public corporation notes

Prior Preparation Prevents Poor Performance Reviewer – Public Corporation

of 77 Sources: Benguet | Cucal | ZPG & Associates Reviewer | Google

I. Pertinent Laws Governing Public Corporations

Article X, 1987 Constitution

Local Autonomy must be enjoyed by territorial and political subdivisions

The power or right of self-government

System of decentralization – Organizing the local units

President – General supervision

Acts should be within the scope prescribed

Right to revenue subject to limitations of the Congress (Right to tax, section 5, Article X)

Term of office – 3yrs per term, 3 consecutive terms o Voluntary interruption - Resigned o Involuntary interruption – Petitioned

... Majority of votes cast in a plebiscite – Political units directly affected = Entire unit

Autonomous Regions o Sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and

other relevant characteristics o President has general supervision o Creation – Majority of the plebiscite cast – Only those favored will be included o ARMM and CAR o Local police agencies – Preservation of peace and order within the regions.

Administrative Code of 1987, Title XII, as amended Local Government

To ensure autonomy in the LGUs – System of decentralization

Department to assist the President in the general suspension

Powers & Functions: o Promulgate policies, rules, regulations and other issuances relative to general supervision o Establish and prescribe rules and regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the

general supervision of LGUs o Provide assistance to national legislation that will effect the local government o Plans, policies, programs and projects o Formulate plans, polices and programs o Perform

To be composed of: Office of the Secretary and immediate staff o Bureau of local government supervision o Bureau of local government development o National barangay operations office o Project development services o Department services o Office of public services o Regional and field office

RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) RA 8551 (Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) RA 9263 (Bureau of Fire Protection and Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Professionalization Act of 2004) Applicable Jurisprudence



A. Local Government and Autonomy

MMDA vs Bel-Air Association

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. RA 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be the administrative character of the MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under PD 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under RA No 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinance for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang panlungsod of Makati City did not pass nay ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of the Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Corporation

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breathe of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so i may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation in the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

Basco vs PAGCOR

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization”. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio”



Local government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by klaw and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such as system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government.

Limbona vs Mangelin

In relation to the central government, it provides that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the autonomous regions.

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

1. decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

2. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

Lina vs Pano

This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.

In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolution is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. [xxx]

Ours still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.

A. 1. Control vs Supervision

Judge Dadole vs CoA

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgement of the former for that of the latter.



Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members if the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.

Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the constitution. Any government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

Taule vs Santos

We further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local government or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body, we said.

Liga ng mga Barangay vs Judge Paredes As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG’s authority over the liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Liga’s constitution and by-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Liga’s own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected liga officers. Like the local government units, the liga ng mga barangay is not subject to control by the Chief executive or his alter ego.

Drilon vs Lim Clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus: . . . The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed… Mondano vs Silvosa this Court defined supervision as “overseeing”, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes the judgment of the former for that of the latter. [xxx]



B. Administrative Regions and Autonomous Regions

Abbas vs COMELEC

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1; Presidential Decree No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.

Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no basis therefor.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that “[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose x x x.” Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec. 18, para. 2.] it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.”

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

Chiongbian vs Orbos

Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power “to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions” following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices.



Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to that subject. Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no “transfer” of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

To be sure Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President’s power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit:

(1) contiguity and geographical features;

(2) transportation and communication facilities;

(3) cultural and language groupings;

(4) land area and population;

(5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies;

(6) socioeconomic development programs in the regions and

(7) number of provinces and cities.

What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, administrative regions are mere “groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.” There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

Cordillera Board Coalition vs CoA

A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the



enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.

The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

C. Role of Civil Service Commission

Rapisora vs Civil Service Commission

Respondent finds untenable petitioner’s contention that his deficiency in educational requirement (Master in Public Health/Hospital Administration) can be offset by his training and experience. It maintains that petitioner should at least have earned for himself some units or started pursuing such particular educational requirements as allegedly required by the rule on substitution. We do not agree. This rule cannot be strictly interpreted as to curtail an agency’s discretionary power to appoint as long as the appointee possesses other qualifications required by law.

The decision as to when the conditions give rise to a necessity to interchange education with experience and vice-versa rests upon the sound discretion of the appointing authority. This is not to be viewed as an unbridled license given to the appointing authority to appoint whomsoever he desires. This is rather a recognition of the fact that the appointing authority is in the best position to determine the needs of his department or agency and how to satisfy those needs. Moreover, it is precisely the province of the QS to provide the gauge by which the appointing authority shall exercise his discretion. The QS has been defined in Section 20, PD 807 as expressing the minimum requirements for a class of position in terms of education, training and experience, civil service eligibility, physical fitness and other qualities required for successful performance. It is, thus, the QS which provides for the considerations upon which the appointing authority decides when the levels of education or experience may be sufficient to offset each other.”

As repeatedly ruled by the Court, the Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine or change the kind or nature of the appointment, for it is an essential discretionary power and must be performed by the officer on whom it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the minimum qualification required by law. In the case at bench, then Secretary of Health, Honorable Alfredo R.A. Bengzon, and his successors, Honorable Antonio O. Periquet and Hon. Juan M. Flavier. believe that petitioner possesses the necessary qualifications required by law for the position.

Mathay vs CA

The provisions of B.P. 337 are clear. As stated above, the power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. This is clear from Section 177 of B.P. 337 which lists the powers of the sanggunian. The power to appoint is not one of them. Expressio unius est exclusio

alterius. Had Congress intended to grant the power to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no uncertain terms.

By ordering petitioner to “reinstate” private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance, the Civil Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot be done. In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission’s power is limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an appointment of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends. The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing authority.



Farinas vs. Barba

[xxx] We held that the appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended by the sanggunian concerned, since the power of appointment is a discretionary power.

When the Civil Service Commission ordered the reinstatement of private respondents, it technically issued a new appointment. This task, i.e. of appointment, is essentially discretionary and cannot be controlled even by the courts as long as it is properly and not arbitrarily exercised by the appointing authority. In Apurillo vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that “appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested.”

It is axiomatic that the right to hold public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. Since Presidential Decree 51 creating the CSU never became law, it could not be a source of rights. Neither could it impose duties. It could not afford any protection. It did not create an office. It is as inoperative as though it was never passed. In Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission we held that “a void appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of the appointment.”

D. Effectivity of the Local Government Code

Section 536, RA 7160

This code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at last one (1) newspaper of general circulation.

Evardone vs COMELEC

Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution ex-presely provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec, 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, which states: “SEC. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.—x x K, (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official’s assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.”

E. Corporation

1. Definition - An Artificial being created by law having the riht of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.

2. Classification of corporation according to purpose

Public Private Quasi-Public

Created by law By will or incorporaors

Purposes of local government / Agency of the state

Private purpose, aim or end

Formed and organized for the Government

Private corporation that renders public service, supply public



wants

3. Criterion to determine whether corporation is public

The relationship of the corporation to the state.

4. Classes of Public Corporation 1. Quasi-Corporation – Private corporation that renders public service. Agencies of the state for

narrow and limited purpose 2. Municipal Corporation – Purpose: Local government and to regulate internal affairs.

5. Municipal Corporations 1. Elements:

Legal Creation or incorporation Corporate name – What is it known Inhabitants - Population Territory –Place to exercise corporate jurisdiction

6. Dual Nature and Functions

Public or Governmental Private or Proprietary

- Agent of the state - Instrumentality to carry out functions of the government

- Same as business category - Patrimonial powers - Agency of the community

Lidasan vs COMELEC

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly, they serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly, they act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.

7. Municipal Corporations in the Philippines 1. Province – Composed of Municipalities and component cities 2. City – Composed of barangays 3. Municipality – Composed of barangays 4. Barangay – Basic political unit 5. Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras

Limbona vs Mangelin

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by PD 1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the decree established internal autonomy in the two regions within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions, except to act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government, [xxx]



Cordillera Board Coalition vs COMELEC

After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. [xxx] Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. x x x In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.

Ordillo vs Comelec

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that: "Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Italics Supplied) The keywords—provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.

Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that: "SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or within the Autonomous Region x x x." From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region. If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies—the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan—exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few people.

Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas



Pambansa Blg. 337—Local Government Code). If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.

6. Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions – Subject to plebiscite. Jurisdiction is limited to basic services.

