property_lecture notes of atty waldemar gravador

8/13/2019 PROPERTY_lecture Notes of Atty Waldemar Gravador

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• Property, Right to Property, and Ownership:

•

• 1. Property is an economic concept [ mass of thingsor objects useful to human activity] and necessaryto life.

•

• 2. Right to Property is the juridical tie by virtue ofwhich a person has the exclusive power to receiveor obtain all the benefits from a thing, except thoseprohibited or restricted by law or by the rights of

others.•

• 2. Distinction between right to property [ vinculumbetween a man and the thing] and ownership [

mass of rights over the thing] is more historical thanactual.



• Concept of things and property:

•

• 1. Things are all objects that exist, and can be of some

use to man. This is more generic and extensive.

Property are all those that are already appropriated orare in the possession of man.

• 2. To be juridically considered as a thing or property,an object must have the following requisites: 1) Utility [capacity to satisfy human wants] 2) Individuality [ or,substance or a separate and autonomous existence]and 3) Susceptibility of being appropriated [ equivalentto occupation, which is the willfull apprehension of acorporeal object which has no owner, with intent toacquire its ownership].

•



Common Things:

Things which, as a whole mass, are not

susceptible of appropriation e.g. sun,

stars, the core of the earth, the sea, and

others called common things, are notthings or property in the juridical concept.



RIGHTS AS PROPERTY:

Things, include not only material objects, butalso rights [ real rights- power belonging to aperson over a specific thing, without a passivesubject individually determined against whom suchright may be personally exercised. It gives to a

person direct and immediate juridical power over athing, which is susceptible of being exercised, notonly against a determinate person, but against thewhole world] [ personal rights- the power

belonging to a person to demand of another, as adefinite passive subject, the fulfillment of aprestation to give, to do, or not to do. Properlycalled right of obligation, or simply obligation]although these are relations and not objects.



DIFFERENCES IN REGIME BETWEENMOVABLE AND IMMOVABLES:

• a. Solemnity is greater in acts relative toimmovables, e.g. donations

• b. Adverse Possession is longer forimmovables.

• c. Publicity and Recording are more importantfor immovables re: double sale, mortgage

of properties.• d. Capacity to alienate, greater capacity is

usually required for immovables.

• e. Venue is usually determined by the location

of the immovable.



IMMOVABLES AND MOVABLES:

a. Par. 1. [ (1) Land, buildings, roads and

constructions of all kinds adhered to the

soil]

1. Separate treatment by the parties of

building from the land on which it stands

does not change the immovable characterof the building.



1. While the building of strong materials in which therice-cleaning machinery was installed by the"Compañia Agricola Filipina" was real property, andthe mere fact that the parties seem to have dealtwith it separate and apart from the land onwhich it stood in no wise changed its character

as real property. It follows that neither the originalregistry in the chattel mortgage registry of theinstrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage ofthe building and the machinery installed therein, nor

the annotation in that registry of the sale of themortgaged property, had any effect whatever so faras the building was concerned. ( LEUNG YEE VS.STRONG MACHINERY 37 PHIL. 644)

•



2. Buildings on rented land- there areauthorities that buildings or constructions

placed on land by lessee do not becomeimmovable, where agreement gives thelessee the right to remove the building andimprovements.

3. Building or house sold to be demolishedimmediately, French court held the sale to beinvolving movable property.



ANTONIO PUNZALAN et.al. vs.

REMEDIOS LACSAMANA et.al. G.R. No.

L-55729 MARCH 28, 1993FACTS:

Petitioner is owner of land situated in

Tarlac which he mortgaged to PNB in1963. This property was foreclosed. While

the land was still in possession of the

petitioner, he was allowed by PNB toconstruct a warehouse. In 1978, deed of

sale was executed between PNB and

herein respondent Lacsamana.



Petitioner filed a suit impugning the validityof the sale of the building in the CFI of

Rizal. Respondent PNB filed a motion todismiss on the ground of improper venuebecause the suit involves a real property.

HELD:

The warehouse claimed to be owned bypetitioner is an immovable or real property

as provided in article 415(1) of the CivilCode. Buildings are always immovableunder the



Code. A building treated separately from

the land on which it stood is immovableproperty and the mere fact that the parties

to a contract seem to have dealt with it

separate and apart from the land on whichit stood in no wise changed its character

as immovable property



4. Par. 2 [(2) Trees, plants, and growing

fruits, while they are attached to the landor form an integral part of an immovable ]

on ungathered fruits. Under the Chattel

Mortgage Law, ungathered fruits have thenature of personal property.



6. Par. 4. [ (4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or

other objects for use or ornamentation,

placed in buildings or on lands by the

owner of the immovable in such a mannerthat it reveals the intention to attach them

permanently to the tenements] – immovable

by incorporation and destination



4.a. objects must be placed by the owneror by his agent. It becomes immobilizedonly when placed in the tenement by theowner of the tenement ( Davao Sawmill Co.vs. Castillo 61 Phil. 709).

4.b. When placed by a mere holder , e.g.tenant, usufructuary, or one with a temporaryright over the immovable, objects do notbecome immovable property, unless the

person acts as agent of the owner ( DavaoSawmill case, supra).

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7. Par. No. 5. [5) Machinery, receptacles,

instruments or implements intended by the

owner of the tenement for an industry or

works which may be carried on in a

building or on a piece of land, and whichtend directly to meet the needs of the said

industry or works]



5.a. immovable by destination, depends

upon their being destined for use in the

industry or work in the tenement ( BH.Berkenkotter. vs. Co Unjieng 61 Phil. 663)

5.b. Additional machinery installed by

the owner of a sugar central to improve

milling capacity is realty ( Berkenkotter vs.Cu Unjieng e Hijos, 61 Phil. 663).



Mindanao Bus . Company vs. City

Assesso r 116 Phil . 50 1, no realty tax is

due on machineries of a transportationcompany, such as welder, boring machine,

lathe machine, etc. sitting on a cement or

wooden platform, because they are notabsolutely essential to its transportation

business which is not carried on in a

building or specified land.

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Movables:

General Test of Movable Character:

1) Whether it can be carried from place to place, 2) whether the change of location

can be effected without injury to an

immovable to which the object may be

attached, and 3) whether the object is not

included in any of the ten paragraphs of

Article 415 .



By Special Provision:

e.g. Act No. 1508 recognizes that growing

crops are personal property and may be

the object of chattel mortgage see.

Section 7.

Forces of Nature:

e.g. electricity, gas, oxygen, light, rays.



Consumables and Non-Consumables:

Consumable are those which cannot beused in a manner appropriate to their

nature without being consumed.

Non-consumables are those not consumed

by use.



*Fungibles and Non-Fungibles:

1. Distinction between Fungible and Non-fungible.Fungible , quality of being fungible depends upontheir possibility ( because of their nature or thewill of the parties), of being substituted by othersof the same kind, not having a distinctindividuality ( e.g. ten heads of cattle, or 100copies of a newspaper of a given date)

Non-fungibles are those which have their ownindividuality and DO NOT admit of substitution

( e.g. ten bottles of wine in my room)

Note: This is a classification based on PURPOSE



PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE

PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS

PUBLIC DOMINION

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP



Dominion and Ownership:

1. Public dominion does not carry the

idea of ownership; property of public

dominion is not owned by the State, but

pertains to the State, which as territorialsovereign exercises certain juridical

prerogatives over such property.



2. Ownership of property is in the social

group, whether national, provincial, ormunicipal. Their purpose is not to serve

the State as a juridical person, but the

citizens; they are intended for thecommon and public welfare, and so they

cannot be an object of appropriation,

either by the State or by private persons.



Outside Commerce of Man:

Rule: Property of public dominion OUTSIDEthe commerce of man.

Principles:

1) They cannot be alienated or leased orotherwise be the subject matter of contracts.

2.) cannot be acquired by prescription against

the State. 3.) not subject to attachment and execution

4.) cannot be burdened by voluntaryeasement.



CASES:

Mun icipal i ty o f Cavi te vs. Rojas , 30 Phil.20 [The said Plaza Soledad being apromenade for public use, the municipalcouncil of Cavite could not in 1907 withdrawor exclude from public use a portion thereof

in order to lease it for the sole benefit of thedefendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portionof said plaza or public place to the defendantfor private use the plaintiff municipality

exceeded its authority in the exercise of itspowers by executing a contract over a thingof which it could not dispose, nor is itempowered so to do.

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* Ignacio v. Directo r o f Lands , 108 Phil.

335

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an

application for the registration of a parcel

of land (mangrove), situated in barrioGasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of

37,877 square meters. Later, he amended

his application by alleging among othersthat he owned the parcel applied for by

right of accretion.

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HELD:

The article cited is clearly inapplicable

because it refers to accretion or

deposits on the banks of rivers, while

the accretion in the present case wascaused by action of the Manila Bay.



ON “FORESHORE” LANDS:

“Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areasof Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the publicdomain, waters x x x and other natural resources"and consequently "owned by the State." As such,

foreshore and submerged areas "shall not bealienated," unless they are classified as"agricultural lands" of the public domain. The merereclamation of these areas by PEA does not

convert these inalienable natural resources of theState into alienable or disposable lands of thepublic domain” ( See: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZvs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R. No.133250 July 9, 2002)

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* Laurel vs. Garcia G.R. No. 92013 July 25,1990

1. The subject property in this case is one of thefour (4) properties in Japan acquired by thePhilippine government under the Reparations

Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,

1956.

2. Petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongiproperty and the related lots were acquired as part

of the reparations from the Japanese governmentfor diplomatic and consular use by the Philippinegovernment. Vice-President Laurel states that theRoppongi property is classified as one of public

dominion, and not of private ownership under

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ISSUE: Can the Roppongi property and othersof its kind be alienated by the PhilippineGovernment?

HELD:

1. The nature of the Roppongi lot as propertyfor public service is expressly spelled out. It isdictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract ofprocurement which bind both the Philippine

government and the Japanese government. As property of public dominion, the Roppongilot is outside the commerce of man. It cannotbe alienated.



2. Applying Articles 419, 420, the SCruled: The Roppongi property is correctly

classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420

of the Civil Code as property belonging tothe State and intended for some public

service.



ON WHETHER OR NOT THE INTENTION OFTHE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CHANGEDBECAUSE THE LOT HAS BEEN IDLE FOR

SOME YEARS? OR, WHETHER IT HASBECOME PATRIMONIAL?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not beenused for a long time for actual Embassyservice does not automatically convert it topatrimonial property. Any such conversionhappens only if the property is withdrawn frompublic use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v.Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 (19751). A propertycontinues to be part of the public domain, notavailable for private appropriation or ownership"until there is a formal declaration on the part ofthe government to withdraw it from being such

(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335[1960]).



We emphasize, however, that anabandonment of the intention to use the

Roppongi property for public service andto make it patrimonial property underArticle 422 of the Civil Code must bedefinite. Abandonment cannot be inferred

from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government'sown deliberate and indubitable will but to alack of financial support to repair and improve

the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonmentmust be a certain and positive act based oncorrect legal premises.

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*Mani la Internat ional A irpo rt Authori ty vs .Court o f Appeals et.al. G.R. No. 155650 Ju ly20, 2006

On 1 October 2001, MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and

injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction ortemporary restraining order. The petition soughtto restrain the City of Parañaque from imposingreal estate tax on, levying against, and auctioningfor public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.














