popular backing for the old christian right: explaining support for the christian anti-communism...

Popular Backing for the Old Christian Right: Explaining Support for the Christian Anti-Communism CrusadeAuthor(s): Clyde WilcoxSource: Journal of Social History, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 117-132Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3788077 .

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POPULAR BACKING FOR THE OLD CHRISTIAN RIGHT:

EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR THE CHRISTIAN

ANTI-COMMUNISM CRUSADE

In the past few years, scholars have paid a good deal of attention to the New Christian Right. Some studies have described the national supporters of the New Christian Right,1 while others have discussed the sources of support for the New Christian Right in various regions and cities.2 Still other studies have concentrated on the activists in organizations like the Moral Majority,3 or on the behavior of New Christian Right organizations in the electoral arena.4 Some scholars have examined the popular support for the issue agenda for the New Christian Right,5 while others have described the dynamics of the New Christian Right movement.6 What is lacking in all of these studies, however, is a sense of history.

To properly understand the New Christian Right movement, it is necessary to place it in historical context. Organizations like the Moral Majority and Christian Voice are not the first to attempt to mobilize evangelical Christians into conservative political action. At least two other periods in the twentieth

century have witnessed the growth of organizations which span the interstitial zone between religion and politics in an attempt to activate the large number of evangelicals to press their demands onto government. In the 1920s, a number of organizations sprung up to mobilize the fundamentalist wing of evangelical Christiandom to fight the teaching of evolution in the classroom. Groups like the Bible Crusaders of America and the Defenders of the Christian Faith were headed by charismatic preachers who spread the word through revival meetings, raised large sums from their foliowers, and achieved considerable success in

lobbying state legislatures to pass anti^evolution measures.7

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a second wave of Christian Right activity occured. These groups focused on the dangers of domestic communism, and sought to mobilize the fundamentalist wing of the evangelical community into political action. Organizations like the Christian Crusade and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade were again headed by charismatic preachers who

spread the word on national radio programs and raised large sums from their followers.8

Although scholars have studied the activists of the Old Christian Right,9 to date there have been no studies ofthe national support for these organizations. This paper will examine the sources of support for the Christian Anti- Communism Crusade in 1964. First, the history ofthe anti-Communist Christian

Right of the period will be discussed. Second, the level and determinants of awareness of the Christian Anti'Communism Crusade will be explored. Next, a series of explanations of right-wing support will be reviewed, and their

applicability to support for the Crusade examined. Finally, a multivariate analysis will attempt to test the relative power of each of these theories to account for

support for the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade.



118 journal of social history

The Old Christian Right: Evolution and Anti-Communism

The successful efforts of separatist fundamentalists in the early part of the twentieth century to establish religious organizations provided an organizational base from which fundamentalist activists were able to establish political organizations in the 1920's. The principal issue which motivated these political groups was the teaching of evolution in the classroom. Organizations such as the Bible League of America, the Bible Crusaders of America, the Flying Fundamentalists and many others opposed evolution as a symbol of modernism. These organizations were often successful; many states adopted laws prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools.10

Beyond opposing the teaching of evolution, however, these organizations did not share a fundamentalist consensus on other political issues. On only one other issue did the leadership forge a consensus ? the opposition to communism. The efforts of the leadership to excite their members against communism fell on fertile

ground, in part because of the predictions of one subgroup within the fundamentalist community, the premillennialists. These fundamentalists

interpreted Biblical prophecy to mean that the final battle of Armeggedon would involve the Russian armies fighting against the army of Christ. The leadership also sought to stress the connections between evolution and communism. The

Moody Monthly, for example, argued that "evolution is Bolshevism in the long run. . .It eliminates the idea ofa personal God, and with that goes all authority in government, in law and order."11

The roots of the Christian Right of the 1950's and 1960's can be traced to the renewal of evangelical enthusiasm and fundamentalist reaction in the mid

1940's. The activity originated at the elite level, and was marked by the formation of a number of religious organizations. This period was shaped by the competition between a number of rival ecumenical religious groups, including the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), the American Council of Christian Churches

