RE: PARKSIDE PHASE 1

CLOSING SUBMISSION OF THE LPA

INTRODUCTION

1. This first phase of the Inquiry has concerned an application which seeks

outline permission for the construction of up to 92,900 sqm of

employment floor space within use class B8 (storage and distribution) with

ancillary B1(a) offices and associated servicing and infrastructure. All

matters other than means of access are reserved. The LPA considers that

this application will be the first phase of a comprehensive development of

the former Parkside colliery site. It is therefore referred to as “Parkside

Phase 1” (PP1). The Application proposals are described in detail in the

SoCG (CD 4.163 at 2.1).

2. The second phase of the Inquiry will consider the application for the A49-

A573 Link Road (“the PLR application”). The PLR application seeks full

planning permission for a road of 3.3 km length that would link the A49

Winwick Road to the A579 Winwick Lane and would enable access to

Junction 22 of the M6 motorway.

3. The PP1 application has been made in order to deliver a first phase of

development at the site, with access off the A49. Further phases of

development will require direct access to the M6. The purpose of the PLR

is therefore to enable the development of Parkside Phase 2 (PP2) and a

Strategic Rail Freight Interchange (SRFI) to the east of the M6 (Parkside

Phase 3) by providing a link to J22 M6. It is therefore necessary to deliver

further phases of development at Parkside and the SRFI1.

4. It is common ground (amongst all parties) that the PP1 application, which

proposes development on the former Parkside colliery site, is not

dependent on the consent or delivery of the PLR. The same is also true of

the PLR application.

5. The Parkside Phase 1 application was considered by the LPA’s Planning

Committee on 17th December 2019. The Planning Committee resolved to

grant planning permission subject to: (i) conditions; (ii) the completion of

a s. 106 agreement required for off-site woodland planting2; and (iii) the

SoS not wishing to intervene. The Planning Committee also resolved to

grant planning permission for the PLR application subject to conditions.

The conditions are set out in the respective Committee Reports3.

6. Both applications were referred to the SoS (as required by s. 77 T&CPA

199) and both were “called-in” on 21st May 2020. Applications for

employment developments at (a) Symmetry Park within Wigan Borough

and (b) at Wingates Industrial Estate within Bolton were also “called-in”

at the same time.

MAIN ISSUES

7. For both applications, the “call-in” letter identifies the matters on

which the Secretary of State (SOS) wishes to be informed:

1 See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Executive Summary to the Planning Statement supporting

the PLR application and the (draft) PLR SoCG paragraphs 2 and 44 2 This is outlined in the St Helens Committee Report for Parkside Phase 1: CD 5.72

paragraphs 3.328 and 3.3293 For Parkside Phase 1 - CD 4.72; and for the PLR - CD 5.45 (St Helens) and CD 5.46

(Warrington).

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i. The extent to which the proposed development is consistent with

Government policies for protecting Green Belt land (NPPF

Chapter 13);

ii. The extent to which the proposed development is consistent with

Government policies for building a strong, competitive economy

(NPPF Chapter 6);

iii. the extent to which the proposed development is consistent with

the development plan for the area, including any emerging plan;

iv. and any other matters the Inspector considers relevant.

8. The Inspector has identified a number of such “other matters” to be

addressed at this Inquiry in respect of the PP1 application. They are

set out in the CMC2 Note, dated 16th November 2020, at paragraph

10:4

Parkside Phase 1

a. the acceptability of the Parkside Phase 1 employment development in principle, having regard to the development plan, national policy and any emerging policy according to the weight accorded them and in particular policies governing the provision of an SRFI, development in the Green Belt wherein the application site is situated and the extent to which the proposed development is consistent with Government policies for protecting Green Belt land (NPPF Chapter 13 - questions of inappropriate/not inappropriate/openness/purposes);

b. the extent to which the proposed developments would be consistent with Government policies for building a strong, competitive economy (NPPF Chapter 6);

c. the current level of need for and available supply of employment land within the Borough and whether the proposed development would contribute to meeting that need, compared with available alternative sites;

d. the effects of the proposed development on the local and strategic road network;

4 CD 5.77

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e. the effects of the proposed development on air quality, in particular within AQMAs;

f. the effects of the proposed development on ecology/biodiversity, taking account of mitigation measures and potential net gain;

g. any other the environmental and amenity effects of the proposed development including:

i. noise and disturbanceii. dominance or overshadowing

iii. design, visual appearance and landscapeiv. best and most versatile agricultural landv. climate change

vi. flood risk and drainagevii. heritage assets

h. whether the proposed development would give rise to socio-economic and/or environmental benefits to be weighed in the planning balance;

i. if inappropriate, whether any factors in favour of the development amount to the requisite very special circumstances to outweigh policy harm and any other harm to justify allowing the development in the Green Belt;

j. any cross-boundary issues relating to the three other proposals under consideration by the Panel (Wigan, Wingates, Haydock).

9. The LPA has not presented oral evidence in respect of each issue. Rather,

the role of the LPA has been to independently audit and assess the

evidence submitted during the application process, resulting in a firm

recommendation and resolution to approve PP1. The LPA has provided

formal evidence in respect of: (i) the need for the proposal; (ii) the impact

of the proposal on the local and strategic highway network; and (iii) on

compliance with planning policy, which necessarily requires a

consideration of all relevant land use planning impacts. Separate Technical

Statements have addressed the issues of air quality, ecology and

biodiversity, noise, agricultural land quality, climate change and flood

risk.

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10. The LPA has been clearly separate from the JV (as Applicant). The LPA

has assessed this application as it would any other. Local Residents are

(perhaps) understandably cynical. However, this is a quite usual process.

Indeed, there is no alternative process by which a Council, who often form

JV’s for regeneration projects, can determine such planning applications.

In this application, the Officers are independent professionals bound by

the code of ethics of their professional body (such as the RTPI). Further,

independent experts have been Instructed to consider specific controversial

topics (such as noise, air quality and highways). Despite the cynicism,

there is no evidence of any lack of independence nor integrity in the

LPA’s determination of this application. There is (literally) no criticism of

the Committee Report, which recommends approval. There is no evidence

to suggest the Planning Committee (of which Cllr Seve Gomez-Asperon

was Chair) determined the application other than in accordance with the

land use planning merits. Accordingly, significant weight should attach to

the LPA’s case at this Inquiry because it has robustly and carefully

undertaken precisely the same statutory and policy exercise which must be

undertaken by the SoS. The LPA is grateful that DT has clarified that he

takes no point about the probity of the decision making process in his

Closing Submission.

EIA DEVELOPMENT

11. The Parkside Phase 1 application falls within the scope of the Town and

Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations. An

Environmental Statement (“ES”) has therefore been submitted. The LPA

considers that the ES is lawfully adequate and provides sufficient

information to assess the environmental impacts of the proposed

development, consistent with the EIA Regs. No party argues the contrary.

In Opening, PAG confirmed that they did not take any legal point over the

adequacy of the ES.

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THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

12. Regeneration lies (literally) at the heart of the Core Strategy’s Vision to

2027 (see CD 2.2 at 4.29 and XX of JC). The Vision is implemented

through 7 Strategic Objectives (SO). Regeneration is the first and primary

Strategic Objective, which the remaining SO’s seek to deliver:

SO 1.1 To secure the regeneration of the Borough by: steady, sustainable

population growth; reducing deprivation through directing development

and investment where it is most needed; and by giving priority to

development of derelict and vacant sites.

13. It is inter alia policies CAS 3.1 and CAS 3.2 (the Newton and Earlestown

policies), which comprise the primary delivery mechanism for SO 1.1. It is

therefore agreed that: (i) the redevelopment of Parkside (as a vacant and

partly derelict site) is a key policy priority to reduce deprivation in the

Borough; and (ii) there is a clear link between redevelopment of the site

and the reduction of deprivation through development and investment

being targeted to where it is most needed (XX of JC).

