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ForewordThis volume is the first in a series which will record the experiences of the Quarter-

master Corps in World War II. It should serve to impress students of military affairs,particularly those in staff and command positions, with the vastness and complexity ofthe activity involved in equipping and maintaining troops in the field. It tells a story ofrapid expansion to meet the needs of a growing Army, of organizational readjustment inthe midst of operations, of supply programs scrapped or modified in the face of unex-pected demands, of improvisation and production under pressure when plans wereinadequate or Jacking. It clearly demonstrates the necessity in time of peace for a flexibleorganization, vision and care in planning, and a program of continuous military researchand development to meet the sudden impact of war.

ORLANDO WARDMaj. Gen., U. S. A.Chief of Military History

Washington, D. C15 March 1952

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Note on the History ofthe Quartermaster CorpsThis is the first volume of a group of four narrating the operation of the Quarter-master Corps in World War II. Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I, and its com-panion volume of the same title, Volume II , analyze activities in the zone of interior.Two other volumes, in preparation, describe Quartermaster operations in the war againstGermany and the war against Japan.Primarily this volume relates the story of Quartermaster supply during World WarII, a phase of the broader subject of military supply which has been much neglected inthe past in favor of the more colorful and dramatic combat history. As the main functionof the Corps, supply operations included the development of Quartermaster items, theestimation of requirements, the procurement of clothing, equipm ent, subsistence, andgeneral supplies, and their storage and distribution. These aspects of the supply process

are analyzed in this volume and set against the background of organizational changes inthe Office of The Quartermaster General and in the field.The author, Dr. Erna Risch, received her Ph. D. degree from the University ofChicago. After extensive teaching experience, she joined the staff of the Historical Sec-tion, Office of The Quartermaster General, in 1943. She has prepared a number ofhistorical studies that have been published by the Quartermaster Corps, in addition towriting the present volume.

THOMAS M. PITKINChief, Historical SectionOffice of The Quartermaster GeneralWashington, D. C.1 January 1952

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PrefaceSome three centuries ago Lion Gardener, in his Relation of the Pequot Warres, sagely

observed that "war is like a three-footed Stool, want on e foot and down comes all; an dthese three feet are men, victuals, and munitions." Nevertheless, until quite recently,military history has almost completely neglected problems of supply. The allocation ofvolumes for the series, UNITED STATES A RMY IN WORLD WAR II, promises amore balanced approach to the subject. There has been a generous assignment of volumesto the supply agencies of the Army, an d among these are four covering the activities ofthe Quartermaster Corps. Two of these, of which the present volume is the first, will bedevoted to operations of the Corps in the zone of interior.One of the oldest of all War Department agencies, the Quartermaster Corps, in spiteof the loss of some of its traditional functions, remained throughout World War II oneof the most important of the supply, or technical, services. In addition to its main missionof supplying broad categories of items needed by the Army, the Corps had, in the courseof its long existence, become responsible for a variety of services to troops in the field.The multiplicity of its activities made a chronological treatment of the war period prac-tically impossible. It was considered more advantageous to project a narrative whichwould first develop completely the supply operation of the Corps as its major function,then analyze personnel and training problems, and finally discuss the special servicesperformed by the Corps for the A rmy.

This volume begins but does not complete the analysis of Quartermaster supply,which is envisaged in broad terms as a continuous process starting with the developmentof military items and moving through the estimating of requirements, the procurementof supplies, their storage and distribution, the reclamation and salvage of items to easesupply, and the final process of industrial demobilization. This approach permitted afunctional treatment, although not all activitiesnotably the supply of subsistence andof fuels and lubricantswere organized functionally in the Office of The QuartermasterGeneral. Within the limits of each function a chronological development is followed.A history of Quartermaster activities in World War II could not begin with the attackon Pearl Harbor nor even with the declaration of the n ationa l emergency in 1939, formany of the Corps' policies were rooted in the years immediately following World War I.Primary emphasis is placed upon developments after December 1941, but, in summaryat least, the period covered extends from 1920 to August 1945.The historical program initiated by the Historical Section of the Office of The

Quartermaster General in the summer of 1942 laid the groundwork for a thorough anddetailed analysis of the supply function of the Corps. A vast amount of source materialwas examined and selections were, for the most part, photostated currently with the oper-ations being described and analyzed in the monographic series published by theHistorical Section during the war years. This collection of material and published mono-graphs, as well as the historical reports and monographs from historical units establishedat Quartermaster field installations and supervised by the Historical Section, provided aninvaluable body of m aterial for the more general treatment of supply in this volume. Itwas supplemented by additional research to provide more continuo us coverage of thesupply program of the Corps.

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Limitation of time has precluded any search into the records of other governmentalagencies with which the Quartermaster Corps co-operated during the war, as, forexample, the War Production Board. As a rule, however, sufficient interdepartmental cor-respondence has been available in Quartermaster files to permit objective treatment.Over-all supply of the Army was directed and co-ordinated by the Services of Supply,later renamed the Army Service Forces as a result of the reorganization of the War

Department in March 1942. While relationships with this higher echelon have been ex-plored, the point of view throughout this volume remains that of the QuartermasterCorps.The material obtained from the official records maintained in the central files of theOffice of The Quartermaster General has been supplemented by a wide use of interviews.Operating personnel were interviewed during the war years as a means of eking out thewritten record, which in many instances was meager, since transactions frequently werecompleted by telephone, and transcriptions of such conversations were not necessarilyavailable. Correspondence and interviews, in the years since the war ended, with some ofthe directors of Quartermaster wartime operations have also added to the record. Thememories of these directors may not always be precise as to their motives in a givenaction or with regard to the exact sequence of events. With due allowances made, theircomments were nevertheless fruitful in directing research into neglected areas, or inproviding explanations nowhere else obtainab le.

This volume was circulated in manuscript form before final editing and was greatlybenefited by the frank criticism accorded it by the wartime directors of the principaldivisions concerned with supply in the Office of The Quartermaster General and theirkey operators. They were most generous in reading relevant portions of the text and incommenting by letter or in personal interviews. These comm ents enabled the autho r tocorrect errors of fact, to include developments that had been inadvertently omitted, andto make such revisions as were warranted by re-examination of the record in the light ofthe criticism offered.

Throughout the preparation of this volume the author could and did rely heavilyupon the scholarly advice and assistance offered by the Chief of the Historical Section,Dr. Thomas M. Pitkin. Under his general direction work has been in progress since 1947no t only on this volume and its companion, which cover Quartermaster activities in thezone of interior, but also on two volumes dealing with Quartermaster overseas opera-tions. Throughout the years of her association w ith the program, the author has alsobeen indebted to her colleagues for their unfailing co-operation and help with problemsrelevant to their specialized fields. No acknowledgment would be complete without alarge vote of thanks to the assistants who toiled in the central and storage files of theOffice.

Thanks are also due the Editorial and Photographic Sections, Office of the Chief ofMilitary History. Final editing of the volume was carried out by Mr. W. Brooks Phillips,senior editor, assisted by Mrs. Loretto Stevens. Miss Margaret E. Tackley, photographiceditor, was most helpful in selecting the photographs and preparing them for the printer.Washington, D. C.1 January 1952 ERNA RISCH

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ContentsPart One: Administration

Chapter PageINTRODUCTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Status of Q M C i n 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Effect o f World W a r I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

I . ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1Expansion of the Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Transfer o f Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6General Reorganization after Pearl Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2Problems of Adjustment Under Office Order 84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Readjustments i n 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8Evolution of Functional-Commodity-Type Organisation, 1943-45 . . . . . 34Field Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8Relations with Other Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5

Part Two: SupplyI I . FACTORS SHAPING RESEARCH ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . 51

Influence of World War I Surplus Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Lack of Integrated Research Pro gram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Financial Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5Influence of Procurement Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Impact o f Global W a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7Effect of Materials Shortages on Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

III. T H E DEVELOPMENT O F ARMY CLOTHING . . . . . . . . . . 7 5Organization f o r Product Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5Development and Standardization Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86Winter Combat C l o t h i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8Summer Combat Clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7Jungle Combat Clothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9Combat Headgear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1Combat Footgear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 2Clothing fo r Women in the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110Textile and Leather Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1

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Chapter PageIV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL AND ORGANIZATIONALEQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3Personal Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3OrganizationalEquipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 8Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 2

V. THE DEVELOPMENT O F SUBSISTENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 4Administrative Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 5The Development of Special Rations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 7Development of Components of A and B Rations . . . . . . . . . . . . 192Development o f Packaging a n d Packing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 1Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 6