(ACCC), and the World Council of Churches (WCC).12 The ACCC, along with the newly formed International Council of Christian Churches (ICCC),

represented the fundamentalist wing of evangelical Christianity. Both

organizations were headed by Rev. Carl Mclntyre, who trumpeted the traditional fundamentalist theme of religious separatism. Mclntyre and his organizations encountered considerable opposition from mainstream religious organizations, including the NAE.13

Until the middle part of the decade, these fundamentalist organizations concerned themselves primarily with the internecine struggles between religious organizations. By 1945, however, Mclntyre was expanding his message to play to the latent anti-communism of his fundamentalist constituency. This anti- communism among fundamentalists has been traced to the earlier successes of the Christian Right organizations in the 1920's to develop anti-communism

among the fundamentalists.14 In fact, there was some continuity in leadership between the Christian Right organizations in these two periods. In this manner, the roots of the Crusade are deeply planted in the same impulses and fundamentalist constituency which created the Christian Right of the 1920's.

The anti-communist theme came to the forefront in the 1950's, with the rise of Senator McCarthy. With the national attention which McCarthy received,



POPULAR BACKING 119

press attention to Mclntyre and his organizations was soon to follow. The

spokesmen for the ACCC and ICCC were sought out by reporters and

broadcasters to air their charges of communist influence in the mainstream

Protestant denominations.15 After the political demise of McCarthy, Mclntyre

helped several of his colleagues start their own anti-communist organizations. One of these collegues was an Australian physician named Fred Schwartz, who formed the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade.

The Crusade was only one ofa set of organizations which attempted to mobilize fundamentalists into anti-communist activity. Groups like the Christian Crusade, the Church League of America, and the Twentieth Century Reformation also were involved in spreading the message. The particular specialty ofthe Christian Anti-Communism Crusade was to sponsor a set of traveling Schools of Anti- Communism.16 In addition, Schwartz used the radio to broadcast to his

support ers. The Crusade grew rapidly during the late 1950's, nearly doubling its revenues

each year.17 The essential message of the Crusade was one of domestic Communist infiltration and foreign Communist threat, but Schwartz also spoke out on other domestic issues which he linked to efforts by the Communists to weaken the United States from within. The Crusade opposed Medicare, sex

education, and other liberal programs on these grounds. Like the earlier manifestation ofthe Christian Right, then, the program ofthe Christian Right of the 1950's was essentially anti-modernist.

The organizations of the Old Christian Right reached the pinnacle of their influence in 1964, with the campaign of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater's issue

positions were quite consistent with those of the Christian Right. He had been a supporter of McCarthy, endorsed by the John Birch Society, and was one of the most consistently conservative Senators in Washington.

The Old Christian Right, together with the more secular Right, comprised a sizable segment ofthe Goldwater constituency. McEvoy reported that around half of the early supporters of Goldwater were supporters of the Crusade and the John Birch Society, but that a much smaller percentage of Goldwater's later

support came from supporters of these groups.18 After Goldwater won the

nomination, more traditional conservatives rallied around his candidacy, reducing the importance ofthe Old Christian Right as an element in his coalition.

The Goldwater campaign was a mixed blessing for these groups. The campaign produced a sizable increase in receipts, but involved a radical departure from the separatist orientation from which these groups had sprung. During the

campaign, they worked in close cooperation with more secular groups such as the Americans for Constitutional Action, and the John Birch Society. With Goldwater's devastating defeat, the organizations of the Christian Right experienced a sharp decline in national exposure and support. By 1968, the

receipts of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade were less than half of their 1961 value.

The 1964 election represents the best opportunity to study popular awareness for and support of the Old Christian Right. National attention to the role of these groups in the Goldwater coalition raised them to a level of prominence which they had not achieved before and would not soon receive again. Not




until the formation ofthe Moral Majority in the 1970's would an organization of the Christian Right again capture the attention of the national media.