14. SO 2.2 refers to the impact of development on Climate Change. SO 5.1

seeks to provide sufficient land to meet local employment needs. It refers

to policy CE 1 which is agreed to be out of date (XX of JC). SO 6.2 seeks

to safeguard the quality of the environment and protect and enhance local

character and distinctiveness (where present). It is agreed that the policies

of the development plan must be applied as a whole, in a manner which

renders them internally consistent where possible (XX of JC).

Accordingly, SO 1.1 and SO 6.2 can both be met by a development of

significant scale at Parkside (XX of JC).

15. The Plan (SO 5.1) seeks to meet the need for employment land to 2027.

However, it is agreed that there must be continuity of supply up to and

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beyond 2027. JC therefore agreed that planning permissions must be

granted now in order to provide continuity of supply in the logistics sector

(given the time it may take for a decision to be taken by the SoS,

submission of reserved matters, site clearance, marketing, construction

etc).

16. It is, therefore, common ground that regeneration lies at the heart of the

development plan’s Spatial Vision and Strategic Objectives. This is

inevitable given the Context, Issues, Problems and Challenges identified in

the CS:5

St Helens saw rapid development through the Industrial Revolution

and whilst a relatively modern town, the intensive process of

development has left a legacy of derelict land and land affected by

contamination, poor health, high unemployment rates and low

educational attainment figures (CS at 2.1);

St Helens endured years of population decline between 1988 and 2001

(CS at 3.1). This de-population of the urban core was replicated across

the north west in Liverpool, Manchester/Salford, Oldham/Rochdale

and Stoke, all of which experienced housing market failure as a result.

It was the more affluent, skilled, healthy and mobile who were able to

leave the area (XX of JC), resulting in significant levels of commuting

from more attractive suburban/rural locations and residual

communities plagued by multiple deprivation;

Indeed, the CS records multiple deprivation amongst the highest in the

country. In 2010, St Helens was the 51st most deprived authority in the

country. Wards in Newton (top 5%) and Earlstown (top 10%) were

identified as being within the most deprived in St Helens (CS 3.3);

St Helens had a legacy of poor health linked with deprivation and its

industrial past (CS at 3.4);

5 JC agreed that the Plan was premised on evidence from 2010

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Derelict land was a key challenge for St Helens. Whilst it was

identified as a “resource for positive re-use” much is contaminated and

requiring remediation through viable development proposals (CS at

3.10). This is entirely consistent with the NPPF imperative to

maximise the re-use of PDL (NPPF 117). JC agreed that neither the CS

nor NPPF provides any support for Mr Lee’s6 heretical contention that

PDL should be left for wildlife in favour of the development of

greenfield GB agricultural land.

17. The general context for the regeneration imperative expressed in the Core

Strategy has a very specific local expression.

REGENERATION OF THE SITE - The Parkside Colliery

18. Planning permission was granted for the Parkside Colliery in 1956. It was

opened in 1959 as a “super pit”, forming part of the Lancashire Coalfield.

The mine reached full production in 1964, working 6 seams between 400m

and 840m (depth) from an area around 25sqkm. As an operational colliery,

the site comprised inter alia vehicular access off the A49 Winwick Road,

two distinctive winding towers (58.4m and 62.6m high), two deep shafts

of ~812m depth, a number of surface installations, ancillary buildings and

structures comprising a coal preparation plant and twin ventilation fans, a

complex of low rise buildings (canteen, offices and administration

buildings), fuel storage, electricity substation, a series of internal access

roads, lighting columns and parking areas, a surfaced roadway under the

M6 to the north of the colliery, very significant areas of above ground

storage of coal and waste, a series of ponds, lagoons, surface water and

underground drains and extensive railway infrastructure and sidings,

which allowed direct access via a spur onto the Chat Moss (Liverpool-

Manchester) railway line.

6 PAG’s ecologist

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19. The above ground features can be readily seen in the contemporaneous

aerial photographs. Significant built structures remain on site and will be

seen on the site visit.

20. The colliery site extended over 100 ha and, at its peak, employed nearly

2,000 people and produced around 1m tonnes of coal annually. It was a

site which contributed significantly to the local and national economy and

to the local community.

21. The Pit closed in 1993. It was cleared of buildings and the shafts were

capped in 1994/1995 as the relevant authorities (including British Coal and

the LPA) sought a beneficial re-use of this significant site, in order to

address the effect of the closure of the colliery and consequent job losses

on the local community.

22. The Parkside Colliery was not transferred to a Government Agency (such

as English Partnerships or the Regional Development Agency). Rather, it

was transferred to Network Rail, whose proposed use of the site never

materialised. Accordingly, neither the site nor the local community

benefitted from National Coalfield Programme grants, which might have

provided for a positive legacy.

23. Thirty years later, the dead hand of dereliction and decay lies heavily

across this once vibrant and productive site. Whilst the buildings have

been demolished, there remains clearly visible large concrete pads, former

rail sidings, access roads, operational areas, underground chambers, the

electricity sub-station, retaining walls and structures and the colliery spoil

heaps. They stand as a bleak reminder of the industrial might of St Helens

in the recent past. Indeed, it has been estimated (and agreed by the LPA)

that:

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13% of the application site is PDL;

41% of phase 2 land is PDL;

26% of the combined sites (Phases 1 and 2) is PDL;

63% of the application site is either PDL or “disturbed” by previous

mining activities, such as the spoil heap;

62% of phase 2 land is either PDL or “disturbed” by previous mining

activities;

63% of the combined sites (Phases 1 and 2) is either PDL or

“disturbed” by previous mining activities, such as the spoil heap;

24. Sadly, this is neither a silent nor passive reminder of the former colliery

use. The site continues (today) to be a magnet for anti-social behaviour. It

is simply not possible for such a vacant site to remain secure. It has been

the subject of repeated break-ins with damage to the perimeter fencing

which is required to maintain site safety and security. The site bears the

more recent scars of unauthorised access by travellers, tipping of waste,

burning of abandoned vehicles, illegal wire stripping, drug use and

widespread scrambling by motorbikes and quad bikes. The site has drained

significant public resources (the Applicant JV, Merseyside Police, the

Local Council and Local Members) in trying to address these issues and

there can be little doubt that they will continue in the absence of a lasting

solution (EiC of AKN), to the clear concern of adjacent local residents and

the local Ward Councillor (EiC of DR).

25. For 30 years, this site has been considered to be a regeneration imperative,

so that the legacy of the pit closure could be addressed both on a site-

specific basis and in terms of the impact on the local community. Whilst

this Government rightly places a high priority on the maintenance of the

Green Belt (GB), in respect of this site, the application of GB policy must

be undertaken in the context of an urgent need to breathe new life into this

vacant and derelict site through redevelopment, to provide a beneficial,

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economically productive and sustainable future which puts an end to

ongoing anti-social behaviour. This is consistent with the Spatial Vision

and Strategic Objectives of the Core Strategy, which require the

regeneration of the borough by inter alia directing development and

investment to where it is most needed, in order to reduce deprivation by

giving priority to the development of derelict and vacant sites.

26. Regrettably, the Plan’s regeneration imperative and the need to redevelop

this site has only strengthened with the passage of time.