RULING:

First , MIAA is not a government-owned orcontrolled corporation but an

instrumentality of the National

Government and thus exempt from localtaxation. Second, the real properties of

MIAA are owned by the Republic of the

Philippines and thus exempt from real

estate tax.



a. A irpor t Lands and Bui ld ings are of

Publ ic Dom in ion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA

are property of pub l ic dom in ion andtherefore owned by the State or the

Republ ic o f the Phi l ipp ines .



The A irpor t Lands and Bui ld ings are

devo ted to publ ic use because they are

used by the pub l ic fo r international anddomest ic travel and

transportat ion . The fact that the MIAA

co l lects term inal fees and other chargesfrom the publ ic does not remove the

character o f the Airpo r t Lands and

Bui ld ings as propert ies for pub l ic

use. The operat ion by the government

of a to l lway does not change the

character of the road as one for pub l ic

use. S



PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs.CITY OF ILOILO G.R. No. 109791 July

14, 2003

“Concededly, "ports constructed by theState" are properties of the publicdominion, as Article 420 of the Civil Codeenumerates these as properties "intendedfor public use." It must be stressed

however that what is being taxed in thepresent case is petitioner’s warehouse,which, although located within the port, isdistinct from the port itself.

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. In Light Rail Transit Authority v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals et al .,22 petitioner thereinsimilarly sought an exemption from real estatetaxes on its passenger terminals, arguing that saidproperties are considered as part of the "publicroads," which are classified as property of publicdominion in the Civil Code.23 We ruled therein that:

…[T]he properties of petitioner are not exclusivelyconsidered as public roads being improvementsplaced upon the public road, and this [separable]nature of the structure in itself physicallydistinguishes it from a public road. Considering

further that carriageways or passenger terminalsare elevated structures which are not freelyaccessible to the public, vis-à-vis roads which arepublic



On subdivision road lots:

WOODRIDGE SCHOOL INC. et.al. vs. ARBCONSTRUCTION INC. G.R. No. 157285February 16, 2007

In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “the road lots in aprivate subdivision are private property,hence, the local government should firstacquire them by donation, purchase, or

expropriation, if they are to be utilized as apublic road.” Otherwise, they remain to beprivate properties of the owner-developer.

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Contrary to the position of petitioners, the useof the subdivision roads by the generalpublic does not strip it of its privatecharacter. The road is not converted intopublic property by mere tolerance of thesubdivision owner of the public’s passage

through it. To repeat, “the local governmentshould first acquire them by donation,purchase, or expropriation, if they are to beutilized as a public road.”

Likewise, we hold the trial court in error whenit ruled that the subject road is public propertypursuant to Section 2 of Presidential Decree

No. 1216.

OWNERSHIP



OWNERSHIP

Definition of Ownership:

1. The independent and general power of aperson over a thing for purposes recognized

by law and within the limits establishedthereby.

2. A relation in private law by virtue of which athing pertaining to one person is completelysubjected to his will in everything notprohibited by public law or the concurrence

with the rights of another.



Rights of an Owner:

Right to enjoy, right to dispose, and the

right to recover or vindicate

Enjoy: right to possess, right to use, and

right to the fruits

Dispose: right to consume or destroy or

abuse, right to encumber or alienate



Actions to Recover:

1. For personal property- Replevin under Rule60, Rules of Court

2. For Real Property: Forcible Entry and

Unlawful Detainer under Rule 70 , 1997 Rulesof Civil Procedure:

Accion Publiciana- the plenary right to recover

possessesion.

Accion Reinvidicatoria- an action torecover ownership.



Roman Law:

Jus possidendi-right to possess

Jus utendi-right to use

Just fruendi-right to the fruits

-natural, industrial,and civil

Jus abutendi-right to consume

Jus disponendi-right to dispose Jus vindicandi-right to recover



ACTIONS TO RECOVER:

Can an action reinvindicatoria be filed even ifthe plaintiff is in actual possession of theproperty?

Answer: Yes

IGLESIA NI CRISTO et.al. vs. HON. THELMAPONFERRADA et.al. G.R. No. 168943OCTOBER 27, 2006



Facts:

In October 2001, Enrique Santos et.al filed acomplaint for quieting of title and/or accionreinvidincatoria against Iglesia ni Cristo. Theyalleged that they are owner of a 936 sq.m.

parcel of land in Tandang Sora, Quezon Citywhich they inherited from Enrique Sr.

Iglesia filed a motion to dismiss contending that

the action has prescribed. It appears that it wasable to obtain a TCT over the same parcel ofland way back in 1984-the year when the titlewas issued in their favor.



In support of its contention, Iglesia contended that theaccion reinvindicatoria presupposes that the plaintiffis not in actual possession of the property he seeks to

recover. Thus, this is true in this case because it(iglesia) was in possession of the property in 1984when the title was issued to it.

HELD:

Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or materialpossession of the property since 1984 when TCT No.321744 was issued in its favor is belied by theallegations in the complaint that respondents hadbeen in actual and material possession of theproperty since 1961 up to the time they filed theircomplaint on October 24, 2001.



Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternativereinvindicatory action against petitioner. An accionreinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that

the actual and material possession of the property ison defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery ofsuch possession from defendant. It bears stressingthat an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seekingthe recovery of ownership and includes jus

possidendi , jus utendi , and jus fruendi as well. It isan action whereby a party claims ownership over aparcel of land and seeks recovery of its fullpossession. Thus, the owner of real property inactual and material possession thereof may file anaccion reinvindicatoria against another seekingownership over a parcel of land including jusvindicandi , or the right to exclude defendants from thepossession thereof.



In this case, respondents filed an alternative

reinvindicatory action claiming ownership

over the property and the cancellation of TCTNo. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In

fine, they sought to enforce their jus utendi

and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimedownership and prevented them from fencing

the property.



Limitations on the right of ownership:

1. Limitations imposed for the benefit of

the State- police power [ e.g. SECTION.

16. ( Republic Act No. 7160) General

Welfare. - eminent domain; and Taxation

2 Li it ti i d b th L l l



2. Limitations imposed by the Law- legaleasement of waters [Art. 637. Lower estates areobliged to receive the waters which naturally and

without the intervention of man descend from thehigher estates, as well as the stones or earth whichthey carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot constructworks which will impede this easement; neither can

the owner of the higher estate make works whichwill increase the burden.] (552) ] or legaleasement of right of way [Art. 649. The owner, orany person who by virtue of a real right maycultivate or use any immovable, which is

surrounded by other immovables pertaining to otherpersons and without adequate outlet to a publichighway, is entitled to demand a right of waythrough the neighboring estates, after payment ofthe proper indemnity]



3. Limitations imposed by the owner - e.g.lease/pledge

4. Limitations imposed by the grantor - donor mayprohibit partition [ e.g. Art. 1083. Every co-heir hasa right to demand the division of the estate unlessthe testator should have expressly forbidden itspartition, in which case the period of indivision shallnot exceed twenty years as provided in article 494.This power of the testator to prohibit divisionapplies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-

ownership terminates when any of the causes forwhich partnership is dissolved takes place, orwhen the court finds for compelling reasons thatdivision should be ordered, upon petition of one ofthe co-heirs. ](1051a) ]

P i i l f “S lf H l ” ( ARTICLE 429 f



Principle of “Self -Help” ( ARTICLE 429 of

the Civil Code)

1. This authorizes the lawful possessor to

USE FORCE, not only to prevent a

threatened unlawful invasion or usurpationthereof.

2. Qualification to the rule that a personshould not take the law in his own hands.

It is lawful to repel force by force.

3 Actual invasion of property may consist of a



3. Actual invasion of property may consist of amere disturbance of possession or of a realdispossession. Mere disturbance of possession [ force may be used against it at any time as longas it continues, even beyond the prescriptiveperiod for an action of forcible entry e.g. if a ditchis opened by Pedro in the land of Juan, Juan mayclose it or cover it by force any time.]

4. If, however, invasion consists of realdispossession [ force to REGAIN possession canbe used only immediately after the dispossession]In other words, once the usurper’s possession

has become firm by the lapse of time, thelawful possessor must resort to the competentauthority to recover his property.

C



Case:

* German Management & Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of

Appeals G.R. No. 76216 and 76217 September 14, 1989.

Private respondents, claiming to be mountainside farmers ofSitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of theConcerned Citizens of Farmer's Association, alleged that

petitioner deprived private respondents of their property withoutdue process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying thebarbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice;(2) bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other cropsof private respondents by means of force, violence andintimidation, in violation of P. D. 1038 and (3) trespassing,coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject privaterespondents from their respective farmholdings in violation ofP.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.

HELD

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HELD:

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at

the time petitioner entered the property,private respondents were already inpossession thereof. There is no evidencethat the spouses Jose were ever in

possession of the subject property. On thecontrary, private respondents' peaceablepossession was manifested by the factthat they even planted rice, corn and fruitbearing trees twelve to fifteen years priorto petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional



Both the Municipal Trial Court and the RegionalTrial Court have rationalized petitioner's drasticaction of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine ofself-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New CivilCode. Such justification is unavailing because thedoctrine of self-help can only be exercised at thetime of actual or threatened dispossession whichis absent in the case at bar . When possessionhas already been lost, the owner mus t reso rt to jud ic ial process for the recovery o f property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Codewhich states, "(In) no case may possession be

acquired through force or intimidation as long asthere is a possessor who objects thereto. He whobelieves that he has an action or right to depriveanother of the holding of a thing, must invoke theaid of the competent court, if the holder should

refuse to deliver the things.

EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP d REGALIAN



EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP and REGALIANDOCTRINE ( Article 437 of the Civil Code)

Extent of Ownership:

Extent of ownership: Horizontal ly , ownershipextends up to the boundaries; vert ical ly ,extends below the surface and above it to theextent required by the economic interest orutility to the owner , in relation to theexploitation that may be made of the property.( e.g. land traversed by power lines)



CASES:

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.

LUCMAN IBRAHIM et.al. G.R. No. 168732,

June 29, 2007

“Thus, the ownership of land extends to thesurface as well as to the subsoil under it. In

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

this principle was applied to show that rightsover lands are indivisible and, consequently,

require a definitive and categorical classification,

thus:

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“The Court of Appeals justified this by sayingthere is “no conflict of interest” between the

owners of the surface rights and the owners ofthe sub-surface rights. This is rather strangedoctrine, for it is a well-known principle that theowner of a piece of land has rights not only to its

surface but also to everything underneath andthe airspace above it up to a reasonable height.Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classifiedas mineral underneath and agricultural on the

surface, subject to separate claims of title. Thisis also difficult to understand, especially in itspractical application.

U d th th f th d t t th f



Under the theory of the respondent court, the surfaceowner will be planting on the land while the mininglocator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer

cannot dig a well because he may interfere with themining operations below and the miner cannot blast atunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deepcan the farmer, and how high can the miner gowithout encroaching on each others rights? Where is

the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land areindivisible and that the land itself cannot be halfagricultural and half mineral. The classification mustbe categorical; the land must be either completelymineral or completely agricultural.

HIDDEN TREASURE



HIDDEN TREASURE

Concept of Hidden Treasure: 1. Consist of money, jewels, or precious

objects [ movables only – Tolentino e.g.

prehistoric tomb excluded except themovables found therein], and 2) they arehidden and unknown, such that their findingis a real discovery.