Data and Operational Measures

The data for this study come from the 1964 American National Election Study conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Respondents were first asked whether they had heard ofthe organization. Those who were familiar with the Crusade were then asked to rate it on an imaginary feeling thermometer where 100? represented extreme warmth and 0? represented extreme coolness. This feeling thermometer was one of a set of similar items

measuring support for a series of social and political groups. One of the difficulties with feeling thermometer items is that many people

tend to respond positively to most groups. Individuals vary in their responses to these items. A score of 70?, for example, may be the warmest score used by one individual and the coolest score used by another. Some adjustment is

necessary to correct for differences in individual response. In this study, respondents who rated the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade at least 10? warmer than their individual mean for all other groups were classified as

supporters.19 This procedure has been used in studies of the New Christian

Right.20 The analysis which follows is limited to whites. Black support for religious

and political groups is associated with entirely different political and social attitudes and characteristics. Most studies of the New Christian Right have followed this same procedure.21

Awareness of the Crusade

A number of surveys have indicated that a sizable portion of the public is unaware of the organizations of the New Christian Right such as the Moral

Majority. The Christian Anti-Communism Crusade did not achieve even the same level of public awareness as the Moral Majority. Only 25% of the white

respondents to the survey were familiar with the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade.

Some of the important determinants of awareness of the Crusade are presented in Table 1. Awareness is higher among those who belong to evangelical denominations, those who believe the Bible is the inspired word of God, and

among those who attend churches at which elections were discussed. This suggests that the church was one ofthe main sources for spreading information concerning the Crusade.

The Crusade seems to have been more visible in certain regions ofthe country. This visibility was highest in the South, in the Border states, and in the Mountain and Pacific states. These states have been historically associated with activity by right wing political groups.22

Most determinants of political information were also related to awareness of the Crusade. Education, involvement in the campaign, and media exposure were all significantly related to awareness of the Crusade. In addition, the Crusade seems to have been more visible to those who had stronger connections to either

party and to those who were more ideological.



POPULAR BACKING 121

To determine which of these variables were most strongly related to awareness of the Crusade, a multivariate logit analysis was performed. Table 1 contains the results of this analysis. Media usage, region and whether preachers discussed elections in the pulpit were all significantly related to awareness of the Crusade

among whites at the .05 level. Significant at .1 were ideology, education, and fundamentalist denomination.

TABLE 1 Awareness of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade

Logit Coefficients. *indicates coeffieient significant at .05. @indicates significant at .1.




It seems, then, that the Crusade was a more visible presence to those who lived in those sections ofthe country most likely to be sympathetic, among those who attended churches of fundamentalist denominations where politics was discussed in church, and among educated whites who kept informed about

politics through a variety of media.

Explanations of Support for the Christian Anti*Communism Crusade

A number of explanations have been offered by scholars to account for support for right-wing political groups. These explanations can be generally grouped into two categories. The first general category, popular during the 1960's, views support for the Right as an aberrant political behavior. Support is linked to some social or psychological strain, such as status anxiety, strongmindedness, or alienation. The second general category of explanation views support for the Right as a rational result of certain political and cultural values, orientation, and beliefs. A number of different explanations have been offered which fit in each of these two categories. Each of these explanations will be considered in turn. After a brief description of the explanation and a listing of the relevant literature, the

explanation will be tested for supporters of the Crusade. Finally, in order to assess the relative power of these explanations, a multivariate analysis will be

performed.

Geographic Explanations: Regions, Ruralism and Mobility

One set of explanations for support for the Right in America centers on

geographic variables. Some writers have suggested that those individuals who reside in or who were born in certain regions are more likely to support right- wing groups.23 This regional explanation is a rational one, stressing the values which are common in different regions of the country. In particular, Southern conservatism and anti-communism, along with Western individualism, are

thought to be fertile breeding grounds for the Right. In addition, rural birth has been hypothesized as a source of support for the

Right.24 It is usually argued that rural and small town birth (and subsequent upbringing) is associated with certain values which produce sympathy for right- wing causes.

Finally, some writers have linked mobility to support for the Right. Those who have recently moved are seen as less likely to have established ties to

community groups, to have formed friendships in the area, or to be integrated into social networks, and therefore are more susceptible to mobilization by the

Right.25 Unlike the two geographic explanations above, this explanation is

usually couched in the language of irrationality, with lonely individuals giving in to the appeals of friendly right-wing activists.