REGENARATION IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY - Deprivation

27. The Indices of Deprivation (2019) St Helens Summary Report (CD 5.168)

provides 39 indicators across 7 domains. The key findings need no

“embellishment”.7 They make for grim reading (see p.5 and XX of JC):

High levels of deprivation are evident across the North West. 11 of the

20 most deprived LA’s are in the North West (a deterioration from

2015);

St Helens is now ranked as the 26th most deprived LA;

St Helens has been ranked 51st (2010), 36th (2015) and 26th (2019). The

indices of multiple deprivation are therefore worsening over time;

There are 29 LSOA’s (neighbourhoods) in the 10% most deprived

nationally;

There are 50 neighbourhoods in the 20% most deprived nationally;

6 LSOA’s are within the 1% most deprived nationally;

The domains of greatest concern are health deprivation, employment

deprivation and income deprivation;

St Helens is the 8th most deprived (health), 9th most deprived

(employment) and 34th most deprived (income);

7 Contrary to the assertions of Mr Astles that such points had been “embellished”

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16,585 people in St Helens are employment deprived. 32,195 people

live in income deprived households;

Nearly a quarter of the population of St Helens live in the most

deprived neighbourhoods. That is 42,877 people (an increase of 26%

from 33,926 in 2010).

9,269 children live in the most deprived neighbourhoods;

There is 1 Earlestown neighbourhood in the worst 5%; 2 Earlestown

and Newton neighbourhoods in the worst 10%; and 5 Earlestown and

Newton neighbourhoods in the worst 20%.

Accordingly there are pockets of deprivation very close (with walking

distance) of the site.

28. PAG therefore expressly agree that (XX of JC):

i. Deprivation has worsened (and materially worsened) since the

adoption of the Plan in 2012, relative to other areas; and

ii. The imperative for regeneration expressed in the Core Strategy has

increased (and materially increased) since the adoption of the Plan; and

iii. The regeneration imperative also lies at the heart of the emerging

Local Plan (eLP), which seeks to allocate land to east and west of the

M6 at Parkside.

29. It is in this context that the development plan expressly seeks to focus

economic development to those sites that are within, in close proximity to,

or have easy public transport to the most deprived areas of the Borough

(Policy CE 1(4)). Such a policy is expressly consistent with this

Government’s Levelling Up Agenda, the Northern Powerhouse and the

requirement to Build, Build, Build in response to the Coronavirus

pandemic (EiC of AKN). This proposal expressly complies with policy CE

1(4) (EiC of AKN and XX of JC).

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30. Indeed, the Core Strategy expressly considers that deprivation can be

addressed through the redevelopment of the Parkside site (see Policy CAS

3.2). If the creation of employment at an SRFI can address deprivation in

the Borough, the same must be true of employment created at a strategic

logistics base (XX of JC and EiC of AKN). There can be no logical

distinction.

31. PAG nonetheless remain concerned that, whilst jobs will be created in St

Helens, they will also be taken by employees outside the Borough. It is

difficult to understand how that is a consideration which weighs against

the proposal. Conditions 13-16 specifically provide for: (i) local

employment schemes to maximise recruitment from the most deprived

areas; (ii) the provision of training for such recruits; (iii) the offer and

provision of work college and/or work placement opportunities at the

development; and (iv) the promotion of the use of local suppliers of goods

and services during construction. The areas of deprivation are readily

accessible by modes other than car (walking, cycling and bus). Further,

there will be a new shuttle bus provided by the Travel Plan which will

further enhance access directly into the deprived areas of the town. In that

context, PAG conceded that there was nothing further that the developer

and/or LPA could do (XX of JC).

32. In any event, the creation of jobs outside St Helens is also beneficial

because adjacent areas also exhibit deprivation. For example, Warrington

Borough is ranked 147th out of 317 on the indices of multiple deprivation8.

Whilst Warrington is (relatively) more affluent that St Helens, areas at

Orford and Poplars and Hulme are within the top 10% in England in terms

of multiple deprivation. These wards are in the northern part of the main

built up area of Warrington, about 3.5km to the south of the site, with

8 Warrington Borough Council, Joint Strategic Needs Assessment (JSNA), Socio-economic

Deprivation Chapter 2019 (CD 5.167).

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direct access to Parkside via the A49 Winwick Road. Such areas would

significantly benefit from the creation of employment at the site.

33. It cannot (respectfully) be clearer that the redevelopment of this moribund

site, in order to reduce severe deprivation in adjacent wards, through

private sector development and investment, is directly supported by the

central Vision and Spatial Objectives of the statutory development plan.

34. There would be a clear benefit to St Helens and parts of Warrington

through the provision of employment in order to tackle key areas of

deprivation identified locally. A comprehensive solution to issues of

multiple deprivation naturally requires a multifaceted approach, as part of

a wider programme of regeneration, but the Parkside Phase 1 application

can make a significant contribution to this regeneration imperative by

providing new jobs in an accessible location where the need is highest and

the level of skills will be commensurate to the employment provided.

BUILDING A STRONG , COMPETITIVE ECONOMY

35. This Government is committed to building a strong and competitive

economy (NPPF Chapter 6).

(i) National Policy

36. Decisions should create the conditions in which businesses can invest,

expand and adapt (NPPF 80). That means (at least): (i) an adequate supply

of employment land; (b) an adequate range of employment sites; (c)

adequate infrastructure, including road infrastructure (XX of JC). The

approach taken should allow each area to build on its strengths, counter

any weaknesses and address the challenges of the future (NPPF 80).

37. The strengths of the area are expressly articulated in the CS (at 2.3 and

2.4). The key economic strength of St Helens/Newton Le Willows (NLW)

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is now its strategic location: (i) proximity to Regional Poles of Liverpool

and Manchester and very significant centres of population; (ii) the M6,

M62 and A580; (iii) proximity to an expanding international port

(Liverpool 2) and two international airports (LPL and MAN); (iv)

proximity to the Chat Moss (Liverpool-Manchester) railway and WCML.

It is agreed (XX of JC) that the strength of St Helens is as a base for

logistics. Government policy is expressly to build on such a strength.

38. The weaknesses of St Helens are also agreed (XX of JC): (i) indices of

multiple deprivation (supra); (ii) a relatively low skilled workforce; (iii)

the significant loss of traditional industries (glass, coal and heavy

engineering such as the Vulcan Works); (iv) a lack of supply of

developable sites for logistics development.

39. Decisions should recognise specific locational requirements of different

sectors (NPPF 82). This expressly includes making provision for storage

and distribution operations at a variety of scales and in suitably accessible

locations (NPPF 82). The specific locational requirements of the logistics

sector are agreed (XX of JC) and comprise:9

i. A large site (a 100,000 sqm unit would require a site of 25ha);

ii. A flat and regular shaped site;

iii. Excellent access to the motorway network;

iv. A high profile location;

v. Good links to public transport/non-car modes;

vi. Proximity to a labour supply.

40. It is, however, recognised by the LPA that such specific locational

requirements must be met on appropriate sites (in landscape and visual

9 See AM at 6.2

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impact terms) and in contextually appropriate buildings. It is therefore

further agreed with PAG (XX of JC) that it is especially beneficial if:

The site is visually contained rather than being visually open;

The contains PDL and disturbed land;

The site is close to pockets of deprivation, to which it is readily

accessible by non-car modes;

Close to enhanced public transport facilities such as the rail and bus

hub at the recently improved NLW station, in order to maximise the

return on the pubic sector investment of Merseytravel;

Access to Ports and Rail.

41. In interpreting and applying NPPF 80 and 82 together, all parties expressly

agree (XX of JC) that, where a proposal delivers a storage and distribution

operation in an accessible location, addressing the specific locational

requirements, building on the strengths of the local area, the NPPF

expressly requires that significant weight should be placed on the need to

support such economic growth.