Section 11, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority tthat will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

II. Basic Principles

A. Policy and Application and Interpretation

1. Scope and Application

Section 4, RA 7160

This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays, and other political subdivisions as may be created by law, and, to the extent herein provided, to officials, offices, or agencies of the National Government

2. Declaration of Policy Section 2, RA 7160

a. System of decentralization b. Accountability of LGUs c. Consultations (periodic) to be conducted before any project/program to be implemented

3. Operative Principles of Decentralization Section 3, RA 7160

a. Effective allocation of their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources. b. Establish and accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism c. Appoint or remove local officials upon merit and fitness based from CS law d. Reasonable adequate resources to discharge their powers and effectively carry out their functions e. To ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of prescribed powers and functions f. May group and consolidate or coordinate their services, efforts and resources. g. Enhanced capabilities to participate in the national government



h. Continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy i. Share with national government the responsibility of management and maintenance of ecological balance within jurisdiction j. Improve quality of local leadership k. Together with the national government, extension of adequate and technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving LGUs l. Participation of the private sector in the delivery of basic services. m. Decentralization to improve quality of life

4. Rules on Interpretation Section 5, RA 7160

Power of local government & devolution of powers Liberally favor LGU Tax ordinance/revenue Liberally favor tax payer Strictly against LGU Tax exemption Strictly agains the person claiming exemption General welfare Favor LGU to give more power Rights and obligations Contracts’ terms and condition when enforced No jurisprudence yet Customs and traditions

Province of Batangas vs Romulo

The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to the LGUs’ share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner’s constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the “automatic release” to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes. Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has “a plain, direct and adequate interest” in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.

Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.



6, Article X of the Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be determined by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.

“just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action”; “Automatic” means “involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automation.”—Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “automatic” as “involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton.” Further, the word “automatically” is defined as “in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention.” Being “automatic,” thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991, the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action.”

Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville, a distinguished French political writer, “[l]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to use and enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.

Tano vs Socrates

B. Creation 1. Authority to create

LGU may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered

Province, Municipality, City, or any other political subdivision – ONLY by an act of Congress

Barangay – A valid ordinance by the sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod as the case maybe

Sema vs COMELEC

A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, “The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x.” Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the “next national elections” from the effectivity of the law.



It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

We rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

** ARMM Can create municipalities and Barangays as long as it conforms with the requisites. It won’t create a national office **

2. Requisites/Limitations in the creation or conversion

PROVINCE CITY HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY MUNICIPALITY BARANGAY

Income 20M 100M (RA9009) 50M 2.5M -

Population 250K 150K 200K 25K 2K

Land Area 2,000 SqKm 100 SqKm 100 SqKm 50 SqKm -

** ALL requires majority of the votes casts in the plebiscite held for the purpose **

a. Plebiscite Requirement – Plebiscite is a preparatory act to the conversion

Tan vs COMELEC

We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the idol therein.

It is a well accepted rule that “in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia.” Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that “the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.”



As this draft legislation speaks of “areas,” what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.

The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the “territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.” The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that “territory” as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the “territory need not be contiguous.” Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, next, or adjacent (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). “Contiguous”, when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be “contiguous” is the “territory”—the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term “territory” embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with “land area” only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).

Padilla vs Comelec

It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted “in the political units directly affected,” it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase “political units directly affected,” is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.

Griño vs COMELEC

As it is worded, Section 462 completely addresses an eventuality where the people of both the original district and the people of the new district to be created agree to the proposed creation of the latter, xxx But suppose the proposed conversion of a sub-province is rejected by those affected by such conversion, what does the law say? The law states only the following in case of a negative vote: “The incumbent elected officials of said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case a negative vote in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by the President. The appointee shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified, xxx.” Whatever incumbent elective positions exist under the present set-up, it appears that in case of a negative vote, these sub-provincial positions shall be filled by appointment of the President. The makers of the law however, failed to foresee that in the event the negative vote prevails naturally, the subprovince shall continue to be a part of the original province and continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the original province, The law is silent or whether the voters of the sub-province proposed to be converted into a regular province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials in the election held simultaneously with the plebiscite, xxx The Commission on Elections, being the agency directed to conduct the plebiscite decided not to let the voters of Guimaras vote for the provincial officials. The Commission was under a mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the 1991 Local Government Code, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the



provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras.

Lopez vs COMELEC

Moreover, the last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present constitutional provision adopted in the plebiscite on January 27, 1984. Thus in the Article on Batasang Pambansa it is expressly provided: “The Batasang Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than 200 Members unless otherwise provided by law, shall include representatives elected from the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities as may be declared by or pursuant to law, and districts in Metropolitan Manila, those elected or selected from the various Sectors as may be provided by law, and those chosen by the President from Members of the Cabinet. Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. The elective representatives shall be apportioned by law among the provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and the districts of Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, but the provinces with component cities and highly urbanized cities shall have at least one representative each. The provinces and cities shall have at least the same total number of representatives as under the 1935 Constitution.” The recognition of the existence of Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed any clearer. There can be no legal justification then for a declaration of unconstitutionally. Presidential Decree No. 824 is not tainted with constitutional infirmity.

b. Income

Alvarez vs Guingona

[xxx] Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.

The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

League of Cities of the Philippines vs COMELEC

2011 FACTS: During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for

conversion into a city from P20 million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed,

through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular

municipality from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. ISSUE: Are the cityhood laws converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional? RATIO: November 18, 2008 Ruling No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional because sec. 10, Art. X of the

Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into the LGC and not into any other laws. “The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the

Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.” “The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of

the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the “just share” of l ocal government units

(LGUs) in national taxes.” (League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008) March 31, 2009 Ruling No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote. April 28, 2009 Ruling No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration. December 21, 2009 Ruling Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress’ deliberations and clear legisla tive intent was that the

then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 215 9 proposes;



and RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a municipality into a city will only

affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen

municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement

after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. “Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should

be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR

No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the

Philippines v. COMELEC, December 21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and was recorded in the SC’s Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.) August 24, 2010 Ruling No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the Ph ilippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its

November 18, 2008 decision declaring unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. “Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not

overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote

on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie -vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision,” the Court said. In the latest resolution, the

Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate sec . 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that “no city…shall be created…except in accordance with the criteria established in the local

government code.” It stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Loca l Government Code, the

assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. “The

unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the

Constitution….Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution,” the Court held. The Court further held that “limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.” (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec, August 24, 2010) February 15, 2011 Ruling Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since the High Court first resolved t he Cityhood case in 2008. April 12, 2011 Ruling Yes! It’s final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities cover ed by the

Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local Government

Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play

demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the

certain collective wisdom of Congress,” the SC said. The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the

Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cit ies.

“The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several

municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was

incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the

House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in

Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even so, the

House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approv al to the Senate, which

again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all

unanimously and favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both Chambers of

Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of th e clear legislative intent to

exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by

repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.” Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local gove rnment units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.” SAME, SAME, SAME G.R. No. 177499. November 18, 2008 Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The

13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the

principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied

retroactively but prospectively. The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other



law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary

for the creation of a cit y, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood

Laws. The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can

govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform,

non -discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local

Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of

a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a c

ity must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any

exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their

cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly

exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be

written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of

national taxes to all local government units. If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair

and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal,

should not receive the sa me share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and

income, as prescribed in Sect ion 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in

determining the “just share” of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of

the Local Government Co de, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the

Constitution. Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such

exemption would still be unconstitution al for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, “Exemption from Republic

Act No. 9009─The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.” This one sentence exemption

provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we

take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income

requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16

municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and

those not entitled to exemption from the P100 millio n income requirement. The intent of R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is to exempt respondent municipalities from the income

requirement of P100,000,000.00. Thus, the cityhood laws, which merely carry out the intent of R.A. No. 9009, are in accordance with the “criteria

established in the Local Government Code,” pursua nt to Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The cityhood laws contain a uniformly worded

exemption clause, which states: “Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The city of [___] shall be exempt from the income requirement prescribed

under Republic Act No. 9009.” The deliberations of Congress are necessary to ferret out the intent of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9009. It is very clear that Congress intended

that the then pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the income requirement of P100,000,000.00 imposed by R.A. No. 9009. It was made clear

by the Legislature that R.A. No. 9009 would not have any retroactive effect. G.R. No. 176951. December 21, 2009 By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in

character. But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a

province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700 (2008). The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the

requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific

protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process

clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection

clause . This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent

LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would

not suffice to bri ng it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake

a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the

uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a

city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.



