power of eminent domain.docx

7/28/2019 Power of Eminent Domain.docx

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Power of Eminent Domain

Sec 19, LGC

Essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the

power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the

landless.3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was

not accepted.

LGU may immediately take possession of the property1. upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and2. upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based

on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. The amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall bedetermined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Rule 67 Expropriation, Rules of Court

The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall1. state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation,2. describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and3. join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as

practicable, the separate interest of each defendant.

the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved1. at any time after the filing of a verified complaint and2. after due notice to the defendant,3. deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of

taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof thecourt authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demandto the authorized government depositary. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer toforthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with serviceof copies to the parties.

IRR of LGC- RULE VI, Eminent Domain

Public Use, Purpose, or Welfare. The following shall, among others, be considered as public use, purpose, or welfare:

(a) Socialized housing;(b) Construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks, viaducts, bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, or piers;(c) Construction or improvement of public buildings;(d) Establishment of parks, playgrounds, or plazas;(e) Establishment of market places;(f) Construction of artesian wells or water supply systems;(g) Establishment of cemeteries or crematories;(h) Establishment of drainage systems, cesspools, or sewerage systems;(i) Construction of irrigation canals or dams;(j) Establishment of nurseries, health centers, or hospitals;(k) Establishment of abattoirs; and

(l) Building of research, breeding, or dispersal centers for animals.

Prerequisites. In acquiring private property for public use or purpose, LGU shall

1. first establish the suitability of the property to be acquired for the use intended,2. then proceed to obtain from the proper authorities the necessary locational clearance and other requirements imposed under existinglaws, rules and regulations.

ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale.(a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, thereasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shallcall them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance

committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in theconference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:

(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the termsand conditions to be embodied in the contract;(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spentfor any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved.

Reclassification of Lands

Sec 9 and 11, RA 8435


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SECTION 9. Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones. - The Department, in consultation with the Departmentof Agrarian Reform, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Scienceand Technology, the concerned LGUs, the organized farmers and fisherfolk groups, the private sector and communities shall, withoutprejudice to the development of identified economic zones and free ports, establish and delineate, based on sound resource accounting,the SAFDZ within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act.

All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, and lands with existing or havingthe potential for growing high-value crops so delineated and included within the SAFDZ shall not be converted for a period of five (5) yearsfrom the effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That not more than five percent (5%) of the said lands located within the SAFDZ maybe converted upon compliance with existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and administrative orders relating toland use conversion: Provided, further,

That thereafter:1) a review of the SAFDZ, specifically on the productivity of the areas, improvement of the quality of life of farmers and fisherfolk, andefficiency and effectiveness of the support services shall be conducted by the Department and the Department of Agrarian Reform, incoordination with the Congressional Oversight Committee on Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization;2) conversion may be allowed; if at all, on a case-to-case basis subject to existing laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances,and administrative orders governing land use conversion; and,3) in case of conversion, the land owner will pay the Department the amount equivalent to the government's investment cost includinginflation.

SECTION 10. Preparation of Land Use and Zoning Ordinance. - Within one (1) year from the finalization of the SAFDZ, in every city andmunicipality, all cities and municipalities shall have prepared their respective land use and zoning ordinance incorporating the SAFDZ,where applicable. Thereafter, all land use plans and zoning ordinances shall be updated every four (4) years or as often as may be deemednecessary upon the recommendation of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and must be completed within the first year of theterm of the mayor. If the cities/municipalities fail to comply with the preparation of zoning and land use plans, the DILG shall impose the

penalty as provided for under Republic Act No. 7160.

SECTION 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. - Any person or juridical entity who knowingly or deliberatelycauses any irrigated agricultural lands seven (7) hectares or larger, whether contiguous or not, within the protected areas for agriculturaldevelopment, as specified under Section 6 in relation to Section 9 of this Act, to lie idle and unproductive for a period exceeding one (1)year, unless due to force majeure, shall be subject to an idle land tax of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) per hectare per year. Inaddition, the violator shall be required to put back such lands to productive agricultural use. Should the continued agricultural inactivity,unless due to force majeure, exceed a period of two (2) years, the land shall be subject to escheat proceedings.

Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fineequivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessorypenalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an administrative proceedings, that violation of this law hasbeen committed:a) Cancellation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and

b) Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion applications that they may file with the DAR.

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF

SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C.CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.

Hunger strike was staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of DAR, protesting the approved the conversion of (144)-hectareland from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area.

This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so- called Win-WinResolution[2]on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it hadalready become final and

executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44)hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

What is the legal effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subjectmatter, which had already become final and executory?

The antecedent facts:

1. 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management andDevelopment Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners

2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in thecertificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.