42. NPPF 81 requires planning policies inter alia to identify strategic sites and

to meet anticipated needs over the Plan period. NPPF 20 similarly requires

sufficient provision to be made for employment land and infrastructure for

transport, looking over 15 years (NPPF 22). It is therefore agreed that

policies should assess and plan to meet the OAN for employment land in

accordance with a clear economic vision and strategy which encourages

sustainable economic growth (NPPF 81(a)). In that context, it is agreed

that: (i) the evidence base on which Policy CE 1 is out of date; and (ii) the

policy requirement to deliver 37ha to 2027 is out of date (XX of JC but cf

JC at 2.14, 2.15 and 2.19). Rather, it is the evidence base to the eLP which

contains the LPA’s up to date evidence on the need for employment land.

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43. It is, therefore, clear that the focus of national policy is meeting the need

for employment land, so that businesses can invest and expand. The focus

of the NPPF is not primarily to create jobs (EiC of AKN). PAG’s focus on

employment density fails entirely to understand (and thereby apply)

national policy.

44. The NPPG identifies that the logistics industry plays “a critical role” in

enabling an efficient, sustainable and effective supply of goods for

consumers and businesses, as well as contributing to local employment

opportunities (NPPG Ref ID 2a-31). Such guidance is up to date (dated

22nd July 2019).

45. The NPPG sets out non-prescriptive criteria which can inform a need

assessment. This has been used by BE Group as the basis for their

assessments, which has informed their evidence to this Inquiry. Having

assessed the need, the LPA is next required to consider the most

appropriate locations to meet the need. This site is considered to be the

most appropriate location to meet the identified need by the LPA.

46. Further, the NPPG supports clustering of certain industries (ID 2a-32).

PAG are concerned about a claimed clustering of logistics development.

If, which is not accepted in the context of this site, there is such a

clustering, it is notable that JC conceded that: (i) where specific industries

have specific locational requirements, it is inevitable that there will be

clustering; (ii) clustering is not seen as objectionable in NPPF nor NPPG;

and (iii) if anything, clustering is recognised and encouraged by the

NPPG.

47. In that context, the LPA submit that the redevelopment of this site will

contribute to building a strong, competitive economy.

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(i) The Locational Benefits of the Site

48. The site has been actively promoted for redevelopment over the last 30

years by the LPA because it benefits from a unique collection of locational

characteristics which make it ideally suited for use as a regional/sub-

regional logistics hub.

49. The site is immediately adjacent to the M6, to which it has direct access

from the A49. It is close to the M62 and A580 (East Lancs Road). The site

therefore has very good road access north/south (M6) and east/west

(M62/A580) to areas of significant population. Further, the Liverpool-

Manchester (Chat Moss) line borders the site to the north and was

formerly directly connected into the colliery site. The West Coast

Mainline (WCML) borders the site in a cutting to the west of the site.

Access is obtainable off the Chat Moss link via the Lowton curve and

from the south via Earlestown and Winwick junction.

50. Moreover, the topography of the site is such that large, flat and relatively

regular development parcels can be developed for very large units

(>50,000 sqm) over an area which is previously developed/disturbed by

colliery activities.

51. The site is visually contained by built development, colliery spoil and

trees. It is previously developed and disturbed. It is close to a ready labour

supply, in deprived areas, which are highly accessible by non-car modes.

52. Accordingly, it is difficult to conceive of a site in the northwest which is

more attractive to warehousing and logistic operations (although no doubt

other developers of schemes before the SoS will try to make that case).

(ii) The Need for Logistics Development

53. Following the adoption of the Core Strategy in 2012, work commenced on

a Site Allocations DPD (ADPD) to identify sites for development in the

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Borough. However, a significant material change in the employment land

market was identified (a change from the evidence base of 2010), which

resulted in a need for considerably more employment land than identified

in Core Strategy Policy CE 1. This was a factor that led to the ADPD

being abandoned and work commencing on a new Local Plan (Part 1 and

2).

54. The emerging Local Plan was submitted for examination on 29 th October

2020. It is premised on evidence of significant need for new logistics

floorspace. The evidence base comprises inter alia:

The St Helens Employment Land Needs Study (ELNS) 2015 (CD

5.79);

ELNS Addendum 2017 (CD 5.80);

The Liverpool City Region SHELMA 2018 (CD 4.214);

LCR Assessment of the Supply of Large-Scale B8 sites (2018) (CD

5.83);

The St Helens ELNS Addendum 2019 (CD 5.81);

LCR Spatial Planning SoCG 2019 (CD 5.84);

LCR Local Industrial Strategy (2020);

Employment Land Need and Supply Background Paper (2020).

55. Policy CE 1 sought 37 ha of land to meet local needs for B1, B2 or B8

purposes. This policy was premised on studies from 2010 and 2011. By

contrast, the LPA’s latest position (addressed comprehensively in the

evidence of Mr Meulman) is that the LPA will aim for a minimum of

219.2ha of land for employment development between 2018 and 2035 (see

emerging policy LPA 04 and LPA 10). Whilst limited weight can be

attached to the emerging policy, significant weight must attach to the

technical need evidence on which it is premised, which is derived from

studies at the LCR and LPA level.

19

56. Indeed, there is a powerful consensus of professional evidence between

Messrs Meulman, Sandwell and Pexton, to which significant weight

should attach.

57. There has been no serious challenge to the evidence of AM and AP from

PAG. There is no competing assessment and no meaningful XX. JC does,

however, rely on a number of points from 3 sources: (i) the Glen Athey

Report; (ii) the Kirkwells Report; and (iii) evidence from Peter Black.

None of it is directed at the evidence of AP or AM to this Inquiry. Rather,

the following criticisms are directed at the LPA’s evidence to the EiP for

the eLP (listed for May 2021):

The LPA relied on the LCR SHELMA;

The SHELMA relied on Oxford Economics (OE) forecasts. It is not

the reliance on forecasts, it is the reliability of the forecast which is

challenged. It is very optimistic compared to OE forecasts;

The SHELMA failed to disaggregate any need to the LPA level;

The SHELMA’s transformational change scenario is not reasonable;

The LPA should have relied on past take up rates between 1997 and

2015, rather than 1997-2012.

58. AM explained that such points were entirely misplaced. There was no

challenge to his evidence. On the contrary, it was agreed by JC (in XX).

59. The ELNS (2015) was undertaken at the LPA area level (CD 5.79). It

looked at 3 models, including (i) historic land take-up; and (ii)

employment based forecasts. The OE forecasts were only relevant to 1 of

the 3 models. It was one of two forecasts used in the employment-based

forecasts (see para 8.1 - 8.3). However, the employment-based forecasts

was not relied upon, in favour of the historic land take-up model (see

20

8.47). Accordingly, JC agreed that any criticism of the OE forecast was

not material to the conclusion of the ELNS.

60. Any criticism of the OE forecast does not, in any event, undermine the

LCR’s SHELMA either (CD 4.160). The SHELMA considered a

traditional approach to the forecasting of logistics to be unreliable

(specifically referring to the widely varying employment densities with

which the LPA is very familiar). Rather, a different approach was taken

based on 2 factors: (a) replacement; and (b) new additional facilities (see

12.5 and 12.6). Neither approach relied on the OE forecasts. JC therefore

agreed that, whilst the SHELMA informed the update to the ELNS, any

concern over the OE forecasts does not undermine the ELNS.

61. The Growth Build element took into account 3 matters (see 12.14). Two

sets of forecasts informed the Growth Build elements, of which the

transformational change scenario which one. It is, therefore, but one input

into the Growth Build elements (see 12.17), which results in the top end of

the range 308ha to 397ha (Table 69).