G.R. No. 176951. August 24, 2010 Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. —The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must

follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any othe r law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution

requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creatio n of a city, including the conversion of a

municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure

that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government

Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress

when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from

the increased income requirement in Section 450 of t he Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section

10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code

and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: “Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x.” RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislature’s primary intent to curtail “the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities,” RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of

nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is

unconstitutional. However, the minority’s novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the

functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws.

This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no

effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That

specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact,

the minority concedes that “the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated.” In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.

Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

Clearly, as worded, the exe mption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would

still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. If only to emphasize the point, the word “code” in the cited constitutional provision refers to a law Congress enacts in line with its plenary power to

create local political subdivisions. As was said in the December 21, 2009 Decision––but without going presently into the qualificatory details therein

spelled out––the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause “in accordance with the criteria established in the local government

code” is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can define, prescribe and impose the criteria. The imposition may be effected either

in a consolidated set of laws or a single -subject enactment, like RA 9009. And provided the imperatives of the equ al protection clause are not

transgressed, an exemption from the imposition may be allowed, just like the cityhood laws each of which contained the fo llowing provision: “Exemption from [RA] No. 9009.—The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requ irement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.” I find it

rather startling, therefore, that the majority opinion, without so much as taking stock of the legislative history of the 16 Cityhood Laws in relation to RA

9009, at least to determine the intent of the law, would conclude that Congress “exceeded and abused its law -making power” when it enacted the said

cityhood laws as an exception to RA 9009. It cannot be emphasized enough that if Congress has the plenary power to create political units, it surely can

exercise the lesser power of requiring a menu of criteria and standards for their creation. As it is, the amendatory RA 9009 increasing the codified

income requirement from Php 20 million to Php 100 million is really no different from the enactment of any of the Cityhood Law exempting the unit

covered thereby from the codified standards. G.R. No. 176951. February 15, 2011. Based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and

higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it

both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged. Not

withstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as a

mended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the

individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.



The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to

make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity,

has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Th e grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative

body possesses ple nary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed

by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative

power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted

R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in

1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area. Congress

deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009,

imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent

municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very

intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic

growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A.

No. 9009 throu gh the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory

R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and t

he August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the

LGC. It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the

enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the apprehension that before

long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual

income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no ev idence or empirical data, such as inflation

rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to

make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created

thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized c ities under Section 452 of the LGC. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in

accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their

cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. —The determination of the existence of substantial

distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This

Court sees the bigger picture. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is

measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus—SECTION 2.

Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and

meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the

attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted

through a syste m of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The process

of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units. Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the c apacity and

viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized

this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the

provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless

pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition

continues to exist. The justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into

component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16

municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009,

acknowledging the “privilege” that they have already given to those newly -converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009,

were undeniably in the same footing or “class” as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent

municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. ABAD, J., Concurring Opinion: The Court has received flak on this case for supposed “flip-flopping.” But its shifting views are understandable because of the nearly even soundness of

the opposing advocacies of the two groups of cities over the validity of the sixteen cityhood laws. It also does not help that the membership of the Court

has been altered by retirements and replacements at various stages from when it first decided to annul the laws, to when it reconsidered and upheld

their validity, and to when it reverted to the original position and declared the laws involved uncon stitutional. This to me is a healthy sign of democracy

at work, the members being blind to the need to co nform. Petitioner League of Cities failed to show that the creation of the sixteen new cities discriminated against other cities. As the respondent cities point

out, the majority of the present cit ies in our midst do not meet the P100 million minimum income requirement of the Local Government Code. It

boggles the mind how these deficient cities can complain of denial of equal protection of the law.



Assuming an improper classification in the case of the sixteen cities, petitioner League of Cities can not invoke the equal protection clause since it has

failed to show that it will suffer deprivation of li fe, liberty, or property by reason of such classification. Actually, the existing cities would not cease to

exist nor would their liberties suffer by reason of the enactment of the sixteen cityhood laws. That their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) will be

diminished does not amount to deprivation of property since the IRA is not their property until it has been automatically released. Mere expectancy in

the receipt of IRA can not be regarded as the “property” envisioned in the Bill of Rights.

G.R. No. 176951. April 12, 2011 Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The

apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local

Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 mill ion under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated

in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of the fact that there

were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009,

including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on

October 5, 2000 while th e 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator

Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not a pply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities

covered by the conversion bills pending dur ing the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint

Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009.

However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint

Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint

Resolution No. 1. Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and favorably

voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The bills, when forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the

Senate. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption claus es ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express

articulations of t he clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009,

and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. The imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the

specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-

effects that were likely to arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become a reality.

While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified

to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the

original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth. The petitioners’ contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not acceptable. In this regard, it suffices to

state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Speci fically, the share of the

cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of

existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the

allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share

the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, alt hough the actual amount received

may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The

respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They h ave demonstrated their viability as component cities of their

respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With

their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities. Local government units do not subsist only on locally

generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great

potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning

more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro

Manila. G.R. No. 176951. June 28, 2011 CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion: The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any

other law. There is only one Local Government Code. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, the Constitution expressly requires

Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality

into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.



Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood

Laws as separate and distinct from the Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the Local Government

Code but are separate and distinct laws. There is therefore no question that the Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local Government Code. As such,

the Cityhood Laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in the Local Government Code, without

running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the old Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short,

RA No. 9009 repealed the old income requirement of P20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our statute books. Compliance with the old

income requirement is compliance with a repealed, dead, and non-existent law—a totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse, compliance with the old

requirement is an outright violation of the Constituti on which expressly commands that “no x x x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance

with the criteria established in the local government code.” Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to validly convert into cities must comply with

the P100 million income requirement under the prevailing Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, and not with the old P20 million income

requirement. Otherwise, such compliance with the old P20 million income requirement is void for being unconstitutional.

The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,

including the conversion of a municipality into a city. To avoid discrimin ation and ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot be embodied in

any other law except the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code,

provide an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cit ies under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by

RA No. 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. In addition, the Cityhood Laws

violate the equal protection clause and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution on the fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local

government units. Without any doubt, the Cityhood Laws must be striken down for being unconstitutional.

c. Population

Aquino III vs COMELEC

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population. To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the minimum population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only in cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion that this country is a “democratic and republican State.” This ruling of the majority strikes a debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government. The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing population. There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an alternative addition to the income requirement. The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that “each province, shall have at least one representative” means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also be created with it. Can this district have a population below



250,000? To answer in the affirmative is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned “in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.” That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x.” In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.

d. Land area Mariano vs COMELEC The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people’s welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, Section 2 stated that the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. ** Recent CA ruling, The Fort belongs to City of Makati **

C. Beginning of Corporate Existence

Upon election and qualification of its chief executive AND majority of the members of its sanggunian



EXCEPTION: Fixed date provided by the law or ordinance (Section 14, RA 7160)

D. Division and Merger, abolition of LGUs

Division and Merger – Same requirements with creation.

PLUS: Such shall not reduce income, population, and land area to less than the minimum

requirements. Income should not fall below its current income classification prior to division or merger.

Abolition – When income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the

minimum standards prescribed

** Must specify where will the abolished LGU be combined **

E. De Facto Municipal Corporation – A corporation that may exist in fact although not point of law because of

certain defects in some essential features of its incorporation.

Requisites: - A valid law authorizing incorporation - An attempt in good faith to organize under it - A colorable compliance with the law - An assumption of corporate powers

** If an LGU has been created by a void law but was recognized and treated as a valid political subdivision for a long period of time, it is a De Jure Municipal Corporation ** Pelaez vs Auditor General Since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding" provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. Municipality of Jimenez vs Borja (Baz) The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired far its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence.



Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., §442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Tobias vs Abalos Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Manda-luyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) “should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.” Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

F. Attack against the validity of incorporations Malabang vs Benito An inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding f or quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a f ew exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporation. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.