3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, DAR placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and

assessed the land value at P2.38 million.[4]

4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), a

writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject landuntil further orders.[5]

5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing theLand Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the justcompensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce theDARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on thevaluation of the subject property.

6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and LandBank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum,dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to return the claimfolder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders.[6]

7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
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8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed ResolutionNo. 6,[8]dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zoneswhere the subject property is situated.

9. Pursuant to Section 20 of LGC, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providingan opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.

Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of five percent (5%) of their agriculturalland area and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, theinstant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-IndustrialDevelopment Association).

Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by itsCommittee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinancenow docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to have thefollowing components:

1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute forLivelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and MindanaoSports Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products; rice processing forwine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruitproducts such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system;commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover33 hectares; and

4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project covering an area

of 20 hectares.The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, BukidnonProvincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council ofBukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued anEnvironmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office ofthe President Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S.Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as long as the development cost of theirrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente IrrigatorsMulti Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question asit will provide more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment opportunitiesthat will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 withDirector Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind

their respective officials in endorsing the project.Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking itspowers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for theconversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARPand directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54,Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was fi led on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied (in an Orderdated June 7, 1995).[9]

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the

property.[10]

11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed[11]the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the

conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition

for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction,[12]docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an

evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum [13]to the President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation thatthe DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land.

14. Also, in a memorandum[14]to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of theDepartment of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional usewith a request that the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question.

15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution [15]ordering the parties to observestatus quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General,manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants and has

agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]

16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP

Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find thatthe instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land inquestion from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the areatowards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are noteven tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mentionthat, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru theproperty (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instantpetition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.

On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawalor lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out
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that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after theexpiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR RegionalOffice and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitionersland.

On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already contributed substantially to the land reformprogram of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearbyMunicipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just compensation up to this time.

Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as, inthe first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeatthe very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply,

the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legalmandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural landsand provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliantcommunities.

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the favorable recommendations of the variousgovernment agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of AgrarianReform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.[17]

17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of Education,

Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land toDECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over the subjectproperty was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, withPreliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the

DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the nameof the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264[19]of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995,DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536[20]of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint[21]with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9),docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTCthen issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997[22]and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,[23]restraining theDAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.

20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24]was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion forreconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.

21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers before

the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the

injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City

to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDCproperty filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decisionallowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]

24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the framework ofthe law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into thecontroversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem.[26]

25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolutionpenned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-four (44) hectareportion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be suitable foragriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in the portion fronting thehighway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed to immediately conductthe segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the identifiedfarmer-beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously determine who among theclaimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just compensation to NQSRMDCfor the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC forCARP coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department of Agrarian Reform in theimplementation of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits

thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.SO ORDERED.[27]

A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao,Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997[28]and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ ofpreliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D.Garilao.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene[29]was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming thatthey are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectareproperty subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30]by the petitioners.

In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issuethe said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/orpolitically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving andmodifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.[31]Thus,

petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
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beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997.[32]They availed of this extraordinary writ ofcertiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[33]They never filed a motion forreconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek areconsideration .[34]

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the followinggrounds:

(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in accordancewith Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the present petition;and

(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion for intervention filed by thealleged farmer-beneficiaries.

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line betweenan error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its

jurisdiction,and which error is reviewable only by an appeal .[35]On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the actcomplained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body withoutor in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretionwhich is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.[36]This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercisingquasi-judicial functions,[38]including the Office of the President,[39]may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petitionfor review[40]within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,[41]whether the appeal involves questionsof fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]

However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petitioncontains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal[43]and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyondhis (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction[44]when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March

29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not anerror of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailedresolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portionof Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1.Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without orin excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, orany plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the propercourt, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.x x x x x x x x x.The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body iswholly void.[45]

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified peti tion (forcertiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolutionsought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer orperson, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed inthe Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its

jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, thepetition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdictionto issue a writ of certiorari,[46]prohibition[47]and mandamus.[48]But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, ifthe challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed withthe Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act oromission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rulesof Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,[49]through now ChiefJustice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand

injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue thewrit, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of

Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity ofBatas Pambansa Bilang129 on August 14, 1981, thelatters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of

jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of thecourt to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue ofappeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becomingregard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against fi rst level (inferior)courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, orthe nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated insubsequent cases, namely:[50]Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51]Torres vs. Arranz,[52]Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53]andAdvincula vs. Legaspi, et.al.[54]As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

x x x.A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special

and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary toprevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedyjustice[55]and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed bypetitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailedresolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petitionfirst with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. Wereiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[56]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigidapplication, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always beavoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higherinterests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been

taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case."
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As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion forreconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when thequestioned resolution is a patent nullity,[57]as will be taken up later.