62. It cannot be a criticism of the LCR SHELMA that it did not disaggregate

the need to individual LPA’s. It was a city region study. Equally, it cannot

be a criticism of the LPA that it has assessed needs at the LPA level

because that is a requirement of NPPF/NPPG in the formulation of the

eLP. The LPA specifically recognise that the SHLEMA requirement is not

disaggregated. In undertaking the exercise, the LPA takes into account 9

points (See CD 5.79 at 8.60). None of them refer to the OE forecast.

63. The ELNS Addendum (2017) also relies on a historic land take-up

approach. It derives a baseline of 135ha-174ha with additional demand for

major projects (55ha – 65ha). This results in a total employment land need

of 190-239ha. This is broken down to 110-155ha for B8 (see tables 6 and

21

7 CD 5.80). This is a floorspace requirement of 420,000 – 604,500 sqm

(AM at 3.47). On the basis of the evidence and analysis before this

Inquiry, that conclusion, which informs the eLP, is considered to be

robust.

64. It is not appropriate to rely on evidence of take up between 2012 and 2015

because (as the objective evidence demonstrates at CD 8.79 table at 8.6)

there was (effectively) no employment land supply. It follows that the

supply was highly constrained and not a reasonable basis for a future

assessment (EiC of AM).

65. Finally, JC accepted that Nick Ireland’s comments (JC at 2.31) about the

SHELMA were made in the housing sessions, in the context of COVID

and Brexit. In the employment sessions, the Inspector indicated that the

SHELMA was a reasonable basis for decision-making.

66. It follows that the evidence base submitted in support of the eLP fully

supports the grant of consent on this site. The LCR analysis demonstrates

how important the Parkside site is for the LCR as a whole in meeting its

need for employment land. It demonstrates that significant weight needs to

be attached to the need for more employment land in this LPA and in the

LCR. Indeed, this proposal is specifically supported by the LCR LEP (DR

App 6).

67. There is, therefore, not just a regeneration imperative to redevelop this

site, there is an imperative to redevelopment this site to meet the needs for

employment land and logistics floorspace on a site which is uniquely

suited to address such a need. Both the LCR and LPA agree that the

development of PP1 derives strong support from national and local

policies seeking to build a strong, competitive economy.

22

(iii) Alternatives

68. There is no dispute that the current supply of employment land is tightly

constrained (less than 1 years’ supply). Further, whilst JC has referred to

the Brownfield Register, it is expressly agreed that there is no site which

could meet the identified need for strategic logistics units: (i) on another

PDL site; (ii) on a site in the urban area; (iii) outside the Green Belt.

Further, JC agreed that there was no site in the Green Belt which would

have a lesser impact (in terms of openness, purposes or landscape

character). Indeed, given the remaining sites in the eLP (including

Haydock Point where this LPA has refused consent) are greenfield GB

releases, it is quite plain that any alternative development in the GB to

meet the needs of this proposal would have a materially greater impact on

the GB. Indeed, JC agreed that: (i) development on PDL is preferable to

development of greenfield GB land; and (ii) a visually constrained PDL

site is preferable to an open greenfield GB site.

69. Further, it is self-evident that any such development would not meet the

significant need to remediate and redevelopment this particular site for a

beneficial re-use to meet needs and address deprivation.

70. JC nonetheless sought to identify 7 greenfield GB sites totalling 155.05ha,

which was asserted to be enough land. The logic of that point is totally

absent. Florida Farm (35.17ha) and Penny Lane (20.58ha) are fully

developed. The Omega site is agreed to meet the needs of Warrington

(31.2ha). Haydock Point has putative RFR and is the subject of an appeal

(42.34ha). Accordingly, it is appropriate to reduce the 155.05ha to

35.29ha. That is not an adequate supply for the next 15 years.

71. Further, JC conceded that her analysis on the GB balance could be applied

to each and every greenfield GB site in the eLP. It follows (on the basis of

her own evidence) that no reliance can be placed on her claimed

23

alternative supply of 155.05ha. There is, therefore, no reasonable

alternative to the development of this site to meet the identified need for

employment land for large scale logistics.

(iv) The Economic Benefits

72. The economic and social benefits have been assessed by Amion and DR.

The agreed position is contained in the SoCG, which records that the LPA

agree that the proposed development will result in the following:

457 FTE jobs during construction;

1330 gross (930 net) additional jobs during operation;

Significant opportunities for skills and training through a joint

approach with the Council, Chamber of Commerce and College, in

order to target joblessness;

Opportunities for local suppliers of goods and services during

construction;

A beneficial economic effect on the locality in terms of additional

expenditure in NLW and the potential multiplier effect with

opportunities for SME’s and other firms to form part of the supply

chain for future occupiers.

73. There has been a focus on the assumed employment densities based on job

creation at Florida Farm. The concern of local residents in this regard is

well-known and well-understood by the LPA. This point has been

addressed by the Amion response, which is consistent with the oral

evidence of AM. The LPA have relied on the HCA Employment Density

Guide, as the authoritative source for employment densities. It is

understood to be an average assumption. Accordingly, there is evidence of

higher job density (Miller Developments at Omega and Warrington and

Co. evidence) and evidence of lower job density (Florida Farm). That is

24

the nature of an average and to be expected. The HCA Employment

Density Guide (2015) specifically addresses automation (see Amion note).

74. This is an outline proposal. There is no detailed scheme. There is no

occupier and no detail on the proposed use. A detailed assumption cannot

be undertaken at this stage of the process. In the absence of any better or

preferable methodology, the assumed HCA density is considered to be a

robust basis for decision-making, with the caveat that the final job creation

may be higher or lower depending on the final development.

75. Regardless of esoteric criticisms of an assumed employment density

figure, the irresistible conclusion is that significant new jobs will be

created in a local community. The LPA does not accept (on the basis of

the submitted evidence) that such jobs will be low skilled nor low paid.

Rather, the jobs appear to be ideally matched to the existing skills base

(with training) of the deprived communities (see DR evidence). Further,

these communities do not have the luxury of choice. They are

characterised by employment and income deprivation (as a matter of

unanswerable fact) and there is not currently an alternative development

proposal.

76. Such benefits should be afforded significant weight.

THE SRFI

77. It is in that context that the site has been consistently promoted for

development in successive development plans. The RSS for the North

West (2008) identified this area as a suitable location for a Strategic Rail

Freight Interchange (SRFI). Further, subject to a comprehensive

development meeting the requirements of policy CAS 3.2, the current

25

development plan anticipated that the site would be taken out of the GB

and developed as a SRFI. This application site comprises the southern part

of the area illustrated diagrammatically in the Core Strategy (see Fig 9.2).

78. It should, however, be remembered that at the time of the adoption of

those development plans, the site was in the hands of Astral/Prologis who

sought to develop the site as a SRFI. As the CS states:

9.24 In 2006, a planning application was submitted by Astral (now known as ProLogis), for the development of 272 hectares of land to the west and east of the M6 at Parkside for a Strategic Rail Freight Interchange. The proposal included up to 715,000 square metres of rail served warehouse and distribution buildings; train assembly area; container depot within a perimeter landscape setting; and up to 10,000 jobs were predicted. Following lengthy negotiations over the scheme and consideration of amendments, the application was formally withdrawn in the Summer of 2010 due to current economic circumstances. ProLogis, however, remain committed to the site and in a joint press release with the Council in July 2010 they stated that “Although the plans do not work at this time, as a business we recognise that the site remains an ideal location for a rail freight interchange given its proximity to two major railway lines, the M6 and M62.”

