power to the people - trade unions for energy...

POWER TO THE PEOPLEToward Democratic Control of Electricity Generation

Working Paper No. 4

Table of Contents

Power to the People Toward Democratic Control of Electricity Generation............................................................1

1.TheEnergyEmergencyandtheLimitsofProfit-BasedApproaches..................................3

Lead author: Sean Sweeney

2.EnergyCooperatives.................................................................................................................7

Lead author: Kylie Benton-Connell

3.RemunicipalizationandPublicRenewablePower..............................................................22

Lead author: Lara Skinner

4.PublicGoodsandPublicWorksApproachestoEnergyTransitionandClimateProtection...43


Conclusion....................................................................................................................................55

PublishedbyTradeUnionsforEnergyDemocracy(TUED),incooperationwiththeRosaLuxemburgStiftung—NewYorkOfficeandtheGlobalLaborInstituteatCornellUniversity,June2015

WithsupportfromtheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ).Coverimage:JoãoAndréO.Dias

Disclaimer:Thispaperrepresentstheviewsofitscontributingauthors.Theopinionsexpressedheremayormaynotbeconsistentwith thepoliciesandpositionsofunionsparticipating inTUED.Thepaperisofferedfordiscussionanddebate.

TradeUnionsforEnergyDemocracy(TUED)isaglobal,multi-sectorinitiativetoadvancedemocraticdirectionandcontrolofenergyinawaythatpromotessolutionstotheclimatecrisis,energypoverty,thedegradationofbothlandandpeople,andrespondstotheattacksonworkers’rightsandprotections.

www.energydemocracyinitiative.org

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Power to the PeopleToward Democratic Control of Electricity Generation

The term “energy democracy” is nowpart ofthe trade union discourse on energy and cli-mate change in a way that was not the casejusttwoorthreeyearsago.Agrowingnumberof unions, aswell as regional bodies like theTrade Union Confederation of the Americas,arecallingfordemocraticcontroloverenergy,fora “reclaiming”of theenergysector to thepublicsphereandforajusttransitiontoare-newables-based,lowcarboneconomy.

But the actual and potential content behindthe term energy democracyneedstobefleshedout. This working paper, Power to the People: Towards Democratic Control of Electricity Gen-eration,hasbeenwrittentohelpunionsgetabettergraspof two things:first,what ishap-peningnowand,second,whatcould happen in thefuture.

What emerges from the pages that follow isthat the struggle for democratic control ofpower generation is expressing itself on sev-eral “fronts.” Three fronts are identified anddiscussed here, and these are very much inthe here and now. Energy democracy is be-ingexpressed through thegrowthof cooper-atives,municipal control of certain functionsandoperations,andreformeffortsdirectedatutilities.However there is a fourth front thatexistsmainlyintheformofhistoricalexample,namelythe“publicworks”approachtoenergytransition thatworked so successfully duringthe middle decades of the last century. Thisapproachisalsodiscussedbelow.

It is our view that unions can engage in thisstruggleinamannerthatcouldincreasework-erandcommunitycontroloverelectricalpow-er generation and, potentially, build unions.

But this isnotablueprint foraction,moreofamappingexercise thatcould further informdiscussionacrosstheinternationaltradeunioncommunity.

Expressionsofenergydemocracypresentlyre-mainverymuchonthemarginsoftheglobaleconomyandtheyarealongwayfromdisrupt-ingtheestablishedenergyorder.Butthiscouldchange—especiallyifunionsbecomeseriouslyengaged.

An Independent Trade Union Ap-proach

A more comprehensive framing of the needforenergydemocracy,aswellasthelimitsofexisting market-driven approaches, can befoundinthe2012TUEDdocumenttitledResist, Reclaim, Restructure: Unions and the Struggle for Energy Democracy.1Thepaperexplainswhythepresent direction of the world’s energy sys-temsconstitutesaplanetaryemergency, andexistingpolicyapproachestoenergy,whetherneoliberalordrivenby“resourcenationalism,”will lead to intolerable levelsof globalwarm-ing,pollution,andothersocialandecologicalproblems. It explains why a democratic and“publicgoods”approachtomovingfromfossilfuelstorenewableenergyisurgentlyneeded.

Resist, Reclaim, Restructure ispartofagrowingefforttofurtherdevelopan independent trade union approach to energy transition and cli-mateprotection.Byindependentwemeanin-dependentoftheinterestsofthefor-profitfos-silfuelcompaniesaswellasmarketizedstate-owned or “parastatal” companies. But tradeunions should also be independent of some

TRADE UNIONS FOR ENERGY DEMOCRACYPOWER TO THE PEOPLE

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ofthewell-establishedenvironmentalgroups.Thesegroupsoftensupport“renewableenergybyanymeansnecessary,”anapproachthat,bydefinition,riskspushingworkerandcommuni-tyconcernstothemargins.Manysuchgroupshavefaithinapolicyapproachthat“levelstheplayingfield”bywayofphasingoutsubsidiestofossilfuelssothatrenewableenergycan“com-petefairly”withcoal,oil,andgas.Unionsrecog-nizethattheproblemsposedbytheimmenseeconomicandpoliticalpowerofthefossilfuelcorporations cannot be addressed by trans-ferring comparable power to large, for-profitrenewableenergymultinationals.Unionsalsoknow that an increase in renewables will notautomatically lead to adecrease in fossil fueluseor, for thatmatter, an increase inworkerrightsandprotections.Inshort,thereisnoau-tomaticalignmentbetweenrenewableenergyandworkerrightsandprotections.

Itcouldbearguedthat,giventheenvironmen-talbenefits,anexploitativerenewables-basedsystem is better than an exploitative fos-sil-based system. But this should not be thegroundsonwhichweplanourenergyfuture—aswill bemade clear below. Another energysystem is therefore necessary—one that isdemocratic, equitable, and truly sustainable.But is itpossible?Muchhasbeensaidbyen-vironmentalorganizationsandconcernedsci-entistsabouttherenewableenergy’spotentialtomeettheworld’sneeds,buttherehasbeentoolittlediscussionaboutwhodeterminesordefineswhat those needs are. It is thereforeimportanttochallengeanyscenariothatseesexpandingenergyuseasinevitable.Acompre-hensivetradeunionapproachtoenergytransi-tionshouldbeasconcernedaboutconservingenergyasitshouldbeaboutgeneratingit.

Thepaperconsistsoffourparts.

Part Onereiteratessomeofthemoresalientpoints of Resist, Reclaim, Restructure and up-datesthem.Itwillagainshowhowtheliberal

policy discourse around renewable energycontinues to be seriously flawed. First andforemost,thisliberaldiscoursefrequentlydis-plays unwarranted optimism in the capacityof privatemarkets to deliver a global transi-tion to renewable energy. Its advocates sel-domchallengetheideathatrenewableenergymustplaybytherulesofthemarket—inotherwords, that itmust out-compete fossil-basedpowerifitistobecometheworld’sdominantsourceofenergy.But the speedandscaleofrenewable energy deployment that sciencetells us we need clearly require non-marketand “public goods” approaches, grounded inlocalactions. Part Two examines energy-related coopera-tivesintherenewableenergy(REorrenewables)sector. These are becoming common in theglobalNorth,buttheycanplayaveryimportantroleintheglobalSouthwhere1.3billionpeoplestillhavenoreliableorcleansourceofelectricalpower. This sectionwill examine thepotentialcontributionofrenewablecooperativestoener-gydemocracy,provideabriefoverviewof thesector,andmakereferencetosomeofthepolit-icaldebatesthatsurroundenergycooperatives.Thevarietyofdifferentcooperativetypesislaidoutinordertoprovideunionswithanuancedviewofthisexpandinglandscape.

Part Three looks at the potential to reclaimelectricalpowergenerationbywayofusingpo-liticalauthorityatthemunicipallevel.Itfocuseson efforts to “remunicipalize” electrical powerinnumerousGermancitiesand,increasingly,incitiesaroundtheworld.Thisapproachamountstotakingovergridsandusingpoliticalauthori-tytoprocureelectricityfromrenewableenergysuppliers and thus reclaim an important partoftheenergysystem.PartThreealsolooksatthepotentialofreformingprivatelyownedutili-tiesthemselves—aprocessthatisconnectedtothemunicipalapproachbutalsocarrieswithitdistinctfeaturesandchallenges.Herethegoalis either to “reclaim” the renewables-resistant


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utility in away that canopen thedoor to thedeployment ofmore renewable energy, or tomandatethattheutilitydothesame.

Part Fourlooksatthehistoricalexperienceofpublic works programs in the context of theNewDealintheU.S.and,inparticular,theRuralElectrification Administration (REA)—a mod-el of energy transition and state-cooperativeinteractionandpartnership thatwassuccess-fully replicated in numerous countries duringthepost-WorldWarIIperiod.Inapublicdebatedominatedbyneoliberalassumptionsglorifyingthewondersofprivatemarkets,callsforradical

government-driven interventions remain verymuchonthemargins.Butgiventhatbusinessasusualisnotanoptionandthatincrementalmarket-basedapproachesaregenerallyfailingtodeliverrenewableenergyat thespeedandscale required tomeet science-based targets,nooptioncanberejectedpurelybecauseit isregardedaspolitically impossibleatthispointintime.Thecasefora“RenewableEnergyAd-ministration”(anew,anddifferentREA)inallofthemajorcountriesdeservesseriousconsider-ationinthelightofthecivilizationalchallengesposed by climate change, pollution, and ad-vancingecologicaldegradation.

1. The Energy Emergency and the Limits of Profit-Based Approaches


The TUED paper Resist, Reclaim, Restructure: Unions and the Struggle for Energy Democracy documented how the present direction of theworld’senergysystemsamountstoaprofoundthreattoall livingthings.2The2012paperalsodocumented how the urgently needed transi-tiontoarenewables-basedandlowcarbonen-ergysystemisnothappeningfastenough,anditurgedtradeunionstoadoptanindependentapproach,oneanchored indemocratic controlandsocialownershipofenergyasameans toaddress the multiple features of the presentcrisis.RatherthanrestatealloftheargumentsexpressedinResist, Reclaim, Restructure,there-mainderof thisopening sectionwill consistofsome supplementary points regarding energytrends and the latest climate science, both ofwhichreinforcetheneedforthekindofradicalpolicyshiftwepropose.

Energy Trends

Liberalcommentatorsarefondofremindingusthatwearepresentlywitnessingarapidgrowth

ofrenewables.Onapercentagebasis,renew-able energy is growing quickly. Global windenergyoutputwasup21percent in2013andsolargrewevenfaster,upby33percent.3Inthesameyear,coalusegrewjust3percent.4

In the debates over the future of renewableenergy, there are a growing number of ref-erences towhatmight be termed the “smartphone scenario,” where renewables’ enthusi-astsmaintainthattheeconomicsofrenewableenergyarebecomingirresistiblefor investorsandconsumersalike.Fallingpricesforrenew-able energy technologies could soon—very soon—leadtoaprecipitouscollapseininvest-ments in fossil-based power. The projectionsoftheInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),whichsuggestonlyalimitedgrowthintheproportion of renewables in the global energymix overthenext20years,areoftenbrushedaside. Itisoftenclaimedthat,justasnoonepredictedthe rapid collapse of the old but trusty tele-phonesystemsasaresultoftheintroductionof the cell phone, analysts are failing to seethat centralized fossil-based energy genera-tionwillcrumbleundertheweightof“renew-


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ables populism,” as millions and eventuallybillionschoosetogeneratetheirownelectricalpowerbecauseitisbothcheaper(orsoonwillbe)andcleaner.

Thisisaone-sidedandoverlyoptimisticassess-ment.Therecentgrowthofrenewableenergy,usually measured in “installed capacity,” cre-atesan impressionthat the“decarbonization”oftheworld’senergysupplyisalreadywellun-derway,sotheexistingmixofpoliciesdrivingrenewables must therefore be working. This“steadyasyougo”approachhasnotsufficientlyfactoredineithertheexpansionofenergyuseoverallortheneedtoreduceemissionsdramat-ically in order tomeet science-based targets.Also,inabsoluteterms,thethreepercentannu-al increase incoaluseequaledapproximatelytwomillionbarrelsofoilequivalentperdayofadditionalenergyconsumption.Solarandwindtogethergrewbyabout620,000barrelsofoilequivalentperday in2013.Coalconsumptiontherefore increased more than three times the levelof increaseofsolarandwindenergycombined.Duringthe lastdecade(2003-2013)thegrowthinglobalcoalusewasseventimeslargerthanthecombinedincreaseinwindandsolarconsumption.5

The optimistic assessment of renewables’growthalsofailstoaddressthefactthatfossilfuelinvestmentsareincreasingrapidly,too.Ac-cordingtotheIEA,foreverydollarinvestedinrenewableenergyin2013,morethanfourdol-larswas invested infossil fuels. It istruethatfossil-based (and nuclear) power generationinfrastructureisbecomingoldanddilapidatedinsomeOECDcountriesandasignificantnum-beroftheseplantswillberetiredintheyearsahead.Thereforesomeof today’s investmentinfossilfuelsistosustainexistingcapacitybycompensating for declining production fromexistingoilandgasfieldsandtoreplacepow-erplantsandotherassetsthatreachtheendoftheirproductivelife.6Theamountofinvest-ment committed to replacing existing fossil

fuelinfrastructurewillinevitablygrowinyearsto come.

Buthigh fossil-fuel investment levels also re-flectthefactthatthereisnoshortageofcom-mercially viable coal, oil, or gas today and—with the rise of “unconventional” fuels likeshalegasandtarsandsoil—noseriousshort-age of fossil-based energy anticipated in theforeseeable future. A recent study calculatedthat G20 governments are spending roughly$88billionperyearsubsidizingexplorationforfossil fuels.Totalsubsidies for fossil fuelsarearound$750billionannually.7Intheelectricalpowersector,therearepresentlyaround280gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired generationunderconstructionglobally.8

Duringthepastyear,thetendencytowardsop-timismatallcostshasexpressed itself in thereactions to therecent trends incoaluse.9 In2014thelevelsofcoalusedroppedquitedra-matically (led by China) and this purported“turnfromcoal”sawmorethan320GWofpro-posed coal fired power generation cancelled.Thisaddeduptoa23percentreductioninpro-posednewcapacity—aseriousslump.

However, the 23% reduction needs to beviewedthroughawiderhistoricallens.In1990(the international benchmark for measuringemissions levels and trends) the level of newcoal-fired power generation capacity addedwasaround17GWglobally, although thean-nualaveragearoundthistimewasalittleover20GW.Butfrom2005to2013,approximately722GWofnewcapacitywasaddedtothecoalfleet (and a little under 100GW retired).10 So evenwiththedramaticfallbetween2012and2014,theannuallevelofnewinstalledcapaci-tywasmorethantwicethelevelof1990.Coalstill supplies 75% of China’s electrical power,andcoal-firedgeneration isexpected todou-ble by 2040.11 China is today consuming halfof theworld’s coal and the country’s coal-re-lated emissions have grown by roughly nine


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percentperyearinthepastdecade.OverhalfofglobalCO2emissionsgrowthbetween2002and 2012 was due to increased coal burningin China, equivalent to the EU’s entire emis-sionsin2011.12Andin2014theamountofnewcoal-firedgenerationcapacityinthe“proposalpipeline”worldwidewasstillestimatedtobeastaggering1,080GWdespitethe23%fall.13

Ofcourse,IEAandindustryprojectionsfortheglobalenergymixtwentyyearsfromnowmayturnouttobewrong,buttheinvestmentpat-ternsof the recentpast tell a sobering story.AccordingtotheIEA,

Annual capital expenditure on oil, gas and coal extraction, transportation and on oil refining has more than doubled in real terms since 2000 to surpass $950 billion in 2013. The epicenter of in-creased oil and gas investment activity has been North America, with the rapid expansion of shale gas and tight oil output, but investment in other parts of the world has also been on an upward trend.14

Meanwhilein2013totalinvestmentinrenew-ableenergywasonly$244billion,fallingfromapeakofalmost$300billionin2011.15

Themainstoryisthis:theuseofrenewableen-ergyand fossil-basedpowerarebothexpect-ed togrow inorder tomeet risingglobalde-mand.Higherlevelsofenergyusearegoodforrenewableenergy companies, and thispartlyexplains the “renewableenergy is the future”optimismsurroundingan industry that isen-joyingaperiodofalmostuninterruptedexpan-sion.Butwhen it comes tohaving an impactonemissionsandpollutionlevels,thepresentdirectionoftheworld’senergysystemsleaveslittleroomforoptimism.

Too Late for Two Degrees?

Globalemissionsarerisingsteadily.The IEA’s“BusinessasUsual”scenarioforenergytrendswarnsthattheupwardcurveofenergyusewill

lead to more energy-related emissions. Thiswill leadtodestructive levelsofglobalwarm-ingduring the lifetimesof childrenwhohavealreadybeenborn.TheWorldHealthOrgani-zation has sounded a similar alarm in termsofthecatastrophichealthimpactsofthecon-tinuedandgrowinguseof fossil fuels. Levelsofrenewableenergydeploymentwillneedtoaccelerate dramatically to alter this state ofaffairs.TheIEAestimatesthatinordertostaybelowthe2degreeCelsius limit, theshareofrenewablesmustincreaseto65-80%ofglobalelectricityproductionby2050.16

The IPCC’s most recent Synthesis Report (re-leased in November 2014) notes: “Climatechange is being registered around the worldandwarmingoftheclimatesystemisunequiv-ocal. Since the 1950s many of the observedchanges are unprecedented over decades tomillennia.” The period from1983 to 2012waslikelythewarmestthirty-yearperiodofthelast1,400 years in the Northern Hemisphere. At-mospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide,methaneandnitrousoxideare“unprecedentedin at least the last 800,000 years.” The reportalso issued a dire warning about the upwardtrajectory of greenhouse gas emissions lev-els.Emissionsfromfossilfuelusehaverisenastaggering61%since1990.To staywithin twodegrees Celsius of warming (the establishedinternational target) emissions “should dropby40to70percentglobally”before2050and“to zero by 2100,” according to the Synthesis Report.Fordevelopedcountries,thiswillrequirean80%reductionby2050basedon1990levels.

However, it is todaywidelyacceptedthat twodegrees Celsius can no longer be considered“safe.” The one degree Celsius of warmingthathas alreadyoccurredhas resulted in se-vere droughts, wild fires, superstorms, anddisplacementsofpeople.Thereforemanysci-entistsbelievethat1.5degreesCelsiusshouldberecognizedasthenewinternationaltarget.Regardlessofwhatthetargetis,theIPCCsays


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that fossil fuels must be phased out completely.

Thesciencemakesitclearthattheenergybaseoftheglobaleconomyneedstobecomplete-ly transformed during the next two or threedecades. Renewables need to be scaled updramatically and fossil-based power genera-tionandtransportationneedstobedrastical-ly reduced in the short termandphasedoutaltogetherby2100.Energyconservationmustbecomeapolicypriority.

The extent of the “mitigation” challenge wasillustrated ina2013PricewaterhouseCoopers(PwC) study titled Too Late for Two Degrees? According the PwC report, improvements incarbonintensitynowneedtoexceed5.1%ev-eryyearfromnowuntil2050inordertoavoidcrossing the dangerous two degree Celsiusthreshold, an annual fall that is virtually un-precedented in peacetime. Not surprisingly,PwC concludes, “Governments’ ambitions tolimitwarmingto2°Cappearhighlyunrealistic;”and therefore, “businesses,governmentsandcommunities across the world need to planforawarmingworld—notjust2° C,but4° C,oreven6° C.”17

Science, Speed, and Scale

The Too Late for Two Degrees? study by PwCserves as a reminder that optimism aboutrenewable energymustbe considered in thelight ofwhat it will take to stop “business asusual” and reduce emissions. Importantly,echoing the IPCC, thePwC report states thattherequiredreductions incarbonare techni-callyachievable,but“The only way to avoid the pessimistic scenarios will be radical transforma-tions in the ways the global economy currently functions”(emphasisadded).

Though itdoesnotappearasanactionpointinthePwCreport,oneofthe“radicaltransfor-

mations” must involve advancing energy de-mocracy.

We understand energy democracy to startfromthepremisethatthatthereismorethanenoughwind, solar,andwavepower tomeetexistingdemand,andalsomeet theneedsofthe 1.4 billion people who currently have noreliablesourceofpower.TheEnergyInforma-tion Agency (EIA) reports that the maximumelectricity consumed worldwide at any givenmomentisabout12.5trillionwatts.Thisisjustatinyfractionoftheenergyavailablethroughrenewablesources.18

Themassive scaling up of renewable energy,manystudiessuggest,appears tobe feasiblefrom a technical standpoint. In a landmark2009essayinScientific American,JacobsonandDelucchiarguedthat thecompletedecarbon-izationofglobalenergyby2030istechnicallypossible.Accordingtotheirstudy,50%of thepower needed in 2030 (as defined by main-streampolicy leaders) couldbegeneratedby3.8 million large (five megawatts) wind tur-bines.Afurther40%couldbegeneratedbyso-larPVandconcentratedsolarpower(CSP)—re-quiringabout89,000photovoltaicandconcen-tratedsolarpowerplantseachaveraging300megawatts. The non-rooftop photovoltaicsand concentrated solar plants would occupyabout0.33percentoftheplanet’sland.Jacob-sonandDelucchialsonotethat“ifwestickwithfossil fuels,demandby2030will [rise]requir-ingabout13,000largenewcoalplants,whichthemselveswouldoccupya lotmore land,aswouldtheminingtosupplythem.”19

The fight for energy democracy is thereforeinspiredbya fewclearandcompelling ideas.First,“businessasusual”isnotanoption,be-cause six degrees of warming is simply notacceptable.Second,thefutureoflifeonearthshouldnotdependonwhetherornotrenew-able energy can compete successfully withfossil-basedenergyornot. If the logic of the


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market is not compatible with the basic sur-vivalofthehumanspeciesandotherformsoflife,thenanotherlogicmusttakeitsplace—thelogicofnon-market,needs-basedapproaches,extending social ownership in order to bringeconomic life into alignment with ecologicalnecessityandplanetarylimits.Third,ifa1.5° C or a 2° Cworld is indeed technicallypossible,then there isanurgentneed tomake ita re-alitybyshapingpolicyandpoliticsaccording-ly.Finally,unionsandsocialmovementshavethepowertohelpcreateanewenergysystem,onethatwillbelocatedattheheartofanewpoliticaleconomygroundedinequity,truesus-tainability,andeconomicdemocracy.Thekeytenetsofenergydemocracy,astheyhavebeenformulatedinTradeUnionsforEnergyDemoc-racy,areasfollows:

⇒ Massivedeploymentofrenewableenergytomeet climate goals and reduce pollu-tion;

⇒ Democraticdirectionandcontrolofallen-ergy,ajusttransitionthatworks;

⇒ Securing a strong union presence in allpartsoftheenergysector;

⇒ Energyforall—addressingenergypovertyintheNorthandSouth.

Thispaperwill explore someconcretepossi-bilitiesformovingtowardsanenergysystembasedon theseor similarprinciples inordertohelp furtheradvanceanalternative to thepresentsystem,onedrivenbyprofit, repres-sion, and almost immeasurable damage tohealth, the atmosphere, and other ecosys-tems.

2. Energy Cooperatives

Lead author: Kylie Benton-Connell

When people hear the term “communityowned and operated energy,” a cooperativeis often the structure that comes to mind.This section will look at renewable energy(RE) cooperatives and their potential role inadvancing mass-scale, community-owned,anddemocraticallycontrolledrenewableen-ergy. After beginningwith a quick sketch ofthe sector,wewillmove toapolitical analy-sisofrenewablecooperatives,lookingatthestructuralfeaturesofdifferentkindsoforga-nizations and what implications they mighthave forworkersandunions.Finally,wewillhighlight somepossibilities for collaborationamong unions and cooperatives. Looking attheseexamples,wehavebeguntomappos-sibilities for a more proactive approach tocooperatives from unions than is currentlycommonplace.

Cooperativesmakeuponlyasmallproportionofrenewableenergyproductionanddistribu-tion,andanevensmallerfractionoftheener-gysectoroverall.But theyappear tobemul-tiplying at a brisk rate across theworld. Thefollowingfiguresindicatethesizeofgrowth:

⇒ InGermanythereareover800renewableenergy cooperatives, with about 200,000peopleinvolved.20

⇒ AboutaquarterofDenmark’swindenergyis cooperativelyowned,byabout150,000members.21

⇒ Renewable energy cooperatives includelarge-scaleoperations:SomEnergiacoop-erativesupplies14,000customerswithre-newableenergyinSpain;22EcopowerinBel-gium serves just over 1%of the country’spopulation,with40,000members;23InItaly,asof2009, therewere32renewableelec-tric cooperatives, with over 24,000 mem-


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bersand40,000customers;24Enercoop,inFrance,has50,000members.25

The proliferation of RE cooperatives can betracedtoavarietyoffactors.AliteraturereviewcompiledbytheInternationalLaborOrganiza-tion(ILO)suggeststhatsupportivegovernmentpolicies have encouraged groups to establishcooperatives. The ILO review also attributestheexpansionofcooperativestogrowingpub-licinterestinboth“greenissues”andthecoop-erativemodelofownershipingeneral.26Coop-erativeshavealsoariseninthefaceofgovern-ment inaction;theabsenceofsupportivelocalornationallegislationhaspushedgroupsinthestruggletoexpandrenewableenergytowardstheDo-It-Yourselfethicofcooperatives.