VI. FORECASTING WAR REQUIREMENTS FOR QUARTERMASTERSUPPLIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 8Administrative Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 9Theory o f Forecasting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2Elements in the Determination of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2Evolution of the Army Supply P r o g r a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221Quartermaster Contributions to Improved Techniques . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 4Development o f Supply Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 26Computation o f Task Force Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 9Overseas Requirements Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 0Subsistence Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 1Elements i n Subsistence Forecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 3Petroleum Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 8Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 2

VII. PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . 2 4 3The Quartermaster Supply System in 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 3W a r Procurement Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 6Developments i n Procurement Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 7Expansion o f Centralized Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 9Experimentation with Decentralized Procurement Operations . . . . . . . 251Streamlining Procurement Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 2Contract Placement Policies an d P r o b l e m s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5Special Procurement Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 9

VIII. PRODUCTION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 3Organization f o r Production Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 3Causes o f Contract Delinquency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 5Expediting Efforts of Contractors a nd Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287Flow o f Materials and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 8Production Planning a n d S c h e d u l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 1Other Aids f o r Expediting Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 3Inspection of Quartermaster Procurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 8

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Chapter PageIX. QUARTERMASTER STORAGE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 3Administrative Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 3Depot Storage Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 6Expansion o f Depot Storage Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 9Use of Commercial Storage Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 34Space Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 2Materials Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 7Packing O p e r a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5

X. STOCK CONTROL OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 0Supply Administration Prior t o 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 0Establishment of N ew Methods of Stock Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 364Stock Control System i n Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2Administrative Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 6Excess Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 9Disposal o f Surplus Property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 4

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 2LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 6INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 0

ChartsNo.1. The Quartermaster Corps in the War Department: 1941 . . . . . . . . 132. The Quartermaster Corps in the War Department: March 1942 . . . . . 253. Office of The Quartermaster General: 31 July 1942. . . . . . . . . . . 324. Office of The Quartermaster General: 15July 1944. . . . . . . . . . . 375. Research and Development Branch, OQMG: 16 June 1944 . . . . . . . 786. Quartermaster Board Shoe Test Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 827. Quartermaster Board Combat Course (1,700 Feet) . . . . . . . . . . 838. Principal Changes in K Ration Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1879. Supply Pipeline (Quartermaster Items) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

10. Quartermaster Corps Depot System: 1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33111. Quartermaster Corps Depot System: 1 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . 335

IllustrationsLt. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FrontispieceService Uniforms of 1918 and 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Utilization of the Layering Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

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PageField Jacket M-1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Combat Uniform with Hood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Footwear Developed by the Quartermaster Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Shoepacs and Wool Ski Socks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108The Original WAAC Uniform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Army Nurse Corps Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Nurse's Seersucker Uniform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Jungle Pack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Barracks Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128Duffel Bag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Intrenching Shovel M-1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135Combination Intrenching Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Filling Blitz Cans from Railroad Tank Car . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Field Range M-1937 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147Gasoline Cooking Stoves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148Small Detachment Cooking Outfit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15220-Man Cooking Outfit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Army Field Bake Oven No. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154Portable Repair Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162Ten-in-One Army Field Ration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190Dehydrated Food Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198Fork-Lift Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 8

All illustrations in this volume are from U. S. Department of Defense files.

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PART ONEADMINISTRATION


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IntroductoryHistorical Background

The Quartermaster Corps (QMC) is one ofthe oldest supply agencies of the W ar Depart-ment. Its origin can be traced to 16 June 1775,when the Continental Congress passed a reso-lution providing "that there be one quartermaster general for the grand army, and a deputy,under him, for the separate army."1 Known asthe Quartermaster's Department during its earlyexistence, it suffered many tribulations, includ-ing temporary extinction on more than oneoccasion, but the importance of its functionscompelled its re-establishment.

The mission of the Quartermaster organiza-tion has always been one of broad and variedservice to combat troops. From Revolutionarydays it was responsible until recent years for alltransportation and most construction, as well asfor the storage and issue of many types of sup-plies for the support of armies in the field,though at first it did not always procure its ownitems.

In the post-Revolutionary period, when theQuartermaster's Department was temporarilyabolished, the Secretary of War purchased sup-plies for the tiny peacetime army throughcivilian contractors. During the twenty yearsand more following the adoption of the Consti-tution, procurement of supplies was handled bya kaleidoscopic succession of quartermasters,contractors, and agents variously named, underthe direction, sometimes of the Treasury, some-times of the War Department.

The approach of war with England broughtabout the re-establishment of the departmentearly in the spring of 1812.2 While the Quarter-master General was given broad procurement

responsibilities, being authorized "to purchasemilitary stores, camp equipage and other articlesrequisite for the troops, and generally to procureand provide means of transport for the army, itsstores, artillery, and camp equipage," at thesame time Congress established a CommissaryGeneral of Purchases whose duty it was "toconduct the procuring and providing of allarms, military stores, clothing, and generally allarticles of supply requisite for the militaryservice of the United States."Under the stress of war the overlapping juris-dictions thus created, together with the absenceof specific provision for a subsistence depart-ment, soon brought confusion forcing remediallegislation. Congress authorized the Secretaryof War to define more precisely the responsibil-ities of the two agencies. Furthermore, whencontracting failures occurred and such actionwas deemed expedient by the President, theQuartermaster's Department might be author-ized to procure and issue subsistence directly inthe field.3In the overhauling of the supply system thatfollowed the War of 1812, the responsibilitiesof the office of the Comm issary General of Pur-chases were further delimited and reduced. TheOrdnance Department acquired the right ofprocurement in its own field in 1815. A separateSubsistence Department was created under itsow n Commissary General in 1818. Althoughthe office of the Commissary General of Pur-

1 Journals of the Continental Congress, edited byWorthington C. Ford et al. (34 vols, Washington:GPO, 1904-37), II, 94.2 U.S. Statutes at Large, II, 696-99, act approved 28Mar 1812.3 Ibid., II, 816-18, act approved 3 Mar 1813.


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4 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSchases remained in existence until 1842, itsremaining functions were gradually absorbed bythe Quartermaster's Department. In 1826 theDepartment acquired the additional responsi-bility of receiving from the purchasing depart-ment and distributing to the Army "all clothingand camp and garrison equipage required forthe use of the troops." By 1842, just before theMexican War, the Quartermaster organizationhad taken over complete responsibility for pro-curement and distribution to the field forces ofall noncombat supplies, except subsistence.4The duties of the Quartermaster Generalwere traditionally performed with the Army inthe field and had been generally considered toexist only in time of war. With the appoint-ment of Lt. Col. Thomas S. Jesup in 1818, how-ever, it was understood that the new Quarter-master General would establish his headquartersin Washington. Under his guidance the Depart-ment emerged as a permanent supply staffagency of the Secretary of War.5During the long administration of Quarter-master General Jesup, which lasted until thesummer of 1860, central and regional organiza-tion and facilities developed slowly. Field facil-ities were largely improvised during the earlyyears of the country's history, although the im-portance of established depots to the movementand distribution of supplies over long distances,as during the Indian campaigns, was recognizedon several occasions. In 1842, with the abolitionof the office of the Comm issary General of Pur-chases, the Quartermaster's Department ac-quired its principal depot, the SchuylkillArsenal. Under the name of the PhiladelphiaQuartermaster Depot, it became the cornerstoneof the great system of Quartermaster depots.There, for more than a hundred years armyclothing was procured and manufactured inpeace and war. A system of reserve and fielddepots was established during the Civil War,6and a number of these were retained at its close.In a sense, the modern development of the

Quartermaster organization began during theCivil War, with the problems incident to thisfirst experience of mobilization and war thatabsorbed a large part of the energy of the nation.To supervise and handle the expanding procure-ment and distribution operations, among otheractivities, and to direct the efforts of the manynewly established field installations, a com-modity-type organization was eventually estab-lished in the Quartermaster General's officewherein designated branches handled the pur-chase and distribution of one or more specifictypes of supplies provided for the troops.7 Allfunctions expanded enormously in the courseof the war, and new facilities and programs oflasting importance were set up in many fields.In 1862, for example, responsibility was as-sumed for the management of national ceme-teries and the interment of the bodies of wardead in these permanent locations.8In the thirty years following the Civil Warthere were no large-scale operations to provideincentive for maintaining an alert, progressiveagency and the Quartermaster's Departmentmerely drifted. With the outbreak of the Span-ish-American War, however, the Departmentwas suddenly called upon to clothe and equipmore than a quarter of a million men in contrastto the peacetime force of only 26,000. Under thestrain of mobilization, supply broke down.Troops were sent to the tropics in winter uni-forms, an d congestion of men and supplies atPort Tampa, the port of embarkation for oper-

4 Ibid., III, 203, act approved 8 Feb 1815. Ibid., III,426-27, act approved 14 Apr 1818. Ibid., IV, 173-74,act approved 18 May 1826. Ibid., V, 513, act approved23 Aug 1842.5 Thomas M. Pi tkin, "Evolution of the Quarter-master Corps, 1775-1950," Quartermaster Review, XXX(May-June 1950), 104ff. Quartermaster Review is here-after cited as QMR.6 U.S. Statutes at Large, XIII, 394-98, act approved

4 Jul 1864.7 Ibid., XIII, 394-95.8 Ibid., XII, 596, act approved 17 Jul 1862. Ibid.,XIII, 394-98, act approved 4 Jul 1864.


