national university of singapore

PS2241 Public Administration in Asia

Term Essay 20%

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Topic 4:

Introduction

According to Rainer Pitschas' definition, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) is an

organisation that is not co-opted by the state and controlled by civil society, i.e., the Third Sector (Pitschas

1995, 8). Additionally, NGOs have sufficient autonomy of external influence, non-profit orientation, aims

of achieving public interests (such as public welfare), relatively informal structures of membership,

solidarity with members and clients, and lastly, a "reciprocal direct relationship to customers" (Pitschas

1995, 8)

The services provided by NGOs are usually those that businesses and/or government sectors are unwilling

or unable to provide. NGOs were viewed as important sources of expertise on local needs and priorities,

skills and resources for development. Their consultative management and expertise made them crucial

actors in policymaking and in promoting "a more open and accountable model of governance" (Brautigam

and Segarra 2007, 149). Thus, partnerships with NGOs were commended "in order to reduce the risks and

responsibility of government, minimize public sector debt, and enrich the quality of public policies"

(Haque 2004, 272).

Greater emphasis on partnership between the state and non-state entities emerged during the 1980s when

governments were preoccupied with neoliberal ideology and good governance (Haque 2004, 2).1

Additionally, it became a decisive component of the World Bank's Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

debt relief initiative. Civil society participation in the policymaking became a requirement for debt

cancellation. And the World Bank ensured that their Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) was

based on "partnerships with borrowing governments, their civil societies, and other international agencies"

(Brautigam and Segarra 2007, 149).

Thus, this paper seeks to critically examine the role and effectiveness of NGOs. I will argue that

unless the government is incorrupt, economically stable and genuinely concerned for the people, NGOs can

hardly be effective and can be in fact detrimental. This will be shown and argued especially in the case of

Bangladesh. The essay will be as follows: the general advantages of NGOs in service delivery will first be

examined; next, the major shortcomings of NGOs in Bangladesh will be critically evaluated; then, I will

propose what can be done and end with some concluding remarks.

1 Here are some of the areas that governments became preoccupied with: prioritisation of public participation; obsession over improving public sector inefficiency and ineffectiveness; and preference for partnering foreign donors in delivering services (Haque 2004, 2).

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General advantages of NGOs in service delivery

NGOs are seen as advantageous because based on the 1993 Human Development report (Garcia

and Macinko 1994, 6), they are more genuine and capable than government and private sector agencies in

reaching the poor (Nzimakwe 2008, 92). Governments and businesses often neglect the poor and pursue

pro-liberal policies at their expense. Or at times, governments are unwilling or unable to provide for their

citizens.2 NGOs, on the other hand, are passionate, genuine and committed about helping the poor and

powerless. They possess the knowledge and expertise to address local needs. As a result, they are more

willing and capable to provide for the poor.3 Thus, NGOs are very advantageous as they aptly fill in the

cracks of service delivery where governments failed. Also, since funds are not come from the government,

NGOs do not provide at the expense of the tax payers' money.

Although NGOs are more capable than governments, some questions remain: to what extent have they been

successful in helping the poor? Being able to reach to the poor does not equate to successful assistance.4

Also, helping to alleviate their problems is not the same as empowerment. While the former gives the poor

fishes, the latter teaches them how to fish.5

An advantage of NGOs is its ad hoc nature. NGOs can be created to specifically address a

particular need without damaging the status quo (Mencher 1999, 2082). This is advantageous as often,

"improving one situation exacerbates another" (Henderson 2002, 100).6 Thus, administrative solutions

which affect societal structures and all aspects of society attempting to reorganise, decentralise or

privatise often result in a "mixed record of overall success"(ibid.). Hence, NGOs are advantageous as they

attempt to address an issue without exacerbating another.