Table 2 compares those whites who supported the Crusade with two groups of nonsupporters: those who were aware of the Crusade and those who were not. The supporters were more likely than the rest of the white population to come from the South and Border states or the Mountain and Western states. In addition, they were less likely than the rest of the white population to be born in large urban areas. Finally, they were slightly more likely than the rest



POPULAR BACKING 123

of the white population to have lived in their current residence for less than two years, perhaps indicating social dislocation.

Percentage of each group falling into each category. * indicates Crusaders are significantly different from the population.

Social Status Explanations

One of the most common explanations for right-wing activity is status anxiety or status inconsistency. Those individuals whose social status is threatened by changes in society are posited to be likely converts to right-wing causes.26 Many of these individuals exhibit objective indicators of status conflict: their various status locations (education, occupational prestige, and income) are incongruent. Discrepant indicators of social status are thought to lead to internal anxiety concerning social status. Those who are undereducated for their occupation, for example, may fear social change which may displace them. Those who are

overeducated, on the other hand, may worry why they have not risen further. Both groups are thought to be attracted to the Right because




the Right is the one organized and visible segment of society that is most radical in attacking the established political and social power structures within the system, while at the same time afflrming the importance of individualism and the legitimacy of hoarding one's money for oneself.27

Table 2 presents the data on status location and anxiety of the supporters of the Crusade and other whites. The Crusaders closely resembled the rest of the population on education, occupation and income. They were significantly more likely than other whites to display two types of status inconsistency, however ? education higher than occupational prestige and education higher than income.28 Other whites were more likely to display other forms of status

inconsistency, however, so that the supporters ofthe Crusade were actually less

likely than other whites to exhibit any one of the possible pairs of inconsistent status locators. Moreover, the supporters ofthe Crusade were also slightly more satisfied than other whites with their personal economic position, and more

optimistic concerning their future economic prospects. Conversely, the supporters ofthe Crusade were slightly more likely than other

whites to report a good deal of interest in social class, and were somewhat less

likely than other whites to feel close to their own class. This concern for their social status and disassociation with their current social class may indicate some status anxiety. They were also more likely to exaggerate their class status: among those whites in the bottom third in education, occupation and income, the

supporters of the Crusade were significantly more likely than other whites to

identify themselves middle class. There is mixed support in these data for a status explanation for support of

the Crusade. Although the supporters were more concerned with matters of social class, and more likely to overstate their actual status, they were also confident of their economic future. Moreover, the type of status inconsistency they displayed, more education than occupational prestige or income, does not fit well with the status theory, which stresses the disruptive effects of status

shakeups in which older economic groups are displaced by younger, better educated workers.

Religious Explanations

Support for the Right has also been linked to certain religious predispositions. In particular, evangelical Christianity, particularly the fundamentalist wing, has been associated with support for right-wing causes, both secular and religious.29 Support for Christian Right groups, then, seems likely to be associated with

membership in evangelical and fundamentalist denominations, frequent church

attendence, and belief in the inspiration of the Bible. Table 2 presents data on the religious orientations and behaviors of the

supporters of the Crusade. The supporters were more likely to be found among those who attend evangelical and fundamentalist denominations, and were more

likely to believe that the Bible is the inerrant word of God. In addition, they were more likely to attend churches in which electoral politics were often part of the sermon. They were no more likely than other whites to attend church

frequently, however.



POPULAR BACKING 125

What is surprising about the data in this table is the weakness of the observed

relationships. While religion clearly was part of the appeal of the Crusade, a sizable portion of the supporters attended church on an infrequent basis, felt that the Bible is not the inspired word of God, and were not associated with

evangelical denominations. Unlike the contemporary New Christian Right,30 then, the Crusade attracted a sizable secular component.

Political Explanations

Some explanations of support for the Right focus on political variables. Several scholars have noted the strong relationship between Republican identification and support for the Right.31 Republican identification has been found to be

strongly related to support for the Moral Majority.32 In addition to partisanship, supporters of the Right are usually assumed to

be conservative in their political attitudes. Rational supporters of the Right are

thought to be attracted by the agenda of these organizations, which is usually conservative on all issues.33

Table 3 presents the political characteristics and beliefs of the supporters of the Crusade. Although there is a mild relationship between support for the Crusade and Republican identification, this relationship is markedly smaller than the reported relationship for other groups. The explanation for this weak

relationship lies in the joint political and religious appeal ofthe Crusade. Those Crusaders who belonged to evangelical denominations, attended church regularly and accepted the infallibility of the scriptures tended to identify with the Democratic party, while their more secular counterparts were more heavily Republican. Even among the secular group, however, the relationship between

party and support was somewhat weaker than expected.