2. Owner unknown e.g. only if the thing hasbeen considered lost and the owner hasalready abandoned it.

Wh “ t ”



Who are “strangers”:

Anyone who has absolutely no right over the

immovable or the thing in which the treasure

is found but INCLUDES also lessee,usufructuary, or a paid laborer working for

the owner of the land [ provided he has not

been engaged precisely to look for hiddentreasure]

Fi d titl d t h



Finder entitled to share:

A finder is entitled to one-half (1/2) , provided:

finding is by chance ( not purposely sought) seehowever: opinion of Jurado where finding by chancemay also include cases “by a stroke of good fortune”. ( a finder ordered by the landowner to search is notentitled)

finder is not a co-owner of the property where it is found finder not a trespasser

finder not an agent of the landowner

finder not married under the absolute community or

conjugal partnership otherwise his share belongs tothe community [Article 117 (4), Family Code: The shareof either spouse in the hidden treasure which the lawawards to the finder or owner of the property where thetreasure is found formed part of conjugal partnership properties]

RIGHT OF ACCESSION



RIGHT OF ACCESSION

Accession:

Accession is the right of a property to everything which is:

a) produced thereby ( accession discreta)

b) incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or

artificially

b.1. natural accession ( accession natural)

b.2. artificial accession ( accession artificial oraccession industrial)

Classification of Accession:



Classification of Accession:

A. Discreta: natural, industrial, and civil fruits

B. Continua: may refer to immovables ormovables

- immovables: alluvion ( deposits), force of river ( avulsion), change of river bed , formation of

islands, and building, planting and sowing .

- movables: conjunction or adjunction;specification; and, commixtion

BASIS OF ACCESSION:



BASIS OF ACCESSION:

1. Accession discreta-based on principles of justice[ itis only “just” that the owner of a thing should also ownwhatever it produces, unless there is some specialreason for a contrary resolution]

2. Accession continua-based on necessity and utility

[ it being practical that the owner of the principal thingshould own the new things instead of a co-ownershipbeing established , e.g. giving riparian the right to

own accretion which they gradually receive from theeffects of the current of the waters]

Basic principles governing the doctrine of



Basic principles governing the doctrine ofaccession:

The owner of a thing belongs theextension or increase of such thing

This extension of the right of ownership isrealized, as a general rule, under the juridical

principle that the accessory follows theprincipal.

This incorporation of the accessory with theprincipal, saving the exceptions provided by

law, is effected only when two th ings are soun ited that they cannot be separatedw i thou t in jur ing or destroy ing the ju r id ical natu re o f one o f them .

CONCEPT OF “FRUITS” ( Article 441)



CONCEPT OF “FRUITS” ( Article 441)

Concept of Fruits:

All products of or income from a thing, in

accordance with its economic purpose, so

long as they do not bring about any essential

alteration thereof.



Kinds of Fruits:

1. natural fruits [ spontaneous products of the

soil, young, and other products of animals]

2. industrial fruits [ produced by lands of any

kind through cultivation or labor];

How about “cultivated trees”? Strictly speaking



How about cultivated trees ? Strictly speaking,they are not fruits for they are really immovablesas long as they are attached to the land, and

they may produce fruits in themselves.

But they may be considered as “fruits” whenthey are expressly cultivated or exploited to

carry on an industry ( Paras, citing Manresa).

3. civil fruits [ rents of buildings, price of leasesof lands, other property and the amount ofperpetual or life annuities or other similarincome]

Exceptions to Rule [ that the owner owns the



Exceptions to Rule [ that the owner owns thefruits]:

1. Possession in Good Faith by another [

fruits belong to the possessor in good faith].

2. Usufruct [ usufructuary gets the fruits]

3. Lease [ lessee gets the fruits from theproperty directly, although the owner receivescivil fruits in the form of rents paid by thelessess];

4 A ti h i [ dit t th f it ] [A t



4. Antichresis [creditor gets the fruits] [Art.

2132. By the contract of antichresis the

creditor acquires the right to receive the fruitsof an immovable of his debtor, with the

obligation to apply them to the payment of

the interest, if owing, and thereafter to theprincipal of his credit. (1881) ]

RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT



RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT

TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Rule:

Whatever is built, planted or sown on theland of another and the improvements or

repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of

the land.

Rights of Owner of Materials: ( Article 447)



Rights of Owner of Materials: ( Article 447)

1. Owner of the materials used by anotherdoes not become a part owner of the thing

constructed with his materials. He is only

entitled to recover their value.

2. According to Tolentino, the owner cannot

return the materials instead of paying theirvalue.

When property is Alienated:



When property is Alienated:

When property is alienated and the

improvements thereon, action of owner of

materials shall be against owner of theland and not against the vendee.(

presumably because consideration for the

sale already includes value of improvements)



ARTICLE 448

Reason for the provision:

The reason for this article is to prevent the

creation of a forced co-ownership.

RULE: Owner of the land on which anything has



RULE: Owner of the land on which anything hasbeen built, planted, or sown in good faith hasOPTION:

a) to acquire the improvements after payment ofthe proper indemnity [Art. 546. Necessaryexpenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but

only the possessor in good faith may retain the thinguntil he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to thepossessor in good faith with the same right ofretention, the person who has defeated him in thepossession having the option of refunding the amountof the expenses]

or of paying the increase in value which the



or of paying the increase in value which thething may have acquired by reason thereof.(453a) ] [Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxuryor mere pleasure shall not be refunded to thepossessor in good faith; but he may removethe ornaments with which he has

embellished the principal thing if it suffers noinjury thereby, and if his successor in thepossession does not prefer to refund theamount expended. (454) ]

b) to oblige builder or planter to pay forthe land and the sower the proper rent.

Wh h th “OPTION”



Who has the “OPTION”:

It is the owner of the land which has the

option: principle of accession, he is entitled

to the ownership of the accessory thing.

Only permanent constructions are

contemplated.

CASE:



CASE:

Sarm iento vs . Agana 129 SCRA 122

( Owner of land must exercise the option, he

can only ask for demolition of improvement,

if, after having chosen to compel builder or

planter to buy land, the latter fails to pay).

A li ti f th A ti l

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/Sarmiento%20vs.%20Agana.doc




Application of the Article:

Good faith in building. Applies to a case

where one builds, plants, or sows on land

in which he believes himself to have a

claim of title. It does not apply where theonly interest of the builder, planter, or sower

is that of a holder, such as a tenant.

Balucanag vs Judge Franc isco G R No L

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/Balucanag%20vs.%20Judge%20Francisco.doc







Balucanag vs . Judge Franc isco G.R. No. L -

34199, May 30, 1983

( Article 448 does not apply to a case of aLessee)

But even in the absence of said st ipu lat ion ,

respondent Stohner cannot be considered a

bu i lder in good fai th. A rt ic le 448 of the Civi l

Code, rel ied upon by respondent judge,

app l ies only to a case where one bu i lds on

land in the bel ief that he is the ow ner thereof

and i t does not app ly where one's on ly

interest in the land is that of a lessee under a

rental contract .

Floreza vs Evangelista 96 SCRA 130








http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/floreza%20vs.%20evangelista.doc




Floreza vs . Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130

[G.R. No . L-25462 February 21, 1980]

( Said codal provision applies only when the

builder, planter, or sower believes he had the

right so to build, plant or sow because hethinks he owns the land or believes himself

to have a claim of title.)

S D l C Ab i 160







http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/Del%20Campo%20vs.%20Abesia.doc




Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia 160

SCRA 379 [G.R. No. L-49219 Apri l 15,

1988.*]

(However, when, as in this case, the co-

ownership is terminated by the partition andit appears that the house of defendants

overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square

meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffswhich the defendants obviously built in good

faith)

OTHER (NEW) CASES:











( )

PNB vs. DE JESUS G.R. No. 149295 September

23, 2003 { Equally significant is the fact that thebuilding, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has inactuality been part of the property transferred topetitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a

piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two ormore parties, one of whom has built some works (orsown or planted something) and not to a case wherethe owner of the land is the builder, sower, or

planter who then later loses ownership of theland by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated,“where the true owner himself is the builder ofworks on his own land, the issue of good faith orbad faith is entirely irrelevant.” }

PARILLA et al VS PILAR G R No 167680

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/PNB%20vs.%20Generoso%20de%20Jesus.doc




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PARILLA et .al. VS. PILAR G.R. No . 167680

November 30, 2006 { Jurisprudence is

replete with cases[21] which categoricallydeclare that Article 448 covers only cases in

which the builders, sowers or planters

believe themselves to be owners of the landor, at least, have a claim of title thereto, but

not when the interest is merely that of a

holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or

usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a

builder in good faith as he has no pretension

to be owner.[22]

In a plethora of cases [23] this Court has held







In a plethora of cases,[23] this Court has held

that Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation

to Article 546 of the same Code, whichallows full reimbursement of useful

improvements and retention of the premises

until reimbursement is made, applies only toa possessor in good faith, i.e., one who

builds on land with the belief that he is the

owner thereof. It does not apply where one’s

only interest is that of a lessee under a

rental contract; otherwise, it would always be

in the power of the tenant to “improve” his

landlord out of his property}

ISMAEL MACASAET et.al. vs . SPOUSES

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/macasaet%20vs.%20macasaet.doc







MACASAET G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30,2004

“This Court has ruled that this provision covers onlycases in which the builders, sowers or plantersbelieve themselves to be owners of the land or, atleast, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not applywhen the interest is merely that of a holder, such as amere tenant, agent or usufructuary. From thesepronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief

that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- onehas the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.

H i i l thi C t h d











However, in some special cases, this Court has used

Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this

limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,[68] this provision was applied to one whose

house -- despite having been built at the time he

was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land of

another.[69] This article was also applied to caseswherein a builder had constructed improvements

with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that

the law deemed the builder to be in good faith.[70]

In Sarmiento v. Agana,[71] the builders were found

to be in good faith despite their reliance on the

consent of another, whom they had mistakenly

believed to be the owner of the land.[72]

Based on the aforecited special cases, Article






Based on the aforecited special cases, Article

448 applies to the present factual

milieu. The established facts of this caseshow that respondents fully consented to the

improvements introduced by petitioners. In

fact, because the children occupied the lots

upon their invitation, the parents certainly

knew and approved of the construction of the

improvements introduced thereon. Thus,

petitioners may be deemed to have been ingood faith when they built the structures on

those lots.

RIGHT BEFORE PAYMENT:



1. Builder has right of retention. The rightof retention extends NOT ONLY to the

IMPROVEMENTS, but also to the LAND.

2. Neither of the parties may bring a

reinvindicatory action against the other.

Landowner has no right to ask for rents fromthe builder.

3.After the owner of the land chooses to



compel the builder or planter to pay for theland or the sower the proper rent, the latter

w i l l lose r igh t of retent ion if he fails to pay asrequired .

4. In the event of failure of the builder to payafter landowner has opted to sell the land,the latter is entitled to removal ofimprovements.

5. If, in the meantime, improvements is gutted

by fire, right of retention is extinguished.