In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case ac bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no off ice; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Municipality of San Narciso vs Mendez The special civil action of quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.” When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding. It must be brought “in the name of the Republic of the Philippines” and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal “when directed by the President of the Philippines x x x.” Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action “at the request and upon the relation of another person” with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be “entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.” While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon. At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance



(adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Repre-sentatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts “organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Municipality of Candijay vs CA Respondent municipality’s situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State’s recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. III. General Powers and Attributes of LGUs

A. Sources of Power a. 1987 Philippine Constitution – Article X b. Statutes c. Charter

Where there is no express power in the charter if a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid [xxx] Where the subject attempts to regulate the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State. (Batangas CATV vs Romulo)

d. Doctrine of Self-government

Therefore, it appears clear that in a government in which the legislative power of the state is not omnipotent, and in which it is axiomatic that local self-government is not a mere privilege, but a matter of absolute political right, the existence of unlimited authority in the law making body to concentrate all the powers of local government in the state does not exist. (Judge Cooley and other American Jurist, Columbia Law Review)

*** Will only be applied if the state recognizes it ***

B. Classifications of Powers a. Express powers – Granted in express words b. Implied powers – Necessary or fairly implied in or incident to powers expressly granted c. Inherent powers – Essential, convenient, indispensable

i. To have perpetual succession



ii. To sue and be sued iii. To purchase, hold, and sell (For the benefit of the corporation) iv. To have common seal v. To make by-laws and ordinances (Government of the municipality)

d. Public or governmental powers – Agent of the state e. Private or proprietary – Stands for the community f. Intramural Powers – Within the corporate limits of the municipal corporation g. Extramural Powers – Protection of water supply, prevention of nuisance, and also police forces h. Mandatory Powers – Exercise of which is required i. Discretionary Powers – May or may not be performed

C. Governmental Powers

a. General Welfare i. To be exercised

1. Powers expressly granted 2. Those necessarily implied 3. Powers necessary 4. Powers appropriate 5. Powers incidental for its efficient and effective governance 6. Powers essential to the promotion of general welfare

ii. Limitations 1. Preservation and enrichment of culture 2. Promote health and safety 3. Enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology 4. Encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific

and technological capabilities 5. Improve public morals 6. Enhance economic prosperity and social justice 7. Promote full employment among their residents 8. Maintain peace and order 9. Preserce comfort and convenience of their inhabitants

Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority – NOT VALID EXERCISE

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance to be valid:

1. Must not contravene the constitution or any statute 2. Must not be unfair or oppressive 3. Must not be partial or discriminatory 4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade 5. Must not be unreasonable 6. Must be general and consistent with public policy

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid deligation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.



Tatel vs Municipality of Virac – VALID EXERCISE

For an ordinance to be be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance

1. Must not contravene the constitution or any statute 2. Must not be unfair or oppressive 3. Must not be partial or discriminatory 4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade 5. Must not be unreasonable 6. Must be general and consistent with public policy

Ordinance No. 13 series of 1952, meets these criteria.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties Corporation – NOT VALID EXERCISE

The court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the Casino. We share the view that “the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman and that habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin.” In People vs Gorostiza, we declared: The social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit. George Washington called gambling “the child of avarice, the brother or iniquity and the father of mischief. Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in PD 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the local government code. That decision can be revoked by this court only if it contravenes the constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravene here.

Tayaban vs People - NOT VALID EXERCISE

[xxx] The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of a law, particularly of the provisions of section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019.

Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisance per se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Petitioners claim that the public market would pose danger to the safety and health of school children it it were built on the place being contested. However, petitioners never made known their supposed concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law in their own hands and precipitately demolished the subject structures that were built without the benefit if any hearing or consultation with the proper authority, which in this case is the CEB.

Parayno vs Jovellanos – NOT VALID EXERCISE

A local government is considered to have properly exercies its police powers only when the following requisites are met:



1. The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and

2. The mans employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.

The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the constitution.

Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatementt of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.

Rural Bank of Makati vs Municipality of Makati - VALID EXERCISE (DOCTRINE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT)

Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner bank’s closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the Court of Appeals is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917. Since then it has been reenacted and implemented by new statutes on the matter. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipality’s exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned.

The general welfare clause has two branches.

1. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.

2. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.

In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause.

Batangas CATV vs CA – NOT VALID EXERCISE

Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, Local Government Units can perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise powers that are:

1. expressly granted; 2. necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted; 3. necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and 4. essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. (Pimentel, The Local Government

Code of 1991, p. 46)

The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and



order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling, the occupation of rig drivers, the installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of cockpits, the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, and the operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses as valid exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general welfare clause.

Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan, Justice Moreland said: “An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right.” In De la Cruz vs. Paraz, we laid the general rule “that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.”

Tano vs Socrates - VALID EXERCISE

[xxx] under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to “[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing… and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance

Lim vs Pacquing – VALID EXERCISE

[xxx] PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.

The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:

The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA – VALID EXERCISE

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,



obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

Binay vs Domingo - VALID EXERCISE

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

[xxx] Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, “the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (section 9, Article II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (section 5) social justice (section 10) as well as human diginity and respect for human rights.”

The care for the poor is generally recognized as public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

Villacorta vs Bernardo – NOT VALID EXERCISE

Ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.



In this prolix age, practically everything a person does and owns affects the public interest directly or at least vicariously, unavoidably drawing him within the embrace of the police power. Increasingly, he is hemmed in by all manner of statutory, administrative and municipal requirements and restrictions that he may find officious and even oppressive.

We therefore urge that proper care attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called “general welfare” is too amorphous and convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness.

This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause.

Terrado vs CA - NOT VALID EXERCISE

Indeed, the Ordinance is clearly against the provisions of the law for it granted exclusive fishery privileges to the private respondent without benefit of public bidding. Under the Fisheries Act, the Municipalty may not delegate to a private individual as Manager-Administrator to “use or dispose of the fisheries portion in accordance with the general law on municipal waters” nor to charge fees for fishing and hunting in the park, much less sell forest products, wild games and fish from the area.

Neither can the Municipality grant the exclusive privilege of fishing for a period more than five (5) years, whereas in the instant case, the period granted the Manager-Administrator was for twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five years.

We cannot sustain the above holding in view of Our holding in the case of Nepomuceno, et al. vs. Ocampo, et al., supra, wherein We held that the only purpose in the enactment of Republic Act 659 which required the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to approve municipal ordinances pertaining to fishing or fisheries within 30 days after submission of the ordinance, rule or regulation is simply to expedite prompt action by the Department Chief concerned. Since Ordinance No. 8 granted fishery privileges exclusively to the private respondent without benefit of public bidding and for a period exceeding five (5) years, the said ordinance and the contract of management executed in accordance therewith were null and void ab initio, such that the failure of the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources to disapprove the same within 30 days from its submission does not render validity to the illegal legislation of the municipal council nor to the contract executed under the same.

Matalin Coconut vs Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur- NOT VALID EXERCISE

However, the tax imposed under the ordinance can be stricken down on another ground. According to Section 2 of the abovementioned Act, the tax levied must be “for public purposes, just and uniform” (Italics supplied.) As correctly held by the trial court, the so-called “police inspection fee” levied by the ordinance is “unjust and unreasonable.”

Said the court a quo: “x x x It has been proven that the only service rendered by the Municipality of Malabang, by way of inspection, is for the policeman to verify from the driver of the trucks of the petitioner passing by at the police checkpoint the number of bags loaded per trip which are to be shipped out of the municipality based on the trip tickets for the purpose of computing the total amount of tax to be collect (sic) and for no other purpose. The pretention of respondents that the police, aside from counting the number of bags shipped out, is also inspecting the cassava flour starch contained in the bags to find out if the said cassava flour starch is fit for human consumption could not be given credence by the Court because, aside from the fact that said purpose is not so stated in the ordinance in question, the policemen of said municipality are not competent to determine if the cassava flour starch are fit for human consumption. The further pretention of respondents that the trucks of the petitioner hauling the bags of cassava flour starch from the mill to the bodega at the beach of Malabang are escorted by a policeman from the police checkpoint to the beach for the purpose of protecting the truck and its cargoes from molestation by undesirable elements could not also be given credence by the Court because it has been shown, beyond doubt, that the petitioner has not asked for the said police protection because there has been no occasion where its trucks have been molested, even for once, by bad



elements from the police checkpoint to the bodega at the beach, it is solely for the purpose of verifying the correct number of bags of cassava flour starch loaded on the trucks of the petitioner as stated in the trip tickets, when unloaded at its bodega at the beach. The imposition, therefore, of a police inspection fee of P. 30 per bag, imposed by said ordinance is unjust and unreasonable.

Quezon City vs Ericta - NOT VALID EXERCISE

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Velasco vs Villegas - VALID EXERCISE

Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.” This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.” As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionally of such ordinance.