79. Since the adoption of the Core Strategy, the LPA has undertaken

significant further technical work to understand how a SRFI might be

developed at Parkside, in order to inform a new Part 1 and 2 Local Plan:

AECOM Parkside Logistics and Rail Freight Interchange

Study, 2016 (CD 5.54);

Parkside Logistics and Rail Freight Interchange Study

Addendum – Parkside West Rail Design and Noise Acoustics

Study, 2017 (CD 5.88); and

Parkside Strategic Rail Freight Interchange Report Capability

and Capacity Analysis, 2018 (CD 5.90); and

26

Parkside Strategic Rail Freight Interchange Background

Paper, 2020 (CD 5.91).

80. It is important to stress that it is the evidence which has led the

development of the proposals at this location.

81. PAG’s position is that the application site should be developed as an SRFI

(as envisaged in Fig 9.2 CAS 3.2). There have been attempts to dilute or

nuance that position, as the implications of that position on environmental

impacts were explained. However, it could not be clearer in the evidence

before this Inquiry. JC is an experienced Inquiry witness, who is used to

acting for Local Residents Groups. In XX, her evidence has been clear and

unequivocal that the site should be developed as an SRFI (see JC at 2.16,

2.17, 3.17, 3.19, 3.23, 4.17 and 4.20). In XX, she further clarified that it

was her position that:

An SRFI on the land west of the M6 is otherwise suitable, viable and

deliverable;

Development on the application site would prejudice the delivery of

the SRFI on the application site and anywhere at Parkside.

82. Further, PB expressly confirmed (in XX) that his (and PAG’s) preferred

alternative development scenario is the development of the site as an

SRFI.

83. PAG’s position is internally inconsistent (with their environmental

concerns) and wholly inconsistent with a significant body of independent

technical engineering evidence which has been carefully compiled over

the last 10 years.

27

84. In the light of the sale of the land by Prologis and in response to the

independent expert report from Arup (submitted by the Applicant –

summarised at DR App 15), the LPA sought its own independent expert

advice from AECOM and Cushman and Wakefield in order to understand

how an SRFI might best be brought forward at Parkside (CD 5.54).

AECOM considered 4 options, of which the smallest option was dismissed

(Table E3). The Report concluded inter alia (as JC agreed in XX) that:10

Policy CAS 3.2 should be modified;

A medium or large scale SRFI (as defined) is appropriate for this area;

Both the east and west side of the Parkside strategic site will be

required;

A first phase of development should be commenced on the west side of

the M6, with access of the A49;

This would assist in supporting the financial case for the development

and is required in order to make the development viable;

Subsequent phases must have rail access;

Subsequent phases will require direct access off the M6 (hence the

requirement for the PLR);

This creates a requirement for both the west and east sides of the M6 to

be released from the GB.

85. This proposal is entirely in accordance with the AECOM and C&W

Report.

86. It has been the subject of analysis by PAG (on a non-technical basis).11

PAG argue here (as they did at the Newton Park Farm Inquiry) that the

SRFI is viable and deliverable (see 3.7 and 3.12). However, they argue

(essentially) that the SRFI (as conceived by AECOM) cannot be delivered

with the PLR (see points raised at 4.20 and 4.33-35). PAG have, however,

10 See the Executive Summary, in particular p.10

11 See PAG technical note on the SRFI

28

failed to address the latest evidence submitted by the LPA, which relies on

further technical evidence submitted by the Applicant and ISec (the

owners of the land to the east of the M6). The eLP Background Paper

October 2020 (CD 5.91) appends a delivery statement from ISec who have

a 25 year track record of delivering major logistics schemes (see 6.5). ISec

have provided a detailed illustrative masterplan which is consistent with

the current PLR application (see App 2 at 3.1-3.3). The model for

development is similar to their development of Thames Enterprise Park

and comprises a Superhub and SRFI. They are in advanced discussions

with a Freight Operating Company (FOC) who have informed the design,

working with their specialist SRFI advisers (Intermodality). It robustly

demonstrates that the SRFI is deliverable and viable with PP1. This is

confirmed by ISec’s latest letter to the Inquiry (appended to the PLR

evidence).

87. In the light of such evidence, the SoS is invited to conclude that there is a

longstanding consensus of professional evidence between Arup, AECOM,

C&W, CBRE, ISec, their FOC and Intermodality, robustly audited by the

LPA. Significant weight should attach to that consensus of independent

expert evidence. Such evidence is not policy and there is no requirement

for it to be the subject of consultation. Rather, it has been capable of

testing at this Inquiry and there has been no challenge to it and no

competing assessment.

88. There is simply no evidential basis on which it can be concluded that the

grant of consent for PP1 will prejudice the delivery of the SRFI. On the

contrary, it will make the delivery of the SRFI more likely and the plans

allow for a safeguarded area for rail servicing in the future. On the basis of

that evidence, consistent with their express support for an SRFI at

Parkside, PAG should actually support this proposal.

29

89. The conclusion of the technical studies is that land to the east of the M6

should be allocated as a SRFI (Parkside East), whilst land to the west

should be allocated for (essentially) road-based logistics, with a rail

reception siding to allow for “all ways” rail access. This is the position

which the LPA promotes in the emerging local plan. Whilst the policies of

the local plan may only be given limited weight, the technical evidence

which underpins it should be given substantial weight.

90. Accordingly, policy in the development plan has (to an extent) been

overtaken by subsequent analysis. Firstly, the land to the east of the M6

has been found to be more suitable for an SRFI. Secondly, the requirement

for employment land is now substantially greater than the evidence for the

Core Strategy. Therefore, whilst this is not an application for an SRFI (in

the manner anticipated by CAS 3.2 in 2012), this proposal would not

prejudice the delivery of the SRFI and would be a logical first phase to it.

91. The LPA’s position is that the application does not accord with Policy

CAS 3.2 and (for the same reasons) it is also in conflict with Policy CSS 1

and Policy CE 1(2). However, given the objectives of the development

plan to secure economic development, to address deprivation and to

remediate derelict sites, to regenerate the Borough and to provide

economic opportunities to areas in most need, the proposal will

nonetheless (unanswerably) comply with the development plan as a whole,

provided the Green Belt tests are met, taking into account any material

breach of policy.

GREEN BELT POLICY

Harm to the Green Belt

92. The LPA considers that the proposal is inappropriate development and that

substantial weight should attach to the harm to the Green Belt (NPPF 143

and 144).

30

93. The LPA reaches different conclusions to the Applicant regarding the

impact to openness and the impact on the purposes of the GB. That should

not concern the SoS. Rather, it confirms that the application has been the

subject of a robust, independent audit by the LPA. The LPA’s analysis is,

therefore, a robust sensitivity test to the Applicant’s assessment.

Importantly, whichever assessment is ultimately preferred, the differences

are not material to the overall decision. On either analysis, both parties

agree that VSC’s are very clearly demonstrated.

94. The site is very well visually contained (especially in comparison to other

potential development sites in the GB). It is not visually open.

Nonetheless, the LPA considers that, notwithstanding the post-industrial

remains on the site, the redevelopment will cause significant impact on the

openness and permanence of the GB as a result of the scale of the

proposed development and the height of the buildings (AKN at 4.16).

95. Further, the development will adversely impact on the purposes of the

Green Belt:

(a) As a result of the previously developed/disturbed nature of the site and the

definition of very strong existing boundary features, it is not considered

that the development would lead to unrestricted sprawl. On the contrary,

the site has logical and defensible boundaries and sits comfortably between

the built up area and the M6;

(b) The land does not fall within a strategic gap between two towns. It will not

lead to 2 towns merging but will nonetheless undermine the purpose of

maintaining the separation but to a modest degree (AKN at 4.20);

(c) The Green Belt Review considered the degree of self-containment of each

parcel of land.  It has also assessed the degree to which each parcel is

compromised by existing development. It concludes that the development

31

of this parcel would extend the built form of NLW into the countryside. 