Manotok Realty v s. Tecson 164 SCRA 587-

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/Manotok%20Realty%20vs.%20Tecson.doc




y 6 SC 58

Since the improvements have been gutted by

fire, and therefore, the basis for privaterespondent's right to retain the premises has

already been extinguished without the fault of

the petitioner, there is no other recourse for

the private respondent but to vacate the

premises and deliver the same to herein

petitioner.

Fil ipinas Co lleges Inc. vs . Timbang G.R.



http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/builder-planter-good%20faith%20etc/Filipinas%20Colleges,%20Inc.%20vs.%20Timbang.doc







No L-12812 September 29, 1959 (Upon

failure of builder to pay the value of land, the

landowner DOES NOT necessarily become

AUTOMATICALLY THE OWNER OF

IMPROVEMENTS under Article 445.)

There is nothing in the language of these







g g g

two article, 448 and 546, which would

justify the conclusion of appellants that,upon the failure of the builder to pay the

value of the land, when such is demanded

by the land-owner, the latter becomes

automatically the owner of the

improvement under Article 445.

Remedies of the parties are:



p

1….. and then they decide to leave things asthey are and assume the relat ion of lessor

and lessee , and should they disagree as to theamount of rental then they can go to the court to

fix that amount.

2. Court approved the sale of the land andthe improvement in a public auction applyingthe proceeds thereof first to the payment of thevalue of the land and the excess, if any, to bedelivered to the owner of the house in payment

thereof.

Alternatives granted to OWNER OF LAND when



Builder etc. in Bad Faith:

1. Appropriate what has been built, planted, orsown in bad faith, without any obligation toINDEMNIFY.

2. Ask the builder, planter, or sower to removewhat he has built, planted, or sown.

3. Compel builder or planter to pay the value ofthe land or the sower the proper rent.

Necessary Expenses: ( Article 452)



y p ( )

As regards necessary expenses, builder,planter, or sower is entitled to be reimbursed,

although, he loses the accessory or

improvement.

What are “necessary expenses”?



y p

Necessary expenses are those made for thepreservation of the property or thing upon

which they have been expended e.g. dike to

preserve from destruction caused by blood.

Conversely, that those that merely “augment”

the thing like expenses for the leveling of theland are not necessary expenses.

RIPARIAN OWNER:



Rule:

Owners of lands adjoining the banks of

rivers [RIPARIAN OWNER] belong theaccretion which they gradually receive from

the effects of the current of the waters.(

alluvion) [accession discreta].

Reason:



Reason:

Owners adjoining banks of rivers areexposed to floods and other damages due to

the destructive force of the waters and if by

virtue of law, they are subject toencumbrances, it is only just that such risks

and dangers should in some way be

compensated.

Requisites for “Alluvion”:



q

1) the deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it be made through the effects of the

current of the water ( deposits by human

intervention not included) and 3) the landwhere accretion takes place is adjacent to

the banks of rivers.

Ign acio vs. Directo r of L and s and Valer iano







Ign acio vs. Directo r of Land s and Valer iano[L -12958 May 30, 1960 May 30, 1960]

( Riparian accretion should be distinguishedfrom the accretion due to sea water. In the lattercase, the accretion is a public land)

De Buyser vs . Directo r o f lands, et al. [G.R.No . L -22763 March 18, 1983] March 18,1983

( Land formed by accretion from the sea is partof the public domain. It cannot be acquired byadverse possession. It is outside the commerceof man unless otherwise declared by theexecutive and legislative branch of the

Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court o f Appeals,



http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/Accessions/Riparian%20Owners/De%20Buyser%20vs.%20Director_1983.doc

















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et al. [G.R. No . L-17652 June 30, 1962]

June 30, 1962

[An accretion to land covered by Torrens title

does not automatically become registeredland. It must be registered. If not registered,

it is subject to acquisition through

prescription by third persons.]

AVULSION: ( Article 459)







Art. 459. Whenever the cu rrent o f a river,creek o r torrent segregates from an estate

on i ts bank a known por t ion o f land and

transfers it to ano ther estate, the owner ofthe land to which the segregated port ion

belonged retains the ownersh ip o f i t ,

prov ided that he removes the same with in

two years.

Transfer by Other Forces:



y

A known portion of land may be transferredfrom one tenement to another by other forces

of nature than the current of a river, e.g. land

from a mountain slope rolls down to anothertenement. Present article may be applied by

analogy.

CHANGE OF RIVER BED:



CHANGE OF RIVER BED:

Rule:

River beds which are abandoned thru natural

change in the course of the waters ipso facto

belong to the owners whose lands are

occupied by the new course in proportion tothe area lost. However, the owners of the

lands adjoin ing the old bed shal l have the

r ight to acquire the same by paying thevalue thereof, which value shal l no t

exceed the value of the area occup ied by

the new bed.

Provision of the Water Code of the Philippines [ PD 1067]:



Art. 58. – When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to

traverse private lands, the owner of the affected lands may notcompel the government to restore the river to its former bed; norcan they restrain the government from taking steps to revert theriver or stream to its former course. The owner of the lands thusaffected are not entitled to compensation for any damagesustained thereby. However, the former owners of the new bed

shal l be the owners of the abandoned bed in pro port ion tothe area lost b y each.

The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the

river or stream to its old bed at their own expense; Provided, thata permit therefore is secured from the Secretary of Public Works [Transportaion and Communication] and works commenced withintwo years from the change in the course of the river or stream.,

THREE TYPES OF ACCESSION WITH



RESPECT TO MOVABLE PROPERTY:

Adjunction

Mixture ( commixtion or confusion)

Specification

Art. 467. The princ ipal th ing , as between twothings inco rpo rated is deemed to be that to



th ings inco rpo rated, is deemed to be that towhich the other has been uni ted as an

ornament, o r for its use or perfect ion . (376)

Criteria to Determine Principal:

Order of Preference in determining which is theprincipal and which is the accessory: 1. That ofthe importance or purpose of the things asstated in this article 2) That of their value 3)That of their volume.

Rules:



1. Owner of accessory thing in bad faith, heshall lose the thing incorporated.

-he shall have obligation to indemnifyowner of principal thing.

2. Owner of the principal is the one in bad faith,owner of accessory may choose: 1) compelling

principal to pay the value of accessory thing or 2) thing belonging to him be separated,even if it be necessary to destroy the principalthing. Damages are available in both cases.

ADJUNCTION MIXTURE SPECIFICATION



1. Involves at least

two (2) things.

2.As a rule, accessory

follows the principal

3. the things joined

retain their nature

1. involves at least

two (2) things.

2. As a rule, co-

ownership results

3. the things mixed

or confused may

either retain or lose

their respectivenature

1. may involve only

one things ( MAY

BE MORE) but

form is changed.

2. As a rule, accessoryfollows the principal

3. the new object retains

or preserves the natureof the original object

QUIETING OF TITLE ( N)



Quieting of Title- purpose: the quieting of title orremoval of a cloud therefrom when there is anapparently valid or effective instrument orother claim which in reality is void,ineffective, voidable or unenforceable.

Originated from equity jurisprudence reasons:1) prevention of litigation 2) protection of thetrue title and possession 3) real interest of bothparties, and that of right and justice, whichrequire that the precise state of the title beknown.

Difference between “an action to quiet title”



from a suit “ to remove cloud”

To quiet title-an action for the purpose of

putting an end to vexatious litigation in

respect to the property involved.

To remove cloud -to procure cancellation,

delivery of, release of an instrument,encumbrance, or claim constituting a claim

on plaintiff’s title

Application:



1. Applies only in the case of real property.

2. The matter complained of must have primafacie appearance of validity, therefore, wheninvalid or inefficacious on its face, an actionto remove cloud on title does not exist.

Examples: title procured by fraud, deceit,forged instrument, taxes levied on exemptproperty etc.

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO FILE AN

ACTION TO QUIET TITLE



ACTION TO QUIET TITLE:

Prescription of the right to quiet title:

Plaintiff is in possession, the ACTIONDOES NOT prescribe.

Plaintiff is NOT in possession, the ACTIONMAY PRESCRIBE.

Gallar vs . Husain G.R.No. L-20954 May 29, 1967

B th d li f i f th l d A il 2

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By the delivery of possession of the land on April 2,1919 the sale was consummated and title was

transferred to the appellee. Indeed, this action is notfor specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, 6to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership asa result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale

made by the predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee isin possession of the land, the action isimprescriptible. 7 Appellant's argument that the actionhas prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then bean action for recovery of real property which must bebrought within the statutory period of limitationgoverning such actions

Caragay-Layno vs . Hon . Cou rt of Appeals

G R No 52064 December 26 1984

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/Quieting%20of%20Title/Caragay-Layno%20vs.%20Court%20of%20Appeals.doc










G.R. No. 52064 December 26, 1984

Prescription cannot be invoked against

JULIANA for the reason that as lawfulpossessor and owner of the Disputed Portion,her cause of action for reconveyance which, ineffect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls

within settled Jurisprudence that an action toquiet title to property in one's possession isimprescriptible. Her undisturbed possessionover a period of fifty-two (52) years gave her a

continuing right to seek the aid of a Court ofequity to determine the nature of the adverseclaim of a third party and the effect on her owntitle.

THIS IS NOT A REMEDY TO SETTLE A“BOUNDARY DISPUTE” as held in the case





BOUNDARY DISPUTE , as held in the caseof

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS andCAMILO AVILES, G.R.

No. 95748. November 21, 1996 “We agree with respondent Court. The facts

presented unmistakably constitute a clearcase of boundary dispute, which is notcognizable in a special civil action to quiettitle.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for

the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or

CO-OWNERSHIP:

Concept:

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/OFFICE%20FILES/USC%20LAW%20FILES/PROPERTY/Civil%20Law%20Review/Cases/Quieting%20of%20Title/Vda.%20De%20Aviles%20vs.%20Court%20of%20Appeals_1996.doc






















Concept:

1. Right of common dominion which two or morepersons have in a spiritual part of a thing, notmaterially or physically divided [ Sanchez Roman]

2. Manifestation of the private right of ownership,which instead of being exercised by the owner in anexclusive manner over the things subject to it, isexercised by two or more owners and the undividedthing or right to which it refers is one and the same [

Manresa]

3. Co-ownership is not a real right distinct fromownership, but is a mere form or manifestation ofownership [ De Diego].

Characteristics:



1. plurality of subjects 2. unity of object (material indivision) and recognition of the

ideal or intellectual shares of co-owners.

relationship of co-owner to his other co-

owners is fiduciary in character .

Cases:



While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 ofthe Code, "may not be compelled to consent toa partial redemption," the redemp t ion by oneco -heir or co -owner of the property in i tstotal ity does no t vest in him ownership over

it . Failure on the part of all the co-owners toredeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retainthe property and consolidate title thereto in hisname.7 But the provision does not give to theredeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode ofterminating a co-ownership ( Adille vs. Hon.Court of Appeals et.al. G.R. No. 44546 29January 1988)

"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner orco-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as



co e aga s s co o e s o co e s so o g ashe expressly or impliedly recognizes the in view oftheir lack of a clear repudiation of the co-ownership,duly communicated to the petitioners (the other co-owners), private respondents cannot acquire theshares of the petitioners by, prescription. The recordin the Off ice of the Assesso r is no t the suff ic ientrepudiat ion and commun icat ion contemp lated bythe law. Neither may the Private respondents' possession of the premises militate againstPetitioners' claim. After all, co-owners are entitled tobe in possession of the premises.The existence of

the co-ownersh ip here argues against the theoryof impl ied trus t , for then a co -owner possessesco-owned p roper ty not in behalf of the other co - owners bu t in his own behal f . (Mariano vs. DeVega G.R. No. L-59974 March 9, 1987 )

Presumption of Equality ( Shares and

Chares):

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Chares):

Share of co-owners in the benefits as well as

in the charges shall be proportional to their

respective interest. Stipulation to the contrary

shall be void.