2. Basic Services and Facilities (Section 17, RA 7160)

(a) Local government units shall endeavour to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:



BARANGAY MUNICIPALITY PROVINCE CITY

(i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and operation of farm produce collection and buying stations;

(ii) Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health center and day-care center;

(iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection;

(iv) Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay;

(v) Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems;

(vi) Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall, multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center, and other similar facilities;

(vii) Information and reading center; and

(viii) Satellite or public market, where viable;

(i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other seedling materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality control of copra and improvement and development of local distribution channels, preferably through cooperatives; interbarangay irrigation system; water and soil resource utilization and conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves;

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects;

(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title

(i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock markets, animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in the organization of farmers and fishermen's cooperatives, and other collective organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology;

(ii) Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology;

(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydroelectric projects for local purposes;

(iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include hospitals and other tertiary health services;

(v) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on

All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition thereto, the following:

(1) Adequate communication and transportation facilities;

(2) Support for education, police and fire services and facilities;



Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services, access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated;

(iv) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth welfare, family and community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the elderly and disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services;

(v) Information services which include investments and job placement information systems, tax and marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library;

(vi) Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or facilities related to

rebel returnees and evacuees; relief operations; and population development services;

(vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas and similar facilities;

(vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residence of the province and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities;

(viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except those funded by the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System p. 172 (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That national funds for these programs and projects shall be equitably allocated among the regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the population;

(ix) Investment support services, including access to credit financing;

(x) Upgrading and modernization of



general hygiene and sanitation;

(vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks, playgrounds, and other sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities;

(viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development, rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage, and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities;

(ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises;

tax information and collection services through the use of computer hardware and software and other means;

(xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines; and

(xii) Tourism development and promotion programs;



(x) Public cemetery;

(xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and security services for such facilities; and

(xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations and municipal jail;

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the national government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs, and services.

(d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of equipment and materials at P170 from both foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines.

(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code.

As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

(f) The national government or the next higher level of local government unit may provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants.



(g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from the share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues and funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and maintain such services or facilities. Any fund or resource available for the use of local government units shall be first allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities enumerated in subsection (b) hereof before applying the same for other purposes, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

(h) Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to local government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one (1) year from the approval of this Code. Said national agencies and offices may establish such field units as may be necessary for monitoring purposes and providing technical assistance to local government units. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional offices shall be distributed to the local government units in the region in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the oversight committee created under this Code.

(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities.

Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, That the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.

(j) To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, local government units may, by ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public economic enterprises owned by them in their proprietary capacity.

Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in this Section.



Albon vs Fernando

The implementing rules of PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, provide that it is the registered owner or developer of a subdivision who has the responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the concerned LGU. The owner or developer shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon securing a certificate of completion and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the LGU. Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently and effectively provide basic services and facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU and “which are funded out of municipal funds.” It particularly refers to “municipal roads and bridges” and “similar facilities.” Applying the rules of ejusdem generis, the phrase “similar facilities” refers to or includes infrastructure facilities like sidewalks owned by the LGU. Thus, RA 7160 contemplates that only the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local government funds.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. One of the “whereas clauses” of PD 1216 (which amended PD 957) declares that open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. In conjunction herewith, PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public. Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the exercise of the City of Marikina’s police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks. However, both the trial and appellate courts erred when they invoked our 1991 decision in White Plains Association and automatically applied it in this case.

Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities.

White Plains Association vs CA

Even assuming that in spite of its dimensions, the 18-meter wide and 1 kilometer long undeveloped area may be used for public purpose other than C-5, QCDFC contends in this petition that just compensation will have to be paid for it. As stated by QCDFC, this is because the area has never been donated; title remains with the developer; the purpose for which the reservation was made can no longer be implemented; and under the law, even indisputably, subdivision streets belong to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.

Same; Same; It is wrong to accept as settled the doctrine still not clearly resolved that a subdivision developer may be forced to donate a street to the city against the owner’s will.—It may be noted that the respondent court called attention to the fact that the dictum in White Plains Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi found in the published reports had been modified on the basis of a second motion for reconsideration. It is wrong to accept as settled the doctrine still not clearly resolved that a subdivision developer may be forced to donate a street to the city against the owner’s will. Conclusively so, if the road to be donated was intended for a national highway which has been since abandoned. This is not what this Court finally promulgated in that case.



League of Provinces of the Philippines vs DENR

The DENR Secretary’s power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.53 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control” over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law. In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary of Health,54 which held: The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.

3. Power to Generate and Apply resources


Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.


Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.


Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

To establish an organization that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program objectives and priorities

To create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by them

To have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to then without need of any further action – No condition must be imposed before the share be released.

To have an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions – Sharing by way of direct benefits

To acquire develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity

To apply their resources and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes – Governmental or proprietary powers and functions



Philippine Petroleum Corporation vs Municipality of Pililla

As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial court did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority (Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, 18 SCRA 488 [1966]). Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 SCRA 121 [1983]). Thus, in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As already stated, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an exemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee like the mayor's permit, shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation under the provisions of the Code.

Basco vs PAGCOR

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Estanislao vs Costales

Consequently even after the prescribed period has lapsed, should the Secretary of Finance, upon review, find that the tax or fee levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory, or not among those that the particular local government may impose in the exercise of its power in accordance with this Code; or when the tax ordinance is, in whole or in part, contrary to the declared national economic policy; or when the ordinance is discriminatory in nature on the conduct of business or calling or in restraint of trade, the Secretary of Finance may certainly suspend the effectivity of such ordinance and revoke the same, without prejudice to the right to appeal to the courts within 30 days after receipt of the notice of suspension. The same rule should apply to the provincial and city treasurers, as the case may be, under Section 44 of the Local Tax Code.

Drilon vs Lim

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs Marcos

The “airports” referred to are the “Lahug Air Port” in Cebu City and the “Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu,” which belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO).

It may be reasonable to assume that the term “lands” refer to “lands” in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a “transfer” of the “lands,” among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines.

This “transfer” is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner’s authorized capital stock consists of, inter alia, “the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports.” Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Section 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable.



Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.

Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, even if it be conceded to be an “agency” or “instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner.

GSIS vs City Treasurer of Manila

In sum, the Court finds that GSIS enjoys under its charter full tax exemption. Moreover, as an instrumentality of the national government, it is itself not liable to pay real estate taxes assessed by the City of Manila against its Katigbak and Concepcion-Arroceros properties. Following the "beneficial use" rule, however, accrued real property taxes are due from the Katigbak property, leased as it is to a taxable entity. But the corresponding liability for the payment thereof devolves on the taxable beneficial user. The Katigbak property cannot in any event be subject of a public auction sale, notwithstanding its realty tax delinquency. This means that the City of Manila has to satisfy its tax claim by serving the accrued realty tax assessment on MHC, as the taxable beneficial user of the Katigbak property and, in case of nonpayment, through means other than the sale at public auction of the leased property.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs Quezon City

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and “exclusively” is defined, “in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.” If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business name “Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.” Indeed, the petitioner’s evidence shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.

NAPOCOR vs Province of Quezon

The test of exemption is the nature of the use, not ownership, of the subject machineries

As applied to the present case, the government-owned or controlled corporation claiming exemption must be the entity actually, directly, and exclusively using the real properties, and the use must be devoted to the generation and transmission of electric power. Neither the NPC nor Mirant satisfies both requirements. Although the plant’s machineries are devoted to the generation of electric power, by the NPC’s own admission and as previously pointed out, Mirant – a private corporation – uses and operates them. That Mirant operates the machineries solely in compliance with the will of the NPC only underscores the fact that NPC does not actually, directly, and exclusively use them. The



machineries must be actually, directly, and exclusively used by the government-owned or controlled corporation for the exemption under Section 234(c) to apply.

Lastly, from the points of view of essential fairness and the integrity of our tax system, we find it essentially wrong to allow the NPC to assume in its BOT contracts the liability of the other contracting party for taxes that the government can impose on that other party, and at the same time allow NPC to turn around and say that no taxes should be collected because the NPC is tax-exempt as a government-owned and controlled corporation. We cannot be a party to this kind of arrangement; for us to allow it without congressional authority is to intrude into the realm of policy and to debase the tax system that the Legislature established. We will then also be grossly unfair to the people of the Province of Quezon and the Municipality of Pagbilao who, by law, stand to benefit from the tax provisions of the LGC.