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INTRODUCTORY 5ations in Cuba, defied description. The Subsist-ence Dep artm ent, responsible fo r feeding th eArmy, was equally unprepared for the task con-fronting it .The investigations and recommendations thatfollowed the war resulted in the enactment in1912 of legislation 9 consolidating the ArmySubsistence, Pay, and Quartermaster's Depart-ments. Prior to 1912 the Quartermaster's De-partment had acquired responsibility for thesupply of clothing, camp and garrison equip-ment, individual equipment, and general sup-plies for the Army, the transportation of theArmy, the handling of construction and realestate activities, the operation of utilities atcamps and stations, and certain miscellaneousactivities, including the administration of na-tional cemeteries. As a result of the merger ofthe three supply organizations, the newly desig-nated Quartermaster Corps also acquired re-sponsibility for feeding and paying the Army.The period from the summer of 1912 to early1917 probably was the high-w ater mark in thehistory of the Corps with respect to the merenumber of important supply an d service func-tions for which it had general responsibilitythroughout the War Department.Impact of World War I

When World War I began, the Office of theQuartermaster General (OQMG) was still or-ganized on a commodity basis. The office con-sisted of five divisionsAdministrative, Financeand Accounting, Construction and Repair,Transportation, and Supplieswhose functionswere largely administrative and supervisory.The operations of procurement and distributionwere decentralized to the field. The actual dis-tribution of supplies was accomplished by thepost and camp quartermasters who submittedrequisitions to the qu artermasters of the terri-torial departments into which the country wasdivided for administrative purposes. They, in

turn, approved and forwarded the requisitionsto the depot quartermasters who procured,stored, and issued supplies on the basis of theserequisitions. There were seven general depotsand certain other specialized depots designatedas points of supply. The procurement of certainclasses of supplies was centralized in specificdepots, as, for examp le, clothing at the Phila-delphia Depot an d wagons an d harness at theJeffersonville Depot. Thus a degree of "cen-tralized decentralization" prevailed in this sup-ply system. Most of the depots acted independ-ently of each other because of the policy ofdecentralization. The purchase of subsistencewas even more decentralized since it was carriedon "as near to the points of consumption as wasconsistent with advantage to the Govern-ment." 10There was nothing wrong with this organiza-tion itself, but decentralization of purchase couldnot continue under the economic strain ofmanufacturing for the Allies, for the govern-ment, and for the civilian population. Further-more, in the absence of effective co-ordination,the QMC, as well as every other supply bureau,sought to accomplish its task independently ofal l other agencies. In the ensuing competitionoccasioned by shortages of materials, facilities,and transportation, supply difficulties increasedand the need for a centralized control to directthe war effort became evident.

Moreover, as the Army grew in size, thetendency was to m ultiply the num ber of sepa-rate bureaus to carry out expanded functions.Responsibility for construction was transferredfrom the Corps to a new and separate Canton-ment Division. Similarly, th e duties of watertransportation were taken over by the Embarka-tion Service.In an effort to secure greater efficiency andco-ordination, the War Department reorganized

9 Ibid., XXXVII, 591, act approved 24 Aug 1912.10 Report of the Quartermaster General to the Secretaryof War, 1919 (Washington: GPO, 1920), pp . 9-10.


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6 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSthe supply bureaus. These agencies, includingthe QMC, were temporarily absorbed by theGeneral Staff in special divisions that were or-ganized along functional lines. At the end ofthe war, the QMC was a part of the Purchase,Storage and Traffic Division.

Once again the shortcomings revealed bywar,and particularly the failure to plan in advancefor mobilization, led to the enactment of reme-dial legislation. Under one of the provisions ofthe National Defense Act of 1920, the QMCwas re-established as a separate supply service,and the functions of transportation and con-struction were restored to the Corps. On theother hand, the pay function of the Corps wastransferred permanently to a separate jurisdic-tion.11Administrative Developments, 1920-39

When the National Defense Act of 1920abolished the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Di-vision and restored the functions of procure-ment, storage, and issue to the supply arms andservices, the OQMG wasagain organized alongcommodity lines.12 The major units of its organ-ization were variously known as "services" or as"divisions" during the next few years. As theoffice gradually consolidated its many activitiesfor peacetime operation, four divisions emergedto handle most Quartermaster activities. Thesewere the Administrative Division, under which,in general, functions of a staff character werecombined; the Supply Division composed ofseveral commodity branches, such as the Sub-sistence Branch, the Clothing and EquipageBranch, and the General Supplies Branch,among others; and the self-contained Construc-tion and Transportation Divisions.13 The func-tions of construction and transportation werelodged in divisions, each of which was estab-lished as an integrated agency with plenaryoperating powers, for it was intended that theorganization set up in the OQMG should be

potentially adaptable to the exigencies of a na-tional emergency. A ready framework was toexist for adaptation and expansion.

World War I experience with the Purchase,Storage an d Traffic Division, which had com-bined staff and operating functions in the sameagency, had emphasized the desirability of sepa-rating staff agencies, which developed plans andpolicies and specified procedures for their execu-tion, from operating units, which carried themout. As a consequence, the OQMG in 1920sought to place all staff or planning activitiespertaining to supply in a Control Service. Op-erating activities lay within the province of theSupply Division. The Control Service exercisedgeneral administrative, procedural, and func-tional supervision. It was charged with formu-lating war plans, controlling all fiscal matters,preparing statistical data, consolidating require-ments, and maintaining liaison with higherauthority on these matters. Incidentally, duringthe twenties and thirties the OQMG set upplanning and staff controls as directed by higherauthority, but the staff units were often skeletonor mere paper organizations.

While the OQMG organization attempted toseparate staff an d operating functions, the les-son of World War I was neglected more oftenthan not.There was a steady tendency for cur-rent operations to absorb staff functions. Withina comparatively short time the majority of thecontrol functions were delegated to the operat-ing branches.14 This change resulted from thedeveloping self-sufficiency of the operatingagencies and the dwindling of supervisory dutiesand personnel in the OQMG. As a consequence,it proved more feasible to lodge staff functionsin operating branches during a peacetime period

11 U.S.Statutes at Large, XLI, 766,act approved 4Jun 20.12 OQMG Cir 11, 28 Jul 20, sub:Orgn of QMC.13 OQMG OO 4, 7 Jan 37, sub: Office Orgn.14 OQMG Office Memo 119, 30 Aug 21, sub:Orgn of OQMG.


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INTRODUCTORY 7when the scope of Quartermaster activities wassharply reduced.Congress had been highly critical of the lackof planning revealed by World War I, and inlegislating for national defense in 1920 it hadcreated the position of Assistant Secretary ofWar, making him responsible for procurementplanning and the supervision of the procure-ment of all military supplies. Hence The Quar-termaster General was under the supervision ofthe Assistant Secretary of War in all these mat-ters, wh ile directly responsible to the G eneralStaff on all others. During this period theOQMG established units with varying namesto carry on its war-planning functions. For ex-ample, it created the War Plans and TrainingDivision in the Administrative Service in 1926directly as a result of the need for meeting theemphasis of the Assistant Secretary of War onplanning activities.15 But the inevitable tend-ency was to divorce planning for a distantemergency from the organization for currentpeacetime operations. This was to have impor-tant repercussions in World War II.The OQMG organization during these yearswas not disturbed by the participation of theQMC in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC)an d other New Deal activities of the thirties.The impact was felt primarily at the field instal-lations. If it had no important effect on head-quarters organization, participation in govern-ment relief and other emergency economicactivities of the period proved an experience oftremendous significance in other ways.16 Bycontributing to the improvement and crystalli-zation of operating methods, it undoubtedlysmoothed the way for the intensification ofpurely military preparations.