2 Unwilling governments are usually corrupt governments that are disinterested in the welfare of its people. Unable governments are those who lack the financial capacity to serve its people.3 Evaluating NGO Service Delivery in South Asia: Lessons for Afghanistan reported of significant service delivery by NGOs in countries with a "serious lack of capacity to supply comparable services". For example, it said that, "In Nepal, NGOs have contributed resources to significantly improve child and maternal health, increase female enrollment and access to education, and equip people with the means to make livings from legitimate products" (Antuono, et al. Spring 2006, vii).4 In fact, based on the 1993 Human Development Report, although NGOs are able to reach the poorest 20% of income groups, they are unable to reach the poorest of the poor the lowest 5-10% of the population.5 The World Bank defines participation as "a process by which people, especially disadvantaged people, influence those) decisions which affect them." Empowerment, on the other hand, is defined by the 1990 African Charter for Participation and Development as the people's ability to "effectively involve themselves in creating the structures and in designing the policies and programmes that serve the interests of all, as well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its benefits." This expanded definition encourages greater self-governance.6 For example, the construction of new low-cost housing outside the central city results in the isolation of the poor from their employment (Henderson 2002, 100). This was exactly what happened in Rio de Janeiro.

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But this is problematic. Firstly, there is no one societal problem that can be completely isolated. Human

societies are by nature interconnected and interdependent. Secondly, this approach implies that the root

causes of social problems, generally engendered by structural inequalities, are avoided. This produces

costly solutions that are temporal, ineffective, and unsustainable in the long run.

Also, it is possible for NGOs to become political. This was the case for Gono Shahajjo Shanstha, an NGO

in Bangladesh who tried to compete in local-level elections.7 GSS candidates "ran on the organisation ticket

and made a major statement of the fact that they were candidates of the organisation of the poor" (Hashemi

1996, 126). It is no wonder that the government officials and politicians viewed the GSS as a political

threat. Generally speaking, unless NGOs service delivery "complements state efforts of advantages the

state by extending services for which the state can take credit, then alternative service-delivery will be

regarded by host governments with suspicion...and appear as a threat to the establishment" (Henderson

2002, 105).

The third advantage of NGOs is its bottom-up approach that allows disadvantaged groups to be

represented. NGOs are generally small, flexible and decentralised. Their informal structure "allows for

decision-making at the grass roots level and enhances their ability to provide public services" (Antuono, et

al. Spring 2006, 4). Consequently, disadvantaged groups can participate in development as NGOs' informal

channels provide the group "structures in order to accomplish its stated goals" (Garcia and Macinko 1994,

6). This makes consensus-based NGOs more appealing than bureaucratic and top-down governments.

Channels established by NGOs help redistribute resources and benefits to those often overlooked

(Nzimakwe 2008, 92). As a result, NGOs can perform better than governments in service delivery as they

are more attuned to the needs of the people and less prone to elitism (Nzimakwe 2008, 92).

Yet, in some cases, NGOs loses its effectiveness when it becomes large and bureaucratic. It loses sight on

its mission and becomes distracted by the pursuit of other goals, such as internal management and funding.

Additionally, participation is not empowerment. NGOs may be attuned to the needs of the disadvantaged

and alleviate their problems, but they do not empower them to "take action on its own behalf" as NGOs

(especially non-advocacy groups) tend not to disrupt the status quo. The rhetoric of participation through

NGOs may just be a façade to "perpetuate the illusion of representative democracy, while large segments of

the population are systematically denied access to the political process" (Garcia and Macinko 1994, 8). In

7 The GSS has been committed to raising the consciousness of the poor and assisting them to set up their own class-based organisation, with the eventual aim of contending for political power. (Hashemi 1996, 126).

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other words, while "representing" the people, it may actually entrench their societal positions as they have

vested interests in making themselves relevant by perpetuating the problem and the resources that they

provide only help to lessen the consequence of being in that position but not helping them out of the

situation.

The fourth advantage of NGOs is that when it comes to work among the poor, NGOs tend to be

more cost-effective than bureaucracies (Nzimakwe 2008, 92). In other words, they spend less money on

administrative costs than actual help (ibid.). One reason could be that NGOs usually have much lesser

financial and human resources than government bureaucracies. Thus, expenditure has to be handled with

extra precautions. Secondly, NGOs are liable to their donors. In order for them to remain credible and to

see a continual flow of revenue, NGOs are obliged to put the money where their mouth is. Thirdly, small

and passionate NGOs are genuinely concerned about helping the poor. Hence, more efforts are put into

doing the work than gaining procedural approvals from bureaucratic authorities.