MIAA vs CA

When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments, and when Congress grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality

The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; x x x. (Emphasis supplied) This exemption should be read in relation with Section 133(o) of the same Code, which prohibits local governments from imposing “[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities x x x.” The real properties owned by the Republic are titled either in the name of the Republic itself or in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the National Government. The Administrative Code allows real property owned by the Republic to be titled in the name of agencies or instrumentalities of the national government. Such real properties remain owned by the Republic and continue to be exempt from real estate tax.

The Republic may grant the beneficial use of its real property to an agency or instrumentality of the national government, an arrangement which does not result in the loss of the tax exemption

Portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax. In such a case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such land area for a consideration to a taxable person and therefore such land area is subject to real estate tax. In Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, 433 SCRA 119, 138 (2004), the Court ruled: Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Section 130, RA 7160 – Fundamental principles in the taxing power:

1. Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit 2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

a. Be equitable and based as far as practicable on the tax payer’s ability to pay b. Be levied and collected only for public purposes c. Not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory d. Not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy or in restraint f trade

3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person



4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein.

5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable evolve a progressive system of taxation

Section 305, RA 7160 – Fundamental principles in the fiscal administration:

1. No money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriations ordinance or law; 2. Local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes; 3. Local revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance, and collection thereof

shall at all times be acknowledged properly; 4. All monies officially received by a local government officer in any capacity or on any occasion shall be accounted

for as local funds, unless otherwise provided by law; 5. Trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out except in fulfillment of the purpose for which the trust was

created or the funds received; 6. Every officer of the local government unit whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of local

funds shall be properly bonded, and such officer shall be accountable and responsible for said funds and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of law;

7. Local governments shall formulate sound financial plans, and local budgets shall be based on functions, activities, and projects, in terms of expected results;

8. Local budget plans and goals shall, as far as practicable, be harmonized with national development plans, goals, and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid duplication in the use of fiscal and physical resources;

9. Local budgets shall operationalize approved local development plans; 10. Local government units shall ensure that their respective budgets incorporate the requirements of their

component units and provide for equitable allocation of resources among these component units; 11. National planning shall be based on local planning to ensure that the needs and aspirations of the people as

articulated by the local government units in their respective local development plans are considered in the formulation of budgets of national line agencies or offices;

12. Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the local government units; and

13. The local government unit shall endeavor to have a balanced budget in each fiscal year of operation.

4. Power of Eminent Domain - In accordance with the Constitution and statutes. - Not absolute - For public use, purpose, welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless

Procedure:

- Must be done thru a valid ordinance - There must be an offer presented to the owner – Which is not accepted. - Filing of an expropriation proceedings - 15% of the fair current market value of the property (Time of expropriation) – DEPOSIT

Lagcao vs Labra

[xxx] Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.



There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power:

1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws

2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the expropriation of a private individual’s property. The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined. In De Knecht vs. Bautista, we said: It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, “Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity. x x x. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated.

Expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted

Moday vs CA – Applicable is BP 337

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.

The necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character—government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

Limitations of the exercise of the power of eminent domain:

1. Use must be public 2. Compensation must be made 3. Due process must be observed 4. Adequacy of compensation 5. Necessity of the taking 6. Public use character or purpose of the taking 7. Must be genuine and of a public character 8. May not capriciously choose what private property should be taken

Municipality of Parañaque vs VM Realty Corp

A Local Government Unit (LGU) may exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:



1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

[xxx] The previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.

Municpal Ordinance Municipal Resolution

- Is a law - Possesses a general and permanent character - A third reading is necessary for an ordinance

- Is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter - Is temporary in nature - By a majority of all the Sanggunian members

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of “law of the case.”

Republic vs. De Knecht

the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

The City of Cebu vs Dedamo

Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the Government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.

[xxx] just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines



Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, “Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare.”

It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 S Ct. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete witnin its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.

Local government units can expropriate agricultural lands without prior authority from the Department of Agrarian Reform as the determination of the public use of the property subject for expropriation is considered an expression of legislative policy.

The fixing of just compensation in expropriation proceedings shall be made in accordance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and not on the basis of the valuation declared in the tax declaration of the subject property by the owner or assessor which has been declared unconstitutional.

Ciy of Mandaluyong vs Aguilar

Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order:

1) government lands

2) alienable lands of the public domain

3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands

4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired

5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired

6) privately-owned lands.

City of Iloilo vs Legaspi

The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows:

1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance

2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.

Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial.



5. Reclassification of Lands

Requisites:

1. Valid ordinance 2. Public hearings conducted for the purpose

Lands that can be validly reclassified:

1. Ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determinded by DA

2. Have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes as determined by the Sanggunian

Percentage Limitations of total agricultural land area:

1. 15% - HUCs, Independent component cities 2. 10% - Component cities, 1st to 3rd class municipalities 3. 5% - 4th to 6th class of municipalities

** May Exceed percentage limits IF Public interest requires upon recommendation by NEDA – by the President **

- Comprehensive land plans – To consider – Food production, human settlements, industrial expansion

- Approval by national agency (REQUIRED) – If failed to act within 3months from receipt will be deemed as approved.

Laynesa vs Sps Uy

Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA 7160, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in question for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following reasons: (1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Likewise settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 was filed by the tenants of an agricultural land for threatened ejectment and its redemption from respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such being the case, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR. It bears stressing that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Primary jurisdiction means in case of seeming conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts, preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise and experience in agrarian reform matters. Sec. 50 is also explicit that except for the DA and DENR, all agrarian reform matters are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR.

Ayala Land Inc vs Castillo

The document submitted by petitioners being a mere resolution and not an ordinance, it cannot support their application for conversion. Even assuming arguendo that the Sangguniang Bayan of Silang passed an ordinance to the effect, still such reclassification would be legally infirm. Memorandum Circular No. 54 “Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of RA 7160 Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses” issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 8,



1993 specified the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses.

The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute and the reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure. The exclusion of agricultural lands already covered by CARP from the operation of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 was reiterated in the statement of policies and governing principles of DAR AO No. 12, Series of 1994 which expressly directs the DAR not to give due course to applications for conversion of lands already issued a Notice of Acquisition.

Fortich vs Corona (Sorry, but this case is very very confusing on my part)

While it may be true that on its face the nullification of the “Win-Win– Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: “Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.– In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit.

Roxas & Co Inc. vs CA

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Department of Agrarian Reform’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of certain landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate over the landowner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural.

“Land Use” refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management. “Land Use Conversion” refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the special training and expertise of the DAR.

Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner’s application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.

DAR vs Saranggani Agricultural Inc.

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that DAR’s scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limited to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Alabel, the local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive land use plans in



evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local government for non-agricultural uses.

This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier, said application is subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is present here is that a portion of respondents’ property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas and coconuts, are covered by CARL’s ten-year deferment scheme, which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of the tenyear period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents’ properties are located. In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sarangani Agricultural Co., Inc. effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

6. Closure and Opening of Roads - Must be thru a valid Ordinance - May be:

Temporary – Mayor’s permit is sufficient - PURPOSE: Emergency, fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or

industrial fairs, undertaking of DPWH, Telecom, Waterworks

Athletic, cultural or civic activities officially sponsored by the LGU

Where shopping malls, Sunday, flea/night markets may be established for the general public

- Duration must be specified

Permanent a. PERMANENT, must be 2/3 approved by majority of Sangguniang members. b. PERMANENT CLOSURE, must provide for a substiture

- What can be closed or opened? – Within LGU’s territorial jurisdiction

Road

Alley

Park

Square - NO freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation

to a new site. - Once permanently withdrawn from public use, may be used for other purposes provided it is

lawful

New Sun Valley Homeowners’ Association Inc. vs Sangguniang Barangay, Brgy Sun Valley Parañaque City

On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:

Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.—(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.



Cabrera vs CA

In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the power of the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets and withdraw them from public use was also assailed. This Court said: x x x So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council’s act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board, there is no reason for not applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

One whose property does not abut on the closed section of the street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has access to the general system of streets.

Dacanay vs Asistio

As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Mayor Robles’ Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve.—The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del ‘96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles’ Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents had started to look for feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.

Pilapil vs CA

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces, cities or municipalities. They are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the same character. Under the applicable law in this case, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them.

Macasiano vs Diokno

However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.



These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent municipality can “use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed” in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code.

[xxx] those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.