Percentage Republican and mean scores for each group. * indicates Crusaders significantly different from other whites.

Personality Explanations

Strongminded Scale Distrust People Scale Nostalgia Scale




Alienation Explanations

Mean values for each scale for each group. * indicates that the Crusaders are significantly different from other Whites.

The Crusade supporters were more conservative than the rest of the white

population on almost all issues in the survey. This relationship was particularly strong on medicare, school prayer, federal government power. Somewhat

surprisingly, the supporters of the Crusade were more likely than other whites to favor foreign aid, but not significantly different from the white population in attitudes towards negotiations with the Communists.

Personality explanations

One set of explanations for support for right-wing groups popular with scholars in the 1960's centered on personality variables. These explanations argued that

supporters of the Right were predisposed towards this support by some inner

personality defects: authoritarianism, dogmatism, strong mindedness, unnaturally strong nostalgia, and lack of trust in people.34 In contrast to the explanations discussed above, these theories posited that support for the Right was not a rational act of a certain subset of American citizens, but a deeply irrational act

by flawed personalities. The 1964 ANES survey contained several items which enable researchers to

measure some of these personality traits. Scales were computed to measure

strongmindedness, cynicism, and nostalgia.35 The data in table 3 summarize the

findings. There is mixed support for a personality explanation. Supporters of the Crusade were significantly more strongminded than other whites, but they were also less heavily nostalgic, and only slightly less trusting of others than the rest of the white population.

Alienation

Another explanation which views support for the Right as an abberation centers on the alienation of large numbers of individuals from mass society.36 Our modern, mass society is thought to create a large number of disconnected individuals without ties to organized groups or organizations. These individuals feel powerless in dealing with the problems of their lives. Conover and Gray



POPULAR BACKING 127

summarized the alienation hypothesis by noting that "without such organizational involvement in their lives, people are thought to grow restless and alienated... Such individuals are 'easy prey' for right-wing groups."37

Table 3 presents data relevant to the alienation hypothesis. The supporters of the Crusade did feel that government was less responsive than did other whites, and were more cynical about government officials, but these relationships are weak and not statistically significant. Moreover, there is little evidence that the

supporters of the Crusade felt powerless toward government. The supporters expressed only slightly lower levels of political efficacy than did other whites.

The supporters did not behave in the political arena like alientated, isolated individuals. They were more likely than other whites to have been highly involved in following the 1964 campaign, and were more politically active than other whites. The alienation hypothesis, then, does not find support in this data.

Symbolic Politics

A final explanation for support for the Right in America centers on symbolic politics. This explanation bears some resemblance to the status explanation discussed above. Gusfield first used this explanation to account for support for the temperance movement.38 He suggested that a status group could be thought of as a group which shares a common lifestyle or set of values and beliefs. When this status group becomes aware that its lifestyle or values are accorded decreasing social status, they become mobilized to enlist government to protect the prestige of the group or its lifestyle.39 In the cases of the Crusade, the supporters may have assumed that their conservative cultural values were under attack from the Eastern elite.40

The issues of a symbolic campaign are those which serve to highlight the differences in lifestyle between the status group and other groups in society. Those who are involved in a symbolic crusade are thought to perceive the social group universe in terms of groups friendly to their values and those which are hostile. The symbolic politics finally manifests itself in different affect towards different sets of social groups. If the supporters ofthe Crusade are motivated by symbolic politics, they should see the political group universe in terms of allies and enemies.

They should feel differently towards different sets of political and social groups than the rest of the white population.

