ARTICLE 133Offending the religious feelingsPeople vs. Mandoriao, Jr.C.A., 51 O.G. 4619FACTS:The Iglesia ni Cristo held a religious rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200 people attended the meeting; about 50 of who weremembers of the Iglesia ni Cristo but the rest were outsiders and curious listeners. While Salvio, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo, was expounding onhis topic to the effect that Christ is not God, but only man, the crowd became unruly. Some peopleurged Mandoriao to go up the stage and havea debate with Salvio. Mandoriao however, was not able to speak before the microphone because the wire connecting it was abruptlydisconnected.

ISSUE:Whether or not the meeting was a religious ceremonyHELD:The meeting here was not a religious ceremony. A religious meeting is an assemblage of people met for thepurpose of performing actsof adoration to the Supreme Being, or to perform religious services in recognition of God as an object of worship The meeting here was notlimited to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The supposed prayers and singing of hymns were merely incidental because the principal objectof the rally was to persuade new converts to their religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious ceremony, the appellant cannot be said tohave performed acts or uttered words offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The act complained of must be directed against a dogma or ritual,or upon an object of veneration. There was no object of veneration at the meeting.RATIO:Religious ceremonies are those religious acts performed outside of a church, such as processions and special prayers for burying deadpersons. When the application of the Church of Christ was to hold the meeting at a public place and the permit expressly stated that the purposewas to hold a prayer rally, what was held on that occasion was not a religious ceremony, even if a minister was then preaching (that Jesus Christwas not God but only a man). The rally was attended by persons who are not members of the sectRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee,vs.JOSE M. BAES,appellant.Crispin Oben for appellant.Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-appellees.No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.CONCEPCION,J.:This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ ofmandamusissued by this court in G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice of the peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was filed of the following tenor:The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against religion committed as follows:That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused, while holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of religious sect known as the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church and is devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of the undersigned complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard. An act committed in grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAESParish PriestComplainant(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn statement regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the facts and of the witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the fiscal, instead of filing the corresponding information, put in the following motion for dismissal:The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. The said priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats, the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the Church. Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to the Church of Christ.The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused does not constitute the offense complained of considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. At most they might be chargeable with having threatened the parish priest, or with having passed through a private property without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert, commenting on the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case, reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file another information for the crime found to have been committed by the accused.From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter given due course by the court by virtue of an order of this court.The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer questions the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part thereof, to wit, that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to the religious services of said church, and it is through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection of the parish priest and through force and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under the rites of the religious sect known as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part, he would not have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not constitute the crime defined and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act committed by the accused had offended the religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act complained of took place. We believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible. As the fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of them, but must admit them, although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty under the law, without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.Peoplev.TengsonChrist is the answerFuneral; performed religious rites inthe house and in an unfinishedbarrio chapel-Chantingof Alleluia,singing religious hymnsAcquitted.Second element that the act isnotoriously offensive to the feelingsof the faithful was not present.Offense should not be depend uponthe subjective conception orcharacterization of such religious act.Laurel Standard: (dissent from Baes)-Perspective of the faithful IN GENERAL-Believers of Jesus Christ regardless of religious sect or denominationRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,petitionervs.JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE,respondents.G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO,petitioners,vs.PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103,respondents.NARVASA,J.:Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence,People vs. Hernandez1once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases2that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition forhabeas corpusherein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;(c) denied his right to bail; and(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.4The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.5On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return6for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 921647Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within theHernandezruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information inHernandezcharged murders and other common crimes committedas a necessary means for the commission of rebellion,whereas the information against Sen. Enrileet al.charged murder and frustrated murder committedon the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of theHernandezruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with whichHernandezwas not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date8granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court9voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two10against granting bail to the Panlilios.The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:(a) abandonHernandezand adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;(b) holdHernandezapplicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;(c) maintainHernandezas applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.