Status of QMC in 1939In September 1939, when war began inEurope, the QMC was a small supply agency ofthe War Department which had potentialities

for expansion, in case of an emergency, into alarge organization. It consisted of less than12,000 military personnel and approximately37,000 civilians, 17 who trained Quartermasterpersonnel and provided supplies and services foran Army of not far from 200,000 men stationedat posts, camps, and stations in the UnitedStates and at such outposts as Alaska, Hawaii,and the Panama Canal Zone. These activitieswere accomplished through a Washington head-quarters, organized on a comm odity basis as ithad been since Civil War days, through field in-stallations, such as depots, engaged in procuringand distributing supplies, and through certainschools operated by the Corpsthe Quarter-master School and the Motor Transport Schoolwhich trained the military personnel needed byth e QMC. For the most part, the depots werelocated in the eastern half of the United States,a significant fact in view of the necessity ofmounting a war in the Pacific.

Effect of World War IIThe outbreak of war in Europe was felt atonce in the United States Army. The presiden-tial proclamation of limited emergency increasedthe size of the Army to 227,000 men from the210,000 provided by earlier legislative action onth e Army appropriation bill. The QMC andother supply services took this limited increase

in the military establishment more or less instride. The fall of France in June 1940,however,brought a more dramatic enlargement of theArmy. Congressional action added to the size ofthe Regular Arm y, the National Guard was in-ducted into the Federal service, and Congress

15 OQMG OO 19, 12 May 26, no sub.16 For a summary view of these trends and develop-ments see the annual Report of the Secretary of War tothe President, Fiscal Years 1930-35.17 More than half of this civilian personnel was em-ployed in the Civilian Conservation Corps, PublicWorks Administ rat ion (PWA), and Works ProgressAdministration (WPA) working on QMC projects.


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8 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSpassed the Selective Service Act in Septemberproviding for an Army of 1,400,000 men.18 Be-cause of its broad and varied supply responsi-bilities, the QMC was greatly and immediatelyaffected by this tremendous expansion.

More than any other supply service, theCorps had to anticipate the needs of the Armythat was to be mobilized by having in readinesshousing for the troops and the increasedamounts of supplies needed to clothe, equip,and feed them. Such supply was carried outthrough the familiar system of depots whichprocured and distributed supplies requisitionedby quartermasters at posts, camps, and stations.Purchase responsibility for the basic classes ofitems became even more concentrated thanheretofore at designated key depots: for exam-ple, footwear at the Boston Quartermaster De-pot, clothing still at the Philadelphia Depot,and tentage at the Jeffersonville Depot. Thiscentralized purchase of specialty items by thedepots was a fundamental feature of the fieldpurchasing system that had been developingeven before World War I. However, co-ordina-tion was not neglected as it had been at thebeginning of World War I, for the Supply Divi-sion and later the Procurement Division guidedand directed these centralized purchase opera-tions and acted as the procurement controlagency of the OQMG.

Supply of the troops was the primary missionof the Corps, and this included the procurementof horses and mules and the purchase of auto-motive equipment. But the Corps had otherfunctions to perform. It operated remount de-pots where horses were conditioned and trained,and it repaired automotive equipment at itsmotor-transport bases and depots. It built camps,hospitals, and other facilities to accommo-date the expanding Army; it transported troops;and it provided and operated laundries for them.By the end of the emergency period it was alsooperating repair shops for shoes, clothing, andequipment. Furthermore, it continued to be re-

sponsible for the maintenance of nationalcemeteries and the care of the dead.To accomplish these tasks and to meet newresponsibilities imposed on the Corps duringthe war, the QMC expanded its personnel andits organization in the field and in Washington.It enlarged it s headquarters organization fromfour to thirteen divisions before the war ended.Its military personnel increased from less than12,000 to more than 500,000. In sharp contrastto the continued rise in military personnel dur-ing the war, c ivilian personnel tended to becomestabilized at about 75,000, after construction andtransportation functions and the personnel con-nected with the execution of these responsibili-ties had been transferred from the Corps toother agencies early in the war.The commodity organization was simply ex-panded during the emergency period to handlethe increased Quartermaster burden. After PearlHarbor, however, more fundamental changesoccurred. The organization of the OQMG wasradically shifted from a commodity to a func-tional basis. Instead of commodity branches re-sponsible for the procurement an d distributionof specific items of supply, single divisions wereestablished which were responsible solely forthe procurement of most Quartermaster sup-plies or for the storage and distribution of them.This was a change that occurred in the midst ofwar as a part of the drastic and fundamental re-organization of the War Department in March1942. As might be expected, it posed manyproblems and entailed numerous adjustments.

The field organization of the Corps was alsoexpanded and altered. During the emergencyand early war years, the depot system was greatlyexpanded and new facilities were established inthe south and in the western part of the UnitedStates to back up the w ar in the Pacific. The use

18 (1) Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of theUnited States Army, July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941,to the Secretary of War (Washington: GPO, 1941), p. 2.(2) 54 U.S.Statutes 885-97, act approved 16 Sep 40.


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INTRODUCTORY 9of dogs in war resulted in the establishment ofcenters for their training. The necessity to co-ordinate the military procurement of subsistenceled to the creation of a nationwide market cen-ter system by the QMC. Other new facilities,such as repair subdepots and a great expansionof Quartermaster repair shops followed fromth e urgent need to conserve materials and de-crease the burden placed upon industry for theproduction of new goods.Of tremendous significance was the develop-ment of Quartermaster laboratories, for inWorld War II as never before an increasingemphasis was placed on exploiting and applyingscientific knowledge and technological skills tothe problems posed by military supplies. For thefirst time in Quartermaster history, a large an dintegrated research program was directed by the

OQMG, and results were so impressive that itseems unlikely to be omitted from any futureoperations. Instead, the importance of a contin-uous program of research in peace as well as inwar has been underscored.Finally the war not only brought far-reachingadminis t rat ive changes and expansion in per-sonnel, but it modified supply procedures bystreamlining procurement methods as well asthose fo r storage an d distribution. This was awar of mechan ization and motorization not onlyin the combat areas but in the zone of interioras well. The use of IBM machines and teletypesspeeded supply operations at depots and in theOQMG, while the use of fork-lift trucks andother mechanical equipment enabled the Corpsto handle the tremendous volume of tonnagerequired for a global war.


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CHAPTER I

Administrative OrganizationTraditionally, the OQMG had been organized

along commodity lines, and the outbreak of warin Europe in September 1939 brought no signif-icant departure from this basic principle of com-modity administration. The OQMG was thenoperating under a simple plan of organizationwhich, except for minor variations, had been ineffect since 1920. Of the four divisions handlingQuartermaster activities, the Administrative Di-vision combined within its province functionswhich were of a staff character. The SupplyDivision, consisting of a number of commoditybranches, handled th e procurement and distri-bution of Quartermaster supplies. The functionsof construction and transportation were vestedin two self-contained divisions.

The extended period of the emergency, whichlasted from the presidential proclamation oflimited emergency in September 1939 until 7December 1941, provided an opportunity fororderly administrative development and expan-sion. However, the great expansion of Quarter-master activity did not begin until mid-1940,after the fall of France had increased the appre-hensions of the United States and defense prep-arations were accelerated. On the eve of thatexpansion the QMC acquired a new Quarter-master General, who was to guide its activitiesthroughout World War II. Maj. Gen. (later Lt.Gen.) Edmund B. Gregory was first appointedfor a four-year period beginning 1 April 1940,and upon the expiration of this term he was re-appointed acting The Quartermaster General,relinquishing the office on 31 January 1946.Having spent the greater part of his thirty-six

years in the Army in the service of the Corps,he brought a well-rounded knowledge to bearupon Quartermaster problems.1

Expansion of the OrganizationIn order to handle its increasing activities, the

OQMG for the most part multiplied its adminis-trative units by expanding sections into branchesand by separating branches and establishingthem as inde pend ent divisions. Nearly all thissubdivision occurred within the AdministrativeDivision. The one exception was the creation ofthe important Motor Transport Division in thesummer of 1940 by separating it from the Trans-portation Division.2 Fiscal and personnel activi-ties were separated from the AdministrativeDivision and given divisional status.3 Within afew weeks, the expansion of numerous activitiesof the Administrative Division was recognizedby the addition of a Statistical and Public Rela-tions Branch and a Storage Control Branch tothe already existing Production Control, andWar Plans and Training Branches. All four han-dled important planning and staff activities.4By the close of the year the Memorial Branchwas raised to a division.5More significant than this increase in admin-istrative units was the important realignment of

1 (1) GO 5, 1 May 40, no sub. (2) "The NewQuartermaster General," QMR, XIX (March-April1940), 21ff2 OQMG OO 49, 26 Jul 40, no sub.3 Ibid.4 OQMG OO 71, 24 Aug 40, no sub.5 OQMG OO 144, 27 Dec 40, sub: Office Orgn.


