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POST – FUKUSHIMA IMPROVEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY PLAN FOR THE TIHANGE AND DOEL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN BELGIUM – FOCUS ON THE RADIOLOGICAL ASPECT -

Brussels – 9-10 April 2013

Benoit Lance, Katja Cauwenbergh, Els Thoelen, Sébastien Bontemps

1

International Symposium 50th anniversary Belgian Association for Radiological Protection (BVS-ABR)

AGENDA

9 April 2013 50 y ABR-BVS 2

• Belgian stress tests overview

• Improvements in EPP

• Focus on radiological aspect

AGENDA





EBL NPP FLEET


NPP P (MWe) Year Cycle length Supplier

Doel 1 390 1975 12 m Westinghouse

Doel 2 390 1975 12 m Westinghouse

Doel 3 1000 1983 12 m Framatome

Doel 4 985 1985 12 18 m Westinghouse

Tihange 1 960 1975 18 m ACEC

Tihange 2 960 1983 18 m Framatome

Tihange 3 1000 1985 18 m Westinghouse

TIMING

Milestones

50 y ABR-BVS 5

April 21 2011 WENRA Stress Test specifications

October 31 2011 Final Report delivered at FANC

Dec 31 2011 Final Report verified by FANC

January – April 2012 Peer Reviews

June 30 2012 Consolidated Report to the European Council

March 11 2011 Accident @ Fukushima

2013 – 14 - 15 Action plan

9 April 2013

SCOPE OF BELGIAN STRESS TESTS

Stress tests specifications

50 y ABR-BVS 6

Issues highlighted by events in Fukushima, combination of initiating events Initiating events conceivable at the plant site

Earthquake Flooding Other extreme natural conditions (tornado, rain, snow,…) Man-made hazards (airplane crash, cyber attack, gas explosion, toxic

gases ,explosive gases)

Consequential loss of safety functions

Loss of electrical power, including Station Black Out (SBO)

Loss of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

Combination of the two

(Severe) Accident management issues and Emergency Preparedness

9 April 2013

RESULTS : MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS

50 y ABR-BVS 7

Subject Major improvements

Earthquake Enhancement of some structures, systems and components (SSC’s) (e.g. pipings)

Flooding Peripheral protection around site of Tihange

Electric Power Alternative electric power supply by additional equipement , connections, cables, breakers

Water Supply Alternative water supply by additional equipement and hydraulic connections

Severe Accident Management

Filtered Containment Vents

Emergency Planning

Details hereafter

9 April 2013

50 y ABR-BVS 8 9 April 2013

INITIATING EVENT « FLOODING » @ TIHANGE (1)

50 y ABR-BVS 9 9 April 2013

INITIATING EVENT « FLOODING » @ TIHANGE (2)

10 50 y ABR-BVS

NON CONVENTIONAL MEANS (1)

9 April 2013

Non conventional means to avoid cliff edge effects:

− Alternative 380V means to source batteries, pumps, compressors ,valves

− Mobile pumps and fire hoses connected to available water sources

NON CONVENTIONAL MEANS (2)


AGENDA





EPP DIMENSIONING

9 April 2013 13

One site affected by Complete Station Black-Out (CSBO) followed immediately by a beyond design earthquake

• Significant radiological releases (cfr. NUREG-0654) from at least 1 unit:

It means: personnel need to wear radiation protection equipment

• Radiological contamination beyond 10 km around the site:

It means: activation of “Rear Base” (fixed or mobile)

• Induced damage to infrastructure at & around the site

• Normal communication means lost at & around the site

Envelope scenario:

* Nureg-0654: Criteria for preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of NPPs 50 y ABR-BVS

MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS FOR EPP

50 y ABR-BVS 14

Subject Major improvements

Organization Development of a new mode “High” : Enhanced emergency organization for multi-unit accident

Communication means Additional communication means – enhanced use of satellite communications

Logistics • Nuclear Logistic Support Cell (NLSC) to be created at Corporate level • Mobile truck “rear base”

Infrastructure Building of a new on-site crisis center @ Tihange

Work @ contaminated site

Details hereafter

Calculation for radioactive releases

Details hereafter

9 April 2013

9 April 2013 15

t0 tH+ 24h t0+ 72h

As dimensioning assumption, the site must have the necessary material to be autonomous up to t0+ 72h

Extended fleet assistance is provided (NLSC), that will be operational at the latest 24 hours after activation of the mode HIGH

It is assumed that it must be possible to reach the site with heavy equipments and large fuel supply for diesel operated engines, as well as needed manpower.