7. Local legislative power

Sangguniang Panlalawigan - Provinces Sangguniang Panlungsod - City Sangguniang Bayan - Municipality Sangguniang Barangay – Barangay

Presiding officer = Vices – To vote only if there is a tie

- Inability of the Vice, members will elect a temporary – IF an ordinance was created, must sign it

Internal rules of procedure – Within 90days after election of members

Organization

Election of officers

Creation of committees – Appropriation, women and family, human rights, youth and sports development, environmental protection, cooperatives. (GENERAL JURISDICTION, Chairman and members)

Calendar of business per session

Legislative process

Parliamentary procedures – Conduct of members

Discipline of members – 4 consecutive session of being absent. o Punishment:

Censured Reprimanded Exclusion from session Max 60days suspension – Must have at least 2/3 votes of all members Expelled – Must have at least 2/3 votes of all members. Automatic – Convicted by final judgement of a crime involving moral turpitude for at least 1yr

I. Products of legislation – Ordinances, Resolutions II. Requisites of validity – Same as requisites of a valid ordinance



III. Approval of ordinances

- Must be presented to the provincial governor / Municipal mayor - If approved – Must signed in each page - May be vetoed – Must be returned to the sangguniang concerned with

objections by chief executive

15 days from receipt – Province FAILURE to return will be deemed as approved

10 days from receipt – Municipality or City

May be vetoed by reason of ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare

Can be done only ONCE - Veto may be override – 2/3 votes of all its members. If not override, cannot take

effect. - Barangay – Approval by majority of its members only. To be signed by Brgy

Chairman *Brgy Chairman doesn’t have a veto power*

La Carlotta City, Negros Occidental vs Rojo

RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod “shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “composed of” as “formed of” or “consisting of.” As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a “member” of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a “member” of the Sanggunian. The Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155 (Local Government Code) show the intent of the Legislature to treat the vice-mayor not only as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod but also as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod

Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself).8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power



to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

Social Justice Society vs Mayor Atienza

The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., 202 SCRA 779 (1991), we stated the reason for this: These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

De Los Reyes vs Sandiganbayan

Contrary to petitioner’s belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.

IV. Review by Sangguniang panlalawigan - 3 days from approval – Secretary to submit for review to Sangguniang

Panlalawigan - Within 30 days from receipt shall examine – After, to be sent to provincial

attorney/provincial prosecutor for prompt examination - Within 10 days from receipt – Provincial attorney/prosecutor must return with

his comments - Any action must be entered in the minutes - Ordinance may be invalidated in whole OR in part - FAILURE to approve or disapprove within 30 days from receipt – Deemed

approved



V. Review of barangay ordinances - Within 10 days from enactment – Submit copies to Sangguniang

panlungsod/bayan as the case may be for review - Within 30days from receipt – Must return submission with their comments if it

be found to be inconsistent with the law - FAILURE of Sangguniang bayan/panlungsod to take action will be deemed as approved.

- Enforement/Effectivity is suspended until the revision be made. VI. Enforcement of disapproved ordinances/resolutions – Official enforcing may be

suspended or dismissed VII. Effectivity – 10 days from posting in bulletin board – Entrance of Provincial capitol,

Municipal hall, city hall, Brgy hall + in two other conspicuous places (To be posted by the

Secretary) - To be posted not later than 5 days upon approval - Posting must be in Filipino and English and Dialect of the place - Ordinances with penal sanctions must be posted in newspaper of

general circulation within the locality. - Absence of newspaper - Posting must be made in ALL

municipalities/Cities

- HUC/Component Cities - + Must be published once in a local

newspaper or newspaper of general circulation

8. Corporate powers a. Continuous succession (Corporate name)

Private – 50yrs

Public – None

b. To sue and be sued – See Rule on Insuability (Compare National to Local) c. To have and use a Corporate seal – Must be registered with DILG (even changes made) d. Acquire and convey real or personal property e. To enter into contracts – Must have prior authorization from Sanggunian concerned. Must

be posted at a conspicuous place f. To exercise other powers granted to corporations subject to limitations (LGC and

Corporation code) – Enjoys full autonomy in the exercise of proprietary function

City of Manila vs IAC

Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: “A municipal corporation proper has . . . a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article



423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws (Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).

Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v. de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga

Under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial . Und er t his n or m, to be consi dered p it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

Republic Act 3039 which provides that all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga, and located within the City of Zamboanga, are transferred to Zamboanga City free of charge, is valid insofar as it affects lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites, and the high school playground sites—a total of 24 lots—since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity they are, therefore, subject to the absolute control of Congress.

City of Cebu vs Cuizon

The suit is clearly not one brought by the plaintiffs in their personal capacity for the annulment of a particular contract entered into between two other contracting parties, in which situation article 1397 of the Civil Code may rightfully be invoked to question their legal capacity or interest to file the action, since they are not in such case in anyway obliged thereby principally or subsidiarily.

Article 1397 of the NCC

The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract.

The lower court's fundamental error was in treating plaintiff s' complaint as a personal suit on their own behalf and applying the test in such cases that plaintiffs should show personal interest as parties who would be benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Plaintiffs' suit is patently not a personal suit. Plaintiffs clearly and by the express terms of their complaint filed the suit as a representative suit on behalf and for the benefit of the city of Cebu.

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs CA

The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation

The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the



municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. “When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.

The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Ramos vs CA

As already stated, private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire private lawyers.

9. Authority to negotiate and secure grants - Approval of National government or higher LGU is not necessary to secure financial grants

and donations in kind – If reason is section 17 of LGC of 1991 – BUT project must be approved!

- 30 days from receipt of project for approval – FAILURE to act on the same deems an approval

- Within 30 days from signing of grant must report to Congress and President

IV. Municipal Liability Specific provisions making LGUs liable Article 189 of CC

Article 2180 of CC – Is this supposed to be Article 2189 of NCC?

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

Article 34 of NCC When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Section 24, RA 7160

Liability for damages – Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property



City of Manila vs Teotico

Where a person "fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue," which street is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila, the latter is liable for damages for the injuries suffered by the former. The liability of the City of Manila in the case at bar is governed by Article 2189 of the Civil Code which provides that: "Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision."

Jimenez vs City of Manila

In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former. The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public market was admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata. In fact, the City of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is-to take direct supervision and control of that particular market, more specifically, to check the safety of the place for the public.

As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasidelict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code). There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods, it must however, be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb under those difficult circumstances. For instance,. the drainage hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of on the passage ways. Even more important is the fact, that the City should have seen to it that the openings were covered. Sadly, the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell into the opening, it was already uncovered, and five (5) months after the incident happened, the opening was still uncovered. (Rollo, pp. 57; 69). Moreover, while there are findings that during floods the vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water (Decision, AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 17), there is no showing that such practice has ever been prohibited, much less penalized by the City of Manila. Neither was it shown that any sign had been placed thereabouts to warn passers-by of the impending danger.

Guilatco vs City of Dagupan

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2189 of the Civil Code is clear.

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

Liability for tort:

In Governmental function – Exempt

In proprietary function – Liable



Torio vs. Fontanilla

The municipal council managed the town fiesta. While the municipality was held liable, the councilors themselves are

not liable for the negligence of their employees or agents

Liability for illegal dismissal pf an employee

Liability of Local officials

Liability for violation of a law

Moday vs. CA

The Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, through the Mayor, was held in contempt and fined P1,000.00 with a

warning, because of the refusal of the Mayor to abide by a Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court

Liability for contracts

A municipal corporation, like an ordinary person, is liable on a contract it enters into, provided that the contract is intra vires. If the contract is ultra vires, the munipal corporation is not liable

A private individual who deals with a municipal corporation is imputed constructive knowledge of the extent of the power or authority of the municipal corporation to enter into contracts.

Ordinarily, therefore, the doctrine of estoppel does not lie against municipal corporation.

Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability

Applies where money or property has been received.