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12 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSstaff and operating phases of Quartermaster or-ganization which occurred during this period.For example, the activities of the War Plans andTraining Branch were separated. It s militarytraining functions were transferred to the Per-sonnel Division. Its planning functions, alongwith the activities of the Contracts and ClaimsBranch of the Supply Division, were vested ina new War Procurement and RequirementsBranch in the Administrative Division.6 Thisfurthered the concentration of planning an dpolicy functions on the staff level. Unfortunatelythis development made the Administrative Di-vision unwieldy; the need fo r reorganizing cer-tain of its important activities became apparent.The most important basic reorganization inth e OQMG before Pearl Harbor was initiatedin a series of orders early in 1941. These wereformalized and integrated later in the year by arevision of the basic organizational directive ofthe OQMG.7 Separation of the AdministrativeDivision's functions of administrative servicefrom those of policy control constituted themost obvious need. Some of the former func-tions, namely those pertaining to departmentalor headquarters activities, had a tendency togravitate toward the executive office; hence aseparate supervisory Executive Office was estab-lished as a formal agency under The Quarter-master General. To this office were transferredthe activities of communications and centralrecords, the OQMG library, a welfare service,and other miscellaneous office services. Attacheddirectly to the Executive Office was an Execu-tive Officer for Civilian Conservation CorpsAffairs, charged with the control and supervisionof all duties of the Corps pertaining to its par-ticipation in CCC matters. An Executive Officerfor Civilian Personnel Affairs was responsible,under the direction and supervision of TheQuartermaster General, for formulating and ad-ministering all policy matte rs relating to civilianemployees of the Corps.8The remaining administrative service func-

tions were retained in the Administrative Divi-sion, which was renamed the General ServiceDivision. It supervised those services of anadministrative nature w hich pertained prim arilyto field activities and handled all adm inistrativematters of general concern not assigned else-where.9 In the basic chart10 drawn to prescribeOQMG organization at this time, this divisionand the Executive Office as well as the Fiscal,Civilian Personnel, Military Personnel andTraining, and Planning and Control Divisionswere placed in theoretically close association ina group of "Executive Divisions."The establishment of the Planning an d Con-trol Division early in 1941 resulted from theneed to co-ordinate basic operating functionsscattered throughout th e comm odity branches.As problems relating to procurement and otherfunctional aspects of supply activity increasedwith the developing emergency, the necessityfor a control agency became increasingly morecompelling. After administrative and policyphases of control had been separated, the neces-sity to consolidate, reorganize, and refine thelatter phase under a single agency became basicin the reorganization of OQMG activities. Inestablishing the Planning and Control Division,th e procurement control, storage control, andwar planning and requirements functions of theformer Administrative Division were transferredto it as well as that division's activities in ref-erence to statistics, claims, and contracts. Inaddition, the war planning activities of thePersonnel Division were transferred to it.Staff-operating relations between the Planningan d Control Division and the Supply Divisionduring the emergency period developed consid-

6 OQMG OO 99, 10 Oct 40, no sub.7 OQMG OO 25, 3 Feb 41, sub: Office Orgn, an dSupplements A-G,published from March to Decem-ber, covering the organization of most of the separatedivisions.8 OQMG OO 25, 3 Feb 41, sub: Office Orgn.

9 OQMG OO 14, 23 Jan 41, no sub.10 See Chart 1.


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14 TH E QUARTERMASTER CORPSerable friction. There were present, of course,the normal irritations and difficulties incident toexpansion of personnel and perfection of organ-ization. Furthermore, the personalities andpolicies of certain of the key staff and operatingofficials inevitably played a part, while the re-luctance of the operating units to accept direc-tion and "interference" was undoubtedly acontributing factor.As to the general resistance of the operatingdivisions to control, it is significant that a for-mal attempt was made to minimize this factorthrough designation of the staff units as "Exec-utive Divisions." The chief of the Planning andControl Division was intended to have generalpowers of direction over the activities of theOQMG, but these were translated with diffi-culty into binding orders on procurement, dis-tribution, and other activities. The operatingdivisions were encouraged in their independenceby the relative unfamiliarity of the staff agencieswith operating problems and their uncertaintyas to the scope of their jurisdiction and power.In any event, commodity branches and divisionshad long been accustomed to having completeand integrated responsibility for their operations.

Conflict and confusion in policies were evenmore basic causes of the difficulties. These de-veloped out of the uncertainties which stemmedfrom the fact that the country was drifting alongthrough a period of partial or limited mobiliza-tion, whereas the procurement planners hadbased their plans on abrupt and complete indus-trial mobilization for war.For twenty years following the passage of theNational Defense Act, the procurement plan-ners in the OQMG under the guidance of theAssistant Secretary of War had been formulat-ing war procurement plans to meet a futureemergency. Such planning had been separatedfrom current peacetime operations in the com-modity branches of the Supply Division, andit had followed a radically different line fromthat of the operators in the commodity branches

who were developing a centralized procurementsystem. Regional self-sufficiency and decentral-ization of procurement to districts that wereroughly coterminous with the corps areas con-stituted the heart of the procurement plans thatwere drafted. Policies stemming from such a de-centralized system were obviously at sharp vari-ance with those of centralized operations whichcarried over into the emergency period. Theplanners were further handicapped in carryingou t their policies since procurement plans wereintended to be put into effect on an M Day(Mobilization Day) which never came. Insteada wholly unanticipated, prolonged emergencyperiod occurred, with the result that the planswere held in abeyance an d operating personnelmet the day-to-day problems by using estab-lished peacetime procedures. By the time warwas declared, the momentum was too great topermit a resort to the plans that had beenprepared.

Because the emergency period was primarilyone of procurement effort, administrative ad-justments naturally revolved around this activ-ity, and staff-operating relationships must beconsidered first in reference to it. The produc-tion control agencies were somew hat intolerantof concessions which had to be made as a resultof the actual course of emergency transition.They were opposed to alternative systems andmethods which negated th e economic and in-dustrial benefits long planned through con-trolled mobilization and production. On theother hand, the approach of the current procure-ment agencies to this matter was more expedi-ent. They recognized the difficulty under thecircumstances of securing an ideal distributionof orders and allocation and full utilization ofindustrial facilities. They were interested pri-marily in pushing those policies which seemedacceptable and practicable in meeting procure-ment objectives.11Both production and purchasing policies relat-

11 See below, Ch . VII.


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ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 15ing to selection of contractors and facilities wereaffected by various complex factorsprofit andcompetitive motives, business pressures, inde-cision on the part of higher planning agenciesin the government, and other elements whichtended to interfere with the procedures of mobi-lization developed by the procurement planners.The latter had formulated programs for allocat-ing contracts to industrial facilities, but depotpersonnel ignored their advice in carrying ou tcurrent operations. Most depot officers andmany officers in the Supply Division were alsoextremely timorous about abandoning peace-time purchasing policies and adopting themethod of negotiation advocated by the plan-ners. The Supply Division, for the most part,pursued a legalistic and hesitant approach toemergency purchasing and production. Com-modity organizations on all levels resisted or re-sented the pressure exerted by the staff units forthe application of new and more radical policiesand methods.Such differences probably acted as the great-est single deterrent to extension and perfectionof administrative controls on the part of thestaff agencies of the Planning and Control Divi-sion. But while the heritage of a ready-made setof controls would have been of inestimablevalue after Pearl Harbor, it must be emphasizedthat relatively loose supervision could be toler-ated before that time. Insofar as the supervisionof procurement policies by the Planning andControl Division was concerned, the situationcould even be rationalized as consisting merelyof a necessary, if troublesome, stage in the proc-ess of transition to war.Considerations of administrative control andorientation were highly interdependent in allphases of procurement. One more illustrationemphasizes this point. There was considerablepressure for expediting procurement, bu t pro-duction scheduling could still be viewed pri-marily as a fiscal matter and accomplished in thecourse of distributing appropriations and funds.

