prof pilapil sws lecture for printing · outline of the lecture outline i. short introduction to...

13 Apr 2018

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The Federalism Project of the Duterte Administration:

A Critique using the Institutional Design Literature in Political Science

Kapihan sa SWS13 April 2018

Gene Lacza Pilapil Assistant Professor of Political ScienceUniversity of the Philippines-Diliman

This lecture is part of my ongoing research project entitled

“A Critical Review of the Federalism Project

of the Duterte Administration”

funded by the Office of the Chancellor

of the University of the Philippines Diliman,

through the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research

and Development’s Outright Research Grant.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank

Dr. Mangahas for inviting me to lecture in the Kapihan sa SWS;

Mr. Leo Laroza for organizing this Kapihan;

everyone in the SWS for having me;

and all the other members of the audience this afternoon

(including my own invitees)

who have taken time out from their busy schedules

to attend my lecture.

Three Main Aims of the Lecture

13 Apr 2018

1. Assert the importance of the institutional design literature in political science,

the very literature that specializes on the design and re-design of political institutions,

in assessing the Duterte administration’s federalism project (and its broader constitutional overhaul campaign).

2. Give three (of the many) cautionary insightsavailable from the institutional design literature

when attempting constitutional overhauls,especially when involving democratic regimes.

3. Apply these cautionary insights to the Duterte administration’s federalism project

and its broader constitutional overhaul campaign.

Outline of the Lecture

Outline

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

II. Three cautionary insights from the institutional design

literature applied to the Duterte administration’s

federalism project (and its overall charter change campaign)

The lecture runs for about 90 minutes

I. Short Introduction

to the Institutional Design Literature

13 Apr 2018


institutions

rules that influence the strategies of state and social actors

1. informal

social values and norms

not written down�

examples: sitting down to listen to a lecture/

standing in front to deliver a lecture


institutions


1. informal


not written down�

examples: sitting down to listen to a lecture/

standing in front to deliver a lecture


institutions


1. informal


not written down�

difficult and take a long time to change (if at all)

�


institutions


2. formal

“written down somewhere as laws, regulations,

constitutions, treaties, and so forth” (John M. Carey)


institutions


2. formal



can be rewritten in a short period of time�

13 Apr 2018


institutions


2. formal



“parchment institutions”


institutions


2. formal




most important: constitution


institutions


2. formal






most basic “institutional

framework” of a democracy

(Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach)

13 Apr 2018


most basic “institutional

framework” of a democracy

(Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach)

creates the fundamental formal rules creating other institutions

example:

1987 Philippine Constitution

constitutional bodies

Article IX

legislative branch

Article VI executive branch

Article VII

local government

Article X

judicial branch

Article VIII

an institution that creates other institution/s

most important formal

“meta-institution”of politics

other institutions

different other Articles

If separated = presidential

one basic example: form of government

relation between the executive and legislative

differences in the arrangement of formal rules

If fused = parliamentaryinstitutional design of a country’s form of government

horizontal

If hybrid = semi-presidential


system of government

relationship between the

central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority

“makes final decisions”

Another basic example:

13 Apr 2018



central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority

subordinate to the central

powers can be

delegated

single sovereignrecognized by the constitution



“constitutional sovereignty”



central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority


powers can be

delegated


a unitary system can range from highly centralized

(ex. Singapore)





central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority


No powers

aredelegated


a unitary system can range from highly centralized

(ex. Singapore)





central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority



a unitary system can range to highly decentralized

(ex. Norway)

No powers

aredelegated





central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority




(ex. Norway)

Many powers

aredelegated





central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority




(ex. Norway)

Many powers

aredelegated



13 Apr 2018



central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority



a unitary system can be more decentralized than some

centralized federal countries(ex. Indonesia over Malaysia)

