prewar period-reading notes p. 149-160 (keylor)

7/31/2019 PreWar Period-Reading Notes p. 149-160 (Keylor)

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French Security Collapsesp. 149-160 (Keylor)


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French Security At Last When last we left France

April, 1935- issuance of the Stresa declaration Agreement to strengthen the Locarno treaties among the

Brits, French, and Italians (Stresa front)

Alsoto insure Austrias independence May, 1935- Franco-Soviet Pact

June, 1935- advent of Franco-Italian military talks

Alliances with Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia

Treaties of friendship with Romania and Yugoslavia Visions of resurrecting the old wartime coalition of

Great Britain, Russia, and Italy to prevent furtherGerman transgressions of the peace treaty


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French Security Collapses Britain Betrays France-

June, 1935- Brits and Germans sign a bilateral navalagreement that was secretly negotiated behindFrances back

Permitted Germany to exceed the naval limitations of theTreaty of Versailles as long as they didnt increase its totaltonnage beyond 35% of that of the combined fleets of theBritish Commonwealth

RESULT- damaged the Stresa front by allowing Germany tobreak yet another Versailles stipulation

Side Note- Germany had no intentions of limiting theirnaval production and looked to rival Britains global navalpower in the long run


4/25

French Security Collapses Italy Betrays France-

1930s- Italy eyed Ethiopia with the idea to recreate a RomanEmpire in and around the Mediterranean World

Britain and France had no colonial interests in that part ofAfrica and immediately attempted to create an atmosphere of

appeasement January, 1935- French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval had

formally renounced Frances minor economic interests inEthiopia and gave assurance of Italys free hand in the region

Purpose- attempt at keeping Italy as a friend

August, 1935- Britain and France allowed Italy a privilegedeconomic position in Ethiopia and the right to appoint Italianadvisers to the countrys civil service, army, and police

Essentially allowing Italy to establish a protectorate in Ethiopia


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October, 1935- Even with all of the concessions givenby Britain and France, Mussolini invaded Ethiopiawith a full-scale military attack

Military victory was easy, but diplomaticallyMussolini took a hit

Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations andpublic outcry throughout Europe was noticeable

Britain and France urged the League intocondemning the Italian offensive as a act ofaggression and voting for economic sanctions


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Hypocritical stance by Britain and France left a lastingnegative impression on Il Duce

December, 1935- Hoare-Laval Pact

A secret Anglo-French agreement providing for the cession ofmost of Ethiopia to Italy and the reduction of the remainder tothe status of an Italian client state

Embarrassingly, the pact had to be disavowed by both Europowers when contents of the agreement were leaked to thepress

Britain and France werent really abiding by the economicsanctions either

Especially for oil, which Italy needed for its mechanized army andair force


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Germany Seizes its Chance The instability of the Stresa front became an

advantage for Hitlers schemes Hitler remained neutral through the Italo-Ethiopian

struggle Expressed his willingness to supply Italy with scarce

resources such as iron, coal, and steel

Created closer ties between the two fascist dictators

Hitler then warned that he would regard the Franco-Soviet alliance as a violation of Locarno and a grave

threat to Germanys security Returned the threat by breaking the Locarno agreement

and reintroducing German military forces and fortificationsinto the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland


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Germany Seizes its Chance Germany also used the Franco-Soviet Pact to

create anti-communist propaganda

Red Menace literature intensified the fear of

communism in Western Europe

February, 1936- the French ratified the treaty

with the Soviet Union

March, 1936- three battalions of Germaninfantry, accompanied by antiaircraft guns and

air for squadrons moved into the Rhineland


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FranceDoesNothing!?

German occupation of the Rhineland shouldhave brought the full wrath of France, but French military strategy as developed over the past

several years dictated just such a posture of passivity

By constructing the Maginot Line France had in effectwritten off the Rhineland as indefensible

The French army possessed no mobile force thatcould be dispatched to the Rhineland to expel theGermans The French had devised no advance plan for such an

operation because it would have been incompatible withthe defensive strategy so tenaciously pursued by theFrench general staff


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France Maybe Does Something? The government leaders in Paris desired an

offensive against German troops in theRhineland even if the militarys general staffdidnt

April, 1936- French Foreign Minister Pierre-Etienne Flandin flew to London to discuss thepossibility of a joint Anglo-French countermove OBSTACLE- Brits did not see German reoccupation of

the Rhineland as a flagrant violation of the treatyof Locarno because it was not accompanied bymenacing German moves toward the French frontier


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Britain Bends

Britain would neither participate in any militaryresponse nor approve of a unilateral Frenchaction

Britain desired to avoid at all costs the Euro warthat it believed would inevitably result from aFrench or Anglo-French advance into theRhineland Brits were quite correct because even though the

German commanders in the Rhineland were told towithdraw in the event of military opposition, thatwithdrawal was to be only a tactical retreatpreparatory to a renewed offensive


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Britain Bends Hitlers brinkmanship made war unnecessary by

paralyzing the Western powers Brits and French were only left with the ability to

issue strong protests, garner a condemnation against

Germany in the League of Nations, and authorizejoint Anglo-French military conversations

Britains remilitarization after Germanoccupation of the Rhineland did little to comfort

France since it concentrated on upgrading navaland air forces for home and imperial defenseinstead of on establishing a land army that couldbe dispatched to the continent