The need had not yet developed for tight sched-uling and therefore for welding the computationof requirements, based on distribution and otherfield data, and the issuance of procurement di-rectives into a single, co-ordinated process.OQMG staff-operating conflicts over this phaseof procurement control, however, were alreadypresent.If administrative adjustments thus far hadcentered particularly on procurement activities,developments were looming nonetheless inother fields, especially with respect to the dis-tribution of supplies. The former Storage Con-trol Branch of the Administrative Division hadremained for a time with the Planning andControl Division, but by May 1941 it wastransferred to the Executive Office as a staff unitand renamed the Depot Division.12 This divi-sion functioned as the agency dealing withQuartermaster depots and Quartermaster sec-tions of general depots on all general matters ofdepot administration in which the variousOQMG divisions had an interest. It also servedas the supply agency for warehouse equipmentof all kinds, kept records bearing on the alloca-tion and utilization of storage space, and initi-ated the procurement and training of personnelto meet the requirements of new depots. In thesummer of 1941 Quartermaster depots andQuartermaster sections of general depots tendedto operate as separate autonomies rather than asparts of the depot system. Each installation wasusing various methods and systems for doingbusiness with little regard for the existence ofsimilar supply organizations. It was the missionof the Depot Division to standardize and co-ordina te the activities of these installations andto insure the efficient operation of the individ-ua l depot.13

12 (1) OQMG OO 25A, 24 Mar 41, no sub. (2)OQMG OO 92, 14 May 41, no sub.13 (1) Chief of Depot Opns Div to Exec Off, S&DSv, 28 Jul 42, sub: Material to be Included in AnnualRpt of SW. (2) See below, Ch. IX, passim, for elabora-tion of activities.


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16 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSA weakness in the position of the Depot

Division lay partly in the looseness of its re-sponsibility for the administrative servicing andplanning on the field level of a variety of activi-ties for which other divisions often claimed pri-mary responsibility. It was enjoined specificallyfrom interfering with th e "prerogatives ofChiefs of Operating Divisions" in supervisingthe procurement, storage, and issue of supplies.At the same time it was made the main channelof contact with the depots on those matters ofadministration in which it dealt, a function nor-mally assigned to an operating agency at head-quarters. Because it was difficult to distinguishactivities of general concern from those whichwere prerogatives of the operating units, therewas ample ground fo r friction to develop withthe commodity branches of the Supply Division.As in the case of procurement, so in distribu-tion there was no need during these months forrigid control. Just as the tight scheduling of re-quirements depended upon influences develop-ing later in the war, so inventory and stockcontrol were hardly required at this time, andthe Depot Division concerned itself, insofar asits administrative functions were involved, onlywith standard organization and procedures indepots. The placing of stock accounting and re-porting activities on a machine basis in 1941,however, superseding the old manual system,presaged the emergence of control problems aswell as the need for functional realignment ofdistribution activities.14

Although a number of other changes, includ-ing the setting up of a lend-lease agency in theOQMG, occurred in the last few months beforePearl Harbor, th e administrative adjustmentsinvolved in the staff-operating relationships onprocurement and distribution constituted themain lines of development. In the pre-PearlHarbor period, despite the development of func-tional controls and services and a general tend-ency to concentrate them in staff units, theOQMG remained organized fundamentally on

the commodity principle. Subject to directionsfrom higher authority and to varying degrees offunctional supervision and aid from agencieswithin the OQMG, each commodity branchretained fairly complete responsibility for thehandling of a group of supply items, from de-termining requirements to seeing that suchitems reached points of issue.

Transfer of FunctionsWar was to bring further changes in the ad-ministrative organization of the OQMG and inthe mission assigned to the Corps. Within afew months after Pearl Harbor, a number of im-

portant functions were lost to the QMC. As inWorld War I, construction, transportation, andmotor transport activities were again eithertransferred to other technical services or estab-lished as separate organizations.Construction

In the case of construction, action to removethis function from the QMC was actually begunin the fall of 1941 and completed a few daysbefore Pearl Harbor. In September the War De-partment submitted a bill to the House ofRepresentatives, providing for the transfer ofnew construction for the Army and the main-tenance and repair of buildings from TheQuartermaster General to the Chief of Engi-neers. To justify this transfer the Secretary ofWar urged that it would eliminate a largeamount of duplication of effort, cost, and ad-ministrative personnel. A more efficient long-range program of construction could be set up.The proposed bill placed the construction workof the War Department under the Corps ofEngineers because, even in peacetime, with itsriver and harbor and flood-control projects, theCorps of Engineers, unlike the QMC, had a

14 See below, Ch. X.


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ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 17large construction program. It was argued thatit also had a long-established organization tohandle such work, whereas the organization ofthe QMC for these activities was of much morerecent creation. Finally, it was urged that th econstruction activities of the War Departmentduring the emergency were more closely relatedto the other functions of the Corps of Engineersand to the training of combat engineer forcesthan they were to the other funct ions of theQMC.15

The Quartermaster General, General Gregory,took exception to the reasons advanced for thistransfer. He observed tha t if housing for theCivilian Conservation Corps were included theQuartermaster expenditures fo r construction fo rthe past ten years would be larger than those ofthe Engineer Corps. This program had beencarried out in an economical and satisfactorymanner. Moreover, a small, continuous, perma-nent housing construction program had beenhandled by the Construction Division, OQMG.In any case, neither the peacetime constructionprogram of the Corps of Engineers nor that ofthe QMC was comparable to the load of con-struction in an emergency. In addition, the typeof work done by the Engineer Corps was quitedifferent from that involved in the constructionof troop housing. Except for a period duringWorld War I when a separate Construction Di-vision was formed, the QMC had handled con-struction at military posts for more than onehundred years. In The Quartermaster General'sopinion the training of combat engineeringforces had very little in common with the con-struction work involved in the zone of interior.He objected to the transfer of maintenance ac-tivities and the repair of buildings and utilities,for these were intimately involved with thefunctions of the Corps at all military posts.

In short, the Quartermaster Corps is already onthe job. It is in intimate touch with every phase ofArmy life. There is a Quartermaster Officer wher-ever a group of soldiers can be found. The Engineer

Corps, on the other hand , handles specialized workusually completely aloof from the rest of the Armyan d entirely out of touch with the day to day life ofmilitary organizations. 16

Although The Quartermaster General ob-jected to losing the construction function, theWar Department and the Construction Divi-sion, OQMG, had been much criticized by theTruman Committee for the excessive cost of theconstruction program fo r camps and canton-ments. The committee had recommended thatthe Secretary of War be granted author i ty toassign additional construction work to theCorps of Engineers. Air Corps construction hadalready been assigned to the Engineers byCongress in 1940.17Under these circumstances there was littledoubt that the bill offered by the Secretary ofWar would be enacted into law. The Quarter-master General was therefore directed to col-laborate with the Chief of Engineers in develop-ing a plan for the transfer of constructionactivities. Such a plan was submitted inNovember.18 On 1 December 1941 Congresspassed the law transferring construction, realestate, and repairs and utilities activities to theCorps of Engineers, a transfer that was madeeffective on 16 December 1941.19

The QMC had borne the major burden ofconstruct ion during the emergency period.Although it had been very critical of this pro-gram, the Truman Committee observed:

15 Ltr, Robert P. Patterson, Actg SW, to Speaker ofHR, 2 Sep 41, no sub.16 Memo, TQMG for CofS, 4 Sep 41, no sub.17 S Rpt 480, Part 2, 77th Cong, 1st Sess, "Campan d Cantonment Investigation," p. 35.18 (1) Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 21 Oct 41, sub: Trans-fer of Const Activities from QMC to CE, AG 600.12(10-20-41) MO-D. (2) Ltr, TQMG and CofEngrsto TAG, 10 Nov 41, same sub. (3) Memo, ACofS forCofS, 19 Nov 41, sub: Transfer of Const and Real

Estate Activities from QMC to CE.19 (1) 66 U.S. Statutes 787-88. (2) Ltr, TAG toTQMG, 3 Dec 41, sub: Transfer of Const Activitiesfrom QMC to CE, AG 600.12 (11-10-41) MO-D.