Many powers

aredelegated





central government

local government

Unitary system of

government

vertical

single central

source of authority



a unitary system can be more decentralized than some

centralized federal countries(ex. Indonesia over Malaysia)

may also be revoked

Many powers

aredelegated





central government

local government

Federal system of

government

vertical

in certain policy areas where central

government has exclusive jurisdiction

sovereign





central government

local government

Federal system of

government

sovereign

in certain policy areas where local


vertical


second sovereignrecognized by the constitution

hence, another level of government

also enjoys constitutional sovereignty




central government

local government

Federal system of

government

sovereign

in certain policy areas where local


powers cannot be revoked because

� they are not delegated

by the central government

� but guaranteedby the constitution


hence, another level of government

also enjoys constitutional sovereignty

second sovereignrecognized by the constitution




central government

local government

Federal system of

government

verticalfederalism can be highly centralized(ex. Venezuela)


13 Apr 2018



central government

local government

Federal system of

government

verticalfederalism can be highly centralized(ex. Venezuela)




central government

local government

Federal system of

government

verticalfederalism tohighly decentralized(ex. United States)




central government

local government

Federal system of

government

verticalfederalism to highly decentralized(ex. United States)




central government

local government

Federal system of

government

vertical


in certain policy areas

where both governments

have jurisdiction

(concurrent/shared)



Federal system of

government

vertical

in certain policy areas

where both governments

have jurisdiction

(concurrent/shared)

local government

central government

“federal paramountcy”


studies how the design(or redesign) of a country’s

political institutions

such as theform of government,


13 Apr 2018







system of governmentelectoral system,






party system,






party system, legislative structure,







judicial system,







judicial system, andconstitutional bodies




13 Apr 2018













affects or will affect, among others,








affects or will affect, among others, the accountability,









representation,









representation, popular empowerment,










elite capture,



13 Apr 2018








elite capture, and coherent policymaking

of the state






(Johan P. Olsen)




(Johan P. Olsen)

“signifies purposeful and deliberate intervention

that succeeds in establishing new institutional structures and processes,

or rearranging existing ones, thereby achieving intended outcomes

and improvements”


“constitutional engineering literature”

other terms

“constitutional design literature”

“institutional approach”

“new institutionalism”


counts some of the biggest names in the political science discipline

including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science

13 Apr 2018

"to the scholar who in the view of the Foundation has made the most valuable contribution to political science”


counts some of the biggest names in the political science discipline

including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science

represents the best minds that have studied similar institutional issues that Filipinos now face

(and are the real experts on these issues)

II. Three Cautionary Insights

from the Institutional Design Literature

II.1. First cautionary insight:

No consensus on the superiority

of one system of government to another

there is no consensus on the superiority of the

form of government

or

parliamentary /semi-presidential

presidential

federal

to the

unitary


to the

or vice versa

While many scholars in the institutional design literature argue for the superiority of a federal to a unitary system

Examples of top political scientists:

Alfred Stepan

13 Apr 2018



Alfred Stepan

Arend Lijphart



Alfred Stepan

Arend Lijphart

Pippa Norris

13 Apr 2018



Alfred Stepan

Arend Lijphart

Pippa Norris

Larry Diamond

Many scholars, also in the same institutional design literature, deny the superiority of a federal to a unitary system.


Daniel Treisman

13 Apr 2018



Daniel Treisman

Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson



Daniel Treisman


Jonathan Rodden

13 Apr 2018



Daniel Treisman


Jonathan Rodden

Erik Wibbels

These scholars find that there is no meaningful difference in the performancebetween federal and unitary systems on a number of key indicators.

For examples:

1. human development (HDI)

2. economic performance (including public finance)

3. income inequality

4. democratic stability

5. quality of democracy

6. rule of law

7. anti-corruption

8. handling multiethnic conflicts

In fact, for a few scholars, their works show that unitary systems do better

than federal ones in some of these indicators.

