presented at: foreign policy research institute, philadelphia 13 december 2011 demography &...
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Presented at:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia
13 December 2011
Demography & Liberal Democracy
The Age-structural Maturity Thesis
(or “How Political Demography Foretold the Arab Spring”)
Richard Cincotta
The Stimson Center
Cincotta & Hummel, 2009
The Demographic Transition
Age structural Classes: Japan 1935 to 2025.Class
Median age range
Intermediate
25 – 35 yrs
Post-mature
45 – 55 yrs
Youthful
15 – 25 yrs
Mature
35 – 45 yrs
Cincotta, in press
(69.2 million) (104.4 million)
(Population)
(123.2 million) (120.8 million)
DATA SOURCE: UN Population Division, 2011
Four categories: four individual countries, 2010
Transitional
Population age structures
2010
Data: UN Population Division, 2009
Median Age (Years)
15 25 35 45 55
Likelihood
Youthful Intermediate Mature Post-Mature
Liberal Democracy
Political Violence
The Empirical Narrative
Median Age (Years)
15 25 35 45 55
Net Benefits
Youthful Intermediate Mature Post-Mature
Unconstrained executive power
Civil liberties & political rights
The Theoretical Narrative
Y: Youthful (<25.0 yrs)
I : Intermediate (25.1-35.0)
M: Mature (35.1 to 45.0)
*P: Post-mature (>45.1)
*(no states yet within this category as of 2010)
Age structure (median age)
Pro
po
rtio
n
“F
RE
E”
no
states
Age structure & Freedom Scores
1975 to 2005
50-50 chance of “Free”
Pro
po
rtio
n (
%)
“F
ree”
Youthfulness and the path to liberal democracy: 8 selected states
Cincotta, 2009
Some anecdotal evidence of rises in democracy scores as age-structural youthfulness declines.
Why does this model work?
No
. o
f S
tate
s
<0.42 >.42
Youth Proportion*
1980s
Fate of States rising to liberal democracy during the decade
Durability of Regime
<29 years >29 years
Median Age
Youthful states
Data: UN 2010 Rev.
from Barnett, 2004
Youthful states
Data: UN 2010 Rev.
Youthful states
Data: UN 2010 Rev.
Data: UN 2010 Rev.
Youthful states
Youthful states
Data: UN 2010 Rev.
Data: UN 2010 Rev.
Youthful states
Presented at:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia
13 December 2011
The Intelligence Value of
“Age Structure”
Richard Cincotta
Demographer-in-residenceThe Stimson Center
Year (5-yr period)
Data: UN Population Div., 2010 Rev.
Model results & forecasts: Cincotta, unpublished
Population data: UN Population Division, 2010 Rev.
Age structure and the “naïve probability” of liberal democracy
Pro
port
ion
of s
tate
s e
xper
ienc
ing
civi
l con
flict
* Conflict involves a more youthful minority
“The first (and perhaps most surprising) region that promises a shift to liberal democracy is a cluster along Africa’s Mediterranean coast: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, none of which has experienced liberal democracy in the recent past. The other is in South America: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, each of which attained liberal democracy demographically “early” but was unable to sustain it. Interpreting these forecasts conservatively, we can expect there will be one, maybe two, in each group that will become stable liberal democracies by 2020.”
Cincotta, R.P. 2008. “How Democracies Grow Up.” Foreign Policy: March/April, 80-82 (plus supplementary map and graph online).
Cincotta, R.P. 2008/09. “Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, 13: 10-18. Available at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ECSPReport13_Cincotta.pdf
These predictions are the subject of the presentation on C-Span: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/richardcincotta
2008 Forecast
4. Rapid democratization in North Africa and the Rise of Islamic Parties. One component of “youth-bulge theory” is a model that suggests that the probability of attaining a stable liberal democracy increases as a state’s age structure matures. North African countries are rapidly maturing toward the 50-50 break-even point (a half a chance for a liberal democracy). In this scenario, a North African state, probably Tunisia, undergoes a “color revolution”—a swift and non-violent transition to liberal democracy. This may bring Islamists into power—or maybe not. However, the possibilities for spreading democracy through the region and for new political dynamics to play out in an age-structurally mature Arab state could produce both risks and opportunities for the US.
Rationale: Age-structural maturation & liberal democracy. Declines in the proportion of young adults in the working age population tends to make youth recruitment to political violence more difficult and promote a more manageable political environment. As politics lose their volatility, commercial and military elites see opportunities under democratic rule and a marketplace free of the patron-client relationships supported by the autocrat.
Low probability, High Impact Analysis, LRAU, Oct. 2010.
Product of political demographic research.
Submitted by R.P. Cincotta, Oct. 2010