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18 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSBy making such criticism the committee does

not wish to detract in any way from th e very im -portant fact that housing, training, and recreationalfacilities for 1,216,459 men were provided in thespace of a few short months and in most instanceswere finished an d ready for occupancy before thetroops arrived. The Construction Division of theQuartermaster General's Office supervised the con-struction of projects which . . . due to their sizeand the necessity of speed, presented some of thegreatest problems ever encountered by any con-struction agency in this country and the facilitiesso provided are better than the troop facilitiespossessed by any other country. Adequate provi-sion has been made for the comfort and health ofthe soldiers. Furthermore, the facilities are betterthan those provided for the troops in the lastWorld War.20

TransportationThree months after the transfer of construc-tion, as part of the general reorganization of theArmy in March 1942, responsibility for trans-

portation and traffic control was centralized inthe Services of Supply (SOS), and the Trans-portation Division, OQMG, was separatedfrom that office.21 In the years since 1920, whenCongress by legislative action had returnedtransportation activities to the QMC despiterecommendations for the establishment of apermanent transportation corps, decentralizedoperating responsibilities had developed. TheQuartermaster General was responsible for themovement of troops and supplies by commoncarriers in the zone of interior and by Armytransports and commercial vessels between theUnited States and its overseas bases. Command-ers of ports of embarkation, however, reporteddirectly to the War Departm ent General Staff.Their functions in regard to Army transportswere not clearly differentiated from those ofThe Quartermaster General. The chiefs of othersupply services maintained separate traffic or-ganizations to look after their transportationinterests such as shipping and procuring agen-cies. The Supply Division, G-4, of the General

Staff exercised over-all supervision of transpor-tation activities.22This decentralization was the real weaknessof the transportation organization. In the periodof the emergency, when overseas bases werebeing strengthened and transportation difficul-ties were multiplying, the Transportation Branchof G-4 promoted the co-ordination of Armytransportation activities. Its activities expandedeven more rapidly after Pearl Harbor. But thisco-ordination offered no real solution to theproblem, which stemmed from the fact that noone operating organization was directly respon-sible for inland, terminal, and overseas transpor-tation.23 This was provided in March 1942byconsolidating all War Department transporta-tion and traffic control under SOS. A Transpor-tation Division, in charge of a Chief of Trans-portation, was established in the SOS. By 31July 1942 it emerged as the TransportationCorps.24

20 (1) S Rpt 480, Part 2, 77th Cong, 1st Sess,"Camp and Cantonment Investigation," p. 34. (2)This work was done under Lt. Col. Brehon B. Somer-vell, Corps of Engineers, who was detailed for duty inthe QMC and assigned as chief of the ConstructionDivision. OQMG OO 130, 11 Dec 40, no sub. (3)For a detailed discussion of construction, see Reming-ton, Coll, and Fine, Corps of Engineers: Zone ofInterior Construction, a volume in preparation for theseries UNITED STATES A R M Y IN WORLD WARII.21 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, sub: WD Reorgn. Threecomm ands were established: the Army Ground Forces(AGF), the Ar my Air Forces ( A A F ) , and the SOS,renamed a year later the Army Service Forces (ASF).22 (1) AR 30-1190, 12 Dec 41, sub: Oversea Mvmtof Orgns and Casuals. (2) AR 30-930, 6 Nov 30, sub:Trans of Troops. (3) Rpt, 30 Nov 45, sub: Rpt of23 Memo, Col T. N. Dillon, OQMG, for Brig GenCofT ASF WW II, pp. 17-18.Brehon B. Somervell, ACofS G-4, 4 Feb 42, sub:Trans Orgn.24 (1) Maj Gen C. P. Gross, CofT, "The Transpor-tation CorpsIts Organization an d Major Functions,"QMR, XXIII (January-February 1944), 19ff. (2 )

Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Respon-sibilities, Organization, and Operations (Washington,1951), in the series UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II.


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ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 19Motor Transport

The last important change made in Quarter-master activities during the w ar was the transferof motor transport activities in the summer of1942. Long before this there had been rumorsof impending changes. The Under Secretary ofWar was concerned with the problem of utiliz-ing industrial capacity to the best advantage. Hedirected John D. Hertz, an authority on motortransportation, to make a special study of thesubject, primarily from the viewpoint of effec-tive use and conservation of automotive equip-ment already on hand. The scope of this surveywas restricted to vehicles of Quartermaster re-sponsibility, and consequently tanks an d othercombat vehicles, which were procured by theOrdnance Department, were excluded fromconsideration in this investigation. The reportof the Hertz committee, submitted in Novem-ber 1941, recommended that one service bemade completely responsible for all automotivemaintenance. This control agency was to beestablished in General Headquarters inasmuchas the committee had found the ac tivation of aHeadquarters Motor Transport approved in aTable of Organization, 1 November 1940. TheHertz report recommended no change in juris-diction over procurement of motor equipment.25A month earlier the General Staff had con-sidered the reorganization of the armored divi-sion, one aspect of which had involved thedelegation of all third echelon vehicle mainte-nance to the divisional ordnan ce battalion.26 Atthat time both Ordnance and Quartermasterpersonnel maintained such third echelon activi-ties. While acknowledging that this led toduplication of overhead, equipment, and effortand that this responsibility should rest with oneagency, The Quartermaster General had urgedthat it be placed with the QMC because abouttwo thirds of the 3,300 motor-propelled vehiclesprovided for an armored division were procuredby the Corps. All but about four hundred of the

vehicles used commercial-type motors.27 InJanuary 1942 Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell,then Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, informedThe Quartermaster General that orders werebeing issued to the Army directing the poolingof third and fourth echelon shops of the QMCand the Ordnance Department.28Many officers of the Motor Transport Divi-sion, OQMG, hoped tha t a separate corpswould be established. General Somervell alsofavored a separate automotive corps, whichwould be responsible not only for maintenancebut also for design and procurement of tanksand other combat, as well as noncombat, cars.29In an analysis of the Hertz report submittedto the Chief of Staff, he emphasized that "thereconditioning of the present automotive fleet,the proper instruction of the present personnel,the provision of the necessary training of main-tenance units for the increased automotive fleetlaid down in the program provide a tremendousproblem which must be solved within the year1942 if our field armies are to wage successful

25 (1) Ltr, John D. Hertz to Robert P. Patterson, 18Nov 41, no sub, enclosing rpt. (2) Memo, USW forCofS, 24 Nov 41, sub: Mr. John Hertz, Rpt on MtrVeh Main t . (3 ) Me mo , Hertz fo r USW, 15 Jan 42,sub: Criticisms on Rpt of Mtr Veh Maint. (4) Ltr,Hertz et al., to USW, 28 Jan 42, no sub.26 Memo, Brig Gen H. L. Twaddle, ACofS, forTQMG, 21 Oct 41, sub: Reorgn of Armd Div.27 Memo, TQMG for ACofS G-3, 3 Nov 41, Reorgof Armd Div.28 Memo, Gen Somervell for TQMG, 17 Jan 42,sub: Autmv Tng and Maint.29 In a study he prepared to be submitted to theChief of Staff, General Somervell had the assistance ofCol. R. P. Shugg, Chief of Staff, 3d Armored Division.The latter heartily endorsed the Hertz report but rec-ommended one change, namely, that command controlof all automotive equipment be exercised by one au-thority. He had long been an advocate of a separatemotor transport corps. See (1) Ltr, Col Shugg to JohnHertz, 8 Dec 41, no sub; (2) Ltr, Shugg to Hertz, 18

Nov 41, no sub, enclosing rpt on Third Army maneu-vers, by Shugg, 10 Jun 40; (3) Ltr, Shugg to Hertz,9 Dec 41, no sub, enclosing rpt to Gen Somervellcommenting on Hertz rpt.


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20 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPSmechanized or motorized warfare." 30 In hisopinion, however, the existing division of motortransport responsibilities among the QMC, theOrdnance Department, the Corps of Engineers,the corps areas, the General Staff, GeneralHeadquarters, and the field armies would pre-vent the accomplishment of this program.Insofar as maintenance was concerned theHertz report had found existing proceduresclearly defined and adequate for a satisfactorymaintenance program. This led the AssistantChief of Staff, G-4, to conclude that th e faultrested in the controls established and the lackof attention given to this vital problem by thehigh command . Maintenance companies hadbeen authorized months after equipment hadbeen put in service, spare parts had not beenordered with vehicles, and efforts of The Quar-termaster General to create an organization atGeneral Headquarters to supervise maintenancehad been disapproved on the recommendationof that agency. The latter's failure to provideadequate training had stemmed from the viewof the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, that"maintenance of modern comm ercial vehiclesis not a serious problem, provided sufficientspare parts are available promptly." 31The Chief of the Armored Force and the Chiefof Field Artillery were strongly in favor of theorganization of a separate automotive corps asproposed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.The advocates of such a separate service urgedthat it would heighten combat efficiency, giveaccess to the high command, promote economyof material and personnel, and provide a vital-ized service with no other interests. In opposi-tion was the weight of tradit ion, of "vestedrights and privileges." 32 The opponents of aseparate service objected to reorganization inthe midst of war, claiming that confusion wouldresult even if advantages did accrue at a laterdate. In the opinion of the Under Secretary ofWar the transfer of responsibility for the designand procurement of tanks and other combat

cars from the Ordnance Department to an auto-motive corps would be unfortunate. The Dep-uty Chief of Staff concurred. He felt that th eresulting confusion would cause delay in pro-curement and development of tanks, self-pro-pelled anti tank guns and artillery, and otherautomotive equipment of the Ordnance De-partment.33 The Chief of Ordnance and TheQuartermaster General strongly opposed theestablishment of a separate automotive corps.The idea was discarded for the t ime being. In -stead, both the QMC and the Ordnance Depart-ment made efforts to improve their fieldservices, and the OQMG strengthened its MotorTransport Division.34In May 1942 General Somervell, as Com-manding General, SOS, visited the EuropeanTheater of Operations (ETO). While there hebecame interested in the unified maintenanceorganization of the British Army. Upon his re-turn he was more than ever convinced of thedesirability of combining maintenance for Ord-nance and Quartermaster automotive and tankequipment under a single head.