However, these are based on a few assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that NGOs are in economically strong

democracies. A weak civil society cannot keep NGOs in check because they do not have the institutions in

place to hold them accountable. Besides, it is highly dependent on NGOs. Moreover, NGOs in poor

developing countries are generally dependent on large, wealth, foreign donors. These dependent NGOs are

vulnerable captives to their imposed rules and vested interests, which may not be complementary to the

local settings and even detrimental at times (Henderson 2002, 104). Secondly, it assumes that these NGOs

remain small, flexible and decentralised. But this is not so, as in the case of Bangladesh, NGOs do expand

and even pursue profit-making ventures. Consequently, they lose sight of their mission. More time and

money are spent on activities and maintenance of the organisation rather than helping those in need. As

they enlarge, they become more bureaucratic and centralised. Their decision-making process is slowed

down as a result. Accordingly, more administrative costs are incurred. Importantly, such multiple levels of

procedures render it difficult to keep a record and hold them accountable.

Major Shortcomings of NGOs in Bangladesh

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This part of the essay will highlight the shortcomings of NGOs in Bangladesh and explain why

they emerge. I will first list the prominent needs in Bangladesh that NGOs strive to address and provide.

Next, I will highlight what the shortcomings are and lastly, explain why NGOs fail to achieve their aims.

NGOs and government organisations aim to help the underprivileged in Bangladesh, especially the

rural poor, and to have improved living conditions and greater political voices (Haque 2004, 280). Thus,

there are two prominent needs in Bangladesh: human development and social empowerment. Human

development is known as "the process of making progress or improvement in terms of income,

employment, living standard, self-reliance, equality, freedom and sustainability" (Haque 2004, 280).

Meanwhile, social empowerment is understood as "the process of shifting power to the common people by

enhancing their capacity to manage their own affairs and exercise influence over decisions that affect them"

(Haque 2004, 280). NGOs strive to achieve this by assisting in areas such as "poverty alleviation, income

generation, skill development, awareness creation, and people's participation in diverse sectors, including

agriculture, livestock, forestry, health, and education" (Haque 2004, 280).

Yet, despite of their efforts and improvements in health, education, and sanitation,8 31.5 percent of

over 161 million Bangladeshis were still living in poverty in 2010 (The World Bank 2011). Only, 47.9

percent of this same population are literate (CIA 2012).9 47 percent of the population still had no improved

access to sanitation facilities in 2008. And while the rate of unemployment stands at a relatively low 5

percent, 40 percent of the population were underemployed from 2010 to 2011 (CIA 2012).10 The numbers

have improved, but slightly. These slight improvements took place over almost two decades since the

emergence and influx of NGOs in the early to mid 90s. However, to what extent can the improvements

seen in Bangladesh be credited to the NGOs? Also, to what extent can the NGOs be blamed for the lack of

significant improvement? In short, even in the presence of NGOs, the underprivileged were still under

represented, not empowered, and in fact made dependent on these organisations.

NGOs were created and aimed to help the underprivileged, such as the poor and women. Their

bottom-up approach and consensus-based decision making were supposed to help facilitate this

8 Well-known NGOs, such as BRAC and Proshika, partnered with government organisations to establish nearly 43,000 schools and centres with an enrolment of about 2.5 million children (in non-formal education). Health services have been expanded by NGO-GO partnerships and made basic health care and family planning accessible to about a quarter of the population. Safe water and basic sanitation have been extended by NGOs to about 9 million rural people in Bangladesh. (Haque 2004, 281)9 This includes only those 15 and above who can read and write.10 The underemployed are those who are in the labour force but work only a few hours a week, at really low wages.

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redistribution (of resources and benefits) and representation of those in need. NGOs generally have

channels for the disadvantaged groups to participate in development. Instead, NGO membership accounts

for only less than 20 percent of the total population (Feldman 2003, 13). Some of the major NGOs in

Bangladesh failed to provide services to the 'hungry poor' or the 'hard-core poor' (those who are assetless)

(Ahmad 2003, 71). The reason is in order to form a NGO group, group members are required to have at

least some assets (Haque 2004, 282). Moreover, these resulted from the targeting of specific populations by

many NGOs (Feldman 2003, 13). Memberships are selected based on the NGO's organisational needs and

interest of funding agencies, that is, "the support of activities which yield readily identifiable outcomes that

will help to legitimise NGO contributions to poverty reduction and economic growth" (Feldman 2003,

