“race, ethnicity and nationalism at the end of the twentieth century”: conference

Race, E thnicity, and Nationalism

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ace, Ethnicity and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century”:

Conference

Andrew Clarke University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

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F r o m September 30 through October 2,1993, a conference was held at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee on ”Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century.” It featured an international rostrum of speakers on topics such as ”Race in Histo- ry,” ”Concepts of Nationalism in History,” ”Race and Biology,” and “Cultural Foundations of Ethnonationalism: The Role of Religion.” Specific subjects ranged around the globe, from Japan and China to Brazil, South Africa, Europe, Northern Ireland, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the Middle East. For DOMES readers, papers relating to the Kurds and to Israel and Palestine are described below.

The Kurds

eorge S. Harris of the U.S. State Department, Office of Research ‘ and Analysis: Near East and South Asia, spoke on ”Stateless Na- tions: Whither the Kurds?” Making clear that he was giving his own

Fall 1993

opinion and not that of the American government, Harris noted that the Kurds, a people of twenty million with their own language, have not achieved nationhood, and he examined their obstacles to unity, beginning with internal factors.

Geography has played a key role. Mountains separate the Kurds from external peoples, but also divide the internal Kurdish region into valleys. This has divided the language into mutually in- comprehensible dialects and scripts. Tribal differences among the Kurds, as great as their differences with others, have ruled in the past, but modem existence, especially in Turkey, is eroding this structure. Religion also divides the Kurds. Most are Sunni, some Shi’a, some Yezedi, some Christian. But beyond the internal factors, the splitting of the Kurdish core land after World War I into other countries has been the biggest factor, as well as strong opposition, in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, especially, against one Kurdish nation. Also, the Kurds are a minority in all those countries, and their energies are focused toward the existing nations rather than a pan-Kurdish movement. The way natural resources, e.g., the Kirkuk oil fields, are dis- tributed also works against unification; the Iraqi Kurds in this area have never regarded it as wealth to be shared with Kurds elsewhere.

Harris then discussed specific countries, starting with Iraq. The Kurds have had greater success there because of fluctuations in central power in Baghdad, the condensation of the Kurdish population, and a long-standing (Barzani) tribal vehicle for insurrection, which survived as Baghdad focused on various external concerns. In the sixties and seventies, help came from Iran, who gave them arms to fight Baghdad. Kurdish fortunes peaked in 1970, but Iraq’s 1972 agreement with Russia forbade the latter to assist the Kurds, and the shah of Iran agreed in the 1975 Algiers accord to stop giving arms to the Kurds, in return receiving a part of the Shatt-al-Arab from Iraq. Mustafa Barzani fled. Kurds in northern Iraq surrendered.

With the start of the Iran-Iraq war, the Ayatollah Khomeini resumed Iranian aid. This prompted Saddam Hussein’s retaliation against the Kurds, highlighted by the infamous Anfal campaign, raz- ing villages and using poison gas, which awakened Kurds to the outside world for protection and attracted its attention. The Anfal raged until the Gulf War, a war which brought about the de facto autonomy of the northern Iraq Kurdish region. In 1992 an election was held under international observance for a parliament. Jalal Talabani and the Barzanis have had to learn to cooperate. How long it will last after the crisis has become less severe is yet to be seen.

As for the Kurds in Turkey, Harris said of their lack of success

Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism

in the past that, for one thing, there has been little outside help. And the central government in Ankara has been stronger than, for example, Baghdad against Iraqi Kurds. The Kemalist policy of assimila- tion, in the nationalizing movement, has always worked to deny separate identity for Kurds. In the 1920s and 1930s, leaders were execut- or jailed; thus there was no continuous single leader like Barzani. Sometimes Kurds were removed to other regions of Turkey. Also, terrain in Turkey is more difficult. The Kurds are spread out, and it would be difficult to agree on an autonomous area.

Now, some restrictions have been lifted. Publications in Kurdi- sh are allowed, but Parliament refused to allow broadcasting in Kurdish. The alternation of government attitudes between tolerance of Kurdish culture and suppression of terrorist activities creates m- certainty about the future.

ways farther behind than in Iraq and Turkey. Geography in Iran, likewise, is a factor against autonomy. Kurdish territory is a long narrow strip; there are fewer resources. Only a small percentage of Iranian Kurds have sought autonomy. The basic antipathy of northern Sunni versus southern Shi’a Kurds has worked against their unity. Another problem has been ”the exodus of the best and the bright- est” seeking better education and opportunity abroad.