However, it notes that the parcel has strong permanent boundaries and is

well contained to the north, east and in part, the south and west. It also

states that given the high level of enclosure and the brownfield nature of

approximately 30% of the parcel, the parcel does not have a strong sense

of openness or countryside character. It concludes that the parcel makes a

medium contribution to purpose. In view of the commentary and the

characteristics of the site, AKN concludes that the role of the site is

overstated. It has only a modest role in fulfilling this purpose;

(d) The site clearly does not contribute to the purpose of preserving the special

character of an historic town;

(e) No alternatives are available that are not Green Belt (supra).

Consequently, this application would not impact on the purpose of

assisting urban regeneration because there is no opportunity to

accommodate the application on land outside the Green Belt. Further, the

application would be consistent with the regeneration aspirations of the

development plan through job creation, direct, indirect, and catalytic

economic benefits in a location close to an area of need (AKN at 4.23).

96. It must therefore be recognised that the site is highly unusual in th Green

Belt: (i) this previously developed site is very well contained visually; (ii)

the colliery legacy together with existing built development and evidence

of anti-social behaviour mean that a significant part of the site cannot

reasonably be characterised as countryside (and rural policies in the CS do

not apply); and (iii) the site is very well contained by significant built

development which means that is has logical and defensible boundaries. It

is, therefore, a Green Belt site which is an entirely logical site for

beneficial redevelopment. It is not a greenfield site in agricultural use with

open views across it which makes a positive contribution to the character

and appearance of the area.

32

Other Harm

97. The LPA has also listened carefully to the concerns of local residents. The

LPA agrees that there are aspects of “other harm”, which must be weighed

in the balance.

98. However, in the light of the evidence at this Inquiry, there is no evidential

basis on which the LPA needs to amend its evidence submitted in the

technical statements (save in respect of highways’ impact). On the

contrary, the “testing” of the evidence has served only to confirm that the

independent expert audits of the applicant’s independent expert evidence

is robust.

99. Further, the concerns of PAG regarding landscape and visual impact,

highways, ecology, heritage and air quality are wholly and irreconcilably

inconsistent with their support for an SRFI on this application site.

Nowhere does the evidence of PAG address (much less reconcile) this

inconsistency. The LPA therefore simply fails to understand how, for

example, the ecological impact of this proposal can be considered to be

unacceptable but the same ecological impact from an SRFI is acceptable.

As JC fairly conceded, the impact to ecology is a function of the built form

and engineering works, rather than the use of the buildings. In the absence

of any differential analysis (demonstrating that the impact of a

medium/large SRFI on the site is materially lower), PAG’s submissions

are fatally undermined. The evidence of the LPA must be preferred.

Highway Evidence

100. PAG have submitted two technical notes regarding the highway impact of

the proposal. On the TN 1, written by Mr Lowe (JL), is relevant. It has

been comprehensively rebutted by the written and oral evidence of AV

and EM, which was not the subject of any robust challenge. Such evidence

is not repeated.

33

101. The central issue in PAG TN1 is whether the trip rates are robust. The

LHA/LPA are very concerned about the manner in which this case has

been presented by JL and relied upon (innocently it would appear) by GE:

TN1 refers to draft guidance to which no weight can attach (2.4);

The adopted Guidance was revoked and superseded in March 2014 by

the PPG (2.9). No weight can attach to it;

TN1 fundamentally misrepresents what the Guidance (2007) actually

provides. A first principles approach (undertaken by the Applicant at

the request of the LHA) is expressly acceptable (TN1 App B at 4.59).

The methodology has been expressly agreed with the LHA, in

accordance with the revoked guidance (as GE conceded);

The NPPG is not prescriptive. It does not require 85 th% trip rates from

TRICS. The Guidance has, therefore, been intentionally revoked. It

cannot (now) be resurrected;

The agreed approach is expressly consistent with the LHA’s own

bespoke Guidance (TN1 App C), which post dates the NPPG (it is

dated March 2016). TN1 fails to mention the relevant guidance which

expressly endorses a first principles approach as an alternative to 85 th%

rates from TRICS (see TN1 AppC);

TN1 therefore fails to understand and apply the relevant guidance. It

fails to draw attention to points which are directly contrary to the case

being made. The author of TN1 has therefore quite clearly failed in the

discharge of their professional obligations. No weight can attach to

such evidence;

GE (quite properly) conceded that the LHA’s approach to trip rates is

“expressly consistent with guidance and, against it, we have no

alternative figure”.

34

102. The more technical points raised in TN1 were specifically addressed by

Em (in EiC). TRICS cannot be relied upon where there are fewer than 20

comparables. Indeed, it is not relied upon to derive an alternative figure.

Of the 24 “comparables”, those from London and N.Ireland must be

stripped out. Those of materially smaller units must be stripped out. TN1’s

approach rather confirms that an approach which takes surveys from a

recent, adjacent development, together with robust comparables from

TRICS is (on a first principles basis) is precisely the right approach,

especially when it has been sensitivity tested against smaller (more

intensive) local developments.

103. Accordingly, there is no evidential basis on which to reach a contrary

conclusion to the detailed SoCG reached between AV (Curtins) and EM

(Mott MacDonald). The proposal complies with policy. There is, however,

nonetheless harm to weigh in the GB balance as a result of the additional

movements.

Very Special Circumstances (VSC)

104. The LPA firmly conclude that there are Very Special Circumstances

because there are “other considerations” which very clearly outweigh such

harm to the GB and any other harm (NPPF 144). This is not a case where

there is a fine balance (EiC AKN). The VSC’s in this case are

“formidable”12 and comprise the following (supra):

The need to regenerate a vacant and derelict site which is the subject of

ongoing anti-social behaviour. This is a site which needs a long-term

sustainable and beneficial re-use;

The proposal will remediate any legacy contamination on the site,

which will not otherwise be addressed;

12 AKN at 7.5

35

This is a valuable previously developed and heavily disturbed site, the

development potential of which should be maximised (NPPF 117) to

meet identified needs and assist in the regeneration of the local

community;

Local Authority and Public Sector stakeholders have been trying to

beneficially redevelop this site for the last 30 years. This development

is suitable, viable and deliverable. It is an opportunity which must be

seized, as there is no guarantee of an alternative, viable redevelopment

of the site;

There is a significant need to address indices of multiple deprivation in

some of the most deprived wards in the country;

There is a need to address the objectively assessed need for more

employment land, especially for logistics floorspace, especially on a

uniquely suitable site to meet the locational requirements of the market

sector;

There is a lack of supply to meet the identified need on land inside the

urban area, on previously developed land, on land outside the Green

Belt and/or on Green Belt which will have a lesser impact on the GB

or environmental impact;

There is no alternative to development in the Green Belt. Further, there

is no alternative to developing this site, in order to address significant

on-site issues;

There is a need to create employment in order to regenerate the site

and to regenerate the local area;

There is a need to exploit the unique locational characteristics of this

site. PP1 will not just deliver road based logistics, it will further assist

in the once in a generation opportunity to assist in the deliverability of

an SRFI in this location, which is strongly supported by PAG;

The site is highly accessible to markets but also to a workforce my

means of transport other than the private car i.e. walking, cycling and

the public transport hub at NLW station, which has been the subject of

36

recent public sector investment, as part of a joined up approach to

assist in the redevelopment of this site.

There are material direct, indirect and catalytic economic benefits of

the proposal. In particular, the provision of jobs which match the skills

base in the areas of deprivation;

There are social benefits to the proposal;

There are modest environmental benefits to the proposal.

105. Such VSC’s clearly outweigh the identified harm. It is for this reason that

this proposal is strongly supported by the Local Planning Authority. There

can be no doubt that (based in its land use planning merits) it is the very

clearly preferred development site.