REcooperativestakedifferentforms;theyhavedistinct structures, scales, financing, and poli-tics.Inwhatfollows,wewillconsidertheexpan-sion of RE cooperatives andwhat options forengagementexist forunionsboth inthepres-entmomentand,potentially,inthefuture.

Political Landscape

Thepresenceofcooperativesintheenergysec-torisnotarecentdevelopment.ThefirstknownelectriccooperativeintheworldwastheSocietà cooperativa per l’lluminazione elettrica,ahydro-poweroperationfoundedatChiavenna,Italy,in1894.27Intheyearsthatfollowed,cooperativesbecameacommonwaytoachieveruralelectri-ficationacrosstheworld.28Communitiesoftencreatedelectriccooperativeswheretheexten-sionofenergyinfrastructurewastooexpensive(and,often,potentialcustomerstoopoor)tobeofinteresttoeitherprofit-drivencompaniesormunicipalities with miniscule tax bases.29 Ru-ral electrification nevertheless forged aheadas a result of state planning and support forcooperatives.TheUnitedStatesledthewayinstate-supported, cooperative extensionof theelectricalgridinthe1930s,andothercountries

followedasimilarpath in thepostwarperiod.Thismodelofelectrificationcontinuestobein-fluentialandhasbeenpickedupinconcertwithrenewable energy in state-led programs suchasthosepursuedinBangladesh(where70ruralenergycooperativesemploy16,000people)and Nepal.30

In the past, electricity cooperatives support-edbystateprogramsoften involvedbringingcentrallygeneratedpower (for instance, fromalargehydroelectricdam,orcoal-firedpowerstation)toremoteorsparselypopulatedcom-munities.When they operate with decentral-ized infrastructure, today’s renewableenergycooperatives can grow alongside significantlydifferentsocialarrangementsandpolicycon-figurations.Intheirdiscussionofenergytran-sitioninGermany,TimothyMoss,SoerenBeck-er,andMatthiasNaumanndescribeaprocessthat is not “asimplepatternofpolicyroll-outfromstatetolocallevels,”butrather“amixtureof top-down policy and bottom-up initiatives[...]generatingheterogeneousactorconstella-tionsandorganizationallandscapes.”31

Cooperatives have worked in concert witha wide range of political agendas. After thehigh-profileimplementationofanation-widerural electrification program under the NewDeal, U.S. administrations were keen to ex-port the model during the cold war. Onceregardedbythepoliticalrightasanexampleof “creepingsocialism”during the1930sand1940s, energy cooperatives became part oftheU.S.attempttowin“heartsandminds”intheGlobalSouth.Inonestrikingexample,theU.S. government proposed that a giant dambebuiltontheMekongRiverinordertobringelectrification to Vietnamese villages. Presi-dent Lyndon Johnsondeclared inunambigu-ous termsthepoliticalworkhewantedsuchinterventionstodo:“Iwanttoleavethefoot-printsofAmericainVietnam[...].We’regoingtoturntheMekongintoaTennesseeValley.”32 Attheotherendoftheideologicalspectrum,


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communistChinaalsomadecooperativesanimportant element of rural electrification—whichsimultaneouslyservedtopromotethe

advantages of Sino-Soviet cooperation (be-fore1960)andtoshowcasetheachievementsofsocialistplanning.

Utility-Scale Electricity Cooperatives in the U.S.

ThestoryofthebigelectricitycooperativesintheU.S.establishedduringthe1930sand1940sundertheRuralElectrificationAdministration(REA)isalsoinstructive.Today,asignificantnum-berof thesecooperativeshavedriftedawayfromthepolitical role theyplayed in theirearlyyears.Whatwereonceparticipatoryorganizationalstructures,designedtoallowforlocalanddemocratic decision-making, have in some instancesbecome farmore static and character-izedbyminimalmemberparticipation.Somestoriesofcronyismandprofiteeringhavebecomepublic,asinthecasesofthePedernales,Texas,andCobbCounty,Georgia,cooperatives,wheremanagementfacedchargesincludingtheft,moneylaundering,andracketeering.33

Thesecooperativeshavebeenreluctanttoembracerenewableenergy.Whentheydoattempttodeveloprenewables,ittendstobethroughagreementswithcounterpartsintheprivatesec-tor. The National Renewables Cooperative Organization (NRCO—the association that workswithU.S.electricitycooperativestoexpandtheirholdingsinrenewableenergy)presentsitselfasafairlycorporatizedsourceoftechnicalassistance.Initspublicmaterials,NRCOmakesnomentionofequity,climatechange,orlaborstandards.ForcooperativesrespondingtoNRCO’smessage,investmentinrenewablesmaybemoreofhedgeagainstfuturegovernmentregula-tionthanaseriouscommitmenttoacleanenergyfuture.

Thatsaid,thenominallydemocraticstructuresofthesecooperativesopenthedoortoreformagendas, and successful examplesof grassroots community campaigns in this arena canbefound.IntheU.S.,inthewakeofthescandalsurroundingthemanagementoftheCobbCoun-tycooperative, reformcandidateswereelected to thegoverningboard,withunprecedentedratesofmemberparticipation. The cooperative thenwithdrew its support fromaproposedcoal-firedpowerplantanddedicatednewinvestmentinsolargenerationthroughapowerpur-chase agreement.34OthercampaignsbyenvironmentalandcommunitygroupssuchastheSi-erraClub,theCommunityPowerNetwork,andRenewEastKentuckypointtothepotentialforreformofruralcooperativestoadvanceboththespreadofrenewablesandthedemocratizationof energy.35InArgentina,thepeakbodyforelectricitycooperativeshasrolledoutaprogramforitsaffiliatessupportingthelaunchofnewrenewableprojects.36

Some contemporary advocates of coopera-tivesclaimthattheyare“relativelyfreeofpo-liticalentanglement,representingpeopleofallviewpoints”37 or that “old ‘left’ and ‘right’ ide-ologiesassociatedwitheconomicmodels”donot apply.38 This attempt to de-politicize thecooperativeorganizationalstructureindicates

howitcanbeincorporatedintoarangeofpo-litical projects. A starker example is found inthisrecentclaimthatEstonianrenewablesad-vocates,waryofthepossibleassociationswithcommunism, are “relabeling cooperatives—which are helping to reduce reliance on Rus-siangas—as‘people’scapitalism.’”39


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Itfollowsthatinordertoassesstheoptionsforengagement, unions and workers must firstclarify the political commitments and entan-glements of any given cooperative, coopera-tivemodel,ormovement.Inparticular,itisim-portant to distinguish between cooperativesthatareformedsolelyformemberbenefitandthose that are formed for public benefit.Ob-viously a cooperative that is not accountableto any group beyond itsmembershipwill beshapedprimarilybythewishesofthosemem-bers. It isworthnotinghere that the incomefromcooperativesisoneinaclusterofreasonsthat local,community-ownedrenewableproj-ects may have stronger community supportthan those owned by remote corporations.Thepopularityandwidespreadpublicsupportforwindenergy inDenmark isoftenattribut-edtothehighnumberofcooperativesinthatcountry’s sector.40 Needless to say, coopera-tive members’ preferences may not includeemployingaunionizedworkforceormanage-mentpracticesthatrespectworkers’rightstoorganize.

Some RE cooperatives are for-profit entities,such as the high-profile Canadian companyWindShare.Themainconcernsoffor-profitco-operativesare likely tobe similar to thoseofany profit-seeking enterprise, including keep-ingcosts—includinglaborcosts—lowandrev-enueshigh.However,manycooperativeshavestructural limitations, either self-imposed orasaresultofregulatoryrestrictions.Thesein-clude elements such as the size of dividendsthatcanbepaidoutorthenumberofsharesthatanyindividualmembercanhold.

Such restrictions are designed to distinguishcooperatives from standard for-profit firms.Nevertheless, some commentators arguethat cooperatives tend towards “capitalist re-cidivism” or “market isomorphism.”42 In oth-erwords, theyargue, there is a tendency forcooperatives to become more like the com-panies from which they once differentiated

themselves. This could express itself whenworker cooperatives “pull the ladderupafterthemselves” by hiring wage workers ratherthan extending the benefits of co-ownershiptonewemployees, thuskeepingkeybenefitsrestrictedtoasmallcircleoforiginalorfound-ingmembers.41

The Solidarity Economy

The common intuition that cooperatives areinsomewayalignedwithprogressivepoliticalagendashasmerit.Thereisnotspaceherefora detailed, transnational history of the rela-tionships between unions and cooperatives.Sufficeittosaythatsomecountries—suchasBrazil,Argentina,andUruguay—havehistoriesof much closer collaboration between coop-erativesandprogressivepoliticalmovementsthan do others. In Argentina, consumer elec-tricity cooperatives bargain with the powerworkersunion.Therewasadebate in theAr-gentineanunionmovementaboutwhetherco-operativeworkersshouldpushformanagerialmembership or whether such amove wouldweakentheirunionaffiliation.42

In the contextof strong “solidarity economy”networks, suchas those inQuébec (Canada),northernItaly,orBrazil,REcooperativesmightbeexpectedtoalignthemselveswiththepoli-ticsofsocialjustice,buttheyarestillrelativelyuncommon.Sometheoristsarguethatcooper-ativesskewtowardsprogressivepolitics—thatthereisa“spillover”effectwhereparticipantsbecomeengagedwithotherpoliticalworkasaresultoftheirexperienceascooperativemem-bers.43AfewREcooperativeshavebeenfound-edwithanexplicitsocialjusticeagenda:Co-opPower,acooperativeinMassachusetts(UnitedStates) that provides installation services—andismovingtowardsdevelopingcommunal-ly-ownedrenewableprojects—explicitlystatesits vision as helping to build a “multi-racial,multi-classmovement.”TheBlackMesaSolar


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Projectincludesanefforttobuildalarge,coop-erativelyownedsolarplant inNavajocountry(in Arizona, United States) where communitymembersarefightingtoshutdownminingandcoal-fired power production on their land.44 Whilenon-profitcooperativesoftentrytokeepconsumercostslow,theymayfaceroadblockswhen it comes to giving discounted rates tolow-incomecustomers.TheSomEnergiacoop-erativeinSpain,forinstance,cannotcurrentlyoffera “social tariff”because thecooperativedoesnotreceivethestatesubsidythatenablesotherlargesupplierstooffercheaperelectrici-tytotheirlowincomecustomers.45

Worker-ownedandmanagedcooperativesarepresently not common in power generation,transmission,ordistribution,thoughtheyap-pearinmanyalliedindustries,likerooftopso-larinstallation(seetextboxbelow).TheEnergy

Solidarity Cooperative in Oakland, California(UnitedStates),hasahybridstructure,whereboth workers and consumers/producers areownersof theenterprise. In this instance thelattertwofallunderthesamecategory,asthecooperative installs rooftop solar on privatehomes. The Val-Éo cooperative in Québec,Canada,representsasimilarexperimentonamuchlargerscale—thecooperativehasthreeownershipcategories, forcustomers,produc-ers, and workers respectively.46 Ohio Solar(UnitedStates)isaworker-ownedcooperativethat installssolarpanelsbutalsoadministersthe supply of electricity from these installa-tions.Itsbusinessmodelfocusesonusing“an-chor institutions”—non-profit organizationsthatplayimportantrolesincommunities,suchashospitals,schoolsanduniversities—tobuilda solid, reliable base of mutually beneficial relationships.47

Worker Cooperatives in Associated Industries

Whileworkers’cooperativesarefairlythinonthegroundinelectricitygenerationanddistribu-tion,theyaremorecommoninassociatedsectors.Therearequiteafewsolarinstallationcoop-eratives,includingNamasteSolar,PVSquared,SolPowerCooperative,ortheBristolAreaSolarInstallersCo-operative (BASIC) and itsU.S. equivalent,Amicus. Thereare severalworker-ori-ented initiatives in theareaofgreenbuildingandenergyefficiency, suchas theSustainergyRetrofittingCo-op(partoftheCincinnatiUnionCooperativeInitiative,ajointprojectofSpain’smega-cooperativeMondragónandtheU.S.tradeunionUnitedSteelworkers.)Finally,thereareworkercooperatives in therenewablesmanufacturingsector,suchasEarthworkerAustralia,asolarwaterheatingmanufacturingandinstallationcooperativebackedbyAustralianunionrepresentatives.Theprojectisdesignedtocreategreenjobsinwhatishistoricallyacoal-min-ing region.Mondragón is involved inmanufacturingcomponents for solar systemsandmaybelookingtoexpandtheirengagementwiththerenewablesindustry.TheEBOGroupinOhio(UnitedStates)alsoproducescomponentsandtechnology.

Equity and Liberalization

Worker and/or union involvement in deci-sion-makingis,however,bynomeansassuredin other kinds of cooperatives—even whentheyappear tobeotherwiseprogressiveand

relativelydemocratic.Andwhilerenewableen-ergy cooperatives often involve decentraliza-tionofenergygeneration, theycanalsoben-efit fromandevenencourageenergyderegu-lation processes,whichput communities andworkersatrisk.


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Climate and environmental advocates some-times champion deregulation, and some re-newableenergy initiativesare framedas “an-ti-monopoly”campaignstargetingbigutilitiesthat—purportedly—need to be exposed tocompetitionfromcommunity-drivenorganiza-tions.48 Discourses ofmonopoly-bustingmayappear to advance the democratic control ofenergy, but they can also serve the interestsof start-up entrepreneurs with few—if any—sympathies for unions or workers’ organiza-tions.Where big utilities are publicly owned,the expansion of cooperative energy can ap-pearasaformofprivatizationthroughthebackdoor. And public sector unions understand-ablyfind it difficult to support initiatives thatare positioned as attacks on the livelihoodsoftheirmembers.UnionssuchastheCanadi-anUnionofPublicEmployees (CUPE)andtheQuébec Federation of Labour (QFL) prefer tosupportgovernmentownershipofenergyonthe grounds that energy providers aremadeaccountabletotheelectorateasawhole,rath-erthanonlythemembersofacooperative.

Community-run renewables cooperatives cananddofindnichesinthewakeofderegulation.As Pier AngeloMori notes, “the liberalizationof somepublic services inEuropehas stimu-lated theemergenceofnewcooperativepro-viders.”49AccordingtoNepomucenoMalaluan,environmentalists in South Korea and Thai-land saw “unbundling” as “emasculat[ing] anenvironmentally destructivemonopoly by al-lowing entry of decentralized non-renewable systems.”50

Thisalignmentbetweenforcesisneitheruniver-salnorautomatic.Asignificantsegmentoftheclimatemovementrecognizesthethreatprivat-izationposes to the ability of governments toexpand renewables and shut down fossil fuelproduction.Groups likeFuelPovertyAction intheUKandorganizationsintheDurbanClimateJusticenetworkhave continuouslyandvocallyopposedprivatized, for-profitenergysystems.

However, in contexts where privatization ofpublicservicesandsupportforthefossilfuelin-dustry appearhegemonic, communitieswork-ingforrenewableenergymayseefewchoicesbeyond initiating cooperatives. The politicallyheterogeneous nature of cooperatives andtheirabilitytofindspacetosurvivewithinalib-eralized marketplace may partly explain howcooperatives are able to gain traction whereothermodels,suchasmunicipalization,donot.

But while liberalization of the energy marketmayinitiallyofferagrowthopportunityforco-operatives, community-owned companies ina capitalistmarketplace are vulnerable to theexpansionistlogicoffor-profitfirms.Asweseein the cases of China and Greece—andmorebroadly internationally—renewable energycompaniesarecurrentlygoingthroughaperiodofconsolidation,wherelargecorporateplayerssuchasShellaresqueezingoutsmalleropera-tions.51 Where deregulation and privatizationofelectricityarecoupled,weoftenseenottheproliferation of small community actors, butamarket inthehandsofafewpowerfulcom-panies,suchastheUK’s“bigsix.” Weshouldbecarefulnottosimplifythisstorytoomuch,how-ever.TheInternationalLabourOffice’sCooper-ativesUnitarguesthattheliberalizationoftheenergy market “opened up opportunities forgrassroots initiatives in theenergysectorandledtothepartialremunicipalizationoftheen-ergymarket.”52Inotherwords,intheseauthors‘view,liberalizationwascoterminouswithopen-ingupnewpossibilitiesforremunicipalization.Thisisacomplexandcounterintuitivehistoricalargument,butoneworthconsidering.

Evenifitwerenotassociatedwiththeexpan-sion of the private sector, completely decen-tralized and disaggregated energy provisionmakesystem-wideredistributionmuchharder.Ifdecision-makingandplanningiscoordinatedwithequityinmind,discrepanciesbetweenlowandhigh-incomecommunitiescanbeevenedoutthroughmeasureslikeprogressiveenergy


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rates and needs-based infrastructure spend-ing. It is possible to imagine a large networkofdisaggregatedenergysystemsmanagedbynot-for-profit,community-controlled,coopera-tiveentities.Butiftheseentitiesoperatewith-outanycentralcoordinationorredistribution,theywillcertainlyreflectandprobablyamplifyinequalitybetweendistinctcommunities.53

This issueofequity isoftenraisedbyutilitiesthataremakingitdifficultfortheircustomersto install “behind the meter” systems—thatis,solarpanelsontheirroofsorwindmillsontheirproperty.Behindthemetersystems,co-operativeorotherwise,maythreatenbigutili-tiesbyhollowingoutthebaseofutilities’“best”customers,54bywhichtheyseemtomeanmid-dle to upper-class customers who pay theirbills on time and consume higher-than-aver-age volumes of electricity. Utilities claim thattheproliferationofbehindthemetersystemsthreatens their ability topay forgridmainte-nance. When consumers mostly use energyfromarenewablesource that theyown, theyno longer pay the utility for the energy theypreviously got from the grid. Yet they oftencontinue to require a connection to the gridin order to ensure a reliable supply of elec-tricityondayswhen it isnotsunnyorwindy.Thisleadstoaperceptionthatcustomerswithrenewable sources behind themeter are not“paying their fair share,”55meaning that evenlessmoneyisavailableforbigutilitiestoinvestingridupgradesandothercapitalinvestmentsthattheshifttorenewablesrequires.Thereis,ofcourse,anothermajorconsequence.Inutil-itieswithanorganizedworkforce,a slump insalesorprofitsis likelytoreducethenumberofgoodjobsavailabletounionmembers.

Renewable energy advocates, however, arguethat at leastoneof these claims is inaccurate.TomBeach,aconsultantwithCrossborderEner-gy,claimsthatutilities’claimsunderestimatethebenefits of “behind themeter” generation.Hearguesthatcostprojectionsshouldaccountfor

the reduced need for new power plants and transmission lines, smaller energy losses through transmission (because much of the power is used where it’s generated); less vulnerability to in-creases in fossil fuel prices; and finally allowing utilities to meet government-mandated renew-able energy targets without investing in big solar or wind farms.56

The shift from centralized utilities to decen-tralized,cooperativelyownedenergymay,forunions, represent another problematic facetof liberalization:namely,asignificantamountofvolunteerlabor,particularlyintheorganiza-tions’earlystages.Inthemostoptimisticlight,thiscouldbereadasacommunizing tenden-cy,followingatrajectorytowardtheabolitionofwage labor. Inamorecommon interpreta-tion,thisbecomesyetanotherinstancewhereunpaidlaborismobilizedthroughadiscourseofvolunteerism,underminingtheprincipleofcompensatingpeoplefortheirwork.

Unionsandworkersarefamiliarwiththecon-cept of “job substitution,”where staff canbereplacedwithunpaidorlowlypaidvolunteers.This is particularly visible in public serviceslikehealthcareandhasoftenbecomegovern-mentpolicy intheeraofausteritypolitics,asin Britain, with the current conservative gov-ernment’semphasison “theBigSociety.” It isrelativelycommonforemployerstocastgreeninitiativesasawaytoincreaseworkerloyalty,retention, and identificationwith the compa-ny’s “mission.”While wemust be careful nottodrawdramaticconclusionsfromonestudy,researchersdidinonesurveyfindthatworkerswhoseemployersengage in “green”activitiesaremore likely towork unpaid overtime.Or,as one conservation blog enthuses, they are“willing to ‘donate’ labor tocompanieswhosevaluesalignwiththeirownbytakinglowersal-aries and showing up at workmore often.”57 Unionscanplayanimportantroleinensuringthis does not happen: in the UK, the TradesUnion Congress (TUC) and Volunteering En-glandhavesetupa charter toaddress these


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party,or—inthecaseofcooperativessupport-edbyUSAID—aparticular foreignpolicy.AndaswehaveseeninthecaseofU.S.ruralelectriccooperatives,thepubliclystated,foundingmis-sionofanorganizationcannotalwayspredictitspoliticalcharacteroverthelongerterm.Forthisreasonitisimportantforunionsandwork-ers’organizationstoassessthedistinctionsbe-tweenthecompositionandgovernancestruc-turesofdifferentcooperatives.

Inthefinalanalysis,whyacooperativeissetupis significant: buthow it is set upmay tell usmoreaboutitsstructurallimitationsandpos-sibilities.Financingandorganizationaltypolo-gycanbothshapeandconstrain themissionofcooperatives, for instancebymakingthembeholden to creditors or donors. In the caseof transnationalaid, theseconstraintscanbeparticularly acute, aswe know from the longhistoryof “tiedaid” and loan “conditionality.”Knowing more about a cooperative’s institu-tional formmay help us assesswhether it islikelytobecomejustanothercapitalistfirm,ortostayaccountabletoawidercommunityand/oritsworkers.

concerns in the context of public spendingcuts.58 If community-owned energy is not tobecomeapermanentsiteforself-exploitationundergreenausterity,withchronicpublicun-derfundingmitigatedbyvolunteerlabor,thenunions and workers must be involved in itsgovernancefromtheoutset.

Structure, Financing, and Mission

Many renewables cooperatives include somekindofsocial“mission”inthewaytheypresentthemselvestothepublic,evenifthis isstatedonly intermsoftheneedforacleanenviron-ment.But it canbedifficult todistinguishbe-tweenthosewithsocialjusticeastheirprimaryorganizationalconcernandthosethatadoptarhetoricofsocialgoodaswindowdressing.Asnotedabove,anorganization’sstated“mission”isusuallyonlyoneofmanycomplicatedpoliti-calforcesatplayintheestablishmentofaco-operative.Anorganizationmaybefoundedto“promotecommunityenergy,”butitalmostcer-tainlyhasotherpoliticalgoalsandimplications,suchasconsolidating thebaseofaparticular

Type of cooperative ExampleProducer/investor

Thesecooperativesaretypicallymadeupofmemberswhofinanceorownenergygenerators,suchasfarmerswithwindturbinesontheirlandorshareholdersinalargesolarfarm.Theysellelectricitytocustomerswhoarenotnecessarilymembersofthecooperative.

WindShare,Canada

Afor-profitcooperativebestknownforputtingawindturbineontheTorontoskylineinpartnershipwiththegovernment-ownedutility,TorontoHydro.Itsmembersarefarmerswithwindturbinesontheirlandandothershareholders.Eachmemberhasavoteinmajordecisions,regardlessofthesizeoftheirinvestment.

Consumer/producer

Thesecooperativesaremadeupofmemberswhoownenergygeneratorsandthosewhoconsumetheelectricityfromthem,forinstancethroughanetworkofrooftopsolarsystems.Thesearecommonthroughouttheworld,incountriesincludingNepal,Bangladesh,Bolivia,Denmark,Germany,andSpain.

SouthLalitpurElectrificationCampaignCommittee,Nepal

OneofmanycooperativestheNepalesegovernmenthassupportedthroughacentralizedagency(theNepalElectricityAuthority).AccordingtoAnnabelYadooandHeatherCruickshank,“whiletheNEAprovidesupto80%ofthecapitalinvestment,communitiesmustcontributeatleast20%ofthetotalcostofgridextensionvialabor,householddonations,bankloans,orloansandgrantsfromthelocalvillageanddistrictdevelopmentcommittees.”59


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Purchasing

Thesearecooperativeswheremembersgettogethertonegotiateacheaperpricefromanenergysupplierbasedontheircollectivepurchasingpower.

CommunityPurchasingAlliance(CPA),U.S.

Acooperativeofmorethan100non-profitentities(includingschoolsandreligiousorganizations)thatnegotiatesforpurchasesatfixedgrouprates,includingoptionsfor100%renewableenergy.

Worker/producer

Presentlyanuncommoncooperativeform,whereenergyproductionisownedbyagroupofworkers.

VolkswagenEmdenPlant,Germany

(Seebelowfordetails)

Hybrid

Thesearecooperativesthatbringtogetherdifferentcombinationsoftheactorsnotedabove(producers,consumers,workers,andinvestors).Theyhavedifferentcategoriesfordifferentkindsofmembership.