13 Apr 2018

a package of institutional featuressystem of government

1. Institutional bundle

federal unitary

distribution of

legislative/executive powers

level and type of decentralization

devil is

in the

details

appointment/budgetary powers of

the president to/over bureaucracydesign of upper house

manner of recruitment

in the national/local

bureaucracy

just a few examples:

mechanisms for intergovern-

mental coordination


type of constitutional

entrenchment

level and type of devolution

We can organize the counter-arguments of the critics of the federal superiority camp via two intertwined institutional arguments:

whose performance depends on the specific design of these features

system of government 1. Institutional bundle

At the level of institutional bundle, helps explain performance

federal unitary

distribution of

legislative/executive powers

level and type of decentralization

devil is

in the

details design of upper house

manner of recruitment

in the national/local

bureaucracy


mechanisms for intergovern-

mental coordination


type of constitutional

entrenchment

level and type of devolution

appointment/budgetary powers of

the president to/over bureaucracy

a package of institutional featureswhose performance depends on the specific design of these features

2. Institutional configurationhow different types of

institutions affect each other

(e.g. how the electoral system affects the form of government)

Critics of the superiority argument give two intertwined reasons:

this means that institutions must not be analyzed independently

from other institutions that may affect their functioning

One of the most important insights of the institutional

design literature

13 Apr 2018


2. Institutional configuration

federal

electoral system

party system

system of government unitary

party system

electoral system

devil is

in the

details

performance also affected by the design of other institutions


just one

pair of

examples:

At the level of institutional configuration, helps explain performance

PR

SMD

MM

Multi-Ptwo-P

Regiona-

lizedNon-

Regionalized

Besides institutional factors,

Besides institutional factors, scholars also raise non-institutional design factors

that affect

institutional

performance(institutional

endogeneity)

length of democracy

Examples:

level of economic development

colonial heritage

political culture (non-formal institutions)

political elite composition

geographical location

type of ethnic fragmentation

path dependence

It is this particular combination of institutional and non-institutional design factors that explain the performance of a federal (or unitary) system

13 Apr 2018

II.2. Second cautionary insight:

Reform not Overhaul

is to reform rather than

overhaul their systems or forms of

government

the recommendation of top scholars for

democratic countries with already functioning

systems or forms of government



government




examples: Shugart and Mainwaring

Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman

13 Apr 2018



government




examples: Shugart and Mainwaring

Stephan Haggard and Robert KaufmanFrancis Fukuyama



government




revival of institutional design questions



government




revival of institutional design questions = largely linked with the most recent wave

of democratization where from 1974-1994:

75 countries transited to democracies role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article “The Perils of Presidentialism” including the Philippines in 1986

fundamental institutional choices for

new democracies: most important is the

form of government

13 Apr 2018



government




picked up by Filipino parliamentary advocates by mid-1990s,

when we have already made our choice of form of government in

the 1987 Constitution



form of government

role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article “The Perils of Presidentialism”



government





and the difficulty and danger of these choices are captured by the subtitle of

Jon Elster et al.’s book on post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe

these regimes in transition have no option but to make

these constitutional choices



form of government



government





and the difficulty and danger of these choices are captured by the subtitle of

Jon Elster et al.’s book on post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe

these regimes in transition have no option but to make

these constitutional choices



form of government



government





even for many scholars arguing the superiority of parliamentary

and/or federal, there is no recommendation to dump

existing presidential/unitary systems



form of government



government










form of government

13 Apr 2018



government







analogy: Sagada vs. Manila

Photo credit: Mr. Angel Juarez



government







analogy: Sagada vs. Manila

just a scholarly debate



government




among the reasons why strongly discouraged:

1. unnecessary: if there is no superiority,then there is no need for overhaul



government





2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally and intellectually complex for lofty goals

especially for federalism

where state governments,

constitutions, courts, bureaucracy, etc.

would have to be created

13 Apr 2018

13 Apr 2018

Benefits are uncertain,

but huge costs are definite







Philippine time frame(depending on which

proposed federal constitution you read)

At least four federal constitutions introduced since 2005

Jose Abueva (Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines) in 2005



Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. et al. (Senate Joint Resolution no. 10) in 2008

13 Apr 2018




Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both Houses 008) in 2016




Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both Houses 008) in 2016

Federalism Study Group of the PDP Laban Federalism Institute in August 2017







Philippine time frame (depending on which

proposed federal constitution you read) is

At least ten years (Abueva)

Not clear but it will take a long time to

execute (Pimentel et al.)