There is presumption of equality in theshares.

Limitation on the right of a co-owner to use

thing owned in common:



thing owned in common:

Use only: 1. purpose for which it is intended

2. without prejudice to the interests of the

co-ownership and 3. without preventing

others from making use thereof according to

their own rights.

Meaning of “purpose for which it is intended”:



What is meant by “purpose for which it isintended”? Agreement of the parties should

govern. If there is none, that use for which it

is ordinarily adapted according to its nature (e.g. house only for living and not to be used

as a factor y) or use to which is has been

previously devoted.

Principles:



1. Mere tolerance on the part of the co-owners cannot legalize the change in the use

of a thing from that intended by the parties.

2. No prejudice to co-ownership-co-owners

agreed to lease, co -owner canno t use

w i thou t paying rent .

De Guia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No.120864. October 8, 2003



120864. October 8, 2003

“ The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limitedby a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-ownercannot devote common property to his exclusive useto the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if thesubject is a residential house, all the co-owners may

live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, i f one co -ow ner aloneoccup ies the ent i re house wi thou t opposi t ionfrom the other co-owners, and there is no leaseagreement, the other co-owners canno t demandthe payment of rent . Conversely, i f there is anagreement to lease the house, the co -owners candemand rent from the co -owner who dwel ls in thehouse.”

Right of any co-owner:



ANY ONE CO-OWNER MAY BRING AN

ACTION FOR EJECTMENT, DEPARTURE

from a previous ruling Palarca vs. Baguisi 38Phil. 177

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “[a] ny oneof the co-owners may bring an action in



of the co owners may bring an action inejectment .” This art ic le covers al l kinds o f

act ions for the recovery ofpossess ion . A rt ic le 487 inc ludes fo rcib le

entry and un law ful detainer (acc ion

interdictal), recovery of pos session (acc ion

publ ic iana), and recovery of ownership(acc ion de reiv indicacion ). The summaryactions of forcible entry and unlawful detainerseek the recovery of physical possession

only. These actions are brought beforemunicipal trial courts within one year fromdispossession (De Guia vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003)

Any co-owner may file an action under

Article 487 not only against a third



Article 487 not only against a third

person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession

and asserts exclusive ownership of the

property. In the latter case, however, the

only purpose of the action is to obtainrecognition of the co-ownership. The

plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the

defendant from the property because asco-owner he has a right of

possession. The plaintiff cannot recover

any material or determinate part of the

Suit by one co-owner vs. co-owner:



Co-owner vs. Co-owner.- one co-owner maybring an action even against another co-

owner who takes exclusive possession and

asserts ownership in himself alone. Remedy,

however, is limited to obtaining

recognition of the co-ownership. He

cannot be excluded from possession.

Acts of Preservation or

Necessary Repairs

Acts of Administration

or

Management

Acts of Alteration,

encumbrance, or

alienation



Management alienation

1. Any co-owner may

decide on an act of

preservation ( Article

489)

2. If practicable, firstnotify his co-owner

of the necessity of

repairs

1. This is to be decided

by the majority of the

co-owners ( Article

489 and 492)

2. By majority is meantthe controlling

interest (financial

majority) not

numerical majority.

3. Appointment of an

administrator if thereis no majority.

1. Unanimous consent

of all the co-owners

is needed

2. Run to the courts for

appropriate relief, ifwithholding of

consent of one or

some of the co-

owners is clearly

prejudicial to the

common interest ( Article 491)

What is “Alteration”:



What constitutes ALTERATION? Alterations

is changing the thing from the state in which

the others believe it should remain, orwithdraws it from the use to which they

desire it to be intended .

Some examples of “acts of alteration”:



1. Sale, donation, or mortgage of the entireproperty

2. Sale, donation or mortgage of a part of theproperty but with definite boundaries

3. A voluntary easement

4. Lease of real property

5. Construction of a house on a lot owned in

common 6. Contracts of long duration

EFFECT OF AN ILLEGAL ALTERATION:



1) Co-Owner will lose what he has spent 2) Demolition can be compelled

3) Liability for loss and damages

4) Whatever benefits belong to the co-ownership

LEASE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY:



1. When lease is recorded with the Registry of

Property [Art. 1648. Every lease of real estatemay be recorded in the Registry of Property.Unless a lease is recorded, it shall not bebinding upon third persons. (1549a) ], it is not a

mere act of administration.

2. Note also [ Article 1878 (8) To lease any realproperty to another person for more than one

year.] lease of immovable property- meremajority cannot lease real property for morethan one year.

EXTENT OF CO-OWNER’S RIGHT:



A co-owner is full owner of his part and thefruit and benefits pertaining thereto. He may

alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even

substitute another person in its enjoyment.

Before partition, no individual or co-

owner can claim title to any definiteportion. All that he has is an ideal or

abstract quota or proportionate share in

the entire land or thing.

From the forego ing , i t may be deduced

that s ince a co owner is ent i t led to sel l h is



that since a co -owner is ent i t led to sel l his

und ivided share, a sale o f the ent ireproperty by one co -owner w i thout the

consent of the other co-owners is not nu l l

and vo id. However, on ly the r igh ts o f the

co -owner-sel ler are trans ferred, thereby

making the buyer a co-owner of the

property." ( Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals

G. R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992)

Limitation on the “Right” of a Co-Owner:



Limitation: co-owner cannot alienate rightswhich are purely personal, such as his share

in a right to use and habitation.

Right of Redemption of a co-owner:



Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercisethe right of redemption in case the shares of allthe other co-owners or of any of them, are soldto a third person. If the price of the alienation isgrossly excessive, the redemptioner shall payonly a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire toexercise the right of redemption, they may only

do so in proportion to the share they mayrespectively have in the thing owned incommon. (1522a)

Termination of co-ownership:



1. Consolidation in only one of the owners of

all the shares of the others. 2. Destruction of the thing or the loss of the

right

3. Prescription in favor of a third person. 4. Partition ( agreement to subdivide is not

enough, there must be a subdivision plan

drawn and the co-owners actually occupiedthe respective portions in the plan and titlesissued accordingly).

CASES:



1. "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as heexpressly or impliedly recognizes the in view of their lackof a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, dulycommunicated to the petitioners (the other co-owners),private respondents cannot acquire the shares of thepetitioners by, prescription. The record in the Office of

the Assessor is not the sufficient repudiation andcommunication contemplated by the law. Neither maythe Private respondents' possession of the premisesmilitate against Petitioners' claim. After all, co-owners areentitled to be in possession of the premises.

The existence of the co-ownership here arguesagainst the theory of implied trust, for then a co-owner possesses co-owned property not in behalf ofthe other co-owners but in his own behalf .[ Marianovs . De Vega G.R. No L-59974 March 9, 1987.]

2. The redemption of the land made by

Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership



p

nor give her title to the entire land subject of

the co-ownership….. Failure on the part of all

the co-owners to redeem it entitles the

vendee a retro to retain the property and

consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra,art. 1607). But the provision does not give

to the redeeming co-owner the right to the

entire property. It does not provide for amode of terminating a co-ownership."[

Paulm itan vs . Cou rt o f Appeals G.R. No.

61584 November 25, 1992.]

POSSESSION:

Concept of Possession



Concept of Possession

To possess means to have, to actually and

physically occupy a thing, with or without a

right. In general, it is the holding of a thing orof a right, whether by material occupation

or by the fact that the thing or the right is

subjected to the action of our will.

Distinction between possession and ownership:

Possession and ownership are two dif ferent legal



Possession and ownership are two dif ferent legalcon cepts. Jus t as possession is not a def in i te proo f

of ownership, neither is non-pos session inco nsistentwi th ownersh ip . Even assuming that petitioners’allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in thecase at hand because the execut ion o f the deeds o fconveyances is already deemed equ ivalent to

delivery o f the proper ty to respondent , and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required.[28] Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, “when the sale ismade through a public instrument, the execution thereofshall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of thecontract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear orcannot be inferred .” Possession is also transferred,along w ith ownership thereof , to respondent by vi r tueof the no tar ized deeds of co nveyances .[29]

Material Occupation

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Possession always includes the idea ofoccupation, except in cases under Article 537[Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and thoseexecuted clandestinely and without the

knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or byviolence, do not affect possession] possessioncannot exist without it.

It is not, however, necessary that the person inpossession should himself be the occupant. Theoccupancy can be held by another in his name.

Animus Possidendi



This involves a state of mind whereby the possessor intends to exercise and does

exercise a right of possession, whether this

right be legal or otherwise and the intentionand will to possess usually are inferred from

the fact that the thing in question is under the

apparent power and control of the alleged

possessor. Two requisites: 1) Occupancy,apprehension, or taking 2) intent to possess.

Constructive Possession:



Possession does not mean that a man has tohave his feet on every square meter ofground before it can be said that he is inpossession.

The rule is: Possession and control of aPORTION of a tract under a claim of

ownership of is a CONSTRUCTIVEpossession of all, i f the remainder is not in

the adverse possess ion of ano ther.

Viewpoints of Possession:



a) RIGHT TO POSSESSION ( juspossidendi)- This is a right or incident of

ownership ( e.g. owner of parcel of land is

entitled to possess)

e.g. “right of registered owner to possess a

parcel of land”

b) RIGHT OF POSSESSION ( jus

possessionis)- This is an independent right of



possessionis) This is an independent right of

itself, independent of ownership ( e.g. lesseeby virtue of the lease agreement is entitled to

possess)

Degrees of Possession:

1. Mere holding or possession WITHOUT title whatsoever and inviolation of the right of the owner e.g. possession of a thief or a

f l d



usurper of land.

2. Possession with juridical [ a possession which gives thetransferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set upeven against the owner] title, BUT not THAT of OWNERSHIP.This is possession peaceably acquired e.g. possession of tenant,depositary, or pledgee.

3. Possession with a just title, or a title sufficient to transferownership, BUT NOT FROM THE TRUE OWNER e.g. thepossession of a vendee of a piece of land from one who pretendsto be the owner but is in fact not the owner.

4. Possession with a just title FROM THE TRUE OWNER. This ispossession that springs from ownership.

Possession may be had in two concepts:



Possession of Holder:

One who possesses as a mere holder, or not

in the concept of owner, acknowledges inanother a SUPERIOR right which he

believes to be ownership, whether his belief

be right or wrong e.g. tenant, usufructuary,

or borrower of a thing in commodatum.

Possession in Concept [ opinion not of

possessor himself but opinion of others] of



possessor himself but opinion of others] of

Owner:

The possessor in the concept of owner may

be the OWNER himself or one WHOCLAIMS to be so.

Effects of Possession in Concept of Owner:

1 Possession in concept of owner is converted into



1. Possession in concept of owner is converted intoownership by the lapse of time necessary for prescription.

2. Possessor can bring all actions necessary to protecthis possession, availing himself of any action which anowner can bring, except accion reinvidicatoria which is

substituted by the accion publiciana.