HERITAGE IMPACT

106. It is also acknowledged that there will be less than substantial harm to the

two Listed Buildings at Newton Park Farm and the Registered Battlefield.

In applying the statutory test, the LPA affords considerable weight to the

harm to designated heritage assets. However, as any such harm (even on

the analysis of weight of PAG and Mr Ward) will be outweighed by the

identified public benefits (supra). There is undoubted compliance with the

development plan (as a whole) and the NPPF.

CLIMATE CHANGE

107. This LPA (in common with the Government and adjacent LPA’s) has

declared a Climate Emergency. The SoS has, therefore, raised the issue of

climate change.

108. In common with the SoS and LPA, PAG are concerned with the climate

emergency. PAG argue that this proposal should be refused because it will

generate GHG emissions. PB accepted that his points (see PB 4.4, 4.8, 1.4,

4.8 and 5.1) would apply equally to any road based logistics development.

37

His central point was that this proposal would undermine the delivery of

the SRFI (see PB at 6.1). Such evidence is, however, undermined by

failing to refer to the relevant statutory framework, planning policy and

guidance, Decarbonising Transport – Setting the Challenge (March 2020)

and the recent Eddie Stobart DL (CD 3.16).

109. The Climate Change Act (CCA) 2008 came into force on 26 th November

2008. The CCA imposed a duty on the SoS to ensure that the net UK

carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990

baseline13 (s.1(1)). The SoS has a discretionary power by Order (“may”) to

amend this percentage or to provide a different baseline year (s.2(1)).

110. Before making such an order, the SoS must obtain and take into account

the advice of the CCC (s.3(1)(a)). The CCC must publish its advice

(s.3(3)). The SoS has amended the target through the CCA 2008 (2050

Target Amendment) Order 2019, which substitutes 100% for 80%.

Accordingly, from 27th June 2019, there has been a duty on the SoS to

ensure that the net carbon account for the UK is 100% lower than the 1990

baseline.

111. The CCA establishes the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) (s.32). Its

membership is prescribed (sched 1). The CCC is under a statutory duty to

advise the SoS on (a) whether the 80% target for 2050 should be amended;

(b) if so: what the amended percentage should be (s.33(1)). The CCC

must also give advice to the SoS on (s.34(1)):

(a) The level of the carbon budget for the period (in the context of a

duty on the SoS to set 5 yearly carbon budgets);

13 As defined in s.1(2)

38

(b) The extent to which the carbon budget should be met (i) by reducing

the amount of net UK emissions of targeted GHG or (ii) by the use

of carbon units;

(c) The respective contributions towards meeting the carbon budget for

the period that should be made by different sectors of the economy;

(d) The sectors of the economy in which there are particular

opportunities for contributions to be made towards meeting the

carbon budget through reductions in emissions.

112. The CCC must also report on (a) the progress towards meeting the carbon

budgets that have been set under Part 1 (the target for 2050); (b) the

further progress which is needed; and (c) whether those budgets and those

targets are likely to be met. The SoS must lay before Parliament a response

to the points raised by each report of the CCC (s.36).

113. The Paris Agreement was signed in 2015 (and ratified in 2016). The Paris

Agreement (PA) seeks to enhance and implement the UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change, adopted in 1992 (art 2(1)). It aims to

strengthen the global response to climate change by inter alia holding the

increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-

industrial levels and “pursuing efforts” to limit the temperature increase to

1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly

reduce the risks and impacts of climate change (art. 2(1)(a)).

114. Each Party must prepare and maintain successive nationally determined

contributions which it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic

mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such

contributions (art 4(2)).

115. The Paris Agreement does not impose a legally binding target on each

specific contracting party to achieve any specified temperature level by

39

2050 (per Supperstone J in Plan B (and others) v SoS BEIS and CCC

[2018] EWHC 1892 (Admin) at para 30). Rather, it contains an ambition:

to “pursue efforts” to limit temperature increases to 1.5°C above pre-

industrial levels.

116. In the light of that statutory background, PB agreed:

i. The CCC have not suggested a moratorium on road based logistics

development;

ii. The SoS has not suggested (in any response to the CC Reports) that

there is a moratorium on road based logistics;

iii. Reading NPPF 80 and 82 (Feb 2019), the Government continues to

give significant weight to road based logistics development;

iv. The NPPG (22nd July 2019) considers the delivery of road based

logistics to be “critical”;

v. Decarbonising Transport (March 2020) post-dates the amendment to

the CCA 2008 target. It has been published in response to the climate

emergency. It does not set out a moratorium on road based logistics.

Rather, it commences a pathway to meeting that target;

vi. It is the Transport Decarbonisation Plan which will set out the

policies and plans to tackle transport emissions from the logistics

sector. It is due to be published in Spring 2021 (delayed from Nov

2020);

vii. It specifically addresses emissions from HGV’s (at p.39). It does not

suggest anywhere that road based logistics should be refused. Rather, it

considers the solution to be the decarbonisation of vehicles to the

answer, with associated benefits for AQ (see 3.3-3.10);

viii. The DfT recognise the benefits of international trade through shipping

(95% of UK trade is via shipping), which is considered to be one of the

most carbon efficient modes of transport (3.32). The DfT do not favour

reducing international trade to address carbon emissions. Rather, they

40

favour an international approach which aims for zero emission ships

by 2050 (3.35);

ix. That emphatically does not suggest there is no legal duty to address

climate change (cf PAG Closing at 11.2). Rather, meeting the

mechanism for addressing climate is not inconsistent with the principle

of development.

117. In that context, PB fairly conceded that the answer is not the refusal of

road based logistics which are “critical” to the economy and which will

result in more efficient movements of freight. He conceded that road based

logistics will be “part of the mix”. He further conceded that: “some road

based logistics is desirable and inevitable”. Rather, his issue was that this

proposal would frustrate the delivery of an SRFI (addressed above).

118. It is, therefore, common ground that there is no “in principle” objection to

this development on climate change grounds. Indeed, this was the

conclusion of the SoS very recently in the Eddie Stobart Appeal (see CD

3.16 – SoS DL 40 and 44, MR 401/402 and AR 160-162). Precisely the

same point was raised at this Inquiry and it was firmly rejected by the IR

(AR 161) and SoS (DL 40 and 44). There is no evidential basis on which

to reach a different conclusion.

119. Further, there is no issue that the proposal is (or will be through the RMA)

resilient to climate change and embeds suitable mitigation (EiC of AKN).

120. Accordingly the LPA conclude that the proposal complies with the

statutory development as a whole. NPPF 11(c) is therefore engaged and

planning permission should be granted without delay.

121. Indeed, it should be noted that there have been false dawns in the last 30

years over the redevelopment of this atrophying site. There is currently

41

both a need and demand for its beneficial redevelopment. There is

commercial interest in the redevelopment of PP1 and public sector funding

is currently available for the PLR which will deliver the infrastructure

required for the delivery of subsequent phases, which can maximise the

return of private sector and public sector investment in this site.

122. Accordingly, this chance must be grasped and grasped now. The LPA does

not consider that there can be any complacency or confidence that private

commercial interest will endure, should this proposal be refused, contrary

to the decision of the LPA and contrary to its emerging development plan.

CONCLUSION

123. It is, therefore, the case for the Local Planning Authority that planning

permission should be granted subject to conditions and a s.106 planning

obligation.

124. This proposal complies with the development plan and material

considerations further support the grant of consent. Planning permission

should therefore be granted “without delay”.14

GILES CANNOCK QC

Kings Chambers

15th January 2021

14 NPPF 11 (c)

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