Not clear also but will also take a long time

to execute (De Vera and Gonzales)

At least six-and-a-half years to pass the

organic acts (PDP-Laban)

13 Apr 2018

illustrates howcomplex,

problematic, elusive,

mindboggling,and risky

the institutional design overhaul needed

to effect a transition from a unitary to a

federal system of government

in a democracy

Specific to PDP-Laban’s federalism proposal,

it reveals how forced,

confused, questionable,

quixotic, frightening, contradictory,

counterproductive, and haphazard

the party’s blueprint for the country’s shift to federalism

Its federalism which it calls

“evolutionary federalism” (sec 13)

is neither evolutionary nor federalism

It creates more problems than the current

decentralization setup

On institutional design principles,

it is inferior to the current Article X of the 1987

Constitution



government






andno democratic country has been

crazy enough to make these

overhauls at the same time!



government






Just when you think it could not get crazier,

“You know, my advice to you is:

maintain a federal system, a

parliament, but be sure to have a

President… You copy the France (sic) system.”

13 Apr 2018



government






semi-presidentialism


dual executive



government






semi-presidentialism


dual executive

very tricky executive veto gates

this overhaul project has become a grocery list of institutions!

only Russia is both semi-presidential and federal ( not a D)�



government



institutional design literature has sobered

from the enthusiasm of the early 1990s on the

power to get institutional design right

and

13 Apr 2018

And this is just about one aspect of the

institutional configuration: electoral system



government






and

(this is true even for the institutional design literature on federalism)

13 Apr 2018



government



Philippines’ constitutional overhaul project in 2016-18:

height of intellectual irony

and

(this is true even for the institutional design literature on federalism)




hubris?

ignorance of the literature?

and/or



government



and

13 Apr 2018



government



and

“hyperrationality” (Croissant and Merkel)

13 Apr 2018



government



andthe mistaken belief that just because you

change the rules, (i.e., formal rules)

politicians’ behaviors will also change (i.e., informal rules)




government



andTaagepera:


I call it in my classes:hyperinstitutionalism

(exaggerated belief in institutional design)

13 Apr 2018



government



andTaagepera: “excessive optimism”

in institutional design easily leads to

“excessive disillusionment”

afterwardsMy argument: undermining rather than deepening democracy

hyperrationality (Merkel and Croissant)





government



andTaagepera: “excessive optimism”

in institutional design easily leads to

“excessive disillusionment”

afterwardsMy argument: undermining rather than deepening democracy

hyperrationality (Merkel and Croissant)





government


3. Unsafe (highly risky): will be discussed in cautionary insight no. 3

and



government




reforms do not need constitutional revisions

only legislation or constitutional amendments

1. More justifiable

two reform principles from Larry Diamond



government






1. More justifiable

A. reform only in the face of manifest flaws

two reform principles from Larry Diamond

B. reform should correct those flaws as specifically as possible



government



2. Less risky: Messed-up reforms are more reformable

If there are errors in the reforms,

easier to return to the old setup

or to push it further to the new setup through new legislation/amendment




13 Apr 2018



government





piecemeal reforms that move to a more parliamentary-like direction

(example: party-system reforms against turncoatism) or a more federal-like direction (exs.: increased regional autonomy or a more robust local govt. code)

If there are errors in the reforms, easier to return to the old setup

or to push it further to the new setup through new legislation/amendment involve only legislation



government

involve only legislation

For scholars, may yet be the most crucial prerequisite

before any talk of a constitutional shift to parliamentary form

or a more federal-like direction (exs.: increased regional autonomy or a more robust local govt. code)


(example: party-system reforms against turncoatism)



government






Sartori:




government






Sartori: undisciplined political

parties in a presidential democracy

becoming disciplined in a parliamentary shift is

“against all odds”