3. He can ask for inscription of his possession in theregistry of property.

4. Upon recovering possession, he demand fruits anddamages.

Possessor in Good Faith:

1. Good faith consists in the possessor’s belief that the



pperson from whom he received the thing was the owner of

the same and could convey his title.

2. The belief of the possessor that he is the legal ownerof the thing must be based upon SOME title or mode ofacquisition such as sale, a donation, inheritance, or other

means of transmitting ownership. Without this, therecan be no real well-grounded belief of one’sownership.

3. Ignorance of the law may be excusable and thus serveas the basis of good faith. ( e.g. prohibition to transferduring the 5 year period in case of lands covered by afree patent)

Possession in Bad Faith:



Possession in Bad Faith:

1. One in possession of property knowing

that his title thereto is defective.

2. Examples: Possessor bought from one

whom she knew was merely a tenant; where

he knew that land belong to another etc.

ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION:



Essential Requisites:

1. Acquisition of possession involves two (2)

elements: corpus [material holding] andanimus [intent to possess].

Constructive Delivery:



1. Constructive delivery may be consideredas equivalent to material occupation in those

cases where such occupation is essential to

the acquisition of possession.

2. Cases of constructive delivery which



y

involve material occupation are: t radi t ion

brevi manu [ takes place when one who

possesses the things by title OTHER than

ownership continues to possess the same but

under a new title that of OWNERSHIP] and const itu tum possessor ium [ when the owner

alienates the thing, but continues to possess the

same under a different title, such as that of

depositary, pledge, or tenant].

Another means of acquiring possession is



q g p

through performance of juridical acts andlegal formalities e.g. donations, succession,

contracts, judicial possession, execution of

judgments, execution and registration of

public instruments etc.

Ign acio Wong vs . Hon . Carpio and Manuel

Mercado [ G.R. No. 50264 October 21,1991]

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1991].

The execution of a sale thru a public instrumentshall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing,

unless there is stipulation to the contrary . If,however, no twi thstanding the execut ion of

the inst rument , the pu rchaser cannot have

the enjo yment and mater ial tenancy o f the

thing and make use of i t hersel f, becausesuch tenancy and enjoyment are opposed b y

ano ther, then delivery has no t been effected .(Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II,

1989 Ed p 400)

Art . 534. On who succeeds by heredi tary





t i t le shal l no t su ffer the consequences o f

the wrong fu l possession of the decedent ,

i f it is no t shown that he was aware of the

f laws affect ing it ; bu t the effects of

possession in good fa ith shal l not benef i t

h im except from the date of the death o f

the decedent . (442)

Reason for the Article:

Bad faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effectt th f b ff d l b th h



must, therefore, be suffered only by the person who

acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled withsuch consequences.

e.g. possession of decedent (in bad faith) is 5 years, possession of successor ( 10 years), successordeemed to have acquired property by prescription.He cannot be required to establish possession for 25years because of Art. 534.

Good faith can benefit only the person who HAS it;

and the good faith of the heir cannot erase the effectsof the bad faith of his predecessor.

Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated , and thoseexecuted clandest inely and w ithout theknow ledge of the possesso r of a thing, or by



g p g, yv io lenc e, do no t af fect possession .

Acts merely tolerated:

1. They are those which by reason ofneighborliness or familiarity, the owner ofproperty allows his neighbor or another personto do on the property. Acts of little disturbances,

in the interest of neighborliness or friendlyrelations e.g. permitting others to do on hisproperty to pass his land, tie a carabao, orgetting some water from a well.

POSSESSORS BY MERE TOLERANCE

CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS BUILDERS

IN GOOD FAITH UNDER ARTICLE 448 OF



IN GOOD FAITH UNDER ARTICLE 448 OF

THE CIVIL CODE

Case:

KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R.

No. 134329, January 19, 2000

“Considering that petitioners were in possession ofthe subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners,th k th t th i ti f th i

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they knew that their occupation of the premises may

be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the landof another at the latter's tolerance or permission,without any contract between them, is necessarilybound by an implied promise that they will vacate thesame upon demand, failing in which a summary

action for ejectment is the proper remedy againstthem.26 Thus, they cannot be considered possessorsnor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both

Article 44827 and Article 54628 of the New Civil Codewhich allow full reimbursement of useful

improvements and retention of the premises untilreimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor ingood faith, i .e., one who builds on land with the beliefthat he is the owner thereof.

EFFECTS OF POSSESSION:



Art . 540. Only the possession acquiredand enjoyed in the concept of owner can

serve as a ti t le for acqu ir ing dom inion

Application of Article:



1. To consolidate title by prescription, thepossession must be under claim of ownership

and it must be peaceful, public and

uninterrupted.

2. Acts of possessory character done by virtue

of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the

real owner are not sufficient e.g. possession bylessees, trustees, pledges, tenants.

3. Where a party through ignorance,



inadvertence, or mistake occupies a land up

to a given line beyond his actual boundaries

because he believes it to be his true line,

BUT HAS NO SPECIFIC INTENTION of

claiming title to that extent, if it should beascertained that such line is on his

neighbor’s land, such possession is NOT

ADVERSE. The question is one of intent.

Meaning of “adverse possession”:

Case:



Case

Wolfson vs. Aenlle G. R. No. 21312 November 22,1924

Facts:

1. At or about the time the shortage in plaintiff's landwas discovered, the defendant said to the plaintiff:"Let us wait for the cadastral survey, and if it is

established by that survey that I am holding any partof your property I will return to you all of that portionwhich may be in excess of what appears in my title.“

2. The cadastral survey was later made from

which it was found as a fact that the

d f d t h ldi 1 635 t



defendant was holding 1,635 square meters

of plaintiff's land in excess of defendant's

record title.

3. The refusal of the defendant to abandon

his claim to the plaintiff for the excess of the

1,635 square meters, which was found to

exist by the cadastral survey, resulted in thecommencement of this action.

Held:

After 1910 the defendant's possession of



After 1910, the defendant s possession of

the land in dispute could not be adverse to plaintiff's claim until after the cadastral surveywas made, and the defendant had refused toabandon his claim for the excess. Thatimportant fact, having been established bythe evidence of an impartial witness whosetestimony is not disputed or denied, is

conclusive of this case. Under such a state offacts, the defendant could not acquire title by prescription.

Art . 541. A possesso r in the concept of

owner has in his favo r the legal



presumpt ion that he possesses w i th a

just t i t le and he canno t be ob liged to

show or p rove it .

Meaning of “Just Title”:

1. Title is NOT NECESSARILY thedocument.

2. By “just title” is meant that which is legally

sufficient to transfer ownership or the real

POSSESSION PRESCRIPTION

a) “Just Title” is presumed a) “Just Title” must be proved



b) “Just Title” means “titulo

verdadero y valido” [ true and

valid title sufficient to transfer

ownership]

Notes:There is a mode of transferring ownership [ Art. 712.

Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual

creation.

Ownership and other real rights over property are

acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by estate

and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain

contracts, by tradition.

They may also be acquired by means of prescription.

(609a)], and the grantor is the owner. No need for

prescription.

b) “Just Title” means “titulo ” (

merely colorable title although

there was a mode of transferring

ownership)

Notes:

Although there is a mode of acquiring ownership,

still something is wrong, because the grantor is not

the owner .



WHAT ARE “NECESSARY EXPENSES”?

Necessary Expenses:



y p

1. Expenses imposed by the existence of the thingitself, and have no relation to the desire or purpose ofthe possessor; hence, they are reimbursed, whatevermay be the juridical character [ whether one is in

good faith or bad faith] of the person who advanced.

2. Those incurred for the preservation of the thing,they ARE NOT considered as improvements. They

DO NOT increase the value of the thing, but merelyprevent it from being useless.

RULE ON “USEFUL EXPENSES”:



Useful expenses shal l be refunded on ly tothe possessor in good fai th wi th the same

r ight o f retent ion, the person who has

defeated him in the possession havingthe op t ion of refunding the amount of the

expenses o r of paying the increase in

value which the th ing may have acquired

by reason thereof.

WHAT ARE “USEFUL EXPENSES”?



Useful Expenses:

They are incurred to give utility or

productivity of the thing. Reimbursed ONLYto the possessor in good faith. E.g. expenses

for filling up with soil, house constructed on

the land etc.

Can there be waiver of the right of retention?



Answer: Yes

The surrender of possession of the property

by the possessor in good faith amounts to awaiver of right of retention; but the claim for

the expenses is not thereby renounced.

Can “possessor in good faith” remove

improvements?



YES.

If the useful impro vements can beremoved w ithou t damage to the pr inc ipal

th ing , the possessor in good fai th may

remove them , un less the person who

recovers the possession exercises the

op t ion under paragraph 2 of the

preced ing art ic le.

RULE ON EXPENSES FOR “PURE

LUXURY”:



Art . 548. Expenses fo r pure luxury or

mere pleasu re shal l no t be refunded to

the possessor in good fai th; bu t he may

remove the ornaments w i th which he hasembel lished the pr in cipal thing i f i t suf fers

no in jury thereby, and i f his successo r in

the possession does not p refer to refundthe amount expended.

What are expenses for “luxury”?



Expenses for Luxury:

These expenses do not affect the existence

or the substance of the thing itself, but ONLYthe COMFORT, CONVENIENCE, or

ENJOYMENT of the possessor. They ARE

NOT subject to reimbursement.

RIGHTS OF POSSESSORS:

1 Useful expenses are reimbursed to the



1. Useful expenses are reimbursed to the

possessor in good faith; by omission, the Codedenies this right to the possessor in bad faith.

2. With respect to expenses for pure luxury orpleasure, two kinds of possessors [ good faithand bad faith possessors] HAVE THE SAMERIGHT i.e. to remove the improvements upon

which they were made if the principal thing willsu f fer no in jury and the owner does not preferto retain them upon payment of the properindemnity.

3. Take note that with regard to USEFUL

EXPENSES th i BAD FAITH



EXPENSES, the possessor in BAD FAITH

has NO RIGHT TO REMOVE.

BUT, as regards “expenses for pure luxury”,a situation may arise where a possessor in

bad faith may receive the value of the

luxurious improvements under Article 549.



HOWEVER, in the later case of of MWSS vs.



COURT OF APPEALS 143 SCRA 623, theSupreme Court reiterated that the right given

a possessor in bad faith to remove

improvements app l ies only to

improvements for pure luxu ry or mere

pleasure as provided in Article 549 of the

Civil Code.

POSSESSION OF MOVABLE:



The possession of movable propertyacquired in good faith is equ ivalent to a

tit le.

Requisites for Title:

1) Possession is in good faith; 2) the ownerhas voluntarily parted with the possession of

the thing; 3) possessor is in the concept of



EXCEPTION TO THE RULE GRANTING

OWNER THE RIGHT TO RECOVER:



When possessor acquired it in good faith in

a public sale.

In this case, owner may recover provided he

shall reimburse the possessor.

There are, however, instances where even if

the owner offers to reimburse, still he cannot

recover as a matter of right:



recover as a matter of right:

1. Estoppel

2. If title is lost through prescription

3. If possessor is a holder in due course of adocument of title

What is the meaning of “unlawful deprivation”?