Between the world wars, Iran followed basically a middle ground toward the Kurds. In World War I1 localized separatist activ- ity grew. But the 1946 Kurdistan Autonomous Republic in Mahabad lacked the allegiance of many Kurds to the south and then, crucially, Soviet support. The shah’s forces after the war basically stopped re- sistance and forced it abroad. The Khomeini regime did not view the Iranian Kurds with sympathy. The 1979 proposal for Kurdish autonomy in the north was thwarted. There was some Kurdish success after the start of the war in 1980. But Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and Sadegh Sharafkandi were eventually assassinated “by what clearly seems to have been Tehran’s agents,” Harris said.

Looking at the future, Harris sees no sign that Kurds in any of the states are satisfied. The little bit of autonomy in Iraq the last few years has energized the Kurdish people. But nothing will happen in the autocratic regimes of Iraq and Iran till world pressure, inevitably, brings them to a more democratic form of government. In Turkey, the democratic process allows a base upon which to work. Things will improve when power is decentralized and there is a better distri- bution of resources. But economic improvement alone will not do. Kurds want to go further, and this will be the refrain for the 1990s.

Turning to Iran, Harris noted that the Kurds in Iran are in many

Digest ofMiddli! East Studies 3

Fall 1993

Israel and Palestinian Statehood

A two-part session under the heading ”Israel and Palestinian Statehood: Two Views” featured Muhammad Hallaj of the Washing- ton, D.C., Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine and Galia Golan of the Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

uhammad Hallaj accentuated the crucial need for Israeli and Palestinian agreement to be reached at this particular point in history. The September 1993 accord is a landmark for three important rea- sons, in that it is the first time since 1948 that representatives of the two peoples reached a ”directly negotiated written agreement on anything”; it was Israel’s first official dealing with the PLO; and it emphasized that the issue is no longer about Israel’s existence but Palestinian rights. A realistic hope is that the two accept partition ”as a prescription for living with bearable injustice.” The Palestinians have made this transition, he feels, but the Israelis have not, although the recent agreement is a sign.

shift since 1947, when it was the Arabs who rejected the United Na- tions two-state partition plan and Israel accepted. In the last two de- cades, however, the Palestinian side has moved toward a two-state solution, notably with the 1988 recognition of Israel. This shift, in turn, has called Israel’s bluff as the traditional advocate of compromise. Israel tried to call up the Palestinian image of “terrorist,” in- vaded Lebanon in 1982, and proceeded with de facto annexation of Occupied Territories. The intifada was a response.

Hallaj noted that since 1967 United States policy has been ”for and against everything.” The result has been ”a peace process which lacks a compass.” Israel has taken advantage of Washington’s ambiv- alence, but this is a short-sighted approach; a day of reckoning will come, when the road to peace will not be as favorable. Palestinians will not go away, and they are too conscious now of their nationhood. The last forty years are proof “that nationalism is still as un- suppressable as ever.”

the two parties converge on the two-state solution. For it to happen, adjustments in attitude are needed. It is ”unfair to deal with the Pal- estinians as felons applying for parole.” Compromise is the only way. The situation requires the surrender of the territories taken in 1967. Once the emotional burdens have been relieved, the technical problems become soluble. Jerusalem could live as a “a shared munic-

In giving his historical overview, Hallaj said there has been a

The climate for peace is good now because for the first time

Race, E thnicity, and Nationalism

ipality”; dividing it would be unnecessary, especially if the issue is redefined as one of holy places and access to them. Other questions become easier technical issues when conceptual adjustments are made: refugees, Jewish settlers, water rights, regional relationships. The issue of Palestinian refugees can be balanced with Jewish settlers. When coexistence, rather than existence, is the issue, “compro- mises which now appear unthinkable become possible.” The question is how to translate these growing concepts into real agreements. “Certainly not by allowing the past to paralyze the search for a better future,” Hallaj says. Both sides must take chances for peace.