Province of Cebu vs. IAC

A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract

V. Local Officials

A. Prohibited business and pecuniary interest

Section 89, RA 7160

- Absolute prohibition - Others as provided by RA 6713 - Government official or employee - Directly or indirectly

Engage in any business transaction with the government where he is an official or employee or he has power of supervision. Funds of Government will be transferred to him

Hold interest in any games licensed by the LGU, ex: cockpits

Purchase real property or any property turned over to the LGU, ex: unpaid taxes

Be a surety for a person contracting business with the LGU when required for one

Possess or use of any public property of the LGU for private purposes



B. Practice of Profession

Section 90, RA 7160

- Absolute prohibition – Governors, City and municipal mayors - Prohibited to practice their profession or engage in any occupation OTHER than the exercise of their

functions - Sangguniang members – may practice profess and engage in any occupation EXCEPT during session

hours (as provided by the legislative calendar) - Sangguniang member which is also member of the bar are prohibited to:

Civil case – To appear as counsel against LGU, office, agency, or instrumentality (adverse party)

Criminal case – To appear as counsel against an officer or employee of the national or local government committed in relation to his office

Administrative proceedings – Collect fees for his appearance

Use of property and personnel of the government – EXCEPT: Depending the government’s interest

Doctors of medicine – During official hours – May practice in case of emergency as long as there’ll be no compensation for the same

Javellana vs DILG

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

C. Prohibitions agains appointment

Section 94, RA 7160

- What is prohibited – Double compensation - Elective or appointive - Not allowed for another appointed or designated position



- Allowed to be as an ex-officio member - Allowed if the law permits his functions - A Candidate who lost in any election EXCEPT barangay to be appointed within 1year after such

election

Section 6, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution

No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporrations in any of its subsidiaries.

Section 7, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution

No elective official shall be eligible fpr appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

D. Elective Officials 1. Qualifications

- Citizen of the Philippines - Registered voter in the brgy, municipality, city, province, district where he intends to be

elected for at least 1yr immediately preceeding the day of election - Able to read and write Filipino or any other language or dialect - Governor, Vice-governor, member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, mayor, vice-mayor or

member of the sangguniang panglunsod of HUCs – At least 23 y/o ON ELECTION DAY - Mayor, vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, municipalities –

At least 21 y/o ON ELECTION DAY - Member of the sangguniang panglunsod or bayan – At least 18 y/o ON ELECTION DAY - Punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay – At least 18 y/o ON ELECTION

DAY - Sangguniang kabataan – 15-21 y/o ON ELECTION DAY (WILL BE ABOLISHED, SK)

Salcedo vs COMELEC

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. – In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive he public as tp one’s identity, is not within the scope of the provision.

Maruhom vs COMELEC

It is true that Maruhom did make several requests for the cancellation of her Marawi registration, but without official action by the COMELEC thereon, they remain mere requests. They cannot simply be deemed granted. We take note that Maruhom’s first request for cancellation of her Marawi registration was submitted on 30 December 2003, and her next request was made only on 20 March 2007. Maruhom subsequently filed her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao on 28 March 2007. Far from convincing us that she had exercised due diligence in having her Marawi registration cancelled, we are more persuaded that Maruhom had not been assiduous in ensuring that her request for cancellation be acted upon by COMELEC. Maruhom’s reiteration of her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration on 20 March 2007, three years and three months since her first request, and just a week prior to the filing of her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao, reveals a harried attempt to comply with the eligibility requirements



for her candidacy than a sincere desire to right a wrong. COMELEC, thus, had more than enough basis to support its conclusion of Maruhom being a double registrant whose subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void, rendering her unfit to run as municipal mayor therein.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

[xxx] Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a separate qualification. The law abhors redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from citizenship), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter in the area or territory he seeks to govern, i.e the law states: “a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province xxx where he intends to be elected” It should be emphasized that the local government code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration – not the actual voting – is the cpre of this qualification. In other words, the law’s purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern – and not anywhere else.

2. Disqualifications - In any local position - Sentenced by final judgement – Offense involving moral turpitude OR for an offense

punishable by 1yr or more of imprisonment – Within 2yrs after serving sentence - Removed from office – Administrative case – Must occur in a single term - Convicted by final judgement for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic - Dual citizen - Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases - Permanent residents of a foreign country. Acquired a right to reside abroad - Insane or feeble-minded

*** Three-term limit rule = 3 FULL term served ***

Dela Torre vs COMELEC

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine”. In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in “Zari v. Flores, to wit:

“It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merelymala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in “International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.



Villaber vs COMELEC

As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”

[xxx] the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

[xxx] that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and “certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person….”

Moreno vs COMELEC

[xxx] Those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which , we reiterate should not be

equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the

2 year period of ineligibility under section 400 (a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.

It is important to note that the disqualification under section 40 (a) of the local government code covers offenses

punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the

provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This ommission is

significant because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not

covered by disqualification.

Mercado vs Manzano

[xxx] dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per sebut with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

3. Manner of Election - Members of Sanggunian:



First & Second class provinces – 10

3rd & 4th class provinces – 8

5th & 6th provinces – 6

Barngay – Shall be elected - Provinces with more than 5 Legislative district – 2 members/district - President of each sanggunian component city and municipality – Ex Officio members of

sangguniang panlalawigan concerned - President of each sangguniang brgy & SK – Ex Officio members of sanggunian

panlalawigan, panlungsod, bayan concerned - 1 Sectoral representative – Women, workers, (plus 1 from urban poor OR indigenous

cultural communities OR disabled persons OR any other sector as determined within 90 days prior to holding of election)

Ramas vs COMELEC

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.” The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, “to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers. [xxx]

In a nutshell, the following constitute “good reasons,” and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal:

(1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate;

(2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and

(3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.

The filing of a bond, which was mentioned in Tobon Uy, does not constitute a good reason, Nevertheless, the trial court may require the filing of a bond as a condition for the issuance of a corresponding writ of execution to answer for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer by reason of the execution pending appeal.

Fermo vs COMELEC

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal:

(1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate;

(2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and

(3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending (emphasis supplied).

Miranda vs COMELEC

‘That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates



because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.

Rulloda vs COMELEC

[xxx] the absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

4. Date of Election - Every 3 years - Every second Monday of May

5. Term of office

Section 43, RA 7160

(a) The term of office of all elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of barangay officials.


The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Borja vs COMELEC

There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to



the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, §8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory

Lonzanida vs COMELEC

[xxx] It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.

Sunga vs. COMELEC

That the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646

Effects of disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

Socrates vs COMELEC

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

[xxx] The winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office. [xxx]

Rivera vs COMELEC

This is the very situation in the instant case. Respondent Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.” Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely.”

Labo v. Comelec

This Court has ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus: The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate



receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Ong vs Alegre

[xxx] However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former.

Abundo Sr. vc COMELEC

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms

[xxx] three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).



3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

A “term,” as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal sense, “a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.” It also means the “time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office.

[xxx] An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension.68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word “renunciation” connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.

6. Rules on succession

Section 44, RA 7160

Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.



(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

Section 45, RA 7160

Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. – (a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;

(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan;

(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.

(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official responsible therefor.

(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.



(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.

Section 47, RA 7160

Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. – (a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.

(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents showing that said legal causes no longer exist.

(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall specify the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.

(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence of the said local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c) hereof.

(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be.

Victoria vs COMELEC

The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything about factoring the number of voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. [xxx]

Menzon vs Petilla



The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. x x x By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy occurring in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

Garvida vs Sales

The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election—the will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.—The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.

7. Resignation

Section 82, RA 7160

Resignation of Elective Local Officials. – (a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance by the following authorities:

(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;

(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities;

(3) The sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members; and

(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.

(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of the Interior and Local Government.

(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof.

(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records: Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such resignations.

8. Grievance procedure



Section 83, RA 7160

In every local government unit, the local chief executive shall establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or settle complaints and grievances presented by local government employees.

9. Disciplinary actions

Section 60, RA 7160

Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;

(e) Abuse of authority;

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

Section 61, RA 7160

Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. – A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and



(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.

Section 62, RA 7160

Notice of Hearing

(a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.

(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or highly urbanized city, such hearing and investigation shall be conducted in the place where he renders or holds office. For all other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where the sanggunian concerned is located.

(c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to any local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of aforesaid period.

Section 63, RA 7160

Preventive Suspension

(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;

(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or

(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.



(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.

(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority.

Section 64, RA 7160

Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. – The respondent official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension.

Section 65, RA 7160

Rights of Respondent. – The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

Section 66, RA 7160

Form and Notice of Decision

(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be furnished the respondent and all interested parties.

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.

(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.

Section 67, RA 7160

Administrative Appeals. – Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:



(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.

Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.

Section 68, RA 7160

Execution Pending Appeal. – An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.

Regidor vs Chiongbian

Salalima vs Guingona

Ganzon vs CA

Joson vs Executive Secretary

Garcia vs Mojica

Flores vs Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Pampanga

Constantino vs Disierto

Castillo-Co vs Barbers

Lapid vs CA

Bunye vs Escareal



Segovia vs Sandiganbayan

Rodriguez vs Sandiganbayan

Aguinaldo vs Santos

Pablico vs Villapando

public corporation notes

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