Retenergie,Italy

Acooperativethathastwokindsofmembership:“consumptionmembers”payadeposit(ofatleast50€euros)andcanthenbuyelectricityfromthecollective.Investmentmemberspay500€fortenshares.Thismoneyisusedtobuildnewinstallations,andinvestmentmembersreceiveashareoftheprofits,inadditiontoreceivingelectricityfromthecollective.60

Type of financing ExampleDonorsGrants PuntaAlta,Argentina

ManagedbythecooperativeCEPA(LaCooperativaEléctricadePuntaAlta),thiswindfarmwaspartiallyfinancedbygrantsfromtheGermangovernment.

Crowdfunding

Smalldonationsorloansaresourcedfromalargenumberofpeople.

KaštelaEnergyCooperative,Croatia

TheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeorganizedthisprojecttopartiallyfinancetheinstallationofsolarpanelsonaschoolthroughcrowdfunding.61

Government subsidies Feed-intariffsanddirectsubsidies

Afeed-intariffisamechanismwheregovernmentregulationsforceutilitiestopayhouseholdsandinstitutionsfortherenewableenergytheygenerate“behindthemeter.”

OttawaRenewableEnergyCo-op,Canada

ThegrowthinenergycooperativessuchasthisoneintheOntarioprovincehasbeenattributedtothelocalintroductionofafeed-intariff.62

Taxbreaks Middelgrunden,Denmark

InDenmark,windcooperativessuchasMiddelgrunden“cantakeadvantageoftaxincentives,whichallowtax-freeincomefromrenewableenergysystemsuptoacertainlimit.Revenuesabovethesetlimitaretaxedalowerratethannormalincometax.”63

Grants HepburnWind,Australia

WhenAustralia’sfirstcommunity-ownedwindfarmlaunched,over1,100membersoftheco-operativehadinvested7.5millionAustraliandollars.Thiswassupportedbya$975,000grantfromthelocalstategovernment.64


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commonmechanismsforelectricityfinancingandcouldwellappearinthecooperativesec-tor.

Renewableportfoliostandards

Theseregulationsrequirepowercompaniestoprovideacertainamountofthetotalenergytheyputintothegridtobegeneratedfromrenewablesources.Theseareinforcein63countries,thoughnotallatthenationallevel.

CleanEnergyCollective,USA

In2013,theYampaValleyElectricAssociation(YVEA,aruralelectricitycooperative)inkedadealtobuy500kWofrenewableenergyfromacooperativelyownedsolarfarminCraig,Colorado.ThispurchaseagreementwillcounttowardsYVEA’sobligationsunderColorado’srenewableportfoliostandards.65

Concessionaryloans RuralElectrificationBoard,Bangladesh

Inadditiontodirectsubsidiesintheearlystagesofcooperativedevelopment,Bangladesh’sRuralElectrificationBoard,anationalauthority,offers“low-interestloanswithlongrepaymentperiods.66“

Consumer financingOn-bill

Thecostofdevelopingrenewablegeneration—forexample,rooftopsolar—isspreadoutovertimeandincludedonacustomer’selectricitybill.

Hawaii,U.S.

Whilewearenotawareofanycooperativecurrentlyemployingit,Hawaii’spublicutilitycommissionhasjustintroducedamechanismforrenewableenergyprojectstobepaidforthroughregularconsumerbills.67

DebtLoans Kiegoiteagrowers’savingsandcreditcooperative,

Kenya

Thiscooperativehasdevelopedloanprogramswiththeirmembersforbuyingandinstallingsolarsystems.68

Shares Baywind,UnitedKingdom

Thiscooperativeraisescapitalfromitsmembersthroughasharestructure,inadditiontoexternalgrants.69

Revolvingloans CommunitySolarGardenInclusionFund,U.S.

ThisColoradoprojectinvolvessolicitingearningsfromwealthiermembersofthecooperative.Low-incomeparticipantsthenpaybackloansmadeoveraseventotenyearperiodfromthesavingsontheirelectricbillsandeventuallybecomeownersofsharesinasolargarden.70

We have not encountered examples of thesaleofbondsorprepaidmeters infinancingrenewableenergycooperatives,buttheyare


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Financing Renewable Energy Cooperatives

A major challenge facing energy cooperatives is the high capital outlay required to set up the infrastructure. Renewable energy-based rural cooperative models across the world require high levels of initial seed capital.71

InternationalLabourOrganization,2014

Manyproposalsforfundingthetransitiontorenewablesrelyonpublictaxrevenues.Nonethe-less,theplacementofprivatecapitalremainsimportant.Campaignsaremultiplyingacrosstheworldforinstitutionstodivestfromthefossilfuelindustry.72Butenvironmentalmovementsarealsolookingtoproactivelybuildrenewablesbydirectingprivatecapitalflowstowardwindandsolar.Canweimaginescenariosnotonlyinwhichmore“green”investmentscontainunionlaborprocurementclausesbutalsowhereunionpensionmoneycontributescapitaltothousandsofcommunityandcooperativeenergyprojects?

Thisisnotanentirelyspeculativequestion;asweseebelowwiththeMiddelgrundenprojectinCo-penhagen,workers’organizationsarealreadyfinancingcommunityrenewableenergy.InAustralia,theCollgarwindfarm,which,bythecompany’saccounting,generatesenoughenergytopower125,000homes,wasjointlydevelopedbyanemployeesuperannuationfund,whichstillowns40%oftheproject.TheCaliforniastatepensionfundCalPERShaspartofitsportfoliodedicatedtowardrenewableenergy.73Althoughmanyoftheseinvestmentscouldnotbeproperlyclassifiedascom-munityenergy—andtheyarecertainlynotcooperatives—they illustratethepotential forunionpensionfundinvestmentinlarge-scalerenewables.Accordingtosourcesintheindustry,pensionfundshavebeensteppingintofillachronicshortfalloflong-termbanklendingtocommunityre-newableprojectsintheUK,withriskandreturnprofileslininguptoeachparty’smutualbenefit.TheNationalUnionofMetalWorkersofSouthAfrica(NUMSA)hasarguedthatworkers’pensionfundsshouldbemobilizedtofinancecommunity-ownedandoperatedrenewableenergyprojects.In2013,followingNUMSA’spoliticallead,theMetalIndustriesBenefitFundsAdministrators(MIB-FA)decidedtocommituptoonebillionRandtowardsinvestingintherenewableenergysector.74

Ofcourse,thisisnotastraightforwardproposition.Asmanycampaignershavediscovered,thegovernanceofpensionfundsistightlycontrolledunderthebanneroffiduciaryresponsibility.75 In theUnitedStates,manyemployeestockownershipplansare fundedbyemployeepensionplans,aprocesswhichdoesnothaveunequivocalsupportinthelabormovementofthatcoun-try.76Workers’organizationsarebynomeansunitedintheirviewofsuperannuationorpensionfunds.Forsome,itremainsaproblematiccompromisewithaneoliberalagenda,andforothersitappearsasastrategicpointofentrytothecapitalmarketsthatshapesomanyindustries.Itiscrucial thatpension-fundedprojectsaredeveloped in linewithworkerneedsandconcerns.Tensionsarisingfromquestionssuchasthesplitbetweenreturnsforworker-investors,wagesforworkers,revenuefortaxation,andlowpricesforcustomers—whomightalsobeowners!—willcontinueunderthismodel,withnoeasyorobvioussolutions.Thereisarealriskthatpensionfundmoneycouldgointovehiclessuchas“public-privatepartnerships”inrenewableinfrastructure,essentiallyprovidingaunionalibifortheprivatizationofpublicservices.Nonetheless,particularlyinthecontextofsluggishgovernmentincentivesforrenewableenergydevelopment,theoptionofchannelingworkers’moneyintocooperativedevelopmentdeservesconsideration.


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Unions and Renewable Energy Coop-eratives

What does the range of possibilities for co-operatives currently include? Is it possible tobuild cooperative renewables in a way thatgrowsemploymentandworkers’politicalpow-er?Thefollowingexamplesareputforwardnotasmodelsbutratherasillustrationsoftheva-riety of relationships betweenworkers’ orga-nizationsandcooperativecommunityenergy.

Volkswagen Staff Association for Regenerative Energy, Germany

Thefirstenergy-producingcooperativewewillhighlight is in whatmight appear an unlikelyplace—ontheroofofacarfactory:aVolkswa-genplantinEmden,Germany.Theprojectwasinitiated by the works council at the factoryand established in 2008. It received supportfromcompanyleadership,andwhileithadtoovercomemiddlemanagementskepticism,theplantmanagerisnowamemberofthecoop-erativealongwiththepersonnelandlogisticsmanagers.ThecooperativehasleasedtheroofspacefromVolkswagenatanominalsum(oneeuroperyear)for25years—andiftheplantissold,theseobligationswilltransferovertothenewowner. The solarpanelsgeneratepowerthatissoldbackintothegeneralgridatafixedprice subsidizedby theGermangovernment.Thisoccursundernationallegislationdesignedtoencouragerenewableenergy.

About 225 employees and their familymem-bers are participants in the project, with in-vestmentsatminimum250eurosandatmaxi-mum10,000euros.Mostmembershavehold-ingswortharound1,000or2,000euros,whichthey can retain even if they stop working atthecompany.Atpeakcapacity,thepanelsaresaidtoproduceenoughenergytopower80to100typicalfour-personhouseholdsforayear.Thecooperativehasgeneratedtwopercentre-turnson investmentperyearand isplanning

toexpand.Thefeasibilityofawindmillonthefactorysiteiscurrentlybeingassessed.

TheGermanformatofthefactoryworkscoun-cil (inwhichworkersandmanagementpartic-ipate together) creates unique opportunitiesforthiskindofcollaboration.Unionparticipa-tionvaries.GermanunionIGMetall’ssupporthasbeenmostprominentattheEmdenplant,where the cooperative is “strictly” separatedfromtheworkscouncil—thoughthechairmanofthecouncilactsasSupervisoryBoardChair-manofthecooperative.Butothercomparableprojects exist around the country at workplaces including a Unilever dispatch hall, theHümmlinglivestockgroup,andtheUniversityofBremen.77

Hvide Sande, Denmark

ThegrowthofwindpowerinDenmarkisoftenreferredtoasamodelfortherestoftheworld.A largeproportionof thiswinddevelopment,particularly in its early stages, has occurredthrough cooperative ownership. One oftenelevatedasamodelforemulationisthehighprofileMiddelgrundrenprojectwithitstwentywindmills off the coast of Copenhagen joint-ly owned bymany investors (including tradeunions)andthemunicipalutilityinacoopera-tivestructure.

However, aswehavenoted followingPrebenMaegaardoftheDanishFolkecenter,theben-efits of profit-oriented cooperatives accrueprimarily to their members. Though Danishlawrequirestwentypercentofanywindpro- jecttobeownedbymembersofthecommuni-tywhereitissited,78thiscanstill leaveaverylargeproportionofthoseaffectedbythepro- ject—either as neighbors or customers—un-der-representedindecisionmaking.

TheHvideSandeproject,bycontrast,presentsa different structure for collective ownershipthat advocateswant tobemorewidely repli-


19

cated. It isasmall-scale initiative,whereonlythree windmills are owned by a non-profitfoundation dedicated to local economic de-velopment. Various organizations, includingthe local tourismboard, localutilities, the lo-cal trade union confederation, and the localbranch of the business association initiatedthe formationof the foundation;butnoneofthem benefit from the trust fund directly, asthey would if they were shareholders. Afterstronglocaloppositiontoapreviousproposaltodevelopaprivatelyownedwindproject,thenon-profit foundationfoundsolidcommunitysupport.

San Jose Employee Solar Group, United States

InSanJose,California,thecreditunionformu-nicipalemployeesnegotiatedabulksolarpur-chase foragroupof130cityemployees.Thecreditunionallowspastandpresentmunicipalworkers to get solar equipment and installa-tionsatacheaperratethantheywouldpayasindividualcustomers.79

Themodelofcollectivelynegotiatingdiscountsisa commonone,particularlywhen it comestorooftopsolar.Thoughthesepurchasesarecommonlygroupedgeographically, theyhavealsobeenarrangedthroughworkplaces.Theseareoftendoneaspartofcompanies’publicre-lationseffortsor“corporatesocialresponsibili-ty”programs.InOctober2014,3M,Cisco,Kim-berly-Clark,andtheNationalGeographicSoci-etypartneredwiththeWorldWildlifeFundandprojectmanagerGeostellar.Theproject“givesemployeesof these companies, their friends,families, and communities” discounted solarequipmentandinstallationthroughabulkpur-chase.BankofAmericahasinitiatedasimilarprogramwith the nonprofit GroupEnergy, ashaveanumberofSiliconValleycompanies.

The San Jose program for municipal work-ers, though its size isundeniablymodest,of-fers insight intowhat a cooperative initiative

within the public sector can look like. It alsodemonstratesanotherwayworkerscanbeen-gagedcollectivelyas workers inthedecentral-ized production of renewable energy. Whilebulk-purchasingprogramscannotbeequatedtolong-termgenerationanddistributioncoop-eratives—as they generally involve a one-offcollectivefinancialengagement,ratherthananongoing one—they indicate the potential fororganizingconcreteactionforrenewableener-gy throughworkplace relationships. Thebulkoftheseprogramsmaycurrentlybeintheser-viceofcorporateimagebuilding,buttheyneednotbe.Aswithanylargeorganization,unionscould easily play the role of connecting theirmembershiptobulk jointpurchases,conceiv-ablyasafirststeptomoreongoingcollectivework.Infact,laborinvolvementintheCommu-nityPurchasingAlliance (seeabove) indicatesthatsomealreadyare.80

Toward More Democratic Energy Sys-tems?

In a context where government inaction onclimate is entrenched—as in many places inthe U.S.—and the constituency advocatingfor government provision of public servicesisweak, cooperativesmayoffera vehicle foradvancingtheshiftfromfossilfuelstorenew-ables.Considerthisassessmentfromthecom-munitychoicemovementinOakland,madeaspartofaproposaltoestablishabuyerscoop-erative:

It would be a very difficult, uphill battle to establish a municipal utility in Oakland. In order to do so, the existing, aging electricity distribution network would have to be purchased from PG&E or a new one built from scratch. Either option would be very costly.81

Where government support can be countedon,itmaybegearedtowardscooperatives—asithasbeen inGermany—making iteasier forthemtoscaleupquickly.


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Theremaybeotherreasonsthatcooperativesemergeasakindofsocialownershipprefera-bletodirectgovernmentcontrol.Wherestateownership involves oligarchic, oppressive,opaque, or ineffectual institutions, includingconstraintsandattacksonworkerorganizing,community-based cooperatives might offerthebestpathtomoreparticipatorycontrolofrenewable energy production. Even in placeswheretrustincentralgovernmentefficacyandtransparencyishigh,tensionsstillremainbe-tweenclaimsoftheadvantagesoflocalcontroland those of centralized governance.82 Fromsomeperspectives,ofcourse,cooperativesareappealingpreciselybecausetheyofferauton-omy from government andmust be defend-edagainstthethreatofstatecollaborationorcooptation.

Perhaps themost noteworthy critique of co-operatives from the left is that cooperativestendtoretainbenefitswithintheirownmem-berships. And the costs of entering into therenewable space can be prohibitive. Upfrontcapitalisoftenrequiredtoattainmembership,stronglydisadvantagingpeoplewithoutaccesstosavingsoreasycredit.Eventhemostinter-nallyegalitarianandcollectivistenergy coop-eratives,aswehavenoted,donotalwaysplayaclear role in the larger landscapeofenergyandequitypolitics.

Aside from the complicated relationship tobothmarketizationandinequalitythatcooper-ativescanhave,theremaybemorepragmat-ic reasons that cooperatives are not the pre-ferred choice of energy provision within anygiven community. Cooperatives take a lot ofwork,andpeoplemaynotwishtospendtheirtimeortheirexpertiseonthemanagementoftheirelectricitysupply.TheauthorsStevenM.Hoffman andAngelaHigh-Pippert argue thatcooperative decentralized energy is a way toreconstitute a fractured public sphere in theUnitedStates.ButtheyciteheavilyJohnR.Hib-bing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse’s work, put-

ting forward the thesis thatmany people donotactuallywantmoreengagementwithener-gygovernanceandthat “theassumptionthatmost people want to and are fully qualified tomakefundamentalenergychoicesthroughademocraticpolitical process ishardly indis-putable.”83

Wealsoknowthatbigcooperativescancometoresemblecorporateutilities,withtheirownoligarchic, opaque, and inflexible features—particularlyintermsoflaborrelations.Inset-tings where increasing government involve-mentinserviceprovisionispartofacommonpoliticalvocabulary,asinthecaseofVenezue-la,Bolivia,Argentina,andEcuador,municipal-izationmightbeamoreviablewaytorestruc-ture theelectricity system—thoughwemustalsobear inmindthatnoneofthesegovern-ments have aggressively pursued renewableenergyexpansion,andallareheavilyinvestedinfossilfuelextraction.Inthesecircumstanc-es, any worker-oriented “energy democracy”initiatives will have to weigh the costs andbenefitsofputtingforwardalternatives—suchasmunicipalizationor reformofexistingpri-vate utilities—on one hand and supportingstrugglestore-democratizecooperativesandorganizetheirworkforcesontheother.Inthelatter case, the full range of possibilities forunionengagementwithcooperativesmustbeexplored.

To conclude, we must consider whether thedistinctformsofsocialownership—decentral-ized community cooperatives at one end ofthespectrum,fullstateownershipattheoth-er—are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Certain-ly, in some circumstances, a strategic choicemustbemade.InthestruggletoshiftBerlin’senergysystemfromfossilfuelstorenewables,competingproposalswereput forward,withonegrouparguingforacooperativewithmassmembershiptobuyoutthegridandanothergroup arguing for municipalization.84 Mori’soutlineof thehistorical trajectoryofelectric-


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ityutilitiesnotesthatafteragrowthspurt inthe 19th century, their proliferation was “lat-er hindered by the municipalization of localpublic services.”85 Certainly interaction withthestateisnottheonlywaythatcooperativescan “scale up.” The cooperative communityhasseveralmethodsintheirarsenal,suchasforminglargerconglomeratesofcooperatives(DCSun,inWashington,isagoodexampleofsuchanendeavor).Otherpossibilitiesincludecollectivizing research, accessing technicalsupport through cooperative peak bodies,forming cross-sector coalitions, concentrat-ingfundingpools,andgrowingthenumberofcooperativesthroughdevelopmentinitiativessuchastheWalesCo-operativeCentre(origi-nallyfoundedbytheWalesTradeUnionCoun-cil).

But in other cases, such as that of Middel-grunden,thereisacollaborativerelationshipbetween these different forms of collectiveownership.InSouthTyrol,Italy,municipalitiesaresometimesmembersofelectriccoopera-tives.86Consider thisdescriptionofaprojectinColoradoSprings,UnitedStates:“Residents[...] may purchase shares in the city’s solargardenandthenreceiveacreditontheirmu-nicipalutilitybillsbasedontheenergygener-ated.Whenshareholdersmove,theycanselltheir shares to other residents in the city.”87 Many cooperatives receive government sub-sidiesandhavepartnershipswithmunicipal-itiesandprovinces,suchasEcopowerinBel-giumandBrixtonEnergy in theUK,whereacommunity cooperative has partnered witha local council to put solar on top of publichousing, while also being financed throughfederaltaxbreaksandsubsidies.HilaryWain-wrightarguesthatthesekindsof“public-pub-lic partnerships” offer a powerful base forcoalitionbuilding formoredemocraticecon-omies.88Wealsoseeexampleswherecollec-tivelyowned renewablesare “nested”withinutilities’operations,allowingutilitiestocountthem toward renewable energy production

requirements. This is the model with whichthe Colorado-based Clean Energy Collectiveoperates. These blurred boundaries and hy-bridformsshouldbetakenintoaccountasweconsiderthepossibilityofwhatDanielChavezhas described as “centralized planning anddecentralizedoperation.”89

We conclude by suggesting some key ques-tions for unions to consider as they assesswhat engagement they and their membersshouldhavewith cooperative renewableen-ergy:

⇒ Dothecooperativeshaveasocialmission,such as providing affordable energy ac-cess for low-incomeearners?Orare theycentrallyconcernedwithgeneratingfinan-cial returns formember-owners?What istheirrelationship—ifany—tocoordinatedredistribution?

⇒ Arethecooperativescommittedtobroaderattempts to expand renewables at speedand scale, or is their regulatory engage-ment limited to a narrow range of issuesthataffecttheirimmediateoperationsandprofitmargins?

⇒ Arecooperativesgrowinginthecontextofabroaderpush toweakenexistingpubliccontroloftheenergysystem,forinstancetheunderminingof publically ownedutil-ities?Orare theyworking toadvancecol-lectivecontrolofenergywherepreviouslytherewasverylittle?

⇒ Whatisthealignmentofpoliticalforcesinthegivencontext?Wherearepotentialal-liessituated,andwhatistheextentoftheirleverage?Arecooperativesthemostviablewaytoexpandsocialownershipofrenew-able energy, in relation to other optionssuchasmunicipalization?

⇒ Whatkindofpoliticsispossiblewithinthefinancing and structure of the coopera-tives? Is there space for worker voices indecision-making,orareanti-workerstruc-tureslikelytobe“lockedin”?


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⇒ Arethereopportunitiesforstablereturnsonpensionfundinvestments?

⇒ Aretheycooperating,competing,orwork-ing in parallel with other forms of socialownership,suchasmunicipalutilities?

Given the complex picture of different con-texts,missions,structures,andfinancesourcesamongrenewablecooperatives,itisneitherpos-siblenoradvisabletoformulateasinglepositionthatunionsshouldtakeinrelationtothem.On

thebasisofpresentexperience,thereisnooneroute to democratically governed renewableenergy;noonemethodthatunionsshouldsup-port that canguaranteepositiveoutcomes forworkersorcommunities.Butgiventheprogres-sive aspects of some cooperatives, a flexibleapproachwith room to adapt to the specifici-tyofeachpoliticalcontextwouldbe judicious.The strategic engagement of workers’ organi-zationswithrenewablecooperativescan—andshould—differaccordingtocircumstance.

3. Remunicipalization and Public Renewable Power

Lead author: Lara Skinner

Community-ledmovementstogainlocal,dem-ocraticcontrolofenergyandincreasethesharesuppliedby renewablesaregrowing.Manyoftheseeffortshavefocusedondevelopingwork-erorconsumercooperativesorrelyingonpri-vate companies and investor-owned utilities(IOUs).Muchlessattentionhasbeenpaidtotherole“publicpower”(state-ownedandoperatedenergy)andpublicutilitiescanplayinmeetingsocialneedsandexpandingrenewables.

Infact,aspublicutilitieshavebecomecorpo-ratized, corrupt, or bureaucratic, burgeoningmovements for renewables and local controloften view public utilities as an obstacle toneededchangeintheenergysector.Butthereare limitations to private, market-based, andevencooperativemodels.Onemajorlimitationlies in the fact that they are not truly public-lyanddemocraticallycontrolled.Even incon-sumer andworker cooperatives, the practiceofeconomicdemocracy is typically limited tothose who are members of the cooperative,excludingthebroaderpublicanditsinterests.Anothermajor limitation is that thepaceandscaleoftheirdevelopmentofrenewableener-

gyisnotsufficienttoaddresstheclimatecrisis.Publicly owned and operated energy, on theother hand,may be themost equitable, effi-cient,andeffectivewaytoaddresstheclimatecrisis,protectworkers,strengthenunions,andcreate an energy system responsive to com-munityneeds.

Historically, unions have been an importantforce both for public power and against pri-vatization in theenergysector.Unions inLosAngeles,amongthemtheInternationalBroth-erhoodofElectricalWorkers(IBEW),struggledforadecade intheearly1900stogainpubliccontrolofthecity’senergyandwatersystems,evenadvocatingforenergytobeviewedasapublic service,offered for freeorat very lowcosts.90 Still in operation, Los Angeles hasone of the oldest publicly owned power sys-temswithunion representation in theworld.In2014, theUtilityWorkersUnionofAmerica(UWUA)successfullystoppedtheprivatizationof thePhiladelphiaGasWorks in lightofseri-ous concerns about rates, reliability, systemimprovementsandupgrades,andworkerpro-tectionsunderprivateownership.91IntheUK,theunionGMB iscalling for renationalizationof theenergysystem. Itsmembers—workers


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intheenergysector—areworriedthatthepri-vate operator has let so many power plantsfallintodisrepairthatdieselgeneratorswillbenecessary to generate electricity during coldwinterspells.92

However,morerecently,therehasbeensignif-icantconflictbetweenenergyunions,commu-nities,andenvironmentalistsovertheexpan-sion of renewable energy because attemptstoswitchtorenewablesoftenthreatenunionjobsincoal,gas,andnucleargeneration.Givenunions’ significant representation in existingenergyutilitiesandtheabilitytobetterprotectworkers in most publicly owned and operat-edsystems,thetradeunionmovementhasamuchgreaterroletoplayindevelopingandad-vocatingfor“publicrenewablepower.”

Itisclearthatcreatingenergysystemsthatarebothmoreecologicallysustainableandequita-bledependslargelyontheabilitytoshiftpow-erfromthefossilfuelindustrytoworkersandcommunities.Energydemocracyisaboutwork-ers’ and communities’ ability to decide whoowns and operates our energy systems, howenergyisproduced,andforwhatpurpose.