Developments which culminated in thetransfer of motor transport functions from th eQMC to the Ordnance Department now movedrapidly. On 22 June 1942 General Somervellsent a memorandum to Lt. Gen. Dwight D.Eisenhower, discussing some of the difficultiesencountered in World War I because the organ-ization of the American Expeditionary Forces(AEF) differed from that of the War Depart-

30 Memo, Gen Somervell for CofS, 7 Jan 42, sub:Rpt on Mtr Veh Maint by Mr. John Hertz.31 Ibid.32 Ibid.33 (1) Memo, Robert P. Patterson, USW, for MajGen R. C. Moore, Deputy CofS, 6 Jan 42, sub: MT.(2) Memo, Patterson for Moore, 12 Jan 42, sub: MtrMaint. (3 ) Memo, Deputy CofS fo r CofS, 10 Jan 42,sub: Mtr Veh Maint.34 (1) Memo, Gen Somervell for CofS, 7 Jan 42,

sub: Rpt on Mtr Veh Maint by Mr. John Hertz. (2 )Memo, Gen Moore, Deputy CofS, for CofS, 10 Jan 42,sub: Mtr Veh Maint. (3 ) Memo, Moore for USW, 12Jan 42, no sub.


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ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 21ment. In this connection he asked whether aseparate motor transport corps, entirely divorcedfrom the QMC, were desirable. Within a weekan affirmative message was received from Gen-eral Eisenhower's headquarters. On 3July SOSinformed The Quartermaster General that theestablishment of a separate automotive corpswas under consideration and invited him tosubmit his views on the matter.35

General Gregory vigorously opposed themove. He outlined the curren t duties of theMotor Transport Service to show that it was nota transportation service but a supply organiza-tion which purchased , stored, and distributedgeneral-purpose vehicles, parts, and equipment.The Army commands were responsible for theoperation of the vehicles assigned to them. Heurged that the distinction between the activitiesof the Motor Transport Service and a transpor-tation service should not be lost. He assertedthat the establishment of a separate motortransport corps would create m a n y new prob-lems.

While he conceded that there might be cer-tain advantages in creating an automotive corpsto carry out the functions now performed by theQMC, General Gregory declared that it was hisbelief that "the activities involving design, pro-curement, storage and distribution, and theoperation of base shops are now being admin-istered and controlled effectively." The proce-dures under which these activities wereoperating were understood by all, an d constantlyincreasing effectiveness could be expected asfield comm anders came to realize more keenlythe importance of "strict command supervisionover the operation and main tenance of motorvehicles." He felt that it was inadvisable toincrease the number of organizations under theCommanding General, SOS, an d that future im -provements in the organization could be madewithin the existing structure as effectively asunder any new organization operating under adifferent name.

Any change from the present organization, hebelieved, could be justified only if the efficiencyof the A r m y as a whole would thereby be in-creased, and he could find nothing in the pro-posal that promised this result. Furthermore, heargued that, if the new corps were created with-out change in managemen t and operatingpersonnel, the only result would be a change ofinsignia; if personnel were also changed, itwould mean the elimination of people who hadworked intensively on motor transport prob-lems for the past two years. He concluded withthe declaration that he did not feel the presentorganization had failed, and therefore he couldnot approve plans to create a separate motortransport corps. Two days later, having reflectedfurther on the matter, General Gregory sent an-other memorandum to the Commanding Gen-eral, SOS, emphasizing the dupl ica t ion ofoverhead that would result from the establish-ment of a new service.36

Whether the arguments of The Quartermas-ter General were persuasive, or whether a coun-terproposal was presented to focus attention ofthe SOS elsewhere, interest shifted once morefrom the creation of a separate motor transportcorps to the transfer of maintenance responsi-bility. This had been discussed for some time,and there had been occasional talk about con-centrating full responsibility for motor procure-ment either in the Ordnance Department or theQMC. Each service naturally felt that, if pro-curement and other responsibilities for motorswere combined, it should perform the work be-cause it was best organized and qualified to doso. At any rate, less than a week after GeneralGregory had submitted his second memoran-dum opposing creation of a separate motor

35 (1) Memo, Somervell for Eisenhower, 22 Jun 42,no sub. (2) Cable 2398, London to AGWAR, 29 Jun42. (3) Memo, Brig Gen W. D. Styer for TQMG, 3Jul 42, sub: Creation of a Separate Autmv Corps.36 (1) Memo, Gen Gregory for CG SOS, 6 Jul 42,sub: Creation of a Separate Autmv Corps. (2) Memo,Gregory for CG SOS, 8 July 42, same sub.


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22 THE QUARTERMASTER CORPScorps, SO S asked him to submit his reasons forbelieving that the Motor Transport Serviceshould not be separated from the QMC and at-tached to the Ordnance Department.

General Gregory called attention to his twoearlier memoranda on the subject an d declaredthat it was his understanding that the principalreason for the proposal was "that the Ordnancerepair activities and the Quartermaster Corpsrepair activities may be combined." This heconceded might have some advantages, particu-larly in the armored divisions, but in the ordi-nary triangula r division Quartermaster vehiclespredominated. Moreover, transfer of the motoractivities to the Ordnance Department, he felt,would result in the establishm ent at every postof another overhead organization, and "confu-sion already exists at a great many posts becauseof the change in the Quartermasters' duties."This change would add to the confusion. Heinsisted that a change at this time would requirean undesirable period of adjustment. If, how-ever, maintenance of vehicles were to be trans-ferred, he advocated that the procurement anddistribution of motor vehicles be left as afunction of the QMC.37The arguments of General Gregory did notprevail. The desirability of centralizing procure-ment as well as maintenance of automotiveequipment was emphasized by a study beingmade by the Control Division, SOS.It surveyedthe problems of the Tank and Combat VehiclesDivision of the Ordnance Department and rec-ommended centralization of all tank and auto-motive procurement in Detroit, a suggestionthat was carried out immediately following thetransfer of motor transport activities.38 On 17July 1942, three days after General Gregory hadpresented his case, Headquarters, SOS,issued anorder transferring motor transport activities tothe Ordnance Department. The regulationwhich put the transfer into effect designated1 August as the effective date.39

Despite the loss of functions to the Corps of

Engineers, the Transportation Corps, and theOrdnance Department, the QMC ranked nextto the Ordnance Department as the most impor-tant procurement service of the ASF. The Quar-termaster General remained responsible for theprocurement, storage, and issue of subsistence,petroleum an d lubricants, clothing, broad cate-gories of equipment, and all general supplies.These functions constituted the basis of a mis-sion unusual ly broad for any single operatingagency and involved many complex administra-tive problems.

General Reorganization After Pearl HarborWhen the United States entered the war, thesupply mission of the QMC was administeredby a headquarters office in Washington, whichfor a short time continued to be organized on a

commodity basis, and a field organization, themost important components of which consistedof depots andmarket centers. The QuartermasterGeneral was still under the direct supervision ofthe General Staff and, insofar as procurementmatters were concerned, the Assistant Secretaryof War, whose title by this time had beenchanged to Under Secretary of War. Because ofpressures both within and without th e office,the OQMG was soon to undergo a generalreorganization.

Early in March 1942 the War Departmentwas reorganized, and as a result the QMC cameunder the direct supervisory control of theCommanding General, SOS.Apparently no par-ticular change was contemplated, however, in

37 Memo, Gen Gregory for Brig Gen LeRoy Lutes,SOS, 14 Jul 42, sub:Transfer of MT Activities.38 Hist Rpt, Hist Sec, Control Div, ASF, History ofControl Division, ASF,1942-1945 (Apr 46), p. 53.On file in the Office of the Chief of Militar

quartermaster corps organization supply and services vol i

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