Tal Gruag Kibbutz Ma‘anit Givat Haviva Institute

9 alia Golan spoke on “A Palestinian State from an Israeli Point of

tember 13,1993, may have replaced the century-old attitude of con- flict, by virtue of the mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, acknowledging the claims of both peoples to nationhood. For Israelis, it also fulfilled the dream of acceptance in the region.

View.“ She began by noting that the historic agreement of Sep-

Fall 1993

Early Jewish attitudes that saw the local Arabs only as part of the larger Arab scene are possible clues to some current attitudes in Israel, which believe that there is not a Palestinian people as such. The Israeli government did not acknowledge the link between the Palestinian issue and the Arab hostility, nor did it face the actual occupation and its effect on Israeli people. And it was this latter factor that finally brought about the critical change. Golan affirms that “so- cial justice is deeply implanted in Jewish life and Israeli culture.” One sign of this was the huge protest in 1982 against Israeli compli- ance in the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Yet, she says, the average Israelis do not look at the Palestinian question as a moral issue, but see themselves as victims, who want to live in peace. For the average Israeli, the Palestinians are not the powerless couple of million, but an extension of the large Arab world with its weaponry and oil.

Nevertheless, this attitude is changing. Sixty-five percent of Is- raeli Jewish urban adults supported the September 13 accord. Polls in Israel showed a crossover, in years leading up to the present, particularly after the start of the intifada, from less to more than half of the Israeli public favoring partial or total return of the Territories.

The intifada affirmed that ”There was no such thing as a sfatus quo but rather that the occupation had created a dynamic of increased violence and rebellion.” It reduced the feeling of security. There was a public reaction to the government’s use of the Israel De- fense Forces (IDF) against the actions of women and children. Jewish protest groups arose, especially among women, including parents of potential draftees into Israeli military service. Public spirit was further lowered by the international attention. But the strongest effect of the intifada was the awakening of “a certain realism among Israelis.” It was not concern for the Palestinians, but for Israeli blood. This greater realism has increased the public’s propensity to agree to compromise. A majority of the Israeli public now believe there will be a Palestinian state, whether Israelis want it or not. All in all, there has been a dramatic change in attitude toward the Palestinian people.

Golan pointed out that while the September 1993 accord com- mits Israel only to agreeing to Palestinian autonomy, nevertheless that it is regarded as an interim agreement leaves it open to more. Labor would still prefer a solution involving Jordan, for security rea- sons, in particular with an eye toward Syria. At any rate, the objec- tion of the Israeli public to a Palestinian state is based on security, not ideology. A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation might be the answer. Yaser Arafat endorses this idea, and it is likely that an Israeli majority will favor the existence of such a state when negotiations for

Race, Ethnicify, and Nationalism

the final status of the Territories get underway. This will depend not only on Palestinians curtailing violent elements within, but also on the degree of poverty and unemployment. Issues of labor, transpor- tation, communications, and water supplies must be resolved.

The argument from the Israeli right about the Palestinian right of return is answerable in that a Palestinian state would provide a place for refugees to return to. Mutual compensations for lost prop- erties would be in order. The settlements will be difficult to resolve; the Palestinians would probably only tolerate them if they were sub- ject to Palestinian law. The Israeli government will have to avoid the stigma of uprooting Jews, which would contravene ”the folklore of Labor Zionism.” She points out that the settlers do not, however, have great support from the public, a fact borne out in the 1992 June elections, because they are viewed as a drain on the economy. What may in fact come about is that the Israeli government will quietly en- courage voluntary departures.

Jerusalem is their capital; Israel wants unity and complete Israeli sov- ereignty. Neither side wants physical division. The problem is sover- eignty over the eastern part of the city. ”Sentiment and symbolism” are particularly strong in this regard. But, she concluded, “We have come this far. I am confident we can make it the rest of the way-for the sake of both our peoples.”