13).11

Another shortcoming is, instead of empowering the underprivileged to make their own decisions

and be self-sustaining, the programmes of NGOs created relations of dependence among those using their

services. This in fact perpetuated social inequalities and entrenched their social positions. A clear example

would be the system of microcredit. Microcredit programmes in Bangladesh are designed for income

generation and not for consumption. Yet, many borrowers appropriate large portions of credit to

consumption,12 making it arduous for them to generate enough income to repay loans. As a result, as seen

in the RDRS case, one RDRS client simultaneously became a client of another NGO in order to "[take] a

loan from one NGO and [repay] the loan taken from another NGO by another member of the same

household" (Ahmad 2003, 70).13 To make things worse, the prioritisation of microcredit over social

consciousness have resulted in field workers abusing their clients in order to get their money back and save

their own jobs (Ahmad 2003, 69).14 This vicious cycle entrenched their social position and inequalities

rather than help in their social mobility.

11 For example, women who are less mobile, more controllable, and more willing to participate in (and be more acceptable to) a group of their village kin, are more likely to receive loans from NGOs. Such practices "underestimates the continued significance of community hierarchies and is rooted in the demand that NGOs carry limited financial risk...[while requiring] recipients to subsidise their own risk, which is ensured by demanding regular attendance at meetings alongside credit insurance and weekly rates of return." (Feldman 2003, 13) And in fact, microcredit policies of nearly all NGOs in Bangladesh were formulated by their senior managers, and field workers were rarely consulted (Ahmad 2003, 65).12 Such as food, marriage and house repair (Ahmad 2003, 69).13 Fieldworkers of NGO group, PROSHIKA, also shared that many clients at times borrow money from businessmen and professional moneylenders and repay these debts with the RDRS (another NGO) loans.14 Qamrul Islam, a fieldworker at PROSHIKA, said that prior to the prioritisation of microcredit, his life was easy. But now, "I ride hundreds of miles, I have no leisure. I have to show good repayment rate of my disbursed credit to save my job. To get money back sometimes I abuse my members. Now my life is full of tension. Many nights I cannot sleep due to the anxiety about what I shall do if I lose the job." (Ahmad 2003, 69)

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Additionally, NGOs regulations over clients', especially women's, personal decision-making in their

household are intrusive and at times worse than state intervention. Instead of pursuing their aims of

emancipating and empowering women to make their own decisions, these regulations may actually "do

more to extend than to undermine relations of patriarchal domination" (Feldman 2003, 14).

Why have NGOs failed in their service delivery?

One main reason for explaining the shortcomings of NGOs is the lack of accountability. The

fundamental cause for the lack of accountability is the obsolete legal framework relating to NGOs in

Bangladesh. The NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB), although established in 1990 to grant permission for NGO

operations and avail NGOs of foreign funds (Zohir 2004, 4109), has not been revised to deal with the

growing number of NGOs that had tripled since 1990 (The World Bank 2006, viii). This has resulted in

delays, inadequate scrutiny of financial reports, and no systematic maintenance of basic data relating to

foreign-funded NGOs (The World Bank 2006, viii).15 This fundamental flaw is significant as laws set the

rules of the game. When rules are legalised, a follow up is required. Institutions would then be established

to ensure that the laws are carried out. Legal actions can be taken action those who violate the laws. In

other words, it is unlikely that a system of checks and balance can emerge without establishing effective

laws. Moreover, if there are no corrective systems in place, unethical organisational behaviour will become

entrenched, rendering it difficult to correct in future.