tH

t0 Extreme external event

tH Activation of mode HIGH

TIME LINE IN MODE HIGH

50 y ABR-BVS

FACILITIES AND SUPPORT

16 9 April 2013

Doel

CARA

SCALDIS Puyenbroeck

NLSC mobile

réserve

CMCPB

NLSC Corporate

Marche-en-Famenne

réserve

KHG: German Logistic Support Company

National check point for evacuees

50 y ABR-BVS

Tihange

RADIOLOGICAL ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED


• Knowledge of the radiological situation

Calculation of radioactive releases

In-situ measurements (on-site, off-site)

• Management of work on a contaminated site

Access to the contaminated site at short term (<< 24 h)

Evacuation from the contaminated site in case of prompt radioactive releases (< 24 h)

Organization of interventions from the rear base (“J Village” @ Fukushima, > 72h)

• Availability of RP equipment

measuring equipment

protective equipment

• Management of contamination

• Management of large volumes of radioactive liquid effluents

CALCULATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES


• Upgrade of the code for atmospheric radioactive releases

Multi-unit releases

Long duration of releases (> 24 h)

Longer range for releases

Use of different meteo data

Etc.

IN-SITU MEASUREMENTS (1)


• Dose rate measurements @ muster rooms

• Extensive RP material available @ site

• On-site passive dose rate measurement (tracers, TLD), operated by Electrabel

• On-line access to the TELERAD network, operated by FANC

IN-SITU MEASUREMENTS (2)


• Use of existing intervention vehicles

Pre-determined GPS measurements coordinates

(2 vehicles @ CNT, 3 @ KCD)

Equipped for dose rate, surface and air contamination measurements (NaI spectro)

• Additional measures currently investigated

ACCESS TO THE CONTAMINATED SITE AT SHORT TERM


• Scenario outside of working hours

• Personnel

On-call engineers have to reach the on-site emergency centers, as fast as possible

Additional technicians may be needed

• Foresee adequate set of RP protective and measuring equipments

• Storage of equipments @ off-site locations

EVACUATION FROM THE CONTAMINATED SITE


• 800 to 1600 persons during open hours

• Attempt to evacuate the non-needed personnel before the beginning of releases

• But if not possible, several issues to be addressed :

Appropriate quantity of protective clothes

Clear radiological criteria

Exhaustive list of needed / non-needed personnel

Prioritization of the personnel to be evacuated

Several escape ways

Counting

Contamination of personal vehicles

…

ORGANIZATION OF INTERVENTION FROM REAR BASE (1)


• @ Tihange : fall back base for the contaminated personnel and preparation of intervention on a contaminated site (Centre Accueil et Repli de la centrale des Awirs)

ORGANIZATION OF INTERVENTION FROM REAR BASE (2)


• Support contract with transport company TRANSNUBEL

• NLSC truck “rear base”

• Determine various locations to set up the rear base

Preferred locations @ GDF-SUEZ sites

• Determine list of material (cloakroom containers)

• Support from KHG (Germany) Infrastructure Group for Transportation, Communication, Power supply

Radiation Protection Group for Measurement and Protection

Decontamination Group for mobile Decontamination

Remote Handling Group for access to areas with high dose rate

• Medical support

INFRASTRUCTURE - FULLY AUTONOMOUS 9 April 2013 26 50 y ABR-BVS

RADIATION PROTECTION AND DECONTAMINATION 9 April 2013 27 50 y ABR-BVS

MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATION (1)


• Time graded approach

Wait for end of releases

Fixing external contamination (reduce resuspension hazard and reduce environmental contamination)

Shielding (hot spots)

>> 72 h : begin decontamination with adapted strategies

o Internal / external structures

o Concrete structures, pathways, grass, soil

• Set up a database of decontamination products : Product characteristics (which product for which support)

Location of supplier, supply delay

Availability of product, quantity

MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATION (2)


With a crawler dump truck (since 26/4)

With pumping trucks on turbine and reactor buildings (since 28/5)

MANAGEMENT OF LARGE VOLUMES OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENTS (1)


• Lessons learnt from Fukushima : huge volumes of contaminated water to be pumped from the flooded buildings

• Take into account the ACTIFLORAD (AREVA) project

Determine the main characteristics / constraints of a contaminated water treatment facility

MANAGEMENT OF LARGE VOLUMES OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENTS (2)


• Storage of solid radio-waste also to be considered

Analyse types of waste

Volumes

Pre-determine storage locations

TO SUM UP


• Stress tests for the Electrabel NPP’s outcome with an on-going action plan (short and medium terms)

• Emergency Plan and Preparedness (EPP) is one safety aspect considered

• Enhancement of the means in case of contaminated site is part of the action plan

• 2 main aspects addressed :

Availability of RP equipment (hardware)

Crisis management on the contaminated site (organization)

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