With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition withpreliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damagesand injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) thepresent petition, constitute forum shopping.

We disagree.The rule is that:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than byappeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation

commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and inanticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in whichthe second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case ofBuan vs.Lopez(145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements oflitis pendentiaare present or where afinal judgment in one case will amount to res judicatain the other, as follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as representthe same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the samefacts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless ofwhich party is successful, amount to res adjudicatain the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, ofauter actionpendant.'[58]

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining whether a partyhas violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicatain the action underconsideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each

other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with thecompulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for theannulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the followinggrounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared nu ll andvoid by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice toNQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of theassailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the previoustwo cases were instituted.

The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which wehave to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, arereal parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of Farmer -Beneficiaries. Apparently, thealleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win -Win Resolution which directs theDAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the saiddocument reveals that movants are those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words, movants are

merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the

party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means apresentsubstantialinterest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.[59]Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is a mereexpectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.

Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, theirmotion for intervention has no leg to stand on.

Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can still be substantially modified bythe Win-Win Resolution.

We rule in the negative.The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order

No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become finalafter the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereofby the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof

is filed within such period.Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.(Emphasis ours)It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory,as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more somodify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion forreconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsiderationis allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in

exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have beenentertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to

administrative determinations.In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60]we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and executory, the samecan no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrativeagencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgmentwithin the purview of the doctrine ofres judicata[Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court ofTax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicatawhich forbids the reopening of a matter once

judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrativeofficers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v.Castro, supraat 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point offinality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.[61]This is a fundamentalprinciple in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle mustalways be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck

down.
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Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attainedfinality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Stree t[62]in a 1918 case,[63]is a lawless thing, whichcan be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.[64]

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office ofthe President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DARREGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS andDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,respondents.

PUNO, J.:This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas bythe government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad andCaylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda Baniladis 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In February 1986, President Aquino issued

Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As head of the provisional government, the President exercised legislativepower "until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution." 1 In the exercise of this legislative power, the Presidentsigned on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program.On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. 2 This Congresspassed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10,1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant tothe provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR inaccordance with the CARL.Hacienda PalicoOn September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent anotice entitled "Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda.Palico." 3 Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of

the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program." 4On October 25, 1989, the MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports after investigation and ocular inspection of the Hacienda. Inthe first Report, the MARO found that 270 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470 were "flat to undulating (0-8%slope)" and actually occupied and cultivated by 34 tillers of sugarcane. 5 In the second Report, the MARO identified as "flat to undulating"approximately 339 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had several actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane; 6 while inthe third Report, the MARO found approximately 75 hectare under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as "flat to undulating" with 33 actualoccupants and tillers also of sugarcane. 7On October 27, 1989, a "Summary Investigation Report" was submitted and signed jointly by the MARO, representatives of the Barangay

Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). TheReport recommended that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at a value of P6,807,622.20. 8 Thefollowing day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and representatives.They recommended that 270.0876 hectares and 75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation ofP8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47, respectively. 9

On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a "Notice of Acquisition" topetitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:

Roxas y Cia, LimitedSoriano Bldg., Plaza CervantesManila, Metro Manila. 10

Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by thegovernment under the CARL; that based on the DAR's valuation criteria, the government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition andDistribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioner's rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conductsummary administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner acceptsrespondent DAR's offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediatepossession of the land. 11

Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separateMemoranda entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each Memoranda requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three

portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value.12

Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agriculturalto non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. 13 On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Directorreiterating its request for conversion of the two haciendas. 14Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trustaccounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. 15 On October 22, 1993, fromthe mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. OnOctober 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. 16Hacienda BaniladOn August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice to petitioner addressed as follows:

Mr. Jaime PimentelHacienda AdministratorHacienda BaniladNasugbu, Batangas 17
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The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that should petitionerwish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing toprovide assistance thereto. 18

On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an "Invitation to Parties" again to Pimentel inviting the latter to attend a conference onSeptember 21, 1989 at the MARO Office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the MARO's investigation over Hacienda Banilad. 19On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO submitted two (2) Reports. In his first Report, he found thatapproximately 709 hectares of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 0237 and 0236 were "flat to undulating (0-8% slope)." On this area werediscovered 162 actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane. 20 In the second Report, it was found that approximately 235 hectares under TaxDeclaration No. 0390 were "flat to undulating," on which were 92 actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane. 21The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the conference were representatives of the prospective farmerbeneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner. 22 After the meeting, on the same day, September 21,