The lack of accountability that allowed the political culture of patron-client relations in Bangladesh

to be extended even to NGOs also explains their shortcomings. Clientelism is a common feature in

15 In the 2006 World Bank report, it states that:There are 12 laws for registering and regulating NGOs, but most NGOs register under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Regulation and Control) Ordinance 1961, administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare. The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies registers “societies and nonprofit companies,” but extremely weak capacity in this agency is compounded by the absence of computerized systems (italics added). There are other weaknesses in the legislative framework. Tax exemptions are increasingly complicated by NGO commercial activity to fund development programs. Appropriate appeals procedures and mechanisms formerger or exit of NGOs are also absent.Laws relating to internal governance and financial accountability of NGOs are inadequate. The reporting and accounting burdens placed on NGOs are contradictory, and weak capacity means that regulators present a feeble deterrent against cases of poor internal governance...accounting and auditing practices are also influenced by donor financial reporting requirements that are highly variable and that typically focus on the donor-financed project rather than on the whole institution. The quality of audit reports varies significantly, and regulators rarely focus on the comprehensiveness and quality of these reports.There is little oversight of NGO audit standards within the profession. Moreover, audit reports are rarely posted in public spaces, such as on relevant Web sites. NGO boards suffer from weaknesses common in the for-profit corporate sector and typically feature the founder-director, family members, and a number of overstretched individuals who rarely rotate their positions. (The World Bank 2006, viii-ix)

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Bangladesh politics. With the emergence of NGO-GO partnerships and the similar socio-economic

background shared between leaders of NGOs and top government officials, it was hardly surprising that

personal connections and patron-client relations were used between the two parties (Haque 2004, 282).16

Hence, the government rarely "exercise[d] effective legal controls over NGOs and ensure their

accountability to people in rural areas" (Haque 2004, 282). As a result, NGOs' autonomy from state

regulations and access to government officials were expanded (Haque 2004, 282), which gave them leeway

to pursue profit-making ventures instead of serving the needs of the rural people and ensuring that their

concerns are represented.

Disadvantaged groups are also under represented in NGOs as the next generation of staff after the elite

pioneers of NGOs were from the lower-middle and middle classes. This generation were usually first-

generation university graduates who often share the same vision of social redistribution as their leaders.

However, "employment in the sector also represented an opportunity for upward mobility" and saw "work

in the NGO sector as a way to participate in a highly desirable international arena" (Feldman 2003, 17).

Their need for economic security meant that they were often unwilling to challenge the interests of NGO

leadership and donors, especially when "donors contribute to programme inputs as well as recurrent costs

that may even include their salaries" (Feldman 2003, 17). As such, employed staffs in NGOs were not fully

committed to serving the people's needs and representing their interests, but rather, their own vested

interests of social mobility.

What also accounts for the shortcomings of NGOs in Bangladesh is their dependency on foreign

donor, which has held them captive to the priorities and vested interests of foreign donors. 17 Huge funds

were needed to "scale up successful development operations, reduce burdensome transaction costs...and

initiate a process that would secure financial sustainability" (Devine 2003, 230). In return, donors required

to have a maximum hold on NGO outputs and performance (ibid.). This included criteria such as

16 First generation of NGO organisers came primarily from elite, urban, educated families. Leaders of these NGOs, particularly those who created the large, internationally recognised NGOs, came from a background of having done graduate study and employment abroad, with relatives employed in the civil and foreign service and in the international donor community. In other words, "This demographic profile situates NGO leaders in international networks, with skills, resources, and experience matching those of many of their honor and highly placed government counterparts." (Feldman 2003, 16) 17 Some numbers to show the deep and extensive dependence on foreign aid among the NGOs in Bangladesh: "By 1997,848 NGOs registered with the NGO Affairs Bureau in Bangladesh were eligible to receive foreign funding. The number of NGOs reflects a significant growth in funding for the NGO sector over the previous 10-15 years, going from approximately 6 percent of total aid disbursements in 1988-1989, to a 17 percent average between 1992 and 1996. The 2001-2002 budget estimates NGO and international annual aid to Bangladesh at US$90million." (Feldman 2003, 12)

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"efficiency, value added, effectiveness, and output/performance orientations" (Devine 2003, 231). To make

matters worse, donor support became increasingly competitive during the 1990s. Many NGOs thus quickly

turned from a commitment to reaching the poor to reaching those participants who could guarantee

measurable and positive results (Feldman 2003, 14).18 Consequently, strict micro credits that were to

detrimental to their poor clients were introduced. Besides, many of these aids were bilateral. The leverage

foreign donors had over NGOs were thus even greater. The ability of foreign donors to have such a heavy

influence is due to the weak regulations over foreign funds and its appropriation (lack of accountability to

the state) as well as a lack of accountability to the people.19 In fact, the dependency on foreign aid is so

steep in Bangladesh that the even state, under pressure by foreign donors, withdrew its decision to cancel

the registration of certain NGOs causing financial inconsistencies and have the head of its regulatory

bureau in charge of NGOs transferred instead (Haque 2004, 284).