13 Apr 2018



government






Mainwaring and Shugart:




government






Mainwaring and Shugart: undisciplined political

parties in a parliamentary shift “could exacerbate

problems of governability and instability” more than

in a presidential democracy




government






Mainwaring and Shugart: undisciplined political

parties in a parliamentary shift “could exacerbate

problems of governability and instability” more than

in a presidential democracy




government






Croissant and Merkel:




government



Croissant and Merkel: different time horizons

the consolidation of the new party system

“old, fragmented, clientelistic, and irresponsible parties”

“would not be able to create strong and stable governments”

could be done in a few months takes much longer than changing the constitution

would take years/ decades to happen









sequencing becomes a key

issue in institutional

design

� would determine

how the new

parliamentary form of government works

� and not the other

way around

13 Apr 2018

“a grand bargain” (quotation marks in the original)











design

� would determine

how the new

parliamentary form of government works

� and not the other

way around







heart bypass operation takes much longer than changing the constitution

walking exercises to build up lung capacity

for operation



design

“a grand bargain” (quotation marks in the original)







heart bypass operation takes much longer than changing the constitution

walking exercises to build up lung capacity

for operation



design

PDP-Laban = do your walking exercises to

build up lung capacityas you are having your

heart bypass operation



government







very different from messed-up constitutional revisions involving

system or form of government

especially for shift to federalism

13 Apr 2018



government






because of constitutional entrenchment protecting

its status, no federal country negotiated under

democratic conditions has ever returned to unitary




government












government










II.3. Third cautionary insight:Institutional design is political design

According to Adam Przeworski et al.:

13 Apr 2018

B

There are no optimal democratic institutions

and even if there were,


B



the distributive impact of institutional design means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them


B




A

B1


A B




B1

B2

B3opposing

political forces

political economy of

institutional design/

constitutional engineering

each institutional

design outcome reflects the

balance of power

(most important

actors are those who

will write the constitution)


different from the federalism project

before Duterte (1986-early 2016)


the federalism

project in the

Philippines under Duterte

only president to support was Arroyo

(in her campaign platform in 2004)

but haphazard support

13 Apr 2018




the federalism

project in the


very strong support of the

president


only played second fiddle to the

parliamentary project



(prominent in his campaign platform)




the federalism

project in the


very strong support of the

president


only played second fiddle to the

parliamentary project

clear primacy over the parliamentary/semi-

presidency project



(prominent in his campaign platform)

F How do we reach here?

Constituent Assembly

Current preferred mode:

- Philippine President - House

- Senate President- some senators


the federalism

project in the


U(P/SP)

The political economy question

13 Apr 2018







the federalism

project in the


U(P/SP)


13 Apr 2018




the federalism

project in the


U(P/SP)





ARTICLE XVII

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

“Constituent assembly” mode

(Note: term never appears in the Constitution)

ARTICLE XVII

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

voting separately or jointly?

13 Apr 2018

October 10, 1986

13 Apr 2018

13 Apr 2018




the federalism

project in the


U(P/SP)




the federalism

project in the


U

assuming that the Duterte administration could get

the 3/4ths vote (18/24) in the Senate = impossible

(P/SP)




the federalism

project in the


U


the 3/4ths vote (18/24) in the Senate = nearly impossible

(P/SP)

13 Apr 2018

Key reason for the opposition of the nationally elected senate is the proposal for its replacement by a regional senate

the most important shared institution of federalism




the federalism

project in the


U


and (223/297) in the Lower House = sure ball, as of now

the 3/4ths vote (18/24) in the Senate = nearly impossible

(P/SP)



U

1. very low level of institutionalization of political parties

Philippine Congress (especially its HoR)

= real minority; 7 members

= PDP-Laban only had 3 out of 297 representatives

= PDP-Laban membership and allies swelled to a supermajority of 260-plus = official minority: 20-plus but also the majority's minority

Just two comments

one of the most crucial indicators:

party switching

current 17th Congress (the one that will become the ConAss):

election result for HoR

post-election party-switching and re-alignment

LP had 116 members

(P/SP)

(must add Makabayan bloc)

(LP down to 28 as of May 2017)

13 Apr 2018



U

1. very low level of institutionalization of political parties



party switching

higher level of payoffs to move legislative agenda

of the executive

pork barrel by any other name

(CDF, PDAF, DAP, Duterte’s pork)