This sectionexplores the important role thatutilities under public ownership and control,eitherthroughremunicipalizationorbyreformofexistingpublicutilities,haveinrealizingen-ergydemocracy.Intoday’senergysystem,en-ergydemocracymeansto:

⇒ Rapidlyscaleuprenewableenergytocon-troland thenquicklyanddramatically re-duceemissionsandharmfulpollution;

⇒ Protect workers’ rights and generate de-centandstablejobs;

⇒ Createanenergysystembasedonecolog-ically sustainable methods of energy ex-traction,transport,anduse;

⇒ Beresponsivetoneedsofcommunities ⇒ Addressenergypoverty; ⇒ Aggressivelypromoteenergyconservation.

Inorderforsuchavisiontoberealized,thela-bormovement, in collaborationwith allies inothersocialmovements,willneedtolead.

A Path to Energy Democracy?

Onepositivetrendtowardgainingmoredem-ocratic, public ownership of energy in recentyears has been the increase inmunicipaliza-tionandremunicipalizationcampaigns.Theseinvolve the creation of a municipally ownedutility(MOU),eitherfromscratchorbyrevers-ingpreviousprivatizations.

In most instances, public utilities were es-tablished to service public needs for energy,water, and sanitation,making them—in prin-ciple—well placed to transfer power to com-munities.Thatsaid,itisclearthatthecurrentdominantapproachtoenergypolicy,involvingtheliberalizationofenergymarkets,privatiza-tion, and corporatization, has diminished thecapacity of public utilities tomeet social andenvironmentalneeds.

Generally, the neoliberal approach to energyhas included higher energy prices, efforts todownsizeanddeunionizetheutilityworkforce,andlessreliableandpoorerqualityelectricityservice.93Manypublicutilities thathavebeencorporatized through the liberalizationof en-ergymarkets havemajor problems includingunderinvestment, corruption, and lack of re-sponsiveness.94Asaresultoftheseissuesandthegrowingvisibilityoftheclimatecrisis,morepressureisbeingputonutilitiestobothinvestsignificantlyinrenewableenergyandaddressothercommunityneeds.

Power to the People

During the 1980s and 1990s, a wave of pri-vatizationspreadthroughNorthAmericaandEurope that impacted many public services,


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including electricity, telecommunication, wa-ter, transportation, and sanitation. Over thelastseveralyears,however,effortstorollbackthesepolicieshavegatheredconsiderablemo-mentum,particularlyinthecasesofwaterandsanitation.Momentumintheenergysectorisnowgrowing.95WeareseeingwhatDavidMc-Donald calls the emergenceof a “new count-er-narrativetotheneoliberalideologyofmar-ket-basedservicedeliverysolutions”thathigh-lightsnon-private,collective,public,andsocialformsofenergyownership.96

Remunicipalizationeffortsoften stem fromaconstellation of factors, including communi-ties’desirefor“localcontrol,distributionaljus-tice, environmental sustainability and justice,andgreaterparticipationinthedecision-mak-ing and operations of the energy system.”97 Buttherecentrise inmunicipalizationeffortsseemstobelinkedtoafewdistinctfactors,dis-cussedbelow.

First,manyoftheconcessionagreementsbe-tween private, investor-owned utilities (IOUs)and cities, signed20or30 yearsago, areex-piring.98Thishasopeneduplegalandpoliticalspace for communities to reconsider wheth-er to renewtheir contractswithprivatecom-panies or to take energy utilities back underpubliccontrol.Thefailuresofprivatizationaremorewidelyrecognizednow,andmanycom-munitiesareconfidentthattheycanrunutili-tiesbetterthanprivatecompanies.99

Nearly everymunicipality operates against adifferent legal and regulatory backdrop thatimpactswhat cities are able to do to reclaimtheir utilities.100 Some, likeBoulder, Colorado,intheUnitedStateshaveafranchiserenewalmodel that enables the city to allow the pri-vatecompanies’franchiseagreementtoexpirewithout renewal.101 Inother cases, evenafterprivatization, thecitystillownsacertainper-centage of the grid and can end the contract followingareferendum.ThisoccurredinHam-

burg, Germany, in 2013 when citizens votedthrougha referendum to terminate the city’scontractwithtwoprivatecompanies.Thevotemandated the city tobuyback theelectricitygrid.102Itisalsopossible,insomecircumstanc-es, for governments to seize companies thatare no longer considered to be serving thepublic good. In California, the City of Coronaexercised eminent domain to “condemn,” orreclaim, the IOU, Southern California Edison,topubliccontrol inordertoreduceratesandprovide more reliable service.103 If sub-na-tional and national governments get seriousabout tackling the climate crisis, the use ofcondemnationandeminentdomainshouldbeexplored further. This isonewayofensuringthatcostdoesnotprohibitmunicipalitiesfromreturningprivateutilitiestopubliccontrol.

Second,growingconcernover theclimatecri-sis, airpollution,and theneed toquicklyanddramatically expand renewables have alsospurred communities to launch municipaliza-tion campaigns. Both private and public utili-tiesstillrelyheavilyonfossilfuelsforelectricitygenerationdespitenumerousstudiesthathaveshown it is technicallypossible tomeet 80 to100%oftheworld’senergyneedswithrenew-ablesinthefollowingdecades.104Inshort,citi-zensandcommunitieshavebecomefrustratedwiththefailureofutilitiestodeployrenewableenergyatthenecessaryscaleandpace.Thisre-fusalofIOUstoshifttorenewableshasmadethe fossil fuel industry’s tremendous powerovertheenergysystemmoreapparenttocom-munities.Thepriorityforfossilfuelcompaniesismaintainingrevenuesinthefaceof“disrup-tivecompetition”—windandsolarproducers—andsustainingorgrowingprofits.Theirpoweroverthesectormakesitverydifficulttoprotectworkers,communities,ortheclimate.Inshort,electricalutilitiesgenerallydecidewhatmakesuptheenergymixacommunityuses.Theonlywaytochangetheenergymixandaddressoth-ercommunityconcernsistogainpublic,demo-craticcontrolofthesedecisions.


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Third, the trend toward collective ownership,includingremunicipalization,isdirectlytiedtothegrowingpowerofsocialforcesforenergydemocracy, including indigenousmovements,climate and environmental justice activism,some segments of the labormovement, andothercommunitiesthathave“seentheeffectsof a profit-driven service delivery model onworkers, low-incomehouseholdsand theen-vironment.”105Thereisgrowingpublicrecogni-tionthatremunicipalizationisa“credible,real-istic,andattractiveoptionforcitizensandpoli-cymakersdissatisfiedwithprivatization.”106

Possible Limits to Remunicipalization

Thereare,however, somereasons tobecau-tiousabout remunicipalizationasameansofachievingmore democratic control of renew-able energy. Unfortunately, any assessmentofremunicipalizationishamperedbythelackof comprehensive data on and analysis ofsuch efforts in the energy sector. Unlike thewater sector, where a substantial movementto develop alternatives to privatization hasemerged,mosteffortstomunicipalizeenergyutilitiesareonly intheirearlystages.Citizenshave launched campaigns to remunicipalizeenergyutilities,andcitieshavemade thede-cision to municipalize their energy systems,butnotmanyhavecompletedtheprocessyet.Atthisstage it isdifficulttodrawanyreliableconclusions about how utilities operate afterremunicipalization or their ability to deliver“energy democracy.” As these stories unfold,thePublicServicesInternationalResearchUnithasdoneextensive researchandpolicyworktosupportunions’oppositiontoprivatizationand thedevelopmentofalternatives, suchaspublic-publicpartnershipsandremunicipaliza-tion.

In addition, remunicipalization efforts in theenergysectoraremostlylimitedtotowns,cit-ies, or counties taking control of the energydistribution system, and only in some cases

include control of electricity generation. This means that even if remunicipalization effortsaresuccessful,decisionsaboutenergygener-ation—forinstance,whethertoinvestinfossilfuels or renewables—may remain in privatehands.

Another reason to be cautious regarding theuniversal applicability of energy remunicipal-ization is that examples to date are not geo-graphicallydiverse.Becauseenergyprivatiza-tioninthe1990soccurredmostextensivelyinNorthAmerica and Europe, the expiration ofconcession agreements with private compa-niesarenowprovidingopportunitiestoreversethesetrendsintheGlobalNorth.Inmanypartsoftheworld,communitiesarestillfacingpres-suretoprivatizetheirenergysystems.Ratherthanamovetowardpubliccontrolofkeyser-vices, privatization is being advanced as partof a global austerity agenda. And even if theWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFundhavemovedawayfromusingthemostaggres-sivetacticsofstructuraladjustmenttoenforcethedirectprivatizationofpublicservices,theystill advocate strongly forpublic-privatepart-nershipsthatunderminepubliccontrolofkeysectors.

Finally,thelastlimittoremunicipalizationcam-paigns relates to free trade agreements. Theenergyremunicipalizationmovementcouldbecrushedbythemyriadfreetradeagreementscurrently being negotiated. The Trade in Ser-vices Agreement (TISA) would limit and mayeven prohibit remunicipalization because itwouldpreventgovernments fromcreatingorreestablishing public monopolies or similarly“uncompetitive” forms of service delivery.107 The standstill clause would lock in currentlevels of services liberalization in each coun-try, effectivelybanninganymoves frommar-ket-based to state-based provision of publicservices.Thisclausewouldnotinitselfprohibitpublicmonopolies;however, itwouldprohib-it the creation of public monopolies in sec-


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tors thatarecurrentlyopen toprivatesector competition.108

Inordertounderstandifremunicipalizationisan importantoptionorpathwayforachievingenergy democracy, the following questionsneedtobeexplored:

⇒ Can remunicipalization help communitiesgainpublicanddemocraticcontroloftheirenergyfuture?

⇒ Towhat extent are remunicipalization ef-forts shifting the power landscape in theenergysector?

⇒ Is remunicipalization an effective way tomassivelyscaleupsolarandwindenergy?Addressenergypoverty?Expandgoodem-ployment opportunities and union repre-sentationintheenergysector?

⇒ Whatarethelimitationsofrealizing“ener-gydemocracy”throughamunicipalizationapproach?

⇒ Towhat extent can remunicipalization ef-fortsbeusedtogainbroaderpublic,dem-ocraticcontroloftheenergysector,partic-ularlyatthenationallevel?

Efforts in the United States and Germany

The next section examines two recent casesofcitieswithstrongcitizen-ledcampaignsforenergy remunicipalization—Boulder, in theUnitedStates, andBerlin, inGermany. Sever-alothercitiesexploringremunicipalizationarealsotouchedon,highlightingthemainoppor-tunities and challenges these campaigns arefacing.

“Renewables Yes!” Takes on Xcel Energy: Boulder, Colorado, United States

Boulder isamedium-sizedcity in thewesternUnited States where environmental concernsenjoystrongpopularsupport.Largelydrivenby

frustrationthattheinvestor-ownedutility,XcelEnergy,wasdelayingBoulder’stransitiontore-newables,acoalitionofenvironmentalorgani-zations and citizens groups, Renewables Yes!, initiatedacampaigntomunicipalizetheutility.

Citizens’ efforts to reclaim the utility coincid-edwiththe2010expirationofXcel’sfranchiseagreement with the City of Boulder. Duringthenegotiationstorenewthefranchise,whichstarted around 2005, the city governmentpushedXceltoincreasetheshareofenergyitsupplied from renewables. Xcel agreed to in-stalla25-acresolararrayandshutdowntheValmont coal plant thathadbegunoperatingin 1924.109However, Xcel alsomoved forwardwith plans to build a new coal-fired powerplant, Comanche 3, and to retrofit anotheroldercoal-firedplant.ThecostofbuildingCo-manche 3 and retrofitting 950megawatts ofcoalgenerationwasover$1billion,andit ledtoincreasedpricesforXcel’scustomers.TheseactionsalsosignaledtoBoulderresidentsthatXcel was committed to using coal for manymore decades.110

Boulderhasanumberofeffortsunderwaytoreduce its carbon emissions, including a car-bon tax based on electricity use (rare for aU.S.city),acommitmenttotheKyotoProtocolemissionsreductiongoals,andastatewidere-newableenergystandard.111 Intheprocessofdevelopingclimategoals,itbecameverycleartoBoulderofficials that theonlyway thecitycouldsignificantlyreduceitscarbonemissionswas by decarbonizing its electricity supply.About 60% of Boulder’s energy mix comesfromcoal-firedgeneration,andXcel intendedtocontinuegeneratingelectricityfromcoalun-tilatleast2070.112ButwhentheCityofBoulderconducted its feasibility study for forming aMOU, it found that it could reduce its green-house gas emissions (GHGs) by 50%, by get-ting54%ofitsenergyfromrenewablesourceswithinfiveyears,withnonegativeimpactsonratesorreliability.113


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Boulder’s citizens became further frustratedwithXcelEnergywhen thecompany failed tosuccessfullycarryoutanenergyefficiencyandsmart gridplan. Xcelwas supposed to install1,845smartgriddevicesthatwouldmakeBoul-der’selectricitysystemmoreenergyefficient,atacostof$16million.Instead,Xcel installedonly101smartgriddevicesatacostof$44mil-lion.115XcelattemptedtorecoversomeofthesecostsfromBouldercustomersbuttheColora-doPublicUtilityCommissionintervened.116

Besideswishing to address climate concerns,Bouldercitizenswantedmoredemocraticcon-trol over their energy system in general, toensure reliability and rate stability.117 Indeed,Bouldercitizenshadconsideredmunicipalizingtheirenergyutilitythreetimesbeforethelat-esteffortin2013.Inthe1960s,Boulderconsid-

eredmunicipalizingXcelbecausethecompanyrefusedtoinstallundergroundelectricitylinesthatwouldmakeelectricityservicemorereli-ableandresistanttostormdamage.118

In2013,thecitizenandenvironmentalcoalitionRenewablesYes!broughttworeferendatovot-ers,andbothballotswerenarrowlyapproved.OneauthorizedtheCityofBouldertoconductalegal,financial,andtechnicalanalysisofthefeasibilityofBouldercontrollingitsownutility.TheotherapprovedaonedollarpermonthperresidenttaxtoestablishBoulder’sMOU.Boul-derhopestoestablishitsMOUby2017.119

Boulder voters’ decision to establish its ownutility is significant, given Xcel and other in-terestgroups’opposition tomunicipalization.Xcelspentmillionsofdollarstryingtooppose

Figure 1: Projection of Xcel Energy Corporation’s Energy Mix, 2015-2030114


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themunicipalizationreferendum,andassomecityofficialsnote,itsbudgettocontinuetofightthetermsofthemunicipalizationis“effectivelyunlimited”comparedtothatoftheCity.120 The totalcompensationpackageforXcelCEORich-ardKellyin2007was$8million.121XcelisalsoamemberofandcontributortotheAmericanLegislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a corpo-rate-funded,rightwingpoliticaloperationthathas developed and introduced a number ofanti-worker,anti-union,andanti-environmentbillsinvariousstatelegislaturesduringthelastseveralyears.122

ItisunclearwhetherunionsinColorado,partic-ularlytheIBEW,joinedthecompanyandotherconservative forces in opposing RenewablesYes! The IBEW has opposedmunicipalizationof Xcel Energy in Minneapolis, Minnesota.123 Aswasmentionedintheintroduction,unionscurrentlyhaverelativelyhighdensity in fossilfuelbasedenergygenerationand little tonorepresentation in renewable energy. In Boul-der, unionizedworkersmaintain andoperateXcel’scoalplants,currentlysupplyingBoulderwithmostofitsenergy.Asaresult,inBoulderand in other places where communities areconsideringremunicipalization,thecommuni-ty’sdesire toshift torenewableenergyoftendirectlythreatensunionandnon-unionjobsincoal and nuclear-dependent workplaces. Un-deraliberalizedenergymarket,workershavenoguaranteeofmakingajusttransitiontoan-othergoodenergyjob.Inthecaseofaremu-nicipalization effort like Boulder’s, the newlypublicly controlled energy grid couldprocureitsrenewableenergyfromaprivaterenewableenergy companywithnoprecedent forusingunionlabor.

AsBouldermovesforwardwithimplementingitsmunicipalizationplan,thecostofdoingsois unclear. These costs include acquiring thedistributionsystemandrelatedinfrastructure,stranded investment costs for Xcel, separa-tioncosts,compensationforinvestmentsXcel

madeinBoulderincludinginstallationofroof-top solar systems, smart grid infrastructureandenergyefficiencyinvestments,andanop-erating costbudget.124Ultimately, theFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)willde-cidehowmuchtheCityofBouldermustpaytoreclaimtheutility.125OncetheCityofBoulderregainscontrolof theenergyutility, itshouldbeabletooperatewithenoughrevenuetoin-vestsignificantlyintheenergysystem,includ-ing theexpansionof renewables,whilekeep-ingenergycostslow.

Remunicipalization in the Broader U.S. Context

The creation of new MOUs has been quiterareinrecentyearsintheUnitedStates.Since2000,sixteenMOUshavebeenformed,almostalways with significant opposition from theIOU involved. In 2001, San Francisco, Califor-nia,triedtoformaMOU.TheIOU,PacificGasand Electric Company, spent twomillion dol-lars todefeat theballot initiative.When IowaCitytriedtoformaMOU,MidAmericanEnergyCompanyspent26timesmorethanthemunic-ipalutilityadvocatestodefeattheballotmea-sure. And inoneof the largest battles in theUnitedStatesaroundmunicipalization,PacificGasandElectricspent$46millionin2010totrytopass a constitutional amendment tomakemunicipalizationharder.Theinitiativewasnev-erthelessdefeated.126

ResidentsinMinneapolis,Minnesota,havere-centlyorganizedacampaigntoremunicipalizetheir electric utility called Minnesota EnergyOptions.LikeBoulder,Minneapolishasacon-tractwithXcelEnergythat isabouttoexpire,openingthelegalandpoliticalspaceforthemtomunicipalizetheutility.LikeBoulder,citizensinMinneapolisarefrustratedwithXcelforde-layingtheirtransitiontorenewables.127

Today there are 2,008 public power systemsintheU.S.,serving15%of thepopulation.Bycontrast,thereare202investor-ownedutilities


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that serve 60%of the population. Rural elec-triccooperativesarealsosignificantactors inthe sector. There are 877 serving 13%of theU.S.population.Nextarepowermarketers,ofwhichthereare173,serving4%ofthepopula-tion.Thepublicpowerutilitiesgenerallyoper-ateonamuchsmallerscalethanIOUs,andthemajorityofenergygenerationanddistributionin theUnitedStates isprivatelycontrolled. InadditiontodistributingfarlesselectricitythanIOUs, two-thirds ofMOUs in the U.S. do notgenerate their own electricity; instead, theypurchaseitonthewholesalemarket.128

Clearly there is a lot of room for further re-municipalizationintheUnitedStates.ThiswillnotbeeasygiventheconcentrationofpowerandwealthinthehandsofIOUs.ButcaseslikethatofBoulder,Colorado,demonstratethatascommunities’ concernover the climate crisisgrowsandthefailuresofprivatizationbecomeclearer,abroadcoalitionofcitizengroups,en-vironmentalists,andothersocialmovementscan build power and successfully reclaim utilities.

Energy Remunicipalization in Germany

Germany’sambitiousplantophaseoutnucle-arandmassivelyscaleuprenewableshassig-nificantly shifted the institutional geographyof energy inGermany.Anumberofdifferentformsofownershiphaveemerged in the lastseveral years. Besidesmassive growth in en-ergy cooperatives, municipalization of ener-gy utilities is also occurring on a large scale.MorethansixtymunicipalenergyutilitieshaveformedinGermanysince2007,andmorethan170communitieshavetriedtoreclaimatleastsome parts of the energy grid from privatecompanies.129

A 2013 survey ofGerman citizens found that93%ofcitizensareawareoftheEnergiewende—thenamegiventoGermany’splantotransitiontorenewables—andthatmorethan80%ofcit-

izenssupportit.By2013,23.4%ofGermany’senergy was supplied by renewables, and onsomedaysoftheyear,renewablesaresupply-ingnearly100%ofGermany’senergy.Howev-er,privateutilitiesonlyown11.9%ofGerma-ny’srenewableenergycapacity.130 This means that 88.1% of Germany’s renewables marketis owned by other entities, and the privatelyowned utilities have lost roughly 20% of thetotalelectricitygenerationmarket.It’salsoim-portanttonotethattwootherGermancities—FrankfurtandMunich—neverprivatized theirenergysystem,andbotharecurrentlyworkingtowards a 100% renewable energy target by2025.131

Recent surveys show that large segments oftheGermanpublicbelievethatprivateutilitiesaredelayingtheshifttorenewables,whileoth-erentitieslikepublicutilitiesandcooperativesaremovingquicklytoscaleuptheirwindandsolar capacity. Indeed, a 2009 survey of Ger-mancitizensfoundthat81%trustlocalmunic-ipalutilitieswhileonly26%trust largecorpo-rations.132

Thesectionbelowreviewstworecentremunic-ipalizationcasesintheGermancitiesofBerlinandHamburg.

Berlin, Germany: Citizens Power Utility

Sparked by activists fromBerlin’s anti-global-izationmovement,thePetitionforClimatePro-tectiongroup,andtheNGOPowerShift,abroadcoalitionof55citizen,community,tenant,tradeunion, social justice, andenvironmentalorga-nizationscametogetherin2011toleadanef-forttoremunicipalizeBerlin’senergyutilitybywayofapoliticalcoalitionnamedBerlinEnergyTable.133Whenviewedalongsidethemunicipal-izationcampaignwagedinBoulder,theBerlincoalitionrepresentedabroader,morediversecoalition of organizations and interests. TheBerlin Energy Table interest in remunicipaliz-ing theutilitygrew froma rangeof concerns,


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goingbeyondtheclimateconcernsthattendedto dominate the Boulder campaign. In Berlintheinterestinremunicipalizationwas“notjustaboutthecity-statebuyingbackthelocalpow-erutilityandmakingitmoreamenabletothepolicy targets of Germany’s Energiewende butalsoabouthowtomakealocalenergysystemmoredemocraticandsociallyequitableaswellasenvironmentallysustainable.”134

TheBerlinEnergyTablecollected227,000sig-naturesinordertobringthereferendumtoavote. However, the referendum that allowedcitizenstovoteforBerlintobuybacktheener-gyutilityfromthestate-ownedSwedishcom-pany,Vattenfall,failedbyaverysmallmargin.The referendumrequired25%of thepopula-tion tovoteandonly24%voted.However,ofthe 600,000peoplewho voted, 83% voted infavorofremunicipalization.135Itisveryconceiv-ablethatareferendumtomunicipalizeBerlin’sutility will be introduced again and themea-surecouldeventuallybeapproved.

Intheprocessofdevelopingitsplanforremu-nicipalization, the Berlin Energy Table wentintoconsiderabledetailtooutlinehowthenewMOU would operate. These are some of thefeaturesthatweredevelopedbytheBerlinEn-ergyTablethatdemonstrateitsattentionandcommitment toworker, community, andeco-logicalissues:136

⇒ Citizen representatives would be electedtoanadministrativecouncilthroughdem-ocratic,directelections;

⇒ Worker representatives would also beelectedtothecouncil;

⇒ Neighborhood assemblies would be heldannually to allow Berliners to meet withtheirrepresentativestoraiseconcernsandnew initiatives. Theywould also have theopportunity to raise concerns outside oftheseassembliesviaanombudsperson;

⇒ The utility would have a mandate toachieve 100% renewables as quickly as

possible. Co-generation would be usedinsteadofcoalandnuclearuntiltheutili-tycouldincreaseitsenergyefficiency,re-duce consumption, and increase renew-ables;

⇒ ThenewMOUwouldofferunionized jobstoallcurrentgridemployeesandmaintaintheworkforceuntil2020;

⇒ Endingenergypovertywouldbeanexplic-it aim of the utility, and the public utilitywould be responsible for helping house-holdsdoenergyefficiencyretrofits.Thesepolicieswouldbefairtorentersandwouldtry to avoid displacement and gentrifica-tion;

⇒ TheMOUwoulddoawaywithabasicener-gyfeeandenergycutoffsandimplementaprogressivetariffthatwouldrisewithcon-sumption;

⇒ TheMOUwouldestablishafixedamountof“basicelectricity”asahumanright.

