of material life, from the existing conflict between the social

18

productive forces and the relations of production. No social

formation ever perishes before all the productive forces for which

there is room in it have been developed, and new, higher relations

of production never appear before the material conditions of their

existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore

mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since,

looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the

task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution

exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines

Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production

can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation

of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last

antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic

not in the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from

the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the

productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society

create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism.

This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory of human

society to a close.

Week 20: Marx on Justice and Exploitation


1. Karl Marx, Extract from Grundrisse (‘Machinery, automation,

freetime and communism’) in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford,

Oxford University Press, 2000), 405-424. (Also available on the PTH

course extracts through the Library).

2. Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ in Karl Marx: Selected

Writings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), 610-617.

3. Karl Marx, ‘The Trinity Formula’ in Capital Vol. III in Karl Marx:

Selected Writings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), 534-535.

These are all available at:



1. Stuart White, ‘Needs, Labour and Marx’s Conception of Justice’,

Political Studies, 44 (1996), 88-101.

2. G. A. Cohen, Lectures on the History of Moral and Political Philosophy

19

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), ch. 9.

3. Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJtSXkZQf0A.

Seminar Questions:

Is it possible to agree to be exploited?

Did Marx have a conception of justice?

Is Marx’s vision of future society utopian?

One big question, on which there is a large literature, is whether Marx

thought that capitalism was just and whether he thought that communism

was better than capitalism because it was more just. The aim is to

understand his account of capitalist exploitation, his account of lower and

higher communism, and how his account trades on his materialist

conception of history. Is exploitation unjust, according to Marx? Is

communism more just than capitalism or do we have other reasons to

realise it? Why does Marx say so little about the character of communism?

Is his positive appraisal of communism warranted?

political theory from hobbes - university of warwick · political theory from hobbes week 3: hobbes...

Documents