(P/SP)

More unstable political support

for the president, especially when

his popularity goes down

More incoherent lawmaking as more

policy side payments are made with more

players representing particularistic interests

Just two comments



U

2. High level of barrier to entry



political dynasty

(P/SP)

Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016) and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)

But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th

Congress (2010-2013)

Just two comments

by Mendoza et al., 2012



U




political dynasty

(P/SP)

HoR of the 15th Congress (2010-2013)

Just two comments

70 percent of members belong to a political dynasty

“with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th, 14th, or 15th Congress, or at least one local government

official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007, or 2010” (Dynasty3 Type)



U




political dynasty

(P/SP)

Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016) and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)

But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th

Congress (2010-2013)

Just two comments

by Mendoza et al., 2012

by Rivera, 2011

13 Apr 2018



U




political dynasty

(P/SP)

HoR of the 15th Congress (2010-2013)

Just two comments

“34 out of 77 provinces or 44 percent had the same political family winning the governorship

and at least one congressional district”






political dynasty

(P/SP)Just two comments

U

Self-perpetuating in politics by nature

of clan replication






political dynasty

(P/SP)Just two comments

Self-perpetuating in politics by nature

of clan replication Prevents party institutionalization

as dynasties act as surrogates of

political parties

Highly clientelistic (patronage-based)

because familial/clan interests take

precedence over any national interests

U

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup

U F(P/SP)

How do we reach here?

13 Apr 2018


ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup

U F

compromises “with groups that have

benefited from existing institutional

arrangements”

F1

each institutional


balance of power

overwhelmingly for non-institutionalized

and dynastic interests

(P/SP)

(P/SP1)

supermajorityin Congress


ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup

U F

F1

each institutional


balance of power



F2distributive

swing could be

more dramatic

(P/SP)

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

supermajorityin Congress

How do we reach here? U F

F1

each institutional


balance of power



F2

(P/SP)

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

because of the sheer

multiplicity of features

involved in changing the

system and form of government


F1

each institutional


balance of power



F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

(P/SP3)






F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

“hybrid outcomes

that leave lines of

accountability unclear and

combine the worstof both

worlds”

institutional Frankenstein outcomes

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)






F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup

institutional endogeneity

(existing vested interests)

among the most important factors:

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

what explains institutional

choices?and performance?

13 Apr 2018


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup



premium on democratic regime

transitions

assumption of some kind of

displacement of the vested

interests of the old order

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup



Worst-case scenario of

constitution-making for

Przeworski (P/SP1)

(P/SP2)


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup





Przeworski (P/SP1)

(P/SP2)


F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup





Przeworski

“When the relation of forces is known and uneven,

the institutions arecustom-made for a particular

person, party or alliance”

Duterte

13 Apr 2018


F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup





Przeworski

“When the relation of forces is known and uneven,

the institutions arecustom-made for a particular

person, party or alliance”

DutertePDP-Laban

supermajority

13 Apr 2018


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup



(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

Elster:


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup



(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

Elster:Constitutions

“ought to be written by

specially convened

assemblies” “not by bodies

that also serve as

ordinary legislatures”


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

(P/SP)ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup



(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)



specially convened


that also serve as


“to reduce the scope for institutional interest”


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

(P/SP)ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup



(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)



specially convened


that also serve as


“to reduce the scope for institutional interest”

13 Apr 2018


F1

each institutional


balance of power

F2

F3

(P/SP)

(P/SP3)

ConAssmembers

who are winners of

the old unitary/

presidential setup




the federalism

project in the


analogy: same inept driver with brand new vehicle

from Manila to Sagada

(P/SP1)

(P/SP2)

Thank you very much

The Federalism Project of the Duterte Administration:

A Critique using the Institutional Design Literature in Political Science

Kapihan sa SWS13 April 2018

Gene Lacza Pilapil Assistant Professor of Political ScienceUniversity of the Philippines-Diliman

prof pilapil sws lecture for printing · outline of the lecture outline i. short introduction to...

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