Another factor explaining the shortcomings of NGOs in Bangladesh is the lack of coordination

among NGOs, rendering them highly ineffective in their service delivery. The absence of an overall

development agenda have resulted in many NGOs engaging in similar functions. This duplication of roles,

waste of resources and fragmentation were the reasons why NGOs found themselves intensely competing

with each other for foreign aid at the expense of the people (Haque 2004, 282). Moreover, fragmentation

among NGOs, which allowed the priorities and interests of foreign donors to dominate, was further

perpetuated by the severe inequalities among them.20 Additionally, dependence on multiple foreign donors

has led to the imposition of conflicting preferred projects by donors at the expense of the people's and

consistency in rural development agenda (ibid.).

Recommendations

Therefore, it can be seen that while advantages of NGOs in service delivery exist, that are certain

disadvantages to it as well. In order for NGOs to be advantageous, certain conditions have to be in place.

As seen, the role of the government in service delivery is imperative. Firstly, there is a need for an

18 To add, it was under these conditions that the pressure to sustain programme outcomes required the reduction of uncertainty. As such, those who are less likely to be among Bangladesh's poorest and thus have a higher chance of being productive were selected.19 Accountability to the people are more likely to take place in strong civil societies where the people are sovereign and know their rights.20 In sum, the three biggest NGOs controlled 72 percent of the total funds available to all the NGOs available in Bangladesh, while the bottom five shared slightly less than 5 percent of the total funds. This pattern was sadly intensified during the 1990s, with widespread consequences for the entire NGO sector. Smaller organisations found themselves acting as subcontractors, which were hardly on favourable terms, to the bigger NGOs. (Devine 2003, 230)

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incorrupt government that is willing to genuinely commit themselves to the improving the lives of the

underprivileged. Governments must be involved in service delivery as "NGOs are often financially,

managerially, and technically incapable of undertaking any massive tasks such as improving the

socioeconomic conditions of millions of rural population" (Haque 2004, 282). It is the state that has the

bureaucracy, information and infrastructure in place to enact policies that correct the root causes and

structural inequalities. Also, it is the role of the state to impose laws that requires stricter regulations

regarding accountability to both the state and the poor their "clients" (Hashemi 1996, 131). In order for

the poor to hold the NGOs accountable, channels for feedback and complaints should be in place. The

government should educate the "clients", or citizens, their rights, the law, and the available channels of

feedback for it to work.

Notably, some levels of economic growth and stability have to be in place in order to reduce

Bangladesh's overall dependence on foreign aid. Countries like Singapore and Taiwan were able to

development economically and socially without the help of any NGOs. One lesson that can be drawn from

their examples is that the state must play an important role in developing the country, economically and

socially. The government has to be genuine and committed in order for them to be successful.

This brings to the point of foreign donors. One way NGOs in Bangladesh can reduce their huge

dependency on foreign donors is by sourcing out multiple donors locally and internationally. The

government could, like in the case of America, allow companies to donate funds to preferred charities or

foundations instead of paying taxes to the government. Another way is to source for more funds from

private and individual donors. The government could also ensure that funds given by certain donors for

example, individual donors do not exceed a percentage.

Since large NGOs are seen to be problematic, a limitation on the size of NGOs can be imposed as

well. Moreover, NGOs engaging in profit-making ventures should not be tax-exempted as this is not only

unfair to other businesses but also distracts NGOs from what is important the people. Most importantly,

media scrutiny local and international obliges NGOs and foreign donors to be accountable to the people.

Conclusion

The problem with Bangladesh and the failure of NGOs in service delivery is that the government

itself is corrupt and hence lack the character and capability to regulate NGOs under them. Throughout this

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paper, I have shown how the role of state plays a very important role in service delivery and ensuring that

the NGOs are effective. It is the responsibility of the state to deliver services and thus, should not wholly

transfer this responsibility to NGOs. Both should complement each other. However, in order for this

partnership to work, the government has to be incorrupt, genuine and be economically stable.

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