On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined.10-AIn the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralizeHernandezby enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."'11In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstatedHernandezas binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory thatHernandezis, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust ofHernandezto rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 andprision mayor,in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years ofprision mayor,and (2) for the crime of murder,reclusion temporalin its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances,the extreme penalty could not be imposedupon him. However, under Article 48 saidpenalty would have to be meted outto him,even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would beunfavorableto the movant.Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose offavoringthe culprit, not of sentencing him to a penaltymore severethan that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penaltylowerthan the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.12The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is thatHernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.This, however, does not writefinisto the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as chargingsimple rebellion. Thus, inHernandez, the Court said:In conclusion, we hold that,under the allegations of the amended informationagainst defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein aremere ingredientsof the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crimechargedin the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years ofprision mayorand a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.13The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context ofHernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without firstpersonallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution.15This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure bypersonallyevaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation.17Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation ofHernandezas applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition forhabeas corpusin this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by theHernandezruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge.18There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judgemotu proprioto set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factualmilieuand is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded20that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated inPeople vs. Hernandez,the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall becomefunctus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990JUAN PONCE ENRILE,petitioner,vs.HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder1with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case ofPeople v. Hernandez(99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus ofJuan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). TheEnrilecase gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in theHernandezcase. This Court recently declared:The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which thatHernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellionwith any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:xxx xxx xxx(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.xxx xxx xxxThe prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed,can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup.(Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held inPeople v. Hernandez, supra:In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve apolitical purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.(p. 536)The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case ofPeople v. Prieto2(80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.In the light of theHernandezdoctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez,supra, at p. 528)TheHernandezand other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses, andassume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently,cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez,supra, p. 541)InPeople v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)xxx xxx xxx[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)Noteworthy is the recent case ofMisolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on theHernandezandGeronimorulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court inHernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguezfind no application in this case.The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed.3The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.D E C I S I O NNOCON, J p:Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information which reads:"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his official duties."Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back up. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues because of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his companions.On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which states: "I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect appellant against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement was free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant from the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?A No.xxx xxx xxxQ In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation which was about to be made?A Yes.Q Who are the persons present at that time?A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.Q What happened after that?A The CIS started the investigation.Q You mean this Ariston Ira?A Yes.Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?A The investigation started.Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.Q Was that reduced to writing?A Yes.xxx xxx xxxQ You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?A Yes, they voluntary.Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).Q Were you present during the proceeding?A I was also present."

We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his counsel of his own choice."The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession."Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and after having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a language known to him, found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B.""Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin Nues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this court had this to say:"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only during trial. Thus it was too late."Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion."Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was charged with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However, appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO,defendant-appellant.KAPUNAN,J.:Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.2On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.3As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.After trial, the courta quofound accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty ofReclusion Perpetuawith all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.With costs against the accused.SO ORDERED.Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,"4(said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty ofprison mayorby the lower court.Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."5Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is notprision mayoras appellant contends, butreclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic ActNo. 6968, theCoup D'etatLaw, prescribesreclusion temporalas the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a rebellion.We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.6The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.7By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined aprioriwithin predetermined bounds.8One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case ofPeople v.Hernandez,9thus:In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve apolitical purpose.The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, inPeople v.Gempes,10this court stressed that:Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.11Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case ofEnrile v.Amin,12where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13for allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14(on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged inEnrile vs.Salazar(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court inEnrile vs.Aminfurther underscored that:[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.The similarity of some of the factual circumstances ofPeople v.Ompad,Jr.,16to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad,alias"Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information.17It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. InPeople v.Pazand Ticawe held:That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's obvious interest in testifying to that effect.18Similarly, inPeople v.Buco,19the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma,alias"Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement.20People v.Dasig21has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." InDasigthe Court however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief inDasigwhich this Court favorably quoted, noted that:[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states that accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self serving23an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial enough as anindiciaof political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a certainaliasALWIN,ALIASSAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)Q Please continue.A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2) companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)Q What is your participation in the group?A Look-out sir.Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)A No more sir.25It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entireextrajudicial confessiondid appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992.27As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member.28The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while upholding the rest of it.29While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was committed.30Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gun wielder, by the testimony of