1989, a Summary Investigation Report was submitted jointly by the MARO, representatives of the BARC, LBP, and the PARO. Theyrecommended that after ocular inspection of the property, 234.6498 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 be subject to compulsoryacquisition and distribution by CLOA. 23 The following day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation was submitted by thesame officers. They recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsoryacquisition for distribution. 24On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2) separate "Notices of Acquisition"over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice overHacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:

Roxas y Cia. Limited7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.Makati, Metro Manila. 25

Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498hectares. 26

On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a "Request to Open Trust Account" in

petitioner's name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. 27 A second "Request to Open Trust Account" was sent onNovember 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda. 28On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had beenearmarked as compensation for petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad. 29On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.Hacienda CaylawayHacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The Haciendahas a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665. On January12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions acceptingpetitioner's voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-44663. 30 The Resolutions were addressed to:

Roxas & Company, Inc.7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg.

Aguirre, Legaspi VillageMakati, M. M 31

On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate Memoranda to the LBP Regional Manager requesting for thevaluation of the land under TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-44663. 32 On the same day, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, sent topetitioner a "Notice of Acquisition" over 241.6777 hectares under TCT No. T-44664 and 533.8180 hectares under TCT No. T-44663. 33 Likethe Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was addressed to petitioner at its office in Makati, Metro Manila.Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DARwithdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification ofHacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying forconversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to otheruses. 34In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land would not exempt itfrom agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only bebased on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land isundeveloped. 35Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application for conversion of both

Haciendas Palico and Banilad.36

On July 14, 1993, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw theVOS over Hacienda Caylaway in light of the following:

1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI(BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasibleand economically sound for further agricultural development.2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the Zoning Ordinance reclassifyingareas covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation withgovernment agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public hearings.3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, 1993 approving the ZoningOrdinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal Planning & Development, Coordinatorand Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu,Batangas has no objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural. 37

On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the

cancellation of the CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu,where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that theSangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the propertywas subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform fordetermination. 38On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It questioned the expropriation of its propertiesunder the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO on November 8, 1993.Petitioner's petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28, 1994. 39 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion wasdenied on January 17, 1997 by respondent court. 40Hence, this recourse. Petitioner assigns the fol lowing errors:

A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION ISPREMATURE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN VIEW OF THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE

RESPONDENTS' ACTS, THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY SAID ILLEGAL ACTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PLAIN,


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SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW ALL OF WHICH ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THESAID DOCTRINE.B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS ARESUBJECT TO COVERAGE UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, IN VIEW OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTTHAT PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES BY PRESIDENTIALPROCLAMATION NO. 1520 WHICH DECLARED THE MUNICIPALITY NASUGBU, BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, ANDTHE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU RE-CLASSIFYING CERTAIN PORTIONS OFPETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS AS NON-AGRICULTURAL, BOTH OF WHICH PLACE SAID LANDHOLDINGS OUTSIDE THESCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM, OR AT THE VERY LEAST ENTITLE PETITIONER TO APPLY FOR CONVERSION ASCONCEDED BY RESPONDENT DAR.C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

RESPONDENT DAR VOID FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS BLATANTLYDISREGARDED THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LANDS UNDER R.A. 6657, MORE PARTICULARLY,IN FAILING TO GIVE DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER AND TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC AREAS SOUGHTTO BE ACQUIRED.D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER WASBRAZENLY AND ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THATPETITIONER WAS NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE IT WAS UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF ITSLANDHOLDINGS THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CLOA'S TO ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES, IN VIOLATION OF R.A.6657. 41

The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1) whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner's failureto exhaust administrative remedies; (2) whether the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance withlaw; and (3) assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, whether this court has the power to rule onthis issue.

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

In its first assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that petitioner failed to exhaustadministrative remedies. As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expectedto have exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may beresorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is inestoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when therespondent acted in disregard of due process; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of thePresident, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (8) when there is no otherplain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when strong public interest is involved; (10) when the subject of the controversy is private land;and (11) in quo warrantoproceedings. 42Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust administrativeremedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner's land without

just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary underR.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. 43 Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be

acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of possession and ownership of the landto the government are conditioned upon the receiptby the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of thecompensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. 44 There was no receipt by petitioner of anycompensation for any of the lands acquired by the government.The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or "LBPbonds." 45 Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the Philippines does notconstitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash orLBP bonds did not ipso factocure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack ofdue process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative dueprocess. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the partof the petitioner.

II. The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas.Petitioner's allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of the acquisition proceedings themselves. Before we rule on this matter,however, there is need to lay down the procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law.

A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2) modes of acquisition of private land:compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657, viz:

Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the followingprocedures shall be followed:

a).After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its noticeto acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the samein a conspicuous placein the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property islocated. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance withthe valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provi

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