The most difficult issue is Jerusalem. To the Palestinians, East

Religion and Ethnonationalism

fE: manuel Gutmann of the Department of Political Science, He- brew University of Jerusalem, spoke on ”Religion and Ethnonational- ism: Israel and Her Arab Neighbors.” He began by saying that ”the stunning truth coming out of the Middle East in the last month” de- mands that we look again at some of the commonly held concepts about the conflicts and their resolution. First, contrary to what many scholars have been saying, religious differences are not an obstacle to peace. Second, the biggest opposition to the peace process has come from ultrareligious Arabs and Jews, at least some of whom on both sides are committed to reject the peace process altogether. For example, in the recent Knesset vote, two of three religious parties voted against the peace process, and the third (Shas) abstained.

movements are not parallel. There has been no influence from one side to the other-Islam to Judaism or vice versa. Therefore ”a separate, dichotomous analysis” is in order.

Gutmann pointed out that the Muslim and Jewish religious

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"Western secularist blinkers" affect our understanding of religion's role in the rise of nationalism. Rather than describing national- isms in terms of language, religion, and race, Gutmann chose to talk of two kinds of nationalism: religious (e.g., Israeli) and secular (e.g., French and Italian nationalism, which arose from anticlericalism). Some of the strains of nationalism came about when this identity between religion and nation broke down.

religion from nationalism has been a failure. So far scholars (e.g., Elie Kedourie) seem to agree that noncompatibility between the two has won the day.

Most of the Arab states seem to be pursuing their own peculiar nexus of religion and nationalism. For example, there is hardly a no- tion of common Lebanese nationalism, although the younger genera- tion has perhaps started thinking in those terms. Saudi Arabia is the opposite case: an Islamic theocracy (or "Sunnite clericocracy"). In Egypt, not only is fundamentalism on the rise, but "the awkward po- sition of the Copts within Egypt is casting doubt on their national sentiments ."

In other words, in the Arab world at large, the distinction between religion and nationalism does not apply.

Turning to Israel, Gutmann pointed out that there is not a common Israeli nationalism; there is definitely a difference between Is- raeli Arab and Jewish nationality. Citizenship is basically determined by religion. As an example, Gutmann mentioned the case of Father Daniel, a Jew who converted to Catholicism in Poland, in which the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that a Jew who converts to another religion is not entitled to Israeli citizenship by law of return. Father Daniel is an Israeli citizen today, but by virtue of receiving citizenship in another way.

Historically, the Jews had been one ethnoreligious people; they called themselves "the people of Israel." Before the nineteenth century, the religious element was the prevailing one. Later, the more secular aspect was stressed.

Zionism at its start a hundred years ago was a revolt against established Jewish religion, which saw world Jewry as a religious body, as a church. Zionism saw it as a national community. Zionism now has changed, becoming more practical and less ideologically antireligious.

"It's very clear that Israel is in an ongoing process of coming to grips with both its religious and nonreligious parties. But we are not at the end of the story, and will not be for quite a long time." Most

In the Middle East (except for Turkey), the attempt to detach

Race, Efhnicify, and Nafionalism

Israelis today do not consider themselves very religious. Gutmann described most Israelis as “nonpracticing orthodox Jews.’’ There is no separation of church and state in Israel; for example, people must get married in their respective churches. Gutmann pointed out that there are many practices (bar mitzvah) that are religious but not real- ly looked upon as that by most Jews. ”Like circumcision, which is looked on as a kind of folkloristic thing to do.” In Israel, orthopraxis is more applicable than orthodoxy. People eat the prescribed food because basically there is little else.

national? There is an ongoing tug-of-war in Israel to impose more religion on this nationalism, and vice-versa. Religious parties are divided on Arab policy, but generally the people against the peace process are in the minority.

”For better or for worse, Israel is going to stay a multinational society, not only a multireligious one.” When asked if there was a willingness to overcome the religious and national differences, Gut- mann said it would have been harder to answer a few weeks earlier, but the September 13 agreement is a clear indication that there is.

In sum, what is the relationship between the religious and the

This report has been preparedfrom notes taken at the lectures and/ orfrom drafts of the papers submitted.

The conference was sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Sys- tem Institute on Race and Ethnicity, the University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee Institufe of World Affairs, and the University of Wis- consin-Milwaukee. Afuture volume in the Ethnicity and Public Policy Series including essays stemmingfrom the conference is planned for publication.

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“race, ethnicity and nationalism at the end of the twentieth century”: conference

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