IncommonwiththeRenewablesYes! effortinBoulder,theBerlinEnergyTablefacedopposi-tionfromthecompanythatcurrentlyoperatestheenergyutility, theBerlinChambersof In-dustry andCrafts, and theunions represent-ingworkersinthecoalindustry.Thecitygov-ernmentultimatelyrecommendeda“no”voteontheremunicipalizationaswell.137Vattenfallranacampaignagainsttheremunicipalizationefforts under the banner “security via com- petence.”138

Asmalllaborunionofscientistssupportedre-municipalizationofBerlin’sutilityandactivelyparticipatedinthecoalition.Theunionrepre-sentingminingworkers—IGBCE—opposedthemunicipalizationonthegroundsthatitwouldnegativelyimpactjobsincoalminingandelec-tricitygeneration.BecauseofIGBCE’sopposi-tiontoremunicipalization,themainunionsinGermany, IGMetall andVer.di, aswell as theGermantradeunionfederation,DGB,didnottakeapositiononthereferendum.139AccordingtoMoss,etal.:


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The latter [IG BCE, the miners’ union] became a member of a “fact alliance” formed to lobby against re-municipalization together with local business organizations and to counter the joint efforts of the social movements’ coalition. The business community has been critical of re-mu-nicipalization from the beginning. The Berlin Chambers of Industry and Crafts argue that re-municipalization would neither improve com-petition in the city’s electricity market nor gener-ate greater public revenue with which to promote the city’s energy transition (IHK and HWK Berlin 2011). Echoing Vattenfall, they insist that “tech-nical and financial issues be put at the center of the discussion” (IHK and HWK Berlin 2011, p. 2). Their strategy is to frame the public discourse in terms of the relative cost efficiency of munic-ipal or private power utilities, the costs of buying up the power grid, the technological expertise required to run it, the legal obstacles to citizen participation and the consequences of re-munic-ipalization for employees. This agenda, reflective of neo-liberal discourses on urban and infra-structure development in general, has sought to outmaneuver and belittle the commons-oriented arguments put forward by the Roundtable and BEB.140

AtthesametimethattheBerlinEnergyTablewasadvocatingfor thecity-statetotakeoverthe energy utility, an urban energy coopera-tive,BürgerEnergieBerlin(CitizenEnergyBer-lin) was campaigning for the cooperative tobuy the city’s electricity system.141 As of Feb-ruary2014, 2,000peoplehad signedupwiththeBürgerEnergieBerlin cooperative,provid-ingtheorganizationwithninemillioneurosincapital.

In comparison to Berlin’s remunicipalizationcampaign,thecampaigntoestablishanurbanenergy cooperative gave far less attention tothe interests and needs of energy gridwork-ersand tomechanisms toguaranteeworkersandlocalcitizenshadveryparticipatory,dem-ocraticcontrolovertheenergygrid.Still,bothcampaigns demonstrate the potent desire ofcitizenstoreclaimtheenergysystemtomorepublic,democraticcontrolanddevelopacon-certedplantosignificantlyexpandrenewables.

Our Hamburg, Our Grid

ThecitizensofHamburg,Germany,launchedacampaign for remunicipalization in 2010. Theinitiative was called Our Hamburg, Our Grid,anditcalledforthepublicbuybackoftheen-ergygrid,gas,anddistrictheatingsupplyfromprivatecompaniesVattenfallandE.On.

As with the Berlin remunicipalization cam-paign, Our Hamburg, Our Grid argued thatsocially equitable, climate-friendly, and dem-ocratically controlled energy supply from re-newablescouldonlybeachievedifenergyin-frastructurewasheldinpublichands.142More-over,thecampaignargued,VattenfallandE.Onwere multinational companies focused onextractingwealthfromlocalcommunities,likeHamburg,ratherthanprovidingahighqualityrenewableenergyservice.143

The Hamburg effort was a grassroots cam-paign led by over fifty groups representinganti-nuclearactivists,environmentalorganiza-tions, anti-corporate campaigners, and faith-basedcommunities.Vattenfallactivelyfoughtthis movement, as did Hamburg’s governingSocialDemocraticParty (SPD)andthe largestoppositionparty,theconservativepartiesliketheChristianDemocraticUnion(CDU).144

Thevoteendedwith50.9%ofHamburg’svot-ersapproving the remunicipalizationreferen-dum in September 2013.145 The City of Ham-burgpurchased theenergygrid fromVatten-fall in January2014 forbetween495and550million euros. When the contracts for Ham-burg’s gas and district-heating infrastructureexpire in 2018-2019, Hamburg will buy thoseback,too,forapreliminarypriceof1.25to1.45billioneuros.146

As the second largest city inGermany, Ham-burg’ssuccessfulremunicipalizationofitsutil-ityisparticularlyinspiringbecauseitincludedthepublictake-overofgasanddistrict-heating


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aswell as the energy grid. Hamburg’s remu-nicipalizationcasewillbeaninstructiveonetomonitor over thenext few years, to seehowthe remunicipalization process unfolds, howdemocratic thecontrolof theenergyandgassystemsreallyis,howquicklyanddramatical-lyrenewablesareexpanded,andhowenergyandgasworkersareprotectedinthetransitiontoapubliclyownedandoperatedsystem.

A Growing Trend?

It appears that the remunicipalization of en-ergyutilitiesisagrowingtrendandpotential-ly an important way to expand democratic,publiccontrolandownershipofenergy.Manycommunitieswant a greater say inhow theirenergy systems are run. They want them toprovidehighquality,lowcostenergy,andtheywanttoseeatransitionfromfossilfuelstore-newables.Anumberoffactorscurrentlymakemunicipalizationattractive:highenergyprices,poorservicequality,shut-offswhenbillsaren’tpaid,andcontinueddependenceonfossilfuelsdemonstrate thatprivateutilities, andcorpo-ratizedpublicutilities,aredrivenbyprofit,notthepublicinterest.

Inthewatersector,therehasbeensignificantresistance to privately controlled water sys-temsandmanysuccessfuleffortstoreturnwa-tertopubliccontrol.In2009-2010,thelargestremunicipalization in Europe occurred whenParis reclaimed its water system fromwatermultinationals Veolia and Suez. In Hamilton,Canada, the “largest privatization contract inNorth America endedwith non-renewal,” re-claiming thewater systemback tomunicipalcontrol. Successful water remuncipalizationshaveoccurredaroundtheworld,fromCocha-bamba,Bolivia,toMalaysiatoDaresSalaam,Tanzania,andmanyotherplaces.147 These cam-paigns emerge for a variety of different rea-sonsbutoftenareledbyacoalitionofunionsandcitizensgroups.Asresistancetothefossil

fuel industry’sextremeenergyagendainten-sifies and themovements for climate justiceand climate jobs grow stronger, campaignsto remunicipalizeenergyutilitiesare likely to increase.

There will be more opportunities for energyremunicipalization campaigns in this decadeas the result of the expiration of concessionagreements that were signed at the heightof theprivatizationwaveduring the 1990s.148 Once they expire, municipalities can choosewhethertheywanttorenewthecontractwiththe private company or take the utility backunderpubliccontrol.However,aswesawwithHamburg, sometimes cities do not need towaitforthecontracttoexpire.InBuenosAires,Argentina,thegovernmentterminateditsthir-ty-yearcontractwithSuezforwaterprovisionwhenitwasonlyhalfwaythroughthecontractperiod.Suezhadfailedtoexpandcoverageorimproveservicesas ithadpromisedbutcon-tinued toask for contract renegotiations thatwouldallowitto increaseprofits.Underpub-lic control, water service has been expandedto poor neighborhoods, and thewaterwork-er’sunionnowownstenpercentoftheutility.Terminatingautilitycontractbeforeitsendisdefinitelyamoredifficultpathtoremunicipal-ization—SuezsuedtheCityofBuenosAiresforterminatingitscontractearlyfor1.7billionU.S.dollars.149But it isnot impossible, and itmaybecome increasingly common as more com-munitiessuccessfully remunicipalize theiren-ergy systems,orevenexploreusingeminentdomaintotaketheirutilitiesbackunderpubliccontrol.

Released from theneed to run theutility forprofit,MOUscanusesomeoftherevenuetheygeneratefromoperatingthegridtoloweren-ergy prices for community members, makeimprovements thatwillprovidemore reliableservice, construct public solar andwind gen-eration, increase staffing levels, and improvewagesandbenefitsforutilityworkers.Agood


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exampleofthisistheremunicipalizationofthewatersysteminParis,France.Inthefirstyearthat thewater systemwas taken back underpublic control fromprivateowners,SuezandVeolia,themunicipalitysaved35millioneurosand loweredwater prices by eight percent.150 Thatmoneywasusednotonlytoimproveandupdate Paris’ water system but also to helpGlobalSouthcommunitiesdevelop theirownpublicwatersystems.

Workerandconsumercooperativesprovideaninterestingmodel for developing small-scale,communitycontrolledrenewableenergyproj-ects, but the majority of energy is currentlyproducedanddistributedbyutilities,andtheyarestillproducingandprocuringthevastma-jorityoftheirenergyfromfossilfuels.Therere-mainsapressingneedtodramaticallychangetheenergylandscape—andtodothisrequiresinterventionintheownershipandoperationofutilities.

Remunicipalizationisonewaytoreclaimspaceforpubliccontrolwithintheenergylandscape.HowdemocraticaMOUbecomesdependsonthe strength and breadth of the movementdemandingremunicipalization.Unioninvolve-ment in remunicipalization campaigns couldcertainly expand thefight to includebroaderworkerandsocialjusticeconcerns.Forexam-ple,unions, incollaborationwithothermove-ments,coulduseremunicipalizationasaplat-formforreclaimingelectricityasahighqualitypublic service supported by unionized work-ers,withadequatestaffinglevels.

Beyond the Limits of Remunicipaliza-tion

From Remunicipalization to National Movements for Public Power?

Can municipalization be a route to advancepubliccontrolofenergyat thenational level?

Ifso,canwemovefromlocalizedcommunitycampaigns to nationwide municipal move-ments that result in a significant portion ofthe energy system being held under public control?

Oneof the limitationsofcurrentenergyutili-tymunicipalizationcampaigns isthatmostofthese efforts are aimed at operation of thegridonly,notenergygenerationitself.Duetoprivatization and liberalization of the energymarket,generation,distribution,andtransmis-sionofenergyareoftensplitup,meaningthatutilitiesmayonlycontroloneaspectoftheen-ergysystem.OnceMOUsgetpubliccontrolofthegrid,theystillhavetoprocureenergyfrommostlyprivatesuppliersorbuild,own,andop-eratetheirowngenerationsystems.

Many of these newly publicly owned utilitieswillhave toenteracompetitivemarketdom-inated by playerswithmany years of experi-ence,marketknowledge,andsubstantial tax-payersubsidiesfortheiroperations.Andoncedistributionofelectricity isunderpublic con-trol, communitieshave some importantdeci-sionstomake:fromwherewillthepublicutilityprocureitsenergy?Whattypeofenergywillitprocure—renewablesorfossilfuels?Andwhatprice,ifany,willbechargedforelectricity?

In South Africa, the country’s largest union,NUMSA,hastakenadifferentapproachtore-turningenergytopubliccontrol,startingatthenationallevel.Theyhaveproposedthatnation-alresourceslikecoalandotherfossilfuelsbenationalizedandthattherevenuefromtheseindustriesbeusedtomassivelyscaleupener-gy efficiency, renewable energy construction,andproduction.151

Insomecases,callingfornationalizationofen-ergymaybethebestoption.Inothersitmaybe taking private, bankrupted renewable en-ergymanufacturersunderpubliccontrol,andin still other cases, thebestoptionmaybea


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remunicipalizationefforttoreclaimtheutilitygridtopubliccontrol.

Giventhewaveofconcessionagreementswithprivateutilitiesthatwillexpireacrossdifferentpartsoftheworldoverthenextseveralyears,remunicipalizationshouldbefurtherexplored.Gaining a foothold of control in the energysystematthepointofdistributionandtrans-missionmayallowutilitiestoshowthebroad-er public the significant advantages of publiccontrol of energy. If remunicipalized utilitiesareable tomakesignificantgains inaddress-ingworker,community,andecologicalneeds,itcouldbecomemucheasiertomobilizecom-munity,public,andsocialmovementsupportforbroaderpublicownershipinotherareasoftheenergy system, likegeneration,and fromthesub-nationaltonationallevels.

Helpingnewlyremunicipalizedutilitiesbesuc-cessfulinthestillliberalizedenergymarketisimportanttobuildingabroader,morepower-ful,andeffectivemovementforpublicowner-ship and control of energy in the long-term.Solidarity and networking between alreadypublic utilities and communities undertakingremunicipalization is important. These com-munities can share experiences, expertise,andknowledgeabouthowtorunhighlypartic-ipatory,accountable,transparent,andrenew-ables based energy systems, perhaps alongthe lines of the emerging discourse around“public-public partnerships.”152 Developing anationalorinternationalnetworkofpublicutil-itiessupportingoneanotherissomethingthathasbeendonequitesuccessfullyinthewatersector and could be replicated in the energysector.

Does Remunicipalization Mean More Democratic Control?

Aswasapparentfromtheexamplesofmunic-ipalization thatwere sharedabove, therearevarying levels of “publicness” in municipally

owned utilities. The process of municipaliza-tionisnotsimplyonethatinvolvesgoingfromaprivatecompanytoasystemthatautomati-callymeetspublicneeds.Theprocessofmu-nicipalization can only be regarded as an ex-pressionof“energydemocracy”ifthesystembecomes truly transparent and accountableto social and environmental needs. In otherwords,eachcasebegs thequestion:docom-munitiesreallytakecontroloforganizingtheirenergy system? The Berlin Energy Table’s re-municipalizationcampaigndemonstratedhowautilitycouldbeoperatedinawaythatistrulydemocraticandresponsive tosocialandeco-logicalneeds.TheBouldercampaignwaslessfocused on ensuring a highly participatory,democratic ownership and operating struc-tureandmore focusedonusingremunicipal-ization to expand renewables. Ensuring thatpublic utilities are truly democratic, account-able, and transparent will depend largely onthestrengthofthemovementforremunicipal-ization.Astrongremunicipalizationmovementcanadvocateforandensurethatanewutilitydemocratically elects a utility board or com-mitteethatrepresentscitizensandworkersintheregion,withthepowertorunthesystemaccording to social and ecological needs andtheinterestsofthecommunity.

Learning from the Struggle for Public Power and Water in Los Angeles

Unionshaveconsistentlybeenstrongsupport-ers of public ownership of key services, likeenergy, water, healthcare, and sanitation. Inthecontextofemergingremunicipalizationef-forts,basedoncommunities’ interest ingain-inglocal,democraticcontrolofenergyandex-panding renewables,unionshaveoftenbeenon the opposite side of these efforts. Ratherthanbeingproactive in leading the transitiontomoredemocraticallycontrolled,renewablesbasedenergysystems,unionsareoftensidingwithIOUs,supportingtheexistingcentralized,fossilfuel-basedenergysystem,andresisting


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remunicipalizationefforts.Ultimately,itwillbeeasier to protect workers’ rights and ensureunion representation in the energy sector ifpublic ownership of the system is expanded,particularly ifunionsareproactivelysupport-ingeffortstoreturntheenergysystemtodem-ocraticcontrol.

Despiteunions’recentoppositiontoremunic-ipalization campaigns related to renewablesexpansion,unionsupportforreturningenergygeneration, distribution, and transmission topublic ownership and control goesbackoverone-hundred years. The municipalization ofLosAngeles’waterandpowersystems in theearly 1900s presents one of the best exam-plesofunionsplayinga leadingrole inbuild-ing successful public power. The Los Angeles(LA)labormovement—thecentrallaborcoun-cil and the IBEW in particular—launched andledahigh-pressure,successfulmovementforpublic power in the early 1900s, playing “thestrongest, longest role of all” of civil societyandbuildingmassivepublicsupportforpublicownershipofenergy,water,andotherkeyser-vices.153TheLA labormovement’s struggle toreclaimwaterandelectricitytopubliccontrolisdescribedbelowasaninstructiveexampleofunions’historicalandpotentialroleinleadingmunicipalizationcampaigns.

After building sufficient support for publicownership of the water system, the unionspushedthecitytouseabondsaletotakeoverthecompany.Thebondsalewasoverwhelm-ingly approved by voters and finalized at apricemuchlowerthanthecompanyhadwant-ed.Sixmonthsafterthevote,theBoardofWa-ter Commissioners took control of the waterutility.Amongtheirearlydirectiveswere:

1. “barring the city from selling, leasing, orotherwiseconveyingitsrighttoLosAnge-lesriverwatersoritscontrolovertheirdis-tributionunlesssoinstructedbya2/3voteofthepeople;”

2. “channelallwaterrevenues intoaspecialfund for the sole purpose of operating,maintaining, improving and extendingmunicipalwaterworks.”Oncethecitytookcontrolofthewatersystem,theyprovidedwaterserviceatcost:waterrateswereonethirdofthepricethattheywereundertheprivatecompany.154

TheLAunions’supportformunicipalizingwaterandenergy eventually led to the formationofa newworkers’ organization, called the PublicOwnershipParty.ThispartyadvocatedstronglyforLAtopassabondmeasurefor23millionU.S.dollars to massively expand LA’s water provi-siontoresidentsandprovidepublicpower.TheUnionLaborNewspublishedthisexcerptfromJohnMurrayofthePrintersUnionin1902:

WHEREAS, the fact has been demonstrated to ev-ery thinking person that both the Democrat and Republican parties are completely dominated by corporations [...]; and

WHEREAS, these monopolies charge extortionate rate for service, shirk the payment of legitimate rate of taxation, pack political caucuses, dominate pri-mary elections and nominating conventions, and name candidates who will be willing tools of these corporations;

THEREFORE [...] as the private ownership of pub-lic utilities is the cause of all political corruption, the Public Ownership Party has been formed for the purpose of promoting and establishing public ownership, and [...] (a) complete city ticket will be nominated.155

The formationof thePublicOwnershipPartypushedtheSocialistPartytoamoreprogres-sivepositiononpublicutilities,callingformu-nicipalization “of everything that is publiclyused, with the highest degree of democraticmanagement,andthecompleteeliminationofsocialparasitism.”156

AsthecampaignforabondmeasuretoexpandLA’swaterprovisionanddeveloppublicpow-ergenerationprogressed,thebankandbond


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syndicate decided to increase the interest rate LAwouldhavetopayonthebonds.Thiswastheir attempt to discourage and penalize thecityforpursuingmunicipalownership,atacticstill usedbybondunderwriters. In response,somemembers of the LACity Council beganadvocating for the City to only take over theelectricitygrid,andnotpursueowningitsownpowergeneration,too.Again,LAunionsfoughtforLAtopubliclyownbothenergygenerationand transmission. The unions convinced theCity tobring abondmeasure to vote for theCity to own and operate energy generationandtransmissionanditwonninetoone.

During thisfight, the IBEWmade it clear thattheyweresupportingthefightforpublicown-ershipofenergy,water,andotherutilitiesonprinciple as well as in the interests of theirmembersintheenergysector.Thecityleader-shipatthetimewasanti-union,buttheIBEWstillsaiditwouldratherworkforthecity,“badas it was as an employer, than for SouthernCaliforniaEdison,PacificLightandPower,andLosAngelesGas&Electric.”The Citizennews-paperreported“unionmemberswouldmuchprefer to work for a city-owned power plantintended toserveall thepeople than to lendtheiraid toprivatepowercorporations [...] inexistenceonlytopileupprofitsattheexpenseofthecommunity.”157

The IBEW also recognized that the fight forpublicpowerwasareputational issueforthelabormovement.Itwasafighttosecuregood,unionjobs inLAbut itwasalsoaboutunionsfighting for quality public services that couldmeet communities’ needs. The public waterand power campaigns built extensive allianc-esbetweenlaborandcommunitygroups,andcitizens developed tremendous respect forunions based on their commitment to remu-nicipalizingwaterandpower:

the councils of Labor, in order to maintain the con-fidence of the rank and file and the respect of the public, must be consistent in all things. The delegat-

ed were warned that [...] if those who represented Labor lined up [...] against bonds, especially when it is well known that the Power Companies have a slush fund to spend, the solidarity that has been es-tablished would fritter away, the respect of the pub-lic and the confidence of the membership would be lost, and the power of Labor to demand either mu-nicipal bonds, a wage scale ordinance, or anything else, would be entirely gone.158

The LA Central Labor Council’s resolution tosupportthebondsincluded:

WHEREAS, The Private ownership of public utilities is not conducive to the best interests of the citi-zens of the community or to the Labor Movement; and…

WHEREAS, It has been clearly demonstrated to the Labor Movement of this city that the treatment of employees by the public utility corporations, under private ownership and control, has been unjust and the benefits and service to the gener-al public [have] been unsatisfactory and the rates exorbitant; and

WHEREAS, It is the general policy of the organized workers of this country, whenever and wherever possible, to exert every possible effort to bring about municipal ownership of public utilities for the benefit of the common people…159

Theunions’fightforpublicutilitiesandthefor-mationoftheLosAngelesDepartmentofWa-terandPower,whichstillexistsoveracenturylater, broughtmanybenefits to LA residents.Ithasprotectedthemfromturbulentpricein-creases and energy shortages that character-izetheprivatepowermarketinCalifornia.

Up until the 1950s, most public transit sys-temsintheUnitedStateshadtheirownpub-licly owned and operated power generationsystems.Whenenergy companies attemptedtoprivatize the transitsystem’spowergener-ation system inNewYorkCity, the TransportWorkersUnionLocal100foughthardtokeepthepowersystemunderpubliccontrolagainstpressure from private energy companies.160 Theywerenot able to keep the system from


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being privatized, but it is just one historicalexample of many where unions have beenamongthemainsocialforcesfightingforpub-lic power. Their struggle for publicly ownedand controlled power has been essential toprotecting workers and growing unions, andithasbeencritical to forgingstrongalliancesbetweenunionsandcommunities.Reclaimingunions’fightforpublicpowertoincludepublicrenewablepowerwillbeessentialtoremakingpublicownershipofenergytomeetcommuni-ty,social,andecologicalneeds.

Reclaiming Public Utilities

Inthedebateoverremunicipalization,existingpublicutilitiesareoftencriticizedfortheirlackofresponsivenesstocommunityneed,corrup-tion,heavy relianceon fossil fuels,andotherproblems.Thesearealllargelyduetotheliber-alizationofenergymarketsandthecorporati-zationofpublicutilities.Inshort,inadditiontotryingtobringIOUsbackunderpubliccontrolthroughremunicipalization,reformingexistingpublicutilities—making them trulydemocrat-icandaccountabletopublicneed—isanotherimportantdimensiontothestruggletorealizeenergy democracy. Today many communities, environmental or-ganizations, and citizen-led campaigns areworking to decrease fossil fuel dependencyandscaleuprenewables.Butveryfewareex-ploringhowpublicutilitiesmightplayamajorroleintheseprocesses.Inmanycases,publicutilitiesareseenasanobstacletothesecam-paigns. This is unfortunate because public-ly owned and operated utilities could be themostequitable,efficient,andeffectivepathtoenergy democracy.

Thepossibleroleofpublicutilitiesingenerat-ing renewable energy and increasing energyefficiencyisunderstudied,despitethefactthatmost communities in the Global North origi-

nallybuiltoutandgainedaccesstoelectricitythroughpubliclyownedandoperatedentities,aswillbediscussedinthenextsectionofthispaper.Thusfareffortstodevelopandexpandrenewableshavemainly focusedoncoopera-tivesorprivateutilitiesandenergycompanies.Given unions’ significant representation inpublicutilitiesandtheabilitytobetterprotectworkers inpublicly ownedandoperated sys-tems, thetradeunionmovementhasamuchgreaterroletoplayindevelopingandadvocat-ing for “public renewable power”—the directdevelopmentandexpansionofrenewableen-ergyandenergyefficiencythroughdemocrati-callycontrolledpublicutilities.

Thenextsectionexamineswhypublicutilitieshavebeenslowto transition fromfossil fuelsto renewables, and it begins a conversationaboutwhyandhowpublicutilitiescanplayamajorroleinexpandingrenewablesandener-gyefficiency.While it isdifficult tofindpublicutilitiesthatarestellarexamplesofdemocrat-ically run,highquality, renewables-baseden-ergyproviders, there are a numberof publicutilities that are focused on improving theirservice,savingthepublicmoney,andaddress-ingclimateconcerns.Afewoftheseexamplesarehighlightedbelow.

Public Utilities and Renewables

Slow to Develop Renewables

Thevastmajorityofpublicutilitiesstillprocuremostof theirenergy fromprivateproducers,mainly relying on fossil fuels. At this point inmost parts of the world, neither public norprivate utilities have a financial incentive toexpand renewableenergy. In the caseofpri-vateutilities,theircontractwithacity,county,orstatetypicallyguaranteesthemaprofit.Onthe other hand, liberalization of the energymarkethasmadeitdifficultforpublicutilitiesto compete with private utilities, especially


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whenitcomestomajorinvestmentsinnewin-frastructure.Butbotharethreatenedbysmall-scaleproducersofrenewableenergy,like“pro-sumers”ofresidentialsolar,whichcutintotheutilities’ market share. Government supportfor renewables often relies onmarket-basedstrategiesthatprovideincentives,subsidies,ortaxbreaks toprivate renewableenergy com-panies, further undermining public utilities’ability to invest in and coordinate renewableenergydevelopment.