Following the methodology of Conover and Gray,41 the "feeling thermometer" items for other social groups were factor analyzed. The analysis resulted in 5 factors. Affect toward those groups which loaded on a factor at .5 or greater were summed to form a scale. The first factor represented those groups which are usually associated with the older values of the Christian Right - farmers, southerners, the military and Protestants. I will refer to these groups as the Old Order. The second factor was composed of groups of the Left ? liberals, Democrats, labor unions, the Americans for Democratic Action, and negative loadings for conservatives, Republicans and the John Birch Society. The third factor represented eastern interests which are often roundly criticized by populists - easterners, big business, Catholics and Jews. I will refer to these groups as the East. The fourth factor was composed of mainstream groups representing Blacks - NAACP, CORE, and Blacks. The fifth factor included groups ofthe




radical right and left ? the Ku Klux Klan, Black Muslims and the American Communist Party.

Table 3 presents the scores ofthe supporters ofthe Crusade and other whites.

Surprisingly, the supporters of the Crusade did not differ significantly from other whites in their evaluation ofthe Old Order, or ofthe Eastern groups or Blacks.

They were significantly more cool, however, towards the Left groups, and towards the Radical groups. Among the individual groups, the Crusade supporters were

significantly cooler towards liberals, labor unions, and the Communist Party, and significantly warmer toward the John Birch Society.

The data in Table 3 do not strongly support a symbolic politics explanation of support for the Crusade. The two clusters of groups which most clearly fit such a theory are the Old Order and the East. If the Crusade had been a reaction

by those whose conservative cultural values were being attacked by the Eastern

elite, affect towards these two sets of groups should have been sharply affected.

Instead, the only real differences in group affect seem to reflect a rational assessment of the political world.

Explaining Support for the Crusade: A Multivariate Account

We have seen that some of the explanations offered by social scientists to account for support for the Right fit the supporters of the Crusade better than others. To assess the comparative power of the various explanations, however, multivariate analysis is needed. Table 4 presents the results of this analysis.

The only significant predictors of support for the Crusade are party identification, denominational affiliation, affect towards the Communist Party, attitudes towards the federal government, and education. Some other variables were nearly significant: region, attitudes towards the Bible, attendence at a church

at which electoral issues were discussed from the pulpit.

TABLE 4 Multivariate Logit Results: Explaining Support

Region .3@ Moved Recently .0002 Education > Income .000 Education >

Occupation .000 Status Anxiety .11 Education .01* Occupation - .002 Income - .005 Fundamentalist Denom. .41* Bible Inerrant Word .27@ Republican Partisanship .16* Federal Gov't Power .10* Medicare .04 School Prayer Strongmindedness .002 Cynicism .02 Government Unresponsive .02 Affect towards Left -.007 Affect Communists -.03*

Multivariate Logit Coefficients. * indicates coefficient significant at .05. @ indicates significant at .1.



POPULAR BACKING 129

The picture which emerges from the multivariate analysis is one of rationality. Support for the Crusade did not come from personality disorders, status anxiety, or alienation. It came instead from conservative Republicans who attended fundamentalist churches where politics was discussed, who believed in the

inerrancy of the Scriptures, and strongly disliked Communists.

Conclusions

The Old Christian Right rose from the same roots as the Christian Right of the 1920's. Both movements were spawned during the enthusiasm of fundamentalist religious activity which had begun with a more purely religious focus and then spread to political concerns. Both were headed by charismatic

preachers who represented the separatist wing ofthe fundamentalist movement. Both embraced anti-communism, which found fertile soil in the minds of fundamentalists predisposed by doctrine to associate the Soviet Union with the forces ofthe anti-Christ. Both included in their agenda other issues, all of which

symbolized the modernization of society. The Christian Right ofthe 1950's achieved a degree of visibility with the crusade

of Senator McCarthy, and had another rise to prominence with the campaign of Barry Goldwater. With the Goldwater campaign, the separatist impulse was violated and the groups worked closely with other, more secular segments of the American Right. After the defeat of Goldwater, these groups faded from view.

There is continuity also between the Crusade and the Christian Right in the 1980's. Support for the Crusade came from conservative Republicans from fundamentalist denominations. Recent studies of the basis of popular support for the Moral Majority suggests that ideology, partisanship and fundamentalism are the most important determinants of support for the New Christian Right as well. In addition, the anti-communism of the Crusade is still quite evident

among the activists ofthe Moral Majority. Previous research has suggested that the activists in the Moral Majority are just as likely as the activists in the Crusade to believe that communists have penetrated the federal government and American colleges and universities.42 Like the Christian Right ofthe 1920's, the

supporters of the Moral Majority oppose the teaching of evolution in the schools.43 Finally, like the Christian Right of the 1920's and the 1950's, the Moral Majority has included in its agenda issues a set of social issues which continue the tradition of opposition to modernism.

The Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, then, arose from the same traditions and impulses as the Christian Right of the 1920s, and was supported by the same basic constituency which supports the New Christian Right in the 1980s.

Understanding the sources of support for the Crusade enriches our understanding of the sources of the Christian Right in earlier and later periods.

Union College Clyde Wilcox

Schenectady, NY 12308




FOOTNOTES

I would like to thank Elizabeth Cook, three anonymous reviewers and the editor for helpful comments. The data for this study were made available by the inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

1. Emmett Buell Jr. and Lee Sigelman, "An Army that Meets Every Sunday? Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980," Social Science Quarterly (1985): 424-434; Clyde Wilcox, "Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980: A Second Look," Social Science Quarterly (1987): forthcoming.

2. Anson Shupe and William Stacey, "The Moral Majority Constituency" in R. Liebman and R. Wuthnow, (eds.) The New Christian Right (New York, 1987), Joseph Tamney and Stephen Johnson, "The Moral Majority in Middletown," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 22 (2) (1983): 145457; Jeffry Will and Rhys Williams, "Political Ideology and Political Action in the New Christian Right," Sociological Analysis 47 (2) (1986): 160-168.

3. Clyde Wilcox, "Evangelicals and Fundamentalists in the New Christian Right: Religious Differences in the Ohio Moral Majority" Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 25 (3) (1986): 355-363; Clyde Wilcox, "Religious Attitudes and Anti-Feminism: An Analysis of the Ohio Moral Majority," Women & Politics 7 (2) (1987): forthcoming; Clyde Wilcox, "Religious Orientations and Political Attitudes: Variations within the New Christian Right," American Politics Quarterly (1987): forthcoming.

4. Clyde Wilcox, "Political Action Cornmittees of the New Christian Right: A Longitudinal Analysis" Unpublished manuscript.

5. Ronald Stockton, "The Falwell Core: A Public Opinion Analysis," presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. Chicago (1984); Milton Yinger and Stephen Cutler, "The Moral Majority Viewed Sociologically." Sociological Focus 15 (4) (1982): 289-306.

6. Robert Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority" in R. Liebman and R. Wuthnow, op. cit; James Guth, "The Politics of the Christian Right" in A. Cigler and B. Loomis, (eds.) Interest Group Politics (1st Edition) (Washington, DC. 1983).

7. Norman Furniss, The Fundamentalist Controversy, 19184931 (New Haven, 1959).

8. Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason (Chicago, 1978); John Redeknop, The American Far Right: A Case Study ofBilly James Hargis (Grand Rapids, MI, 1967); Erling Jorstad, The Politics of Doomsday (New York, 1970).

9. Raymond Wolfinger, Barbara Wolfinger, Kenneth Prewitt and Sheilah Rosenhack, "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology" in D. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (New York, 1964); Sheilah Koeppen, "The Radical Right and the Politics of Consensus" in R. Schoenberger, (ed.) The American Right Wing (New York, 1969); Clyde Wilcox, "America's Radical Right Revisited: A Comparison of the Activists in the Christian Right in Two Decades," Sociological Analysis (1987): forthcoming.

10. Furniss, op. cit.

11. George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980) (New York, 1980), p. 209.

12. Gary Clabaugh, Thunder on the Right: The Protestant Fundamentalists (Chicago, 1974).

13. Jorstad, op. cit.



POPULAR BACKING 131

14. Clabaugh, op. cit.

15. Jorstad, op. cit.

16. Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.

17. Clabaugh, op. cit.

18. James McEvoy, Radicals or Conservatives: The Contemporary American Right (Chicago). McEvoy uses unrecoded feeling therometers to measure support for the Crusade. For an account of methodological problems with this method, see Wilcox, "Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980: A Second Look." op. cit.