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Central and Eastern Europe Reassess

Hitlers unilateral repudiation of the Locarno Pact had adevastating psychological impact on all of the smallercountries on the continent They all thought France would take the lead in restraining

Germany

June, 1936- meeting of the chiefs of staff of the LittleEntente CONCLUSION-their countries future security might well

require a choice between subservience to Germany or toRussia

Poland, in particular, beefed up diplomacy with Germany tofurther their previous pact

Central and Eastern European nations still had some hope thatFrench protection would be afforded them


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Belgium Breaks from France

October, 1936- the Belgian government formally

renounced its military alliance with France

Reverted to its prewar status of neutrality

Military ramifications of the Belgian defection werecritical

Anglo-French forces were no longer guaranteed transit

rights across Belgian territory in case of war with Germany

Franco-Belgian military coordination, a key element inFrances strategy for the defense of its unfortified

northeastern frontier, was abruptly terminated


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German Security is Increased

Fall, 1936- Germany had obtained geographicalprotective screens on its western and eastern bordersthat effectively insulated it from the threat of militaryintervention from the great powers in alliance against

it West- neutralized Belgium and a remilitarized Rhineland

East- an increasingly cooperative Poland served as aformidable barrier against the Soviet Union

South- the nations of the Little Entente were driven toseek improved relations with Germany in the hope ofstabilizing the political situation in that region


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Spanish Civil War Provides a

Smokescreen Failure of the Western powers to recognize the

implications of German security was in large part dueto the fixation of world attention on the civil war thaterupted in Spain in the summer of 1936

General Francisco Franco looked for military assistancefrom abroad

Both Italy and Germany were much obliged to help out

For Germanys part they would get to test out theirnew weapons, military techniques (terror bombing of

civilian population centers), and access to Spanishnatural resources

For Italy it meant greater ties to Germany


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Germany Prepares for War

October, 1936- Hitler unveiled his Four-Year

Plan

Under the supervision of Hermann Goring

Aimed at establishing Germanys absolute

independence from foreign trade by fostering the

production of synthetic materials as substitutes

for the natural resources unobtainabledomestically


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World War I was a war of attrition as

remembered by the new Nazi leadership,

so

The Nazis adopted a warfare method known as

blitzkrieg (aka- lightning wars)

A series of short, swift engagements against isolated

opponents

The principal weapons to be used were tanks and

airplanes


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October, 1936- Rome-Berlin Axis

Signaled Mussolinis acceptance of Germanysfreedom of action in Austria in particular and

Southeastern Europe in general Two crucial advantages for Hitler

It removed the Italian veto of Germanysannexationist designs on Austria

It increased the likelihood of tension in theMediterranean and North Africa between Italy andthe two dominant powers in that region- Britain andFrance


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Anschluss

1937- Hitler steadily increased the pressure on theAustrian government to align its foreign and domesticpolicies more closely with those of the Third Reich

Meanwhile, Hitler urged the Austrian Nazis to step uptheir subversive activities in preparation for apeaceful takeover in Vienna

Austrian chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg authorizedpolice raids on the HQ of the Austrian Nazis that

uncovered collusion with German Nazis Changed the method by which Hitler would unify

Germany and Austria


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Anschluss February, 1938- Schuschnigg met with Hitler

at Berchtesgaden

The Fuhrer verbally attacked the Austrian

chancellor for failing to pursue pro-Germanpolicies and threatened immediate military

action against Austria if Schuschnigg would not

allow Austrian Nazis to play a major role in his

government


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Anschluss Schuschnigg preempted Hitlers demands by calling for a

plebiscite on March 13, 1938 Sought national support and a vote of confidence in resisting

pro-German policies

March 12, 1938- Hitler sent German military into Austriato help oversee the plebiscite Schuschnigg sought help/advice from Britain and France to no

avail

April 10, 1938- a rigged election resulted in anoverwhelming vote for the unification of Germany andAustria Of course, this was verbotenby the Versailles TreatyBUT,

nobody dared to intervene at this point


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Berlin-Tokyo Axis

Between 1936 and 1938- Hitler activelypromoted the evolution of a cordial relationshipwith the rising imperial power in the Far East

(Japan) Germany stood to benefit from the pressure

that Japanese expansion would exert on theAsian possessions of Germanys principal

antagonists in Europe OBSTACLE-Hitlers relationship with Chinese

nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek


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Berlin-Tokyo Axis Commonality that brought the Germans and

Japanese together was their disdain forcommunist Russia

November, 1936- Anti-Comintern Pact Purpose- to promote cooperation to combat the

subversive activities of the CommunistInternational and its political apparatus in each

country Ulterior Motives- military alliance to pinch the

Soviet Union


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Formation of the Axis Powers

November, 1937- Italy was added to the AntiComintern Pact and the Axis Powers were formed

The world was now confronted with the nightmare ofan impending global alignment of the three

expansionist powers OBSTACLE-Germanys reluctance to sacrifice its lucrative

economic relations with China at a time when Japan waslaunching an undeclared war against the Nankinggovernment

OBSTACLE AVOIDED- spring, 1938- Hitler recognized theJapanese puppet state of Manchukuo, terminated allmilitary assistance to China, and recalled the Germanmilitary advisers to Chiang Kai-Shek

prewar period-reading notes p. 149-160 (keylor)

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