Forbothpublicandprivateutilities,theimpactofcustomerstryingtoleavethegrid—whetherbecause they’re producing their own renew-ables or they’re trying to avoid tax levies ontheir renewableproduction—hasbeensignif-icant.Asmoreandmorecustomersleavethegrid, the cost of operating and maintainingthe grid goes up. This increases the cost ofelectricity for the remaining customers, dis-proportionatelyimpactinglow-incomehouse-holdsandmakingitevenmoredifficultfortheutilitiestomakebiginvestmentsinrenewableenergy and energy efficiency. In Europe, thetop twenty private utilities have lost abouthalftheirvalueinthelastfewyearsbecauseofthestrandedassetsleftbehindfromcustom-ers leavingthegridforsmall-scalerenewableproduction.161 Importantly, the devaluing ofIOUs opens up an important opportunity forunions toadvocatestrongly for socialowner-ship of these utilities and grid systems. Thiscouldbedoneatthenationallevel—essential-lyrenationalization—orthroughmunicipalitiesdevelopingpoliciestoscaleupandotherwisesupportcooperatives.

The reluctance on the part of many utilitiestodevelop renewableshascausedsignificanttensionbetweencommunitieslaunchingcam-paignstoexpandrenewablesandthetypicallyunionizedworkerswhocurrentlymaintainandoperate utilities’ fossil fuel or nuclear gener-ation and distribution systems. If communi-tiesaresuccessfulinshuttingdownfossilfuel

plants,theworkers inthoseplantsoftenlosetheir jobs and economic livelihoods. This haspushedutilityworkers andunions toopposethedevelopmentandexpansionofrenewables.Thisputsworkersonthewrongsideofclimateprotection and renewable energy struggles,in opposition to communities, environmentalorganizations,andothersconcernedwiththeclimatecrisisandthepublichealthimpactsofmining,transporting,andburningfossilfuels.Giventhehighuniondensityinpublicutilities,astrategytohavepublicutilitiesbuildandrunutility, community, and residential scale re-newables promises to expand unionized jobcreation,strengthenpublicutilityunions,andensurehighqualityenergyservice fromwell-trainedandhighlyskilledunionworkers.

The Public Power Advantage

Thereareanumberofreasonswhypublicutil-itiesdeserveseriousconsiderationasthebestway tomassively scale up renewables.Manyoftheadvantagesthatallowpublicutilitiestoprovide electricity more cheaply and reliablythanprivateutilitiescanbeappliedtotheissueofexpandingrenewablesandenergyefficien-cy.Asnot-for-profitentities,publicutilitiescanrunatcost,whichopensupspacetoprovideelectricity service with communitymembers’interestsandneedsinmind.Onaverage,pub-licpowercosts10-15%lessthanelectricitypro-vided by private companies and contributesabout18%moreofitsrevenuestomunicipal-ities than IOUs.162Publicutilitiesalsotypicallyfeature better reliability, the ability to targetinvestments according to local priorities, andlowerborrowingcosts.163

Public utilities are generally less hostile tounionized workforces. As MOUs are locallyownedandoperated,theyemploymorelocalpeopleandhelpkeepenergydollarswithinlo-calcommunities.165ManyIOUsoperatewithaverycentralizedadministrativeandoperationsstructurethatrequireslittlelocalemployment.


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MOUsmustemploymanagers,operators,cus-tomerserviceagents,repairmen,andahostofotherworkers to run andmanage their dailyoperations.Privatizedutilities,withtheirfocuson increasing profits, are also known to runtheiroperationswithlessthansufficientstaff-ing levels to keep costs down. This becameveryevidentinNewYorkin2012,whenSuper-stormSandyseverelydamagedtheelectricitysystem.TheIOU,Con-Ed,hadtobringin6,000workerstorepairthesystembecausetheyhadreduced the utility workforce to dangerouslylowlevels.

In principal, public utilities are committed tothecommongoodandarethe“designinstru-

mentof regional infrastructurepolicy for thepublic.”166 For this reason, municipal utilitiesare usually subject to less state regulatoryoversightthanIOUs,allowingthemtoactmorequicklyandinnovateinnewways,aswiththedevelopment and deployment of renewableenergy.167

Equity, Speed and Scale: Public Renewable Power

Public utilities can directly build and operaterenewables at all scales. Many communitiesare focused on developing small or residen-tial-scalesolarandwind.Thiscanbeinordertohavemoredirectcontrolovermeetingtheirenergy needs or because large-scale renew-

Figure 2: Difference in Electricity Costs Between Private and Public Utilities164


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ableprojectscanhavenegativeecologicalim-pacts—some large-scale solar andwindproj-ects require vast amounts of water or causemajor and permanent disruption to the sur-roundingecosystem.Giventhescaleofthecli-matecrisisandthevastenergyneedsofsomelarge,densecities, it is likely thatutility-scaleand smaller-scale renewable energy supplyprojects eachhave an important role to playin reducing emissions. Public utilities can bedirectlyinvolvedinbothtypesofprojects,con-structing, owning, and operating both smallandlargescalerenewables.

Currently, most public utilities procure theirlarge scale generation supply from privatecompanies and IOUs. In other words, publicutilitiesdistributeandtransmittheenergy,butdonotownandoperatetheplantsthatsupplyit.Byonlyowningandcontrollingthedistribu-tionandtransmissionofenergy,communitiesare reliantonprivatecompaniesand IOUs todeveloprenewableenergy.Italsomeansthattheprivate IOUshavesignificantcontroloverthe price they charge for the energy, includ-ingwhattheyneedtochargeinordertoprofitfromtheenergy.Butpublicutilitiescanbuild,operate, and maintain their own renewableenergygeneration.Givenmanycommunities’interest in scaling up renewable energy andpublicutilities’accesstolow-interestpublicfi-nancinglikebonds,thisismorethanpossible.

Oneof themost importantaspectsofhavinga public utility construct and operate solarand wind is that it can be done at the scaleandspeedneededtoaddresstheclimatecri-sis. Thus far,having individualhouseholdsorworkerandconsumercooperativesinstallso-larandwindhasnotachievedthescaleofre-newabledeploymentthatisneededtoquicklyanddramaticallybringdownemissions.Inor-dertoensurethatglobalemissionspeakinthenext fewyears,solarandwind installationaswell as energy efficiency retrofits need to berolled out en masse. Public utilities have the

capacitytocoordinateandcarryoutthisscaleofwork.Withwell-trained,unionizedworkers,theworkcanbedoneefficientlyandcorrectly.TheNewYorkCityBuildingTradesCouncilandtheNewYorkCitygovernmentsignedaprojectlaboragreementin2015torebuildresidentialhomes damaged by Superstorm Sandy. Thefederalgovernmentisprovidingover$400mil-lionfornearly20,000homestoberepairedinthenext two years, allwithunion labor. Thisprovides an interestingmodel for how large-scaleenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergyworkcanbedonequicklyandwithunionlabor.Indeed,anumberofenergyefficiencyretrofitswillbedoneonthese20,000homesastheyarerepairedandrebuilt.

Large-Scale Renewables

Intheearly1900s,LosAngelesunions,includ-ing the central labor council, fought hard fortheLosAngelesPowerandWaterDepartmentto own both its energy supply and transmis-sion grid.168A largepartof thisfightwaswin-ningvoterapprovalforthelargepublicbondsthatwouldpayfortheconstructionofhydro-electricdamsandhundredsofmilesofwateraqueducts that were used to supply LA withfreshwater and electricity. In general, publicfinancinghasplayedanimportantroleinmak-ingsignificantinvestmentsandimprovementstopublicenergysystemsinthepast.

Public institutionsalsohaveaccess to low-in-terest, general obligation bonds that can bepaidoffoveralongperiodoftimethroughtax-es.SomeLAunionsadvocated for “currency”or“popular”bonds.Currencybondsmeanthatbonds are sold to ordinary citizens for smallamountsthatcollectivelyadduptosignificantamounts,particularlyinlargecitieslikeLosAn-geles. Like other bond underwriters, citizensare then able to earn interest on their shareover time. Rather than having thousands ormillionsofdollarsofinterestgotowealthyin-dividualsorcorporations,currencyorpopular


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bondskeepthevalueoftheinterestwithinthelocalcommunity.Thesetypesofpopularbondstrategies come into play because the largebanks, wealthy individuals, and corporationsthatunderwritebondsanddeterminetheirin-terestratesmaybeopposedtopublicowner-shipofenergyandthustrytostopitthroughincreasingtheinterestratesonbonds.

Utilities,bothpublicandprivate,alsousecus-tomer rate increases to fund energy systemupgrades and improvements. Raising energypricesunfairlyimpactslow-incomecustomers,however,soutilitiesconcernedwithequitytrytoavoidit.Overtheyears,communitieshaveexploredprovidingabasicamountofenergytoallhouseholdsforfreeinthesamewayas,forexample,publiceducationis.Providingabasicunit of electricity for free means that lower- incomefamiliesarenotdisproportionatelyaf-fected by rising energy prices. Unions in LosAngeles advocated for this while they werebattling for public ownership of energy andwater systems. The Berlin Energy Table alsoadvocated for this during their struggle forremunicipalization. Until recent deregulation,Norway’spublicpowersystemofferedtwoen-ergyplanoptionstothepublic—abasicunitofenergyforalowcostoraslightlyhighercon-sumptionplanthatcostabitmore.

Smaller-scale renewables

Underprivatesectorinitiatives,oreventhroughconsumer and worker cooperatives, individ-uals self-select to install solar or wind powerandoftenneedfundsforaninitialinvestment.Thismeansthatlower-incomehouseholdsandcommunitiesaremuchlesslikelytoinstallsolarandwindpower.Thisinturnmeansthatthein-stallationratesforsolarandwindarefarbelowwhatisneededtoaddresstheclimatecrisis.Inadditiontodirectlyconstructingandoperatinglarge renewable projects, public utilities canalso build, own, and operate community andresidential-scaleprojects.

Public utilities installing, owning, and main-taining parts of the energy system at thehouseholdlevelisactuallyrelativelycommon.Forexample,insomeCanadianprovinces,ifahouseholdneedsanewhotwaterheater,theycall thepublicutility to tell themtheyneedareplacement.Thepublicutilitythenschedulesa time tocome to theirhouseand install thenewheater.Individualhouseholdspaynothingforthenewheateroritsinstallation,buttheyreceivethebenefitsofhavingamoreefficienthot water heater and a lower monthly elec-tric bill. Thirdpartyownership arrangementsare already common in private sector solarinstallations. Under this arrangement, a pri-vatecompanypaystoinstallsolaronaprivatehome.Whiletheindividualdoesn’thavetopayfor the installation, theyalsodonotown thesolarpanelsorhavecontrolovertheirenergysupply. Public utility installation and owner-ship of household-scale solar is a compellingandviablealternativetothesekindsofprivatethirdpartyagreements.

Some public utilities are already significantlyexpandingtheirrenewableenergyandenergyefficiencywork.Someexamplesarehighlight-edbelow,providinginsightintohowpublicutil-itiescanplayaleadingroleinenergyefficiencyandrenewableenergyworkatalargescale.

Public Utilities Leading

Manypublicutilitiesdoenergyefficiencyworkatnocosttothecustomer,includinginstallinginsulation and providing efficient light bulbs.Customersneedonlyrequesttheefficiencyim-provements.Or,insomecases,everycustom-er is providedwith the improvement—publicutilitiesdotheupgradesonehouseholdafteranother by region. TheUK’s public utility didthisinthe1960sand1970s,temporarilyaskingfamilies tomove tootherhousingwhile theydida completeenergy retrofitof theirhome.Theworktookafewdaysandwasdoneatno


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costtotheresidents.Belowareseveralexam-plesofpublicutilitiesdoingthisworktodayintheUnitedStates.

Sacramento Municipal District Utility (SMUD)

SMUDisaMOUserving600,000customersinandaroundSacramento,California.SMUDwascreatedin1946aftera23-yearlegalbattlewiththe IOU, Pacific Gas and Electric. SMUD hasmade significant investments in solar, wind,andenergyefficiencysince the1980sand in-deed has the ambitious goal of reducing itsGHGsby90%by2050.169

SMUD built its first utility-scale solar farm in1984,aonemegawattplantthathassincebeenexpandedtoa3.2MWplant.Italsodevelopedadistributedsolarinstallationprogramforitscustomersthatledtoitmanagingover600so-larprojectsbytheyear2000,whichaccountedfor tenpercentofall solarPV installed in theU.S.at that time.SinceSMUDwasbuyingso-larproductsinbulk,itsinstallationcostsweremuchlowerthanthoseofcomparableprojectsin the U.S.—SMUD’s solar installation projectcosts in1999were“equaltotheaveragecostnationwidein2012.”170

SMUDbuilt itsfirstwindfarm in1994,nowa100MWoperation.Italsohasasignificanten-ergy efficiency program. For example, it hasplanted500,000treestoreduceaircondition-ingdemandinSacramento.Importantly,SMUDisexpectedtomeettheCaliforniastaterenew-able energy standard of 33% renewable by2020.Evenwithitsmajorinvestmentsinsolar,wind, and energy efficiency projects, SMUD’saverageretailelectricityrateis25%lowerthanthestateaverage.

Austin Energy

Thepublicenergyutility inAustin,Texas,hasalso made important strides towards ambi-tious renewable energy goals. Austin Energy

recentlycompleteda30MWutility-scalesolarinstallationandhas installedover1,000solarsystemsonresidentialrooftopstotaling8MWofin-citysolarenergy,anditplanstohave35%of its energymix supplied by renewables by2020, reducing itsGHGs20%below2005 lev-els by 2020.171 15% of Austin Energy’s supplycamefromrenewablesin2012.Energyauditsaremandatoryforallresidentialandcommer-cialbuildingsmore than tenyearsold, and itpartners with a local credit union to provideloansforenergyimprovementsonresidentialbuildings.

Chattanooga’s Electric Power Board (EPB)

TheMOU inChattanooga, Tennessee,has in-stalledworld-classsmartgridtechnologytore-duceenergydemand, improveelectricityser-vice,andprovideitscustomerswithexcellentInternetservice.Chattanooga’sElectricPowerBoard(EPB),createdin1935bytheTennesseestate legislaturetodeliver inexpensivepowerfrom the TVA, built a $111million fiber opticnetworkthatallowssmartmeterstocommu-nicatewirelesslywiththefibernetwork.172 This project was completed seven years ahead ofscheduleandisalsousedtodeliverhigh-speedinternetservicetoitscustomers.

Aspen Utilities

InAspen,Colorado,theMOUalreadyprovides75% of its electricity from hydroelectric andwind power and hopes tomove to 100% re-newables (including hydropower) within fiveyears.173 The mission statement of the City of AspenUtilitiessays:

To manage and maintain our water and electric resources from their resources to our customers in a manner that most efficiently meets, or ex-ceeds, all related State and Federal standards, while driving the reduction of Aspen’s greenhouse gas emissions and energy use through policy, out-reach, energy efficiency and renewable energy programs.174


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Winter Park, Florida Electric Utility

Citizens in Winter Park, Florida, successfullyremunicipalized their electric utility in 2001.Their major concern with the IOU, ProgressEnergy Florida, was around reliability—resi-dents frequently lostpower.The IOUrefusedtobuildundergroundelectrical lines tomakethemmoreresistanttostormdamageunlessthe city paid for it.When the remunicipaliza-tioninitiativewenttoavote,69%votedtore-municipalize the utility. Since then, the newpublic utility has completed undergroundingprojects for five neighborhoods and has puta number of mainline feeders underground.Winter Park has also started amajor energyefficiency programwhere the city pays for asignificantportionofthecostsrelatedtoductrepair, attic insulation upgrades, heat pumpreplacements,energyefficiencywindows,wallinsulationupgrades,reflectiveroofing,andso-larwaterheaters.175

Dover Public Utilities

A number of other public power utilities inthe United States offer important programsforexpandingsolargeneration.DoverPublicUtilities in Delaware offers customers directcash incentives of up to $128,000 annuallyto install solar systems. Non-profit custom-ers of the utility receive twice the rebateamountavailabletoothercustomers,totaling

up to $256,000of direct cash incentivesper year.176

Unions Essential to Remunicipalizaiton and Public Renewable Power Fights

With support and leadership from unions, apowerful movement for “public renewablepower” canbebuilt.Apoliticalprogrambuiltaroundpublicrenewablepowercouldbringto-getherunions, citizen groups concernedwithlocal and democratic control of energy, andothermovementsconcernedwiththeclimatecrisis. It would be an opportunity to quick-ly and dramatically scale up renewables andcreatethousandsofunionjobs—inawaythatis equitable and democratic. Given the fossilfuelindustry’scurrentcontrolovertheenergysector,unionswillneed toplaya lead role inbuilding a broad-based, powerful movementforpublicownershipandcontroloftheenergysector, including support formunicipalizationcampaigns. Experience from other sectors—waterandsanitation,forexample—showthatgainingandregainingpubliccontroloftheen-ergysector isessential toprotectingworkersandstrengtheningunions—particularlyintheenergy sector—as we transition to a renew-ables-basedenergysystem.It’salsoimportanttoensuring this transitionoccursat thepaceandscalenecessarytoaddresstheclimatecri-sisandinanequitablemanner,withoutharm-inglow-incomehouseholds.

4. Public Goods and Public Works Approaches to Energy Transition and Climate Protection


Thepurposeof thisfinalsection is to furtherdevelopthecaseforapublicgoodsandpublicworks approach to advancing energy democ-racyandclimateprotection.

The approaches to energy democracy dis-cussedsofarinthispaperhavemanypositivesocialandeconomicfeatures.Eachcanpoten-tially make a major contribution to buildinga new energy system that is democraticallyrun for the public good. The fight for a new


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energy system is likely to unfold on severalfronts, and forming cooperatives, reformingthe utilities, exerting municipal-level controlover electricity systems, and other initiativesare all important to one degree or another.

But the climate challenge, alongwith the im-pact of pollution from fossil fuels on humanhealth,meansthatmoreattentionneedstobeplacedonthespeedandscaleofthetransition.Therearepresentlynotenoughcooperatives,notenoughcitiesconvertingtorenewableen-ergy, and not enough utilities pivoting awayfrom fossil-based power to significantly alterthe“businessasusual”scenario.Thiscan,andmust,change.Ifitdoesnotchange,wewillfaceaplanetbetweenfourandsixdegreeswarm-erby2100,andlargeregionsoftheworldarelikelytobeuninhabitable.Asnotedattheout-set, the science-based emissions reductiontargets and timetablesproposedby the IPCCmake itnecessary for theenergybaseof theglobaleconomytobecompletelytransformedduringthecourseofthenexttwoorthreede-cades. Renewable energyneeds to be scaledupdramaticallyandfossil-basedpowergener-ationandtransportationneedstobedrastical-ly reducedorphasedout altogether. Theen-ergy system ischanging,butitisnotchangingquicklyenough.

A public goods and publicworks approach toadvancingenergydemocracyandclimatepro-tectionthereforedeservestobegivenseriousconsiderationbecausesuchanapproachcouldgiveimpetustothekindofpositiveexpressionsofenergydemocracydiscussedinprevioussec-tions, perhaps helping them to have a muchlargerimpact.

The “Depression and World War Two” Approach The severity of climate change and relatedcrisesandtheneedtoactquicklyhasevoked

comparisonswiththeperiodoftheGreatDe-pression. As is well known, mass unemploy-ment and high levels of social unrest com-pelled governments of the 1930s to take de-cisiveaction—inmanycasestakingcontrolofthebanks, developing infrastructureprojectsto provide jobs, and other emergency mea-sures.Similarly,duringWorldWarTwo—acri-sisofadifferentkind—governmentsmobilizedvast amounts of capital and redirected hugesuppliesof labor toward themilitaryand theindustries that served it. In both instances(economicdepressionandescalatingwar)thecore concerns of the private sector revolvingaroundprofitwerenolongerprimary;indeedtheincapacityofprivatecorporationstoservethepublicinterestintimessuchasthesewaswidely acknowledged during the debates oftheperiod.

Inrecentyears,asmallhandfulofwritersandcommentators have suggested that the cli-mate crisis demands the same kindof policyresponse from governments.177 They arguethat dealing with climate change (and otherplanetary limits) will require the suspensionofbusinessasusualandprofoundsocietalre-structuringinthedecadesahead.

Unions and the Case for a Public Goods Approach

Unionsdonotaccepta“sixdegreeworld.”Butinordertoavoidasixdegreeworld,aradicalshiftinpolicyisneeded.Thewaytheissuesaredefinedalsoneedstochange,andthiscanbe-ginbyassertinga“publicgoods”approachtoclimateprotection.

Thetradeunionmovementcouldbeastrongadvocate for such an approach, especially inthe knowledge that market-based policieshavefailedtodelivertheenergytransitionweneed and these policies will almost certainlycontinuetofallshort.Apublicgoodsapproach


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to the fight against energy poverty and forfull energy access can also be asserted. Thismeans thatunions canproposepublicgoodsapproachesinawaythataddressesthesetwomassive challenges simultaneously. Thebasicprinciple behind a public goods approach toenergy transition is simple: the future of hu-mancivilization isatstake,andeveryonewillthereforebenefitfromaplanned,orderly,andtransparentenergytransitionthatdevolvesasmuchpoweraspossible toworkers, commu-nities, and municipalities. However, govern-mentswillhavean importantrole.Amassivedeploymentof renewable energywill requirehighlevelsofplanningandcoordinationinor-dertoensurethattherightmixofrenewablesis developed. How much solar photovoltaic?Howmuch solar thermal?Wind power? Tidalpower?Theanswerstothesequestionswillde-pendonspecificlocationsandcircumstances.

Becausethebenefitsaremanyandvaried,andstand in stark contrast to the unimaginabledamagelikelytoresultfrom“businessasusu-al,” a public goods approach is fully justifiedandrequired.

Learning from the New Deal

How can climate and energy-related publicgoods be delivered? Historically, the connec-tionbetweenpublicgoodsandpublicworksisastrongone.Thepublicworksprogramsde-veloped in numerous countries in the 1930sand1940sandintheformercolonialworldinthe nameof nation building during the post-warperiodchangedtheglobalpoliticalecono-myofthemiddledecadesofthe20thCentury.

TheexperienceoftheNewDealintheUnitedStates is particularly relevant when consid-eringhowanenergy transitioncanbe imple-mentedinthenexttwoorthreedecades.WiththeUnitedStatesinadeepeconomicandso-cialcrisis,theRooseveltAdministrationestab-lishedthePublicWorksAdministration(PWA),

theWorksProgressAdministration(WPA),andthe Civic Works Administration (CWA). Theseprograms employed millions of workers andbuiltthousandsofmilesofroads,hundredsofairports,andtensofthousandsofpublicbuild-ings.TheWPAalonebuilt78,000bridges.TheU.S.governmentcommittedtheequivalentof13%ofU.S.GrossDomesticProduct (GDP) totheseprograms.Toput thisfigure incontext,the Obama Administration’s stimulus pack-age under the American Recovery and Rein-vestmentActcommittedjust2%ofGDP—andmost of this commitment came in the form of taxcutsthatgeneratedonlymodestnumbersofnewjobs. The TVA and the REA

Twomajor projects under the PWAwere theTennesseeValleyAuthority (TVA)and theRu-ral ElectrificationAdministration (REA). In themid-1930s,barely10%ofruraldwellingsintheUnitedStateshadelectricalpower.By1955thepercentagewas97%.BeforetheTVAandREA,private power companies had no incentiveto connectmostlypoor ruraldwellers. Thesedwellershadnomeanstopayfortheelectrici-ty,thereforeconnectioncostswereunlikelytoberecoveredandprofitpotentialsforthecom-panieswereextremelypoor—asituation thatisnotqualitativelydifferentfromthechalleng-esfacingglobalandmass-leveldeploymentofrenewableenergytoday.

During theNewDeal, Senator GeorgeNorriscommented:

The experience of the [REA] indicates that the lim-itation on the extension of electric service to ru-ral areas has been due to the prohibitive costs of line construction; to excessive demands for cash contributions from the farmers to pay for the lines that would serve them, to high [electricity] rates which discourage the abundant use of current, and to the traditional policy of the private utilities of extending their monopolistic franchise as wide-ly as possible, while attending their actual service only to areas which are most profitable.178


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In May 1935 President Roosevelt, by Execu-tive Order, created the REA and allotted $50milliontothetaskofruralelectrification.TheOrder also stipulated that 25% of the alloca-tionshouldbespentonlaborandthat90%ofthe labor required should come from joblesspeoplereceivingunemploymentrelief.Privatecompanies applied for REA loans and sub-mitted a plan to extend rural electrification,but theseplanswere rejected. Instead, loansweregranted to “municipalities,people’sutil-ity districts, and cooperative, non-profit andlimited dividend associations.”179 Applicationsforloanscamefromstateruralelectrificationauthorities,ruralpowerdistricts,andcooper-atives.TheREAledtoalmost1,000electricitycooperativesbeingestablished,manyofwhicharestillfunctioning.

Loan recipients were declared independentbodies responsible for their own affairs, buttheREAitselfprovidedspecialistsandtechni-cians, conducted field visits, sent out operat-ingmemoranda and bulletins, and convenedconferences of system superintendents andmeetingsofsystemofficialsandmembers. In1942, the National Rural Electric CooperativeAssociation (NRECA)was formed to bring to-gether the958cooperatives in46states thathadbeensetuporstabilizedduringtheREA.