19. The groups included in the survey were farmers, liberals, Southerners, Catholics, big business, Democrats, the military, Jews, Whites, Labor Union members, Republicans, Easterners, Protestants, Negroes, conservatives, the NAACP, the ADA, Ku Klux Klan members, CORE members, Black Muslims, the John Birch Society adherents, and members of the U.S. Communist Party.

20. Wilcox, "Popular Support.. .", op. cit.; Lee Sigelman, Clyde Wilcox and Emmett Buell, Jr., "An Unchanged Minority: Popular Support for the Moral Majority in 1980 and 1984." Presented at the annual meeting ofthe Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Washington, DC. (1986).

21. Shupe and Stacey, op. cit.; Buell and Sigelman, op. cit.; Wilcox, "Popular Support...", op. cit.

22. Lipset and Raab, op. cit.

23. McEvoy, op. cit.; Lipset and Raab, op. cit.

24. Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; Wolfinger, et al., op cit; Fred Grupp, "The Political Perspectives of Birch Society Members." (1969) in Schoenberger, op. cit.; Scott McNall, "Social Disorganization and Availability: Accounting for Radical Rightism." (1969) in Schoenberger, op. cit.

25. McNall, op. cit.

26. Martin Trow, Right Wing Radicalism and Political Intolerance, Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, (1967); Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Gary Rush, "Status Consistency and Right Wing Extremism." American Sociological Review (32) (1967): 86-92; Ira Rohter, The Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study, Doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967.

27. McEvoy, p. 38.

28. Status inconsistency was operationalized by dividing all whites into three roughly equal thirds on education, occupational prestige, and income. Those with scores in the highest third on one measure and the lowest on another were considered inconsistent.

29. Lipset and Raab, op. cit.; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; McEvoy, op. cit.

30. Wilcox, "America's Radical Right Revistied. .." op. cit. Wilcox found that the activists in the Crusade included a sizable secular force, while activists in the Moral Majority almost exclusively demonstrated high levels of religiosity.

31. Nelson Polsby, "Towards an Explanation of McCarthyism." Political Studies 8 (1963): 250-271; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Grupp, op. cit.; Rohter, op. cit.




32. Sigelman, Wilcox and Buell, op. cit.; Wilcox, "Popular Support. . ." op. cit.

33. McEvoy, op. cit.; Lipset and Raab, op. cit.

34. T. Adorno, W Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson and R. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York, 1950); Polsby, op. cit.; Wolfinger, et al., op. cit.; Rohter, op. cit.; Alan Elms, "Psychological Factors in Right-Wing Extremism," in Schoenberger, op. cit.; Mark Chesler and Richard Schmuck, "Social Psychological Characteristics of Super-Patriots," (1969) in Schoenberger, op. cit.; McEvoy, op. cit.

35. Items on strongmindedness asked respondents whether they usually won arguments, whether they had strong opinions, and whether it was difficult to change their mind. The nostalgia scale was composed of items which asked whether life was better 50 years ago, whether people are more satisfied today, and whether it is harder to be moral today. Trust in people was measured by items asking whether most people can be trusted, whether most people are helpful or selfish, and whether people are basically altruistic. The validity of each scale was verified by factor analysis.

36. Rohter, op. cit.; Wolfinger, et al, op. cit.; Pamela Conover and Virginia Gray, "Political Activists and the Conflict over Abortion and the ERA." Presented at the annual meeting ofthe Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, (1981); Gilbert Abcarian and Sherman Stanach, "Alienation and the Radical Right." Journal of Politics 27 (4) (1965): 776-796.

37. Conover and Gray, p. 14.

38. Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana).

39. Corwin Smidt, "The Mobilization of Evangelical Voters in 1980: An Initial Test of Several Hypotheses." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago (1983); Conover and Gray, op. cit. In addition, Kristin Luker suggests that some of the energy of the anti-abortion activists comes from the notion that their lifestyle is devalued by feminism. See Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Los Angeles, 1984).

40. Attitudes toward the Eastern elite have proved to be important in understanding support for the populist segments ofthe Right. See Lipset and Raab (op. cit.) for an historical account of populist right-wing movements.

41. Conover and Gray, op. cit.

42. Wilcox, "America's Radical Right Revisited. . ." op. cit.

43. Shupe and Stacey, op. cit.



popular backing for the old christian right: explaining support for the christian anti-communism...

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