Unlawful deprivation extends to all cases-not only in cases where property is stolen-

where there is no valid transmission of

ownership including those where the

proprietor has entrusted the thing to aborrower

The case of *EDCA Pub l ishing &

Distr ibut ing Corp . vs . Santos [ G.R. No.

80298 April 26 1990]



80298 April 26, 1990].

Issue: Whether the petitioner has been

unlawfully deprived of the books because the

check issued by the impostor in payment

therefor was dishonored.

HELD:

N t l t i h t t



Non-payment only creates a r igh t to

demand payment or to rescind the

contract , or to c r iminal prosecu t ion in the

case of bouncing checks . But absent the

st ipu lat ion above no ted, del ivery o f the

thing so ld w i l l ef fect ively transfer

ownersh ip to the buyer who can in turn

trans fer i t to ano ther .

Actual delivery of the books having been

made Cruz acquired ownership over the



made, Cruz acquired ownership over the

books which he could then validly transfer to

the private respondents. The fact that he had

not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter

between him and EDCA and did not impairthe title acquired by the private respondents

to the books.

USUFRUCT:



Definition of “Usufruct”:

Real Right, of a temporary nature, which

authorizes its holder to ENJOY all thebenefits which results from the normal

enjoyment of another’s property, with the

OBLIGATION TO RETURN, at the

designated time, either THE SAME THING

or, in special cases (QUASI-USUFRUCT), its

EQUIVALENT.

Extent of Usufruct:

1. Usufruct is a REAL RIGHT [ power belonging



1. Usufruct is a REAL RIGHT [ power belonging

to a person over a specific thing, without apassive subject individually determined againstwhom such right may be personally exercised]and includes both the jus utendi AND the jus

fruendi.

2. There is an obligation to preserve the form

and substance of the thing in usufruct AS ARULE e.g. if usufruct on a fishpond, it must bepreserved as a fishpond; if a sugarcane field, itmust be preserved as a sugarcane field.

Consumable things:

1 With regard to consumable things strictly



1. With regard to consumable things, strictly

speaking there can be no usufruct, becausethey cannot be enjoyed without being

consumed. But since the law recognizes

usufruct over ALL KINDS OF THINGS, if thing isconsumable, usufruct should be considered as

on their value if appraised, or an equal quantity

and quality if not.

2. Even unproductive things can be an object of

usufruct.

Usufruct granted to aliens:



*Ram irez, et al. vs. Vda. de Ramirez, etc .,et al . [ G.R. No. L-27952 February 15,

1982]

This opinion notwithstanding, We upho ld the

usufru ct in favor o f Wanda because a

usu fruct, albeit a real r igh t, does no t vest

t i t le to the land in the usufru ctuary and i t

is the vest ing o f t i tle to land in favor o f

al iens w hich is p rosc r ibed by the

Rights of Usufructuary:



1. The usufructuary has the right to enjoy theproperty, to the same extent as the owner,

BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO ITS USE

and the RECEIPT OF ITS FRUITS.

2. He cannot, however, extract products

which do not constitute fruits, because he is

bound to preserve the form and

substance of the thing.

USUFRUCTUARY MAY LEASE HIS

USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS



Art. 572. The usu fructuary may personal ly

enjoy the thing in usufru ct , lease i t to

ano ther, or alienate his righ t of usu fruct,

even by a gratui tou s t i t le; but al l the

contracts he may enter into as such

usufruc tuary shall term inate upon the

exp irat ion of the usu fruc t , saving leases

of ru ral lands, which shal l be considered

as subsist ing du r ing the agr icu l tural year.

Usufruct over Consumable Things:

1. Improperly called “quasi-usufruct”.



2. The usufruct is not upon the consumable thingsTHEMSELVES which are delivered to theusufructuary, but upon THE SUM representing their

value or upon a quantity of things of the same kindand quality.

3. Usufructuary becomes the owner of the things in

usufruct such as a sum of money or a quantity ofliquids or grain. Grantor becomes merely aCREDITOR entitled to the return of their value or ofthings of the same quantity and quality.

OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY:

1) To make after no t ice to the owner o r



1) To make, after no t ice to the owner or

h is legit im ate representative, an inventory

of al l the property, which shal l contain an

app raisal of the movables and a

descr ipt ion of the condi t ion of theimmovables ;

(2) To give secur i ty[ personal bond ,

pledge, or mortgage], b ind ing himsel f to

fu l f il l the ob l igations imposed upon him in

accordance w ith th is Chapter.

Exemptions of Usufructuary:



1. When the owner waives; 2) where the title constituting the usufruct

exempts the usufructuary; and

3) where the usufructuary asks to be relievedfrom these obligations and no one will be

injured.

LIABILITY FOR ORDINARY REPAIRS:

Art. 592. The usu fructuary is ob l iged to

make the ord inary repairs needed by the



make the ord inary repairs needed by the

th ing g iven in u su fruct .

LIABILITY FOR EXTRA-ORDINARYREPAIRS:

Art . 593. Extraord inary repairs shall be at

the expense of the owner . The

usufruc tuary is ob l iged to no t i fy the

owner when the need fo r such repairs is

urgent.

EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES:



Characteristics of Easements:

1. It is a real right; 2) Can be imposed only

on the property of another , never on one’sown property; 3) Produces limitation on

ownership, but ownership of servient estate

is unimpaired; 4) It is inseparable from thetenements to which it is actively or passively

attached; 5) Exists only between

neighboring tenements.

KINDS OF:

Continuous and Discontinuous:



1. The distinction refers only to the EXERCISEof the servitude and not THE ESSENCE,because servitude exist continuously, whether itis being used or not e.g. right of aqueduct, rightto support a beam on another’s wall.

2. Discontinuous Easements e.g. right of way,the very exercise of the servitude depends uponthe act of man in passing over another’sproperty.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EASEMENTS:



A pos i tive easement is one wh ichimposes upon the owner of the serv ient

estate the ob l igat ion o f allow ing

someth ing to be done or of doing i t

h imself , and a negative easement, that

which prohib i ts the owner of the serv ient

estate f rom do ing someth ing which he

could law ful ly do i f the easement d id no t

exis t (ALTIUS NON TOLLENDI)

EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW:



When “positive”?

Positive- When opening is made on

another’s wall, or on a party wall, theservitude acquired is POSITIVE, because the

owner or owners of such wall permits the

encumbrance to burden his or their wall.

When “negative”?

Negative- when the openings are made in



Negative when the openings are made in

one’s own wall [ when a person makes

openings on his own wall to admit light below

the ceiling joists [any of the parallel beams of

wood, metal, or concrete that support a floor,roof, or ceiling ], and he acquires a servitude to

admit such light, the servitude is a negative one-

because it imposes upon the owner of the

adjacent estate the obligation NOT TO

CONSTRUCT on his land in such manner as

to obstruct the light.]

Easements are ind ivis ible:



If the servient estate is partitioned, theservitude continues upon the portions upon

which it was originally exercised.

If the dominant estate is divided into parts,

there arise as many new dominant

tenements as there are parts, each owner

exercising the rights of the owner of a

dominant tenement.

Easements are establ ished either by law

or by the wi l l of the owners.



NO JUDICIAL EASEMENT:

Courts cannot create easement. They canonly declare the existence of one, if it exists,

but cannot constitute it when none existed

before. They may only apply the law

providing for legal easements, or declare the

existence of those created by the will of the

owners.

. Cont inuous and apparent easements are

acquired ei ther by v ir tue of a tit le or by

prescr ipt ion o f ten years .



p p y

TITLE means the juridical acts which gives

rise to the servitude e.g. law, donation,

contracts, and wills.

PRESCRIPTION:



Special Case of Prescription (10 years). ItDOES NOT REQUIRE good faith or just title.

The general rules for acquisitive prescription

of ownership and other real rights do notapply to it. BUT ADVERSE POSSESSION or

EXERCISE OF THE EASEMENT must be

present.

HOW TO COMPUTE PRESCRIPTION:

POSITIVE EASEMENTS:



In posi t ive easements , from the day on

which the owner of the dom inant estate,

or the person who may have made use of

the easement, commenced to exercise i t

upon the servient estate

NEGATIVE EASEMENTS:



In negative easements, from the day on

which the owner of the dom inant estate

forbade, by an instrument acknow ledgedbefore a no tary pub l ic, the owner of the

servient estate, from execu t ing an act

which would be law fu l wi thout the

easement. E.G. proh ibi t ion to bu i ld a

bu i ld ing o f higher elevat ion .

CAN A RIGHT OF WAY BE ACQUIRED BY

PRESCRIPTION?



NO.

1. Being an apparent but discontinuouseasement, it cannot be acquired by

prescription.

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS ANDHEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR.,respondents.

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“Under civil law and its jurisprudence,easements are either continuous ordiscontinuous according to the manner they are

exercised, not according to the presence ofapparent signs or physical indications of theexistence of such easements. Thus, aneasement is continuous if its use is, or may be,

incessant without the intervention of any act ofman, like the easement of drainage; and it isdiscontinuous if it is used at intervals anddepends on the act of man, like the easement ofright of way.”

“Its use of the right of way, however long,

never resulted in its acquisition of the



easement because, under Article 622, thediscontinuous easement of a railroad

right of way can only be acquired by title

and not by prescription.”

EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY:

Requisites:

1.Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables



and has no adequate outlet to a public hightway.2. After payment of the proper indemnity

3. Isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of thedominant estate

4. Right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicialto the servient estate; and insofar as consistent withthis rule, where the distance from the dominant estateto a public highway may be the shortest [ e.g. hence,

subject to the limitation that the usefulness of theservient tenement to its owner is not impaired]

REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR., petit ioner, vs .

GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., EDUARDO

ASPREC, ENELDA ASPREC, ERNESTO



ASPREC, and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents .[ G.R. No. 75905 Oc tober 12,

1987] 3rd Division

["mere convenience for the dominant estate

is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify

the imposition of this servitude, there mustbe a real, not a fictitious or artificial,

necessity for it."]

CRITERION OF “LEAST PREJUDICE”



Art. 650. The easement o f r igh t o f wayshall be establ ished at the po int least

p rejud icial to the servient estate, and ,

inso far as consistent w ith this ru le, where

the distance from the dom inant estate to a

publ ic highway may be the shortest .



WIDTH OF EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY:



Art. 651. The width o f the easement o f

r ight of way shal l be that wh ich is

su f fic ient for the needs o f the dom inant

estate, and may acco rdingly be changed

from t ime to t ime.

EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL:

Co-ownership or Easement?



Easement [ Manresa, De Diego, Castan, and Ricci];Co-Ownership [ Sanchez Roman, Valverde, etc]

This co-ownership is a special class in itself [ as

shown by the following: 1) co-ownership is indivisible2) part pertaining to the co-owner can be materiallydesignated 3) rights of a co-owner greater than thoseof an ordinary co-owner, such as with respect toincreasing the height of the wall] . This is a kind of

COMPULSORY KIND OF CO-OWNERSHIP.

It is a servitude because, in an ordinary co-

ownership [ none of the co-owners may do



y

anything on the common property for his own

exclusive benefit, but in a party wall, there is

no limitation upon the juridical action of the

owners].

EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW:

Art. 667. No part-owner may, w ithou t the



Art. 667. No part owner may, w ithou t the

consent of the others, open th rough the

party wal l any w indow or aperture of any

k ind . (580) Note: [ Co-owner can close,

UNLESS a sufficient time for prescription haselapsed.]

Two kinds of Easements:

1. Easement of Light “jus luminum” [ e.g.



Art. 669. When the distances in Article 670are not observed, the owner of a wall whichis not party wall, adjoining a tenement or

piece of land belonging to another, can makein it openings to admit light at the height ofthe ceiling joist or immediately under theceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters

square, and, in every case, with an irongrating imbedded in the wall and with a wirescreen]

2. Easement of View “ servidumbre

prospectus” e.g. as in the case of full or



regular windows overlooking adjoiningestate. “ altius non tollendi ” - easement not to

build higher for the purpose of obstruction.

REGULATORY OPENINGS:

Art. 670. No w indows, apertures, balcon ies,

or o ther sim i lar pro ject ions which afford a



di rec t v iew upon or towards an adjo in ingland or tenement can be made, w i thout

leaving a distance of two meters between

the wall in which they are made and such

cont iguous property.

Neither can s ide or obl ique views upon o r

towards such con term inous p roperty be

had, un less there be a distance of sixtycent imeters.

The nonobservance of these distances does

NUISANCE:

A nuisance is any act, om ission, establ ishment,

business, condi t ion o f proper ty, or anything else



, p p y, y g

which:

(1) Inju res or endangers the health or safety o f

others; or (2) Annoys or o ffends the senses; or

(3) Shocks , def ies o r dis regards decency or

morali ty ; or

(4) Obs truc ts or interferes w ith the free passageof any publ ic highway o r street , or any body of

water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of pro perty.

PUBLIC NUISANCE:

A publ ic nuisance affects a commun i ty o r



neighbo rhood o r any considerablenumber of persons , al though the extent o f

the annoyance, danger or damage upon

ind iv iduals may be unequal .

PRIVATE NUISANCE:

A private nu isance is one that is no t

included in the forego ing def in i t ion.

Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance:

Dangerous instrumentality or appliance



g y pp

which is likely to attract children at play.

One who maintains on his estate or premises

an attractive nuisance without exercising due

care to prevent children from playing

therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a

child of tender years who is injured thereby,

even if the child is technically a trespasser inthe premises.

Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. vs. Guillermo Balandan et.al. G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952

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“Nature has created streams, lakes and poolswhich attract children. Lurking in their waters isalways the danger of drowning. Against thisdanger children are early instructed so that they

are sufficiently presumed to know the danger;and if the owner of private property createsan artificial pool on his own property, merelyduplicating the work of nature without

adding any new danger , . . . (he) is not liablebecause of having created an `attractivenuisance.”

`Estate of Gregoria Francisco et.al. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 95279 July 26, 1991

Respondents can not seek cover under thegeneral welfare clause authorizing the

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abatement of nuisances without judicialproceedings. That tenet applies to anuisance per se, or one which affects theimmediate safety of persons and propertyand may be summarily abated under theundefined law of necessity (Monteverde v.Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storageof copra in the quonset building is alegitimate business. By its nature, it can not

be said to be injurious to rights of property,of health or of comfort of the community. If itbe a nuisance per accidens it may be soproven in a hearing conducted for that

MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP:

Art . 712. Ownersh ip is acquired by



occupat ion and by intel lectual creat ion .

Ownersh ip and other real r igh ts over

property are acquired and transm it ted by

law, by donation , by testate and intestate

succession, and in consequence of

certain contracts, by tradi t ion .

They may also be acquired by means of

prescr ipt ion.

MODE AND TITLE:

Mode is the specific cause which produces



dominion and other real rights as a result of

the co-existence of special status of things,

capacity and intention of persons and

fulfillment of the requisites of law.

Title is every juridical rights which gives a

means to the acquisition of real rights but



which in itself is insufficient.

Illustration:



Title is the remote cause, and mode theproximate cause of the acquisition.

e.g. Contract of sale is the title, tradition is themode.

Ownership is not transferred by contract of

sale but by tradition

Classification of Donations:

Simple- cause is pure liberality



Remuneratory ( first kind)- to reward past

services e.g. donation who saved life of his

son)

Remuneratory (second kind)- to reward future

services

Onerous- there are burdens, charges, or

future service. This is govern by the rules of

contracts.

EFFECT OF ILLEGAL OR IMPOSSIBLE

CONDITIONS

Art. 727. Il legal or impossib le condit ions

i i l d t d t i



in s imple and remuneratory donat ion s

shal l be cons idered as no t imposed. (

THIS ONLY APPL IES IF THE DONATION IS

PURELY GRATUITOUS)

FOR ONEROUS DONATIONS, THE RULE INOBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS APPLIES

i R l i t t [ hi h i li bl i



i.e. Rule in contracts [ which is applicable in acase of “onerous donation”]:

Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those contraryto good customs or public policy and those

prohibited by law shall annul the obligation

which depends upon them. If the obligation is

divisible, that part thereof which is not affected

by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be

valid.

Validity of conditions in an “onerous donation”:

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA

et.al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

77425 J 19 1991

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77425 June 19, 1991

The deed of donation allegedly provides that

the donee shall not dispose or sell the propertywithin a period of one hundred (100) years from

the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise

a violation of such condition would render ipso

facto null and void the deed of donation and the

property would revert to the estate of the

donors.

HELD:

The cause of action of private respondents is

b d th ll d b h b titi f





based on the alleged breach by petitioners of

the resolutory condition in the deed of

donation that the property donated should

not be sold within a period of one hundred(100) years from the date of execution of the

deed of donation. Said condition, in our

opinion, constitutes an undue restriction onthe rights arising from ownership of

petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to

ublic olic .

DONATION MORTIS CAUSA:

A t 728 D ti hi h t t k



Art. 728. Donation s which are to takeeffect upon the death o f the dono r partake

of the nature of testamentary pro vis ions ,

and shal l be governed by the rules

estab l ished in th e Tit le on Success ion .

Austria-Magat vs. Hon. Court of Appeals G.R.

No. 106755 February 1, 2002 [ INTER-

VIVOS DONATION]

D d f D ti id

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Deed of Donation provides:

Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at

hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko

at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking

lupang residential o tirahan sampu ng aking

bahay nakatirik doon xxx. (emphasissupplied)

This is a clear expression of the irrevocabilityof the conveyance. The irrevocability of the

donation is a characteristic of a donation

i t i B th d “hi di b b i”



inter vivos. By the words “hindi mababawi”,the donor expressly renounced the right to

freely dispose of the house and lot in

question. The right to dispose of a property isa right essential to full ownership. Hence,

ownership of the house and lot was already

with the donees even during the donor’s

lifetime.

On the issue of effect of prohibition to alienate:

“On the other hand, the prohibition to

b li t ll th t d i



encumber, alienate or sell the property duringthe lifetime of the donor is a recognition of

the ownership over the house and lot in issue

of the donees for only in the concept of anowner can one encumber or dispose a

property.”

CHARACTERISTICS OF A MORTIS CAUSA DONATION:

Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals [ G.R. No. L-6600 July 30,1954 ], the characteristics of donation mortis causa areas follows:



(1) It conveys no title or ownership to thetransferee before the death of the transferor; or, whatamounts to the same thing, that the transferor shouldretain the ownership (full or naked) and control of theproperty while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should berevocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; butrevocability may be provided for indirectly by means of areserved power in the donor to dispose of the propertiesconveyed;

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferorshould survive the transferee.

PERFECTION OF DONATION:

Art. 734. The donation is perfected from

the moment the donor kno s of the



the moment the donor knows of the

acceptance by the donee.



The purpose of the formal requirement is toinsure that the acceptance of the donation isduly communicated to the donor. In the caseat bar, it is not even suggested that Juana

f th t f h i



was unaware of the acceptance for she infact confirmed it later and requested thatthe donated land be not registered during

her lifetime by Salud. 13 Given thissignificant evidence, the Court cannot inconscience declare the donation ineffectivebecause there is no notation in the

extrajudicial settlement of the donee'sacceptance. That would be placing too muchstress on mere form over substance.

DONATION OF A MOVABLE:

A rt. 748. The donation of a movable may



be made orally o r in w ri t ing .

An oral donat ion requ ires the

simul taneous delivery o f the th ing or o f

the document represent ing the r igh t

donated.

If the value of the personal property

donated exceeds f ive thousand pesos, the

donat ion and the acceptance shal l be

made in w ri t ing, otherw ise, the donat ion



Quilala vs. Gliceria Alcantara et.al. G.R. No.132681 December 3, 2001

FACTS:

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FACTS:

The acknowledgement only contains the name of

the donor to be the only one who appearedbefore the Notary Public. There was no mention

of the donee. But in the Deed of Donation itself,

there appears a stipulation that the “donee

hereby receives and accepts the gift and

donation made in her favor by the donor….”

HELD:

In the same vein, the lack of an

acknowledgment by the donee before the notarybli d t l d th d ti ll



acknowledgment by the donee before the notarypublic does not also render the donation nulland void. The instrument should be treated inits entirety. It cannot be considered a private

document in part and a public document inanother part. The fact that it was acknowledgedbefore a notary public converts the deed ofdonation in its entirety a public instrument. The

fact that the donee was not mentioned bythe notary public in the acknowledgment isof no moment.

VOID DONATION may be basis for title through ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

CALICDAN vs. CENDANA G.R. NO. 155080FEBRUARY 5, 2004

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FACTS:

The donation involved a 760 sq.m. parcel of land in

Mangaldan, Pangasinan executed by Fermina Calicdan (in 1947) in favor of Silverio Cendana. This is a suit forrecovery instituted by Soledad Calicdan, one of thechildren of Fermina.

The donation was found to be the exclusive property ofFermina’s husband, Sixto, being an inheritance from thelatter’s parents.

HELD:

Although the donation is void for having been

t d b h i t th



executed by one who is not the owner,

considering that it was established that

respondent Silverio Cendana has been in

possession of the land for 45 years alreadyhe has acquired title to it by acquisitive

prescription.



ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA et.al. vs.COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991

HELD:

Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code

an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought







an action for the revocation of a donation must be broughtwithin four (4) years from the non-compliance of theconditions of the donation, the same is not applicable inthe case at bar. The deed of donation involved hereinexpressly provides for automatic reversion of the

property donated in case of violation of the conditiontherein, hence a judicial declaration revoking thesame is not necessary.

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly

provides for automatic revocation and reversion of theproperty donated, the rules on contract and the generalrules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 ofthe Civil Code.

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO FILE ACTIONTO REDUCE ON THE GROUND OFIMPAIRMENT OF LEGITIME

“Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code actions



Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actionsupon an obligation created by law must bebrought within ten years from the time theright of action accrues. Thus, the ten-yearprescriptive period applies to theobligation to reduce inofficiousdonations, required under Article 771 of

the Civil Code, to the extent that theyimpair the legitime of compulsory heirs.”

( Eloy Imperial vs. CA et.al. GR.112483 Oct.8, 1999

From when shall the ten-year period bereckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29

SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for

inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias



inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias,recognized that the cause of action to

enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of

the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it isonly then that the net estate may be

ascertained and on which basis, the

legitimes may be determined.

property_lecture notes of atty waldemar gravador

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