One of NRECA’s priorities was to protect theREA itselfagainsteffortsbythepoliticalrighttorestraintheREA’sscopeofoperations.Therightwingarguedthattheprovisionofcheapelectricity was distorting electricity marketsand,bythelate1940s,ledindustryfromnon-REA areas to relocate in the areas served bytheREA.180TherightwasparticularlyinfuriatedbythefactthatREAloanshadbeenfixedatathreepercentrateofinterestin1936,reducedin1944tojusttwopercent,muchlessthantheratestheU.S.Treasuryhadtypicallypaidonitsownborrowings.Furthermore,borrowersun-dertheREAhadalongtimetopaybacktheselow-interestloans.From1936to1944thepay-

backperiodwassetat25years.After1944theperiodwasextendedto35years.Andopera-torswerenot expected tobeginpayingbacktheloansuntilafullfiveyearshadelapsed.Ina1963report,ahorrifiedAmericanEnterpriseInstitutedocumented thatmanyof the loanshadnotbeen fully repaidwithin the25 to35yeartimeperiod.

At the outset, REA loans were extended toconnectruralareastocentralpowersupplies,muchofitgeneratedbythegovernment-ownedTVA.Butonceconnected,thedemandforelec-tricityfromruralareasbegantoriseand,cou-pledwiththeadvanceofindustrializationandthepopulationgrowthintheruralareas,moreloans were sought—and granted—for powergeneration and transmission. By 1960, 55.3%of REA loans were for generation and transmission.

TheconcernsofthepoliticalrightthattheREA,alongwithpublicworksprogramslikethePWAand WPA, were signs of “creeping socialism”gained little traction during this period. Pub-licworksprogramsduring theNewDeal hadoriginally been mainly intended to providereliefforthe—increasinglyorganizedandmil-itant—unemployed,butseveralkeyfigures intheRooseveltAdministrationthoughttherealvalueofpublicworksprogramsweretheircon-tribution to economic development. The REAwasparticularly successfulandsurvived longafterthePWAandWPAweredissolved.

The impact of rural electrification was enor-mous.Livingstandardsandlaborproductivityin rural areas rosedramatically from1935 to1955.Suchwasthesuccessof theREAthat itwas emulated with impressive results in nu-merous countries, including the Philippines,Costa Rica, and China (after 1950).181 Ruralelectrification became an important part ofthe ColdWar. China was determined that itsrural electrification program show both thepotentialoftheplannedeconomyand(before


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1960) the Sino-Soviet partnership. PresidentJohnF.KennedydescribedtheTVAas“thebestambassador that the United States has everhad,”andpraiseditforthe“greatcontributiontothefreeworld’seffortstowinthemindsofmen.”182President Johnsonsought totransfertheTVAmodeltotheMekongBasinaspartofthe“heartsandminds”effortduringtheperi-odofescalatingwarinVietnam.183

U.S. Trade Unions and New Deal Pub-lic Works

TheAmerican Federationof Labor (AFL) sup-portedpublicworksprogramsorganizedunderthePWAandWPA.TheAFLjoinedwithprivatecontractorsinlobbyingforpublicworksontheunderstanding thatagreementsreachedwithcontractors for infrastructure projects wouldmeanmoreworkforunionmembers.TheAFLwas, however, suspicious of PWA and WPAagenciesthatsoughttohiredirectly.The“craft”or “skilled trades” unions in the U.S. had setupa“hiringhall”systemtoensurethatunionmembers were hired in way that preventedwageandstandardscompetitionbetween in-dividualworkersandalsohelpedworkerswhohad beenwaiting for work the longest to behiredfirst. ThePWAand theAFL came to anarrangementwherebyaunionhad48hourstofillapositiononaproject,andifitcouldnotdoso theprojectmanagerunder thePWAcouldhire from elsewhere. There existed consider-abletensionsbetweenskilled“contract”laborand“daylabor”withinthePWAandWPA,lead-ingto“laboradvisoryboards”beingsetuptoworkthroughsuchproblems.184

The Roosevelt Administration was somewhatdividedregardingtheroleprivatecontractorsshould play in publicworks projects. InteriorSecretaryandheadofthePWA,HaroldIckes,expressedconcernthattheprivatecontractorsoften expected to turn a 20% profit on proj-ects andwere known for their overpricingof

inputs—including labor inputs. He preferred,wherepossible, for thePWAtobothhireandperformtheworkwithminimalprivatesectorinvolvement.185 But the skills and expertise—alongwith trade union support—rested withthecontractors,making itdifficult inmost in-stancesforthePWAtoperformeveryfunctioninhouse.ThePWAreducedtheinfluenceandcostsofprivatecontractorsbyhavingthePWApurchase all construction materials for proj-ectsinordertopreventoverpricingandexces-siveprofiteering.

In the case of the TVA, the relationship be-tweentheunionsandtheAuthoritywaspathbreakingintermsofNewDeal—andeventuallypostwar—industrialrelations.In1935theTVA’sboard issuedaunilateralstatementrecogniz-ing the right for employees to organize, affil-iate, designate representatives, and bargaincollectively with management. This occurredinthefaceofFDR’sownreluctancetoendorsethe ideaofpublicsectorunions.Unionswerealsogivenavoiceinformulatingpolicies,rules,and regulationsdefining labor standardsandconditionsofemployment.In1937theAFLes-tablishedtheTennesseeValleyTradesandLa-borCounciltorepresent14unionsworkingonTVAprojects.TheTVAalsoopenedthedoortowhite-collarworkerorganizing,withtheAmer-ican Federation of Government Employeesgaining recognition just a fewyearsafter theunionwaslaunched.186

The Potential of Public Works Today

The experience of public works programsduringtheNewDealareimportanttotoday’stradeuniondiscussionsonclimateprotectionandenergytransitioninseveralrespects.

If nothing else, the historical experience ofNew Deal-era public works reveals the starklimitationsoftheexistingneoliberalapproachtoenergy transition—anapproachthat isap-


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parentlymoreinclinedtoacceptsixdegreesofglobalwarming than it is to embrace theun-avoidable truth that deep structural changein the global economy is needed. The key to“thinkingoutsidethebox” istofirstbeawarethattheboxactuallyexists,anditisquestion-able whether most proponents of neoliberalideashavegraspedthisreality.

But liberal and many nominally social dem-ocratic policy approaches are similarly con-strained intheiralmostobduraterejectionoftheideathatgovernmentscanandshouldplaya leading roleandbeadriving forcebehindthetransition to a renewable energy system. ASeptember2014studyreleasedbytheCenterforAmericanProgress (CAP) and thePoliticalEconomyResearchInstitute(PERI)istypicalinthisrespect.ItassertsthatiftheU.S.istomeetitsclimateobligations,theprivatesectormustplay the leadingrole.Theauthorsstate, “Ourpolicy agendamust ultimately be effective inmobilizingcleanenergyinvestmentsbyprivatebusinessowners.There is no other wayinwhichthe United States can realistically achieve its20-yearCO2 emissions reduction target” (em-phasis added). To support this claim, the au-thors quote the former Chief of Staff to theClintonWhiteHouse,JohnPodesta:“Thescaleof the energy transformation is simply toolargeforpublicsectorresourcesandprogramstotacklealone.”187

The reportnotes that annual investment lev-els in renewableenergywouldneed toreachroughly $110 billion in order for the UnitedStatestomeetitsemissionsreductionobliga-tions.However,in2013,thecombinedvalueofU.S. investmentsinwindandsolarstoodatalittle under $20 billion.188 From this perspec-tive,theroleofpolicyistohelptheprivatesec-tormakeup the shortfall.Government’s roleisto“shapethemarket”byremovingexistingobstaclestoprivatesectorinvestmentbypro-moting low-cost financing, solidifying tax in-centives,andothersubsidiesandalso“expand

themarket”byensuringdemandreachesthelevelsneededtoattractprivatecapital.189

In arguing for private sector-driven solu-tions—theonetruepath—theCAP/PERIstudyinadvertentlymakes the case foraNewDealpublic works approach. Who, other than thegovernment, can relatively easily make upthe investment shortfall of $90 billion peryear, expand themarket, andprovide “policypredictability” foraprotractedperiod?And ifsuch investmentsare indeedwise forprivatecorporations,whyshould theynotbeequallywiseforgovernments?TheNewDealthinkersunderstoodthattheprivatesectorwouldonlyinvestiftherisksweresuchthatprofitwasei-therverylikelyorallbutguaranteed.Thefactthatwearefacingacivilizationalcrisisbroughtabout by runaway climate change will havelittlebearingonprivate investorswhosesolepriorityistomake“healthy”returnsoninvest-ment.Toleavethefateofthehumanspeciesinthehandsofprivatecorporationsandbankersamountsthereforetoextremerecklessness.

The Promise of Jobs in Renewable Energy

Theclimate-driven imperatives for “scaleandspeed”inthedeploymentofrenewableenergymeansthatpublicworksprogramsforrenew-ableenergycouldbevery largeorveryplen-tiful, depending on the jurisdiction or entityemployingandorganizing the labor involved.Itiswellknownthatanambitiousdeploymentofrenewableenergycancreatelargenumbersof jobs.190Globalwindpower-relatedemploy-menthasexpandedmorethaneleven-fold inthepast15years,whilesolarPVemploymenthassoaredcloseto290-foldduringthesameperiodoftime.191

Severalrecentstudieshavereinforcedthenowfamiliar claim thatanaggressiveapproach toemissions reductions and renewable energy


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deploymentcancreatelargenumbersofjobs.Recent studies by Jacobson and Delucchi ex- amining New York State192 and California193 carefullyexaminedhowafairlyrapidshiftto-wardswind,wave,andsunpower(WWS)couldgeneratelargenumbersofdirectjobsinthere-newablessector,morethanoffsettingjobslostinfossilfuelsovera15-yearperiodbyalargemargin.TheCAP/PERIstudyreferredtoaboveconcluded that if the United States reducedemissions according to science-based targetsthenumberofjobsinrenewableenergywouldequal 1.38million per year over the next 20years—ifthe$110billionannualinvestmentinrenewablesweretomaterialize.194

IntakingafreshlookattheNewDealexperi-ence,itisworthnotingthatboththeREAandtheTVAweretop-downandtherefore“statist”in theirdesignand in their implementation—butonlyuptoapoint.TheREAallowedconsid-erablespaceforlocalautonomyandcontrolinthe formof cooperatives andmunicipal-levelbodies. TheREAplayedan important coordi-nating and convening role, offered technicalexpertise,etc.,buttheactualdeliveryofelec-tricalpowerwasmanagedandperformedbylocalactors.TheTVAwashailedatthetimeasanagencythatepitomizedthebenefitsofdem-ocratic planning involving unions, communi-ties,andelectedrepresentatives.195Thesepro-grams engaged the private sector, but moreoftenthannotontermsthatservedthepublicgood—instarkcontrasttotoday’spillagingofthepublicsectorundertheguiseof“publicpri-vatepartnerships.”

Thelow-interestfinancingofprojectswasob-viously crucial to the successofREAprojectsoveratwo-decadeperiod.Again,governmentweighedthecostsofinaction(chroniclowlev-els of rural productivity, unemployment andpoverty, and a depressed agricultural sector)against the costs of taking action to preventhigh levels of social unrest and prolongedhardship formillions. The benefits of electri-

fication andother public goodsdid not needtobemonetizedinawaythateverydollarwasaccountedfor;insteaditwasunderstoodthatthevalue,monetaryaswellassocial,wouldbefar greater than the costs.

Intoday’sclimatepolicydiscourse it iswidelyacceptedthatthedamagethatcanbeexpect-ed tooccurasa resultof climate changewillfar exceed the costs of reducing emissions.ThisbasicpointwasmadebytheformerChiefEconomist to theWorldBank,Nicholas Stern(now Lord Stern), in the landmark documentThe Stern Revue on the Economics of Climate Change published in 2006.196 The point wasreiterated in Stern’s 2014 report titled Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Econ-omy. This reportestimates thatglobal invest-mentsinalow-carbonfuture“willonlycostanadditionalU.S.$270billionperyearontopoftheU.S. $6 trillionwewill spendanyway.Re-ducedfuelexpenditures—nofuelneedstobebought for solar or wind power—and othersavingsareexpectedtosaveanestimated$5trillionby2030, fullyoffsettinganyadditionalinvestments.”197 This additional investmentisequivalent to roughlyone-eighthofannualworldmilitaryexpendituresin2013,calculatedat$1,747billion.198

But the climate policy discourse,which takesalonger-termand“macro-societal”view,isin-compatiblewiththeassumptionsandbehaviorof current energy policy and the unshakablecommitment to liberalization and marketiza-tion. It is ironic that Stern, once a prominentWorldBankneoliberal,forgetsthatoneoftheconsequencesofprivatizationandmarketiza-tionof largepartsof theenergy sector—andother key sectors—hasmeant that long-termsocietal considerations seldom impose them-selves on the calculationsmade by themainprivate sector players who operate in theworld of the here and now where electricityprices,forexample,changebytheminuteandshort-termprofitmakingisthemainpriority.


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Asnotedabove,itisstillwidelyacceptedthatthe mass-scale deployment of renewablesourcesofpowerwillbecontingentonrenew-ablesbeingabletocompetewithfossil-basedpowerinliberalizedelectricitymarkets.Unionsand their allies must challenge this head onandinsodoingpointtothefactthatthemostformidablechallengeassociatedwiththetran-sitiontorenewableenergyconcernsthescaleof the task and the limited amount of timeavailabletocompleteit.

Thetransitiontorenewablescannotwaituntilrenewables are “competititve” or reach “gridparity”withfossilfuels.JacobsonandDelucchihave calculated that, in order to decarbonizepower generation, millions of wind turbinesand tens of thousands of solar power plantswill need to be operational in just two de-cades.199 Therearecountless studies that saymoreorlessthesame.Oneofthemoststrik-ingfeaturesofthepublicworksprogramssetupduring theNewDeal is the sheernumberofprojectsthatwere successfullycompleted—and completed in times when taxation reve-nueshadcollapsedduetotheeconomiccrisis.There isnoobviousreasonwhypublicworksprograms deploying renewable energy couldnotbesimilarlysuccessfulintheyearsahead.

Building a Trade Union Politics for Public Works

Neoliberal thinkers, includingmany latter-daysocialdemocrats,mayhaveassumedthatbothpublicworksandgovernmentagenciestoad-ministerthemhadbeenconsignedtohistory,nevertobeseenagain.Butthecaseforpublicworksapproachestoenergytransitionandcli-mateprotectionistodayoverwhelming.

In three countries, unions are already begin-ningtoadvocateforsuchanapproach.IntheUKandSouthAfrica,aswellasNorway,unionshaveendorsedcampaignsoperatingunderthe

name “OneMillionClimate Jobs.” These cam-paignsarebasedonrigorouscalculationsofthenumberofjobsthatcouldbecreatedthroughthe implementationofanaggressiveandsci-ence-basedapproachtoemissionsreductions.However, ineach instance thecampaigncallsfor aNational Climate Service specifically setuptotakeresponsibilityforthemaintasksintermsofplanning,resourceallocation,andre-searchanddevelopment—arolenotdissimilarfromtheoneplayedbythePWAorREAduringtheNewDeal.

Public works programs dedicated to renew-able energy deployment and other “energytransition”tasksandservices,suchasdecom-missioningoldcoal-firedpowerstations,couldbe performed at local, regional, andnationallevels. Public utilities suitably “reclaimed” toreflect their public mission as the result ofcitizens’movementssuchastheonesseeninBoulder,Berlin,andelsewherecouldorganizeexisting and new hires in ways that deployrenewables “behind themeter”or,whereap-propriate, by way of centralized utility-sizedprojects.Municipalitiescanalsoemploywork-ersdirectly toperformprojectdesign, instal-lation,andmaintenancework for renewablesandenergyconservationworkinthesamewayas theyhireworkers (or, at least, as theydidbefore privatization and contracting out be-camesowidespread)tomaintainparks,play-grounds,schools,etc.Cooperatives,too,couldcontract with a public works agency to plan,design, and erect community-based renew-ablesprojects that could thenbemaintainedand operated by community-level consumerandperhapsworker-ownedpowergenerationcooperatives.

When compared tomost private sector proj-ects,publicworksprogramsarealsomorelike-lytoprovidespaceandrecognitiontounions,andunionrightstorepresentworkerscouldbewrittenintothedesignoftheprogramsthem-selves,aswasthecasewiththeTVA.


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The Economics of Public Works

Public works programs cost money. But it iswell known that money paid in wages oftengoes straight back into the economy in theform of purchases of basic necessities, thustriggering a healthy and almost immediatemultipliereffect.

IntheUnitedStates,aMarch2011studycon-ductedbyPhilipHarveyfromRutgersUniversi-ty calculatedthattheannualcostofcreatingamilliontemporary jobsforunemployedwork-ers in a government-administered, direct jobcreationprogramwouldcost$46.4billionperyear.However, the same$46.4billion “wouldtrigger a multiplier effect that would createan additional 414,000 jobs outside the pro-gram.”200Thestudyalsocalculatedhavingonemillionpeopleworkinginsteadofbeingunem-ployedwouldgenerateadditionaltaxrevenuesthatwouldreducethenetcostoftheprogramto$17.8billion.Endingsubsidies to fossil fuelcompaniescouldmorethancovertheannualnetcostofsuchaprogram.TheUnitedStatesfederal and state governments gave away$21.6 billion in production and explorationsubsidiesto theoil,gas,andcoalindustriesin2013.201 According to UNEP, government sub-sidiestofossilfuelsgloballyamountsto$500billionannually.202

Thereareofcoursenumerouswaysofcover-ingthecostsofpublicworksprograms.Acar-bontaxonpollutersisjustone.Anotheroptionis to build out renewable energy first in thepublicsectoritself.If,forinstance,solarPVwasinstalledonallpublicbuildings,thefullcostofthe PV (at 2014 prices, including installationand maintenance costs) could be recoveredwithin five years. Electricity supply to thesepublic facilities will also be sharply reduced.Whenmeasuredalongsidethecoststhepublicsectorwouldbeexpected topay for electric-ity fromnon-renewablesourcesovera twen-ty-yearperiod,itishighlylikelythatthesavings

over the sameperiodwill exceed the cost ofthe public works program by some distance.Electricitycoststosustainthepublicsector—includingschools,hospitals,andothergovern-mentbuildings—will probably fall, potentiallyfreeingup revenue forother socialprogramsand purposes. If energy conservation pro-gramsweredevelopedalongsiderenewables,thesavingswouldbeevengreater.

Thepublicsectorcanprovidenotonlyameansoffinancinginvestmentinrenewablesbutalsoa collective resourceofknowledgeembodiedinworkerswhoaresecurelyemployed,paidadecent wage, and working in conditions thatprioritizesafetyforbothworkersandthepub-lic.Italsohastheflexibilitytodeveloprenew-ablesonalargescaleortosupportsmall-scale,decentralized,off-gridlocaloperations.203

Centralized or Decentralized Genera-tion?

There has been considerable debate amongadvocates of energy democracy revolvingaroundtheissueoftherespectiverolesofcen-tralized and decentralized renewables gener-ation.Somehold theview thatcentralizedorutility-scalegeneration is inherentlyundemo-cratic and that only decentralized power canensure democracy, transparency, and equity.Otherstaketheviewthattheissuecannotbereducedtosizeorlocationbutdependsonthemissionandpurposeoftheentityoverseeingthe generation itself. TVA power generationprojectstendedtobelarge,butthewaytheAu-thoritybuiltasocialbaseandengagedworkersand communities stands in stark contrast tosomeoftoday’slargeenergyconcerns—publicaswellasprivate.

There are disagreements, too, that are of amore technicalnature.The technical case forcentralized renewables is based on the needtodealwiththeproblemoffluctuatingsupply,


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sometimes called “intermittency.” Not everydayisasunnydayorawindyday,andsome-times the levelsofgenerationcan fallquicklyanddramatically.Dealingwiththisfluctuationhasbecomeperhapsthemostformidablechal-lengefacingthetransitiontorenewables.Theexistingutilitiesmovingintorenewablesmain-tainthatthebestwaytohandlethesefluctu-ations is constructing large projects, such aswind farms off-shore where the wind blowsmore continuously; laying down cross-conti-nentaltransmissionlinesthatcancompensatefor local variations; orbuilding large systemsfor storing electricity—essentially a central-izedor“bigprojects”approach.Waveandtidalpower isalsobelievedtobeasolutiontotheneedfor“baseload”backupcapacity,andthewaveandtidalpowerprojectspresentlyonthedrawingboardaretypicallylarge.

Meanwhile, the technical case for decentral-ized generation makes reference to the factthat advanced information technologies willallow for a high level of end-user flexibilityand the development of “smart” options forenergystorageandin-housemanagementforboth commercial and residentialusers.204 So-lar PV power, in particular, can to a large ex-tentbegeneratedintheimmediatevicinityofconsumptionpoints,reducingthenecessityoftransmission.Theavailabilityofnewsemi-con-ductorbasedpowerelectronicshas ledtoanincreasing interest in “microgrids.”Microgridshave been deployed extensively in Cuba. Inrecent years, 180 micro-hydro systems havebeenputinplaceharnessingenergyfromwa-terinstreamsandrivers.Thenumberofinde-pendentsolarelectricsystemsinruralareasofthecountryhasrisentoover8,000.Itisworthnothing thatCuba’sefforts to transition fromits dilapidated centralized system have alsobeen combined with aggressive energy con-servation. Cuba is the first and only countryintheworldtocompletelyconvertfromincan-descent bulbs to 100% compact fluorescents(CFBs)viaagovernmentprogram implement-

edfreeofcharge.72millionCFBsweredistrib-uted.205

Thenarrowtimeframeformass-levelrenew-able energy deployment suggests that bothcentralizedanddecentralizedrenewableener-gywillbeneeded.Presentlyutility-sizedproj-ects are dominating the deployment of solarPV across the globe. By early 2013, about 90plantsinoperationhadcapacitiesinexcessof30MW,andsome400hadat least10MWofcapacity. The world’s 50 biggest PV generat-ingplantshaveacumulativecapacityofmorethan4GW,ormorethan80MWonaverage.206 However,thismaysaymoreaboutthebiasofthe utilities for large-scale projects, and thestrengthof the largeprivateproducers (IPPs)inshapingenergypolicythanitdoesabouttheinherent advantages of big projects over on-sitedecentralizedgeneration.207

Thedecisiontodevelopcentralizedordecen-tralized capacity—or both—has no real bear-ing on the publicworks option. Publicworksprogramscouldbedeployedforeitherorbothpurposes,andmanyoftheskillssetsrequiredare probably transferable across any type ofproject. Meanwhile the debate around themeritsanddemeritsofcentralizedanddecen-tralizedgenerationwillcontinue.

Supply Chains

Publicworksprogramsestablishedbyreformedutilities,MOUs,ornationalgovernmentswillinmany instances have to dealwith insufficientdomesticsuppliesofcomponentsand,insomecases, skills. The latterhas alreadypresentedproblems—such as in the UK offshore windsector—evenwhererenewableenergyismov-ingforwardonlyatasnail’space.208

In recentyears thecollapse insolarPVpanelprices is forcing a consolidation of the solarindustry,withthelossoftensofthousandsof


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manufacturingjobsinEurope,NorthAmerica,and China.209Consolidationisalsotakingplaceinthesolarinverterindustry,withproductionshifting away fromEurope towardChina andthe United States.210 Wind power productioncapacities(80GW)alsoexceedmarketdemand(44.7GWinstalledduring2012)byasubstan-tialmargin,which ledto job losses in turbinemanufacturing.Thisconsolidationputsalimiton the renewable energy manufacturing em-ploymentthatanycountrymayexpect in theshort term.

The “insourcing”ofmanufacturing ispossibleinprinciple,especiallyifthepoliciestodeployrenewables to scaleappear irreversible.Gov-ernments can of course consider beginningtheir own PV and wind turbine production.Publicly owned manufacturing facilities orcooperatives are not inconceivable but mayinitially involve “joint venture” arrangementsinordertoallowfor thetransferofskillsandknowledge.

Jobs can, however, be created in the produc-tionofbasiccomponentsandintheconstruc-tion, installation, andmaintenance of renew-ableenergyprojects.Theproductionofsolarmodulesamountstoabout25%ofthecostofsolar, and labor costs are a small portion ofthat 25% (perhaps 10%). Invertors add a fur-ther10%ofthecostofsolar.ButsolarPValsoneedsmounting structures suchasextrudedaluminumrails(themodulesareconnectedbythese rails) that can be produced by domes-ticmetal fabricators. “Follow the sun” single- axisanddouble-axistrackingsystemsarealsoneeded.211 Large-scale deployment will alsostimulate demand for cables and connectorsand other electrical components. Array plan-ners are also needed. A Heinrich Böll Foun-dationstudyofthesolarindustryinGermanyclaims that as manufacturing has shifted toChinathecostofsolarhasdecreased,leadingtohigherinstallationrates,presentlyat7.5GWofnewcapacityperyearonaverage.Thishas

in turn created employment in installation,components,andprojectdevelopment.212

A public works installation program could,therefore, generate demand for componentsthatcouldbemetbysmallandmedium-sizedcompanies(SMEs)operating“closetothemar-ket.”Thisisqualitativelydifferentthanengag-ing inPublic-PrivatePartnerships (P3s)whereprofits for theprivate corporationareall butguaranteed. Many SME’s would prosper as aresult.

Upgrading Transmission Infrastruc-ture

Scaling up renewable energy goes hand inhandwiththeexpansionoftransmissioninfra-structure.Thebestsolarandwindrenewableenergy sites are often located far away fromconsumption centers or existing transmis-sionnetworks.Thereforetapping intoa largeamountofnewerrenewablesourcesrequiresbringingtransmissionservicestomultipledis-persed locations.Achievingambitious renew-ableenergytargetswillrequireaconsiderableoverhauloftransmissionsystems—andestab-lishingnewonesintheGlobalSouthwhereen-ergypovertyisamajorproblem.

The present neoliberalmodel does not havethe policy tools to deal with this challenge.As generation, transmission, and distributionfunctionshavebeenseparatedfromeachoth-erandsoldoff(“unbundled”),thishasseparat-ed the roles of energy provider and grid op-erator. Transmissionupgrades to ensure thatrenewable energy can be integrated are ex-pensive.Massive investments intransmissionupgrades and expansion are required. Thecostofbuildinganation-widesmartgridmaywellbehundredsofbillionsofdollarsinmanyinstances.213However,thecostoftransmissioncontinues to be a relatively small percentageofoverallelectricitycosts.Thereforethecosts


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ofupgradescouldbecomfortablyabsorbedorequitablydispensediftheywerespreadacrossthe entire system.214

Transmission companies are presently reluc-tanttoinvestinimprovementsthatwillbenefitpowergeneration companies. Thishas led tocomplex discussions about appropriate pric-ing—who will pay and how much?—and thestruggletofindaresolutiontothisconflicthasimpeded the progress of renewables.215 Newwindandsolarprojectscanbecompletedinaslittleassixmonths,buttransmissionupgradespresently take considerably longer—whichmeans renewable energy companies can ex-pecttobewaitingtobeoperationalwhilepay-inginterestontheirownborrowing.

Renewableenergyinvestorswillthereforenotpushforwardwithprojectsuntiltransmissionlinesareguaranteedtobeinplace.Meanwhile,traditional utilities are often in no hurry toconnectsourcesofrenewablepowerwheninmany instancesall theconnectionsdo isaddtothelevelofdisruptivecompetitiontheyfacefrom the renewables sector. And the utilitieshavebeendisinclinedtoengagein“anticipato-ryplanning”—whichwouldrequiredevelopingthe infrastructure to connect renewable en-ergy before theprojecthasbeenapprovedorcompleted.

ArecentWorldBankstudyacknowledgedthat,“Traditional transmission planning practicescan result in long delays in renewable ener-gy projects.” Clearly these delays have to beavoided if scientific targets for emissions re-ductionsaretobeachieved.Thestudycalledforanendto“reactiveapproaches”(i.e.trans-missioncompanieswaitingfortheconnectionrequest from a renewable energy company)and urged “proactive transmission planning”whereby transmission upgrades aremade inorder to attract investors in renewableswiththe costs shared across the entire system. This,saystheWorldBank, isa lessexpensive

andfasterwaytoscaleuprenewables.“Wait-ing forgenerators toexpress their interest ininterconnecting to network and attending tosuchrequestsindividuallycanstrainutilityre-sources and finally delay the interconnectionprocess. In addition, reacting to interconnec-tion requests individually can lead to signifi-cantcostinefficiencies.”216

Again,theconclusionofthisWorldBankstudyinadvertentlymakes the case foraNewDealpublicworksapproach.Proactivetransmissionplanningonlymakessenseinthecontextofa regional or national transition plan thatensuresthatcapitalismobilizedinamannerthatmakestheupgradesinawaythattakesadvantageofeconomies of scale and pools the necessaryskillsandexpertise.Awareofthefactthereisunlikely to be a stampede of private compa-niesofferingtomeetthisneed,theWorldBankconcludes that, “Apublicsector–ledproactiveplanningeffort”isneeded,followedbyprivatesectorengagementto“buildandmaintaintherequisitetransmissionprojects.”

But there appears to be no compelling rea-sonwhyprivatecompaniesneedto“buildandmaintain”theprojects—otherthantoconformtotheWorldBank’sownunswervingcommit-ment to public-private partnerships. Despiteits own single-minded focus on mobilizingprivatesector investment, theauthorsof theCAP/PERI study concluded that “grid mod-ernization for renewable energy [is] amajornational undertaking [...] President FranklinRoosevelt led themassiveproject of buildinganelectricalgridsystemthatcouldserveruralAmericaduringtheNewDealera.”217AsimilarinterventionfromtheWhiteHouseis,theyar-gue,neededtoday.

Public Works in the Public Interest

New Deal public works programs generatedmuch-neededemploymentanddevelopedthe


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infrastructureforthemodernpost-warecono-my.Apublicworksapproachtorenewableener-gydeploymentandclimateprotectioningener-aloffersperhapsthebestmeansofaddressingthe challenges of “speed and scale” identifiedaboveandwillgeneratelargenumbersofjobswithinthepublicsectorandforprivatesuppli-ercompaniesintheSMEsector.Itliberatestheenergytransitionfromthedictatesofprofitandthe “returnon investment”calculus,whilestillgeneratingworkandwealthbeyondthepublicsector.PublicworksprojectscanalsoharnesstheskillsofthescientificandR&Dcommunitiesthatwanttousetheirabilitiesinwaysthatcanhelpaddresstheclimatecrisisandatthesametimecreatemeaningfulcareers.

Publicworksarethereforeatoolforenergyde-mocracyinthattheycanbedesignedinwaysthatallowspaceforunions,community-basedorganizations (including cooperatives), andmunicipal authorities to have real influenceover the energy transition we desperatelyneed.

Muchmoreresearchisneededtofurtherde-velopthetradeunioncaseforapublicworksapproachtoenergytransitionandclimatepro-tectionandtodemonstratehowpublicworksprojects can reinforce positive developmentsintermsofenergycooperatives,municipaliza-tion,andthereclamationofutilitiesinordertohavethemservethepublicinterest.

Conclusion

Thispaperhasattemptedtodescribehowthestruggleforenergydemocracyisunfoldingatanumberoflevels.Ithasalsoattemptedtodrawattention to some of the challenges and op-portunitiesforunionsthatwishtoplayaroleindriving anenergy transition that increasesworker and community control, creates jobs,and can potentially build union membershipandenhanceunions’reputation.

Thisis,ofcourse,moreaworkinprogress.Anyexercise in “mapping thepossible” is restrict-edbythefactthatwhatisconsideredpossiblemaychangeovertime.Allwecandoasunionsislookforconcretewaystoplayarolethroughthe development of policy, by assisting cam-paigns,andthroughbasicorganizing.Wealsoneed to share knowledge and experiences—as has been evident with the movement forunion-supportedpublic-publicpartnershipsinthewatersector.

Inahistoricalsense,thisisnotunchartedterri-tory.Workersandunionsinmanypartsofthe

worldhaveaproudtraditionofformingcooper-ativestomeetthebasicneedsofworkers,suchas fresh food, housing, and transport. Whenprivate markets failed to meet these needs,workers’ organizations intervened. Workersandunions fought forpublic services and forpublicworksprogramstodeliverthemandtheinfrastructureonwhichtheseservicesdepend-ed.Thereisaneedforunionstoreconnectwiththistraditioninaconsciousandrigorousman-ner.Giventheenergyandclimateemergency,thereisaneedtoboththinkbigandpayatten-tiontothedetailsatthesametime.

Wehaveseenhowthestrugglefordemocraticcontrolofpowergenerationisexpressingitselfon several “fronts,” and it is likely to grow instrength in theyearsahead.Butat thispointintimethereisnoconsciousmovementforen-ergydemocracy that isguidedbyclear class-basedortradeunionprinciples.Moreover,giv-entheclimatecrisis,thereisacertainnaivetywhenitcomestoissuesoftherequiredspeedandscaleofthetransition.


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Unionsthereforehaveanimportant,andper-hapsdecisive,roletoplay.Inparticular,unionmembersinpowergenerationknowthechal-lenges of transitioning to renewable energyandhaveafirmergraspthanmostregardingwhat canbedoneandwhatmayposemoreofachallenge.Asnotedabove,unionsdonotsupport “renewable energy by any meansnecessary,”andtheyknowthattheanswertotheexpandingeconomicandpolitical powerofthefossilfuelcorporationsisnottotrans-

fer comparable power to large, for-profit re-newable energy multinationals. Unions alsoknowthatan increase inrenewableswillnotautomaticallyleadtoadecreaseinfossilfueluseoran increase inworker rightsandpro-tections.

Anotherenergysystemisnecessary.Anditisclearlypossible.Thestageissetforunionstoexplorewaystoplayaclearandpositiveroleinmakingithappen.

TUED Working Papers

No. 1: Global Shale Gas and the Anti-Fracking MovementDevelopingUnionPerspectivesandApproaches

No. 2: The Great InactionNewTradeUnionPerspectives

No. 3: Energy Democracy in GreeceSYRIZA’sProgramandtheTransitiontoRenewablePower

www.energydemocracyinitiative.org


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1 Sean Sweeney, Resist Reclaim Restructure: Un-ions and the Struggle for Energy Democracy,Cor-nellUniversityILRSchool,TheWorkerInstitute,and Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung—New York Of-fice,2013.

2 Ibid.3 “Statistical ReviewofWorld Energy 2014,” BP;

REN21, Renewables 2014 Global Status Report,Paris:REN21Secretariat.

4 RobertBryce,“NotBeyondCoal:HowtheGlob-al Thirst for Low-Cost Electricity ContinuesDriving Coal Demand,” Manhattan Institute,2014.

5 “Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.” In2013, wind energy use grew by about 480,000boe/d,andsolarusebyabout140,000boe/d.

6 InternationalEnergyAgency,“WorldEnergyIn-vestmentOutlook2014Factsheet,”Paris.

7 “TheFossilFuelBailout:G20Subsidies forOil,GasandCoalExploration,”OilChangeInterna-tional,2014.

8 Pilita Clark, James Wilson, and Lucy Hornby,“Energy:TheTollonCoal,”Financial Times, 2014.

9 ChristineShearer,NicoleGhio,LauriMyllyvirta,andTedNace,Boom and Bust: Tracking the Glob-al Coal Plant Pipeline,SierraClub,2015

10 BoomandBust11 IEA, cited in Charles C. Mann, “Renewables

Aren’tEnough.CleanCoalIstheFuture,”Wired,March25,2014.

12 Greenpeace East Asia, The End of China’s Coal Boom,2014.

13 “GlobalCoalRiskAssessment,”WorldResourc-esInstitute,2014.

14 InternationalEnergyAgency,“WorldEnergyIn-vestmentOutlook2014Factsheet.”

15 Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2013,FrankfurtSchoolUNEPCollaboratingCen-treforClimate&SustainableEnergyFinance.

16 “WebinarLaunchoftheSolarEnergyRoadmaps2014,” Presentationby the ExecutiveDirector,InternationalEnergyAgency.

17 PwC,“TooLateforTwoDegrees?”18 MarkDelucchiandMarkZ.Jacobson,“APlanto

Power100PercentofthePlanetwithRenewa-bles,”InstituteofTransportationStudies,2009.

19 Ibid.20 “NationalOffice forEnergyCooperatives -Co-

operativesinGermany-DGRV.”21 PierAngeloMori,“CustomerOwnershipofPub-

licUtilities:NewWineinOldBottles,”Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, Feb1,2013.

22 ConradKunzeandSoerenBecker,Energy Democ-racy in Europe,RosaLuxemburgStiftung,2014.

23 “CustomerOwnershipofPublicUtilities.”24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 InternationalLabourOfficeCooperativesUnit,

Providing Clean Energy and Energy Access through Cooperatives,2013.

27 “CustomerOwnershipofPublicUtilities.”28 Providing Clean Energy.29 “CustomerOwnershipofPublicUtilities.30 AnnabelYadooandHeatherCruickshank,“The

ValueofCooperatives inRural Electrification,”Energy Policy38.6,June2010.

31 Timothy Moss, Sören Becker, and MatthiasNaumann, “WhoseEnergy Transition Is It, An-yway?OrganisationandOwnershipoftheEner-giewende inVillages,CitiesandRegions,”LocalEnvironment,May19,2014.

32 MichaelSchaller,“TVAontheMekong:LBJ,theNewDeal,andtheTragedyofVietnam-PayAnyPrice: Lyndon Johnson and theWars for Viet-nambyLloydC.Gardner,”Reviews in American History24.4,December1996.

33 “3ChargedinTexasCo-OpCreditCardAbuse,”The Washington Times, March 15, 2014; Court-houseNewsService,January18,2011.

34 “US: Citizens Reclaim Energy Cooperatives,”Co-operativeNews,August7,2014..

35 “RuralElectricCooperatives,”CommunityPow-er Network; “A Cooperative Approach to Re-newingEastKentucky,”Solutions.

36 Providing Clean Energy.37 “Cooperative Movement Should Embrace Dis-

cussion of Systemic Issues,” Grassroots Eco-nomicOrganizing.

38 “DevelopmentBeyondEconomism:LocalPathsto Sustainable Development,” New EconomyCoalition.

39 “Renewable Energy Co-Ops: The Power toTransform,”Red Pepper.

40 “Cooperative Enterprise and System Change,”GrassrootsEconomicOrganizing;ThomasBau-wens, “WhatRoles forEnergyCooperatives inthe Diffusion of Distributed Generation Tech-nologies?”SSRN.

41 “CooperativeEnterpriseandSystemChange.”42 BrunoDobrusin,“Workers’CooperativesinAr-

gentina:TheSelf-AdministeredWorkers’Asso-ciation,”International Journal of Labour Research 5.2,2013.

43 “WorkerCooperativeDevelopmentModelsandApproaches:ABriefOverview,”GrassrootsEco-nomicOrganizing.

44 “NavajoGroupProposesSolarProjectonBlackMesa,”New America Media,January2013.

45 Energy Democracy in Europe.

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88 HilaryWainwright,The Tragedy of the Private, the Potential of the Public, Public Services Interna-tionalandtheTransnationalInstitute,2013.

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91 “CityCouncilIssuesRecommendationsonPhil-adelphiaGasWorks,”PhiladelphiaCityCouncil,October27,2014.

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93 David Hall, “Liberalisation, Privatisation andPublicOwnership,”PSIRU,August5,2014.

94 Ibid.95 OlivierHoedeman,SatokoKishimoto,andMar-

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96 David A. McDonald, “RemunicipalisationWorks!”Remunicipalisation,2012.

97 Ibid.98 ManfredRöber,“RemunicipalizationinGerma-

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99 “RemunicipalisationWorks!”100 “LookingtotheFuture.”101 CharleenFeiandIanRinehart,“TakingBackthe

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102 AnnaLeidreiter,“HamburgCitizensVotetoBuyBack Energy Grid,” Energy Transition: The Ger-man Energiewende,HeinrichBoellStiftung,Oc-tober8,2013.

103 Shelley Ross Saxer, “Government Power Un-leashed: Using Eminent Domain to Acquire aPublicUtilityorOtherOngoingEnterprise,”Re-searchGate,January1,2009.

104 MarkDelucchiandMarkZ.Jacobson,“APlantoPower100PercentofthePlanetwithRenewa-bles,”InstituteofTransportationStudies,2009.

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in theCityofBoulder:SuccessfulGreeningorPathtoBankruptcy?,”Thesispaper,ClaremontMcKennaCollege,2013.

110 “TakingBacktheGrid.”111 Ibid.112 “Electric Municipalization in the City of Boul-

der.”

113 “TakingBacktheGrid.”114 “Figures,”LafayetteEnergySustainability.115 “TakingBacktheGrid.”116 “Colorado Public Utilities Commission,” Clean

EnergyCoalition.117 Mark Jaffe, “Boulder Willing to Let Xcel Fran-

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118 “Electric Municipalization in the City of Boul-der.”

119 “TakingBacktheGrid.”120 Ibid.121 “XcelEnergy,”Bloomberg Business,accessedJan-

uary7,2014.122 American Legislative Exchange Council, “Solu-

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123 NickHalter, “DebateHeatsUpOverMunicipalEnergy inMinneapolis,”Southwest Journal, Au-gust1,2013.

124 “APlantoPower100PercentofthePlanetwithRenewables”; “Electric Municipalization in theCityofBoulder.”

125 “Boulder Willing to Let Xcel Franchise LapseWhileItStudiesFutureEnergyOptions.”

126 Ibid.127 NatStein,“Statetap:MinneapoliswranglesXcel

onrenewables,innodtoBoulder,”The Colorado Independent,October28,2014.

128 American Public Power Association.129 Ibid.130 “TakingBacktheGrid.”131 “Hamburg Citizens Vote to Buy Back Energy

Grid.”132 Ibid.133 FrederikBlauwhof,“ReferendumMovementin

BerlinAims toDemocratizeEntireEnergySec-tor,”Democracy At Work,March17,2013.

134 Timothy Moss, Sören Becker, and MatthiasNaumann,“WhoseEnergyTransitionIsIt,Any-way?OrganisationandOwnershipoftheEner-giewendeinVillages,CitiesandRegions,”LocalEnvironment,May 19, 2014;MichelleWender-lich, “Gaining Public Ownership of ElectricityinBerlin,”MunicipalServicesProject,April16,2013.

135 “Berlin ReferendumonBuying ElectricityGridfrom Vattenfall Fails,” Spiegel Online, Novem-ber4,2013.

136 “WhoseEnergyTransitionIsIt,Anyway?”;Gain-ingPublicOwnershipofElectricityinBerlin.”

137 “ReferendumMovementinBerlin.”138 Vattenfall’s billboards against remunicipali-

zation displayed the following: “A 35,000 kmelectricitynetwork.Goodforyouthatyoudon’thavetobebotheredbysuchdetails.Theelec-tricity network of our operator is one of theworld’s safestandmostadvanced.Everyyear240 million Euros are spent on its extension


60

and maintenance. If this had to be financedfrom Berlin’s budget into the bargain therewould be no money left for other projects.”“BerlinReferendumonBuying ElectricityGridfromVattenfallFails,”SpiegelOnline.

139 “Volksentscheidam3.November2013 inBer-lin-ver.di-Jugend Berlin gegen Energietischge-setz,”ver.di,November1,2013.

140 “WhoseEnergyTransitionIsIt,Anyway?”141 CraigMorrisandMartinPehnt,“KeyFindings,”

EnergyTransition:TheGermanEnergiewende,Heinrich Boell Foundation, November 28,2012.

142 “WhoseEnergyTransitionIsIt,Anyway?”;“Tak-ingBacktheGrid.”

143 “Hamburg Citizens Vote to Buy Back EnergyGrid.”

144 “TakingBacktheGrid.”145 “Remunicipalization in Germany - Trends and

Interpretations.”146 “TakingBacktheGrid.”147 “RemunicipalisationWorks!”148 “Remunicipalization in Germany - Trends and

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ivierHoedeman,PhilipTerhorst,MartinPigeon,Satoko Kishimoto, Public-Public Partnerships(PUPs) in Water,” PSI, TNI, and PSIRU, March2009.

153 OrganizingWorkersandtheMakingofLosAn-geles.

154 Ibid.155 Ibid.156 Ibid.157 Ibid.158 Ibid.159 Ibid.160 Ed Watt, Amalgamated Transit Union, Inter-

view,December8,2014.161 FatihBirol,etal.,WorldEnergyInvestmentOut-

look,InternationalEnergyAgency,2014.162 Ibid.163 “RemunicipalisationWorks!”164 Ibid.165 Ibid.166 Ibid.167 “Remunicipalization in Germany - Trends and

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168 OrganizingWorkersandtheMakingofLosAn-geles.

169 TrendsinPhotovalticApplications-SurveyRe-port of Selected IEA Countries between 1992and2013,InternationalEnergyAgency,January15,2014.

170 Ibid.171 Ibid.172 Ibid.173 Ibid.174 JohnFarrell,CityPowerPlay,InstituteforLocal

Self-Reliance,2013.175 “Energy Conservation Rebates and Incentive

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178 John D. Garwood and W.C. Tuthill, The RuralElectrification Administration: An Evaluation,AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,September1963.

179 AGuideforMembersofREACooperatives,Ru-ralElectrificationAdministration,1939.

180 The Rural Electrification Administration: AnEvaluation.

181 DouglasF.Barnes,ed.,TheChallengeofRuralElectrification:StrategiesforDevelopingCoun-tries,ResourcesfortheFuturePress,2007.

182 “TVAontheNewFrontier,”TennesseeValleyAu-thority,AccessedNovember27,2014.

183 LyndonB.Johnson.“PeaceWithoutConquest,”Speech at Johns Hopkins University, April 7,1965.

184 Jason Scott Smith, Building New Deal Liber-alism: The Political Economy of Public Works,1933-1936,CambridgeUniversityPress,2006.

185 Ibid.186 RobertS.Avery,“TheTVAandLaborRelations:

AReview,”The JournalofPolitics16.3,August1954.

187 Robert Pollin, Heidi Garrett-Peltier, JamesHeintz,andBrackenHendricks,GreenGrowth:A US Program for Controlling Climate Changeand Expanding Job Opportunities, Center forAmericanProgress,September2014..

188 2014SustainableEnergyinAmerica2014Fact-book,BloombergFinanceLP,2014.

189 GreenGrowth.190 MaxWei, Shana Patadia, and Daniel M. Kam-

men,“PuttingRenewablesandEnergyEfficien-cytoWork:HowManyJobsCantheCleanEner-gyIndustryGenerateintheUS?”EnergyPolicy38.2,February2010.

191 DennisMcGinn,etal.,Renewables2013GlobalStatusReport,REN21RenewableEnergyPolicyNetwork,2013.

192 MarkZ.Jacobson,etal.,“ExaminingtheFeasibil-ityofConvertingNewYorkState’sAll-PurposeEnergy Infrastructure toOneUsingWind,Wa-ter,andSunlight,”EnergyPolicy57,June2013.

193 Mark Z. Jacobson, et al., “A Roadmap for Re-powering California for All Purposes withWind,Water,andSunlight,”Energy73,August2014.

194 GreenGrowth.


61

195 Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots; aStudyintheSociologyofFormalOrganization,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1949.

196 NicholasStern.SternRevueontheEconomicsofClimateChange,HMTreasury,2006.

197 “BetterGrowth,BetterClimate - TheNewCli-mate Economy Report,” The Global Commis-sionon theEconomyandClimate, September2014.

198 “The 15 Countries with the Highest MilitaryExpenditure in 2012,” Stockholm InternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,2013.

199 “APlantoPower100PercentofthePlanetwithRenewables.”

200 PhilipHarvey,BacktoWork:APublicJobsPro-posalforEconomicRecovery,Demos,2011.

201 ShakuntalaMakhijani,“CashinginonAlloftheAbove:USFossilFuelProductionSubsidiesun-der Obama,” Oil Change International, July 9,2014.

202 “FossilFuelSubsidiesHamperPathwaytoInclu-siveGreenEconomy,ExpertsSay,”UNEPNewsCentre,April28,2014.

203 DavidHall,SteveThomas,SandravanNiekerk,andJennyNguyen,RenewableEnergyDependson the Public Not Private Sector, PSIRU, June2013.

204 Ruggero Schleicher-Tappeser, “How Renewa-blesWillChangeElectricityMarketsinthenextFiveYears,”EnergyPolicy48,September2012.

205 “LaRevolucionEnergetica:Cuba’sEnergyRevo-lution,”RenewableEnergyWorld,April2009.

206 Renewables2013GlobalStatusReport.207 “Utility-ScaleInstallationsLeadSolarPhotovol-

taicGrowth,”TodayinEnergy,U.S.EnergyInfor-mationAdministration,October31,2012.

208 ScottDickinson,etal.MaximisingEmploymentand Skills in theOffshoreWind Supply Chain,UKCommissionforEmploymentandSkills,Au-gust2011.

209 “AsiaReport:ChinaGetsSeriousAboutCullingItsSolarHerd,”RenewableEnergyWorld,Janu-ary2014.

210 SnehaShah,“SolarInverterMarket,”WallStreetSectorSelector,October2013.

211 TrendsinPhotovalticApplications.212 Craig Morris, German Solar Bubble? Look

Again!,HeinrichBöllStiftung,June2012.213 Jesse Jenkins, “Economic Stimulus, Clean En-

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214 MarcelinoMadrigalandStevenStoft,Transmis-sionExpansionforRenewableEnergyScale-UpEmergingLessonsandRecommendations,TheWorldBank,June2011.

215 “Theproblemisthattransmissionprovidersdonotwishtostartbuildingalineuntilgenerationdevelopershavecommittedtousingit,andde-velopersdonotwishtocommituntiltransmis-sionaccess isassured in thenear future.Pro-activeplanningcanalsospeeduptransmissionaccesscomparedwiththewait-and-seeversionof anticipatory planning, or a purely reactiveapproach.Finally,becauseitoptimizestheba-sictradeoff, itwillgenerallyprovidemoreeffi-cientsolutionsandcheaperrenewableenergy.”Ibid.

216 Ibid.217 GreenGrowth.

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